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THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Mr. President, Your Honors, on Friday last I stated that I would not read anything from the first volume of the document book; that does not mean, however, that I should not like to refer to one or another document in my final speech. The question now arises whether, under these circumstances, documents to which I may refer, but which I will not read now should be submitted as evidence to the Court, or whether it is sufficient if these documents are copied down in the book. I would be grateful if the Court would help me regarding this question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I have a suggestion to make: That the Tribunal take these documents de bene esse at the moment, and that when Dr. Seidl comes to make his final speech, then any point as to admissibility can be discussed. With regard to the third book, for example, that consists of a number of opinions of various politicians and economists in various countries. The Prosecution will, in due course, submit that these have no evidential value and in fact relate to a matter too remote to be relevant. But I should have thought the convenient course would have been to discuss that when we find what ultimate use Dr. Seidl makes of the documents, at the moment letting them go in, as I suggest, de bene esse.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal think that you should offer the documents in evidence now, and that they should be num-bered consecutively. Probably the best way would be with the letter "H" in front of them -- H Number 1 and so on -- and, that then, as Sir David says, as they are being offered all together, objection, if necessary, can be taken to them at a later stage -- objection on the ground of admissibility or relevance.
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DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn once more to Volume 1 of the document book. The first document is a speech made by the Defendant Rudolf Hess on 8 July 1934. This document will bear the Number H-1, Page 23 of the document book. The second document can be found on Page 27 of the document book ...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. To what issue has this speech got relevance?
DR. SEIDL: The speech of 8 July 1934?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, it is the one on Page 23. It is 8 July 1934.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Mr. President, this speech deals with the ques-tion of war and peace. Since the Defendant Hess is accused of having participated in the psychological preparation of aggressive war, and thus also of being a participant in the conspiracy, it seems to me that the attitude of the Defendant Hess toward the question of war is of considerable importance as regards evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We will allow you to read it.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I do not intend to read the speech now. I only want to bring up the speech as an exhibit so as to be able to refer to it in my final speech, if necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: I shall read nothing at all from the first document book. I shall only mention certain documents as exhibits.
I turn to Page 28 of the document book. This is another speech by the Defendant Hess, delivered on 27 November 1934. The number of this exhibit will be H-2.
THE PRESIDENT: The speech of 8 December 1934 begins on Page 27.
DR. SEIDL: Page 27, that is right. It was marked here incor-rectly. As the third exhibit I submit a speech -- that is to say, an excerpt from a speech -- of 17 November 1935, Page 31 of the docu-ment book, Exhibit Number H-3.
I turn to Page 32 of the document book, an excerpt from a speech of 11 October 1936, Exhibit Number H-4.
Then comes a speech of 14 March 1936, Page 33 of the document book, Exhibit Number H-5.
The next exhibit is on Page 35 of the document book, a speech of 21 March 1936, Exhibit Number H-6.
Exhibit Number H-7 is a speech on Page 36 of the document book.
Exhibit Number H-8 is a speech of 6 June 1936, on Page 40 of the document book.
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Then, I turn to Page 43 of the document book, a speech at the Reichsparteitag in Nuremberg 1936, Exhibit Number H-9.
There follow excerpts of a speech on Page 59 of the document book, Exhibit Number H-10.
A speech of 14 May 1938 at Stockholm is found on Page 70 of the document book, Exhibit Number H-11.
The next exhibit is on Page 78 of the document book, Exhibit Number H-12.
So much for the first volume of the document book.
I pass on to the second volume, to the affidavit which I submitted last Friday. It can be found on Page 164 of the document book. It is an affidavit made by the former Secretary, Hildegard Fath, and it will bear the Exhibit Number H-13.
The next exhibit is on Page 86 of the document book, Volume 2, a decree of 3 June 1936, Exhibit Number H-14.
And now I come to the point where I shall read certain excerpts from the minutes of the meeting between the Defendant Hess and Lord Simon, which took place on 10 June 1941. These minutes begin on Page 93 of the document book. The minutes will have the Exhibit Number H-15.
Your Honors, the Defendant Hess, on 10 May 1941, flew to England. Nobody except his then adjutant, Hitsch, knew of this flight. The Fuehrer himself was informed about the flight and the intentions connected therewith in a letter which was delivered to the Fuehrer after Hess had already landed in England. After his arrival in England Hess was frequently questioned by officials of the Foreign Office, and, as already mentioned, a meeting took place between him and Lord Simon on 10 June 1941. This meeting lasted two hours and a half. In the course of this meeting the Defendant Hess told Lord Simon the reasons for his extraordinary undertaking and he then submitted four proposals, or four points, which he claimed would give the intentions of Adolf Hitler, and which he considered to be the basis for an understanding and a conclusion of peace.
For the conference Lord Simon assumed a pseudonym; in the minutes which were given to the Defendant Hess shortly after the meeting, he is referred to as Dr. Guthrie.
As far as I know, this measure was probably taken to prevent the stenographers or the translators from knowing at once what it was all about. In the minutes mention is also made of a Dr. Mackenzie, an official of the Foreign Office, and of Mr. Kirk-patrick, who had previously already spoken with the Defendant Hess.
After a few introductory remarks by Lord Simon, the Defendant Hess began to explain the reasons which led him to take his singular step, and I quote liberally from Page 93 of the document book,
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about the middle of the page. I must add that in the minutes, the Defendant Hess is referred to by the name "J." The Defendant Hess, after the introductory remarks, said the following ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, there seems to be a typographical error, probably in the date. The date is given as the 9th of August. You said the 10th of June, did you not?
DR. SEIDL: 10 June, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a mistake at the top of Page 93- -- 9.8.41?
DR. SEIDL: On the cover of the document there is the following remark: "Minutes of the conversation which took place on 9 June 1941 somewhere in England." On the inside of the document, there is also the entry 9. 6. 41; so there must obviously be a typographical error here.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it must have been. They put "8" instead of "6."
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
"I know that probably nobody has correctly understood my coming; but in view of the extraordinary step that I have taken, that can by no means be expected. Therefore I would like to begin by explaining how I came to do this."
I continue on Page 94:
"The idea came to me in June of last year, during the time of ihe French campaign, while visiting the Fuehrer ...."
I believe I may omit the following incidental remarks and con-tinue quoting further:
"I must admit that I came to the Fuehrer convinced, as we all were, that sooner or later in the end we would surely conquer England, and I expressed the opinion to the Fuehrer that we must naturally demand from England the restitution of property -- such as the equivalent of our merchant fleet, et cetera -- which had been taken from us by the Versailles Treaty."
I turn to Page 95:
"The Fuehrer then immediately contradicted me. He was of the opinion that the war could possibly be an occasion for coming to an agreement with England for which he had striven ever since he had been politically active. To this I can testify, that ever since I have known the Fuehrer, since 1921,
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the Fuehrer has always said that an agreement between Germany and England had to be achieved. He said he would bring this about as soon as he was in power. He told me at that time in France that one should not impose any severe conditions, even if victorious, on a country with which one desired to come to an agreement. Then I conceived the idea that if this were known in England, it might be possible that England also might be ready for an agreement."
I turn now to Page 96 of the document book.
"Then, at the conclusion of the French campaign came the Fuehrer's offer to England. The offer, as is known, was refused. This made me all the more firm in my belief that under these circumstances I had to execute my plan. During the subsequent period came the air war between Germany and England, which, on the whole, meant heavier losses and damages for England than for Germany. Consequently, I had the impression that England could not give in at all without suffering considerable loss of prestige. That is why I said to myself, 'Now I must realize my plan all the more, for if I were over in England, England could be enabled to take up negotiations with Germany without loss of prestige.'"
I turn now to Page 97 of the document book. After a short incidental remark by Dr. Mackenzie, Hess continued:
"I was of the opinion that, apart from the question of the terms for an agreement, there would be still in England a certain general distrust to overcome. I must confess that I faced a very grave decision, the gravest in my life, of course, and I believe I was aided by continuously keeping before my inner vision the picture of an endless row of children's coffins with the mothers weeping behind them on the German side as well as on the English side... "
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, have you got the original document there before you?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Might it be handed up?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
[The document was handed to the President.]
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
"... and vice versa, the coffins of mothers with the children behind them.
"I want to mention certain points which, I believe, have a certain importance from the psychological point of view. I must go back a bit. After Germany's defeat in the World War, the
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Versailles Treaty was imposed on her, and no serious historian is today still of the opinion that Germany was responsible for the World War. Lloyd George has said that the nations stumbled into the war. I recently read an English historian, Farrar, who wrote about Edward VII and his policy at that time. This historian, Farrar, lays the main guilt for the war on the policies of Edward VII. After her collapse Germany had this treaty imposed upon her, which was not only a frightful calamity for Germany but also for the whole world. All attempts of politicians, of statesmen in Germany, before the Fuehrer came to power -- that is to say, when Germany was a pure democracy -- to obtain any sort of relief failed."
I forego the reading of the following part of the minutes literally A conversation followed on various points. Among other things the subject of the conversation then was the air strength of Germany a: that time and the preparations with regard to the building a U-boats. I do not believe that these questions are relevant in the present connection, and so I shall turn at once to that part of the minutes where mention is made of the proposals which Hess made to Lord Simon. This is on Page 152 of the document book. From the minutes we can see that Hess had previously written down the proposals which he wanted to submit. He gave these notes to Dr. Mackenzie and Mr. Kirkpatrick, who then read and translateed them, and now I quote on Page 152, at the bottom of the page literally:
"Basis for an understanding." And here I have to ask the Tri-bunal to turn from Page 152 of the document book to Page 159 of the document book because the first point in the proposal obviously has been presented in the wrong fashion. On Page 159, about the middle of the page, there is a statement by Dr. Mackenzie which, expresses the first point correctly, and I quote:
"In order to prevent future wars between the Axis and England, the limits of the spheres of interest should be defined. The sphere of interest of the Axis is Europe, and England's sphere of interest is the Empire."
I ask now that you turn back, namely to Page 153 of the document book. Here we find on the last line the second point of the proposals which Hess made. Dr. Mackenzie is reading:
"2. Return of German Colonies."
I turn to Page 154 of the document book and begin to quote at the top of the page -- it is possible that the figure "2" is inadvertently repeated here in the document book. It should be:
"3. Indemnification of German citizens who before or during the war had their residence within the British Empire, and who suffered damage to life and property through measures
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of a Government of the Empire or as a result of pillage, riot, et cetera; indemnification of British subjects by Germany on the same basis.
"4. Armistice and peace to be concluded with Italy at the same time."
Then there is a personal remark by Hess as follows:
"'The Fuehrer in our conversation repeatedly presented these points to me in general as the basis for an understanding with England."
I shall not read any further excerpts from these minutes.
I forego the reading of the other passages marked in red. The conference was terminated by a statement made by Lord Simon to the effect that he would bring the proposals made by Hess to the knowledge of the British Government. That was Exhibit Number H-15.
Your Honors, the Defendant Rudolf Hess is accused in the Indictment of helping the Nazi conspirators to seize power and of furthering the military, economic, and psychological preparations for the war as mentioned under Count One of the Indictment; of participating in the political planning and preparation of aggressive wars and of war in violation of international treaties, agreements and promises, as mentioned in Counts One and Two, and of participating in the preparation and planning of foreign political plans of the Nazi conspirators as listed under Count One.
That accusation is the nucleus of the Indictment against Rudolf Hess. It is therefore my duty to discuss also briefly in evidence the circumstances which in 1939 led to the outbreak of war. In that respect I have the following to say:
On 23 August 1939, at Moscow a non-aggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union, which has already been submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit GB-145 (Document TC-25). On the same day, that is to say but I week before the outbreak of the war and 3 days before the planned attack on Poland, these two nations made another secret agreement. This secret agreement essentially contained the definition of the spheres of, interest of both nations within the European territory lying between Ger-many and the Soviet Union.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you are not forgetting, are you, the Tribunal's ruling that this is not the opportunity for making a speech, but simply the occasion for introducing documents and calling witnesses. You will have the opportunity of making your speech at a later stage.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I do not intend to make a speech, but I intend to say a few introductory words on a document which I shall submit to the Tribunal.
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Germany, in the secret documents, declared herself disinterested in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, we have not yet seen the document. If you are going to put in the document, put in the document.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed. I can submit the document at once. It is an affidavit of the former ambassador, Dr. Friedrich Gaus. In the year 1939 he was the Chief of the Legal Department of the Foreign Office. He was present at the negotiations as the assistant of the then German plenipotentiary in Moscow, and it was he who drafted the non-aggression pact which has already been submitted as an exhibit, as well as the secret agreement, the contents of which I want to submit now to the Tribunal as facts which are important as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you hand in the document?
DR. SEIDL: Surely. However, I intend to read parts of this docu-ment later.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal does not quite understand what this document is, because it is not included in your document book and it does not appear that you made any application for it or made any reference to it, and it is in German; it is not translated.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, when I prepared the document book for the Defendant Hess, I did not as yet have this affidavit in my possession. It dates from 15 March 1946. At that time, when the relevancy of the applications for Defendant Hess were discussed, I had as yet no definite knowledge of the context which would have enabled me to make a proper application. The excerpts which I intend to read from this document are short, and it will be possible to have them translated immediately by the interpreters present here in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy for the Prosecution?
DR. SEIDL: Surely, a German copy.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that would not be any use to me. I do not know whether it is to all the members of the Prosecution. Have the Prosecuting Counsel any objection to passages being read from this document?
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr. President, I did not know about the existence of this document, and I therefore strenuously object to having it read into the record. I would wish that the procedure established by the Tribunal be observed by the Defense. The Prosecution, in the past, when presenting its evidence invariably presented copies of these documents to the Defense Counsel. Counsel for Hess is now presenting
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a completely unknown document, and the Prosecution, with every reason, would like to familiarize itself with this document before-hand. I do not know what secrets or what secret agreements Counsel for the Defense is talking about and on what facts he is basing his statements. I would therefore, to say the least, define them as unfounded. I request that this document should not be read into the record.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecutor for the Soviet Union states that he has no knowledge of the existence of this secret document which shall be established by this affidavit. Under these circumstances I am compelled to move that Foreign Commissar Molotov of the Soviet Union be called as a witness, so that it can be established, firstly whether this agreement was actually concluded, secondly, what the contents of this agreement are, and thirdly...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the first thing for you to do is to have a translation of this document made, and until you have a translation of this document made the Tribunal is not prepared to hear you upon it. We do not know what the document contains.
DR. SEIDL: As to what the document contains, I already wanted to explain that before. In the document there is...
THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal is not prepared to hear from you what the document contains. We want to see the document itself and see it in English and also in Russian. I do not mean, of course, you have to do it yourself, Dr. Seidl. If you would furnish this copy to the Prosecution they will have it translated into the various languages and then, after that has been done, we can reconsider the matter.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. I turn then to another document, the reading of which can certainly raise no objections, because it is a document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution. It is the address made by the Fuehrer to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 22 August 1939. It was submitted by the Prosecution of the Soviet Union as 798-PS and as Exhibit Number US-29. I quote from Page 6 of the German photostat: "Thereupon Hitler declared..."
