4000bce - 399
400 - 1399
1400 - 1499
1500 - 1599
1600 - 1699
1700 - 1799
1800 - 1899
1900 - 1999
The Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America met in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference, confirmed at the Berlin Conference, that there should be periodic consultation between-them. At the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, discussions took place on an informal and exploratory basis and agreement was reached on the following questions:JAMES F. BYRNES
At the meeting which took place in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945 of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, agreement was reached on the following questions:
As announced on the 24th of December, 1945, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have agreed and have requested the adherence of the Governments of France and China to the following procedure with respect to the preparation of peace treaties:
1. In the drawing up by the Council of Foreign Ministers of treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, only members of the Council who are, or under the terms of the Agreement establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers adopted at the Berlin Conference are deemed to be, signatory of the Surrender Terms, will participate, unless and until the Council takes further action under the Agreement to invite other: members of the Council to participate on questions directly concerning them. That is to say:
A) the terms of the peace treaty with Italy will be drafted by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France;
B) the terms of the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom;
C) the terms of the peace treaty with Finland by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.
The Deputies of the Foreign Ministers will immediately resume their work in London on the basis of understandings reached on the questions discussed at the first plenary session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.
2. When the preparation of all these drafts has been completed, the Council of Foreign Ministers will convoke a conference for the purpose of considering treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungry and Finland. The conference will consist of the five members of The Council of Foreign Ministers together with all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with substantial military force against European enemy states, namely: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, China, France, Australia, Belgium, Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The conference will be held not later than May 1, 1946.
3. After the conclusion of the deliberations of the conference and upon consideration of its recommendations the States signatory to the terms of armistice with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland-France being regarded as such for the purposes of the peace treaty with Italy-will draw up final texts of peace treaties.
4. The final texts of the respective peace treaties as so drawn up will be signed by representatives of the States represented at the conference which are at war with the enemy states in question. The texts of the respective peace treaties will then be submitted to the other United Nations which are at war with the enemy states in question.
5. The peace treaties will come into force immediately after they have been ratified by the Allied States signatory to the respective armistices, France being regarded as such in the case of the peace with Italy. These treaties are subject to ratification by the enemy states in question.
Agreement was reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to take the place of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The Terms of Reference for the Far Eastern Commission are as follows:
I. Establishment of the Commission
A Far Eastern Commission is hereby established composed of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth.
A. The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:
1. To formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished.
2. To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
3. To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating Governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure provided for in Article V-2 hereunder.
B. The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.
C. The Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan and will respect existing control machinery in Japan, including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander and the Supreme Commander's command of occupation forces.
III. Functions of the United States Government
1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United States Government agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission.
2. If the Commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II-A-2 should be modified, its decision shall be regarded as a policy decision.
3. The United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission; provided that any directive dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission
4. All directives issued shall be filed with the Commission.
IV. Other Methods of Consultation
The establishment of the Commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.
1. The Far Eastern Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the States party to this agreement. The membership of the Commission may be increased by agreement among the participating Powers as conditions warrant by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. The Commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations not members of the Commission in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations.
2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.
VI. Locate and Organization
1. The Far Eastern Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as occasion requires, including Tokyo, if and when it deems it desirable to do so. It may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
2. Each representative on the Commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representation.
3. The Commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.
The Far Eastern Commission shall cease to function when a decision to that effect is taken by the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Prior to the termination of its functions the Commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating governments are members those functions which may appropriately be transferred.
It was agreed that the Government of the United States on behalf of the four Powers should present the Terms of Reference to the other Governments specified in Article I and invite them to participate in the Commission on the revised basis.
The following agreement was also reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan:
1. There shall be established an Allied (council with its seat in Tokyo under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his Deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto; and for the purpose of exercising the control authority herein granted.
2. The membership of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy) who shall be Chairman and United States member; a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics member; a Chinese member; and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India.
3. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate staff consisting of military and civilian advisers.
4. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.
5. The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto. In all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. He wild consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon these matters shall be controlling.
6. If, regarding the implementation of policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on questions concerning a change in the regime of control, fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, and a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his Deputy), the Supreme Commander will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission.
