The Cuban Missile Crisis
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union


Washington, November 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

1180. Eyes only for Ambassador. Following is summary of meeting yesterday Stevenson, McCloy and Yost with Mikoyan, Zorin, Kuznetsov and Mendelevich:

Mikoyan said Soviet government, anxious terminate Cuban matter, believes Soviet draft protocol best form for termination, but since US doesn't like it, is prepared accept declarations which will be presented to SC for approval. Raised several objections to US draft declaration. Argued that according US draft, if Cuba takes any act which US considers jeopardizes security of Caribbean, US obligation against invasion would lapse; that this is direct retreat from statement in President's letter. Complained that there is no word in declaration about subversive activity against Cuba whereas Castro supported by USSR proposes that subversive activity be stopped by all countries. Contended that while US has right to ask for inspection in relation to non-introduction of weapons, Cubans also have right of inspection against invasion preparations. Supported multilateral inspection by UN observed. Said whole of US would not be inspected but only certain parts, including Puerto Rico, where camps of invasion bands are located; whole territory of Cuba would be subject to inspection as well as certain neighboring countries; one-sided inspection is impossible. Supporting Castro proposals, argued US need not at once abandon Guantanamo but should enter into negotiations with Cubans about its disposition. Also argued that if US not prepared normalize relations with Cuba at present, at least should say we are prepared negotiate later. Referred to statement President's letter October 27(1) not only US would not invade but was confident other states would give similar assurances. Complained this point does not appear in US declaration.

Stevenson replied US eager have Cuban affair settled and he hoped receive Soviet draft declaration soonest. Said it appears principal points outstanding between us are Castro's five points; we cannot discuss them and it is better adhere to US-Soviet terms of agreement. If new matters introduced into negotiations, doubted they could ever be concluded said we understand Soviets feel obligated to support Cuba's demands but we also have numerous demands from other American republics which we are not introducing into negotiations. Regarding safeguards against introduction offensive weapons in Cuba, noted that according President's letter October 27 this was to be delegated to UN observers; since such observation in Cuba has not been possible, we have said frankly in our draft declaration that until such safeguards are provided, we must use our own means; we do not ask Soviets to agree to our unilateral means and inspection but simply point out to them we have no other choice. Pointed out US has gone further than exchange of correspond-ence by saying not only that we would not invade Cuba ourselves but that we would not support such invasion. As to assurances other American republics against invasion of Cuba, said President merely expressed opinion they would be willing give such assurances. As to procedures, believe best course is to proceed by agreed declarations in SC. If declarations cannot be fully agreed, they could at least be presented separately to Secretary General to be submitted to SC and have Cuban affair concluded in this manner.

McCloy urged should try to finish this crisis promptly and proceed to other problems to avoid other crisis. Pointed out US had gone beyond letters of agreement in raising quarantine before safeguards worked out and in demobilizing and sending back to their bases US forces in Florida. Emphasized US-Soviet agreement would not involve settlement with Castro. As to subversion, pointed out other American republics are threatened by Castro's activity in this field, and there are camps in Cuba training men for subversion in Latin America. Said when Castro eventually ceases to be a threat to the western hemisphere, we are willing to normalize relations with him and help Cuba economically. Added cannot waste time talking about Castro's conditions when US and USSR have much important matters of common concern to settle between themselves. Noted that inspection of US and Puerto Rico would be comparable to inspection of Soviet ports to detect offensive weapons being dispatched to Cuba.

Meeting concluded with repeated mutual assurances of desire to finish matter quickly and to study points made on both sides. Agreed meet again Friday.


1 See Document 95. Back

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret. The source text is a copy from Moscow and contains no drafting information.

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