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your document book or not, I mean just for convenience?
DR. SEIDL: The document was already submitted by the Prosecution in full.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean it is not here. I have not got the document before me. It is not in your document book?
DR. SEIDL: No, it is not in the document book because the Court has already ruled that each defendant's counsel has the right to
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refer to any document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution. I quote:
"... I have gradually brought about a change in our attitude towards Russia. In connection with the trade agreement, we got into a political conversation., Proposal of a non-aggression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step which had as a result that Russia answered yesterday she was ready for settlement. Personal contact with Stalin has been established. Von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty the day after tomorrow. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her to be."
End of the quotation.
Mr. President, Gentlemen: I had now the intention to call the witness Bohle who has already been approved by the Tribunal. The Defendant Hess, however, has asked me to forego the personal appearance of that witness and read an affidavit concerning the facts of evidence in reference to which the witness was to be heard.
I have prepared such an affidavit, and undoubtedly it would accelerate the proceedings if the Tribunal would permit the reading of this affidavit. If however, the Tribunal should have the opinion that...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not had the opportunity of seeing the affidavit. As previously advised, if the witness covers the ground for which he was asked, I should want him for cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the witness?
DR. SEIDL: He is here. With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call the witness Bohle now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean to call him or to read his affidavit?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, indeed; since Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe apparently protests against the reading of the affidavit, I would like to call the witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have not seen the affidavit, of course, My Lord, so at the moment, as I say, if the affidavit covers the ground that the witness should speak upon, then I shall want to cross-examine him.
THE PRESIDENT: Unless the Prosecution are agreeable that the affidavit should be put in, the witness must be called, but if the Prosecution are agreeable to the affidavit being read and then the witness presented for cross-examination, the Tribunal is quite willing that it should be done.
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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not mind that in the least, my Lord. Of course, I am in slight difficulty not knowing what is in the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the best course would be for the Tribunal to have a 10-minute adjournment now, and you could per-haps just see what is in the affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a pleasure, My Lord.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, did not wish to hurry counsel, but we thought we had better get on with other witnesses, and this document can be translated and considered and possibly dealt with after the main adjournment.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I have not had the chance of reading the translation. A preliminary view of the affidavit convinced my staff that it was not of very great importance, and I was going to consider whether the quickest way might be to let the affidavit be read, if the Tribunal would then permit me to read three documents which I was going to put in cross-examination to the witness. That might be more convenient than to take the course which Your Lordship suggests, of waiting until we have seen the full affidavit and then consider what would be the best way to deal with it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have perhaps seen part of the document, and you can perhaps judge better which would be the more convenient course. Whichever you think more convenient.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am quite content if Dr. Seidl reads it, but it would have to be on the terms that the documents which I was going to put in cross-examination to the witness are read.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks he had better be called.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: If I understood the High Tribunal correctly, they do not wish to have the affidavit read but to have the witness interrogated before the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the affidavit has been translated, and the Prosecution have had an opportunity of considering it, they can let us know whether they think it will be better to treat the affidavit as the examination of the witness, and he must
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then be produced here for the purpose of cross-examination unless you prefer to examine him orally yourself.
DR. SEIDL: I believe that under these circumstances it would be best to call the witness immediately to the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness Bohle took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell me your name?
ERNST WILHELM BOHLE (Witness): Ernst Wilhelm Bohle.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God -- the Almighty and Omniscient -- that I will speak the pure truth -- and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were ultimately the leader of the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP? Is that correct?
DR. SEIDL: You were also State Secretary of the Foreign Office?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Mr. Dodd of the American Prosecution just made the suggestion that, in order to save time, it might b possible to follow the same procedure as in the case of witness Blaha, that is, first of all, to read the affidavit in the presence o the witness and then afterwards hear him in cross-examination
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. SEIDL [Turning to the witness.]: You made an affidavit which I shall now read to you. Concerning the matter:
"1. The Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP was founded on 1 May 1931 at Hamburg upon suggestion of some Germans abroad. Gregor Strasser, Reich Organization Chief at the time, appointed as its leader the NSDAP Member of the Reichstag, Dr. Hans Nieland.
"I myself became a volunteer assistant of the Auslands-Organi-sation in December 1931 and was taken into the Party on I March 1932. On 8 May 1933 Dr. Nieland resigned as leader of the Auslands-Organisation, having become in the meantime a member of the Hamburg Government and also, as a German who had always stayed at home, being less interested in ques-tions concerning Germans abroad. On account of my experience and my connections abroad -- I was born in England and raised in South Africa -- I was charged with the leadership of the Auslands-Organisation.
"2. The purpose of the Auslands-Organisation was, upon the assumption of power, to hold together in an organized way
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the approximately 3,300 Party members living outside the boundaries of Germany at the time of the seizure of power. Further, through it Germans abroad, who could have only a vague idea of the political happenings at home, were to be taught the philosophy and the political program of the new state.
"3. Only German nationals could become members of the Party. The acceptance of foreigners or former Germans who had acquired citizenship in another state was strictly prohibited.
"4. The guiding principle of the Auslands-Organisation of the Party concerning its attitude to foreign countries was found on the Ausland pass of every German national who was a member of the Party, in the following passage: 'Observe the laws of the country whose guest you are. Let the citizens of the country in which you stay take care of their internal politics; do not interfere in these matters, not even by way of conversation.'
"This principle was basic for the work and the attitude of the Auslands-Organisation with respect to foreign countries from the day of its founding up to its end. I myself referred to this in many public speeches, and in so doing coined, among others, the phrase: 'The National Socialist honors foreign folkdom because he loves his own.'
"My speeches in Porchester Hall in London on 2 October 1937 and in Budapest at the end of January 1938 give a comprehen-sive picture of the attitude of the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP toward foreign countries.
"Winston Churchill in the late summer of 1937 repeatedly attacked the activity of the Auslands-Organisation in news-paper articles, and in his well-known article, 'Friendship with Germany,' in the London Evening Standard of 17 September 1937, designated it as an encumbrance on German-English relations. In the same article he said that he was ready to converse with me in the most cordial manner about this question. The German Embassy in London informed the Foreign Office at that time that a question by Churchill in the House of Commons regarding the activity of the Auslands-Organisation would be extremely undesirable. As a result a meeting between Churchill and myself was advocated as urgent. This took place on the day of my speech to the Reich Germans in London, in Winston Churchill's London home, and lasted more than an hour. I had ample opportunity in this thoroughly cordial conversation to describe the activity of the Auslands-Organisation and to dispel his misgivings. At the end he accompanied me to my car and let himself be photographed with
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me, in order, as he said, to show the world that we were parting as friends. There was no inquiry in the House of Commons. From that day Churchill never uttered a word of objection again about the activity of the Auslands-Organisation. My speech of the same date, which was published shortly afterwards in English in pamphlet form by an English concern, was very favorably received. The Times published from it a lengthy excerpt under the heading 'Herr Bohle's Plea for an Understanding.' After this conversation Churchill wrote me a letter in which he voiced his satisfaction with the result of our conversation.
"6. In the trial of the murderer of the Landesgruppenleiter of the Auslands-Organisation in Switzerland, Wilhelm Gustloff, which was held in a Swiss court at Chur in 1936, the legality of the activity of the Auslands-Organisation was the subject of investigation by the court. The Defendant, David Frankfurter, was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. From what I remember, I can say that the Swiss authorities, who were in no way friendly to Nazis, had to testify that Gustloff and the Landesgruppen of the Auslands-Organisation had never in any way given reason for complaint with regard to their activity. The testimony of Federal Councillor Baumann, who, to my knowledge, was then Minister of the Interior and of the Police in Switzerland, was at that time decisive.
"7. I should further like to point out in this connection that also after the outbreak of the war the Landesgruppen of the Auslands-Organisation in neutral countries continued to func-tion until the end of the war. That is especially true of Switzerland, Sweden, and Portugal.
"From 1943 on, at the latest, the Reich would hardly have been able to take any steps against suppression, if the Auslands-Organisation had come into conflict with the internal laws of these countries; and suppression would have been the inevitable result.
"8. Aside from the indisputable legality of the Auslands-Organisation, as its leader I have repeatedly expressed the idea that the Auslandsdeutschen (Germans abroad) would certainly be the last people who would let themselves be misused as warmongers or as conspirators against the peace. From bitter experience they knew that with the outbreak of the war they would face at once internment, persecution, confiscation of property, and destruction of their economic existence.
"9. As a result of the knowledge of the situation abroad, no one knew better than the Auslandsdeutschen that any activity
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in the sense of a Fifth Column would be just as foolish as detrimental to the interests of the Reich. To my knowledge, moreover, the expression 'Fifth Column' can be traced back to the Spanish Civil War. It is in any case a foreign invention. When Franco attacked Madrid with four columns of troops, it was asserted that a Fifth Column consisting of nationalist elements was doing its seditious work underground within the besieged city.
"10. There is no basis whatsoever for applying the term 'Fifth Column' to the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. If this assertion were true, it would mean that members of the Auslands-Organisation working together with local oppositional elements in one or more foreign countries had been delegated, or had by themselves tried, to undermine this state from within. Any such assertion would be pure invention.
"11. Neither from the former Deputy of the Fuehrer, Rudolf Hess, nor from me, as the leader of the Auslands-Organisation, has this organization or members of this organization in any way received orders the execution of which might be considered as Fifth Column activity. Even Hitler himself never gave me any directive in that respect. In summary, I can say that the Auslands-Organisation at no time, as long as I was its leader, displayed any activity in the sense of a Fifth Column. Never did the Deputy of the Fuehrer give orders or directives to the Auslands-Organisation which might have led to such activity. On the contrary, Rudolf Hess most urgently desired that members of the Auslands-Organisation should under no circumstances take part in the internal affairs of the country in which they were living as guests.
"12. Of course, it is known that just as citizens of the then enemy countries, so also Germans were employed in the espionage and intelligence services abroad. This activity had however nothing at all to do with membership in the Auslands-Organisation. In order not to imperil the existence of the Auslands-Organisation groups, which worked legally and entirely in the open, I constantly demanded that members of the Auslands-Organisation would not be used for such purposes or that I should previously be given the opportunity to relieve them of their functions within the Auslands-Organisation."
And that is the end of the statement of the witness Bohle. For the moment I have no questions to ask the witness, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel wish to ask the witness any questions?
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DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): I would like to put several questions to this witness, Your Honor.
Witness, I represent the Defendant Von Schirach, the former leader of the German Youth. Therefore the following would interest me: Did the Hitler Youth (HJ) also exist in foreign countries or only in Germany?
BOHLE: The Hitler Youth existed among German nationals, in foreign countries also.
DR. SAUTER: Please tell me whether this HJ, the Hitler Youth abroad, was subject to the political directives of the competent Landesleiter of the Auslands-Organisation, or is that not right?
BOHLE: Yes, the Hitler Youth abroad was politically under the control of the Hoheitstrager of the Party.
DR. SAUTER: Once in the course of the proceedings the assertion was made that members of the Hitler Youth were trained for service as agents and for espionage work abroad and also were used for these purposes. Specific facts, that is, specific instances, were certainly not mentioned, but only a general assertion was made, and it was also asserted that Hitler Youth abroad were even used as paratroopers, that is, that they had been trained at home as paratroopers in order to be used abroad in this capacity.
That is the assertion which I submit to you, and I now ask to have your opinion on this, whether, on the basis of your knowledge as the competent leader of the Auslands-Organisation, something like that did occur or whether anything like that was at all possible?
BOHLE: I would like to say the following in reply: I consider it entirely out of the question that members of the Hitler Youth abroad were misused in this way. I can assert that so much the more since I know I would have heard anything to the contrary from the leaders of the Party in the various foreign countries. I know also nothing at all about the training of the Hitler Youth as paratroopers or anything similar. I consider these assertions as absolutely pure invention.
DR. SAUTER: Then I may assume, as the result of your testi-mony, that things of that sort on the basis of the entire organization would certainly have come to your knowledge, if something like that had occurred or perhaps even only had been planned; is that correct?
BOHLE: Yes, indeed.
DR. SAUTER: And then, Witness, I have a last question:
Here in the courtroom a further assertion was also made about the HJ, that is, about the Hitler Youth. It has been asserted that
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at Lvov it once happened that the Hitler Youth or members of the Hitler Youth had used little children as targets. Also in this report no details of course were given, but only the assertion was made. The following would interest me:
As you know the Hitler Youth had, I believe, a membership toward the end of about 7 to 8 million.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, does that have anything to do with the Auslands-Organisation?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, it does insofar as my client, the Defendant Von Schirach, is charged with the fact that the Hitler Youth abroad committed such atrocities.
THE PRESIDENT: It was not suggested that they did this abroad, was it -- that Hitler Youth ever used children as targets abroad?
DR. SAUTER: Yes, indeed, it was said that at Lvov, in the Government General, not in Germany, but in Lvov, which means abroad.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean after the war began?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought this witness was speaking about the same organization before the war.
DR. SAUTER: I do not know whether he was also talking about the Auslands-Organisation during the war. But in any case, Mr. President, the witness knows these facts, for he was the head of the Auslands-Organisation. Therefore this witness seems to me especially qualified to give us information on these matters.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that we are very far from the point, but you can go on.
R. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President, for otherwise I would have to call expressly this witness for my client again.
Witness, do you at all recall the last question I put to you, whether you had any knowledge that the Hitler Youth, or members of the Hitler Youth abroad, which was under your jurisdiction, is supposed to have committed atrocities of that nature?
BOHLE: I regret to tell you, Mr. Attorney, that the Government General did not belong to the Auslands-Organisation, that I was never there and therefore am not in a position to state anything on that point. Obviously the erroneous opinion seems to exist that the Government General, from the point of view of the organization of the Party, was connected with the Auslands-Organisation; however that was not the case. I had no organizational powers there.
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DR. SAUTER: Otherwise, I have no further questions.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Witness, to what extent, in your capacity as Reichsleiter of the Auslands-Organisation, were you informed about the foreign political intentions of the Fuehrer?
BOHLE: I was not Reichsleiter, but Gauleiter, and was never informed of the foreign political intentions of the Fuehrer.
DR.SERVATIUS: Do you know whether the Fuehrer basically advocated to your organization an understanding with, England?
BOHLE: I do not quite understand your question.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Hitler, before the war, in your presence and before the other Gauleiter, frequently emphasize the fact that he wanted at all costs an understanding with England, and that you also were to work for its achievement?
BOHLE: I received no orders in this respect from the Fuehrer, but certainly from the Deputy of the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer never discussed foreign political matters with me during the 12 years was in office.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of the Defense Counsel want to ask any other questions?
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Your Auslands-Organisation was organized in the same way as the Party in Germany was organized; is that not so?
BOHLE: Not in all points, because there were various organizations within the body of the Party in the Reich which were not intended for foreign countries, for example, the Office for Municipal Policy.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can shorten my question: Did you have Hoheitstrager abroad in the same way as you had them in Germany?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The organization in each country was under the Landesgruppenleiter; is that correct?
BOHLE: In almost all countries.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And under many there were lower-ranking Hoheitstrager?
BOHLE: Yes, the Ortsgruppenleiter.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was the result of that, that you had your German population in foreign countries well organized and known to the leaders in those countries?
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BOHLE: To a great extent that might be correct, but it was not so thoroughly organized, nor could it actually be so, because the leader of the Party did not know all the Reich Germans in the country concerned.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did it never occur to you that in the event of your army's invading a country where you had a well-organized organization, that organization would be of extreme military value?
BOHLE: No, that was not the sense and the purpose of the Auslands-Organisation and no offices ever approached me in this con-nection.
LT. COL. GRIF FITH-JONES: Are you telling this Tribunal now that when the various countries of Europe were in fact invaded by the German Army your local organizations did nothing to assist them in a military or semimilitary capacity?
BOHLE: Yes, indeed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, let me ask you about something else for a moment: You had, had you not, an efficient system of reporting from your Landesgruppenleiter to your head office in Berlin?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I think you have said yourself, did you not, in your interrogations, that you took an especial pride in the speed with which your reports came back?
BOHLE: I did not say that, I believe, with respect to speed but rather with respect to the accuracy of their political survey.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, your reports did come back with great speed, did they not?
BOHLE: I cannot say that in general. It depended on the possibility of dispatching these reports quickly to Berlin, and how far that was the case in individual instances, I naturally cannot say today. In any ease, I had no special speed or acceleration measures at my disposal.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In fact, you told your interrogator -- and I can refer you to it if necessary -- that on occasion you got back information before Himmler or the Foreign Office had got similar information.
BOHLE: That must be a misunderstanding. It concerns the political reports from the Landesgruppenleiter which I transmitted from Berlin to the different offices.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we will leave the speed out I have it from you that you had an efficient system of reporting, had you not?
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BOHLE: In order to answer that question I would have to know in respect to what reports I am supposed to have had an efficient system of reporting.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was going to be my next question. I was going to ask you: What in fact did your Landesgruppenleiter report to you?
BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter reported of their own accord to me, whenever they had anything of importance which they wanted to report to the competent offices in the Reich.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they ever report anything which might have been of military or semimilitary value?
BOHLE: That may have been the case in some instances, although at present I cannot recall any specific cases.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They were never given any instructions, were they, to report that kind of information?
BOHLE: No, generally not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: How did you get your reports back? Did you have wireless sets with your organization in foreign countries?
BOHLE: No, we did not have any such transmission or wireless stations. Reports either came through courier in special cases or were brought by individuals to Germany.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: After the war started, did your organizations continue in neutral countries?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did they never have wireless sets reporting back information?
BOHLE: I do not know anything about that. I do not believe they had them, for I would have had to know about it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to ask you about only one or two documents. Would you look at 3258-PS -- My Lord, that is the exhibit already in, GB-262; I have copies of the extract for the Tribunal and members of Defense Counsel. I expect you read English -- the book itself is coming.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There you have before you a copy of some extracts from it. Would you look at the bottom of the first page, last paragraph, commencing "In 1938..." Did you have a Landesgruppenleiter in the Netherlands by the name of Butting?
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LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just pay attention to me for perhaps one moment before you look at that document. Do you know that Butting shared a house at The Hague with the military intelligence office? Do you know that?
BOHLE: No, I do not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to quote you quite shortly two paragraphs of this document, which is a report, published as an official United States publication, called "National Socialism, Basic Principles, Their Application by the Nazi Party's Foreign Organization, and The Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims." I just want you to tell the Tribunal what you think first of all about this report, which is printed in that book:
"In 1938 the German Legation owned two houses in The Hague. Both were of course the subject of diplomatic immunity and therefore inviolable as concerned search and seizure by the Dutch police. I shall call the house in which Dr. Butting had his office House Number 2. What went on in House Number 2? It had been remodeled and was divided like a two-family house -- vertically, not horizontally, but between the two halves there was a communicating door. One side of the house was Dr. Butting's. The other half housed the Nazi military intelligence agent for Holland ..."
You say that you do not know anything about that?
BOHLE: Butting was Landesgruppenleiter of the Auslands-Organisation. I am hearing about this house -- or these two houses -- for the first time, that is quite new to me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I will just go on.
"S. B. (the military intelligence agent) may have had as many as a dozen subordinates working in Holland, all subagents of the Canaris bureau. These were professional spies who knew their trade. But they could not possibly know Holland as intimately as was required by the strategy of the German High Command, as it was revealed following the invasion of May 1940. For this, not a dozen but perhaps several hundred sources of information were necessary. And it is at this point that Butting and the military intelligence agent come together. Through his German Citizens' Association, Butting had a pair of Nazi eyes, a pair of Nazi ears, in every town and hamlet of the Netherlands. They were the eyes and ears of his minor Party officials. Whenever the military intelligence agent needed information concerning a comer of Holland which his people had not yet explored, or was anxious to check information relayed to him by one of his own people, he would go to Butting."
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Do you know whether Butting assisted the military intelligence agent in Holland in any way like that?
BOHLE: I was told later that he aided in Holland. To what extent he helped him I do not know, for he had had no such mission from me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand, he had no instructions but he was doing it. Just turn now to the last paragraph on that page, too:
"'I know every stone in Holland,' S.B. once boasted. By 'stone' he meant canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, culvert, highway, by-road, airport, emergency landing field, and the name and location of Dutch Nazi sympathizers who would help the invading army when the time came. Had Dr. Butting's Party organization not existed under the innocent cover of his Citizens' Association, S.B.'s knowledge of Holland would have been as nothing compared with what it was. Thus the Citizens' Association served a double purpose; it was invalu-able for espionage at the same time as it fulfilled its primary function as a Fifth Column agency."
Do you know whether the members of your organization in Holland were given instructions to learn about every canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, railway, and so on?
BOHLE: No, I had not the least idea of this.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want you to be quite clear. I am putting to you that your organization was in the first place an espionage system reporting information of importance back to the Reich, and, in the second place, it was an organization aimed to help, and which did help, your invading German armies when they overran the frontiers of their neighboring states. Do you understand those two points?
BOHLE: Yes, indeed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your organization publish an annual book, your Year Book of the Foreign Organization?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And did that book contain information as to the activities of your organization during the year?
BOHLE: Partially, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I suppose that the Tribunal would be safe in assuming that what was published in that book was accurate information?
BOHLE: One may assume that.
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LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at the Year Book for 1942? I have copies of the extracts. Would you turn to Page 37 of that book? If you look back one or two pages in the book, you will find that that is an article entitled "The Work of the Norway Branch of the Auslands-Organisation in the War." Is that written by your Landesgruppenleiter in Norway?
BOHLE: I assume so, I cannot recall this.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 37, and you will see that there are some passages in the book that you have in front of you that have been lightly marked in pencil along the side.
BOHLE: Yes, I have it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you find the paragraph which starts, "Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939..." Have you got that?
BOHLE: Yes, I have it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will be so kind as to follow me.
"Therefore, soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939, the enlargement and extension..."
BOHLE: Yes, I am following you.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
"... the enlargement and extension of the German Legation in Oslo and of the consulates at Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Hamgesund, Narvik and Kirkenes proved to be of primary importance. This enlargement of the Reich agencies resulted in the local organization of the NSDAP in Norway having to increase its field of activity too, in the same proportion, in order to support the work of the Reich agencies, particularly by Party members and other Germans who had a thorough knowledge of the country and language."
Why, in September '39, was it necessary for the Party to increase its organization in Norway with people having higher knowledge of the country and language? Answer me that before you read on. You need not worry about the rest; we are going to deal with it. Why was it necessary in 1939 to enlarge your organization?
BOHLE: In Norway, as far as I recall, there were only 80 members of the Party in all, and it goes without saying that after the outbreak of the war the official agencies, not only of Germany but also, as you know, those of other states, were enlarged and were assisted by national elements, who knew the country
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concerned. That did not hold true for Germany alone but for all the nations participating in the war.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I still do not understand why your perfectly harmless organization should have found it necessary to increase its membership with people who had a profound knowledge of the language and the country. Why should the Auslands-Organisation have found it necessary?
BOHLE: Because the Reich agencies needed Germans who knew the country and the people, especially to furnish information on the German targets of attack in Norway -- exactly what every other nation did, too.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, your answer is, is it, that you required them to tell you about targets in Norway? Is that your answer?
BOHLE: No, I did not say that. I said that they were to be at the disposal of the agencies in Norway in case they were needed for public enlightenment, that is for German propaganda purposes among the Norwegians. I would like to emphasize once again that that was done not only by Germany but, of course, by all the warring countries.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us go on and see what happens next:
"The choice and assignment of these supplementary collaborators was carried out by the local leader of the organization in close collaboration with the representatives of the Reich. Therefore, from the first moment of the outbreak of war a great number of Party members were taken away from their jobs and employed in the service of the nation and the fatherland. Without any hesitation and without considering their personal interests, their families, their careers or their property, they joined the ranks and devoted themselves body and soul to the new and often dangerous tasks."
Tell me, was finding out and reporting about the Norwegian people, was that an "often dangerous task"?
BOHLE: Certainly not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What, then, were the often dangerous tasks which your own Landesgruppenleiter is saying members of his organization were undertaking from the very moment war broke out, in September '39?
BOHLE: I cannot tell you anything about that, for I have no knowledge whatsoever about this and I cannot conceive any of these dangerous tasks. I have the impression from this article, which, incidentally I did not know about until now, that the
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Landesgruppenleiter had the plausible desire to give more importance to his organization than it had in reality.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you say you did, not know about this. This appeared in the official yearbook of your organization. Did you never read what appeared in that book?
BOHLE: Certainly not everything, for I am not familiar with this article.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have told us that the members of your organization took no part in this. What about the people who were responsible for publishing that book? Did they not ever draw your attention to an article of that kind?
BOHLE: Obviously not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just look at the next little paragraph:
"The success of their work, which was done with all secrecy, was revealed when, on 9 April 1940, German troops landed in Norway and forestalled the planned Rank attack of the Allies."
What work was revealed on the 9th of April? What work which had been done with all secrecy was revealed on the 9th of April, work carried out by members of your organization?
BOHLE: I am sorry I cannot reply, for I have no knowledge whatsoever of this. I do not know.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see. Will you look down to the last paragraph of that page? It is the second sentence -- four, five lines down -- at the end of the fifth line. I beg your pardon. You have the book in front of you. Will you look at Page 40 of the book? In the center of a paragraph the last word of one of the lines starts with "According to the task plan..." Have you got it? It is Page 40. To save time, let me read it:
"According to the task plan which had been prepared since the outbreak of the war, the Landeskreisleitung gave orders on 7 April for Phase 1 of the state of employment..."
It does not sound, does it, like plans being made for different phases of an operation? It does not sound, does it, as if the work of your organization had been simply finding out about Norwegian people?
BOHLE: That might have been since this is entirely new to me, exclusively an agreement within the country itself with military or other authorities. I have had no knowledge of it up to this moment.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So I understand you to say. But you were the head of this organization, were you not?
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LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have come before this International Tribunal and given them evidence, presumably saying you are in a position to give them truthful and accurate evidence; is that so?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that?
BOBLE: Yes, I have understood that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, then, do I understand you to say now that you do not know what was happening in your organization, and therefore you are not in a position to give evidence as to whether or not it was a Fifth Column business?
BOHLE: It is quite evident that in an organization of this size the leader, who has his office at Berlin, cannot be closely acquainted with everything which is going on abroad and, more so, what is done against his instructions. I did not have the same disciplinary authority over my Party members abroad as did, for instance, some Gauleiter within the Reich. I need not elaborate on that, because it is self-evident. It is also evident, and this I know, that some Germans abroad, who were called on because of their patriotism in individual cases let themselves be used for purposes without the knowledge of the Auslands-Organisation and against its explicit instructions.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In the interest of time we will not pursue that particular sphere of activity in Norway, just in case it may have been an exception which you did not know about.
Let me turn to something else. Will you look at Page 65 of that book?
Is that an article by your Landesgruppenleiter in Greece?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Is it in the form of a day-to-day diary of the activities of the Auslands-Organisation in Greece when German troops invaded that country?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 65?
"Sunday the 27th of April. Swastika on the Acropolis."
That is the heading. I beg your pardon. I do not know whether it comes directly under that heading. This is the Landesgruppenleiter talking:
"I set out immediately, quickly visiting the other quarters," -- where the German colony had been interned -- "the Philadelphia and the Institute. I enjoined the inmates of the house
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in Academy Street to give up returning home today, and to hold themselves in readiness. After all, we did want to help the German troops immediately with our knowledge of the language and the district. Now the moment has come. We must start in immediately."
Do you know...
BOHLE: Yes, I even know all about this. It certainly must be evident that the moment German troops occupied a foreign city and freed the Germans living abroad who had been interned, the latter would put themselves at the disposal of the German troops and help them in every respect as guides, interpreters, or the like. That is certainly the most logical thing in the world.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is in fact what they did do, and the assistance that your organization appears to have given them is that it managed to organize them and get them ready to do it; is that not so? That is what your Landesgruppenleiter seems to be doing?
BOHLE: I did not understand this question. Will you please repeat it?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you understand that it is your Landesgruppenleiter who is organizing the members of your organization, organizing them so that they can give their assistance most beneficially to the invading armies?
BOHLE: That is a completely wrong way to express it. The Landesgruppenleiter in Greece, who filled that post from 1934, could not possibly tell whether there was to be an invasion of Greece or not. That had not the slightest thing to do with the nature of his organization. The moment that German troops were in the country it stands to reason that they would welcome their countrymen, act as their hosts, and help them in every way. That was a patriotic duty taken for granted.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I see.
Just turn to Page 66, the next page. Will you find the paragraph which commences "Meanwhile I organized the employment of all Party members to do auxiliary service for the Armed Forces."
Do you have that?
BOHLE: I understand it ...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had better find the place.
BOHLE: Where shall I find that place?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On Page 66. It is a new paragraph.
BOHLE: Yes, I have it now.
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LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: "Meanwhile I organized the employment of all Party members to do auxiliary service for the Armed Forces."
It really looks now as though the Landesgruppenleiter is organizing them, does it not?
BOHLE: In this instance, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
"Soon our boys and girls could be seen riding proud and radiant in their Hitler Youth uniforms, beside the German soldiers on motorcycles and in Army cars ..."
Did you yourself know of the organization and work that your Landesgruppenleiter had put in in Greece to assist your armies in semimilitary capacities, or was that another case like Norway which you did not know anything about?
BOHLE: The Landesgruppenleiter in Greece did not create a semimilitary organization, but set up of course in this instance an organization to aid the troops entering the country in a sector which was entirely civilian.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well; I just want to ask you about another matter. Have you got a document there which is a telegram from somebody called Stohrer, in Madrid?
BOHLE: Stohrer, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did Stohrer have something to do with the German Embassy in Madrid?
BOHLE: Stohrer was the German Ambassador himself; Doctor Von Stohrer.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: This is dated 23 October 1939. Just let us see what it says:
"The Landesgruppenleiter can obtain a very suitable house for accommodating the Landesgruppe, as well as the German Labor Front, the Ortsgruppe, the Hitler Youth, and the German House Madrid, also room available in case of embassy having to spread out, and especially a very suitable isolated room for the possible installation of second secret radio transmitter, which can no longer be housed at the school because of reopening.
"Landesgruppenleiter requests me to rent the house through the embassy, in which way very considerable tax expense will be avoided. Have no hesitation, in view of anticipated partial use by embassy as mentioned above. If you do not agree I request wire by return.
"Please submit also to Gauleiter Bohle."
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Were you telling the truth to this Tribunal when you told them some 30 minutes ago that you had no knowledge of wireless sets being used by your organization?
BOHLE: Yes, because I have no knowledge of these transmitters, or their use; I must assume that it concerns apparatus of the embassy.
DR. SEIDL: The copy of the telegram, as I have it before me, does not indicate to whom this wire was addressed. The last sentence of the telegram leads one to assume that it was not in any case addressed to the witness. According to my opinion, I think the witness should next be asked whether he knew about this wire and to whom it was addressed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps you will tell Dr. Seidl to whom the Ambassador in Madrid was likely to send a telegram on such matters as this?
BOHLE: To the Foreign Office at Berlin.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you, at that time, were State Secretary at the Foreign Office of Berlin, were you not?
BOHLE: Quite right, in October 1939.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Beneath his signature is set out the distribution to -- it mentions various persons in departments in the Foreign Office in Berlin. Is that so?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And are you saying now that all of those departments which were asked to submit this matter to you, that they all failed to do so?
BOHLE: No, I do not claim that. They surely would have done that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember yourself seeing this telegram before?
BOHLE: I cannot recall it. I would have noticed it for I never heard anything about two secret transmitters in Spain. It would also be quite in order for me to admit it. But I cannot do so if I do not know it. The distribution under Number 3 mentions "State Secretary," but that does not mean me, but the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, the political one. My designation in the Foreign Office was: Chief A.O.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can save you all that. I am not suggesting that that "State Secretary" means you; otherwise it would not be asked to be submitted to you. What I want to know is what you or your embassy workers, or both of you working together,
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wanted with two secret wireless transmitting sets in Spain in October 1939?
Are you still saying that your organization was quite unconcerned in reporting back information of military importance?
BOHLE: Just how do you mean, "reporting back"?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal -- I want you to be quite clear -- are you telling the Tribunal that your organization was not being used for espionage purposes in Spain?
BOHLE: Yes indeed, I am asserting that. A distinction must be made between certain members of the Auslands-Organisation who naturally without my knowledge -- I protested against this often enough -- were used abroad for such purposes. I had no objection to Germans abroad being utilized in time of war for such tasks, as was the case very frequently with all other countries. However, I did not want members or officials of the Auslands-Organisation to become involved. A distinction must . . .
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to stop you at all. I do not want to stop you. Go on if you have anything to say. But, in the interest of time, try and make it as short as possible.
BOHLE: It seems to me there is some confusion between the Auslands-Organisation as an organization and what certain Germans abroad did during the war as their patriotic duty. This seems to me to be the crucial point of the question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I will not argue about that. We see that your organization took sufficient interest to reproduce accounts of what they were doing in its official book. I just want to show you one thing further.
[Turning to the President.] Well, I have one further document to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may as well go on.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is a document which I have just had found. I have not had them copied. The Tribunal will forgive me if I read extracts from them?
[Turning to the witness.] It is an original document you hold in your hand and it appears to be, does it not, a carbon copy of a letter from ...
THE PRESIDENT: Has Dr. Seidl got one?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, he has one in German.
[Turning to the witness.] Is that a letter from your Landesgruppenleiter Konradi?
25 March 46
BOHLE: It seems to be a directive from Konradi, but not signed by him.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you will look at the end of the letter you will see that it is actually signed "Konradi," after the usual "Heil Hitler"...
BOHLE: The copy that I have is not signed.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you get that copy back? Perhaps these documents...
[The document was taken from the witness to Lt. Col. Griffith-Jones.]
It is in fact signed "Konradi." Show it to him.
[The document was returned to the witness.]
BOHLE: It is not signed by Konradi, but typed in.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to you. It is my fault for not making myself clear. I told you that we have here a carbon copy. A copy of a letter which was signed and sent by Konradi. That appears to be so, does it not?
BOHLE: That I do not know, for of course I do not know about all the letters written by Konradi.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You can take it, so far as you are concerned, that that is a German document which has been captured, that it is this bit of paper that you are holding in your hand which was found by Allied troops and that bears a typewritten signature of Konradi, who was your Landesgruppenleiter in Romania; is that correct? You remember that you had a Landesgruppenleiter in Romania?
BOHLE: His name was Konradi.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And is this a letter of instructions to the Zellenleiter in Constantsa?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is dated the 25th of October 1939. Will you read the first paragraph?
"From 9 to 12 October conferences took place with the Supreme Party functionaries, or their deputies, of the Southeastern and Southern European groups at the head office of the Auslands-Organisation."
Does that mean Berlin?
BOHLE: Yes. Berlin.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That means your office, does it not?
BOHLE: Yes, in my office, but not in my personal office.
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LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, but is it in the office over which you had complete control?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Agreed. I imagine, before we go on, that no orders would be issued from your head office at a conference of that kind which were contrary to your direction, would they?
BOHLE: Not on important things, naturally not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to you.
"I subsequently received direct instructions from the competent department of the head office of the Auslands-Organisation."
So it appears that the direction given at the conference was confirmed in writing.
"During the war, every National Socialist abroad must directly serve the fatherland, either through propaganda for the German cause or by counteracting enemy measures."
Now perhaps you will turn over, or rather, you will miss out -- I am reading from copy -- the English, the next paragraph, and the next plus one paragraph, and go on to the paragraph com-mencing:
"As everywhere else it is extremely important to know where the enemy is and what he is doing..."
I want you to be quite clear about this and keep it in mind. These are directions coming directly from your head office in Berlin.
"It has been ascertained that the I.S. (Intelligence Service) has attempted, sometimes most successfully, to gain admittance for seemingly trustworthy persons into the activities of the Party group and its associate organizations. It is therefore necessary that you thoroughly investigate not only all those persons coming into contact with you who are not very well known to you, and above all you must scrutinize any new persons and visitors appearing in your immediate vicinity. If possible, let them be taken in hand by a comrade whose absolute Nazi convictions are not generally known to the man in the street...."
I think we can leave the rest of that.
"You are to report everything that comes to your notice, even though it may at first appear very insignificant. Rumors suddenly arising also come in this category, however false they may be."
Do you remember your members in Romania being told to report everything? Everything they saw?
25 March 46
BOHLE: Yes, of course.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
"An important section of both your work and that of your comrades' work must be industrial concerns, business enterprises, et cetera. Not only can you spread your propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage organizations are especially active in industrial circles both in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage. Members with close connections with shipping and forwarding companies are particularly suitable for this work. It goes without saying that you must be meticulous and cautious when selecting your assistants."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have some more to read from this document? If so, we will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
25 March 46
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the Defendant Streicher is absent from this session.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Witness, will you look again at the document we were reading before the Court adjourned. Would you look at the paragraph which commences "as everywhere else it is extremely important to know where the enemy is and what he is doing." My Lord, I am not absolutely certain that I did not start reading.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, you had read that and the next one and the one at the top of Page 3 in the English text. At least I think you have. You read the one beginning "An important section."
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps I can start the paragraph commencing "An important section." Have you got that?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
"An important section of both your work and that of your comrades must be industrial concerns, business enterprises, et cetera. Not only can you spread your propaganda very well in this way, but it is precisely in such concerns that you can easily pick up information concerning strange visitors. It is known that the enemy espionage organizations are especially active in industrial circles, both in gathering information and carrying out acts of sabotage. Comrades with close connections with shipping and forwarding companies are particularly suitable for this work. Naturally you must be meticulous and cautious when selecting your assistants.
"In this connection a reference to interstate organizations and exchange organizations is relevant." -- I particularly want you to note these next lines:
"It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the Foreign Intelligence Department."
Witness, doesn't that exactly describe the way in which the Auslands-Organisation was carrying on its business? Read it again:
"It has been proved that these often use harmless activities as camouflage and are in reality to be regarded as branches of the Foreign Intelligence Department."
Doesn't that fit in with the directions that this Landesgruppenleiter of yours has been writing to his members in this document?
25 March 46
BOHLE: On the contrary, I find that this is clear proof of the fact that the organizations mentioned here were in a foreign espionage service and not in the German espionage service. My interpretation is the exact opposite of that of the British Prosecutor.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you not giving instructions here, or is not your Landesgruppenleiter giving instructions, to carry out counterespionage -- the work that is carried on by the intelligence service? Isn't that what the writer is writing about so far?
BOHLE: The letter, with which I am not personally familiar, apparently instructs Germans abroad to turn in a report whenever they encounter the intelligence service at work. I do not think that any objection can be raised to that in time of war.
LT. COL. GRIFTITH-JONES: Very well. We will not go on arguing about it. I understand that you know nothing about the instructions which are contained in that letter. This is the first you have ever seen or heard of it; is that right?
BOHLE: No, this letter is new to me, and I do not know whether it is true, for there is no original here.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it then that, of the countries around Germany in which your organization worked, you have no knowledge of the activities that they were carrying out in Belgium? You have no knowledge of the activities that they were carrying out in Norway, none about what they were doing in Spain, and not very much about what they were doing in Romania either; is that correct?
BOHLE: No, that is not correct. Of course I knew of the activity of these groups abroad; but the particular activity that the British Prosecutor wishes to point out as the aim of the Auslands-Organisation is not quite clear to me.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you had knowledge of any of their activities -- I understand from your evidence that you had none of the activities about which your own Auslands-Organisation Yearbook publishes a story. Both in Norway and Greece the activities were recounted in those two stories. You knew nothing about them at all; is that right?
BOHLE: I did not know about the activity in Norway. I have already testified to that effect. I was very familiar with the activity in Greece which was along perfectly normal lines.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I want to leave that, and I just want to ask you two questions about another matter. Am I right in saying that the information -- and I am not going to argue with you now as to what type of information it was -- but the information that your organization sent back, was that passed on to the Defendant Hess?
25 March 46
BOHLE: Sometimes yes and sometimes no. It depended upon the nature of the information. If it was information on foreign policy it was, of course, sent to another office.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were in fact acting as a pool of information, were you not? Let me explain myself: You were forwarding information that you received, to the SS?
BOHLE: Sometimes, yes; if not to the SS then probably...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: To the Foreign Office?
BOHLE: Sometimes also to the Foreign Office.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And to the Abwehr, were you not?
BOHLE: Very seldom, but it happened occasionally.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say very seldom. Did you not have a liaison officer attached to your organization from the Abwehr?
BOHLE: No. I had only one assistant who maintained an unofficial connection with the Abwehr, if the occasion arose.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Perhaps we are talking about the same gentleman. Did you not have a Captain Schmauss attached to your head office in Berlin?
BOHLE: Mr. Schmauss has never been a captain but he was a political leader and honorary SS-leader. In the Army, I believe he was a sergeant. Moreover, he did not come from the Abwehr; he was chief of personnel of the Auslands-Organisation and his function as liaison was purely unofficial.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say he was not a liaison officer between your organization and the Abwehr?
BOHLE: No, he was not an officer at all. He was not a member of the Wehrmacht.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I do not want to quibble with you about his rank. Was he, in effect, whatever he was, acting in a capacity of liaison between you and the Abwehr?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES. Very well. Now, in addition to the information that Hess obtained through your system of reporting, that is, the Auslands-Organisation, did he also obtain information from those organizations which were dealing with the Volksdeutsche, that is to say, non-German citizens, racial Germans abroad who were not members of your organization, because you allowed only Ger-man citizens to become members of your organization. But others -- Volksdeutsche, I think you call them -- did Hess receive information from other sources about their activities?
BOHLE: I could not say, because I did not discuss it with Hess, and the affairs of the Volksdeutsche were entirely out of my field.
25 March 46
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Dr. Karl Haushofer was for some time in 1938 and 1939 president of the VDA, was he not?
BOHLE: I believe so.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Which was an organization dealing with the activities of the Volksdeutsche in foreign countries. Is that correct?
BOHLE: Yes, I believe so. I am not familiar with this field.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And, as you know, Hess and Karl Haushofer were great friends, were they not?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Haushofer had been Hess' pupil at Munich University; did you know that?
BOHLE: It was the other way around.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you not know that Hess received information from Haushofer as to the activities of these other organizations?
BOHLE: No, I know nothing about it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, I do not want to catch you out. Is that your answer? Are you being honest to this Tribunal?
BOHLE: No. I wanted to add that the Deputy of the Fuehrer very painstakingly separated the "Auslandsdeutsche," that is, citizens of the Reich who worked abroad, and the "Volksdeutsche," and with equal care he made certain that I should have nothing to do with the question of Volksdeutsche. Therefore I knew nothing of these matters.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Hess as Deputy to the Fuehrer was in fact in, charge of all matters concerning Germanism abroad; was he not?
BOBLE: Yes, that is so, because he was born abroad. However, to my knowledge, he did not take charge of these matters in his capacity as Deputy to the Fuehrer. I do not believe that there was any connection.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you telling the Tribunal that just because he was born in a foreign country he had charge of all matters concerning Germanism abroad?
BOHLE: I believe so, because any other Reichsleiter of the Party might just as well have taken rare of these matters. However, I assume that Hess took over these functions simply because he was familiar with foreign countries.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to be quite clear. Whatever the reason was, he in fact did have charge of them. That is your evidence?
25 March 46
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I just want to remind you of a passage in your interrogation in this building on the 9th of November. Do you remember that you were interrogated on the 9th ...
BOHLE: [Interposing.]: September?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On 9 November last.
BOHLE: November, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were interrogated by a Lieutenant Martin, the afternoon of that day.
BOHLE: By Lieutenant Martin, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me read a short extract from the transcript of that interrogation and ask you whether, hi fact, it is correct. You were being asked about the information which came back through the Auslands-Organisation.
"Question: 'He would have to rely on you for his information on matters of that kind?'
"Answer: 'Not entirely; I think Hess had a great many connections in Hamburg through which he obtained information which he did not relay to me.'
"Question: 'What were his connections in Hamburg?'
"Answer: 'The shipping companies.'
"Question: 'Rather like your Landesgruppenleiter instructions in Romania?'
"Answer: 'I think he knew a number of people there. I have always been convinced that he knew them.'
"Question: 'Is that Helferich?'
"Answer: 'Helferich was one, but then there were many people from whom he received information. I believe from Professor Haushofer, his old teacher, with whom he was very friendly. But he always made it a point not to inform us of anything that concerned the Volksdeutsche; he said, "It is not your affair at all."
Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is quite correct, yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And as you have said it there, is that a correct description of the position that Hess was in with regard to information from abroad, from agents abroad? Does that correctly state the facts as they were?
BOHLE: So far as I can see, it is probably correct. I myself can judge only to the extent to which the reports concerned the Auslands-Organisation. About the others I can make only a guess; I
25 March 46
cannot give definite information, because I was not acquainted with them.
LT. COL. GRIFF ITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might get the exhibits in order, the ones that I have referred to.
The Yearbook of the Auslands-Organisation from which the stories about Norway and Greece came, becomes Exhibit GB-284. The two translations that you have are numbered Documents M-153 and M-156, both of which become Exhibit GB-284.
The secret wireless telegram, which was Document Number M-158, becomes Exhibit GB-285; and the letter from Landesgruppenleiter Konradi, which was Document Number 3796-PS, becomes Exhibit GB-286.
BOHLE: May I add something to a point which was brought up by the British cross-examination?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
BOHLE: May I begin?
THE PRESIDENT: You may give a short explanation. You are not here to make a speech.
BOHLE: No, I do not want to make a speech. I merely wish to say the following on the question of secret transmitters which was brought up this morning: Although I am not familiar with the technique of these secret transmitters, I assume that a secret transmitter would be of use in a foreign country only if there were a receiving set in Berlin.
I am quite certain that to my knowledge there was never such a receiving set, either in my office in Berlin or in any other office of the Auslands-Organisation, and therefore I may assume that such a receiving set did not exist.
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): Do you recall being interrogated on 11 September 1945, by Colonel Brundage?
COL. AMEN: I want to read you a few questions and answers from your interrogation and ask you whether you recall being asked those questions and having made those answers:
"Question: 'Now, when you started, your immediate superior was who?'
"Answer: 'Rudolf Hess, until 1941 when he left for England.'
"Question: Who succeeded him?'
"Answer: 'Martin Bormann. Martin Bormann automatically succeeded Hess, but he did not really fill Hess' position,
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because Hess had been born abroad in Egypt, while Martin Bormann understood nothing about foreign affairs. He paid no attention to them at all, but of course, he was my superior.'
"Question: 'But he was nominally your chief?'
"Answer: 'He was technically my chief, but he gave me no orders, directives or similar instructions, because he did not understand anything about these things.'
"Question: 'So that everything that was done in your office, you would say you were responsible for?'
"Question: 'And you are willing to accept the responsibility for that?'
Do you remember being asked those questions and having made those answers?
BOHLE: That is absolutely correct.
COL. AMEN: And were those answers true when you made them?
BOHLE: Absolutely true.
COL. AMEN: And are they still true today?
BOHLE: They are still true.
COL. AMEN: So that you accept responsibility for everything which your office was conducting, is that true?
BOHLE: Yes, that is correct.
COL. AMEN: Who was Von Strempel?
BOFILE: Von Strempel was, I believe, counsellor to a secretary of a legation (Gesandtschaftsrat) in the foreign office, but I do not know him very well.
COL. AMEN: Was he not the first secretary of the German Embassy in the United States from 1938 until Pearl Harbor?
BOHLE: I cannot say definitely. I knew him only slightly and had absolutely no contact with him.
COL. AMEN: Well, he was interrogated with respect to the support of the German-American Bund by the Auslands-Organisation prior to 1938, and I want to read you just one or two questions and answers which he made and ask you whether they conform to your understanding of the facts. Do you understand?
"Question: 'Was the German-American Bund supported by the Auslands-Organisation?'
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"Answer: 'I am positive that it was connected with the foreign section of the Party. For example, the Bund received instructions from the Party on how to build up their political organization, how, where, and when to hold mass meetings and how to handle their propaganda. Personally, I do not know whether it received financial support."'
Does that conform with your understanding of the facts?
BOHLE: No, that is a completely false representation. The Auslands-Organisation gave no financial support whatever and had no connection with the German-American Bund. I have stated that clearly in many interrogations here in Nuremberg, and have signed an affidavit to that effect.
COL. AMEN: I know you have. So that if Von Strempel has sworn that that is a fact, your testimony is that he was not telling the truth. Is that correct?
BOHLE: I am of the opinion that if Von Strempel was legation secretary, or secretary of another office, he could not have known of the matter and he therefore testified about something which was not quite clear to him. In any event, what he said is not true.
COL. AMEN: Are you familiar with the fact that in 1938 an order was issued prohibiting members of the German embassies and consulates to continue relations or connections with the Bund?
BOHLE: It was a general order for German citizens abroad to resign from the Bund if they were members. But as far as I know, that order was issued some years previously about 1935 or 1936, by the Deputy of the Fuehrer upon my request.
DR. SEIDL: I object to this question; it has no connection with the evidence for which the witness Bohle was called. During his direct examination he was not questioned on any subject which has the slightest relation to the question of the activity of the German-American Bund. I do not believe that this form of interrogation is designed to test the witness, as it has not the slightest bearing on the subject.
COL. AMEN: It seems to me to have a very direct bearing on whether or not this organization was engaged in espionage work abroad and within the United States.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly; in the opinion of the Tribunal the questions are perfectly proper.
COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that in spite of that order the foreign section of the Nazi Party nevertheless continued to support the Bund?
BOHLE: No, I was not aware of that and I consider it to be impossible.
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COL. AMEN: Now I would like to read you one or two further extracts from the interrogation of Strempel and ask you whether these statements conform with your knowledge of the facts:
"Question: 'Did the foreign section of the Party continue to support the Bund after the order you mentioned before was issued?'
"Answer: 'I am sure that Mr. Draeger, consul in New York City and representative of the foreign section of the Party, did continue to have relations with Bund officials.'"
Does that conform with your recollection of the facts?
BOHLE: No. In my opinion, that does not correspond to the facts. Naturally, I cannot say whether the consul, Dr. Draeger, maintained his contacts against my order, but there was an imperative order to withdraw completely from the Bund, because from the very beginning I objected strenuously to the activities of the Bund and was supported in my objections by the Deputy of the Fuehrer.
COL. AMEN: You were acquainted with Draeger, were you not?
COL. AMEN: What was his position in the United States, insofar as your organization was concerned?
BOHLE: He was a liaison man (Vertrauensmann) of the Auslands-Organisation for the individual Party members in the United States.
COL. AMEN: He was what was known as a confidential agent, was he not?
BOHLE: No, he was not, naturally, but we had...
COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, you called him a "confidential agent" in your interrogation, did you not?
BOHLE: No. I called him a "Vertrauensmann," and this was translated into "confidence man." I did ...
COL. AMEN: Well, I will accept that correction. He was a confidence man for your organization in the United States. Correct?
BOHLE: Correct, yes, that is true.
COL. AMEN: And in addition to him there were other confidence men of your organization in the United States? Correct?
BOHLE: Yes, correct.
COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal what their names were and where they were located?
BOHLE: One was Wiedemann, consul general in San Francisco. There was also Consul Dr. Gissling in Los Angeles and Consul Von Spiegel in New Orleans I believe, but I do not know; perhaps it was Boston. It was one of the two. I believe these are all.
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COL. AMEN: And each of those individuals made reports from time to time which were forwarded to you through Draeger. Is that not a fact?
BOHLE: No, they made no reports to me. I cannot recall that I ever saw a report from Wiedemann, Spiegel, or Gissling. That was not their job.
COL. AMEN: Draeger made the reports to you, did he not?
BOHLE: Draeger made the reports to the Auslands-Organisation in Berlin or to me personally. Mostly to my office.
COL. AMEN: And contained in those reports were various items of information collected by other confidential agents? Isn't that correct?
BOHLE: I do not know, because I am not familiar with these reports and I cannot say whether there was anything to report. We had no Party organization in the United States, because it had been dissolved by Rudolf Hess in April 1933.
COL. AMEN: So you say; but you nevertheless had an individual in Germany whose duty it was to read and pass upon these reports from Draeger as they came in. Is that not a fact?
BOHLE: So far as I know, and I believe my information is correct; the reports that we received were of a purely technical nature. We merely had few Party members in the United States whose card index and membership fees had to be looked after in order to preserve their privileges as Party members. Political activity in the United States was forbidden and did not actually exist.
COL. AMEN: But I am suggesting to you that in spite of the order the activities of your organization nevertheless continued. Now, is it not a fact that there was an individual in your organization in Germany who received these reports from the United States regularly?
BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe, who ...
COL. AMEN: I beg your pardon?
BOHLE: It was my assistant, Mr. Grothe.
COL. AMEN: Correct. Why didn't you tell me that before when I asked you about the individual who read these reports from the United States as they came in?
BOHLE: Please repeat the question. I did not fully understand it.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will withdraw that question. After Grothe received these reports from the United States regularly, to whom did he report the substance of those reports?
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BOHLE: So far as I know, he usually kept them, because they contained nothing of interest and he himself was not in a position to use them. Mr. Grothe had an honorary position with us because of his advanced age and took over this branch of the office because it was of no importance at all in the Auslands-Organisation.
COL. AMEN: So that you were in no position to know what was contained in those reports? Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is for the most part correct.
COL. AMEN: So you do not know whether they were important or not and you do not know whether they contained information relative to espionage matters or not. Is that correct?
BOHLE: I am sure that if they had contained such information, Grothe would have submitted them to me.
COL. AMEN: Well, outside of that, you have no knowledge of it whatsoever. Is that correct?
BOHLE: That is correct.
COL. AMEN: Now, let me just read you one or two more excerpts from the interrogation of Von Strempel:
"Question: 'These relationships seem to have violated the order you mentioned before. Did you report these violations to, the Foreign Office?'
"Answer: 'Yes, several times. In reports that I drafted for Thomsen when I was in the Embassy, we called the attention of Berlin to the fact that this relationship to the Bund was very detrimental ... and stated that the continued support of the Bund by the foreign section of the Party was harming diplomatic relations with the United States.'
"Question: 'What action was taken in Berlin to halt the activities of which you complained?'
"Answer: 'I know of no action.'"
Does that conform to your knowledge of the facts?
BOHLE: I have not the slightest idea of this report by Herr Von Thomsen. This is the first time that I have heard of protests from the Embassy in Washington regarding prohibited connections between Dr. Draeger and the Bund.
COL. AMEN: You know who Thomsen was, do you not?
BOHLE: Thomsen was Charge d'Affaires in Washington.
COL. AMEN: And you know that from time to time various officials of the Bund came over here and had conferences with repre-sentatives of your organization and of the Fuehrer, do you not?
BOHLE: I have heard that they visited the Fuehrer but they did not visit me and we had no conferences of any description.
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COL. AMEN: I did not say with you. I said with representatives of your office; perhaps your friend, Mr. Grothe?
BOHLE: That might be possible but I cannot say definitely because he did not report to me on this matter. They could not have discussed any official matters with Grothe, because he knew very well that I completely repudiated the activities of the German Volksbund in America.
COL. AMEN: In any event, however, you accept responsibility for everything which was done in your organization. Correct?
THE PRESIDE NT: Do either of the other Chief Prosecutors wish to cross-examine? [There was no response.] Then, Dr. Seidl, you can re-examine if you wish.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have already answered a question that I intended to ask you, that is, that there was no secret transmitter in Germany which would have been in a position to broadcast secret communications to foreign countries. I ask you now, did you yourself have a transmitter in Germany?
BOHLE: I myself had no transmitter.
DR. SEIDL: Did the Auslands-Organisation have such a trans-mitter?
BOHLE: I consider that to be absolutely impossible; if there had been one, I would have known of it. I never saw one.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that in order to communicate with Germans overseas by radio you yourself did not use code on the German network?
BOHLE: That is correct.
DR. SEIDL: You stated previously that the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Hess, was your immediate superior?
DR. SEIDL: Were the directives given to you by the Deputy of the Fuehrer of a general nature, or did he go into the details of the work of the Auslands-Organisation?
BOHLE: The Deputy of the Fuehrer gave only general directives and left all the details to me because I had his complete confidence. In his general directives he impressed upon me repeatedly in the sharpest terms the fact that it was my duty to avoid any measures by the Auslands-Organisation that might be detrimental to foreign relations.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
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DR. SEIDL: Your Honors, before I go on to my next witness -- that is the witness Strolin -- I should like to submit the suggestion or rather the application to the Tribunal that the affidavit of the witness Gaus be handled in the same way as the interrogation of the witness Bohle. Gaus has already been admitted as a witness for another defendant. However, the Defense Counsel for the other defendant waived his right to call this witness. The situation is the same as it was in the case of Bohle; therefore it would be preferable, in my opinion, to hear the witness Gaus now and to read his sworn statement to him during his examination as has been done in other cases, for instance in the case of Blaha.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet and submitted in the various languages to the Chief Prosecutors?
DR. SEIDL: I do not know whether the translation is complete. At any rate, this noon I submitted six copies of the affidavit to the Translation Division.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me, Sir David or Colonel Pokrovsky?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not seen this affidavit, and, My Lord, with regard to the last one, we got it hurriedly translated into English, but it was only by the kindness of my Soviet colleagues, who allowed the matter to go on without a Russian translation and left it to my delegation to deal with, that the matter went on. Otherwise, my Soviet colleagues would have asked the Tribunal to have it put back.
It is very difficult when these affidavits are sought to be put in at the last minute without having given us a chance of seeing them.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky could tell me whether he has seen this affidavit or had it translated yet.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Members of the Tribunal, I fully share the viewpoint of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. It appears to me absolutely unacceptable to have this document presented immediately to the Tribunal.
If I understood Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe correctly, he did not receive this affidavit. The Soviet delegation is in the same position. Besides, I would like to remind you that the question of this witness has already been discussed, that it has been definitely solved, and it seems to me there are no grounds for a further revision of this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal considers that the course which must be taken is that that affidavit must be translated and submitted to the Tribunal for their consideration, for this witness was allowed to the Defendant Ribbentrop, I think, and then
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he withdrew his application for the witness. You have not applied for the witness Gaus, and I would point out to you and to the other counsel for the defendants that it is very inconvenient that documents of this sort -- after all the question of witnesses and documents has been thoroughly gone into by the Tribunal -- should be presented at the last moment and without any translation whatever. But we will not go into it now, and it must be translated and submitted to the Tribunal in the three languages.
DR. SEIDL: Perhaps I might make one short remark in regard to the last point. Up to now I was always under the impression that a formal application to call a witness would not be necessary in the case of a witness who has already been admitted by the Tribunal for another defendant. That was undoubtedly so in the case of Gaus who was named as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. Consequently I had no reason to make a formal application, since I would have the opportunity to interrogate the witness in cross-examination anyhow.
I have just been informed by counsel for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop that, as his representative said last Saturday, he will forego calling the witness Gaus, and now I, in turn, apply to call Ambassador Dr. Gaus as witness regarding the statements in his sworn affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean by saying you call him. You can apply to call him if you like, but you do not call him until you apply.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: When we have seen this document, we will determine the question.
DR. SEIDL: The next witness admitted by the Tribunal for the Defendant Hess is the witness Karl Strolin. In order to save time I have also prepared an affidavit for this witness, and I ask the Tribunal to inform me whether we will follow the same procedure with this witness as with the witness Bohle, or whether the Prosecution agree that only the affidavit should be presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they seen the affidavit?
DR. SEIDL: I gave the affidavit to the Prosecution this morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have got an English translation of the affidavit. There are one or two questions the Prosecution want to put to the witness, so I suggest that the most convenient course would be if Dr. Seidl did as he did with the last witness, to read the affidavit, and then after the affidavit is read, the few questions that the Prosecution desire to be put can be put to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well.
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COL. POKROVSKY: I must report to you, Mr. President, that as far as this document is concerned, the Defense Counsel has violated the procedure you have established; the Soviet Prosecution received this affidavit only a very short time ago -- about 1 or 2 hours ago -- and it was not received by us in Russian but in English. Therefore, I had the opportunity of familiarizing myself with it only very slightly, and I ask to have the presentation of this document postponed until such time when the order of the Tribunal is complied with, in other words, not until we have received our document in Russian.
THE PRESIDENT: But, Colonel Pokrovsky, in the interest of the time of the Tribunal, wouldn't it be better to get on with it now? Sir David has apparently seen the affidavit and read it in English, and if he is satisfied upon that, wouldn't it be better to go on with it now rather than to postpone it?
You see, Dr. Seidl has actually been allowed this witness, so that it is only a question of time, doing it by way of an affidavit when he can call him, and he can then ask him questions.
COL. POKROVSKY: I must repeat that I have familiarized myself with this document very slightly. As far as I can understand, it is of no particular interest to the Soviet Delegation; it is of greater interest to the British Delegation ...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you see the witness was allowed to Dr. Seidl. Therefore, Dr. Seidl could have put him on the witness box and could have asked him questions, and the only reason for doing it by way of an affidavit is to get the matter more clearly and more quickly. So if we were to order that this affidavit was not to be used, we should then have Dr. Seidl asking the witness questions, and probably, I am afraid, taking up rather longer than it would to read the affidavit, and you would not object to that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps the Tribunal would find it advisable to have Dr. Seidl ask the witness those questions which have already been answered in the affidavit? It seems to me that that would give us an opportunity to reconcile this contradiction, especially since there are only a few questions, and the first three, as far as I can understand, are mostly of a historical nature and connected with the organization of the Institute in Stuttgart in 1917.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have not read the affidavit yet so I am afraid I am not in a position to present the question which you wish me to present.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I withdraw my objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Call your witness then now.
[The witness Strolin took the stand.]
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What is your name?
KARL STROLIN (Witness): Karl Strolin.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: "I swear by God -- the Almighty and Omniscient -- that I will speak the pure truth -- and will withhold and add nothing."
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were last Lord Mayor of the City of Stuttgart; is that correct?
DR. SEIDL: In this capacity were you also Honorary President of the German Auslands-Institut?
DR. SEIDL: You signed a sworn affidavit this morning which I shall now read to you.
"1. The German Auslands-Institut was founded in Stuttgart in the year 1917. The fact that Stuttgart was chosen as the seat of this institute is connected with the fact that the Swabian district has always furnished a particularly high percentage of emigrants. That is precisely why there arose in Stuttgart the need to create an institution for the purpose of preserving the national ties between the old and the new homeland. The German Auslands-Institut was to serve this purpose. It had the following aims:
"(a) Scientific research on Germanism in the world.
"(b) Maintaining cultural connections with the emigrants.
"(c) Informing the people at home about Germanism abroad and about foreign countries.
"For scientific research the German Auslands-Institut had a library of more than one hundred thousand volumes on folk-lore and an archive for newspaper files concerning Germanism abroad. For this purpose nearly all newspapers which were published abroad in the German language and a large number of newspapers in foreign languages were subscribed to and their contents evaluated. An extensive collection of pictures was in one filing room. As the Germans abroad became increasingly interested in the homeland, genealogical research took on ever greater proportions.
"In addition to its activities of collecting and registering, the German Auslands-Institut also had advisory and representative functions. The question of emigration was also a subject for consultation for a long time. This required that the German Auslands-Institut be informed regarding the living
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conditions and the possibility of finding employment in the individual areas favored by emigrants. The records of the German Auslands-Institut were placed at the disposal of the various offices and organizations upon request. The representative activities of the German Auslands-Institut consisted mainly in organizing exhibitions. The center of this activity Museum of Germandom Abroad, in Stuttgart.
"The scientific work of the German Auslands-Institut found expression particularly in the books, magazines, and calendars about the homeland which it published. The connections with the Germans abroad were maintained by sending out such publications. The guiding thought of the German Auslands-Institut in its relations with the Germans abroad was that these Germans abroad were to be the connecting links between nations in order to strengthen mutual understanding and the desire for co-operation. They were to be the envoys of friendship between their old and their new homeland.
"As President of the German Auslands-Institut, I particularly emphasized this thought in the speech which I made at Madison Square Garden in New York City in October 1936 on the occasion of German Day. Moreover the German Auslands-Institut had no agencies or representatives abroad acting as liaison for these corresponding members. Direct or individual care for Germans abroad was not the task of the German Auslands-Institut. The welfare of German nationals abroad was taken care of by the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. Relations with the Volksdeutsche were maintained by the Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im Ausland (League For Germans Abroad).
'2. The German Auslands-Institut never engaged in any activities which could be termed Fifth Column activities. No one has ever made a request of this nature to me or to the Institut.
"3. Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the Fuehrer, did not exert any influence on the activities of the Institute. He issued no directives or instructions which could have induced the Institute to undertake any activity along the lines of Fifth Column work."
Witness, are these statements correct?
STROLIN: These statements are correct.
DR. SEIDL: I have at the moment no further questions to direct to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions of this witness?
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DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LUDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, with the permission of the Tribunal I should like to ask you a few questions.
First, from when to when were you Lord Mayor of Stuttgart?
STRCUN: From 1933 until the end of the war.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And how long have you known the Defendant Von Neurath? What was his position at that time and what was his reputation?
STROLIN: I have known Herr Von Neurath since the first World War. At that time, at the end of the first World War, he was Chief of the Cabinet of the King of Wurttemberg, and his reputation was excellent. In my capacity as Lord Mayor I met Herr Von Neurath frequently. In 1938 Von Neurath became an honorary citizen of the city of Stuttgart.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you enter in still closer relations with him later when he returned from Czechoslovakia?
STROLIN: When he returned from Czechoslovakia Herr Von Neurath retired to his estate of Leinfelden in the vicinity of Stuttgart, and here I had closer and more active connection with him.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about his ancestry, his family, his education, his personality, in general?
STROLIN: Von Neurath comes from an old Swabian family. His father was Lord Chamberlain of the King of Wurttemberg. His grandfather and his great-grandfather were ministers. Von Neurath was very much respected as a high-minded character, a distinguished personality, always ready to help, extraordinarily humane, very conscientious, straightforward and frank.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: During his activity as Foreign Minister and possibly later, did you have an opportunity to discuss politics with him and particularly his views on foreign policy?
STROLIN: Von Neurath repeatedly discussed these matters with me, but of course, only in general terms. As Reich Foreign Minister he was convinced that Germany would succeed in getting by peaceful means the place in the world which she deserved. He rejected any other way. He strove to build up and strengthen relations of mutual confidence with other European powers, particularly with England. He was convinced that it was precisely in this field that he had done everything possible.
Later, I had occasion to examine with him Henderson's book Two Years with Hitler, which particularly emphasized how extremely popular Von Neurath had been in London at that time. I recall that we also discussed the sentence written by Henderson, that he acknowledged Von Neurath's honest devotion to peace and to peaceful
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and friendly relations with England. Von Neurath was also greatly concerned with the cultivation of better relations, with the United States. I recall that he discussed the subject with me after my trip to America and said that I had done well to emphasize in my various speeches Germany's desire for friendship with the United States. I also remember how severely Von Neurath criticized the tone of Hitler's speech made in the beginning of 1939 in reply to Roosevelt's message. He said at that time that the international tension had been increased by that speech. Then Von Neurath spoke of the Munich Agreement, in which he had been an active participant. Later he very frequently spoke of the tragedy that was implicit in the fact that, despite all efforts, the relation between England and Germany had not remained one of continuing confidence. He pointed out how tragic it was for Europe and for the world. All my conversations with Von Neurath convinced me that he desired an understanding and a peaceful settlement, and that he would never have pursued a policy that might lead to war.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What were the reasons for his appointment as an honorary citizen of Stuttgart? This happened after he resigned his office as Reich Foreign Minister, did it not?
STROLIN: He was appointed in 1938, on the occasion of his 65th birthday on 2 February 1938. This appointment was to express to Von Neurath the gratitude and appreciation not only of the people of Stuttgart but of all Swabia for his manifest love of peace and the calm and prudence with which he had conducted foreign affairs. It was also a token of respect for his honest and incorruptible character.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Witness, the British Prosecution assert that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly assured foreign govern-ments or their representatives that Germany had no military or aggressive intentions toward these states, but that these assurances were, in fact, given for the sake of appearances, in order to lull these states into a false sense of security, because even then Von Neurath knew and approved of the fact that Hitler actually had aggressive intentions toward these states.
From your knowledge of his personality do you consider Von Neurath capable of such infamy?
STROLIN: No, I do not consider him capable of such action.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath inform you, at the time, of his resignation from his position as Foreign Minister?
STROLIN: By chance, I was with Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry on 4 February 1938 at the very moment when his resignation was accepted. He described how this resignation came about. He said that until the end of the year 1937 he had been convinced that Hitler was completely in sympathy with the foreign policy
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which he was pursuing and that Hitler as well as himself had not wanted to chance an armed conflict, but at the end of 1937 Hitler had altogether unexpectedly changed his attitude; he had suddenly struck a different note, and it was impossible to decide whether it was to be taken seriously. Von Neurath went on to say that in a personal conversation with Hitler he had attempted to persuade him to give up this altered view, but that he had the impression that he had lost his influence over Hitler, and this prompted him to submit his resignation.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: After, or rather simultaneously with his discharge from the foreign ministry, Von Neurath was appointed President of the Secret Cabinet Council. Do you know anything about this appointment -- how and why he received it and what he did in this capacity?
STROLIN: He received this appointment as President of the Secret Cabinet Council at the same time that his resignation was accepted, but this Cabinet never convened; this was also true of the Reich Cabinet. The Secret Cabinet was to be convened by Hitler personally, and Hitler had simply not done this. Von Neurath believed later that he had been appointed to this post as president only in order to conceal from foreign countries that the former Foreign Minister no longer had any influence on the policy of the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Ludinghausen, I do not see how this witness can know whether the Secret Cabinet Council was ever called. In any event we have already heard it from Goering, and presumably we shall hear it again from the Defendant Von Neurath, in which case it is grossly cumulative. I do not think we should waste the time of the Tribunal with it.
DR. VON LIUDINGHAUSEN: Did you occasionally speak to Von Neurath regarding his attitude and relations toward the Nazi Party?
STROLIN: Von Neurath's attitude toward the Party was critical and disapproving; at first he disapproved and waited to see what would develop. His relations with the Party were bad. The Party was of the opinion that Von Neurath was not a National Socialist.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever discuss with him the policy of the Nazis toward the Christian churches, that is, the Catholic and the Protestant Church?
STROLIN: Von Neurath was a faithful Christian and disapproved of the policy of the Party toward the Christian churches. He partic-ularly supported Bishop Bohr's efforts to maintain freedom of religion. He repeatedly used his influence to see to it that seminaries which had been requisitioned were released. Following a discussion with Von Neurath I visited Minister for Churches Kerrl personally and discussed with him the question of the policy toward the Church.
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I discovered that Minister for Churches Kerrl was making every effort to represent and carry out the ideas of positive Christianity. However, he did not succeed because his work was continually sabotaged, particularly by Himmler and Bormann.
DR.VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Later, when Herr Von Neurath retired to his estate of Leinfelden, did you discuss his activities as Reich Protector with him?
STROLIN: Von Neurath said that he took the post as Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia most unwillingly, and that he had refused it twice but finally decided that he must make this sacrifice. He believed that it was precisely there that he could act as an intermediary and bring about reconciliation. He had personal difficulties with Himmler and Frank; he told me of his efforts to gain better treatment for the Czechs, and of the protests which he made to Hitler in vain. Once, when I visited Von Neurath in Prague, I was invited to visit President Hacha, who told me emphatically how pleased he was that Von Neurath had been sent to Bohemia and Moravia, for he enjoyed fullest confidence and performed in every respect a conciliatory function. Von Neurath told me that he was recalled and replaced because in his treatment of the Czechs he was too mild for the Fuehrer, who preferred a particularly trustworthy SS leader in that position.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Who was to be appointed to that post?
STROLIN: That was Heydrich.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Was that Herr Von Neurath's reason for resigning?
DR.VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, Von Neurath was also an Honorary GruppenFuehrer of the SS. Did he tell you how he attained this -- let us say -- honor?
STROLIN: He told me that he was appointed honorary leader of the SS without having been consulted. When he asked the reason, Hitler told him that Mussolini was soon to pay a visit and that he, Hitler, wanted everyone in his attendance to wear a uniform. Since Von Neurath had no uniform he appointed him an honorary leader of the SS. Von Neurath said he did not intend to become one of Himmler's subordinates. Thereupon Hitler told him that that was not necessary; it was merely a question of wearing a uniform.
DR.VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath's attitude toward war?
STROLIN: On the first day of the war I saw Von Neurath to the railroad station. He was depressed and rather dismayed. He called
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the war a terrible disaster, a gamble with the existence of the nation. He said that all his work from 1932 to 1938 had thereby been destroyed. I understood that during the war he saw the Fuehrer occasionally, and on each such occasion he used the opportunity to ask Hitler to consider the idea of peace. That he, Neurath...
THE PRESIDENT: How can the witness say this? He was not present at these meetings; how can the witness tell us what the Defendant Von Neurath said to the Fuehrer?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: As you will understand, that is what the defendant told him. That was told the witness by the defendant directly.
STROLIN: Von Neurath told me so repeatedly. He told me ...
THE PRESIDENT: It will be all extremely cumulative.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I do not believe so. The witness himself needs only to corroborate this to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Ludinghausen, the Tribunal imagines that the Defendant Von Neurath will give this evidence himself, and the Tribunal does not wish to hear evidence from witnesses that was told to them.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Very well, I shall dispense with any further questions along those lines. I should like to ask only one more question.
[Turning to the witness.] Did not Von Neurath, with you and other people, make an effort to put an end to the war and to the Hitler regime, or at least consider the possibility of doing so?
Now these are facts that the witness knows from his own obser-vation.
STROLIN: Von Neurath discussed this question with me on several occasions after his return from Prague. He tried particularly to bring about a meeting of the Reich Cabinet, as did the other ministers, but he did not succeed, since Hitler disapproved of this Reich Cabinet as a "defeatists' club." As a preliminary step for ending the war Von Neurath tried to bring about a change of ministers and the appointment of a Reich Chancellor, which was also widely demanded. This also failed. During the year 1943 Neurath became more and more convinced ...
THE PRESIDENT: This is the same thing over again -- nothing about what Von Neurath did but all about what Von Neurath said to this witness.
DR.VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I beg your pardon; these are only preliminary remarks to clarify what is to follow.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had one last question?
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DR. VOIN LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, we come to that now. The question shows the attempts he made to carry out his intentions.
STROLIN: When Von Neurath failed in his attempts at reform, that is, when he saw that it had miscarried and that Hitler's attitude was negative and intransigent, Von Neurath came to the conviction, at the beginning of 1944, that the saving of Germany from complete destruction must not be wrecked because of Hitler. He considered the question of how to speak to Hitler once more and persuade him to end the war. He thought of Field Marshal Rommel and asked me to discuss the matters with him. Rommel was at that time very popular in Germany and abroad, and Von Neurath believed that due to the position he held, Rommel was the right person to replace Hitler, if necessary. In the beginning of March 1944, I went to Field Marshal Rommel and discussed the matter with him. Rommel was just as critical of the situation. I knew him from the first World War, so that I could speak to him frankly. He was also of the opinion that if the war could not be won on a military basis, unnecessary bloodshed and senseless destruction ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Ludinghausen, we really do not want all this conversation between this witness and Rommel. We do not want it. We will not hear the conversation between this witness and Rommel.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Nor do I want the witness to discuss this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you stop him then? Why don't you stop him?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to hear it from the defendant himself, but from the person who was employed by the defendant to take these steps. That in my opinion has more weight than if the defendant makes the statement himself. That is why I asked the witness about it. But it is almost finished now.
THE PRESIDENT: When we come to the defendant then we will not hear him on these subjects.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: No, that is not intended -- moreover, as far as I know, the matter will be finished with just a few words. Please, Witness.
STROLIN: Upon Von Neurath's instigation, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler saying that because of the military situation he believed that it would not be possible to continue the war, and that he, Rommel, suggested to Hitler that he start political negotiations. Consequently, as he told me, after his accident Rommel fell from favor for this reason, and thus Von Neurath's attempt to end the war with Rommel's aid also failed.
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DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And then came 20 July and soon afterwards the end.
I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adiourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants' counsel want to ask questions of this witness?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May the witness be handed GB-262 (Document Number 3258-PS). My Lord, that is the same document of which an extract has already been handed up to the Tribunal while I was cross-examining the last witness.
Witness, I want to be quite clear as to what you say about the Deutsches Auslands-Institut. Do you say that that institute had no connection with either Hess or the Auslands-Organisation?
STROLIN: The Deutsches Auslands-Institut had no connection with Hess. The connection with the Auslands-Organisation was due to the fact that the Auslands-Organisation had its meetings at Stuttgart.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that the fact that the Auslands-Organisation and the Deutsches Auslands-Institut both had their meetings at Stuttgart, that is the only connection between the two organizations; is that so?
STROLIN: The Auslands-Organisation, to my knowledge, did not consult the German Auslands-Institut on practical matters, for it had its own collection of material. The Auslands-Organisation was, as far as I know, created in the year '32, and ...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I do not want to stop you, but if you can answer my question "yes" or "no" it will save us all a great deal of time. I will repeat my question in case you are not quite clear about it. Do you say that the fact that both those organizations held their meeting in Stuttgart is the only connection between the two? Now you can answer that "yes" or "no."
STROLIN: I cannot answer that with "yes" or "no." I must say that the connecting link was the fact that Stuttgart was the city of foreign Germans and so to speak the representative of Germans abroad, because of, its past history.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you read English?
STROLIN: A little.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 461 of the book that you have? At the bottom of Page 461 you will see
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reproduced a copy of an article from the Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt of 21 September 1933.
The Tribunal will find the extract on Page 4 of the translation.
That article describes the annual meeting of your institution, after its reorganization in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. I want to read just four short extracts from that article 2 and ask you for your comments.
"The chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, Lord Mayor, Dr. Strolin, opened the celebration."
That is yourself presumably; is that so?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
"Among those present, he greeted in particular, Minister President and Minister of Religion in Wurttemberg, Mergenthaler, as the representative of the supervisory authorities; General Haushofer of Munich as representative of Rudolf Hess, who has been entrusted by the Fuehrer with the supreme direction of all matters concerning Germans in foreign countries..."
Did you say that?
STROLIN: I cannot remember having said that. Haushofer was for me the representative of the VDA, and I cannot conceive how he could have been the deputy of Hess at this occasion. However, it is probably true.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Tribunal is safe in taking it that the Stuttgatter Neues Tagblatt on the day after that celebration would accurately report what you said in your opening address?
You need not look at the rest of it for the moment. It is not likely that that article is untrue or incorrect, is it?
STROLIN: No, the article is probably correct, but I did not remember -- now looking back -- that Haushofer was at that time the deputy of Hess, for Rudolf Hess had no connection with the Deutsches Auslands-Institut as such.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It appears that you are saying there, and you are saying it in a speech, that Haushofer is representing Hess, and that Hess has been charged by the Ftihrer with the supreme command of all matters concerning Germans in foreign countries. Do you understand what you are saying there?
STROLIN: Yes, it may have been put that way at that time, but in practice, it never happened that I received a directive of any kind from Rudolf Hess.
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LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Your institution could correctly be said to concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries, could it not?
STROLIN: I did not understand the question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your institution, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I shall leave that. Will you look down the page and omit the next...
STROLIN: I would like to add to this point. It was the first time that I made a speech for the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the speech was, of course drafted with the approval of the personalities who were to be welcomed there. I cannot longer remember that Haushofer was present in that capacity on that occasion and can merely repeat my statement that as the honorary president of the Institute I know nothing of Rudolf Hess having given directives to the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may have known nothing about it, but you were the new chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut at that time, were you not?
STROLIN: No, I was not the chairman. The chairman of the Institute was a special leader. In my capacity as Lord Mayor it was merely one of my many extra duties to act as president of the Institute. It is quite impossible for me to remember which personalities I greeted at the time, and how I did it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Please confine yourself to answering the particular question I put to you: Were you or were you not the chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut on 20 September 1933?
STROLIN: Yes, I was appointed to that position at that time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had just been appointed because you were a good Nazi and the Nazi Party had come to power and was reorganizing this institution.
STROLIN: I was appointed to this post because I was Lord Mayor of Stuttgart and because later the city of Stuttgart was called the "City of Germans Abroad" since, because of its history and tradition it had always had very close connection with Germans abroad.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, now, we will go on. Will you miss out the next short paragraph and look at the paragraph which starts off, "Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, stated the local Party leadership..."
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STROLIN: What page is that on?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is on the same page.
STROLIN: Page 461?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, it is on Page 462. And it is the third paragraph in the center of the page.
STROLIN: Yes, I found the place.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
"Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, stated, 'The local Party leadership (Gauleitung) is prepared to co-operate through thick and thin with the new officers of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.'"
Hess, you know, was in charge of the Party leadership, wasn't he -- the Gauleiter? We will go on:
"National Socialism will demand the blood unity of all Ger-mans as its historic right."
Will you look now at Page 463 -- we will leave that -- Will you look now ...
STROLIN: May I say something in connection with this?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you please, yes.
STROLIN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Schmidt, was here purely in his capacity as a deputy of the Gauleiter, but he was not the Deputy of Rudolf Hess.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. But the point I am putting -- I will make it quite clear -- is that the Gauleitung which came under Hess was going to co-operate with your institution through thick and thin. You appreciate that?
STROLIN: That is obvious.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Page 463, and on the second paragraph:
"In his address the new director of the DAI, Dr. Csaki, stated:
'We followed with deep distress the inner disunity of the German people. Now since all that has been overcome, since we see that all the German Folk (Volksdeutsche) organizations are standing in one line, we are filled with a feeling of pride for our German mother-country, a feeling of happiness: Germany is united.'
"'The feeling of adherence to the German people gives us a happy consciousness. In the course of centuries this or that position has been lost. We must prevent any from being lost. It gives us a feeling of pride and self-confidence that we are bridges for the German Lebensraum.'"
Was that in fact what the purpose of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was?
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STROLIN: Dr. Csaki said in this quotation that the Germans abroad were bridges to the German Lebensraum. This German Lebensraum, also applied, for instance, to the Germans in Hungary and Romania and to that extent it is true when he says the Germans are "bridges" to this Lebensraum, that is, the space in which Germans live. This has also always been the attitude of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut; to build bridges to the Lebensraum in which these Germans live.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, have you ever read a book by Dr. Emil Ehrlich, or seen it, entitled: Die Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP? You need not look at that. Have you ever read that book? A title of that kind?
ST'ROLIN: I do not think so.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that Dr. Emil Ehrlich was the personal adviser to Bohle?
STROLIN: I believe he was Bohle's adjutant at one time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 305 of the book that you have in front of you -- My Lord, this passage appears on Page 5 of the document the Tribunal has -- and that is a reproduction of Dr. Emil Ehrlich's book. Would you look at the second paragraph on Page 305, half way down that paragraph, starting:
"On 27 August 1936 the Fuehrer designated Stuttgart as the 'City of Germans Abroad,' and the Gauleiter of the Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP assumed protection of this beautiful city, which also houses within its walis the German Auslands-Institut, which works in hearty co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation."
Would I be right in saying that throughout the whole history, from 1933 onwards, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was working in the heartiest co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation?
STROLIN: This is not correct, inasmuch as there was no practical or scientific co-operation between the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the Auslands-Organisation. The hearty co-operation, as I have already mentioned, referred to the fact that the Ausland Germans had their meetings in Stuttgart. That was the hearty co-operation between them. There was no co-operation in practical matters since it was not necessary.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 127 of this book? I want you to tell me, looking at the last paragraph, whether that is an accurate report, "All persons who in the future... " this is, I beg your pardon, a confidential report on the special schooling work conducted by the DAI for the foreign organizations. You did in fact, did you not, assist the foreign organizations in training their Landesgruppenleiter and other leaders abroad?
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STROLIN: May I ask who signed this article or report?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I cannot tell you who signed that report. I asked you a question. Did the Deutsches Auslands-Institut assist in training leaders for the Auslands-Organisation abroad?
STROLIN: I am not informed on that point.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just turn over to Page 128 second paragraph, which I read to you quite shortly:
"The Auslands-Institut plays a part in determining the curriculum for the training camps (Schulungslager) as well as serving as an intermediary between the party authorities who run these camps and the Germans from abroad who attend them."
You still say that that report is ...
STROLIN: May I ask the date of this report?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I told you it is a report...
STROLIN: I had no knowledge of this report.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I just want to ask you one or two very short questions on the evidence that you have given about the Defendant, Von Neurath. You have told us that he was a man of peace, with an excellent, kind character. Do you know that on the 5th of November 1937 he attended a meeting at which Hitler addressed the leaders of his Armed Forces? Did you ever hear of that meeting, on the 5th of November 1937?
STROLIN: No, I did not hear of this meeting, at least not until I was imprisoned.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well then, perhaps I could tell you quite shortly what took place. Hitler said at the meeting, among other things, that the only way out of the German difficulties was to secure greater living space, and he said that that problem could be solved only by force. And, having said that, he then went on to say that he had decided to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia. You never heard of that meeting?
STROLIN: No, I have not heard anything of that meeting, and concluded only later that ...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But...
STROLIN: May I finish my sentence?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know...
STROLIN: I said just that Von Neurath indicated to me that he had serious differences of opinion with Hitler. That was toward the end of 1937. It was only later that I realized that he must have meant the conference with Hitler and the attitude
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which he took on 5 November; however, it was only when I was in prison that I heard through the newspapers that such a conference actually took place.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I shall come to all that in a moment. I just want you to get a picture of what happened at this meeting, and I quote four lines from the minutes of that meeting:
"Hitler believed that very probably England and presumably France had already secretly abandoned Czechoslovakia and were satisfied that this question would one day be cleared up by Germany."
And Hitler then went on to say that the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute a conquest of food for 5 or 6 million people, and that he visualized the compulsory immigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia.
Now, that is what took place at that conference. Do you know that some 4 months later -- on 12 March 1938 -- Von Neurath was giving an assurance to M. Masaryk, and among other things he assured him, on behalf of Herr Hitler, that Germany still con-sidered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of 1925? Do you know that he said that?
STROLIN: I do not recall it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Can you understand, now that I have told you that that is a fact, can you understand anybody who had been at that conference and had heard what Hitler had said on 5 November giving an assurance to Czechoslovakia 4 months later in terms of that kind? Can you understand any honest man doing that?
STROLIN: I cannot judge the situation prevailing at that time. I do not know from whom Von Neurath might have received an order.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not asking you to judge at that time. I am asking you now what your opinion is of a man who can do that sort of thing. I want you to tell the Tribunal.
STROLIN: I cannot answer that because I do not have a com-prehensive picture of that situation.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must under any circumstances object to this type of suggestive question. It is not permissible to put such a question to the witness without giving him the complete picture of how this assurance was given. The fact is, and it is correct, that in the speech of 5 November 1937, Hitler for the first time developed plans which were no longer in accord with the peace policy of Herr Von Neurath, and Von
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Neurath took the opportunity -- I believe in December or early in January -- to discuss this thoroughly with Hitler and point out to him the impossibility of the policy which he apparently wanted to embark upon and to persuade him not to carry it out. When from Hitler's reply he was forced to the conclusion that Hitler would nevertheless insist on this policy which would lead to aggres-sion in the future he submitted his resignation. On 4 February 1938 Herr Von Neurath was permitted to resign. He no longer participated in active politics.
On 11 or 12 March, when the invasion of Austria took place, an invasion of which Herr Von Neurath had no inkling until that day, Hitler called him ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Ludinghausen, will you kindly wait? The question was put about the 5th of March 1938, whether a man who had heard the conference of the 5th of November 1937 could have given the assurance of the 5th of March.
DR.VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I can also clarify that statement, if I may. The question put by Minister Mastny was whether any military action against Czechoslovakia was intended immediately or soon after the invasion of Austria, and Herr Von Neurath believed that he could, honestly and as a gentleman, answer this question in the negative.
We have to take into consideration the circumstances under which this statement was made. First, Hitler, in his speech of 5 November 1937, spoke of the years to come. When he marched into Austria on 12 March, that is at a time which from 5 March ...
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. We do not want to have all this argument. The question was what was this witness' opinion of a man who had done that. That was all the question that was asked, and that question is put to credit...
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I beg your pardon; no one can answer that question unless he knows in what connection it was put. Mr. Mastny asked whether the march into Austria would entail any aggressive action against Czechoslovakia and Von Neurath answered that question. No more and no less. He did not want to give an answer regarding the future. The Minister wanted to know whether in connection with the march of the German troops into Austria any military actions against Czechoslovakia were intended. According to the information which my client had, he could in the given situation answer this question in the negative with a clear conscience. This question is admissible only if the witness is informed about what I have just said. The point is not that he declared once and for all Germany will never march into Czechoslovakia, but that he merely answered the Czech
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Minister Mastny's question: Is there any danger that in connection with the march into Austria, military measures will also be taken against Czechoslovakia? This question he could answer the way he did. Therefore, the question in the form in which it was put by the British Prosecution is in my opinion not admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question properly admissible.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we will not pursue the matter. I ask you just this one further question, so that I make myself quite clear. You said in your evidence, as I wrote it down, that the Defendant Von Neurath was well thought of, dignified and of noble character. Having heard what I have told you, are you still prepared to tell the Court that you think he is well thought of, dignified, and of noble character? Is that your opinion now? I just want to get the value of your evidence; do you see? After what you have been told is that your opinion?
STROLIN: It is still my opinion that Herr Von Neurath is a man of distinguished and decent character. I cannot judge under what circumstances he acted at the time and what considerations prompted him to act this way.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say that he was in favor of peace and did all he could to avoid a war. Do you call a deceit of that kind doing everything possible to avoid war? Is that what your idea of a peaceful policy is -- giving assurance 4 months after you know perfectly well that the German intention is to overrun their country? Is that what you call doing everything to avoid war?
STROLIN: I would like to state once more that I do not sufficiently understand the essential points and ramifications of this question to form a proper opinion on it. But obviously things cannot be as simple as they have been pictured here.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me turn to another aspect of this matter. We have been told at great length that he disapproved of Hitler's policy, and that he resigned. Do you know that having resigned, he was appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939? Do you know that?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was after the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been overrun, occupied.
STROLIN: I said previously that Von Neurath told me that he accepted this post very reluctantly; that he had twice refused to accept it but later he believed that he had to make a sacrifice in order to achieve his ends; and, as the State President Hacha told me later, Von Neurath's personal influence was of great benefit
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because, as Hacha told me, Von Neurath's activity undoubtedly had a balancing and conciliatory effect. As I said before, he was recalled because he was too mild.
LT. COL. GRIEFFITH-JONES: Now, you have already said it, and we have heard it, and we have remembered it, so it is quite unnecessary for you to say it again. Do try to answer my question shortly. Let me ask you this question. Have you ever thought that the reason for that appointment might have been as a reward for his assistance in the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia that had followed so shortly before?
STROLIN: No, I never thought of that. However, if I may mention it, I have read quite a different version in the book by Henderson, that is, that Von Neurath had been put into that post so that his international prestige could be discredited. I wanted to bring in this version in order to point out that there were other possibilities that might come into question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember that you described him as a disciplined, humane, and conscientious man?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at that poster.
[The poster was submitted to the witness.]
My Lord, I regret that I have not got a copy of this for the Tribunal. It is a very short matter. It has been introduced in the Czechoslovak report on the German occupation. I win give Your Lordship the number: Document Number USSR-60.
[Turning to the witness.] Do you see that this is signed by the Defendant Von Neurath, the humane and conscientious man?
STROLIN: Yes, I see that the Czech universities were closed for a period of 3 years, and that nine culprits were shot. This announcement, however, does not say, as far as I can see, exactly why this was done. Consequently I cannot pass judgment on the announcement, because I do not know what Von Neurath proclaimed in it. The announcement does not tell me anything, if I do not know the reason why the announcement was issued. That universities were closed and nine culprits shot must have been for convincing reasons.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I add the following? I would like to say this in order to save time. This question of Czechoslovakia and of this poster, with which I am also familiar, will, of course, be dealt with, in connection with Von Neurath's case, and at that stage of the proceedings. I will then have the opportunity to bring the proof that this poster did not originate with the Defendant Von Neurath. This witness was not in Prague
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and can relate only things which he did not know of his own experience, but which Herr Von Neurath told him. Therefore, I believe that this question is not appropriate and is taking up time unnecessarily, for I would have to raise objections and describe the actual situation. We should not put questions to the witness which, though put in good faith, are positively incorrect, that is, questions which are based on inaccurately reported facts which actually occurred in a different manner. I shall prove that at the time when this poster was drafted and put up, Herr Von Neurath was not in Prague and was not informed of what was going on during his absence.
Therefore I believe that we should not deal with this question today, since, as I have said, the witness cannot know anything about it from his own observation.
THE PRESIDENT: It will be open to you to show that this poster was put up when Von Neurath was not at Prague, and that he gave no authority for it. That would clear him with reference to this poster; but what is being put to this witness is: Assuming that this poster was put up by Von Neurath, is it right to describe him as a humane man? That is all the cross-examination means.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But, the witness knows nothing of this poster. He cannot answer the question correctly if he does not know the ramifications, if he does not know that this poster actually did not originate with Herr Von Neurath.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was examined at great length by you to show he was a humane man and had a very good character. Under such circumstances it is up to the Prosecution to put to the witness circumstances which would indicate that he was not of that humane character. That is all that is being done.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In that case the most this witness could say would be "I do not know," or "if it is true, one cannot call it humane." Any one of us can say that. The witness does not need to say it.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can say, "If this is correct it is inconsistent with what I knew of Von Neurath."
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: He cannot and he will not say that either, for the simple reason that he does not know the circumstances under which this poster was published. Frankly I cannot see the purpose of this question, for if the question is put in that way, every decent individual will say that it is inhumane; but this would not alter the fact that the witness would be judging facts which do not exist and which are not true.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, don't you think this is really taking up unnecessary time, if this witness doesn't know
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anything about it? I quite see that it is the proper purpose of cross-examination to discredit the witness.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to the Tribunal. The point of that cross-examination was, perhaps I might be allowed to say this: This defendant has produced a witness to give evidence on his oath before this Tribunal. If that evidence is unchallenged, then it goes down on the record, and there is nothing to stop this Tribunal from regarding this witness as a man who is in a position to give reliable evidence of that kind. This cross-examination is rather to show that this witness, whether he is saying it truthfully or untruthfully, is certainly inaccurate. The evidence he has given as to the good character of this defendant does not bear investigation -- that is quite clear -- and the Tribunal is not saying we are not entitled to cross-examine as to character. However, I do not think I need occupy the time of the Tribunal with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. AMEN: Witness, when were you last in New York City?
STROLIN: I was in New York in 1936.
COL. AMEN: At that time you made a speech at Madison Square Garden; is that correct?
COL. AMEN: That was a rally in the Garden?
STROLIN: It was for "German Day," on 6 October 1936.
COL. AMEN: A "German Day" rally, correct?
STROLIN: It was the annual meeting of the Germans which took place on 6 October.
COL. AMEN: And a great percentage of the German-American Bund, is that correct?
COL. AMEN: In fact, that whole rally was held under the auspices of the German-American Bund, was it not?
STROLIN: The fact is, a festival committee had been commissioned by all German clubs -- I believe there are all in all two thousand of them in New York -- and these 2,000 German clubs had united in one festival committee which organized the "German Day." I did not know the composition of this committee in detail.
COL. AMEN: And it was at the solicitation of the German-American Bund that you made your speech, was it not?
STROLIN: No, it was at the solicitation of the festival committee of the German clubs of New York.
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COL. AMEN: Yes, and on that committee were numerous members of the German-American Bund; is that true? "Yes" or "no."
COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, there were many of the members of your organization at that time who were active members of the German-American Bund; is that correct?
COL. AMEN: And you personally had had several conferences with them, both here in Germany and in New York City, correct?
STROLIN: No, that is not correct.
COL. AMEN: Well, what is correct?
STROLIN: It is correct that I was invited, but there were no further conferences.
COL. AMEN: But you do not dispute that many of the members of your organization were at that time members of the German-American Bund?
STROLIN: I am not informed on that point.
THE PRESIDENT [To the witness]: I have just taken down that you have said that was so.
COL. AMEN: Precisely.
STROLIN: Please repeat the question.
COL. AMEN: Did you not just tell me a few moments ago, in response to a previous question, that many members of your organization were members of the German-American Bund at the time of your speech at the rally in Madison Square Garden?
STROLIN: When you speak of an "organization," do you mean members of the German Auslands-Institut?
COL. AMEN: "Your organization" is the way I put it.
STROLIN: I had no organization; I had an institute.
COL. AMEN: Exactly. And under whose auspices were you making this speech in Madison Square Garden?
STROLIN: I was asked to make this speech because I had shortly before been appointed Lord Mayor of the City of Germans Abroad. I was Lord Mayor of that city, and therefore I was asked to deliver the address. Stuttgart was made the City of Germans Abroad, since the Swabians furnished most of the emigrants, and for that reason Stuttgart was to be the home city of foreign Germans.
COL. AMEN: Well, is it not a fact that many members of the Auslands-Organisation were at that time also members of the German-American Bund? "Yes" or "no."
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COL. AMEN: Is it not also a fact that at that time many members of the Institute were also members of the German-American Bund? Yes or no.
STROLIN: Yes, some of these Germans had come from America; they were students who had studied in America and returned to Germany.
COL. AMEN: And is it not also a fact that many of these members of the German-American Bund, who were likewise members of the Auslands-Organisation and of the Institute, were indicted and tried and convicted for various espionage offenses in the Federal courts of the United States? Yes or no.
STROLIN: No, I know nothing about that.
COL. AMEN: You never heard that?
STROLIN: No, I never heard about it. I know of the case of Kappe, but that has no connection with the Deutsche Auslands-Institut.
COL. AMEN: That is one case, as a matter of fact; now, you know some others too, don't you?
STROLIN: I wonder if you could give me particulars.
COL. AMEN: I could, but I am asking you the questions rather than trying to tell you the answers.
STROLIN: I cannot remember any other case. Please question me.
COL. AMEN: No, I will go to another subject now, because it is getting late. Are you acquainted with a Mr. Alfred Weninger-W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r?
STROLIN: I did not understand the name. Alfred...
COL. AMEN: Alfred Weninger, W-e-n-i-n-g-e-r, or however you pronounce it.
STROLIN: Weninger -- yes I am familiar with that name.
COL. AMEN: Who is he?
STROLIN: Alfred Weninger is, to my knowledge, at present in France. I believe he is a jurist.
COL. AMEN: Well, don't you know? Don't you know whether he is a jurist or not?
STROLIN: Yes, he is employed as a jurist.
COL. AMEN: What is his nationality?
STROLIN: He is a Frenchman.
COL. AMEN: Is he a friend of yours?
COL-AATEN: Did you intervene on his behalf on at least one occasion?
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STROLIN: I provided for his release from prison.
COL. AMEN: That was in March 1943?
STROLIN: No, there must be some misunderstanding. I mean the Alfred Weninger who is a Frenchman and whom I helped during the war so that he was not sentenced to death, and was later released from prison. However, that took place during the period from 1942 to 1944. 1 do not know another Alfred Weninger. There may be two Alfred Weningers.
COL. AMEN: No, that is correct. He was sentenced along with 12 other comrades for espionage and intelligence with the enemy.
STROLIN: Yes, and he is the one whom I helped.
COL. AMEN: And you intervened with the Attorney General at the People's Court?
STROLIN: Yes, I intervened with Freisler.
COL. AMEN: And also, at the Ministries of the Interior and Justice in Berlin?
STROLIN: I submitted to the Ministry of the Interior a memorandum regarding conditions in Alsace, at the time, in order to have the Alsatians, pardoned.
COL. AMEN: And as a result of your efforts, these people received temporary suspension of their sentences; is that correct?
STROLIN: Yes. I would like to mention expressly that I asked Herr Von Neurath to intervene and it is due to a letter which he wrote to Hitler that these Alsatians were pardoned.
COL. AMEN: So that this individual, to put it mildly, is under a considerable obligation to you at the present time? Correct?
STROLIN: Yes, I imagine so.
COL. AMEN: Well, you saved his life in effect, did you not?
STROLIN: I also saved the lives of many others; I do not know if the people are grateful for it or not.
COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, I take it you do not question the truth of what he might report as a conversation with you, correct?
STROLIN: I do not doubt that he would remember this.
COL. AMEN: Do you recall having a conversation with him in June of 1940?
STROLIN: At the moment I cannot say unless you tell me what it was about.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will tell you what you are reported by him to have said and I ask you whether you recall having said that to him, either in the exact words which I put to you, or in substance. Do you understand?
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STROLIN: Yes, I understand.
COL. AMEN: Here are the words: "I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals and I have but the one wish -- to get out of it."
Did you say that to Weninger in words or in substance? "Yes" or "no"?
STROLIN: I did not quite understand what you said. Will you please repeat it?
COL. AMEN: You understand English, don't you, Witness?
STROLIN: Some. I understand just a little.
COL. AMEN: As a matter of fact, you were interrogated in English by one of our interrogators, were you not?
STROLIN: I spoke a little English only on one occasion, but, I believe that he did not understand me correctly.
COL. AMEN: And you understood perfectly well what I just read to you, did you not?
STROLIN: I did not fully understand the German translation of what you said and the substance of your question is not clear to me.
COL. AMEN: Well, I shall read it to you again. But I suggest that you are merely taking this time in order to find out what answer you want to make. I ask you again whether you said to Weninger in words or in substance, in June of 1940, the following:
"I warn you against National Socialism, which does not recoil before anything, and which makes justice its servile agent. They are criminals and I have but the one wish -- to get out of it."
Do you understand?
STROLIN: Yes, I understand but I do not recall having made that statement.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement when I tell you that Weninger so states -- Weninger, whom you have just told us has every obligation to you?
STROLIN: I do not remember it. It may be true that I made critical statements, but I do not recall the wording.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement? Answer yes or no.
STROLIN: I deny the statement. I deny that I made it in this form.
COL. AMEN: Did you make it in substance; did you make that statement?
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STROLIN: I cannot remember the conversation at all.
COL.ANEN: Do you recall having made another statement to Weninger in 1936 in Strasbourg -- were you in Strasbourg with Weninger in 1936?
STROLIN: At the moment I cannot recall.
COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?
STROLIN: I cannot recall.
COL. AMEN: It is quite possible?
STROLIN: It is possible, but I cannot recall it. I cannot at a moment's notice recall the date I was there.
COL. AMEN: And did you not say to Weninger in Strasbourg in 1936, in words or in substance, the following: "When I am abroad I am ashamed to be a German!'? "Yes" or "no."
STROLIN: It was entirely out of the question at that time, since in the year of 1936 1 was very proud of the fact that I was a German.
COL. AMEN: And then, do you deny having made that statement to Weninger?
STROLIN: I am quite certain that I did not make that statement in the year 1936.
COL.ANEN: When did you make it?
STROLIN: I do not recall having made such a statement to Weninger at all, at least not in 1936.
COL. AMEN: When did you make that statement to Weninger or anybody else? In what year did you decide to make statements like that?
STROLIN: I cannot recall having made such a statement at all.
COL. AMEN: But you do not deny it?
STROLIN: I frankly admit that there was a time when one was no longer proud of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the other Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?
DR. SEIDL: I have no questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire. [The witness left the stand.]
Does that conclude your case, Dr. Seidl, or have you got any other evidence to offer?
DR. SEIDL: Yes. First, I have to read into the record the questionnaire of the witness Alfred Hess which has arrived in the meantime. The Tribunal has admitted his testimony in the form of a questionnaire. I would then like to refer to various documents
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in Document Book Number 3, but before going into that and to conclude today's proceedings, I would like to establish upon the request of the Defendant Hess -- this refers to Volume 2 of the document book -- that Lord Simon came to the meeting as the official representative of the British Government; I therefore read a few sentences from Page 93 (Volume 11, Page 93):
"Lord Simon said: 'Herr Reichsminister, I was informed that you had come here feeling charged with a mission and that you wished to speak of it to someone who would be able to receive it with Government authority. You know I am Dr. Guthrie and therefore I come with the authority of the Government and I shall be willing to listen and to discuss with you as far as seems good anything you would wish to state for the information of the Government.'"
That was what I wished to state in completion of my reading of the Simon minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you be able to finish tonight if we went on for a few minutes or not?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the answers on this questionnaire are rather long. The witness was cross-examined and I assume that the Prosecution also intend to read the particulars of the cross-examination and I do not believe this would be possible today.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 26 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]