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DR. HORN: Witness, you knew Count Ciano. Where and when did you meet him?
VON STEENGRACHT: I knew Count Ciano but not in a political sense, only personally. I cannot remember exactly when I met him; probably it was on the occasion of a state visit. I was working, at the time in the Protocol Department in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: What experiences did you have with Count Ciano?
VON STEENGRACHT: Since I did not work with him politically, I had no political experience with him.
DR. HORN: Now, another matter. Is it correct that Herr Von Ribbentrop gave orders that under all circumstances the French franc should be sustained against inflation?
VON STEENGRACHT: Such measures can apply only to a time when I was not yet State Secretary. But I know that the basic attitude towards France and all occupied territories was that under all circumstances their currency was to be preserved as far as possible, or rather should be preserved by all means. That is why we often sent gold to Greece in order to attempt to maintain the value of the currency there to some extent.
DR. HORN: What was accomplished in Greece by sending this gold there?
VON STEENGRACHT: By sending gold to Greece we lowered the rate of exchange of foreign currencies. Thus the Greek merchants who had hoarded food to a large extent, became frightened and threw the food on the market, and in this way it was made available to the Greek population again.
DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop gave strictest orders not to undertake any confiscation in occupied territories but to deal directly only with their governments?
VON STEENGRACHT: If you put the question like that, it is basically correct, but I say, as I said yesterday, that in principle we had no functions at all in the occupied territories, therefore no power to confiscate, nor was such power within the jurisdiction of other agencies; but it is correct that we negotiated only with the
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foreign governments and that Von Ribbentrop had most strictly forbidden us to support any direct measures concerning an occupied country which were carried out by other departments.
DR. HORN: For the time being I have no further questions to put to this witness.
DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, are you well acquainted with Von Papen as a result of the period during which you were working in the Foreign Office and particularly during the time you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: I had known Herr Von Papen for several years before 1933, but privately. Then I lost track of him for some time and re-established contact with him when I became State Secretary in the German Foreign Office. Then I was continually associated with him in an official and unofficial capacity.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, particularly in the last period of your activities as State Secretary, continually receive the reports which Von Papen, as Ambassador in Ankara, sent to Berlin?
VON STEENGRACHT: Unless Herr Von Papen sent reports directly to Von Ribbentrop -- which may have been possible; I do not know -- I received them weekly through official channels.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you remember that after two previous refusals Von Papen took over the post of Ambassador in Ankara, in April 1939, on the day that Italy occupied Albania, whereby an acute danger of war arose in the Southeast?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I was not State Secretary and also had no political position, so that I am not acquainted with the events of that period. But today I have the impression that he took over that position after the Italians had occupied Albania. And he himself told me later that at that time there was danger that the Italians would advance further into the Balkans, possibly causing a conflict with Turkey, as a result of which world peace would have been endangered. For that reason he had decided at the time to accept the post. Exactly on which day that was, I cannot say.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What can you say in general about Herr Von Papen's efforts toward peace?
VON STEENGRACHT: I am under the impression that Herr Von Papen always strove to preserve peace by every means. He certainly considered that it would be a great disaster for Germany and the world if war were to break out.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were the efforts which Von Papen made during the war towards establishing peace aimed at foregoing any
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annexations regardless of the military outcome and completely reestablishing the sovereignty of occupied territories, in short, to achieve, by means of reasonable renunciation, a bearable status for all European states?
VON STEENGRACHT: In principle it was quite clear that Von Papen always worked for the re-establishment of peace under conditions which would have re-established full sovereignty for all countries, and so that no encroachment nor damage, material or otherwise would be inflicted on any foreign countries.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was that Von Papen's attitude even at the time of the greatest German military successes?
VON STEENGRACHT: I believe that his basic attitude in this respect never changed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were his continuous personal efforts to establish peace held against Von Papen by Hitler, and was he considered a disagreeable outsider in that connection?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with Hitler; I only know that he was quite generally criticized by Hitler and other persons as a man who always followed a weak line.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen frankly acknowledge that peace would be impossible as long as Hitler and the Party existed in Germany and the necessary credit for negotiating abroad was lacking?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I think it must have been about April 1943 or May 1943, that I spoke to Von Papen in detail about the whole subject, since, at that time, I had just become State Secretary. At that time he very clearly voiced the opinion to me which you have just sketched. It was quite plain to him that foreign countries would conclude no peace with Hitler and the methods he employed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just one last question, Witness: The Indictment accuses the Defendant Von Papen of being an unscrupulous opportunist. You, Witness, know the defendant from the reports and from all the official relations the defendant had with his superior office for a number of years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, get the impression that this characterization of Von Papen is correct, or can you say, on the strength of these reports and these official relations, that Von Papen appears to you to be a man who always tells the truth, even when that truth is disagreeable to his quite unpleasant superiors, and even when the voicing of that truth involves personal danger for him?
