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LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, before picking up our line of proof against the Defendant Schacht, I would like to supply a point of information.
Yesterday the President of the Tribunal inquired with respect to Document Number EC-457, Exhibit Number USA- 619. The question raised by the Tribunal was with respect to the words "in retirement" in the letterhead used by Schacht in writing to Hitler in 1932. This is the letter in which Schacht expressed his belief in the truth of the Nazi movement and in which he said that Hitler could always count upon him as a reliable assistant.
The letterhead has printed upon it "The President of the Reichsbank" and after that phrase there is typed the letters "a. D.", and I understand that those letters are an abbreviation for a German phrase meaning "in retirement" and that it is customary, or it was customary, in Germany for retired officials to continue to use their titles with the letters "a. D."
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
LT. BRYSON: Yesterday we had just about completed our proof with respect to the contribution of the Defendant Schacht to the preparation for war, and I wish to submit one more document on this point. This is Document Number EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626. It consists of a statement by George S. Messersmith, United States Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I will quote therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the fourth paragraph:
"It was his" - Schacht's - "financial ability that enabled the Nazi regime in the early days to find the financial basis for the tremendous armament program and which made it possible to carry it through. If it had not been for his efforts, and this is not a personal observation of mine only but I believe was shared and is shared by every observer at the time, the Nazi regime would have been unable to maintain itself in power and to establish its control over Germany, much less to create the enormous war machine which was
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necessary for its objectives in Europe and later throughout the world.
"The increased industrial activity in Germany incident to rearmament made great imports of raw materials necessary, while at the same time exports were decreasing. Yet by Schacht's resourcefulness, his complete financial ruthlessness, and his absolute cynicism, Schacht was able to maintain and to establish the situation for the Nazis. Unquestionably, without this complete lending of his capacities to the Nazi Government and all of its ambitions, it would have been impossible for Hitler and the Nazis to develop an armed force sufficient to permit Germany to launch an aggressive war."
We turn now...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Lieutenant Bryson, I am not sure that that gives a full or quite fair interpretation of the document. Don't you think perhaps you ought to read the paragraph before?
LT. BRYSON: The preceding paragraph, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: "Dr. Schacht always attempted to play both sides of the fence. He told me, and I know he told both other American representatives in Berlin and various British representatives, that he disapproved of practically everything that the Nazis were doing. I recall on several occasions his saying, after the Nazi Party came into power, that if the Nazis were not stopped, they were going to ruin Germany and the rest of the world with it. I recall distinctly that he emphasized to me that the Nazis were inevitably going to plunge Europe into war."
If the Court please, I would like to read also from the last paragraph:
"In my opinion Schacht was in no sense a captive of the Nazis. He was not compelled to devote his time and his capacities to their interest. His situation was such that he would most likely have been able either to work on much less restrained scale or to abstain from activity entirely. He continued to lend his services to the Nazi Government out of opportunism."
We turn now to the third part of our case against Schacht. The evidence is clear that he willingly contributed his efforts to the Nazi conspiracy, knowing full well its aggressive designs. The Tribunal will recall our proof that Schacht was converted to the Nazi philosophy in 1931 and helped Hitler come to power in 1933. We will now prove, first, that Schacht personally favored aggression and, second, that in any event he knew Hitler's aggressive intentions.
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There is ample evidence to justify the conclusion that Schacht rearmed Germany in order to see fulfilled his strong belief in aggressive expansion as an instrument of German national policy.
Schacht had long been a German nationalist and expansionist. He spoke against the Treaty of Versailles at Stuttgart as early as 1927. I offer in evidence Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of excerpts from speeches by Schacht. I quote from the top of Page 2: "The Versailles Dictate cannot be an eternal document, because not only its economic but also its spiritual and moral premises are wrong."
It is common knowledge that he strongly favored acquisition of colonial territory by Germany. However, he also favored acquisition of contiguous territory in Europe. On 16 April 1929 at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said...
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a later stage?
LT. BRYSON: At a later stage, if you please, Sir, in connection. with another point.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
LT. BRYSON: On 16 April 1929, at the Paris conference in connection with reparations, he said:
"Germany can as a whole pay only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia will be handed back to Germany from Polish possession and if, besides, somewhere on the earth, colonial territory will be made available to Germany."
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What are you quoting from?
LT. BRYSON: I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-628 (Document 3726-PS), consisting of excerpts from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 24 August 1945. You will find it in the document book at the back, labelled "Interrogation of 24 August". At the top of the first page of the interrogation this statement was quoted to Schacht, and his reply contains an admission of having made the statement. In his reply he said:
"That Germany could not pay at the time after I made the statement has been proved, and that Germany will not be able to pay after this war will be proved in the future."
I wish to point out that this is the very territory which was the subject of the armed aggression in September 1939.
In 1935 Schacht stated flatly that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. I offer in evidence Document EC-450, designated as Exhibit Number USA-629. This document consists of an affidavit of S. R. Fuller, Jr., together with a transcript of his
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conversation with Schacht at the American Embassy in Berlin on 23 September 1935. I wish to read from Page 6 of the document where there appears a statement by Schacht in the lower half of the page.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the conversation?
LT. BRYSON: The conversation occurred on 23 September 1935. The page number of this document is at the bottom, and I quote from Page 6:
"Schacht: 'Colonies are necessary to Germany. We shall get them through negotiation, if possible; but if not, we shall take them."'
In July 1936, when the rearmament program was well under way, Schacht again publicly spoke of the Versailles Treaty. This time his language contained an explicit threat of war. I refer the Tribunal again to Document EC-415, which I have previously introduced in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-627, consisting of a collection of speeches by Schacht. I wish to read from the paragraph beginning in the middle of the first page:
"But the memory of war weighs undiminished upon the peoples' mind. That is because, deeper than material wounds, moral wounds are smarting, inflicted by the so-called peace treaties. Material loss can be made up through labor, but the moral wrong which has been inflicted upon the conquered peoples in the peace dictates, leaves a burning scar on the peoples' conscience. The spirit of Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war; and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning." Later in the same year Schacht publicly advocated the doctrine of Lebensraum for the German people. I quote again from Document EC-415, Exhibit Number USA-627, being an excerpt from Schacht's speech at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, on the second page, the last paragraph:
"Germany has too little living space for her population. She has made every effort, and certainly greater efforts than any other nation, to extract from her own existing small space whatever is necessary for the securing of her livelihood. However, in spite of all these efforts, the space does not suffice."
In January 1937 Schacht, in a conversation with Ambassador Davies, at least by inference threatened a breach of the peace in demanding a colonial cession. I offer in evidence Document L-111, being Exhibit Number USA-630, and consisting of excerpts from a
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report under date of 20 January 1937, by Ambassador Davies to the Secretary of State. I wish to read therefrom, beginning with the second sentence of the second paragraph:
"He" meaning Schacht - "stated the following:
"That the present condition of the German people was intolerable, desperate, and unendurable; that he had been authorized by his Government to submit proposals to France and England which would: (1) Guarantee European peace, (2) secure present European international boundaries, (3) reduce armaments, (4) establish a new form of a workable league of nations, and (5) abolish sanctions with new machinery for joint administration; all based upon a colonial cession that would provide for Germany an outlet for population, a source for food stuffs, fats, and raw materials."
In December 1937 Ambassador Dodd noted in his diary that Schacht would be willing to risk war for the sake of new territory in Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's diary.
THE PRESIDENT: The proposal contained in Document L-111 was for cession of colonies, was it not?
LT. BRYSON: It was, Sir.
I turn now to Document EC-461, consisting of excerpts from Ambassador Dodd's diary. The entire diary has previously been received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-58. I quote some notes on a conversation with Schacht on 21 December 1937, beginning near the bottom of the second page of Document EC-461, in the last paragraph:
"Schacht meant what the army chiefs of 1914 meant when they invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks; that is, domination and annexation of neighboring little countries, especially north and east. Much as he dislikes Hitler's dictatorship, he, like most other eminent Germans, wishes annexation without war if possible; with war if the United States will keep hands off."
THE PRESIDENT: There is another passage in that book, that diary. I am not sure; it probably is not the same date, but it is on the first page of the exhibit, I think - the third paragraph.
LT. BRYSON: The third paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it at a different time?
LT. BRYSON: It is a different time, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: September the 19th of what year?
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LT. BRYSON: We will check that in the complete volume here, and I think in a minute I will be able to supply the date. In the meantime would you like me to read it, Sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think you had better read it.
LT. BRYSON: "He then acknowledged that the Hitler Party is absolutely committed to war; and the people, too, are ready and willing. Only a few government officials are aware of the dangers and are opposed. He concluded, 'But we shall postpone it 10 years. Then it may be we can avoid war"'.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think you should read the next paragraph, too.
LT. BRYSON: "I reminded him of his Bad Eilsen speech some 2 weeks ago and said, 'I agree with you about commercial and financial matters in the main. But why do you not, when you speak before the public, tell the German people they must abandon a war attitude?' He replied, 'I dare not say that. I can speak only on my special subjects."'
THE PRESIDENT: And the next one.
LT. BRYSON: And the next one:
"How, then, can German people ever learn the real dangers of war, if nobody ever presents that side of the question? He once more emphasized his opposition to war and added that he had used his influence with Hitler - 'a very great man', he interjected - to prevent war. I said, 'The German papers printed what I said at Bremen about commercial relations between our countries, but not a word about the terrible effects and barbarism of war.' He acknowledged that and talked very disapprovingly of the Propaganda Ministry which suppresses everything it dislikes. He added, as I was leaving 'You know a party comes into office by propaganda and then cannot disavow it or stop it."'
The date of his conversation was in September 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a pity that those years are not stated in the document. It is rather misleading as it is.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, the exhibit which is in evidence will show the dates.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not blaming you; but it is misleading, because it looks like September the 19th and December the 21st, and as there were 3 years' interval between, it makes a difference. That is right, isn't it?
LT. BRYSON: Yes, that is right. I am sorry the excerpt simply shows the page numbers from the exhibit, and not the dates.
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Schacht admittedly strained all the resources of Germany to build up a Wehrmacht which would provide Hitler with an instrument of realization of his desire for Lebensraum. In this connection I offer in evidence Document Number EC-369, Exhibit Number USA-631, consisting of a memorandum from the Reichsbank Directorate, signed by Schacht, to Hitler, dated 7 January 1939. I wish to read the last paragraph of the first page:
"From the beginning the Reichsbank has been aware of the fact that a successful foreign policy can be attained only by the reconstruction of the German Armed Forces. It - the Reichsbank - therefore assumed to a very great extent the responsibility of financing the rearmament in spite of the inherent dangers to the currency. The justification thereof was the necessity, which pushed all other considerations into the background, to carry through the armament at once, out of nothing and furthermore under camouflage, which made a respect-commanding foreign policy possible."
It is clear that the "successful foreign policy" which Schacht thus attributed to rearmament included the Austrian and Czechoslovakian acquisitions. I offer in evidence Document EC-297(a), Exhibit Number USA-632, being a speech of Schacht's in Vienna after the Anschluss in March 1938. I quote from the third page and the second full paragraph:
"Thank God, these things could not after all hinder the great German people on their way, for Adolf Hitler has created a communion of German will and German thought. He bolstered it with the newly strengthened Wehrmacht and finally gave the external form to the internal union between Germany and Austria."
With respect to the Sudetenland I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-611, already in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-622, being a speech by Schacht; EC-611 but I will not read it, Sir - being a speech by Schacht on 29 November 1938, shortly after the Munich settlement. I have earlier read the pertinent remark attributing Hitler's success at that conference to the rearmament made possible by Schacht's financial and economic measures.
This line of proof shows that Schacht entertained an aggressive philosophy with respect to territorial expansion and justifies the conclusion that he allied himself with Hitler because of their common viewpoint.
We turn now to prove that, whether or not Schacht wanted war, he at least knew Hitler planned military aggression for which he was creating the means. He had numerous discussions with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. He knew that Hitler was intent upon expansion to the east, which would mean war, and that Hitler felt
11 Jan. 46 he must present the German people with a military victory. I offer in evidence Exhibit Number USA-633 (Document 3727-PS), consisting of an excerpt from a pre-trial interrogation of Schacht on 13 October 1945, and I read from the second page at the end of the second question:
"Q: 'What was there in what he"' meaning Hitler "'said that led you to believe he was intending to move towards the east?'
"A: 'That is in Mein Kampf. He never spoke to me about that, but it was in Mein Kampf.'
"Q: 'In other words, as a man who read it, you understood that Hitler's expansion policy was directed to the east?'
"A: 'To the east.'
"Q: 'And you thought that it would be better to try to divert Hitler from any such intention and to urge upon him a colonial policy instead?'
I also offer in evidence Document EC-458, Exhibit Number USA-634, consisting of an affidavit of Major Edmund Tilley under date of 21 November 1945, with respect to an interview of Schacht on 9 July 1945. I read the second paragraph:
"During the course of the discussion Schacht stated to me that he had had numerous talks with Hitler from 1933 to 1937. Schacht stated that from these talks he had formed the impression that in order to make his hold and government secure, the Fuehrer felt that he must present the German people with a military victory."
As early as 1934, Schacht stated his belief that the Nazis would bring war to Europe. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC- 451, which I have already submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-626, consisting of an affidavit under date of 15 November 1945 by Messersmith, American Consul General in Berlin, 1930 to 1934. I wish to read from the first page, third paragraph, last sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: You have read it already.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, there is a little more there which we have not read, which I should like to read.
THE PRESIDENT: You read the whole paragraph. At our invitation you read from the third paragraph down to the bottom of the page.
LT. BRYSON: I should like to read the first sentence of the fourth paragraph on Page 1.
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THE PRESIDENT: All right.
LT. BRYSON: "While making these protestations he nevertheless showed by his acts that he was thoroughly an instrument of the whole Nazi program and ambitions and that he was lending all his extraordinary knowledge and resourcefulness toward the accomplishment of that program."
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, speaking for myself and for some other members of the Tribunal, we think it is a far better way to deal with a document, to deal with it, if possible, once and for all, and not to be coming back to it. It not only wastes time by the fact that the Tribunal have got to turn back and forth, back and forth, to the document; but you get a much fairer idea of the document if it is dealt with once and for all, although it may cover more than one subject. I say that although it may be impossible for you to do that now in consonance with the preparations that you have made; but those who follow you may be able to alter their course. If it is possible, when you get a document with a variety or a number of paragraphs in it which you want to quote, you should quote them all at the same time. Do you follow what I mean?
LT. BRYSON: I follow you, Your Honor. We have so organized our materials that we have directed our evidence to specific points, and since the points are separated, we had to separate our quotations.
THE PRESIDENT: I realize that it may be difficult for you.
LT. BRYSON: In September of 1934 Ambassador Dodd made a record in his diary of a conversation with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy in Berlin. If the Court please, I will pass over this document, because in response to a question from the Tribunal, I read an excerpt from the document which covers the same point that I was about to direct myself toward.
I had just pointed out that Schacht has acknowledged to Ambassador Dodd in September 1934 his knowledge of the war purposes of the Nazi Party; and we had already shown that in 1935 Schacht had stated that Germany would, if necessary, acquire colonies by force. He must then have known to what length Hitler was prepared to go.
After attending a meeting of the Reich ministers on 27 May 1936 in Berlin, Schacht must have known that Hitler was contemplating war. Your Honors may recall, as has been earlier shown, that at this meeting the Defendant Goering, who was very close to Hitler, stated that all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war and that waiting for
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new methods is no longer appropriate. I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, from which I will not read, as the quotation is already in evidence in Exhibit Number USA-123.
On 31 August 1936 the War Minister, Von Blomberg, sent to Schacht a copy of Von Blomberg's letter to the Defendant Goering. I refer the Tribunal again to 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, and read from the middle of Page 19 of the document. The page numbers, if the Court please, on this document are found in the upper lefthand corner:
"According to an order of the Fuehrer the setting up of all Air Force units is to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936, which at the time when the budget for 1936 was made were planned for later years only."
This intensification of the air force program certainly revealed to Schacht the closeness to war which Hitler must have felt.
I also offer in evidence Document EC-416, Exhibit USA-635, consisting of minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 4 September 1936 which Schacht attended. I read the statement by Goering found at the top of Page 2 of this document:
"The Fuehrer and Reichskanzler has given a memorandum to the Colonel General and the Reich War Minister which represents a general instruction for the execution of this task.
"It starts from the basic thought that the show-down with Russia is inevitable."
Schacht thus knew that Hitler expected war with Russia. He also knew of Hitler's ambitions towards the east. It must have been plain to him, therefore, that such a war would result from Russian opposition to German military expansion in that direction; that is, Schacht must have known that it would be a war of German aggression.
In January 1937, the Tribunal will recall, Schacht stated to Ambassador Davies in Berlin that he had "been authorized by his government" to submit certain proposals to France and England which, in fact, amounted to a bid for colonies under threat of war. If Schacht was acting under instructions from Hitler, he was necessarily familiar with Hitler's aggressive intentions at that time.
In November of 1937 Schacht knew Hitler was determined to acquire Austria and at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia and that Hitler also had designs on the Polish Corridor. I refer the Tribunal to Document L-151, already in evidence as
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Exhibit Number USA-70, this being a letter containing a memorandum of a conversation between Schacht and Ambassador Bullitt, dated 23 November 1937. I quote the last paragraph on Page 2:
"Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor, and in his" - Schacht's - "opinion it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany."
To digress for just a moment, Schacht here was really speaking for himself as well as for Hitler. We have seen from his speech of 29 March 1938 in Vienna his enthusiasm for the Anschluss after the event. He was even working hard for its achievement. In this connection I refer the Tribunal to Pages 506 and 507 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 373) for evidence of Schacht's having subsidized the Nazis' preliminary agitation in Austria.
In addition to the foregoing direct evidence, the Tribunal is asked to take into consideration the fact that to such a man as Schacht the events of the period certainly bespoke Hitler's intention. Schacht was a close collaborator of Hitler and a member of the Cabinet during the period of the Nazi agitation in Austria, the introduction of conscription, the march into the Rhineland, the overthrow of the Republican Government in Spain, the ultimate conquest of Austria, and the acquisition of the Sudetenland by a show of force. During this period the Reich's debt tripled under the stress of mounting armaments, the expenditures from 750,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1932 to 11,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1937, and 14,000,000,000 Reichsmarks in 1938. During the entire period 35,000,000,000 Reichsmarks were spent on armaments. It was a period in which the burning European foreign policy issue was the satisfaction of Germany's repeated demands for additional territory. Hitler, committed to a policy of expansion, was taking great risks in foreign policy and laying the greatest stress upon utmost speed in preparation for war.
Certainly, in this setting Schacht did not proceed in ignorance of the fact that he was assisting Hitler and Germany along the road toward armed aggression.
We turn now to our last line of proof with respect to Schacht's loss of power in the Hitler regime. In November 1937, Schacht resigned his offices as Minister of Economics and General Plenipotentiary for the War Economy. At that time he accepted appointment as Minister without Portfolio and he also continued as President of the Reichsbank.
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Our evidence will show: (a) This change in position was no more than a clash between two power-seeking personalities, Goering and Schacht, in which Goering, being closer to Hitler, won out; (b) their policy differences were concerned only with the method of rearming; and (c) Schacht's loss of power in no sense implies an unwillingness to assist armed aggression.
There was an issue of policy between Goering and Schacht, but it was concerned only with the method and not the desirability of war preparations. Schacht emphasized foreign trade as a necessary source of rearmament material during the transitory period until Germany should be ready to strike. Goering was a proponent of complete self-sufficiency. Hitler supported Goering; and Schacht, his pride wounded and bitterly resenting Goering's intrusion in the economic field, finally stepped out.
I refer the Tribunal to Document 1301-PS, previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-123, containing notes of a conversation between Schacht and Thomas on 2 September 1936. These are found on Page 21 of the document, from which I quote:
"President Schacht called me to him at 1300 hours today and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War: Schacht returned from the Fuehrer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the economic program planned by the Fuehrer.
"The Fuehrer wants to speak at the Party convention about economic policy and wants to emphasize there that we now want to get free from foreign countries with all our energy by production in Germany.
"Schacht requests urgently that the Reich Minister of War warn the Fuehrer from this step."
And three paragraphs farther down:
"If we now shout out abroad our decision to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period."
Nevertheless, Hitler announced the Four Year Plan of self-sufficiency a few days later in Nuremberg, and against Schacht's wishes Goering was named Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan.
At this point I refer the Tribunal again to the interrogation of Schacht on 16 October 1945, being Exhibit Number USA-636; and I wish to read beginning near the bottom of Page 9 of the document:
"Q: 'And the Four Year Plan came in when?'
"A: 'It was announced in September '36, on the Party Day.'
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"Q: 'Do you say that from the time that the Four Year Plan came in in September 1936, you were ready to rid yourself of your economic duty?'
"A: 'No. At that time I thought that I might maintain my position even against Goering.'
"Q: 'Yes, in what sense?'
"A: 'That he would not interfere with affairs which I had to manage in my ministry.'
"Q: 'As a matter of fact, his appointment was not met with favor by you?'
"A: 'I would not have ever appointed a man like Goering who didn't understand a bit about all these things."'
Schacht and Goering immediately became embroiled in a conflict of jurisdiction. On 26 November 1936 Goering issued a directive regarding raw and synthetic material production. I offer in evidence Document EC-243, Exhibit Number USA-637, consisting of a copy of this directive. It shows that Goering's Office for Raw and Synthetic Materials pre-empted control over large economic areas previously in the hands of Schacht. As an example, I will quote from Paragraph V of the directive on Page 4 of the document: "The planning and determination of objectives, as well as the control over the execution of the tasks which must be accomplished within the framework of the Four Year Plan, are the responsibility of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials, which supersedes the authorities which
have heretofore been in charge of these tasks."
On 11 December 1936 Schacht found it necessary to order all supervisory offices in the Ministry of Economics to accept instructions from him alone. I offer in evidence Document EC-376, Exhibit Number USA-638, consisting of a circular letter from Schacht to all supervisory of flees under date of 11 December 1936, and I quote from the second paragraph: "The supervisory offices are obliged to accept instructions from me alone. They must answer all official inquiries for any information of the Office for German Raw and Synthetic Materials in order to give any information at any time to the fullest extent." And a little further down ". . . I herewith authorize the supervisory of offices to take the necessary measures for themselves. In case doubts should result from requests of the above offices and these doubts. cannot be cleared by oral negotiations with the experts of these offices, I should be informed immediately. I will then order in each case the necessary steps to be taken."
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The military sided with Schacht, who had rearmed them so well. I of offer in evidence Document EC-420, Exhibit Number USA-639, consisting of a draft of a memorandum by the Military Economic Staff, dated 19 December 1936. I wish to read from Paragraph 1: "(1) The direction of war economy in the civilian sector in case of war can be handled only by the person who in peacetime has borne the sole responsibility for the preparations for war.
"Upon recognizing this fact a year and a half ago Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was appointed Plenipotentiary General for War Economy and an operations staff was attached to his office."
And then Paragraph Number 2:
"(2) The Military Economy Staff does not deem it compatible with the principle laid down in Number 1, Paragraph 1, if the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is now placed under the Minister President General Goering's command."
In January 1937 the Military Weekly Gazette published an article warmly praising Schacht's achievements in rearmament. Without reading it I offer in evidence Document EC-383, Exhibit Number USA-640, containing this article, a pertinent quotation from which already appears in the transcript for 23 November at Page 296 (Volume II, Page 233).
Shortly thereafter Schacht attempted to force a show-down with Goering by temporarily refusing to act in his capacity as Plenipotentiary. I offer in evidence Document EC-244, Exhibit Number 641, consisting of a letter from Von Blomberg, the Minister of War, to Hitler under date of February 22, 1937. I read the second paragraph of this letter as follows:
"The President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, has notified me that he is not acting in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for the time being, since in his opinion there exist discrepancies regarding the powers conferred upon him and those of Colonel General Goering. Because of this the preparatory mobilization steps in the economic field are delayed."
Schacht obviously was using his importance to the war preparations as a lever.
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Bryson, does the Defendant Schacht admit in his interrogation that the reason for his giving up his office was the difference of opinion between him and the Defendant Goering?
LT. BRYSON: He does, Sir, and the Defendant Goering so states in his interrogation.
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THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into the details of their quarrel?
LT. BRYSON: If the Court will be satisfied that this was the cause of Schacht's resignation
THE PRESIDENT: If they both say so....
LT. BRYSON: . . . and that the cause was not his unwillingness to go along with the aggressive intentions of the Nazis at that time, I shall be perfectly satisfied to confine our evidence to the interrogations of Schacht and Goering.
THE PRESIDENT: Does he suggest that in his interrogation? that that might have been the reason?
LT. BRYSON: I will find out, Sir, but our case against Schacht is premised upon conspiracy.
THE PRESIDENT: If the Defendant Schacht wants to set up such a case as that, you could apply to be heard in rebuttal.
LT. BRYSON: Well, we shall be satisfied then to eliminate a number of our items of evidence, including the controversy between Goering and Schacht, and satisfy ourselves with the interrogations.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. BRYSON: If the Court please, we are almost at the time of the break. Perhaps during the break we can arrange our evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes. [ A recess was taken.]
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): We agree that the question of the disagreement between the Defendants Goering and Schacht need not be discussed further at this time. But we shall come back to and deal in detail with the question as to how far these disagreements had any bearing on the plan for an aggressive war.
LT. BRYSON: If the Tribunal please, we have eliminated part of our proof. I would simply like to put in a letter from Goering and an interrogation of Schacht which will finish up the question of the disagreement.
Under date of 5 August 1937 Schacht wrote a critical letter to Goering, who replied with a 24-page letter on 22 August 1937. Goering's letter reviews their many differences in detail. I offer it as Document EC-493, Exhibit Number USA-642, and I wish to read simply one statement found in the middle of Page 13:
"In conclusion I should like to refer to remarks which you made in a paragraph of your letter entitled 'The Four
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Year Plan' about your general attitude toward my work in regard to the economic policy. I know and I am pleased that at the beginning of the Four Year Plan you promised me your most loyal support and co-operation and that you repeatedly renewed this promise even after the first differences of opinion had occurred and had been removed in exhaustive discussions. I deplore all the more having the impression recently, which is confirmed by your letter, that you are increasingly antagonistic toward my work in the Four Year Plan. This explains the fact that our collaboration has gradually become less close...."
Schacht and Goering were reconciled by written agreement on 7 July 1937 but subsequently again fell into disagreement, and Hitler finally accepted Schacht's resignation as Minister of Economics on 26 November 1937, simultaneously appointing him Minister without Portfolio, and later Schacht's resignation was extended to his position as Plenipotentiary for War Economy. Without reading it, I offer in evidence Document EC-494, Exhibit Number USA- 643, as proof of this fact.
Now, finally, I wish to refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of Schacht, under date of 16 October 1945, Document 3728-PS, Exhibit Number USA-636, and I wish to read from Page 12 of the document near the bottom:
"A: 'It may amuse you if I tell you that the last conversation"' this is Schacht speaking "'that I had with Goering on these topics was in November 1937, when Luther for 2 months had endeavored to unite Goering and myself and to induce me to cooperate further with Goering and maintain my position as Minister of Economics. Then I had a last talk with Goering; and at the end of this talk Goering said, "But I must have the right to give orders to you." Then I said, "Not to me, but to my successor." I have never taken orders from Goering; and I would never have done it because he was a fool in economics, and I knew something about it, at least.'
"Q: 'Well, I gather that was a culminating, progressive personal business between you and Goering. That seems perfectly obvious.'
In all this abundant and consistent evidence there is not the slightest suggestion that Schacht's withdrawal from these two posts represented a break with Hitler on the ground of contemplated military aggression. Indeed, Hitler was gratified that Schacht would still be active in the Government as President of the Reichsbank
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and as Minister without Portfolio. I offer in evidence Document L-104, Exhibit Number USA-644, consisting of a letter to the United States Secretary of State from Ambassador Dodd, under date of 29 November 1937, enclosing a translation of Hitler's letter of 26 November 1937 to Schacht. I quote the last two sentences of Hitler's letter, found on Page 2 of the document:
"If I accede to your wish it is with the expression of deepest gratitude for your so excellent achievements and in the happy consciousness that, as President of the Reichsbank Directorate you will make available for the German people and me for many years more your outstanding knowledge and ability and your untiring energy. Delighted at the fact that in the future, also, you are willing to be my personal adviser, I appoint you as of today a Reich Minister."
Schacht did continue, obviously still in full agreement with Hitler's aggressive purpose. He was still President of the Reichsbank at the time of the taking of Austria in March 1938. In fact, the Reichsbank took over the Austrian National Bank. On this point I refer the Tribunal to Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 254, and ask that judicial notice be taken thereof. Further, Schacht even participated in the planning of the absorption of Austria. In this connection I introduce into evidence Document EC-421, Exhibit Number USA-645, consisting of excerpts from minutes of a meeting of the staff of General Thomas on 11 March 1938 at 1500 hours. I quote therefrom as follows:
"Lieutenant Colonel Huenerm reads directive of the Fuehrer of 11 March concerning the 'Action Otto' and informs us that 'The Economy War Service Law' has been put in force. He then reads Directives 1 and 2 and gives special orders to troops for crossing the Austrian borders. According to that, at Schacht's suggestion, no requisitions should be made but everything ought to be paid for at the rate of 2 schillings to 1 Reichsmark."
On the conversion of the Austrian schilling the Tribunal is asked also to take judicial notice of Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 405.
The Tribunal, of course, is already familiar with the public approval by Schacht of the Anschluss in his Vienna speech of 21 March 1938, and Your Honors will also recall Schacht's pride in Hitler's use of the rearmed Wehrmacht at Munich, as expressed in his speech of 29 November 1938. Both speeches were subsequent to his resignation in November 1937.
We come now to the removal of Schacht from the presidency of the Reichsbank in January 1939. The reason for this development is quite clear. Schacht lost confidence in the credit capacity
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of the Reich and was paralyzed with the fear of a financial collapse. He felt that the maximum level of production had been reached, so that an increase in banknote circulation would only cheapen money and bring on inflation. In this attitude he ceased to be useful to Hitler, who was about to strike and wished to tap every ounce of available Government credit for military purposes.
I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-369, which I have previously submitted in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-631. This document is a memorandum from the Reichsbank directorate to Hitler, under date of 7 January 1939, in which Schacht reviews in detail his fears of inflation. The seriousness of the situation may be seen generally from the entire text. I wish to quote several of the more crucial statements, one from the last paragraph on Page 3, the second sentence:
"We are, however, faced with the fact that approximately 3 billion Reichsmark of such drafts cannot now be paid, though they will be due in 1939."
I quote from the upper half of Page 4:
"Exclusive of. the Reichsbank there are approximately 6 billion Reichsmark mefo drafts which can be discounted against cash payment at any time at the Reichsbank, which fact represents a continuous danger to the currency."
And I quote finally from the concluding paragraph of the memorandum:
"We are convinced that the effects on the currency caused by the policy of the last 10 months can be mended and that the danger of inflation again can be eliminated by strict maintenance of a balanced budget. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor himself has publicly rejected, again and again, an inflation as foolish and fruitless.
"We therefore ask for the following measures:
"(1) The Reich as well as all the other public offices must not incur expenditures or assume guaranties and obligations that cannot be covered by taxes or by those funds which can be raised through loans without disturbing the long term investment market.
"(2) In order to carry out these measures effectively, full financial control over all public expenditures must tee restored to the Reich Minister of Finance.
"(3) The price and wage control must be rendered effective. The existing mismanagement must be eliminated.
"(4) The use of the money and investment market must be at the sole discretion of the Reichsbank."
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It is clear that Schacht's fear was genuine and is a complete explanation for his departure from the scene. He had good reason to be afraid. In fact, the Finance Minister had already recognized the situation in September 1938. I refer the Tribunal to Document EC-419, Exhibit Number USA-621, which I have already submitted in evidence and which consists of a letter under date of 1 September 1938 from Krosigk to Hitler, in which Krosigk warns of an impending financial crisis. I quote from the bottom of Page 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not really cumulative of what you have already read?
LT. BRYSON: We will be glad to skip it, Sir. It is cumulative.
Schacht was not only afraid of a financial crisis, but he was afraid that he personally would be held responsible for it. I offer in evidence an affidavit of Emil Puhl, a director of the Reichsbank and co-worker of Schacht, dated 8 November 1945, designated as Document EC-438, Exhibit Number USA-646, and I read therefrom, beginning at the bottom of the second page:
"When Schacht saw that the risky situation which he had sponsored was becoming insoluble, he was more and more eager to get out. This desire to get out of a bad situation was for a long time the 'Leitmotiv' of Schacht's conversation with the directors of the bank."
In the end Schacht escaped by deliberately stimulating his dismissal from the Presidency of the Reichsbank. I offer in evidence Document 3731-PS, Exhibit Number USA-647, consisting of excerpts from an interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945, and I wish to read several statements beginning at the very bottom of the second page:
"I asked Mr. Schacht to finance for the Reich for the ultimo of the month the sum of 100 or 200 millions. It was this quite customary procedure which we had used for years, and we used to give back this money after a couple of days. Schacht this time refused and said that he was not willing to finance a penny because he wanted, as he said, that it should be made clear to Hitler that the Reich was bankrupt. I tried to explain that this was not the proper ground to discuss the whole question of financing because the question of financing very small sums for a few days during ultimo never would bring Hitler to the conviction that the whole financing was impossible. As far as I remember now, it was Funk who told Hitler something about this conversation; then Hitler asked Schacht to call upon him. I do not know what they said but the result certainly was the dismissal of Schacht."
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THE PRESIDENT: Just give me the reference again to that document that you were reading from.
LT. BRYSON: This is the interrogation of Von Krosigk under date of 24 September 1945. I wish to read further, continuing on Page 3:
"Q: 'Now did Schacht ever say anything to you to the effect that he wanted to resign because he was in opposition to the continuance of the rearmament program?'
"A: 'No, he never said it in this specific form, but in some conversations he certainly spoke about it several times in his own way when he had encounters with Goering... therefore I did not take these things very seriously.'
"Q: 'Well, let me put it this way, and please think carefully about this. Did Schacht ever say that he wanted to resign because he realized that the extent of the rearmament program was such as to lead him to the conclusion that it was in preparation for war rather than for defense?'
"A: 'No, he never did.'
"Q: 'Was Schacht ever quoted to you to this effect by any of your colleagues or by anybody else?'
"Q: 'Now, after Keitel took over the position of Chief of the Wehrmacht were there still meetings between Schacht and yourself with Keitel in place of Blomberg?'
"Q: 'Did Schacht ever say anything at these meetings to indicate that except for the technical question of the financing through the Reichsbank directly he was opposed to a further
program of rearmament or opposed to the budget of the Wehrmacht?'
"A: 'No, I do not think he ever did."'
The Defendant Goering has also confirmed this testimony. I refer the Tribunal to the interrogation of Goering under date of 17 October 1945, this being Document 3730-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-648. I read from the interrogation of Goering on 17 October 1945, from the lower half of the third page:
"Q: 'I want to ask you this specifically. Was Schacht dismissed from the Reichsbank by Hitler for refusing to participate any further in the rearmament program?'
"A: 'No, because of his utterly impossible attitude in this matter regarding this advance, which had no connection with the rearmament program."'
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Hitler dismissed Schacht from the Reichsbank on 20 January 1939. Without reading, I offer in evidence Document EC-398, Exhibit Number USA-649, consisting merely of a brief note from Hitler to Schacht announcing his dismissal.
From all of the foregoing it is clear that Schacht's dismissal in no sense reflected a parting of the ways with Hitler on account of proposed aggression. This fact may also be seen from Document EC-397, Exhibit Number USA-650, consisting of Hitler's letter to Schacht under date of 19 January 1939, the text of which I wish to read:
"At the occasion of your recall from office as President of the Reichsbank Directorate I take the opportunity of expressing to you my most sincere and warmest gratitude for the services which you have rendered repeatedly to Germany and to me personally in this capacity during long and difficult years. Your name, above all, will always be connected with the first epoch of the national rearmament. I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister."
In fact, Schacht continued as Minister without Portfolio until January 1943.
I wish to conclude by saying that the evidence shows: First, Schacht's work was indispensable to Hitler's rise to power and to the rearmament of Germany; second, Schacht personally was favorably disposed towards aggression and knew Hitler intended to and would break the peace; and, third Schacht retired from the scene for reasons wholly unrelated to the imminence of illegal aggression.
As long as he remained in power, Schacht was working as eagerly for the preparation of aggressive war as any of his colleagues. He was beyond any doubt most effective and valuable in this connection. His assistance in the earlier phase of the conspiracy made their later crimes possible. His withdrawal from the scene reflected no moral feeling against the use of aggressive warfare as an instrument of national policy. He personally struggled to retain his position. By the time he lost it he had already completed his task in the conspiracy, namely, to provide Hitler and his colleagues with the physical means and economic planning necessary to launch and maintain the aggression. We do not believe that, having prepared the Wehrmacht for assault upon the world, he should now be permitted to find refuge in his loss of power before the blow was struck.
This concludes our case against the Defendant Schacht, and Lieutenant Meltzer follows me with the presentation of the American case against the Defendant Funk.
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LIEUTENANT (j. g.) BERNHARD D. MELTZER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, the documents bearing upon Defendant Funk's responsibility have been assembled in a document book marked "HH," which has been filed with the Tribunal and has also been made available to Defense Counsel. The same is true of the brief. The documents have been arranged in the book in the order of their presentation. Moreover, to facilitate reference, the pages of the document book have been numbered consecutively in red. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable collaboration of Mr. Sidney Jacoby, who sits to my right, in the selection and analysis of these documents.
We propose to submit evidence concerning five phases of Defendant Funk's participation in the conspiracy:
First, his contribution to the Nazi seizure of power; second, his role in the Propaganda Ministry and in the related agencies and his responsibility for the activities of that ministry; third, his responsibility for the unrelenting elimination of Jews, first from the so-called cultural professions and then from the entire German economy; fourth, his collaboration in the paramount Nazi task to which all other tasks were subordinated - preparation for aggressive war; and finally, we propose to mention briefly the evidence concerning his active participation in the waging of aggressive war.
We turn now to the evidence showing that Defendant Funk actively promoted the conspirators' accession to power and their consolidation of control over Germany. Soon after he joined the Nazi Party in 1931 Defendant Funk began to hold important positions, first within the Party itself and then within the Nazi Government. Funk's positions have, in the main, been listed in Document Number 3533-PS, which is a statement signed by both Defendant Funk and his counsel. This document has been made available in the four working languages of these proceedings, and a copy in the appropriate language should be available in each of Your Honors' document books. It is accordingly requested that this document, which is Exhibit Number USA-651, be received into evidence without the necessity of its being read in its entirety.
Your Honors will observe that there are some deletions and reservations after some of the items listed in Document Number 3533-PS. These were inserted by Defendant Funk. The words which he wished deleted are enclosed in parentheses. His comments are underscored and followed by asterisks.
We wished to avoid troubling the Tribunal with a detailed discussion of all these contested points. Accordingly, we collected in Document 3563-PS relevant excerpts from certain German publications. This document has also been made available in the four working languages. Moreover, we submit that the Tribunal can
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properly take judicial notice of the publications referred to in the document. However, in order to facilitate reference, we request that it be received in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-652.
In connection with Item "b" on the top of Page 1 of Document Number 3533-PS - Your Honors will find that on Page 1 of the document - Your Honors will observe that Defendant Funk has in effect denied that he was Hitler's personal economic adviser in the 1930's. However, the excerpts from the four German publications set forth on Pages 1 and 2 of Document Number 3563-PS directly contradict this denial.
We submit that it will be clear from the documents just referred to that Defendant Funk, soon after he joined the Party, began to operate as one of the Nazi inner circle. Moreover, as a Party economic theorist during its critical days in 1932, he made a significant contribution to its drive for mass support by drafting its economic slogans. In this connection I would refer to Document 3505-PS, which is a biography entitled, in the English translation, Walter Funk - A Life for Economy. This biography was written by one Oestreich in German and published by the Central Publishing House of the Nazi Party. I offer this document in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-653. I wish to quote now from Page 1 of the translation of this document, the center of the page. The corresponding page of the German document is Page 81:
"In 1931 he" that is, Funk "became a member of the Reichstag. A document of his activity at the time is the 'Economic Construction Program of the NSDAP' which was formulated by him in the second half of the year 1932. It received the approval of Adolf Hitler and was declared binding for all Gau leaders, speakers on the subject, and Gau advisers on the subject and others of the Party."
Thus Defendant Funk's slogans became the economic gospel for the Party organizers and spellbinders.
Defendant Funk, however, was much more than one of the Nazi Party's economic theorists; he was also involved in - the highly practical work of soliciting campaign contributions for the Party. As liaison man between the Party and the large German industrialists he helped place the industrialists' financial and political support behind Hitler. Defendant Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June 1945, admitted that he helped finance the highly critical campaign of 1932. I offer in evidence Document Number 2828-PS as Exhibit Number USA-654, and I quote from the bottom of Page 43...
THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Meltzer, isn't this really all cumulative and detailed evidence to support what the Defendant
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Funk has already agreed with reference to his office? On Page 1 you have there the admission that he was a member of the Nazi Party, chief of the division of the Central Nazi Party, chairman of the committee of the Nazi Party on economic policy, and then it goes on from A to U with views of the various offices which he held and which he admits he held. But surely to go into the details of those positions is unnecessary.
LT. MELTZER: If Your Honor pleases, the admission of the various positions listed do not, in our judgment, indicate in any way Defendant Funk's participation in the fund-raising for the Nazi Party.
THE PRESIDENT: The fund-raising?
LT. MELTZER: The fund-raising. Now, it is a possible inference from those positions that he did engage in the solicitation of campaign contributions. However, it did seem to us relevant to mention most briefly direct evidence of that aspect of his activity.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, if you say there is nothing in these offices which covered the matter you are going to deal with; well and good.
LT. MELTZER: Defendant Funk, in an interrogation conducted on 4 June 1945, admitted, as I said a minute ago, that he helped to finance this highly critical campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Lieutenant Meltzer, the heading that you have so conveniently given to us is that he contributed to the seizure of power. Well now, nearly every one of the headings A to U on Page 1, which he admits, is evidence that he contributed to seizure of power. Is it your object to propose that he also helped to raise funds? The contribution to the seizure of power is not in itself a crime; it is only a step.
LT. MELTZER: Very well, Your Honor. There is one aspect, however, of his activity in that regard which I should like to mention; that is, in connection with his fund-raising activities, he was present at a meeting in Berlin early in 1933.
I am referring to the document which records what went on in that meeting in order to point out that in the course of the meeting Hitler and Goering submitted an exposition of certain basic elements of the Nazi program. The reference to this meeting is found in Document 2828-PS, which Your Honors will find on Page 28 of the document book. I wish to quote the following question and answer:
"Q: 'About 1933, we have been informed, certain industrialists attended a meeting in the home of Goering before the election in March. Do you know anything about this?'
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"A: 'I was at the meeting. Money was not demanded by Goering but by Schacht. Hitler left the room, then Schacht made a speech asking for money for the election. I was there as an impartial observer, since I was friendly with the industrialists."'
The character and importance of Funk's work with the large industrialists is emphasized in the biography of Funk, which I referred to earlier, and I will simply invite Your Honors' attention to the relevant pages of that book, which are 83 and 84.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't understand why you read that passage. If you wanted to show that he was at the meeting, it would be merely sufficient to say that he was at the meeting. I don't think those two sentences that you read help us in the very least.
LT. MELTZER: If the Tribunal please, those two sentences do not refer to the meeting. Those two sentences refer to the biography which sums up the Defendant Funk's general contribution to the Nazi accession to power and I thought it might be of interest to the Tribunal to see the attitude of a German writer on this aspect of the defendant's career.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me you referred to the meeting.
LT. MELTZER: I was referring Your Honors to Pages 32 and 33 of the document book, and to clarify this point may I read briefly from the biography:
"No less important, than Funk's accomplishments in the programmatic field in the years 1931 and 1932 was his activity at that time as the Fuehrer's liaison man to the leading men of the German industry, trade, commerce, and finance. On the basis of his past work his personal relations to the German economic leaders were broad and far-reaching. He was now able to enlist them in the service of Adolf Hitler and not only to answer their questions authoritatively but to convince them and win their backing for the Party. At that time that was terribly important work; every success achieved meant a moral, political, and economic strengthening of the vitality of the Party and contributed toward destroying the prejudice that National Socialism is merely a party of class hatred and class struggle."
THE PRESIDENT: Again, I don't see that that has helped the Tribunal in the least.
LT. MELTZER: After Funk had helped Hitler become Chancellor, as Press Chief of the German Government, he participated in the early Cabinet meetings, in the course of which the conspirators
planned the strategy by which they would secure the passage of the Presidential Emergency Decree, which was passed on 24 March 1933. Funk's presence at these meetings is revealed by Document 2962-PS which has already been received in evidence and by Document Number 2963-PS, offered as Exhibit Number USA-656. Your Honors will recall that this decree marked the real seizure of political power in Germany.
Soon after this the Defendant Funk assumed an important role in the Ministry of Propaganda. The record shows that the Ministry became one of the most important and vicious of Nazi institutions and that propaganda was fundamental to the achievement of the Nazi program within Germany and outside of Germany. We do not propose to review those matters to you but rather to present evidence showing, as we have said, that the Defendant Funk took a significant part in the propaganda operations.
The Ministry was established on 13 March 1933, with Goebbels as Chief and Defendant Funk as undersecretary, second in command.
As undersecretary Defendant Funk was not only Goebbels' chief aide but was also the organizer of the large and complex propaganda machine. I wish to offer in evidence Document Number 3501-PS, which will be found on Page 47 of your document book as Exhibit Number USA-657. This document is an affidavit signed on 19 December 1945 by Max Amann, who held the position of Reich Leader of the Press and President of the Reich Press Chamber. I should like to read the second sentence of the first paragraph and the entire second paragraph:
'In carrying out my duties and responsibilities I became familiar with the operation and the organization of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment. Funk was the soul of the Ministry, and without him Goebbels could not have built it up. Goebbels once stated to me that Funk was his 'most efficient man.' Funk exercised comprehensive control over all of the media of expression in Germany; over the press, the theater, radio, and music. As Press Chief of the Government and later as undersecretary of the Ministry, Funk held daily meetings with the Fuehrer and a daily press conference in the course of which he issued the directives governing the materials to be published by the German press."
In addition to his position as undersecretary, Funk had many other important jobs in the Propaganda Ministry and in its subordinate agencies. These positions have already been' listed in Document 3533-PS. I wish, however, to refer in particular to Funk's position as vice-president of the Reich Chamber of Culture. This
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position was, of course, related to his functions in the Propaganda Ministry.
In his dual capacity he directly promoted two vital and related Nazi policies. The first was the regimentation of all creative activities in the interests of Nazi political and military objectives. The second was the complete elimination of Jews and dissidents from the so-called cultural professions. A full discussion of the methods by which these policies were effectuated has been included in the brief which was submitted as part of Document Book E. Accordingly, we will not go into that matter now unless the Tribunal wishes us.
In view of the Defendant Funk's major role in the Propaganda Ministry, it is natural to find Nazi writers stressing his responsibility for the Nazi perversion of culture. In this connection, I Will simply invite the Tribunal's attention to Pages 94 and 95 of Oestreich's biography, which has already been referred to.
After Defendant Funk left the Ministry- of Propaganda and became Minister of Economics in 1938, he continued to advance the anti-Jewish program. For example, on 14 June 1938 he signed a decree providing for the registration of Jewish enterprises. This decree, which became the foundation for the ruthless economic persecution which followed, is found in the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1938, Part I, Page 627. It is requested that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this reference to the Reichsgesetzblatt and all subsequent references. May I add that the brief on Defendant Funk gives the document numbers of translations of decrees and other German publications of which the Tribunal will be requested to take judicial notice.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?
LT. MELTZER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Before we do so, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, I see that one of the counsel, Colonel Phillimore, I think, is proposing to call certain witnesses. The Tribunal would like to know who those witnesses are and what subject their evidence is going to deal with.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would the Tribunal like to know now? I would like to let them know, if it is convenient.
THE PRESIDENT: If you could, it would be convenient now.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The first witness is Korvettenkapiten Moehle, who was a captain on Defendant Doenitz' staff; and he will prove the passing on the Doenitz order of 17 September 1942. 1 think that is the main point that he deals with. I
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think he deals also with the destruction of some rescue ships, but that is the main point.
The second witness is Lieutenant Heisig. He will deal primarily with lectures of the Defendant Doenitz in which he advocated the destruction of the crews of merchant ships. That is the general effect of the evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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THE PRESIDENT: Lieutenant Meltzer, are you intending to call any witnesses this afternoon?
LT. MELTZER: No, Sir. There is another member of the Prosecution, Sir, who I believe is intending to call a witness - Mr. Dodd.
THE PRESIDENT: In connection with the case against Funk?
LT. MELTZER: No, Your Honor. :
THE PRESIDENT: Or in connection with the case against somebody else?
LT. MELTZER: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is it in connection with, Raeder?
LT. MELTZER: I believe Mr. Dodd might offer...
THE PRESIDENT: Raeder, is it?
LT. MELTZER: No, Sir. Mr. Dodd might offer a better explanation than I on the purpose of calling the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd?
MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Yes, Sir. Your Honor, the witness is offered in connection with the Defendants Rosenberg, Funk, Frick, Sauckel, and Kaltenbrunner.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. The evidence relates to concentration camps, does it?
MR. DODD: It does, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
MR. DODD: This witness would have been called at the time that we presented the other proof, except for the fact that he, was before the military court at Dachau at that time and was not available.
THE PRESIDENT: I see; thank you.
LT. MELTZER: May it please the Tribunal, before we adjourned we were dealing with Defendant Funk's role in the economic persecution of the Jews. As Your Honors will recall, in November of 1938 the death of Vom Rath in Paris was exploited by the Nazis' as a pretext for intensifying the persecution of the Jews. The new policy was directed at the complete elimination of the Jews from the economic life of Germany. The evidence we will offer will show that Defendant Funk took a significant part in both the formulation and execution of that policy. In this connection I would refer the Tribunal to Document Number 1816-PS which is already in the Record. This document is a report of the meeting on the
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Jewish question. It will be found, Your Honor, on Page 52 of the document book. This meeting was held under Goering's chairmanship on 12 November 1938. In opening the meeting, Defendant Goering stated - and I quote now from Page 1, Paragraph 1, of the translation; the corresponding page of the German document is also Page, 1:
". . . today's meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a letter written by the chief of staff of the Fuehrer's Deputy, Bormann, on the Fuehrer's orders directing that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, co-ordinated and solved one way or another."
Defendant Funk came to this meeting well prepared. He had a law already drafted which he submitted with the following explanation - I quote again from Document 1816- PS, Page 15:
"I have prepared a law for this case which provides that as from 1 January 1939 Jews shall be prohibited from operating retail stores and mail-order establishments as well as independent workshops. They shall be further prohibited from hiring employees for that purpose or offering any goods on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, it is to be closed by the police. From 1 January 1939 a Jew can no longer operate a business in the sense of the law for the regulation of national labor of 20 January 1934."
I believe we may omit the rest. It is all in the same tenor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. MELTZER: The substance of Defendant Funk's draft law promptly found its way into the Reichsgesetzblatt. On 12 November 1938 Defendant Goering signed a decree entitled, and I quote, ". . . for the Elimination of Jews from German Economic Life," and in Section 4 he authorized Defendant Funk to implement the provisions of the decree by issuing the necessary rules and regulations. An examination of the provisions of this decree, which is set forth in the Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 1580, will reveal how well it deserved its title ". . . for the Elimination of the Jews from German Economic Life."
Soon after the passage of the decree of 12 November, Defendant Funk delivered a speech on the Jewish question. He made it clear that the program of economic persecution was part of the larger program of extermination and he boasted of the fact that the new program insured the complete elimination of Jews from the German economy. I offer into evidence Document Number 3545-PS as Exhibit USA-659. This document, which is found on Page 76 of the document book, is a certified photostatic copy of Page 2 of the Frankfurter Zeitung of 17 November 1938. I quote a very brief portion of that speech:
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"State and economy constitute a single unit. They must be directed according to the same principles. The best proof of this is given by the most recent development of the Jewish problem in Germany. One cannot exclude the Jews from political life and yet let them live and work in the economic sphere."
I shall omit the rest, with the request that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this reprint from the German newspaper, the Frankfurter Zeitung.
I wish, however, to refer to only one more decree, signed by Defendant Funk himself. On the 3rd of December 1938 he signed a decree which imposed additional and drastic economic disabilities upon the Jews and subjected their property to confiscation and forced liquidation. This decree is set forth in the Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Part I, Page 1709. Defendant Funk himself has admitted and deplored his responsibility for the economic persecution of the Jews. I offer into evidence Document Number 3544- PS, as Exhibit USA-660. This document, which is the last document in connection with this phase of the case, is an interrogation of Defendant Funk dated 22 October 1945. Your Honors will find it on Pages 102 and 103 of the document book. I wish to quote from Pages 26 to 27 of the interrogation. The corresponding page of the German translation is Page 21. Although I propose to quote enough to place Defendant Funk's statements in their proper context, I do not, of course, intend to give any credence to his attempts at self-justification:
"Q: 'All the decrees excluding the Jews from industry were yours, were they not?"'
Now, omitting the first nine lines of the reply:
"A: 'As far as my participation in this Jewish affair is concerned, that was my responsibility, and I regretted later on that I ever participated. The Party had always brought pressure to bear on me to make me agree to the confiscation of Jewish property, and I refused repeatedly. But later on, when the anti-Jewish measures and the brutality against Jews were being carried out with full force, something legal had to be done to prevent the looting and confiscation of the whole of Jewish property.'
"Q: 'You knew that the looting and all that was done at the instigation of the Party, didn't you?'
"Here Defendant Funk wept and answered:
"'That is when I should have resigned, in 1938. I am guilty. I am guilty. I admit that I am a guilty party here."'
In the Propaganda Ministry, Defendant Funk, as we have seen, helped solidify the German people in favor of war. When he
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moved on to his position as Minister of Economics, and to other positions which will appear, he used his talents even more directly for the conspirators' main task: preparation for war. Immediately before Defendant Funk took over the Ministry of Economics from Defendant Schacht in 1938, there was a major reorganization of that ministry's functions which integrated it with the Four Year Plan as the supreme command of the German military economy. This reorganization was effected by a decree, dated 4 February 1938, signed by Goering as Commissioner of the Four Year Plan. This decree is set forth in an official monthly bulletin issued by Goering and entitled, in the English translation, The Four Year Plan, Volume II, 1938, Page 105. It is requested that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this publication.
At this point I would simply note that that decree makes it clear that Defendant Funk assumed a critical role in the task of economic mobilization during a decisive period. Indeed, in 1938 he was directly charged with the task of preparing the German economy for war. By a secret decree he was made Plenipotentiary General for Economics and assumed the duties which once had been discharged by Defendant Schacht. In this connection I refer to Document 2194-PS, which has already been placed in evidence. This document, which is found on Page 111 of Your Honors' document books, consists of a letter dated 6 September 1939, and that letter transmitted a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938. It is this enclosure that we wish to deal with now. I wish to quote from Page 4 of the translation, Paragraphs 2 to 4:
"It is the task of the GBW" - that is the Plenipotentiary General for Economics "to put all economic forces into the service of the Reich defense and to safeguard economically the life of the German nation. To him are subordinated: the Reich Minister of Economics, the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, the Reich Minister of Labor..." and so on. "He is furthermore responsible for directing the financing of the Reich defense within the realm of the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank." To quote one more paragraph: "The GBW must fulfill the demands of the OKW which are of essential importance for the Armed Forces and must ensure the economic conditions necessary for the production of the armament industry directly managed by the OKW, according to the requirements of the latter."
This law, in essence, re-enacted the provisions previously passed in the Reich Defense Law of 1935, and I will not trouble the Tribunal with further reading. I do wish to note, however, that the law was, at the specific direction of Hitler, kept secret and that
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it was signed by Defendant Funk, among others, as Plenipotentiary General for Economics. Your Honors will find Defendant Funk's signature on the next to the last page of the document, and I invite your attention to the names of his co-signers.
Defendant Funk, in a speech which he delivered on 14 October 1939, explained how, as Plenipotentiary General for Economics, he had for a year and a half prior to the launching of the aggression against Poland, advanced Germany's economic preparations for war. I offer into evidence Document Number 3324-PS as Exhibit USA-661. This document is a German book by Berndt and Von Wedel entitled, in the English translation, Germany in the Fight. That book reprints the defendant's speech. I quote now from Page 2 of the translation of Document Number 3324-PS, which is found on Page 116 of the document book. The translation of this speech is somewhat awkward, and with the Tribunal's permission I would rephrase it somewhat without changing its substance in the slightest.
"Although all economic and financial departments were harnessed to the task of the Four Year Plan under the leadership of General Field Marshal Goering, Germany's economic preparation for war was also secretly advanced in another sector for well over a year, namely, through the formation of a national guiding apparatus for special war economy tasks which would have to be accomplished the moment that war became a fact. For this work all economic departments were combined into one administrative authority, the Plenipotentiary General for Economics, to which position the Fuehrer appointed me one and a half years ago."
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that?
LT. MELTZER: The date of that speech, Sir, is 14 October 1939.
In his dual capacity as Plenipotentiary General for Economics and Minister of Economics, Defendant Funk was naturally advised of the requirements which the conspirators' program of aggression imposed on the German economy. In this connection I would invite the Tribunal's attention to Document Number 1301-PS, which is already in evidence. As Your Honors will recall, this document is a top-secret report of the conference held in Defendant Goering's office on 14 October 1938. Your Honors will find it on Page 142 of the document book. I shall simply summarize the relevant portions of this document.
During the conference Goering referred to the world situation and to Hitler's directive to organize a gigantic armament program. He thereupon directed the Ministry of Economics to increase exports in order to obtain the foreign exchange necessary for stepping up
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armament. He added, as Your Honors Will recall, that the Luftwaffe must be increased fivefold, that the Navy should arm more quickly, and that the Army should accelerate the production of weapons for attack. Defendant Goering's words directed at Funk, among others, were the words of a man already at war; and his emphasis on quintupling the Air Force and on weapons for attack was that of a man waging aggressive war.
After Schacht's departure Funk was a key figure in the preparation of plans to finance the war. This was natural, since Defendant Funk after 1939 occupied three positions crucial to war finance. Two we have already named: Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for Economics. In addition, he was President of the Reichsbank.
Funk's role in war financing is illustrated by Document Number 3562-PS, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA- 662. This document was found in the captured files of the Reich Ministry of Economics. It consists, in part, of a letter from the Plenipotentiary General for Economics, signed on his behalf by Dr. Posse. The letter is dated 1 June 1939 and encloses the minutes of a conference concerning the financing of the' war which was held under the chairmanship of Funk's undersecretary in the Ministry of Economics, Dr. Landfried. A copy of the document which I have offered into evidence bears a marginal note on Page 1 in the bottom lefthand corner, dated 5 June, stating, and I quote: "To be shown to the Minister," that is, Funk "for his information."
During the course of the meeting, which was attended by 12 officials, five of whom were directly responsible to Defendant Funk in his various capacities,. the conferees discussed a memorandum regarding war finance which had been prepared by the Plenipotentiary General for Economics on May 9, 1939. I wish to quote briefly from Page 2 of the English translation, which is found on Page 153 of Your Honors' document book:
"Then a report was made of the contents of the 'Notes on the question of Internal Financing of War' of 9, May of this year, in which the figures given to me by the Reich Minister of Finance were also discussed. It was pointed out that the Plenipotentiary General for Economics is primarily interested in introducing into the legislation for war finance the idea of financing war expenditures by future revenues to be expected after the war."
And, if I may quote another brief excerpt from this important memorandum, which is found on Page 2 of the English translation, Page 153 of your document books:
"State Secretary Neumann first submitted for discussion the question of whether, in case of war, production would
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be able to meet, to the extent supposed, the demands of the Armed Forces, especially if the demands of the Armed Forces, as stated in the above report, should increase to approximately 14,000 millions in the first 3 months of war. He stated that if the production potential of the present Reich territory is taken as a basis he doubts the possibility of such an increase."
It is plain then that Defendant Funk exercised comprehensive authority over large areas of the German economy whose proper organization and direction were critical to effective war preparation. The once powerful military machine which rested on the foundation of thorough economic preparation was a tribute to the contribution which Defendant Funk had made to Nazi aggression.
And Funk made this contribution with full knowledge of the plans for military aggression. A compelling inference of such knowledge would arise from the combination of several factors: From Funk's long and intimate association with the Nazi inner circle; from the very nature of his official functions; from the war dominated setting of Nazi Germany; from the fact that force and the threat of force had become the primary and the open instruments of German foreign policy. And the final element in weighing the question of Defendant Funk's knowledge is, of course, the fact that, at the same time that Defendant Funk was making economic preparation, specific plans for aggression were being formulated plans which were carried out and plans which could be effectively carried out only if they were synchronized with the complementary economic measures.
The conclusion concerning Defendant Funk's knowledge is reinforced beyond any question by considering, in the light of the factors described above, the more specific and direct evidence which has already been placed into the Record. We have seen from Document 1760-PS that Defendant Funk had told Mr. Messersmith that the absorption of Austria by Germany was a political and economic necessity, and that it would be achieved by whatever means were necessary. We have already referred to Document Number 1301- PS, in which Defendant Goering laid down directives which could be understood only as directives to prepare the economic basis for aggression. And Document Number 3562-PS has revealed that Defendant Funk was making detailed plans for financing the war, that is, of course, a particular war, the war against Poland. In this connection I wish to refer to another vital piece of evidence which has already been introduced in the Record. It is the letter dated 25 August 1939 which Defendant Funk wrote to Hitler. In that letter, as Your Honors will recall, Defendant Funk expressed his gratitude at being able to experience those world-shaking times
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and to contribute to those tremendous events. And he thanked Hitler for approving his proposals designed to prepare the German economy for the war.
Moreover, the Record contains evidence showing that Defendant Funk, both personally and through his representatives, participated in the economic planning which preceded the military aggression against the Soviet Union. I would refer the Tribunal to Document 1039-PS, which revealed that in April of 1941 Defendant Rosenberg, who had been appointed deputy for the centralized treatment of problems related to the occupation of the Eastern territories, that is, the Soviet Union, discussed with Defendant Funk the economic problems which would arise when the plans for aggression in the East matured. And Document 1039-PS also reveals that Defendant Funk appointed one Dr. Schlotterer as his deputy to collaborate with Rosenberg in connection with the exploitation of the Eastern territories and that Schlotterer met with Defendant Rosenberg almost daily.
It is clear, then, that Defendant Funk participated in every phase of the conspirators' program, from their seizure of power to their final defeat. Throughout he worked effectively, if sometimes more quietly than others, on behalf of the Nazi program, a program which from the very beginning he knew contemplated the use of ruthless terror and force within Germany and, if necessary, outside of Germany. He bears, we submit, a special, a direct, and a heavy responsibility for the commission of Crimes against Humanity, Crimes against Peace, and War Crimes. The Record makes it clear, if we may summarize the evidence, that by virtue of his activities in the Ministry of Propaganda and in the Ministry of Economics he is responsible for stimulating and engaging in the unrelenting persecution of the Jews and other minorities, for psychologically mobilizing the German people for aggressive war, and for weakening the willingness and capacity of the conspirators' intended victims to resist aggression. It is also clear, we submit, that Defendant Funk, with full knowledge of the conspirators' purposes, in his capacity as Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank, and Plenipotentiary General for Economics, actively participated in the mobilization of the German economy for aggression. In these capacities and as a member of the Ministerial Council for Defense and the Central Planning Board he also participated in the waging of aggressive war. Moreover, by virtue of his membership in the Central Planning Board, which, as Your Honors will recall from Mr. Dodd's presentation, formulated and directed the program for the enslavement, the exploitation, and degradation of millions of foreign workers, Defendant Funk also shares special responsibility for the Nazi slave-labor program.
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The French Prosecution, I am informed, will deal with this matter in greater detail. Moreover, the French and Soviet Prosecution will submit evidence showing that Defendant Funk actively participated in the program for the criminal looting of the resources of occupied territories.
MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we would like to call at this time the witness, Dr. Franz Blaha.
[The witness, Blaha, took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT [To the witness]: Is your name Franz Blaha?
DR. FRANZ BLAHA (Witness) [In Czech.]: Dr. Franz Blaha.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath: "I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient - that I will speak the truth, the pure truth - and will withhold and add nothing."
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You can sit down if you wish.
MR. DODD: You are Dr. Franz Blaha, a native and a citizen of Czechoslovakia, are you not?
BLAHA: [In Czech.] Yes.
MR. DODD: I understand that you are able to speak German, and for technical reasons I suggest that we conduct this examination in German, although I know your native tongue is Czech; is that right?
BLAHA: [In Czech.] In the interest of the case I am willing to testify in German for the following reasons: 1. For the past 7 years, which are the subject of my testimony, I have lived exclusively in German surroundings; 2. A large number of special and technical expressions relating to life in and about the concentration camps are purely German inventions, and no appropriate equivalent for them in any other language can be found.
MR. DODD: Dr. Blaha, by education and training and profession you are a doctor of medicine?
BLAHA: [In German.] Yes.
MR. DODD: And in 1939 you were the head of a hospital in Czechoslovakia?
MR. DODD: You were arrested, were you not, by the Germans in 1939 after they occupied Czechoslovakia?
MR. DODD: And were you confined in various prisons between 1939 and 1941?
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MR. DODD: From 1941 to April of 1945 you were confined at Dachau Concentration Camp?
BLAHA: Yes, until the end.
MR. DODD: When that camp was liberated by the Allied Forces?
MR. DODD: You executed an affidavit in Nuremberg on the 9th day of January of this year, did you not?
MR. DODD: This affidavit, if it please the Tribunal, bears the Document Number 3249-PS, and I wish to offer it at this time. It is Exhibit USA-663. I feel that we can reduce the extent of this interrogation by approximately three-fourths through the submission of this affidavit and I should like to read it. It will take much less time to read this affidavit than it would to go through it in question and answer form and it covers a large part of what we expect to elicit from this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: I wouldn't have read it if we had had time to have a Russian and French translation, but unfortunately that wasn't possible in the few days we had.
"I, Franz Blaha, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
"1. I studied medicine in Prague, Vienna, Strasbourg, and Paris and received my diploma in 1920. From 1920 to 1926 I was a clinical assistant. In 1926 I became chief physician of the Iglau Hospital in Moravia, Czechoslovakia. I held this position until 1939 when the Germans entered Czechoslovakia and I was seized as a hostage and held a prisoner for co-operating with the Czech Government. I was sent as a prisoner to the Dachau Concentration Camp in April 1941 and remained there until the liberation of the camp in April 1945. Until July 1941 I worked in a punishment company. After that I was sent to the hospital and subjected to the experiments in typhoid being conducted by Dr. Muermelstadt. After that I was to be made the subject of an experimental operation and succeeded in avoiding this only by admitting that I was a physician. If this had been known before, I would have suffered, because intellectuals were treated very harshly in the punishment company. In October 1941 I was sent to work in the herb plantation and later in the laboratory for processing herbs. In June 1942 I was taken into the hospital as a surgeon. Shortly afterwards I was directed to perform a stomach operation on 20 healthy
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prisoners. Because I would not do this I was transferred to the autopsy room where I stayed until April 1945. While there I performed approximately 7,000 autopsies. In all, 12,000 autopsies were performed under my direction.
"2. From the middle of 1941 to the end of 1942 some 500 operations on healthy prisoners were performed. These were for the instructions of the SS medical students and doctors and included operations on the stomach, gall bladder, and throat. These were performed by students and doctors of only 2 years' training, although they were very dangerous and difficult. Ordinarily they would not have been done except by surgeons with at least 4 years' surgical practice. Many prisoners died on the operating table and many others from later complications. I performed autopsies on all of these bodies. The doctors who supervised these operations were Lang, Muermelstadt, Wolter, Ramsauer, and Kahr. Standartenfuehrer Dr. Lolling frequently witnessed these operations.
"3. During my time at Dachau I was familiar with many kinds of medical experiments carried on there on human victims. These persons were never volunteers but were forced to submit to such acts. Malaria experiments on about 1,200 people were conducted by Dr. Klaus Schilling between 1941 and 1945. Schilling was personally ordered by Himmler to conduct these experiments. The victims were either bitten by mosquitoes or given injections of malaria sporozoites taken from mosquitoes. Different kinds of treatment were applied including quinine, pyrifer, neosalvarsan, antipyrin, pyramidon, and a drug called 2516 Behring. I performed autopsies on the bodies of people who died from these malaria experiments. Thirty to 40 died from the malaria itself. Three hundred to four hundred died later from diseases which were fatal because of the physical condition resulting from the malaria attacks. In addition there were deaths resulting from poisoning due to overdoses of neosalvarsan and pyramidon. Dr. Schilling was present at my autopsies on the bodies of his patients.
"4. In 1942 and 1943 experiments on human beings were conducted by Dr. Sigmund Rascher to determine the effects of changing air pressure. As many as 25 persons were put at one time into a specially constructed van in which pressure could be increased or decreased as required. The purpose was to find out the effects on human beings of high altitude and of rapid descents by parachute. Through a window in the van I have seen the people lying on the floor of the van.
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Most of the prisoners used died from these experiments, from internal hemorrhage of the lungs or brain. The survivors coughed blood when taken out. It was my job to take the bodies out and as soon as they were found to be dead to send the internal organs to Munich for study. About 400 to 500 prisoners were experimented on. The survivors were sent to invalid blocks and liquidated shortly afterwards. Only a few escaped.
"5. Rascher also conducted experiments on the effect of cold water on human beings. This was done to find a way for reviving airmen who had fallen into the ocean. The subject was placed in ice cold water and kept there until he was unconscious. Blood was taken from his neck and tested each time his body temperature dropped one degree. This drop was determined by a rectal thermometer. Urine was also periodically tested. Some men stood it as long as 24 to 36 hours. The lowest body temperature reached was 19 degrees centigrade, but most men died at 25 or 26 degrees. When the men were removed from the ice water attempts were made to revive them by artificial sunshine, with hot water, by electro-therapy, or by animal warmth. For this last experiment prostitutes were used and the body of the unconscious man was placed between the bodies of two women. Himmler was present at one such experiment. I could see him from one of the windows in the 'street between the blocks. I have personally been present at some of these cold water experiments when Rascher was absent, and I have seen notes and diagrams on them in Rascher's laboratory. About 300 persons were used in these experiments. The majority died. Of those who survived, many became mentally deranged. Those who did not die were sent to invalid blocks and were killed just as were the victims of the air pressure experiments. I know only two who survived, a Yugoslav and a Pole, both of whom are mental cases.
"6. Liver puncture experiments were performed by Dr. Brachtl on healthy people and on people who had diseases of the stomach and gall bladder. For this purpose a needle was jabbed into the liver of a person and a small piece of the liver was extracted. No anaesthetic was used. The experiment is very painful and often had serious results, as the stomach or large blood vessels were often punctured, resulting in hemorrhage. Many persons died of these tests for which Polish, Russian, Czech, and German prisoners were employed. Altogether about 175 people were subjected to these experiments.
"7. Phlegmone experiments were conducted by Dr. Schuetz, Dr. Babor, Dr. Kieselwetter and Professor Lauer. Forty healthy men were used at a time, of which twenty were given intramuscular and twenty intravenous injections of pus from diseased persons. All treatment was forbidden for 3 days, by which time serious inflammation and in many cases general blood poisoning had occurred. Then each group was divided again into groups of 10. Half were given chemical treatment with liquid and special pills every 10 minutes for 24 hours. The remainder were treated with sulfonamide and surgery. In some cases all the limbs were amputated. My autopsy also showed that the chemical treatment had been harmful and had even caused perforations of the stomach wall. For these experiments Polish, Czech, and Dutch priests were ordinarily used. Pain was intense in such experiments. Most of the 600 to 800 persons who were used finally died. Most of the others became permanent invalids and were later killed.
"8. In the fall of 1944 there were 60 to 80 persons who were subjected to salt water experiments. They were locked in a room and for 5 days were given nothing for food but salt water. During this time their urine, blood, and excrement were tested. None of these prisoners died, possibly because they received smuggled food from other prisoners. Hungarians and Gypsies were used for these experiments.
"9. It was common practice to remove the skin from dead prisoners. I was commanded to do this on many occasions. Dr. Rascher and Dr. Wolter in particular asked for 'this human skin from human backs and chests. It was chemically treated and placed in the sun to dry. After that it was cut into various sizes for use as saddles, riding breeches, gloves, house slippers, and ladies' handbags. Tattooed skin was especially valued by SS men. Russians, Poles, and other inmates were used in this way, but it was forbidden to cut out the skin of a German. This skin had to be from healthy prisoners and free from defects. Sometimes we did not have enough bodies with good skin and Rascher would say, 'All right, you will get the bodies.' The next day we would receive 20 or 30 bodies of young people. They would have been shot in the neck or struck on the head so that the skin would be uninjured. Also we frequently got requests for the skulls or skeletons of prisoners. In those cases we boiled the skull or the body. Then the soft parts were removed and the bones were bleached and dried and reassembled. In the case of skulls it was important to have a good set of teeth. When we got an
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order for skulls from Oranienburg the SS men would say, 'We will try to get you some with good teeth.' So it was dangerous to have good skin or good teeth.
"10. Transports arrived frequently in Dachau from Struthof, Belsen, Auschwitz, Mauthausen and other camps. Many of these were 10 to 14 days on the way without water or food. On one transport which arrived in November 1942 I found evidence of cannibalism. The living persons had eaten the flesh from the dead bodies. Another transport arrived from Compiegne in France. Professor Limousin of Clermont-Ferrand who was later my assistant told me that there had been 2,000 persons on this transport when it started. There was food available but no water. Eight hundred died on the way and were thrown out. When it arrived after 12 days, more than 500 persons were dead on the train. Of the remainder most died shortly after arrival. I investigated this transport because the International Red Cross complained, and the SS men wanted a report that the deaths had been caused by fighting and rioting on the way. I dissected a number of bodies and found that they had died from suffocation and lack of water. It was mid-summer and 120 people had been packed into each car.
"11. In 1941 and 1942 we had in the camp what we called invalid transports. These were made up of people who were sick or for some reason incapable of working. We called them 'Himmelfahrt Commandos.' About 100 or 120 were ordered each week to go to the shower baths. There four people gave injections of phenol, evipan, or benzine, which soon caused death. After 1943 these invalids were sent to other camps for liquidation. I know that they were killed, because I saw the records and they were marked with a cross and the date that they left, which was the way that deaths were ordinarily recorded. This was shown on both the card index of the Camp Dachau and the records in the registry office of Dachau. One thousand to two thousand went away every 3 months, so there were about five thousand sent to death in this way in 1943, and the same in 1944. In April 1945 a Jewish transport was loaded at Dachau and was left standing on the railroad siding. The station was destroyed by bombing, and they could not leave. So they were just left there to die of starvation. They were not allowed to get off. When the camp was liberated they were all dead.
"12. Many executions by gas or shooting or injections took place right in the camp. The gas chamber was completed in 1944, and I was called by Dr. Rascher to examine the first
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victims. Of the eight or nine persons in the chamber there were three still alive, and the remainder appeared to be dead. Their eyes were red, and their faces were swollen. Many prisoners were later killed in this way. Afterwards they were removed to the crematorium where I had to examine their teeth for gold. Teeth containing gold were extracted. Many prisoners who were sick were killed by injections while in the hospital. Some prisoners killed in the hospital came through to the autopsy room with no name or number on the tag which was usually tied to their big toe. Instead the tag said 'Do not dissect'. I performed autopsies on some of these and found that they were perfectly healthy but had died from injections. Sometimes prisoners were killed only because they had dysentery or vomited and gave the nurses too much trouble. Mental patients were liquidated by being led to the gas chamber and injected there or shot. Shooting was a common method of execution. Prisoners could be shot just outside the crematorium and carried in. I have seen people pushed into the ovens while they were still breathing and making sounds, although if they were too much alive they were usually hit on the head first.
"13. The principal executions about which I know from having examined the victims or supervised such examinations are as follows:
"In 1942 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Russians held in a separate camp inside Dachau. They were taken on foot to the military rifle range near the camp in groups of 500 or 600 and shot. Such groups left the camp about three times a week. At night we used to go out to bring the bodies back in carts and then examine them. In February 1944 about 40 Russian students arrived from Moosburg. I knew a few of the boys in the hospital. I examined their bodies after they were shot outside the crematory. In September 1944 a group of 94 high-ranking Russian officers were shot, including two military doctors who had been working with me in the hospital. I examined their bodies. In April 1945 a number of prominent people were shot who had been kept in the bunker. They included two French generals, whose names I cannot remember; but I recognized them from their uniform. I examined them after they were shot. In 1944 and 1945 a number of women were killed by hanging, shooting, and injections. I examined them and found that in many cases they were pregnant. In 1945, just before the camp was liberated, all 'Nacht und Nebel' prisoners were executed. These were prisoners who were forbidden to have any contact with the outside world. They
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were kept in a special enclosure and were not allowed to send or receive any mail. There were 30 or 40, many of whom were sick. These were carried to the crematory on stretchers. I examined them and found they had all been shot in the neck.
"14. From 1941 on the camp was more and more overcrowded. In 1943 the hospital for prisoners was already overcrowded. In 1944 and in 1945 it was impossible to maintain any sort of sanitary conditions. Rooms which held 300 or 400 persons in 1942 were filled with 1,000 in 1943, and in the first quarter of 1945 with 2,000 or more. The rooms could not be cleaned because they were too crowded and there was no cleaning material. Baths were available only once a month. Latrine facilities were completely inadequate. Medicine was almost nonexistent. But I found after the camp was liberated that there was plenty of medicine in the SS hospital for all the camp, if it had been given to us for use. New arrivals at the camp were lined up out of doors for hours at a time. Sometimes they stood there from morning until night. It did not matter whether this was in the winter or in the summer. This occurred all through 1943, 1944, and the first quarter of 1945. I could see these formations from the window of the autopsy room. Many of the people who had to stand in the cold in this way became ill with pneumonia and died. I had several acquaintances who were killed in this manner during 1944 and 1945.
"In October 1944 a transport of Hungarians brought spotted fever into the camp, and an epidemic began. I examined many of the corpses from this transport and reported the situation to Dr. Hintermayer but was forbidden, on penalty of being shot, to mention that there was an epidemic in the camp. He said that it was sabotage, and that I was trying to have the camp quarantined so that the prisoners would not have to work in the armaments industry. No preventive measures were taken at all. New healthy arrivals were put into blocks where an epidemic was already present. Also infected persons were put into these blocks. The 30th block, for instance, died out completely three times. Only at Christmas, when the epidemic spread into the SS camp, was a quarantine established. Nevertheless, transports continued to arrive. We had 200 to 300 new typhus cases a day and about 100 deaths from typhus daily. In all we had 28,000 cases and 15,000 deaths. Apart from those that died from the disease my autopsies showed that many deaths were caused solely by malnutrition. Such deaths occurred in all the years from
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1941 to 1945. They were mostly Italians, Russians, and Frenchmen. These people were just starved to death. At the time of death they weighed 50 to 60 pounds. Autopsies showed their internal organs had often shrunk to one-third of their normal size.
"The facts stated above are true. This declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion. After reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at Nuremberg, Germany, this 9th day of January 1946."*
--Signed-- "Dr. Franz Blaha.
"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of January 1946 at Nuremberg, Germany. 2d Lieutenant Daniel F. Margolies."
MR. DODD: [Continuing the interrogation.] Dr. Blaha, will you state whether or not visitors came to the camp of Dachau while you were there?
BLAHA: Very many visitors came to our camp so that it sometimes seemed to us that we were not confined in a camp but in an exhibition or a zoo. At times there was a visit or an excursion almost every day from schools, from different military, medical, and other institutions, and also many members of the Police, the SS; and the Armed Forces; also...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you pause so as to give the interpreter's words time to come through; do you understand?
BLAHA: Yes. Also some State personalities came to the camp. Regular inspections were made month by month by the Inspector General of Concentration Camps, Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl; also by SS Reichsfuehrer Professor Grawitz, Inspector of Experimental Stations; Standartenfuehrer Dr. Lolling; and other personalities.
MR. DODD: The presiding Justice has suggested that you pause, and it would be helpful if you paused in the making of your answers so that the interpreters can complete their interpretation.
MR. DODD: Are you able to state how long these visits lasted on an average?
BLAHA: That depended on the sort of visits being made. Some were inside for half an hour to an hour, some for 3 or 4 hours.
MR. DODD: Were there prominent Government people who visited the camp at any time while you were there?
* The last paragraph of this affidavit appears in the English translation signed by Dr. Blaha but not in the original German version.
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BLAHA: While I was there many personalities came to our camp: Reichsfuehrer Himmler came to Dachau several times and also was present at the experiments. I was present myself on these occasions. Other personalities also were there. I myself have seen three ministers of state, and from political prisoners who were Germans and therefore knew these people I heard that several other personages visited the camp. I also twice saw high-ranking Italian officers and once a Japanese officer.
MR. DODD: Do you remember the names of any of these prominent Government people, or do you remember more particularly who any of them were? '
BLAHA: Besides Himmler there was Bormann; also Gauleiter Wagner; Gauleiter Giesler; State Ministers Frick, Rosenberg, Funk, Sauckel; also the General of Police Daluege; and others.
MR. DODD: Did these people whom you have just named take tours around the camp while you were there?
BLAHA: Generally the tour through the camp was so arranged that the visitors were first taken to the kitchen, then to the laundry, then to the hospital, that is, usually to the surgical station, then to the malaria station of Professor Schilling and the experimental station of Dr. Rascher. Then they proceeded to a few "blocks," particularly those of the German prisoners and sometimes they also visited the chapel, which, however, had been fitted up inside for German clergy only. Sometimes, too, various personalities were presented and introduced to the visitors. It was so arranged that always, first of all, a "green" professional criminal was selected and introduced as a murderer; then the Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Schmitz, was usually presented as the second one; then a high-ranking Czech officer; then a homosexual; a Gypsy; a Catholic bishop or other Polish priest of high rank; then a university professor, in this order, so that the visitors always found it entertaining.
MR. DODD: Now did I understand you to name Kaltenbrunner as one of those visitors there or not?
BLAHA: Yes, Kaltenbrunner was also present. He was there together with General Daluege. That was, I believe, in the year 1943. I was also interested in General Daluege because it was he who, after Heydrich's death, had become Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, and I wanted to see him.
MR. DODD: Did you see Kaltenbrunner there yourself?
BLAHA: Yes. He was pointed out to me. I had not seen him previously.
MR. DODD: Did I understand you mentioned the name Frick as one of those whom you saw there?
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BLAHA: Yes, it was in the year of 1944, the first half of 1944.
MR. DODD: Where did you see him? Where in the camp did you see him?
BLAHA: I saw him from the hospital window as he was entering with his staff, with several people.
MR. DODD: Do you see the man whom you saw there that day, by the name of Frick, in this courtroom now?
BLAHA: Yes, the fourth man from the right in the first row.
MR. DODD: I understand you also named the name Rosenberg as one of those whom you saw there?
BLAHA: I can recall that it was shortly after my arrival in the concentration camp at Dachau that there was a visit and it was then that my German comrades pointed Rosenberg out to me.
MR. DODD: Do you see that man in this courtroom now?
BLAHA: Yes. He is the second farther to the left in the first row.
MR. DODD: I also understood you to name Sauckel as one of those who were present in the camp.
BLAHA: Yes, but I did not see him personally; I merely heard that he had also visited certain factories and armament plants; and that was in 1943, I believe.
MR. DODD: Was it general knowledge in the camp at that time that a man named Sauckel visited the camp, and particularly the munition plant?
BLAHA: Yes, that was general knowledge in the camp.
MR. DODD: I also understood you to name one of those who visited this camp as Funk.
BLAHA: Yes. He was also present at a visit, and I can remember that it was on the occasion of a state conference of the Axis Powers in Salzburg or Reichenhall. It was the custom on such occasions, when there was a Party convention or a celebration in Munich, Berchtesgaden, or Salzburg, for several personalities to come from the celebrations to Dachau for a visit. That was also the case with Funk.
MR. DODD: Did you personally see Funk there?
BLAHA: No, I did not see Funk personally; I merely heard that he was there.
MR. DODD: Was that general knowledge in the camp at that time?
BLAHA: Yes. We knew beforehand that he was to come.
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MR. DODD: Were there any visits after the end of the year 1944, or in the months of 1945?
BLAHA: There were some visits still, but very few, because there was a typhus epidemic in the camp at that time and quarantine was imposed.
MR. DODD: Doctor, you are now director of a hospital in Prague, are you not?
MR. DODD: I have no further questions to ask of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other counsel for the Prosecution wish to ask any questions? Colonel Pokrovsky? [Colonel Pokrovsky indicated assent.] We will adjourn for a 10-minute recess.
[A recess was taken.]
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like permission to ask this witness several questions.
[Turning to the witness]: Tell us, witness, do you know what was the particular purpose of the concentration camp at Dachau; was it really, so to speak, a concentration camp of extermination?
BLAHA: Until the year 1943 it was really an extermination camp. After 1943 a good many factories and munition. plants were established, also inside the camp, particularly after the bombardments started, and then it became more of a work camp. But as far as the results are concerned there was no difference, because the prisoners had to work so hard while going hungry that they died from hunger and exhaustion instead of from beatings.
COL. POKROVSKY: Must I understand you this way, that, in fact, both before 1943 and after 1943 Dachau was a camp of extermination and that there were different ways of extermination?
BLAHA: That is so.
COL. POKROVSKY: How many, according to your own observations, went through this camp of extermination, Dachau; how many internees came originally from the U.S.S.R., how many passed through the camp?
BLAHA: I cannot state that exactly, only approximately. First, after November 1941, there were exclusively Russian prisoners of war in uniform. They had separate camps and were- liquidated within a few months. In the summer of 1942, those who remained of these - I believe there were 12,000 prisoners of war - were
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transported to Mauthausen; and, as I learned from the people who came from Mauthausen to Dachau, they were liquidated in gas chambers.
Then, after the Russian prisoners of war, Russian children were brought to Dachau. There were, I believe, 2,000 boys, 6 to 17 years old. They were kept in one or two special blocks. They were assigned to particularly brutal people, the "greens," who beat them at every step. These young boys also...
COL. POKROVSKY: What do you mean when you refer to the "greens"?
BLAHA: Those were the so-called professional criminals. They beat these young boys and gave them the hardest work. They worked particularly in the plantations where they had to pull ploughs, sowing machines, and street rollers instead of horses and motors being used. Also in all transport Kommandos Russian children were used exclusively. At least 70 percent of them died of tuberculosis, I believe, and those who remained were then sent to a special camp in the Tyrol in 1943 or the beginning of 1944.
Then after the children, several thousand so-called Eastern Workers were killed. These were civilians who were removed from the Eastern territories to Germany and then because of so-called work-sabotage were put into concentration camps. In addition there were many Russian officers and intellectuals.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like to ask you to be more exact in your answers in regard to those people whom you call "greens." Did I correctly understand you when you said that those criminals had the task of supervising those internees arriving at the camp?
COL. POKROVSKY: And these professional criminals were given complete charge of the children, and they beat and ill-treated these children of Soviet citizens and put them to work far beyond their strength, so that they became tubercular?