7. In cases of necessity the Supreme Commander may take decisions concerning the change of individual Ministers of the Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual cabinet members, after appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the Allied Council.
1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.
2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view- to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic selfgovernment and the establishment- of the national independence of Korea.
The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.
4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.
The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non interference in the internal affairs of China.
Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes had several conversations concerning Soviet and American armed forces in China.
Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet forces had disarmed and deported Japanese troops in Manchuria but that withdrawal of Soviet forces had been postponed until February 1st at the request of the Chinese Government.
Mr. Byrnes pointed out that American forces were in north China at the request of the Chinese Government, and referred also to the primary responsibility of the United States in the implementation of the Terms of Surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of Japanese troops. He stated that American forces would be withdrawn just as soon as this responsibility was discharged or the Chinese Government was in a position to discharge the responsibility without the assistance of American forces.
The two Foreign Secretaries were in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities.
The three Governments are prepared to give King Michael the advice for which he has asked in his letter of August 21, 1945, on the broadening of the Rumanian Government. The King should be advised that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the Government. The Commission referred to below shall satisfy itself that
(a) they are truly representative members of the groups of the Parties not represented in the Government;
(b) they are suitable and will work loyally with the Government.
The three Governments take note that the Rumanian Government thus reorganized should declare that free and unfettered elections will be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot. All democratic and anti-fascist parties should have the right to take part in these elections and to put forward candidates. The reorganized Government should give assurances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion and association.
A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to proceed to Bucharest immediately to consult with King Michael and members of the present Government with a view to the execution of the above-mentioned tasks.
As soon as these tasks are accomplished and the required assurances have been received, the Government of Rumania, with which the Soviet Government maintains diplomatic relations, will be recognized by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom
It is understood by the three Governments that the Soviet Government takes upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the desirability of the inclusion in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, now being formed, of an additional two representatives of other democratic groups, who (a) are truly representative of the groups of the parties which are not participating in the Government, and (b) are really suitable and will work loyally with the Government.
As soon as the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are convinced that this friendly advice has been accepted by the Bulgarian Government and the said additional representatives have been included in its body, the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom will recognize the Bulgarian Government, with which the Government of the Soviet Union already has diplomatic relations.
Discussion of the subject of atomic energy related to the question of the establishment of a commission by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom have agreed to recommend, for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. Their have agreed to invite the other permanent members of the Security Council, France and China, together with Canada, to join with them in assuming the initiative in sponsoring the following resolution at the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in January 1946:-
Resolved by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a Commission, with the composition and competence set out hereunder, to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters.
I. Establishment of the Commission
A Commission is hereby established by the General Assembly with the terms of reference set out under Section V below.
II. Relations of the Commission with the Organs of the United Nations (a) The Commission shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council, in the interests of peace and security, otherwise directs. In the appropriate cases the Security Council should transmit these Reports to the General Assembly and the members of the United Nations, as well as to the Economic and Social Council and other Organs within the framework of the United Nations.
(b) In view of the Security Council's primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission in matters affecting security. On these matters the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council.
III. Composition of the Commission
The Commission shall be composed of one representative from each of those states represented on the Security Council, and Canada when that state is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the Commission may have such assistants as he may desire.
IV. Rules of Procedure
The Commission shall have whatever staff it may deem necessary, and shall make recommendations for its rules of procedure to the Security Council, which shall approve them as a procedural matter.
V. Terms of Reference of the Commission
The Commission shall proceed with tile utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the Commission shall make specific proposals:
(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;
(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;
(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.
The work of the Commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.
The Commission shall not infringe upon the responsibilities of any Organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those Oilcans in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.JAMES F. BYRNES
The purpose of my talk tonight is to render a report on the recent meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union at Moscow.
With President Truman's approval and encouragement I had urged the calling of this meeting in fulfillment of the understanding reached at Yalta that the three Foreign Secretaries should meet every three or four months.
I was well aware of the risk involved in suggesting this meeting without any definite assurance that the three governments would be able to reach agreement on the points under discussion. I knew the risk of another impasse such as occurred in London. I felt this risk had to be taken.
It is just when there are genuine difficulties in reaching agreement that Foreign Secretaries should meet in au effort to understand each other's problems and troubles.
In this modern world where events move with lighting speed there is not time to wait for agreement to be reached by the slow exchange of diplomatic communications.
We must realize that discussion and personal contact in international affairs are useful and helpful even though they do not at once lead to agreement. They contribute to a meeting of the minds and the reconciliation of differences.
In September the Council of Foreign Ministers at London had been unable to agree upon the procedure to be followed in drawing up the European peace treaties. The Soviet Union took the position that the treaties should be made only by; the. principal powers who had signed the respective armistices. The other delegations took the view that all states which took an active part in the war should be allowed to participate in the peace.
While we could not agree at London and many referred to the London conference as a complete failure, it was, I think, the discussions at London that helped us greatly to reach agreement on peace machinery at Moscow.
The agreement at Moscow meets our insistence that all states which took an active part in the war should participate in the peace. It also frankly recognizes the responsible role of the larger powers in the making of peace.
Our agreement is that the terms of peace in the first instance should be drawn by the principal powers which were signers of the respective armistices. But it was decided that as soon as these terms were drawn up, they should be submitted to a peace conference called by the five states-the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China, who constitute the Council of Foreign Ministers and are the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. All states which actively waged war with substantial military force against the European members of the Axis will be invited to participate in the conference.
The peace conference is to be called not later than May 1.
The conference will consider the draft treaties prepared by the states that signed the respective armistices. The peace conference will then draw up its own recommendations. After that, the states which prepared the preliminary texts will consider the recommendations of the peace conference and prepare the final texts of the treaties to be signed by all states actively at war with the enemy states in question.
I do not consider this solution ideal. But the departure from the ideal standard is more in the form than the substance. What is preserved is that the proposals of the larger powers are subjected to the judgment and public criticism of all the nations which took an active part in the war. The procedure contemplates and requires that these nations formally and publicly make their recommendations. The larger powers are not bound by these recommendations, but they must agree in order to draw up the final treaties. Certainly the United States would not agree to a final treaty which arbitrarily rejected such recommendations. Certainly the great powers which drew up the draft charter for the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks did not ignore the changes suggested by the smaller powers at San Francisco.
The test of a successful peace is not in the form of its making, but whether it both commends itself to the nations concerned by its justice and wisdom and also commands the support of those nations whose unity is essential to preserve the peace. The method agreed upon at Moscow gives ample scope for the achievement of these essential results.
The question of the recognition of the ex-satellite states was discussed. Since the London conference, we have found it possible to recognize Austria and Hungary where free elections have occurred. There is still a wide divergence in our viewpoints on the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. That divergence is accentuated by the fact that in those countries democratic institutions have not functioned in accordance with traditions familiar to us.
The Soviet Union contends that the governments of those countries are satisfactory and conditions do not warrant concerted action under the Yalta Agreement. And concerted action is possible only by common agreement.
Our objections to the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments have been not only to the exclusion of important democratic groups from those governments, but to the oppressive way in which those governments exercise their powers. Until now our objections have been little heeded by those governments or by the Soviet Government.
It must be recognized that the Soviet Government has a very real interest in the character of the governments of these states. These countries are neighbors of the Soviet Union and were involved in the war against the Soviet Union. It is therefore to be expected that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these countries may depend upon the Soviet Government's confidence in the peaceful character of these governments.
I urged upon Generalissimo Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov that it was in their interest as well as ours, that the peoples of these countries, as well as their governments, should be peacefully disposed toward the Soviet Union. I stressed the fact that it was our desire to work with the Soviet Government and not against it in making these governments more representative. And for the first time since Yalta the Soviet Government has agreed to cooperate with us to this end.
A tripartite commission is to proceed immediately to Rumania to advise the King, who has sought the advice of the three Allied governments, on broadening representation in the Rumanian Government. At London we asked this but were unable to secure agreement.
The British and American Governments have agreed that they will recognize the Rumanian Government as soon as they are satisfied that the Government has been broadened to include two truly representative members of two important political parties not now represented in the Government and assurances have been given regarding free elections, freedom of speech, press, religion, and association. These are the terms under which we will recognize this government. It is for us to say whether the terms have been complied with.
The situation in Bulgaria is complicated by the fact that an election has already occurred there which the Soviet Government regards as a free election and we do not. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government has undertaken to advise the new Bulgarian Government to include in the government two members truly representative of important political parties not now included. The British Government and the American Government have stated that as soon as they are satisfied that this has been done they will recognize the new Bulgarian Government.
The agreements regarding Rumania and Bulgaria do not go as far as I should have liked, but I am hopeful that they will result in a substantial improvement in the democratic character of these governments.
In the Far East, it has been our policy to work for the creation of conditions that make for lasting peace. Cooperation with our Allies is an essential part of that policy.
While the United States sustained the major burden in crushing the military power of Japan, we have always considered the war against Japan a part of the war against the Axis. From the outset we have planned to make the control of Japan an Allied responsibility.
As early as August 90 we invited the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China to join with us in carrying out the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration and the Terms of Surrender for Japan. The Far Eastern Advisory Commission was established in October, but Great Britain had reservations regarding its advisory character, and the Soviet Union requested a decision regarding control machinery in Tokyo before joining the work of the Commission.
At Moscow the three Governments, with the concurrence of China, agreed on a Far Eastern Commission. It will consist of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, the United States, France, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, and the Philippines.
This Far Eastern Commission will have the authority to formulate principles to govern the control of Japan. It will act by a majority vote which, however, must include the concurring votes of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The decisions of the Commission will be incorporated into directives to the Supreme Commander by the United States Government.
Under the agreement establishing the Commission no basic allied policy for Japan may be adopted without our concurrence.
Pending agreement in the Far Eastern Commission in case of need we are free to give interim directives on all urgent matters. Only three questions are excepted from our authority to give interim directives. The questions reserved for action by the Commission- which action requires our concurrence-are questions dealing with changes in the control of Japan as set forth in the surrender terms or with fundamental changes in the Japanese Constitutional structure or with changes in the Japanese Government as a whole.
These are questions which by their nature require agreement among the principal alleles if there is to be a common allied policy. To reserve them for decision by the Commission does not affect the administration of allied control by the Supreme Commander.
It has not been occur policy to dictate changes in the Japanese Government as a whole, and so far as it is necessary to make individual changes in the cabinet or to fill vacancies created by the resignation of individual members the authority of the Supreme Commander to act remains unimpaired.
The three Governments also agreed, with the concurrence of China, on the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan to be composed of representatives of the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, China, and the United States under the chairmanship of General MacArthur as the Supreme Allied Commander. The Council is to advise and consult with the Supreme Commander in carrying out the Terms of Surrender. His decision will be controlling on all but the three reserved questions I have just mentioned.
If any disagreement arises in the Council regarding the implementation of a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission Upon any of these three points, the Supreme Commander will withhold action pending a clarification of its decision by the Far Eastern Commission. But when necessary, as I have already explained, the Supreme Commander, after appropriate consultation with the Council, may change individual ministers or fill vacancies.
The proposals we offered regarding Japan make it clear that we intend to cooperate with our Allies and we expect them to cooperate with us. But at the same time our agreement safeguards the efficient administration which has been set up in Japan under the Supreme Allied Commander.
It assures that the authority of General MacArthur will not be obstructed by the inability of the Far Eastern Commission to agree on policies or by the inability of the Allied Council to agree upon the methods of carrying them out.
We were determined to assure that the outstanding and efficient administration set up and executed by General MacArthur should not be obstructed.
The administration of Korea has been a trying problem since the surrender of Japan. For purposes of military operations the occupation of Korea was divided north and south of latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas. The continuation of this division after surrender has been unsatisfactory. The movement of persons and goods and the functioning of public services on a nationwide scale has been hampered.
Under our agreement at Moscow, the two military commands are to form a joint Soviet-American Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They will make recommendations to the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China for the formation of a Korean provisional democratic government. They will also make proposals to these governments regarding a four-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years.
The joint Soviet-American Commission, working with the Korean provisional democratic government, may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the society of nations.
In the various agreements and understandings reached in Moscow the interests of China were taken into full account. China is to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Far Eastern Commission, in the four-power Allied Council in Tokyo, in the formation of a Korean provisional national government, and in any trusteeship for Korea.
But China divided by civil strife will not be able to take its rightful place among its Allies and discharge properly its international responsibilities.
Our policy toward China as recently announced by- President Truman was discussed at Moscow. We found our Allies in substantial accord with that policy. The three Governments agreed that the cessation of civil strife and broad participation throughout the National Government of democratic elements are necessary to assure a unified, peaceful, and democratic China under the National Government. The three Governments reaffirmed adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.
Mr. Molotov and I discussed the problem of Soviet and American armed forces in China. The Soviet Union, pursuant to their agreement with the National Government of China, plans to remove its forces from Manchuria by February 1st. We will move our Marines from north China when Japanese troops are disarmed and deported from China or when China is able to complete the task unassisted by us.
The understanding of the three Powers as to policy toward China should assist General Marshall in the mission he has undertaken
The British and ourselves came to Moscow with a very definite proposal for the establishment by the United Nations of a commission on atomic energy and related matters based on the Washington declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada on that subject. At the request of the Soviet Government the discussion of our proposal was placed at the end of our agenda. Our discussions were limited to this proposal. At no time did we discuss any technical or scientific matters, nor were we asked by the Soviet Government about the new weapon. I was happy to find that the Soviet Government feels as we do that this particular weapon is of such a revolutionary nature that we should explore through a United Nations commission methods of international control.
It should be understood that the task of the commission is to inquire into the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and related matters and to make recommendations. Neither the Security Council nor the commission has authority to bind any government to act on its recommendations.
The four objectives set forth in the proposed resolution establishing the commission are not intended to indicate the order in which they are to be considered. In particular, it was intended and is understood that the matter of safeguards will apply to the recommendations of the commission in relation to every phase of the subject and at every stage. Indeed, at the root of the whole matter lies the problem of providing the necessary safeguards.
Neither we nor any other nation would be expected to share our armament secrets until it was certain that effective safeguards had been developed to insure our mutual protection.
The Soviet Government offered only a few amendments to the proposal submitted by us. These amendments were designed to clarify the relations of the commission to the Security Council. With some revisions we accepted them.
Carefully examined, these amendments will be found to go no further than appropriate to enable the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.
The Security Council can give directions to the commission and restrain publication of reports detrimental to peace and security, but such action can be taken only with the concurrence of all its permanent members. Failure of the Security Council to act cannot block the work of the commission.
The three Governments have invited France, China, and Canada to join with us in submitting the proposed resolution to the Assembly of the United Nations.
The Foreign Ministers reached understanding on all important items placed on our agenda with the exception of Iran. At one time it looked as if we might agree on a tripartite commission to consider Iranian problems which have been accentuated by the presence of Allied troops in Iran. Unfortunately, we could not agree. I do not wish to minimize the seriousness of the problem. But I am not discouraged. I hope that the exchange of views may lead to further consideration of the grave issues involved and out of such consideration a solution may be found.
There was no subject as to which an agreement was reached that was not covered in the communique published Friday, apart from instructions to the representatives of the three Governments to facilitate agreements in the field.
The agreements reached should bring hope to the war-weary people of many lands. They will facilitate the signing of peace treaties which is necessary to permit the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories. Only by the withdrawal of armies of occupation can the people have an opportunity to start on the long road to economic recovery. Only by economic recovery of other countries can we in America hope for the full employment of our labor and our capital in this interdependent world.
We must realize that international conferences are not intended to give individual statesmen the opportunity to achieve diplomatic successes. They are intended to be useful in the adjustment of delicate social and human relations between states with many common interests and many divergent interests.
In international affairs, as in national affairs, conflicting interests can be reconciled only by frank discussion and better understanding. The meeting in Moscow did serve to bring about better understanding. We must not slacken in our efforts. With patience, good will, and tolerance we must strive to build and maintain a just and enduring peace.