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MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): If it please Your Honor, the Defendant Streicher and the Defendant Kaltenbrunner are absent this morning due to illness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please the Tribunal, before the Tribunal adjourned, I was dealing with the share of the Defendant Neurath in the aggression against Austria. Before I proceed to the next stage, I should like the Tribunal, if it be so kind, to look at the original exhibit to which I am referred, Document 3287-PS, Exhibit USA-128, which is the letter from this defendant to Sir Neville Henderson, who was then the British Ambassador. The only point in which I would be grateful is if the Tribunal would note Page 92 of the document book. When I say original, that is a certified copy certified by the British Foreign Office, but the Tribunal will see that the heading is from the President of the Secret Cabinet Council. That is the point that the Tribunal will remember. The question was raised as to the existence or activity of that body and the letterhead is from the defendant in that capacity.
The next stage in the Austrian aggression is that at the time of the occupation of Austria, this defendant gave the assurance to M. Mastny, the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia to Berlin, regarding the continued independence of Czechoslovakia. That is one document at Page 123, TC-27, which I have already put in as Exhibit GB-21. It was to Lord Halifax, who was then Foreign Secretary; and if I may read the second paragraph just to remind the Tribunal of the circumstances in which it was written, M. Mastny says:
"I have in consequence been instructed by my Government to bring to the official knowledge of His Majesty's Government the following facts: Yesterday evening (the 11th of March) Field Marshal Goering made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments in Austria will in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasizing the continued
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earnest endeavor on the part of Germany to improve those mutual relations."
And then there are the particulars of the way it was put to Defendant Goering which have been brought to the Tribunal's attention several times, and I shall not do it again. The 6th paragraph begins: "M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject"-that is, to give the Defendant Goering on the Czech mobilization-and then it goes on:
"... and today spoke with Baron Von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925."
In view of the fact that the Defendant Von Neurath had been present at the meeting on the 5th of November, 4 months previously, when he had heard Hitler's views on Czechoslovakia-and that it was only 6 months before that really negotiated treaty was disregarded at once-that paragraph, in my submission, is an excellent example on the technique of which this defendant was the first professor.
I now come to the aggression against Czechoslovakia. On 28 May 1938 Hitler held a conference of important leaders including Beck, Von Brauchitsch, Raeder, Keitel, Goering and Ribbentrop at which Hitler affirmed that preparations should be made for military action against Czechoslovakia by October; and it is believed, though not-I say frankly-confirmed, that the Defendant Von Neurath attended. The reference of that meeting is in the transcript of Pages 742 and 743 (Volume III, Page 42).
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, is there any evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. Your Lordship will remember the documents, a long series of them, and it does not state who was present; therefore, I express that and put it with reserve.
On the 4th of September 1938 the government of which Von Neurath was a member enacted a new Secret Reich Defense Law which defined various official responsibilities in clear anticipation of war. This law provided, as did the previous Secret Reich Defense Law, for a Reich Defense Council as a supreme policy board for war preparations. The Tribunal will remember that I have already referred them to Document 2194-PS, Exhibit USA-36, showing these facts. Then there came the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938, but in spite of that, on the 14th of March 1939 German troops marched into Czechoslovakia; and the proclamation to the German people and the order to the Wehrmacht is Document TC-50, Exhibit GB-7, which the Tribunal will find at
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Page 124, which has already been referred to and I shall not read it again.
On the 16th of March 1939 the German Government, of which Von Neurath was still a member, promulgated the "Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor on the Establishment of the Protectorate 'Bohemia and Moravia."' That date is the 16th of March. That is at Page 126 of the document book, TC-51, Exhibit GB-8.
If I may leave that for the moment, I will come back to it in dealing with the setting up of the Protectorate. I will come back in a moment and read Article 5. But taking the events in the order of time, the following week the Defendant Von Ribbentrop signed a treaty with Slovakia, which is at Page 129 (Document 1439-PS, Exhibit GB-135); and the Tribunal may remember Article 2 of that treaty, which is:
"For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German Armed Forces shall have the right at all times to construct military installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary in an area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians, and the Javornik Mountains.
"The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to the German Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military installations."
The Tribunal will appreciate that the ultimate objective of Hitler's policy disclosed at the meeting at which this defendant was present on the 5th of November 1937, that is the resumption of the "Drang nach Osten" and the acquisition of Lebensraum. in the East, was obvious from the terms of this treaty as it has been explicit in Hitler's statement.
Then we come to the pith of this criminality. By accepting and occupying the position of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the Defendant Von Neurath personally adhered to the aggression against Czechoslovakia and the world. He further actively participated in the conspiracy of world aggression and he assumed a position of leadership in the execution of policies involving violating the laws of war and the commission of crimes against humanity.
The Tribunal will appreciate that I am not going to trespass on the ground covered by my colleagues and go into the crimes. I want
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to show quite clearly to the Tribunal the basis for these crimes which was laid by the legal position which this defendant assumed.
The first point. The Defendant Von Neurath assumed the position of Protector under a sweeping grant of powers. The act creating the Protectorate provided-if the Tribunal would be good enough to turn back on Page 126 in the document book (TC-51, Exhibit GB- 8) and look at Article V of the Act, it reads as follows:
"1. As trustee of Reich interests, the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich nominates a 'Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia' with Prague as his seat of office.
"2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich Government, is charged with the duty of seeing to the observance of the political principles laid down by the Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich.
"3. The members of the Government of the Protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn.
"4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all measures taken by the Government of the Protectorate and to give advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich and, in case of danger in delay, issue ordinances required for the common interest.
"5. The promulgation of laws, ordinances, and other legal provisions and the execution of administrative measures and legal judgments shall be deferred if the Reich Protector enters an objection."
At the very outset of the Protectorate the Defendant Von Neuratles supreme authority was implemented by a series of basic decrees of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. They established the alleged legal foundation for the policy and program which resulted, all aimed towards the systematic destruction of the national integrity of the Czechs:
1. By granting the "racial Germans'' in Czechoslovakia a supreme order of citizenship-and I give the official reference to the Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the Protectorate to which I just referred-and then;
2. An act concerning the representation in the Reichstag of Greater Germany by German nationals resident in the Protectorate, 13 April 1939;
3. An order concerning the acquisition of German citizenship by former Czechoslovakian citizens of German stock, 20 April 1939.
Then there was a series of decrees that granted "racial Germans" in Czechoslovakia a preferred status at law and in the courts:
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1. An order concerning the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 14 April 1939;
2. An order concerning the Exercise of Jurisdiction in Civil Proceedings, 14 April 1939;
3. An order concerning the Exercise of Military Jurisdiction, on 8 May 1939.
Then the orders also granted to the Protector broad powers to change by decree the autonomous law of the Protectorate. That is contained in the Ordinance on Legislation in the Protectorate, 7 June 1939.
And finally the Protector was authorized to go with the Reich Leader SS and the Chief of the German Police to take, if necessary, such police measures which go beyond the limits usually valid for police measures.
In view of the form of the order itself the Tribunal, if it cares to listen and to take judicial notice of this, in the Reichsgesetzblatt we have found inserted that one in the document book at Page 131, which rather staggers the imagination to know what can be police measures even beyond the limits usually valid for police measures when one has seen police measures in Germany between 1933 and 1939. But if such increase was possible, and presumably it was believed to be possible, then an increase was given by the Defendant Von Neurath and used by him for coercion of the Czechs.
The declared basic policy of the Protectorate was concentrated upon the central objective of destroying the identity of the Czechs as a nation and absorbing their territory into the Reich; and if the Tribunal will be good enough to turn to Page 132, they will find Document Number 862-PS, Exhibit USA-313, and I think that has been read to the Tribunal. Still, the Tribunal might bear with me so that I might indicate the nature of the document to them.
This memorandum is signed by Lieutenant General of Infantry Friderici. It is headed "The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia." It is marked "Top Secret," dated 15 October 1940. That is practically a year before this Defendant Von Neurath went on leave, as he puts it, on 27 September 1941; and it is called the "Basic Political Principles in the Protectorate," and there are four copies. It also had gone to the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl, and it begins: "On 9 October of this year"-that is 1940:
"On 9 October of this year the Office of the Reich Protector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Gruppenfuehrer K. H. Frank"-that is not the Defendant Frank, it is the other K. H. Frank---"spoke about the following:
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"Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have been considering the solution of the Czech problem.
"After careful deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three possibilities of solution were indicated:
"a. German infiltration of Moravia and withdrawal of the Czech part of the people to a remainder of Bohemia. This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.
"b. Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. Therefore the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable space of time.
"c. Assimilation of the Czechs, that is, absorption of about half of the Czech people by the Germans, to the extent that it is of importance from a racial or other standpoint. This will be brought about, among other things, also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory, with the exception of the Sudeten German border districts-in other words, by dispersing the block of Czech people. The other half of the Czech nationality must by all possible ways be deprived of its power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid parts and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.
"Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.
"The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.
"After a report, the Fuehrer has chosen solution c (assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate outwardly, Germanization will have to be carried out uniformly by the Office of the Reich Protector for years to come.
"From the above no specific conclusions are drawn by the Armed Forces. It is the way that has always been followed. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was
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sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, entitled 'The Czech Problem."'
And that is signed, as I said, by the Deputy Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces.
That view of the Reich Protector was accepted and formed a basis of his policy. The result was a program of consolidating German control over Bohemia and Moravia by the systematic oppression of the Czechs through the abolition of civil liberties and the systematic undermining of the native political, economic, and cultural structure by a regime of terror, which will be dealt with by my Soviet Union colleagues. They will show clearly, I submit, that the only protection given by this defendant was a protection to the perpetrators of innumerable crimes.
I have already drawn the attention of the Tribunal to the many honors and rewards which this defendant received as his worth, and it might well be said that Hitler showered more honors on Von Neurath than on some of the leading Nazis who had been with the Party since the very beginning. His appointment as President of the newly created Secret Cabinet Council in 1938 was in itself a new and. singular distinction. On 22 September 1940 Hitler awarded him the War Merit Cross 1st Class as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. That is in the Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero, 22 September 1940.
