1. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Friday morning, October 26, 1962.
2. It was agreed that, unless the U Thant initiative led to prompt negotiations, the three major requirements were:
a. To maintain diplomatic and public focus on the continued exist-ence and expansion of offensive installations in Cuba;
b. To increase the degree of our pressure and to build anxiety in all quarters that more decisive action will be required of the U.S. to eliminate the offensive installations; and
c. To maintain a diplomatic track which holds open the possibility of a peaceful resolution on terms consistent with the President's speech.
3. The planning process was brought into focus around the following major problems:
a. An operational and political scenario for the extension of the blockade to POL. (ARA, Mr. Hurwitch)
b. Operational and political track involving progressively increased pressure building up to an airstrike against missile installations. (Amb. Thompson; Messrs. Rowen and Kitchen)
c. A consolidated negotiating track. (EUR, NEA, S/P)
d. Assessment and recommendations concerning possibilities and dangers in Cuban political situation. (ARA)
e. Regular daily reassessment of Soviet intentions and appropriate posture for U.S. (S/P, Mr. Harvey)
f. Assessment of Free World political position vis-a-vis the crisis, with recommendations for U.S. action. (Mr. Jorden, USIA, and appropriate State Department bureaus)
g. Post-crisis Cuba: conditions of coexistence with Hemisphere. (ARA)
4. The planning tasks listed in Report Number Two are either going forward or will be consolidated into the tasks listed above.
1 Reports number one and two (ibid.) are included in the Supplement. Back
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow.