The Cuban Missile Crisis
Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State


New York, December 7, 1962, 1 p.m.

2183. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Re: Cuba. While new Soviet texts need important revisions, we believe basic idea of short agreed declarations by US and USSR in SC plus fuller unagreed statements, either in SC or outside, has much to commend it. We do not believe, however, we should agree to Cuba making an agreed declaration (as Soviet position implies) since this would complicate negotiations greatly and provide status as third party which we have refused for good reasons so far. Cuba would of course make unagreed statement on same basis as US and USSR. We should ask USSR to provide US copy in advance to assure it will not be too obnoxious.

This procedure would meet objective of closing up transaction on relatively harmonious note, and thus maintaining momentum for possible subsequent agreements on other subjects, while at same time giving us freedom of action to say what needs be said on matters which are not agreed. Since Cubans, and, we suspect, Soviets, will be making their unagreed statements in SC rather than outside, US should be prepared to do likewise.

What would seem to us at first reading to be most important to correct in Soviet draft declaration would be (1) too narrow definition of weapons which will not be reintroduced, and (2) indications that "parties concerned", including both Soviets and Cuba, will continue negots for "normalizing" situation in Caribbean and (3) lack ref to Khrushchev-Kennedy letters. Second observation applies a fortiori to last para Soviet draft res.

We would much prefer end SC exercise with consensus statement by SC Pres, though Soviets have so far insisted this is not enough. Believe we should argue this point, possibly being willing concede to res in last analysis, trading this for satisfactory substance.

If we accept short declaration idea, we could presumably relegate to our separate unagreed statement in SC some of points to which Sovs object, such as references to overflights and Sov military personnel. However others, such as provisos attached to non-invasion assurance, as well as ref to treaty obligations, would have to be retained in our agreed declaration.

We are preparing redrafts of US and USSR agreed declarations, US unilateral statement, and consensus statement and will forward them later today.(1)


1 Document 237. Back

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-162. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House.

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