He was also awarded the Golden Badge of the Party and was promoted by Hitler, personally, from the rank of Gruppenfuehrer to Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS on 21 June 1943. And I also inform the Tribunal that he and Ribbentrop were the only two Germans to be awarded the Adlerorden, a distinction normally reserved for foreigners. On his seventieth birthday, 2 February 1943, it was made the occasion for most of the German newspapers to praise his many years of service to the Nazi regime. This service, as submitted by the Prosecution, may be summed up in two ways:
1) He was an internal Fifth Columnist among the Conservative political circles in Germany. They had been anti-Nazi but were converted in part by seeing one of themselves, in the person of this defendant, wholeheartedly with the Nazis;
2) His previous reputation as a diplomat made public opinion abroad slow to believe that he would be a member of a cabinet which did not stand by its words and assurances. It was most important for Hitler that his own readiness to break every treaty or commitment should be concealed as long as possible, and for this purpose he found in the Defendant Von Neurath his handiest tool.
That concludes the presentation against the Defendant Von Neurath.
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THE PRESIDENT: In view of the motion which was made yesterday by Counsel for the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal will postpone the presentation of the individual case against Hess, and will proceed with the presentation of the case by counsel for France.
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): When stating the charges which now weigh upon the defendants, my British and American colleagues showed evidence that these men conceived and executed a plan and plot for the domination of Europe. They have shown you of what crimes against peace these men became guilty by launching unjust wars. They have shown you that, as leaders of Nazi Germany, they had all premeditated unjust wars, and had participated in the conspiracy against peace.
Then my friends and colleagues of the French Delegation, M. Herzog, M. Faure and M. Gerthoffer, submitted documents establishing that the defendants, who all in various positions counted among the leaders of Nazi Germany, are responsible for the repeated violations of the laws and 'customs of war committed by men of the Reich in the course of military operations. However, it still remains for us to expose the atrocities of which men, women, and children of the occupied countries of the west were victims.
We intend at this point to prove that the defendants, in their capacity as leaders of Hitlerite Germany, systematically pursued a policy of extermination, the cruelty of which increased from day to day until the final defeat of Germany; that the defendants planned, conceived, willed, and prescribed these atrocities as part of a system which was to enable them to accomplish a political aim. It is this political aim which closely binds all the facts we intend to present to you. The crimes perpetrated against people and property, as presented so far by my colleagues of the French Prosecution, were in close connection with the war. They had the distinct character of war crimes stricto sensu. Those which I shall present to you surpass them both in meaning and extent. They form part of the plans of a policy of domination, of expansion, beyond war itself.
It is Hitler himself who gave the best definition of this policy in one of his speeches in Munich on 16 May 1927. He was deceiving his listeners about the danger that France, an agricultural country of only 40 million inhabitants, might represent for Germany, which was already a highly-industrialized country with a population of nearly 70 million. That day Hitler said:
"There is only one way for Germany to escape encirclement; and it is the destruction of the state which, by the natural order of things, will always be her mortal enemy: that is
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France. When a nation is aware that its whole existence is endangered by an enemy, it must aim at one thing only: the annihilation of that enemy."
During the first months that followed their victory, the Germans seemed to have abandoned their plan of annihilation; but this was only a tactical pretense. They hoped to draw into their war against England and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics the western nations they had enslaved. By doses of treachery and violence, they attempted to make these western nations take the road of collaboration. The latter resisted; and the defendants then abandoned their tactics and came back to their big scheme, the annihilation of conquered peoples in order to secure in Europe the space necessary for the 250 million Germans whom they hoped to settle there in generations to come.
This destruction, this annihilation-I repeat the very words used by Hitler in his speech-was undertaken under various pretenses; the elimination of inferior, or negroid races; the extermination of bolshevism; the destruction of Jewish-Masonic influences hostile to the founding of the pseudo "New European Order."
In fact, this destruction, this elimination, conduced to the assassination of the elite and vital forces opposed to the Nazis; it also led to the reduction of the means of livelihood of the enslaved nations.
All of this was done, as I shall prove to you, in execution of a deliberate plan, the existence of which is confirmed, among other things, by the repetition and the immutability of the same facts in all the occupied countries.
Faced with this repetition and this immutability, it is no longer possible to claim that only the one who performed the crime was guilty. This repetition and this immutability prove that the same criminal will united all the members of the German Government all the leaders of the German Reich.
It is from this common will that the official policy of terrorism and extermination, which directed the strokes of the executioners, was born; and it is for having participated in the creation of this common will that each of the defendants here present has been placed in the ranks of major war criminals.
I shall come back to this point when, having finished my presentation of the facts, I shall have to qualify the crime, in accordance with the legal tradition of my country.
Allow me to give you some indications as to how, with your kind permission, I intend to make my presentation.
The facts I am to prove here are the results of many testimonies. We could have called innumerable witnesses to this stand. Their
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statements have been collected by the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. It seemed to us that it would simplify and shorten the procedure if we were to give you extracts only from the testimony that we have received in writing.
With your authorization, therefore, I shall limit myself to reading excerpts from the written testimonies collected in France by official organizations qualified to investigate War Crimes. However, if in the course of this presentation it appears necessary to call certain witnesses, we shall proceed to do so but with constant care not to slow down the sessions in any way and to bring them with all speed to the only possible conclusion, the one our peoples expect.
The whole question of atrocities is dominated by the German terrorist policy. Under this aspect it is not without precedent in the Germanic practice of war. We all remember the execution of hostages at Dinant during the war of 1914, the execution of hostages in the citadel of Laon, or the hostages of Senlis. But Nazism perfected this terrorist policy; for Nazism, terror is a means of subjugation. We all remember the propaganda picture about the war in Poland, shown in Oslo in particular on the eve of the invasion of Norway. For Nazism, terror is a means of subjugating all enslaved people in order to submit them to the aims of its policy.
The first signs of this terrorist policy during the occupation are fresh in the memory of all Frenchmen. Only a few months after the signing of the armistice they saw red posters edged with black appear on the walls of Paris, as well as in the smallest villages of France, proclaiming the first execution of 'hostages. We know mothers who were informed of the execution of their sons in this way. These executions were carried out by. the occupiers after anti-German incidents. These incidents were the answer of the French people to the official policy of collaboration. Resistance to this policy stiffened, became organized, and with it the repressive measures increased in intensity until 1944-the climax of German terrorism in France and in the countries of the West. At that time ,the Army and the SS Police no longer spoke of the execution of hostages; they organized real reprisal expeditions during which whole villages were set on fire, and thousands of civilians killed, or arrested and deported. But before reaching this stage, the Germans attempted to justify their criminal exactions in the eyes of a susceptible public opinion. They promulgated, as we shall prove, a real code of hostages, and pretended they were merely complying with law every time they proceeded to carry out reprisal executions.
The taking of hostages, as you know, is prohibited by Article 50 of the Hague Convention. I shall read this text to you. It is to be found in the Fourth Convention, Article 50:
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"No collective penalty, pecuniary or other, can be decreed against populations for individual acts for which they cannot be held jointly responsible." (Document Number RF-265).
And yet, supreme perfidy! The German an General Staff, the German Government, will endeavor to turn this regulation into a dead letter and to set up as law the systematic violation of the Hague Convention.
I shall describe to you how the General Staff formed its pseudo law on hostages, a pseudo-law which in France found its final expression in what Stuelpnagel and the German administration called the "hostages code." I shall show you, in passing, which of these defendants are the most guilty of this crime.
On the 15th of February 1940 in a secret report addressed to the Defendant Goering, the OKW justifies the taking of hostages, as proved by the excerpt from Document Number 1585-PS which I propose to read to you. This document is dated Berlin, 15 February 1940. It bears the heading: "Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Secret. To the Reich Minister for Aviation and Supreme Commander of the Air Force."
"Subject: Arrest of Hostages.
"According to the opinion of the OKW, the arrest of hostages is justified in all cases in which the security of the troops and the carrying out of their orders demand it. In most cases it will be necessary to, have recourse to it in case of resistance or an untrustworthy attitude on the part of the population of an occupied territory, provided that the troops are in combat or that a situation exists which renders other means of restoring security insufficient....
"In selecting hostages it must be borne in mind that their arrest shall take place only if the refractory sections of the population are anxious for the hostages to remain alive. The hostages shall therefore be chosen from sections of the population from which a hostile attitude may be expected. The arrest of hostages shall be carried out among persons whose fate, we may suppose, will influence the insurgents."
This document is filed by the French Delegation as Exhibit Number RF-267.
To my knowledge, Goering, never raised any objection to this thesis. Here is one more paragraph from an order, Document Number F-508 (Exhibit Number RF-268), from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in France, administrative section, signed "Stroccius," 12 September 1940. Three months after the beginning of the occupation, the hostages are defined therein as follows:
"Hostages are inhabitants of a country who guarantee with their lives the impeccable attitude of the population. The
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responsibility for their fate is thus placed in the hands of their compatriots. Therefore, the population must be publicly threatened that the hostages will be held responsible for hostile acts of individuals. Only French citizens may be taken as hostages. The hostages can be held responsible only for actions committed after their arrest and after the public proclamation."
This ordinance cancels 5 directives prior to 12 September 1940. This question was the subject of numerous texts, and two General Staff ordinances, dated, as indicated at the head of the Document Number F-510 (Exhibit Number RF-269), 2 November 1940 and 13 February 1941:
"If acts of violence are committed by the inhabitants of the country against members of the occupation forces, if offices and installations of the Armed Forces are damaged or destroyed, or if any other attacks are directed against the security of German units and service establishments, and if, under the circumstances, the population of the place of the crime or of the immediate neighborhood can be considered as jointly responsible for those acts of sabotage, measures of prevention and expiation may be ordered by which the civil population is to be deterred in future from committing, encouraging, or tolerating acts of that kind. The population is to be treated as jointly responsible for Individual acts of sabotage, if by its attitude in general towards the German Armed Forces, it has favored hostile or unfriendly acts of individuals, or if by its passive resistance against the investigation of previous acts of sabotage, it has encouraged hostile elements to similar acts, or otherwise created a favorable atmosphere for opposition to the German occupation. All measures must be taken in a way that it is possible to carry out. Threats that cannot be realized give the impression of weakness."
I submit these two documents as Exhibit Number RF-268 and 269 (Documents Number F-508 and F-510).
Until now we have not found any trace in these German texts of an affirmation which might lead one to think that the taking of hostages and their execution constitute a right for the occupying power; but here is a German text which explicitly formulates this idea. It is quoted in your book of documents as Document Number F-507 (Exhibit Number RF-270), dated Brussels, 18 April 1944. It is issued by the Chief Judge to the military Commander-in-Chief in Belgium and the North of France; and it is addressed to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. It reads in the margin: "Most
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Secret. Subject: Execution of 8 terrorists in Lille on 22 December 1943. Reference: Your letter of 16 March 1944 Lille document." You will read in the middle of Paragraph 2 of the text:
"...Moreover, I maintain my point of view that the legal foundations for the measures taken by the Oberfeldkommandantur of Lille, by virtue of the letter of my police group of the 2d of March 1944, are, regardless of the opinion of the Armistice Commission, sufficiently justified and further explanations are superfluous. The Armistice Commission is in a position to declare to the French, if it wishes to go into the question in detail at all, that the executions have been carried out in conformity with the general principles of the law concerning hostages."
It is, therefore, quite obviously a state doctrine which is involved. Innocent people become forfeit.. They answer with their lives for the attitude of their fellow-citizens towards the German Army. If an offense is committed of which they are completely ignorant, they are the object of a collective penalty possibly entailing d
eath. This is the official German thesis imposed by the German High Command, in spite of the protests of the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. I say: A thesis imposed by the German High Command, and I will produce the evidence. Keitel, on the 16th of September 1941, signed a general order which has already been read and filed by my American colleagues under Document Number 389-PS (Exhibit Number RF-271) and which I shall begin to explain. This order concerns all the occupied territories of the East and the West, as established by the list of addresses which includes all the military commanders of the countries then occupied by Germany: France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, Denmark, eastern territories, Ukraine, Serbia, Salonika, southern Greece, Crete. This order was in effect for the duration of the war. We have a text of 1944 which refers to it. This order of Keitel, Chief of the OKW, is dictated by a violent spirit of anti-Communist repression. It aims at an kinds of repression of the civilian population.
This order, which concerns even the commanders whose troops are stationed in the West, points out to them that in all cases in which attacks are made against the German Army:
"It is necessary to establish that we are dealing with a mass movement uniformly directed by Moscow to which may also be imputed the, seemingly unimportant sporadic incidents which have occurred in regions which have hitherto remained quiet."
Consequently Keitel orders, among other things, that 50 to 100 Communists are to be put to death for each German soldier killed. This is a political conception which we constantly meet in
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all manifestations of German terrorism. As far as Hitlerite propaganda is concerned, all resistance to Germany is of Communist inspiration, if not in essence Communist. The Germans thereby hoped to eliminate from among the resistance the nationalists whom they thought hostile to Communism. But the Nazis also pursued another aim: They still hoped above all to divide France and the other conquered countries of the West into two hostile factions and to put one of these factions at their service under the pretext of anti- Communism.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off for 10 minutes?
[A recess was taken.]
M. DUBOST: Keitel confirmed this order concerning hostages on 24 September 1941. We submit it as Exhibit Number RF-272, and you will find it in your document book as F-554. I shall read you the first paragraph:
"Following instructions by the Fuehrer, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued on 16 September 1941 an order concerning the Communist revolutionary movements in the occupied territories. The order was addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for the attention of Ambassador Ritter. It also deals with the question of capital punishment in court-martial proceedings.
"According to the order, in the future, most stringent measures must be taken in the occupied territories."
The choice of hostages is also indicated thus in Document Number 877-PS, which has already been read to you and which is previous to the aggression of Germany against Russia. It is necessary to remind the Tribunal of this document because it shows the premeditation of the German Command and the Nazi Government to divide the occupied countries, to take away from the partisan resistance all its patriotic character, in order to substitute for it a political character which it never had. We submit this document under Exhibit Number RF-273:
"In this connection it must be borne in mind that, apart from other adversaries with whom our troops have to contend, there is a particularly dangerous element of the civilian population which is destructive of all order and propagates Jewish Bolshevist philosophy. There is no doubt that, wherever he possibly can, this enemy uses this weapon of disintegration cunningly and :in ambush against the German forces which are fighting and liberating the country."
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This document is an official document issued by the headquarters of the High Command of the Army. It expresses the general doctrine of all the German Staff. It is Keitel who presides over the formation of this doctrine: He is therefore not only a soldier under the orders of his government; but at the same time that he is a general, he is also a Nazi politician whose acts are those of a war leader and also those of a politician serving the Hitlerite policy. You have proof of it in the document which I have just read to you: A general who is also a politician, in whom both politics and the conduct of war are combined in one single preoccupation. This is not surprising for those who know the German line of thought, which had never separated war and politics. Was it not Clausewitz who said that war was only the continuation of politics by other means?
This is doubly important. This constitutes a direct and crushing charge against Keitel; but Keitel is the German General Staff. Now this organization is indicted, and we see by this document that this indictment is justified as the German General Staff dabbled in the criminal policy of the German Cabinet.
In the case of France, the general orders of Keitel were adapted by Stuelpnagel in his order of 30 September 1941, better known in France under the name of "hostages code," which repeats and specifies in detail the previous order, namely that of 23 August 1941. This order of 30 September 1941 is of major importance to anyone who wishes to prove under what circumstances French hostages. were shot. This is why I shall be obliged to read large extracts. It defines, in Paragraph 3, the categories of Frenchmen who will be considered as hostages. I shall read this document 1588-PS, which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-274. Paragraph I concerns the seizure of hostages. I read:
"1. On 22 August 1941, 1 issued the following announcement: "'On the morning of 21 August 1941, a member of the German Armed Forces was killed in Paris as a result of a murderous attack. I therefore order that:
"'I. All Frenchmen held in custody of whatever kind, by the German authorities or on behalf of German authorities in France, are to be considered as hostages as from 23 August. "T. If any further incident occurs, a number of these hostages are to, be shot, to be determined according to the gravity of the attempt.'
"2. On 19 September 1941 by an announcement to the Plenipotentiary of the French Government attached to the Military Commander in France, I ordered that, as from 19 September 1941, all French males who are under arrest of any kind by the French authorities or who are taken into custody because
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of Communist or anarchistic agitation are to be kept under arrest by the French authorities also on behalf of the Military Commander in France.
"3. On the basis of my notification of the 22d of August 1941 and of my order of the 19th of September 1941 the following groups of persons are therefore hostages:
"'(a) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind whatsoever by the German authorities, such as police custody, imprisonment on remand, or penal detention.
"(b) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind whatsoever by the French authority on behalf of the German, authorities. This group includes:
"(aa) All Frenchmen who are kept in detention of any kind whatsoever by the French authorities because of Communist or anarchist activities.
"(bb) All Frenchmen on whom the French penal authorities impose prison terms at the request of the German military courts and which the latter consider justified.
"(cc) All Frenchmen who are arrested and kept in custody by the French authorities upon demand of the German authorities or who are being handed over by the Germans to French authorities with the order to keep them under arrest.
"(c) Stateless inhabitants who have already been living for some time in France are to be considered as Frenchmen within the meaning of my notification of the 22d of August 1941' . .
"III. Release from detention.
"Persons who were not yet in custody on 22 August 1941 or on 19 September 1941 but who were arrested later or are still being arrested are hostages as from the date of detention if the other conditions apply to them.
"The release of arrested persons authorized on account of expiration of sentences, lifting of the order for arrest, or for other reasons will not be affected by my announcement of 22 August 1941. Those released are no longer hostages.
"In as far as persons are in custody of any kind with the French authorities for Communist or anarchist activity, their release is possible only with my approval as I have informed the French Government....
"VI. Lists of hostages.
"If an incident occurs which according to my announcement of 22 August 1941 necessitates the shooting of hostages, the execution must immediately follow the order. The district commanders, therefore, must select for their own districts
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from the total number of prisoners (hostages es) those who, from a practical point of view, may be considered for execution and enter them on a list of hostages. These lists of hostages serve as a basis for the proposals to be submitted to me in the case of an execution.
"I. According to the observations made so far, the perpetrators of outrages originate from Communist or anarchist terror gangs. The district commanders are, therefore, to select from those in detention (hostages), those persons who, because of their Communist or anarchist views in the past or their positions in such organizations or their former attitude in other ways, are most suitable for execution. In making the selection it should be borne in mind that the better known the hostages to be shot, the greater will be the deterrent effect on the perpetrators, themselves, and on those persons who, in France or abroad, bear the moral responsibility--as instigators or by their propaganda-for acts of terror and sabotage. Experience shows that the instigators and the political circles interested in these plots are not concerned about the life of obscure followers, but are more likely to be concerned about the lives of their own former officials. Consequently, we must place at the head of these lists:
"(a) Former deputies and officials of Communist or anarchist organizations."
Allow me to make a comment, gentlemen. There never were any anarchist organizations represented in parliament, in either of our Chambers; and this paragraph (a) could only refer to former deputies and officials of the Communist organizations, of whom we know, moreover, that some were executed by the Germans as hostages.
"(b) Persons (intellectuals) who have supported the spreading of Communist ideas by word of mouth or writing.
"(c) Persons who have proved by their attitude that they are particularly dangerous.
"(d) Persons who have collaborated in the distribution of leaflets."
One idea is dominant in this selection: "We must punish the elite." In conformity with paragraph (b) of this article, we shall see that the Germans shot a great number of intellectuals, including Solomon and Politzer, in 1941 and 1942, in Paris and in the provincial towns.
I shall come back to these executions later when I give you examples of German atrocities committed in relation to the policy' of hostages in France.
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"2. Following the same directives, a list of hostages is to be prepared from the prisoners with De Gaullist sympathies.
"3. Racial Germans of French nationality who are imprisoned for Communist or anarchist activity may be included in the list. Special attention must be drawn to their German origin on the attached form.
"Persons who have been condemned to death but who have been pardoned may also be included in the lists....
"5. The lists have to record for each district about 150 persons and for the Greater Paris Command about 300 to 400 people. The district chiefs should always record on their lists those persons who had their last residence or permanent domicile in their districts, because the persons to be executed should, as far as possible, be taken from the district where the act was committed....
"The lists are to be kept up to date. Particular attention is to be paid to new arrests and releases.'
"VII. Proposals for executions:
"In case of an incident which necessitates the shooting of hostages, within the meaning of my announcement of 22 August 1941, the district chief in whose territory the incident. happened is to select from the list of hostages persons whose execution he wishes to propose to me. In making the selection he must, from the personal as well as local point of view, draw from persons belonging to a circle which presumably includes the guilty." I skip a paragraph. "For execution, only those persons who were already under arrest at the time of the crime may be proposed.
"The proposal must contain the names and number of the persons proposed for execution, that is, in the order in which the choice is recommended."
And, at the very end of Paragraph VIII, we read:
"When the bodies are buried, the burial of a large number in a common grave in the same cemetery is to be avoided, in order not to create places of pilgrimage which, now or later, might form centers for anti-German propaganda. Therefore, if necessary, burials must be carried out in various places." Parallel to this document, concerning France, there exists in Belgium an order of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941, which you will find on Page 6 of the official report on Belgium, Document Number F-683, which I shall submit as Exhibit Number RF-275.
THE PRESIDENT: Is the Belgian document worded in substantially the same terms as the document you have just read?
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M. DUBOST: Exactly.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I do not think you need to read that. M. DUBOST: As you wish. Then it will not be necessary either to read in entirety the warning of Seyss-Inquart concerning Holland. I think that by referring to these exhibits in your document book, you will be able to obtain items of evidence which will only confirm what I read to you of Stuelpnagel's order.
For Norway and Denmark there is a teletyped letter from Keitel to the Supreme Command of the Navy, dated 30 November 1944, which you will find in the document book, as Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280). I read the end of Paragraph 1:
"Every ship-yard worker must know that any act of sabotage occurring within his sphere of activity entails for him personally or for his relatives, if he disappears, the most serious consequences."
Page 2 of Document Number 870-PS (Exhibit Number RF-281): "4. 1 have just received a teletype from Field Marshal Keitel requesting the publication of an order according to which the personnel or, if need be, their near relatives (liability of next of kin) will be held collectively responsible for the acts of sabotage occurring in their factories."
And Terboven, who wrote this sentence, added (and it is he who condemns Marshal Keitel):
"This request only makes sense and will only be successful if I am actually allowed to have executions carried out by shooting."
All these documents will be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, do I understand that in Belgium, Holland, in Norway, and in Denmark, there were similar orders or decrees with reference to hostages?
M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, I mean to read those concerning Belgium, Holland, and Norway. For Belgium, for instance, you will find at Page 6, Document Number F-683, which is the official document of the Belgian Ministry of, Justice:
"Brussels, 29 November 1945, 1, rue de Turin. Decree of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1911.
"In the future, the population must expect that if attacks are made on members of the German Army or the
German Police and the culprits cannot be arrested, a number of hostages proportionate to the gravity of the offense, five at a minimum, will be shot if the attack causes death. All political prisoners in Belgium are, with immediate effect, to be considered as hostages."
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THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I did not want you to read these documents if they are substantially in the same form as the document you have already read.
M. DUBOST: They are more or less in the same form, Your Honor. I shall submit them because they constitute the proof of the systematic repetition of the same methods to obtain the same results, that is, to cause terror to reign in all the occupied countries of the West., But, if the Tribunal considers it constant and established that these methods were systematically used in all the western regions, naturally I shall spare you the reading of documents which are monotonous and which repeat in substance what was said in the document relating to France.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better give us references to the documents which concern Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark.,
M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, for Belgium, Document F-683, Page 6, decree of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-275, as constituting the official report of the Kingdom of Belgium against the principal war criminals.
The second document is C-46, -corresponding to UK-42 (24 November 1942), submitted as Exhibit Number RF-276.
For Holland, a warning by Seyss-Inquart, Document Number F-224, which you may feel it necessary for me to read, since Seyss- Inquart is one of the defendants. I submit this document under Exhibit Number RF-279, and I quote:
"For the destruction or the damaging of railway installations, telephone cables, and post offices I shall make responsible all the inhabitants of the community on whose territory the act is committed.
"The population of these communities must expect that reprisals will be taken against private property and that houses or whole blocks will be destroyed."
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I don't know where you are reading. Which paragraph are you reading?
M. DUBOST: I am told, Mr. President, that this document has not been bound with the Dutch report; I shall file it at the end of the hearing, if I may.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well,
M. DUBOST: I quote now another document, the warning of Seyss-Inquart to Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: And that is what number?
M. DUBOST: Number 152 in your document book, concerning German justice, which will be submitted at the hearing tomorrow.
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For Norway and Denmark we have several documents which establish that the same policy of execution of hostages was followed. We have, in particular, Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280) from which I read a short time ago.
All those special orders for each of the occupied regions of the West are the result of the general order of Keitel, which my American colleagues have already read and on which I merely gave a comment this morning. The responsibility of Keitel in the development of the policy of execution of hostages is total. He was given warning; German generals even told him that this policy went beyond the aim pursued and might become dangerous.
On 16 September 1942, General Falkenhausen addressed a letter to him, from which I extract the following passage-it is Document Number 1594-PS, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-283:
"Enclosed is a list of the shootings of hostages which have taken place until now in my area and the incidents on account of which these shootings took place.,
"In a great number of cases, particularly in the most serious, the perpetrators were later apprehended and sentenced.
"This result is undoubtedly very unsatisfactory. The effect is not so much deterrent as destructive of the feeling of the population for right and security; the cleft between the people influenced by communism and the remainder of the population is being bridged; all circles are becoming filled with a feeling of hatred toward the occupying forces and effective inciting material is given to enemy propaganda. Thereby military danger and general political reaction of an entirely unwanted nature . . .- Signed - "Von Falkenhausen."
I shall now present Document Number 1587-PS from the same German general and he seems to be lucid:
"In addition I wish once more to point out the following:
"In several cases the authors of aggression or acts of sabotage were discovered when the hostages had already been shot, shortly after the criminal acts had been committed, according to the instructions received. Moreover, the real culprits often did not belong to the same circles as the executed hostages. Undoubtedly in such cases the execution of hostages does not inspire terror in the population but indifference to repressive measures and even resentment on the part of some sections of the population who until then had displayed a passive attitude. The result for the occupying power is therefore negative as planned and intended by the English agents, who were often the instigators of these acts. It win therefore be necessary to prolong the delay in cases where the arrest of
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the culprits may yet be expected. I therefore request that you leave to me the responsibility for fixing such delays, in order that the greatest possible success in the fight against terrorist acts may be obtained."
THE PRESIDENT: Is it known what the date of that document was?
M. DUBOST: It is after the 16th of September 1941. We do not have the exact date. The document is appended to another document, the date of which is illegible; but it is after Keitel's order since it gives an account of the executions of hostages, carried out in compliance with that order. It points out that after the execution of the hostages the culprits were found; that the effect was deplorable and aroused the resentment of some of the population.
You will find also in this Document Number 1587-PS-but this time an extract from the monthly report of the Commander of the Wehrmacht in the Netherlands-the report for the month of August 1942, a new warning to Keitel:
"B. Special events and the political situation:
"On the occasion of an attempt against a train of soldiers on furlough due to arrive in Rotterdam, a Dutch railway guard was seriously wounded by touching a wire connected with an explosive charge, thus causing an explosion. The following repressive measures were announced in the Dutch press:
"The deadline for the arrest of the perpetrators, with collaboration of the population, is fixed at 14 August, midnight. A reward of 100,000 florins will be made for a denunciation, which will be treated confidentially. If the culprits are not arrested within the time appointed, arrests of hostages are threatened; railway lines will be guarded by Dutchmen.
"Since, despite this summons, the perpetrator did not report and was not otherwise discovered, the following hostages, among whom some had already been in custody for several weeks as hostages, were shot on the order of the Higher SS and Police Fuehrer."
I will pass over the enumeration of the names. I omit the next paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you read the names and the titles?
M. DUBOST: "Ruys, Willem, Director General, Rotterdam; Count E.O.G. Van Limburg-Stirum, Arnhem; M. Baelde, Robert, Doctor of Law, Rotterdam; Bennenkers, Christoffel, former Inspector General of the Police at Rotterdam; Baron Alexander Schimmelpennink Van der Oye, Noordgouwe (Seeland)." One paragraph further on:
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"Public opinion was particularly affected by the execution of these hostages. Reports at hand express the opinion that, from the beginning of the occupation, no stroke inflicted by the Germans was more deeply felt. Many anonymous letters, and even some signed ones, sent to the Commander of the Wehrmacht, who was considered as responsible for this ,unheard of event,' show the varied reactions of the mass of the Dutch people. From the bitterest insults to apparently pious petitions and prayers not to resort to extremes, no nuance was lacking which did not in one way or another indicate, to say the least, complete disapproval and misunderstanding, first of the threat, and secondly of the actual execution of the hostages. Reproaches for this most severe infraction. of law (which were based on serious argument and often gave rise to thought), and also cries of despair from idealists who, in spite of all that had occurred in the political sphere, had still believed in German-Dutch understanding but now saw all was at an end-all this was found in the correspondence. In addition, the objection was raised that such methods were only doing the work of the Communists, who as the real instigators of active sabotage must be very glad to couple with their achievements the pleasure of the elimination of such hostages.
"In short, such disapproval even in the ranks of the very few really pro-German Dutch had never before been noticed, so much hatred at one time had never been felt."-signed-Schneider, Captain."
Despite these warnings proffered by conscientious subordinates, neither the General Staff nor Keitel ever gave any order to the contrary. The order of 16 September 1941 always remained in force. When I have shown you examples of executions of hostages in France, you will see that a number of facts which I shall utilize are dated 1942, 1943 and even 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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MARSHAL: If Your Honor please, the Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Streicher will continue to be absent during this afternoon's session.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dubost, the Tribunal had some difficulty this morning in following the documents that you were citing; and also, the Tribunal understands the interpreters had some difficulty because the document books, except the one that is before me, have no indications of the "PS" or other numbers; and the documents themselves are not numbered in order. Therefore it is extremely difficult for members of the Tribunal to find documents, and it is also extremely difficult for the interpreters to find any document which may be before them.
So, this afternoon, it will be appreciated if you will be so kind as to indicate what the document is, and then give both the interpreters and the Tribunal enough time in which they may find the document, and then indicate exactly which part of the document you are going to read, that is to say, whether it is the beginning of the document, or the first paragraph, or the second, and so on. But you must bear with us if we find some difficulty in following you in the documents.
M. DUBOST:, Very well, Your Honor.
I had finished this morning presenting the general rules which prevailed during the five years of occupation in the matter of the execution of numerous hostages in the occupied countries of the West. I brought you the evidence, by reading a series of official German documents, that the highest authorities of the Army, of the Party, and of the Nazi Government had deliberately chosen to practice a terroristic policy through the seizure of hostages.
Before passing to the examination of a few particular cases, it seems to me to be necessary to say exactly wherein this policy consisted, in the light of the texts which I have quoted.
According to the circumstances, people belonging by choice or ethnically to the vanquished nations were apprehended and held as a guarantee for. the maintenance of order in a given sector; or after a given incident of which the enemy army had been the victim. They were apprehended and held with a view to obtaining the execution by the vanquished population of acts determined by the occupying authority, such as denunciation, payment of collective fines, the handing over of perpetrators of assaults committed against the German Army, and the handing over of political adversaries; and these persons thus arrested were often massacred subsequently by way of reprisal.
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An idea emerges from methods of this kind, namely, that the hostage, who is a human being, becomes a special security subjected to seizure as determined by the enemy. How contrary this is to the rule of individual liberty and human dignity. All the members of the German Government are jointly responsible for this iniquitous concept and for its application in our vanquished countries. No member of the German Government can throw this responsibility on to subordinates by claiming that they merely executed clearly stated orders with an excess. of zeal.
I have shown you that upon many occasions, on the contrary, the persons who carried out the orders reported to the chiefs the moral consequences resulting from the application of the terroristic policy of hostages. And we know that in no case were contrary orders given. We know that the original orders were always maintained.
I shall not endeavor to enumerate in their totality all the cases of executions of hostages. For our country, France, alone, there were 29,660 executed. This is proved in Document Number F-420, dated Paris, 21 December 1945, the original of which will be submitted under Exhibit Number EF-266 to your Tribunal. It is at the beginning of the document book, the second document. There in detail, region by region, the number is given of the hostages who were executed.
"Region of: Lille, 1,143; Laon, 222; Rouen, 658; Angers, 863; Orleans, 501; Reims, 353; Dijon, 1,691; Poitiers, 82; Strasbourg, 211; Rennes, 974; Limoges, 2,863; Clermont-Ferrand, 441; Lyons, 3,674; Marseilles, 1,513; Montpellier, 785; Toulouse, 765; Bordeaux, 806; Nancy, 571; Metz, 220; Paris, 11,000; Nice, 324; total, 29,660."
I shall limit my presentation to a few typical cases of executions which unveil the political plan of the General Staff which prescribed these executions-plans of terror, plans that were intended to create and accentuate the division between Frenchmen, or, more generally, between citizens of the occupied countries. You will find in your document book a file quoted as F-133, which I submit as Exhibit* Number RF-288. This is called "Posters Concerning Pans." At the head of the page you will read, Pariser Zeitung supplement. This document reproduces a few of the very numerous posters and bills, some of the numerous notices inserted in the a press from 1940 to 1945 announcing the arrest of hostages in Paris, in the Paris district, and in France. I shall read only one of these documents, which you will find on the second page, entitled Number 6, 19 September 1941. You will see in it an appeal to informers, an appeal to traitors; you will see in it a means of corruption, which systematically applied
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to all the countries of the West for years; all tended to demoralize them to an equal extent:
"Appeal to the population of occupied territories.
"On 21 August a German soldier was fired on and killed by cowardly murderers. In consequence I ordered on 23 August that hostages be taken, and threatened to have a certain number of them' shot in case such an assault should be repeated.
"New crimes have obliged me to put this threat into execution. In spite of this, new assaults have taken place.
"I recognize that the great majority of the population is conscious of its duty, which is to help the authorities in their unremitting effort to maintain calm and order in the country in the interest of this population."
And here is the appeal to informers:
"But among you there are agents paid by powers hostile to Germany, Communist criminal elements who have only one aim, which is to sow discord between the occupying power and the French population. These elements are completely indifferent to the consequences, affecting the entire population, which result from their activity.
"I will no longer allow the lives of German soldiers to be threatened by these murderers. I shall stop at no measure, however rigorous, in order to fulfill my duty.
"But it is likewise my duty to make the whole population responsible for the fact that, up to the present, it has not yet been possible to lay hands on the cowardly murderers and to impose upon them the penalty which they deserve.
"That is why I have found it necessary, first of all for Paris, to take measures which, unfortunately, will hinder the everyday life of the entire population. Frenchmen, it depends on you whether I am obliged to render these measures more severe or whether they can be suspended again.
"I appeal to you all, to your administration and to your police, to co-operate by your extreme vigilance and your active personal intervention in the arrest of the guilty. It is necessary, by anticipating and denouncing these criminal activities, to avoid the creation of a critical situation which would plunge the country into misfortune.
"He who fires in ambush on German soldiers, who are doing only their duty here and who are safeguarding the maintenance of a normal life, is not a patriot but a cowardly assassin and the enemy of all decent people.
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"Frenchmen! I count on you to understand these measures which I am taking in your own interests also."-Signed "Von Stulpnagel."
Numerous notices follow which all have to do with executions.
Under Number 8 on the following page you will find a list of twelve names among which are three of the best known lawyers of the Paris Bar, who are characterized as militant Communists, Messrs. Pitard, Hajje and Rolnikas.
In file 21 submitted by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, in the course of his economic presentation, you will find a few notices which are similar, published in the German official journal VOBIF.
You will observe, in connection with this notice of 16 September announcing the execution or rather, the murder, of M. Pitard and his companions, that the murderers had neither the courage nor the honesty to say that they were all Parisian lawyers. Was it by mistake? I think that it was a calculated lie, for at this time it was necessary to handle the elite gently. The occupying power still hoped to separate them from the people of France.
I shall describe to you in detail two cases which spread grief in the hearts of the French in the course of the month of October 1941 and which have remained present in the memory of all my compatriots. They are known as the "executions of Chateaubriant and of Bordeaux." They are related in Document Number F-415 in your document book, Which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-285.
After the attack on two German officers at Nantes on 20 October 1941 and in Bordeaux a few days later, the German Army decided to make an example. You will find, on Page 22 of Document Number F-415, a copy of the notice in the newspaper Le Phare of 21 October 1941.
"Notice. Cowardly criminals in the pay of England and of Moscow killed, with shots in the back, the Feldkommandant of Nantes on the morning of 20 October 1941. Up to now the assassins have not been arrested.
"As expiation for this crime I have ordered that 50 hostages be shot to begin with. Because of the gravity -of the crime, 50 more hostages will be shot in case the guilty should not be arrested between now and 23 October 1941 by midnight."
The conditions under which these reprisals were exercised are worth describing in detail. Stulpnagel, who was commanding the German troops in France, ordered the Minister of the Interior to designate prisoners. These prisoners were to be selected among the Communists Who were considered the most dangerous (these are the terms of Stulpnagel's order). A list of 60 Frenchmen was
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furnished by the Minister of the Interior. This was Pucheu. He has since been tried by my compatriots, sentenced to death, and executed.
The Subprefect of Chateaubriant sent a letter to the Kommandantur of Chateaubriant in reply to the order which he received from the Minister of the Interior:
"Following our conversation of today, I have the honor of confirming to you that the Minister of the Interior has communicated today with General Von Stulpnagel in order to designate to him the most dangerous Communist prisoners among those who are now held at Chateaubriant. You will find enclosed herewith the list of 60 individuals who have been handed over this day."
On the following page is the German order:
"Because of the assassination of the Feldkommandant of Nantes, Lieutenant Colonel Hotz, on 20 October 1941, the following Frenchmen, who were already imprisoned as hostages in accordance with my publication of 22 August 1941 and of my ordinance to the Plenipotentiary General of the French Government of 19 September 1941, are to be shot."
In the following pages you will find a list, of all the men who were shot on that day. I leave out the reading of the list in order not to lengthen the proceedings unduly.
On Page 16 you will find a list of 48 names. On Page 13 you will find the list of those who were shot in Nantes. On Page 12 you will find the list of those who were shot in Chateaubriant. Their bodies were distributed for burial to all the surrounding communes.
I shall read to you the testimony of eyewitnesses as to how they were buried after having been shot. On Page 3 of this document you will find the note of M. Dumenil concerning the executions of 21 October 1941, which was written the day after these executions. The second paragraph reads:
"The priest was called at 11:30 to the prison of La Fayette. An officer, probably of the GFP, told him that he was to announce to certain prisoners that they were going to be shot. The priest was then locked up in a room with the 13 hostages who were at the prison. The other three, who were at les Rochettes, were ministered to by Abbe Theon, professor at the College Stanislas.
"The Abbe Fontaine said to the condemned, 'Gentlemen, you must understand, alas, what my presence means.' He then spoke with the prisoners collectively and individually for the two hours which the officers had said would be granted to
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arrange the personal affairs of the condemned and to write their last messages to their families.
"The execution had been fixed for 2 o'clock in the afternoon, half an hour having been allowed for the journey. But the two hours went by, another hour passed, and still another hour before the condemned were sent for. Certain of them, optimists by nature, like M. Fourny, already hoped that a countermanding order would be given, in which the priest himself did not at all believe.
"The condemned were all very brave. It was two of the youngest, Gloux and Grolleau, who were students, who constantly encouraged the others, saying that it was better to die in this way than to perish uselessly in an accident.
"At the moment of leaving, the priest, for reasons which were not explained to him, was not authorized to accompany the hostages to the place of execution. He went down the stairs of the prison with them as far as the car. They were chained together in twos. The thirteenth had on handcuffs. Once they were in the truck, Gloux and Grolleau made another gesture of farewell to him, smiling and waving their hands that were chained together.
"Signed: Dumenil, Counsellor attached to the Cabinet."
Sixteen were shot in Nantes. Twenty-seven were shot in Chateaubriant Five were shot outside the department. For those who were shot in Chateaubriant. we know what their last moments were like. The Abbe Moyon, who was present, wrote on 22 October 1941 the account of this execution. This is the third paragraph, Page 17 of your document:
"It was on a beautiful autumn day. The temperature was particularly mild. There had been lovely sunshine since morning. Everyone in town was going about his usual business. There was great animation in the town for it was Wednesday, which was market day. The population knew from the newspapers and from the information it had received from Nantes that a superior officer had been killed in a street in Nantes but refused to believe that such savage and extensive reprisals would be applied. At Choisel Camp the German authorities had, for some days, put into special quarters a certain number of men who were to serve as hostages in case of special difficulties. It was from among these men that those who were to be shot on this evening of 22 October 1941 were chosen.
"The Cure of Bere was finishing his lunch when M. Moreau Chief of Choisel Camp presented himself. In a few words
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the latter explained to him the object of his visit. Having been delegated by M. Lecornu, the subprefect of Chateaubriant. he had come to inform him that 27 men selected among the political prisoners of Choisel were going to be executed that afternoon; and he asked Monsieur Le Cure to go immediately to attend them. The priest said he was ready to accomplish this mission, and he went to the prisoners without delay.
"When the priest appeared to carry out his mission, the subprefect was already among the condemned. He came to announce the horrible fate which was awaiting them, asking them to write letters of farewell to their families without delay. It was under these circumstances that the priest presented himself at the entrance to the quarters."
You will find on Page 19 the "departure for the execution," Paragraph 4:
"Suddenly there was the sound of automobile engines. The door, which I had shut at the beginning so that we might be more private, was abruptly opened and French constables carrying handcuffs appeared. A German officer arrived. He was actually a chaplain. He said to me, 'Monsieur le Cure, your mission has been accomplished and you must withdraw immediately."'
At the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:
"Access to the quarry where the execution took place was absolutely forbidden to all Frenchmen. I only know that the condemned were executed in three groups of nine men, that all the men who were shot refused to have their eyes bound, that young Mocquet fainted and fell, and that the last cry which sprang from the lips of these heroes was an ardent 'Vive la France."
On Page 21 of the same document you will find the declaration of Police Officer Roussel. It is also worth reading:
"The 22 October 1941 at about 3:30 in the afternoon, I happened to be in the Rue du 11 Novembre at Chateaubriant and I saw coming from Choisel Camp four or five German trucks, I cannot say exactly how many, preceded by an automobile in which was a German officer. Several civilians with handcuffs were in the trucks and were singing patriotic songs, the 'Marseillaise,' the 'Chant du Depart,' and so forth. One of the trucks was filled with armed German soldiers.
"I learned subsequently that these were hostages who had just been fetched from Choisel Camp to be taken to the quarry of
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Sabliere on the Soudan Road to be shot- in reprisal for the murder at Nantes of the German Colonel Hotz.
"About two hours later these same trucks came back from the quarry and drove into the court of the Chateaubriant. where the bodies of the men who had been shot were deposited in a cellar until coffins could be made.
"Conning back from the quarry the trucks were covered and no noise was heard, but a trickle of blood escaped from them and left a trail on the road from the quarry to the castle.
"The following day, on the 23rd of October, the bodies of the men who had been shot were put into coffins without any French persons being present, the entrances to the chateau having been guarded by German sentinels. The dead were then taken to nine different cemeteries in the surrounding communes, that is, three coffins to each commune. The Germans were careful to choose communes where there was no regular transport service, presumably to avoid the population going en masse to the graves of these martyrs.
"I was not present at the departure of the hostages from the camp nor at the shooting in the quarry of Sabliere, as the approaches to it were guarded by German soldiers armed with machine guns."
Almost at the same time, in addition to these 48 hostages who were shot, there were others-those of Bordeaux. You win find in your document book, under Document Number F-400, documents which have been sent to us by the Prefecture of the Gironde, which we submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-286.
One of them comes from the Bordeaux Section of Political Affairs, and is dated 22 October 1941, Document F-400(b).
"In the course of the conference, which took place last night at the Feldkommandantur of Bordeaux, the German authorities asked me to proceed immediately to arrest 100 individuals known for their sympathy with the Communist Party or the Gaullist movement, who will be considered as hostages, and to make a great number of house searches.
"These operations have been in process since this morning. So far no interesting result has been called to my attention. In addition, this morning at 11 o'clock the German authorities informed me of the reprisal measures which they had decided to take against the population."
These reprisal measures you will find set forth on Page "A" of the same document in a letter addressed by General Von Faber Du Faur, Chief of the Regional Administration of Bordeaux, to the Prefect of the Gironde. I quote:
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"Bordeaux, 23 October 1941.
"To the Prefect of the Gironde, Bordeaux.
"As expiation for the cowardly murder of the Councillor of War, Reimers, the Military Commander in France has ordered 50 hostages to be executed. The execution will take place tomorrow.
"In case the murderers should not be arrested in the very near future, additional measures will be taken, as in the case of Nantes.
"I have the honor of making this decision known to you.
"Chief of the Military Regional Administration,"-signed" Von Faber Du Faur."
And in execution of this order, 50 men were shot. There is a famous place in the suburbs of Paris which has become a place of pilgrimage for the French since our liberation. It is the Fort of Romainville. During the occupation the Germans converted this fort into a hostage depot from which they selected victims when they wanted to take revenge after some patriotic demonstration. It is from Romainville that Professors Jacques Solomon, Decourtemanche, Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer and six other Frenchmen departed. They had been arrested in March 1942, tortured by the Gestapo, then executed without trial in the month of May 1942, because they refused to renounce their faith.
On 19 August 1942, 96 hostages left this fort, among them M. Le Gall, a municipal councillor of Paris. They left the fort of Romainville were transferred to Mont-Valerien and executed.
In September 1942 an assault had been made against some German soldiers at the Rex cinema in Paris. General Von Stulpnagel issued a proclamation announcing that, because of this assault, he had caused 116 hostages to be shot and that extensive measures of deportation were to be taken. You will find an extract from this newspaper in Document Number F-402(b) (Exhibit Number RF-287).
The notice was worded as follows:
"As a result of assaults committed by Communist agents and terrorists in the pay of England, German soldiers and French civilians have been killed or wounded.
"As reprisal for these assaults I have had 116 Communist terrorists shot, whose participation or implication in terroristic acts has been proved by confessions.
"In addition, severe measures of repression have been taken. In order to prevent incidents on the occasion of demonstrations planned by the Communists for 20 September 1942, 1 ordered the
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"1) From Saturday, 19 September 1942, from 3 o'clock in the afternoon, until Sunday, 20 September 1942, at midnight, all theaters, cinemas, cabarets, and other places of amusement reserved for the French population shall be closed in the Departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. All public demonstrations, including sports, are forbidden.
"2) On Sunday, 20 September 1942, from 3 o'clock in the afternoon until midnight, non-German civilians are forbidden to walk about in the streets and public places in the Departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. The only exceptions are persons representing official services ......
In actual fact, it was only on the day of 20 September that 46 of these hostages were chosen from the list of 116. The Germans handed newspapers of 20 September to the prisoners of Romainville, announcing the decision of the Military High Command. It was, therefore, through the newspapers that the prisoners of Romainville learned that a certain number of them would be chosen at the end of the afternoon to be led before the firing squad.
All lived through that day awaiting the call that would be made that evening. Those who were called knew their fate beforehand. All died innocent of the crimes for which they were being executed, for those who were responsible for the assault in the Rex cinema were arrested a few days later.
It was in Bordeaux that the 70 other hostages of the total of 116 announced by General Von Stulpnagel were executed. In reprisal for the murder of Ritter, the German official of the Labor Front, 50 other hostages were shot at the end of September 1943 in Paris. Here is a reprint of the newspaper article which announced these executions to the French people-Document Number F-402(c).
"Reprisals - against terroristic acts. Assaults and acts of sabotage have increased in France recently. For this reason 50 terrorists, convicted of having participated in acts of sabotage and of terrorism, were shot on 2 October 1943 by order of the German authorities."
All these facts concerning the hostages of Romainville have been related to us by one of the rare survivors, M. Rabate, a mechanic living at 69 Rue de la Tombe-Issiore, Paris, whose testimony was taken by one of our collaborators.
In this testimony-Document Number F-402(a), which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number RF-287-we read the following:
"There were 70 of us, including Professor Jacques Solomon, Decourtemanche and Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer, and Messrs. Engros, Dudach, Cadras, Dalidet, Golue, Pican who were shot
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in the month of May 1942, and an approximately equal number of women.
"Some of us were transferred to the German quarter of the Sante (a prison in Paris), but the majority of us were taken to the military prison of Cherche-Midi (in Paris). We were questioned in turn by a Gestapo officer in the offices of the Rue des Saussaies. Some of us, especially Politzer and Solomon, were tortured to such an extent that their limbs were broken, according to the testimony of their wives.
"Moreover, while questioning me, the Gestapo officer confirmed this to me: I repeat his words:
'Rabate, here you will have to speak. Professor Langevin's son-in-law, Jacques Solomon, came in here arrogant. He went out crawling.'
"After a short stay of 5 months in the prison of Cherche-Midi, in the course of which we learned of the execution as hostages of the 10 prisoners already mentioned, we were transferred on 24 August 1942 to the Fort of Romainville.
"It is to be noted that from the day of our arrest we were forbidden to write, or to receive mail, or inform our families where we were. On the doors of our cells was written, 'Alles verboten' ('Everything is forbidden'). We received only the strict food ration of the prison, namely, 'three-fourths of a liter of vegetable soup and 200 grams of black bread per day. The biscuits sent to the prison for political prisoners by the Red Cross or by the Quakers' Association were not given to us because of this prohibition.
"In the Fort of Romainville we were interned as 'isolated prisoners,' an expression corresponding to the 'NN' (Nacht und Nebel), which we knew about in Germany."
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that, unless there is anything very special that you wish to read in any of these documents, they have already heard the number of the hostages who were put to death and they think that it really does not add to it - the actual details of these documents.
M. DUBOST: I thought, Mr. President, that I had not spoken to you of the regime to which men were subjected when they were prisoners of the German Army. I thought that it was my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on the condition of these men in the German prisons.
I thought that it was also my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on the ill-treatment inflicted by the Gestapo, who left the son-in-law of Professor Langevin with his limbs broken. Moreover that is found in a testimony.
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THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if there are matters of that sort which you think it right to go into, you must do so; but the actual details of individual shooting of hostages we think you might, at any rate, summarize. But if there are particular atrocities which you wish to draw our attention to, by all means do so.
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I have only given two examples of executions out of the multiple executions which caused 29,660 deaths in my country.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: In the region of the North of France, which was administratively attached to Belgium and subjected to the authority of General Von Falkenhausen, the same policy of execution was practiced. You will find in Document Number F-133, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-289, copies of a great number of posters announcing either arrests, executions, or deportations. Certain of these posters include, moreover, an appeal to informers, and they are analogous to those which I read to you in connection with France. Perhaps it would be well, nevertheless, to point out the one that you will find on Page 3, which concerns the execution of 20 Frenchmen, ordered as the result of a theft; that on Page 4, which concerns the execution of 15 Frenchmen, ordered as a result of an attack against a railroad installation; and finally, especially the last, the one that you will find on Pages 8 and 9, which announces that executions will be carried out, and invites the civilian population to hand over the guilty ones, if they know them, to the German Army.
As concerns especially the countries of the West other than France, we have a very great number of identical cases. You will find in your document book, under Document Number F-680, Exhibit Number RF-290, a copy of a poster by the Military Commander-in- Chief for Belgium and the North of France, which announces the arrest in Tournai, on 18 September 1941, of 25 inhabitants as hostages, and specifies the condition under which certain of them will be shot if the guilty are not discovered. But you will find especially, under the Number F-680(a) a remarkable document; it comes from the German authorities themselves. It is the secret report of the German Chief of Police in Belgium dated 13 December 1944, that is to say, when Belgium was totally liberated and this German official wished to give an account to his chiefs of his services during the occupation of Belgium.
From the first page of this document we take the following passage:
"The increasing incitement of the population, by enemy radio and enemy press, to acts of terrorism and sabotage"-this is
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applied to Belgium-"the passive attitude of the population, particularly that of the Belgian administration, the complete failure of the public prosecutors, the examining judges, and of the police to disclose and prevent terrorist acts, have finally led to preventive and repressive measures of the most rigorous kind, that is to say, to the execution of persons closely related to the culprits.
"Already on 19 October 1941, on the occasion of the murder of two police officials in Tournai, the Military Commander-in-Chief declared through an announcement appearing in the press that all the political prisoners in Belgium would be considered as hostages with immediate effect. In the provinces of the north of France, subject to the jurisdiction of the same Military Commander-in-Chief, this ordinance was already in force as from 26 August 1941. Through repeated notices appearing in the press the civilian population has been informed that political prisoners taken as hostages will be executed if the murders continue to be committed.
"As a result of the assassination of Teughels, Rexist major of Charleroi, and other attempts at assassination of public officials, the Military Commander-in-Chief has been obliged to order, for the first time in Belgium, the execution of eight terrorists. The date of the execution is 27 November 1942."
On the following page of this same document-Number F-680(b) you will find another order dated 22 April 1944, secret, and issued by the Military Commander in Belgium and the North of France, concerning measures of reprisal for the murder of two Walloon SS, who had fought at Tcherkassy; five hostages were shot on that day.
On the following page nine hostages are added to these five, and still a tenth on the next page. Then five others on the following page.
You will find, finally, on the next to the last page of the document, a proposed list of persons to be shot in reprisal for the murder of SS men. Compare the dates, and judge the ferocity with which the assassination of these two Walloon traitors, SS volunteers, was revenged.
Finally, you will see the names of the 20 Belgian patriots who were thus murdered.
"Nouveau Journal, 25 April 1944.
"Measures of reprisal for the murder of men who fought at Tcherkassy.
"Announcement by the German authorities:
"The perpetrators of the assassination on 6 April of the members of the SS Sturmbrigade Wallonie, Hubert Stassen and
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Francois Musch, who fought at Tcherkassy, have so far not been apprehended. Therefore, in accordance with the communication dated 10 April 1944, the 20 terrorists whose names follow have been executed:
"Renatus Dierickx of Louvain; Francois Boets of Louvain; Antoine Smets of Louvain; Jacques Van Tilt of Holsbeeks; Emiliens Van Tilt of Holsbeek; Franciskus Aerts of Herent; Jan Van der Elst of Herent; Gustave Morren of Louvain; Eugene Hupin of Chapelle-lez- Herlaimont; Pierre Leroy of Boussois; Leon Hermann of Montigny-sur-Sambre; Felix Trousson of Chaudfontaine; Joseph Grab of Tirlemont; Octave Wintgens of Baelen-Hontem; Stanislaw Mrozowski of Grace Berleur; Marcel Boeur of Athus; Marcel Dehon of Ghlin; Andre Croquelois of Pont des Briques, near Boulogne; Gustave Hos of Mons; and the stateless Jew, Walter Kriss of Herent."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
M. DUBOST: As far as the other western countries, Holland and Norway, are concerned, we have received documents which we submit as Document Number F-224(b), Exhibits RF-291, 292, and 293.
In the French text you will find a long list of civilians who were executed. Also you will find a report of the Chief of the Criminal Police, Munt, in connection with these executions, and you win observe that Munt tries to prove his own innocence, in my opinion without success. This is in Document Number RF-277, already submitted.
On Page 6 you will find the report of an investigation concerning mass executions carried out by the Germans in Holland. I do not think it is necessary to read this report. It brings no new factual element and simply illustrates the thesis that I have been presenting since-this morning: That in all the western countries the German military authorities systematically carried out executions of hostages as reprisals for acts of resistance. You will see that on 7 March 1945 an order was given to shoot 80 prisoners, and the authority who gave this order said, "I don't care where you get your prisoners"execution without any designation of age or profession or origin.
The Tribunal will see that a total of 2,080 executions was reached. It will be noted that as a reprisal for the murder of an SS soldier, a house was destroyed and 10 Dutchmen. were executed; and in addition, two other houses were destroyed. In another case 10 Dutchmen were executed. Altogether, 3,000 Dutchmen were executed under these conditions, according to the testimony of this
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document, which was drawn up by the War Crimes Commission, signed by the Chief of the Dutch Delegation to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Colonel Baron Van Tuyll van Serooskerken.
This document gives to the Tribunal the approximate number of victims, region by region.
I do not wish to conclude the statement as to hostages concerning Holland without drawing the attention of the Tribunal to Section (b) of Document Number F-224, which gives a long list of hostages, prisoners or dead, arrested by the Germans in Holland; for the Tribunal will observe that most of the hostages were intellectuals or very highly placed personages in Holland. We note, therein, the names of members of parliament, lawyers, senators, Protestant clergymen, judges, and amongst them we find a former Minister of Justice. The arrests were made systematically among the intellectual elite of the country.
As far as Norway is concerned, the Tribunal will find in Document Number F-240, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-292, a short report of the executions which the Germans carried out in that country:
"On 26 April 1942 two German policemen who tried to arrest two Norwegian patriots were killed on an island on the west coast of Norway. In order to avenge them, 4 days later 18 young men were shot without trial. All these 18 Norwegians had been in prison since the 22 February of the same year and therefore had nothing to do with this affair."
In the first paragraph of the French translation in the French document book, which is Page 22 of the Norwegian original, it states that:
"On 6 October 1942, 10 Norwegian citizens were executed in reprisal for attempts at sabotage.
"On 20 July 1944 an indeterminate number of Norwegians were shot without trial. They had all been taken from a concentration camp. The reason for this arrest and execution is unknown.
"Finally, after the German capitulation, the bodies of 44 Norwegian citizens were found in graves. All had been shot and we do not know the reason for their execution. It has never been published, and we do not believe they were tried. The executions were effected by a shot through the back of the neck or a revolver bullet through the ear, the hands of the victims being tied behind their backs."
This information is given by the Norwegian Government for this Tribunal.
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I draw the attention of the Tribunal to a final document, Number R-134 (Exhibit Number RF-293), signed by Terboven, which concerns the execution of 18 Norwegians who were taken prisoners for having made an illegal attempt to reach England.
It is by thousands and tens of thousands that in all the western countries citizens were executed without trial in reprisal for acts in which they never participated. It does not seem necessary to me to multiply these examples. Each of these examples involves individual responsibility which is not within the competency of this Tribunal.
The examples are only of interest in so far as they show that the orders of the defendants were carried out and notably the orders of Keitel.
I believe that I have amply proved this. It is incontestable that in every case the German Army was concerned with these executions, which were not solely carried out by the police or the SS.
Moreover, they did not achieve the results expected. Far from reducing the number of attacks, it increased them. Each attempt was followed by an execution of hostages, and every shooting of hostages occasioned more attacks in revenge. Generally the announcement of new executions of hostages plunged the countries into a stupor and forced every citizen to become conscious of the fate of his land, despite the efforts of German propaganda. Faced with the failure of this terroristic policy, one might have thought that the defendants would modify their methods. Far from modifying them, they intensified them. I shall endeavor to show the activity of the police and the law from the time when, the policy of hostages having failed, it was necessary to appeal to the German police in order to keep the occupied countries in a state of servitude. The German authorities made arbitrary arrests at all times and from the very beginning of the occupation; but with the failure of the policy of executing hostages, which was-as you remember-commented upon by General Von Falkenhausen in the case of Belgium, arbitrary arrests increased to the point of becoming a constant practice substituted for that of killing hostages.
We submit to the Tribunal Document Number 715-PS, Exhibit Number RF-294. This document concerns the arrest of high-ranking officers who were to be transferred to Germany in honorable custody:
"Subject: Measures to be taken against French Officers.
"In agreement with the German Embassy in Paris and with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, the Supreme Commander in the West has made the following proposals:
"1. The senior officers enumerated below will be arrested and transferred to Germany in honorable custody:
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"Generals of the Army: Frere" -who died subsequently in Germany after his deportation-" Gerodias, Cartier, Revers, De Lattre de Tassigny, Fornel de la Laurencie, Robert de Saint-Vincent, Laure, Doyen, Pisquendar, Mittelhauser, Paquin;
"Generals of the Air Force: Bouscat, Carayon, De Geffrier D'Harcourt, Mouchard, Mendigal, Rozoy;
"Colonels: Loriot and Fonck.
"It is a question of generals whose names have a propaganda value in France and abroad or whose attitude and abilities represent a danger.
"3. Moreover, we have chosen from the index of officers kept by the 'Arbeitsstab' in France about 120 officers who have distinguished themselves by their anti-German attitude during the last two years. The SD has also given a list of about 130 officers previously accused. After the compilation of these two lists, the arrest of these officers is to be arranged at a later date, depending on the situation ....
"6. In the case of all officers of the French Army of the Armistice, the Chief of the Security Police, in collaboration with the Supreme Command West, will appoint a special day for the whole territory for a check to be made by the police of domiciles and occupations."
And here are the most important passages:
"As a measure of reprisal, families of suspected persons who have already shown themselves to be resistants or who might become so in the future, will be transferred as internees to Germany or to the territory of eastern France. For these the question of billeting and surveillance must first of all be solved. Afterwards we contemplate as a later measure the deprivation of their French nationality and the confiscation of property, already carried out in other cases by Laval."
The police and the army were involved in all of these arrests. A telegram in cipher shows that the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself was concerned in the matter. Document Number 723-PS, which becomes Exhibit Number RF-295, will be read in this connection. It is the third document of the document book. It is addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and is dated Paris, 5 June 1943:
"In the course of the conference which took place yesterday with the representatives of the High Command West and the SD, the following was agreed on concerning measures to be taken:
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"The aim of these measures must be to prevent, by precautionary measures, the escape from France of any more well-known soldiers and at the same time to prevent these personages from organizing a resistance movement in the event of an attempted landing in France by the Anglo-Saxon powers.
"The circle of officers here concerned comprises all who, by their rank and experience or by their name, would considerably strengthen the military command or the political credit of the resistants, if they should decide to join them. In the event of military operations in France we must consider them as being of the same importance.
"The list has been drawn up in agreement with the High Command West, the Chief of the Security Police, and the General of the Air Force in Paris."
I shall not read these new names of high-ranking French officers who were to be arrested but will go on further where the Tribunal will see that the German authorities contemplated causing officers already arrested by the French Government and under the surveillance of the French authorities to undergo the same fate as General De Lattre de Tassigny, General Laure, and General Fornel de la Laurencie. These generals were to be literally torn away from the French authorities to be deported.
"In view of the present general situation and the contemplated security measures, all the authorities here consider it undesirable for these generals to remain in French custody, as the possibility must be considered that either through negligence or by intentional acts of the guard personnel, they might escape and regain their liberty."
Finally, Page 7, under Roman numeral IX, concerning reprisals against families:
"General Warlimont had asked the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front to raise the question of reprisal measures against the relatives of persons who had joined the resistance and to submit any proposals.
"President Laval declared himself ready, not long ago, to take measures of this kind on behalf of the French Government; but to limit himself to the families of some particularly distinguished persons."
I refer to the paragraph before the last of the telegraphic report Number 3,486 of 29 May 1943:
"We must wait and see whether Laval is really willing to apply reprisal measures in a practical way.
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"All those present at the meetings were in agreement that such measures should be taken in any event, as rapidly as possible, against families of well-known personages who had become resistants. (For example, members of the families of Generals Giraud, Juin, Georges, the former Minister of the Interior, Pucheu, the Inspector of Finance Couve De Murville, Leroy-Beaulieu, and others.
"The measures may also be carried out by the German authorities, since the persons who have become resistants are to be considered as foreigners belonging to an enemy power and the members of their families are also to be considered as such.
"In the opinion of those present, the members of these families should be interned; the practical carrying-out of this measure and its technical possibilities must be carefully examined ....
"We might also study the question of whether these families should be interned in regions particularly exposed to air attacks, for instance, in the vicinity of dams, or in industrial regions which are often bombed.
"A list of families who are considered liable for internment will be compiled in collaboration with the Embassy."
In this premeditation of criminal arrests we find the Defendant Ribbentrop, the Defendant Goering, and the Defendant Keitel involved; for it is their departments who made these proposals, and we know that these proposals were agreed to-Document Number 720-PS, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-296, the second in your document book.
It is a fact that these arrests were carried out. Members of the family of General Giraud were deported. General Frere was deported and died in a concentration camp. The orders were therefore carried out. They were approved before being carried out, and the approval inculpates the defendants whose names I have mentioned. The arrests did not only affect high-ranking officers but were much more extensive, and a great number of Frenchmen were arrested. We have no exact statistics.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, did you produce any evidence for your last statement?
M. DUBOST: I shall bring you the proof of the arrest of General Frere and his death in the concentration camp when I deal with the concentration camps. With regard to the arrest and death of several French generals in the concentration camps in Dachau, the Tribunal still remembers the testimony of Blaha. So far as the family of General Giraud is concerned, I shall endeavor
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to bring proofs, but I did not believe it was necessary; it is a well known fact that the daughter of General Giraud was deported.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we can take judicial notice of all facts which may be public knowledge in France.
M. DUBOST: I shall submit to the Tribunal the supplementary proof concerning the generals who died while deported when I deal with the question of the camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. DUBOST: General Frere died in Struthof Camp and we shall explain the circumstances under which he was assassinated. In addition, there exists in your document book a document numbered F-417, Exhibit Number RF-297, which was captured among the archives of the German Armistice Commission, which establishes that the German authorities refused to free French generals who were prisoners of war and whose state of health-and advanced age made it imperative that they should be released. I quote:
"As far as this question is concerned the Fuehrer has always adopted an attitude of refusal, not only from the point of view of their release but also with regard to their hospitalization in neutral countries.
"Release or hospitalization today is more out of question than ever, since the Fuehrer has only recently ordered the transfer to Germany of all French generals living in France."
It is signed by Warlimont, and in handwriting it is noted: "No reply to be given to the French."
Please retain as evidence only this last sentence: "-since the Fuehrer has only recently ordered the transfer to Germany of all French generals living in France." As I explained, however, these arrests infinitely exceeded the relatively limited number of generals or families of well-known persons envisaged by the document which I have just read to the Tribunal: "Very many Frenchmen will be arrested...." We have no statistics; but we have an idea of the number, which is considerable according to the figures given for Frenchmen who died in French prisons alone, prisons which had been placed under German command and were supervised by German personnel during the occupation.
We know that 40,000 Frenchmen died in the French prisons, alone, in France, according to the official figures given by the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees. In the prison registry "Schutzhaft" (protective custody) is written. My American colleagues explained to the Tribunal what this protective custody meant when they read Document Number 1723-PS, submitted under Number USA-206. It is useless to return to this document. It is sufficient
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to remind the Tribunal that imprisonment and protective custody were considered by the German authorities as the strongest measure of forceful education for any foreigners who would deliberately neglect their duty towards the German community or compromise the security of the German State; they had to act in accordance with the general interests and adapt themselves to the discipline of the State.
This protective custody was, as the Tribunal will remember, a purely arbitrary detention. Those who were interned in protective custody enjoyed no rights and could not vindicate themselves. There were no tribunals at their disposal before which they could plead their cause. We know now through official documents which were submitted to us, particularly by Luxembourg, that protective custody was carried out on a very large scale.
The Tribunal will read in Document Number F-229, already submitted as Exhibit Number USA-243, Document L-215, a list of 25 persons arrested and placed in different concentration camps under protective custody. The Tribunal will recall that our colleagues drew its attention to the 'reason for the arrest of Ludwig, who was merely strongly suspected of having aided deserters.
Evidence of the application of protective custody in France is given in our Document Number F-278, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-300:
"Copy attached to VAAP-7236 (g)--Secret. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 18 September 1941.
"Subject: Report of August 30, of this year.
"The explanations of the Military Commander in France, of 1 August of this year, are considered in general to be satisfactory as a reply to the French note.
"Here, also, we consider there is every reason to avoid any further discussion with the French concerning preventive arrest, as this would only lead to fixing definite limits to the exercise of these powers by the occupying power, which would not be desirable in the interests of the liberty of action of the military authorities. By order, signed (illegible)."
"To the Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden.
"The Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs - VAAP 7236(g), Secret, dated Wiesbaden, 23 September 1941. Copy.
"...the Representative of the Ministry requests that he be informed at an opportune time of the reply made to the French note."
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The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was still involved in this question of protective custody.
The grounds for this custody were, as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs admits and according to the testimony of this document, very weak; nevertheless, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not forbid it. The arrests were carried out under multiple pretexts, but all these pretexts may be summarized under two general ideas: Arrests were made either for motives of a political nature or for racial reasons.' The arrests were individual or collective in both cases.
Pretexts of a political nature:
From 1941 the French observed that there was a synchronism between the evolution of political events and the rhythm of arrests. The French Document Number F-274(i) (Exhibit Number RP-301), which is at the end of your document book, will show this. A description is given by the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees of the conditions under which these arrests took place, beginning in 1941-a critical period in the German history of the war, since it was from 1941 that Germany was at war with the Soviet Union:
"The synchronism between the evolution of political events and the rhythm of arrests is evident. The suppression of the line of demarcation, the establishment of resistance groups, the formation of the Maquis resulting from forced labor, the landings in North Africa and in Normandy, all had immediate repercussions on the figures for arrests, of which the maximum curve is reached for the period of May to August 1944, especially in the southern zone and particularly in the region of Lyons.
"We repeat that these arrests were carried out by the members of all categories of the German repressive system: the Gestapo in uniform or in plain clothes, the SD, the Gendarmerie, particularly at the demarcation line, the Wehrmacht and the SS....
"The arrests took on the characteristics of collective operations. In Paris, as a result of an attempted assassination, the 18th Arrondissement was surrounded by the Feldgendarmerie. Its inhabitants, men, women, and children could not return to their homes and spent the night where they could find shelter. A round-up
was carried out in the arrondissement."
I do not think that it is necessary to read the following paragraph, which deals with the arrests at the University of Clermont- Ferrand, which the Tribunal will certainly remember, and also the arrests in Brittany in 1944, at the time of the landing.
The last paragraph, at the bottom of Page 11:
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". . on the pretext of conspiracy or attempted assassinations, whole families were made to suffer. The Germans resorted to round- ups when compulsory labor no longer furnished them sufficient workers.
"Round-up in Grenoble, 24 December 1943, Christmas Eve.
"Round-up in Cluny, Saone-et-Loire, in March 1944.
"Round-up in Figeac in May 1944."
The last paragraph, at the bottom of Page 11:
"Most Frenchmen who were rounded up in this way were in reality not used for work in Germany but were deported, to be interned in concentration camps."
We might multiply the examples of these arbitrary arrests by delving into official documents which have been submitted by Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. These round-ups were never legally justified, they were never even represented as an action taken in accordance with the pseudo-law of hostages to which we have already referred. They were always arbitrary and carried out without any apparent reason, or at any rate, without its being possible for any act of a Frenchman having motivated them even as a reprisal. Other collective arrests were made for racial reasons. They were of the same odious nature as the arrests made for political reasons.
On Page 5 of the official document of the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees, the Tribunal may read a few odious details connected with these racial arrests.
"Certain German policemen were especially entrusted to pick out Jewish persons, according to their physiognomy. They called this group. 'The Brigade of Physiognomists.' This verification sometimes took place in public as far as men were concerned. (At the railway station at Nice, some were unclothed at the point of a revolver.
"The Parisians remember these round-ups, quarter by quarter. Large police buses transported old men, women, and children pell- mell and crowded them into the Velodrome d'Hiver under dreadful sanitary conditions before taking them to Drancy, where deportation awaited them. The round-up of the month of August 1941 has gained sad renown. All the exits of the subway of the 11th Arrondissement were closed and all the Jews in that district were arrested and imprisoned. The round-up of December 1941 was particularly aimed at intellectual circles. Then there were the round-ups of July 1942.
"All the cities in the southern zone, particularly Lyons, Grenoble, Cannes, and Nice, where many Jews had taken
24 Jan. 46
refuge, experienced these round-ups after the total occupation of France.
"The Germans sought out all Jewish children who had found refuge with private citizens or with institutions. In May 1944 they proceeded to take into custody the children of the Colony of Eyzieux, and to arrest children who had sought refuge in the colonies of the U.G.I.F. in June and July 1944."
I do not believe that these children were enemies of the German people, nor that they represented a danger of any kind to the German Army in France.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, M. Dubost, we had better break off now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 25 January 1946 at 1000 hours.]
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