COL. POKROVSKY: What do you know about the executions of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. which were carried out in this camp?
BLAHA: I believe I am not far from the truth when I say that of all those executed, at least 75 percent were Russians, and that women as well as men were brought to Dachau from outside to be executed.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you give us more details in regard to the execution of 94 high field and staff officers of the Red Army, which you already spoke about in reply to the question of my
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colleague? Who were these officers, and what rank did they hold? What were the reasons for their execution? Do you know anything at all about it?
BLAHA: In the summer or late spring of 1944 high-ranking Russian officers - generals, colonels, and majors - were sent to Dachau. During the following weeks they were examined by the political department; that is to say, after each interrogation they were brought to the camp hospital in a completely battered condition. I myself saw and knew well some who for weeks had to lie on their bellies, and we had to remove by surgical operation parts of their skin and muscles which had become mortified. Many succumbed to these methods of investigation. The others, 94 people in number; were then brought to the crematory in the beginning of September 1944 on orders from the RSHA in Berlin and there, while on their knees, shot through the neck.
In addition, in the winter and spring of 1945 several Russian officers were brought from solitary confinement to the crematory and there either hanged or shot.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like to ask you the same kind of question about the execution of the 40 Russian students. It is possible for you to give us a few details about the execution?
BLAHA: Yes, those Russian students and intellectuals - I can recall that a doctor was also among them - were brought from the Moosburg Camp to Dachau' and after 1 month they were all executed. That was in March of 1944.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you happen to know what the reason was for their execution?
BLAHA: The order for it came from Berlin. We did not get to know the reason, because I saw the bodies only after the execution and the reason was read aloud before the execution took Place.
COL. POKROVSKY: This execution produced the impression that it was one of the stages of the general plan for extermination of the people who entered Dachau?
BLAHA: Yes. It was easy to see that these executions, these transports of invalids, and the way epidemics were dealt with, were all part of the general plan for extermination; and particularly, and this I must emphasize, it was the Russian prisoners who were always treated the worst of all.
COL. POKROVSKY: Would you be so kind as to say what is known to you in regard to those internees who were in the "Nacht und Nebel" (night and fog) category? Were there many of these internees? Do you know the reason why they were sent to the concentration camp?
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BLAHA: Many so-called Nacht und Nebel prisoners came to the concentration camp. The people so designated were mostly from the western countries of Europe, particularly Frenchmen, Belgians, and Dutchmen. The Russian people - and this was also the case with the Czechs and also in my own case - frequently had the designation "return undesirable." This actually meant the same. Shortly before the liberation many of these people were executed on the order of the camp commander, that is, shot in front of the crematory. Many of these people, particularly the French and Russians, were serious cases of typhus and with a temperature of 40 degrees were carried on stretchers to the rifle range.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you mentioned something about a considerable number of prisoners who died of starvation. Could you tell me how large that number was - the number of people who died of starvation?
BLAHA: I believe that two-thirds of the entire population of the camp suffered from severe malnutrition and that at least 25 percent of the dead had literally died of starvation. It was called in German "Hungertyphus." Apart from that, tuberculosis was the most wide-spread disease in the camp and it spread also because of malnutrition. Most of its victims were Russians.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you said, answering the question of my colleague, that the majority of those who died of starvation and exhaustion were French, Russians, and Italians. How do you account for the fact that in just these categories of internees more people died than in other categories?
COL. POKROVSKY: How do you explain that especially Russians, French, and Italians made up the largest number of those people who died from starvation? Was there any difference in the feeding of internees of the different nationalities, or was there some other reason?
BLAHA: It was like this: The others, the Germans, Poles, and Czechs, who had already been in the camp for some time, had had time, if I may say so, to adjust themselves to camp conditions, physically I mean. The Russian deteriorated rapidly. The same was true of the French and the Italians. Moreover, these nationals for the most part arrived from other camps suffering from malnutrition so that they then soon fell easy prey to the other epidemics and diseases. Also, the Germans, Poles, and many others who worked in the armaments industry had since the year 1943 been able to get parcels from home. That, of course, was not the case with citizens of Soviet Russia, France, or Italy.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you answer the question about what Rosenberg, Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, or Funk saw when they were in
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the Dachau Concentration Camp? Do you know what they saw and what was shown them?
BLAHA: I had no opportunity of seeing what happened during these visits. Only on very rare occasions did one have the opportunity of seeing these visitors from the window and observing where they went. I seldom had the opportunity to be present as I was in the case of Himmler's visits and those of Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and once on the occasion of Gauleiter Giesler's visit, when they were shown the experiments or the patients in the hospital. As to the others I do not know what they individually saw and did in the camp.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you had an opportunity of observing the length of the visit of those people in the camp, whether the visit was short just for a few moments - or whether they stayed there a long time. I have in mind Rosenberg, Kaltenbrunner, Sauckel, and Funk.
BLAHA: That varied. Many visitors were there for half an hour, many, as I said before, spent as many as 3 hours there. We were always able to observe that quite well because at those times no work could be done, nor was food distributed. We did not carry on our work in the hospital and had to wait until the signal was given to us that the visitors had left the camp. Apart from that I had no means of knowing how long these visits in the camp lasted in the individual cases.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you recall the visit of Kaltenbrunner, Rosenberg, Funk, and Sauckel? On the basis of what you said just now could you state whether they were brief visits or whether those people stayed there for several hours? Did you understand my question or not?
BLAHA: Unfortunately, I cannot make a statement on that because, as I said, the visits took place so frequently that I have difficulty, after all these years, in recalling whether they lasted for a short or longer time. Many visits, for instance, from schools from the military and police schools - lasted a whole day.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. I have no further questions of this witness at this stage of the sitting.
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French
Republic): You alluded to a convoy of deported French people who came from Compiegne, of whom only 1,200 survivors arrived. Were there any other convoys?
BLAHA: Yes. There were transports, particularly from Bordeaux, Lyon, and Compiegne, all in the first half of 1944.
M. DUBOST: Were all the transports carried out under the same conditions?
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BLAHA: The conditions under which these transports were made were, if not the same, at any rate very similar.
M. DUBOST: Each time you were able to see on arrival that there were numerous victims?
M. DUBOST: What were the causes of death?
BLAHA: The deaths were caused by the fact that too many people were packed into the cars, which were then locked, and that they did not get anything to eat or drink for several days. Usually they starved or suffocated. Many of those who survived were brought to the camp hospital, and of these a large number died from various complications and diseases.
M. DUBOST: Did you make autopsies on the people who died while en route?
BLAHA: Yes, particularly for the transport from Compiegne my services were demanded because the rumor was spread that the French Maquis and Fascists had attacked and killed each other in the cars. I had to inspect these corpses, but in no case did I find any signs of violence. Moreover, I took 10 corpses as a test, dissected them thoroughly and sent special reports on them to Berlin. All these people had died of suffocation. I was also able to note during the autopsy that these were prominent people of France. I could tell from their identity papers and uniforms that they were high-ranking French officers, priests, deputies, and well- nourished people who had been taken direct from civilian life to the cars and sent to Dachau.
M. DUBOST: After the reports which you sent to Berlin did the conditions under which the transports were made remain the same?
BLAHA: Nothing happened, as usual. Always long reports were written but conditions did not improve at all.
M. DUBOST: You indicated that some French generals had been put to death shortly before the liberation of the camp. Do you know the names of these generals?
BLAHA: Unfortunately I have forgotten these names I can remember only what I was told by the prisoners who were kept in the bunkers with them that they were the prominent personalities from Germany and other countries: Pastor Niemoller was there, also a French prince, Schuschnigg was there too, and members of the French Government and many others. I was told that one of the generals who had been shot was a close relative of General De Gaulle. Unfortunately I have forgotten his name.
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M. DUBOST: If I understood you correctly, these generals were prisoners of war who had been transported to this concentration camp?
BLAHA: These two generals were not in the concentration camp. They were kept, along with the other prominent personalities, in the so-called "Kommandantur-Arrest," that is, in the bunker separated from the camp. On various occasions when they needed medical attention I came into contact with them, but that was very seldom. Otherwise they did not come into contact with the other prisoners at all.
M. DUBOST: Did they belong to the category of deported 'people whose "return was undesirable" or were they in the Nacht und Nebel category?
BLAHA: I do not know. It was 2 days previously that all the others who were kept in the bunker were sent by special transport to the Tyrol. That was, I believe, a week or 8 days before the liberation.
M. DUBOST: You indicated that numerous visitors, German military men, students, political men, often toured the camp. Can you say if any ordinary people, like workers or farmers, knew what was going on in this camp?
BLAHA: In my opinion, the people who lived in the neighborhood of Munich must have known of all these things, because the prisoners went every day to various factories in Munich and the neighborhood; and at work they frequently came into contact with the civilian workers. Moreover, the various suppliers and consumers often entered the fields and the factories of the German armament works and they saw what was done to the prisoners and what they looked like.
M. DUBOST: Can you say in what way the French were treated?
BLAHA: Well, if I said that the Russians were treated worst of all, the French were the second in order. Of course, there were differences in the treatment of individual persons. The Nacht und Nebel prisoners were treated quite differently; likewise the prominent political personalities and the intellectuals. That was so for all nationalities. And the workers and peasants also were treated differently.
M. DUBOST: If I understood correctly, the treatment reserved for the French intellectuals was particularly rigorous. Do you remember the treatment inflicted on some French intellectuals and can you tell us their names?
BLAHA: I had many comrades among the physicians and university professors who worked with me in the hospital Unfortunately a large number of them died of typhus. Most of the
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French, in fact, died of typhus. I remember best of all Professor Limousin. He arrived in very poor condition with the transport from Compiegne. I took him into my department as assistant pathologist. Then I also knew the Bishop of Clermont-Ferrand. There were other physicians and university professors whom I knew. I remember Professor Roche, Dr. Lemartin, and many others I have forgotten their names.
M. DUBOST: In the course of the conversations which you had with Dr. Rascher were you informed of the purpose of these experiments?
BLAHA: I didn't understand the question, excuse me please...
M. DUBOST: Were you informed of the purpose of the medical and biological experiments made by Dr. Rascher in the camp?
BLAHA: Well, Dr. Rascher made exclusively so-called Air Force experiments in the camp. He was a major in the Air Force and was assigned to investigate the conditions to which parachutists were subjected and, secondly, the conditions of those people who had to make an emergency landing on the sea or had fallen into the sea. According to scientific standards, insofar as I can judge, this was all to no purpose. Like all the other experiments, it was simply useless murder; and it is amazing that learned university professors and physicians, particularly, were capable of carrying out these experiments according to plan. These experiments were much worse than all the liquidations and executions, because all the victims of these experiments simply had their suffering prolonged, as various medicines such as vitamins, hormones, tonics, and injections, which were not available for the ordinary patients, were provided for these patients so that the experiments might last longer and give those people more time to observe their victims.
M. DUBOST: I am speaking now of the experiments of Dr. Rascher only. Had he received the order to make these experiments or did he make them on his own initiative?
BLAHA: These experiments were made on Himmler's direct orders; also, Dr. Rascher had close relations with Himmler and was like a relative of his. He visited Himmler very often and Himmler visited Dr. Rascher several times.
M. DUBOST: Have you any information as to the kind of physicians who were making these experiments? Were they always SS men or were they members of medical faculties of universities who, however, did not belong to the SS?
BLAHA: That varied. For example, the malaria station was under the direction of Professor Klaus Schilling of the Koch
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Institute in Berlin. The Phlegmone station also had several university professors. The surgical station was manned solely by SS doctors. In the Air Force station there were exclusively SS and military doctors. It differed. Dr. Bleibeck from Vienna conducted the experiments with sea water.
M. DUBOST: Were the experiments for the Luftwaffe made on the order of Himmler only?
M. DUBOST: Do you know - this is the last question - how many Frenchmen passed through this camp?
BLAHA: I believe at least eight or ten thousand people arrived at the camp. Furthermore, I know very well that, particularly during the last period, several thousand French prisoners marched on foot from the western camps, especially from Natzweiler, Struthof, et cetera, and that only very small remnants of these ever reached Dachau.
M. DUBOST: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us to what branches of the German service those who were employed at the camp belonged?
BLAHA: If I understood you correctly, the highest authority on everything going on in the camp was the so-called Security Main Office in Berlin. All demands and directives came from Berlin; also the experimental stations received a definite quota of subjects for the experiments and the numbers were fixed by Berlin. If the doctors making the experiments needed a larger number, new requests had to be sent to Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to know is to what branch of the service the men belonged who were employed in the camp.
BLAHA: They were all SS men and most of them from the SD. During the last days, at the very end, a few members of the Armed Forces were there as guards but the men in charge were entirely SS men.
THE PRESIDENT: Were there any of the Gestapo there?
BLAHA: Yes, that was the so-called political department, which was directed by the chief of the Munich Gestapo. It had control of all the interrogations and regulations, and it proposed the executions, transports, and transports of invalids. Also, all the people who were provided for the experiments had to be approved by the political department.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel want to cross-examine the witness?
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DR. SAUTER: Witness, you told us that at one time the Defendant Funk also was at Dachau, and you informed us, if I understood you correctly, that this happened on the occasion of some celebration or state conference between the Axis Powers. Please think back a little and tell us when that was approximately. Perhaps - just a moment perhaps you could tell us the year, maybe also the season, and perhaps you could also state which political celebration it was.
BLAHA: As far as Funk is concerned, I can remember that it was, I believe, a conference of finance ministers. The papers had announced that it would take place and we were informed beforehand that some of the ministers would come to Dachau. Such a visit was actually made a few days afterwards, and it was said that Minister Funk was among the visitors. It was, I believe, during the first half of the year 1944. I cannot say that with absolute certainty.
DR. SAUTER: You mean to say: during the first half of 1944, on the occasion of a conference of finance ministers?
- DR. SAUTER: Where did that conference take place?
BLAHA: If I remember correctly - I didn't write that down, of course - that was either in Salzburg or Reichenhall or Berchtesgaden, somewhere in the neighborhood of Munich, I believe.
DR. SAUTER: From whom did you learn at that time that on the next day, or the day after, high-ranking visitors would arrive?
BLAHA: We always received an order to prepare for such a visit. Elaborate preparations were always made; everything was cleaned up; everything had to be in order, as you will understand; and those people whose presence might be undesirable or those who, in a certain sense, might be dangerous, had to disappear. Thus, whenever such high-ranking visitors were announced we always received an order from the camp headquarters 1 or 2 days beforehand; and, also these visitors were always accompanied by the camp commander.
DR. SAUTER: By the camp commander? Now, if you know that the Defendant Funk was there and people talked about it, then I think they would have mentioned also what other persons were present at this visit made by the Defendant Funk
BLAHA: I cannot remember. There were always several important persons.
DR. SAUTER: The rest do not interest me. I am interested only in knowing whether or not at that particular visit, which was said to have been made by Funk, word was passed around the camp that such and such personalities were with him?
BLAHA: I cannot remember that now.
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DR. SAUTER: You cannot remember. Can you remember afterwards, perhaps on the next day or the day after, something was said perhaps by people who had seen the visitors?
BLAHA: Yes, we always discussed that, but now I can no longer remember which personalities were mentioned.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, I am not interested in any other visit, but in this specific visit, as long as I do not say anything to the contrary. In this case I should like to know whether or not anything at all was said later on about the persons who were there with Funk.
BLAHA: That I do not know; there were so many visits. For instance, after one visit, the very next day already another visit would be announced.
DR. SAUTER: Now, you do also remember the visit that Funk made. Well, if other finance ministers were there, one would think that you would recall these other persons also.
BLAHA: I cannot remember that. It may be that the people with whom I talked did not know who these other persons were.
DR. SAUTER: Do you know why, or to put it differently, which departments of the camp were visited on the occasion when Funk was supposed to have made this visit. At any rate he did not come to you.
BLAHA: No; he did not come to the pathological department.
DR. SAUTER: He did not. But you were also prepared?
BLAHA: Yes. All departments had always to be prepared, even if no visitors came. It also happened at times that a visit was announced, and then, for one reason or another, nothing came of it.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, as regards these observations of yours that you have related to us today, have you been interrogated in regard to them many times already?
BLAHA: I was interrogated on these matters for the first time before the military court at Dachau.
DR. SAUTER: Did you also at that time say that Funk had been there? I repeat, did you before the military court at Dachau say anything to the effect that Funk had been present?
BLAHA: Yes, I said the same thing before the court at Dachau.
DR. SAUTER: About Funk?
BLAHA: Also about Funk.
DR. SAUTER: But is it true, Witness? I ask again whether it is really true, because you are here as a witness under oath.
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DR. SAUTER: You were interrogated also the day before yesterday?
DR. SAUTER: Did you, at that time, also make these statements about Funk?
BLAHA: I said the same thing at the interrogation conducted by the Prosecution.
DR. SAUTER: Is that also in the record which I believe you signed?
BLAHA: I signed no record.
DR. SAUTER: You signed no record?
BLAHA: No; I simply signed what was read by the Prosecution.
DR. SAUTER: Well, that is a record.
BLAHA: Yes, but in that record there is no mention of these visits.
DR. SAUTER: Why then didn't you mention these visits the day before yesterday?
BLAHA: I was asked about it orally, and the prosecutor told me that these matters would be taken up orally in the courtroom.
DR. SAUTER: Were you then also told where the defendants sit in the courtroom?
BLAHA: No. Before the military court I was shown all the pictures . . .
DR. SAUTER: Aha!
BLAHA: "And I was asked to identify to the court the various people. I identified the three of whom I said today that I had seen them in person. Funk and others I did not name.
DR. SAUTER: You did not name Funk?
BLAHA: I did not say that I had personally seen him or that I could identify him.
DR. SAUTER: But when the pictures were shown to you did you see the defendants in the pictures?
DR. SAUTER: Now, if I understand you correctly, you knew today where, for instance, Funk or Frick or anyone else was sitting?
BLAHA: Funk I do not know personally, because I did not see him at that time.
DR. SAUTER: Were you not told when the pictures were shown to you at Dachau, "This is Funk; look at him; do you know him"?
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BLAHA: No; that was done quite differently.
DR. SAUTER: How?
BLAHA: All the pictures were shown to me and I was asked to say which of these individuals I had seen at the Dachau camp. Of these people I named these three. There was no further discussion whatsoever in regard to the other pictures.
DR. SAUTER: Well, Dr. Blaha, when your hearing started and you were questioned by the President or by the prosecutor, you made a statement, I believe, in the Czech language.
DR. SAUTER: What then?
BLAHA: In the German language.
DR. SAUTER: No; everyone heard that that was not German, but it was obviously Czech.
BLAHA: The first sentence only.
DR. SAUTER: The first sentences? Well, now, as it will in any case come into the court transcript for practical purposes, I ask you to state and to repeat quite literally, giving the true sense, that which you sail then, because we are interested in that from the point of view of the Defense.
BLAHA: I believe that it was included in the transcript because an English translation was added to my statement.
DR. SAUTER: No, I do not believe that Czech is being translated. But anyhow please repeat it. We did not hear it.
BLAHA: Yes. I said that I was ready, since it is technically impossible to use my native Czech tongue in the hearing, to give my testimony in German, because I have lived in German surroundings through all these events which occurred during the last 7 years and which are now the subject of this Trial. Moreover, the special and new expressions referring to life in the camp can be found only in German, and in no other dictionary can one find such suitable and expressive terms as in the German language.
DR. SAUTER: Then, Mr. President, I have no further questions. Thank you.
DR. THOMA: Witness, were the inmates of the Concentration Camp Dachau bound to secrecy?
BLAHA: No. Of course, if someone was discharged from the camp by the Gestapo - those cases were few and far between, particularly in the case of the Germans, who were then drafted one had to sign a so-called pledge of secrecy.
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DR. THOMA: Could the inmates of the camp, those inside the camp, who worked on farms, et cetera, talk to the other workers about conditions in the camp?
BLAHA: Yes, there were opportunities, because the people worked in the same rooms and factories with other workers - civilian workers. That was the case in the German armament industry, in the fields, and in all factories in Munich and the surroundings.
DR. THOMA: If I understood you correctly, you said previously that visitors, people who delivered things, and customers, also had an opportunity of observing these conditions in the camp without difficulty.
BLAHA: Yes. Many of these people had access everywhere, in the fields as well as in the various factories, and could observe what life was like in these places.
DR. THOMA: And what did they see there in the way of atrocities and ill- treatment, and so forth?
BLAHA: I believe they saw how the people worked, what they looked like and what was produced there. For instance, I can remember one example of what they saw quite well. At that time I was working in the fields. We were pulling a heavy street roller, 16 men, and a group of girls passed who were on an excursion. When they passed, their leader said very loudly, so that we all could hear it, "Look, those people are so lazy that rather than harness up a team of horses they pull it themselves." That was supposed to be a joke.
DR. THOMA: Witness, when did you first have occasion, after your liberation from the concentration camp, to tell outside people about those horrible atrocities which you related to us today?
BLAHA: I did not understand that; please repeat.
DR. THOMA: When did you first have an opportunity, after your discharge or liberation from the concentration camp, of telling an outsider about these horrible atrocities?
BLAHA: Immediately after the liberation. I was at that time, as chief physician of the concentration camp, interrogated by the American investigating corps; and it was to this corps that I told this story for the first time, and I also gave them various proofs diagrams, and the medical records which I had saved from being burnt.
DR. THOMA: That prosecutor believed the information you gave without further ado?
DR. THOMA: Witness, you said that the Defendant Rosenberg was pointed out to you in the Concentration Camp Dachau shortly after you arrived there.
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DR. THOMA: When was that?
BLAHA: In the year 1941; first half of 1941.
DR. THOMA: First half?
BLAHA: I believe so, yes.
DR. THOMA: Can you perhaps remember the month?
BLAHA: I cannot remember. I arrived in April; I believe it was between April and July or something like that.
DR. THOMA: From April to July 1941?
BLAHA: I believe so.
DR. THOMA: Was Rosenberg at that time in uniform?
BLAHA: He was in uniform.
DR. THOMA: In what uniform?
BLAHA: I believe it was an SS uniform.
DR. THOMA: SS uniform?
BLAHA: It was a - I cannot say that very precisely - but he was in uniform.
DR. THOMA: All right, you remember prima facie that it was an SS uniform, that is, a black uniform?
BLAHA: No, at that time the SS no longer wore the black uniform, because after the beginning of the war they wore field uniforms and other similar uniforms.
DR. THOMA: Then, you assume it was a gray uniform?
BLAHA: Something like that; whether it was gray or yellow or brown I don't remember any more.
DR. THOMA: That is just the point: whether it was gray, brown, or yellow. Was it a field uniform?
BLAHA: I do not know because from 1939 I was in the concentration camp, and I am not at all familiar with the various German uniforms, ranks, and branches of the Army, and so forth.
DR. THOMA: But you just said that during the war they changed the uniform.
BLAHA: Yes, the men in the Gestapo also changed theirs. When I was arrested in 1939, all Gestapo personnel wore this black uniform. Then, after the war broke out most of them wore either green or gray uniforms.
DR. THOMA: May I ask you again: Did Rosenberg wear a wartime uniform or a peacetime uniform?
11 Jan. 46
BLAHA: I believe it was a wartime uniform.
DR. THOMA: Wartime uniform? The Defendant Rosenberg was pointed out to you by another comrade, wasn't he?
DR. THOMA: At what distance?
BLAHA: Well, he was just going down the camp street. That was perhaps 30 or 40 degrees.
DR. THOMA: Thirty or forty metres you mean?
BLAHA: Well, 30 metres; 30 paces I wanted to say, 30 or 40 paces.
DR. THOMA: And had you previously seen photographs of Rosenberg? Did you already have an idea of what Rosenberg looked like?
DR. THOMA: And when this comrade showed you Rosenberg, was it then necessary for him to say, "This is Rosenberg"? Didn't you recognize him already from having seen him in the photographs which you had previously...
BLAHA: I cannot remember that. But when he showed him to me I remembered that I knew him already from the various pictures in the newspapers.
DR. THOMA: May I ask you to describe the incident precisely? How it happened; where you were standing; where Rosenberg came from; and who was in his company.
BLAHA: Who was in his company? I knew only the camp commander.
DR. THOMA: Who was the camp commander at that time?
BLAHA: Pierkowski was camp commander, Sturmbannfuehrer Pierkowski.
DR. THOMA: Do you know whether he is still alive?
BLAHA: No, I don't.
DR. THOMA: The camp commander?
BLAHA: Pierkowski. Then the Lagerfuehrer Ziel and Hoffmann, I knew them.
DR. THOMA: Now were you in your room and looking out of the window?
BLAHA: No, we were in one of the so-called "block" streets. This led into another street along which the visitors passed.
DR. THOMA: And what was said to you?
BLAHA: "Look, there goes Rosenberg."
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DR. THOMA: Was Rosenberg alone?
BLAHA: No, he was with the other persons.
DR. THOMA: That is to say, only with the camp commander?
BLAHA: No, there were many other people with 'trim.
DR. THOMA: That is to say, he had an escort, a staff?
DR. THOMA: Members of Rosenberg's staff?
BLAHA: I don't know whether that was Rosenberg's staff, but there were a number of persons.
DR. THOMA: A number of persons? Witness, the Defendant Rosenberg assures me most definitely that he has never been to the concentration camp at Dachau. Is it possible that there has been a mistake?
BLAHA: I believe I am not mistaken. Besides the German in question knew Rosenberg very well, I believe.
DR. THOMA: How do you know that?
BLAHA: Because he told me so definitely. Otherwise, I have no way of knowing that.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You will forgive me if I point out to you that this is intended to be an expeditious trial and that it is not right to take up too much time upon small points like this.
DR. THOMA: My Lord, I ask your permission to remark that the question of whether or not Rosenberg was in the concentration camp is of decisive importance. I thank you.
DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): The Defendant Frick states that he has never been in Dachau Camp. Therefore, in order to clarify the facts I should like to ask the following questions:
Witness, at what distance do you believe you saw Frick?
BLAHA: I saw him from the window as he passed with a number of people.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you know Frick before?
BLAHA: Yes, from pictures.
DR. PANNENBECKER: From pictures? Did you recognize him yourself or did some friend tell you that it was Frick?
BLAHA: A number of us saw him and I looked at him particularly, because at that time he was already Protector of Bohemia
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and Moravia. For that reason I had a personal interest in recognizing him.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did Frick wear a uniform?
BLAHA: I do not believe so.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize anybody who was with him, anyone from his staff or from the camp command?
BLAHA: I did not know his staff. From the camp command there was Camp Commander Weiter. Camp Commander Weiter, and his adjutant, Otto.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Could you name anyone of your comrades who also recognized him?
BLAHA: There were many comrades of mine who at that time were standing at the window. Unfortunately, I cannot say who they were, because, as you will understand, life in the concentration camp was so full of incidents that one could not record these things accurately in one's memory. One remembers only the more important events.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize him at once of your own accord when he passed by, or had it been mentioned previously that Frick was expected?
BLAHA: No, it was not mentioned then. We simply heard that a high-ranking visitor was expected, and we were waiting for this high-ranking visitor. We were not told beforehand who it would be.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you recognize Frick immediately when you came into the courtroom, or did you know beforehand that he was sitting in the fourth seat here?
BLAHA: No, I recognized him easily, because I have already seen him many times in various pictures, and because he is a well known person in Bohemia and Moravia.
DR. PANNENBECKER: You believe then that there can be no question of any error.
BLAHA: I don't think so.
DR. PANNENBECKER: May I then ask the Court whether Frick himself may take the stand to testify that he has never seen Dachau Camp? I want to make this motion now so that, if necessary, the witness might be confronted with Frick.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the defendants will understand that they will have the opportunity, when it comes to their time to present their cases, to call all the defendants, but they will not have an opportunity of calling them now. They will have to wait until the case for the Prosecution is over and they will then have
11 Jan. 46
an opportunity, each of them, to call the defendant for whom they appear, if they wish to.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I simply thought, that as the witness is available now...
[Dr. Kubuschok approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: It is now 5:00 o'clock and unless you are going to be very short. . . are you going to be very short?
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): Yes, Sir.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, you said that when prominent visitors came to the camp, for instance, Reich ministers, extensive preparations were made beforehand. You also said that undesirable persons were removed. Maybe you could supplement that statement. I am interested to know what the purpose of these preparations was.
BLAHA: I meant that everything had to be in order. In our infirmary all the patients had to lie in bed quietly, everything was washed and prepared; the instruments were polished, as is usually the case for high-ranking visitors. We were not allowed to do anything - no operations; no bandages nor food were given out before the visit had terminated.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Could you perhaps tell me which undesirable persons were to be removed, as you said before?
BLAHA: Well, the Russians especially were always kept strictly in their blocks. It was said that they were afraid of possible demonstrations, assassinations, et cetera.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were prisoners kept out of sight because they showed outward signs of ill-treatment?
BLAHA: It goes without saying that before the visitors nobody was struck, beaten, hanged, or executed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: To sum up, the purpose of these preparations was to prevent the guests from seeing the concentration camp as it really was.
BLAHA: From seeing the cruelties.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will not sit in open session tomorrow, Saturday, and will only sit in the morning on Monday, because there is work to be done in the closed session tomorrow and on Monday afternoon. I thought it would be convenient for counsel to know that.
The Court will now adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 14 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]
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