VON STEENGRACHT: I can say that is absolutely so. I find the best evidence of it is that Herr Von Papen was finally completely
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eliminated from the position of Vice-Chancellor and resigned from the government, then he became a private citizen and only in the greatest emergency was he called upon. In my opinion, Von Papen made himself available only because he said to himself, "I have still got a certain amount of credit, I am a good Catholic, and accordingly I represent an attitude which is opposed to all inhumanity, et cetera. Perhaps I can, through my intervention, exercise some influence in that direction." I myself never attended a meeting or a conference which took place between Hitler and Von Papen, but, particularly from my liaison officer with Hitler, I often heard that Von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler many things which no one else could have told Hitler and I believe that through his manner he prevented a number of things, at least for a time.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you have stated that Hitler, because of the terrible bombing attack on Dresden, intended to issue an order according to which thousands of prisoners of war were to be killed in reprisal.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: Do I remember your testimony of yesterday correctly, that all you have said about this matter is information from, or based on information from Herr Von Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
DR. NELTE: What do you know from your own personal knowledge?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own personal knowledge I only know that our liaison man with Hitler called me on the telephone and told me that Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or more British and American prisoners of war be shot in reprisal, and that Hitler would agree or had agreed. I immediately reported this to Von Ribbentrop, and he went there at once and told me after half an hour that the order had been withdrawn. About Field Marshal Keitel I know nothing at all in that connection.
DR. NELTE: You do not know, therefore, who was the originator of that order?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
DR. NELTE: Who suggested it, I mean.
VON STEENGRACHT: The suggestion for that order evidently came from Goebbels according to the information which I received.
DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop, do you mean?
VON STEENGRACHT: Who?
DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop?
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VON STEENGRACHT: No, Von Ribbentrop had nothing to do with that.
DR. NELTE: Then from Herr Hewel?
VON STEENGRACHT: Herr Hewel told me that. He called me up and told me that.
DR. NELTE: And you know nothing about the participation of military men?
VON STEENGRACHT: I know nothing at all about the participation of military men.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.
DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, I have only one question. Did you, as State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office regularly inform military offices, for instance, the Army High Command or the High Command of the Navy, with reference to pertinent matters of German politics?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, they were not informed.
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESEDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to crossexamine?
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness, you told us yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against the persecution of the churches, was against the persecution of Jews, and did not know what was going on in the concentration camps. You have told us that he was not a typical Nazi. What are the qualities of a typical Nazi?
VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical National Socialist, I mean a man who fanatically acknowledges and represents all the doctrines of National Socialism.
Herr Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but he really knew uncommonly little of any of the other ideology and never bothered about it. He never spoke at meetings, never participated in large rallies, and therefore, he really knew extremely little about the people and the mood of the people.
COL. PHILLIMORE: By "a typical Nazi," do you mean someone who was persecuting the churches?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will repeat it. By "a typical Nazi," do you mean a man who was engaged in persecution of the churches?
VON STEENGRACHT: At any rate, someone who, if Adolf Hitler considered it right, did not state his personal opinion on the matter.
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COL. PHILLIMORE: And a man who would take his full share in persecution and extermination of Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I would not like to say either. That was limited to a certain circle of people. A large number even of fanatical Nazis knew nothing about these atrocities and repudiated them and would have repudiated them, had they been properly informed of them.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I understand you to say that you knew nothing of them yourself. Is that so?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I knew nothing?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.
VON STEENGRACHT: In my position as State Secretary and because I read foreign papers, and particularly since I had contact with the opposition, I knew of many things connected with concentration camps. In all these cases, as far as it was in my power, I intervened. But regarding the things which I have heard here now, I knew nothing at all.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you about another matter. You have told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in the occupied territories. Your words were that "the Foreign Office lost responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the frontier." Is that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said that at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole right to negotiate with foreign governments everywhere. Beyond that, in most countries, the Foreign Office did not have the right to have even a diplomatic observer without authority, particularly in Norway and the Eastern Territories.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You have said the Foreign Office had no right to have an observer there, and that direct relations with occupied territories were withdrawn, is that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I said that in all occupied territories the Foreign Office no longer had the sole right to negotiate with the government, since there was then either a civil administration in those countries or a military government with auxiliary command offices and a military administrative head, and that these offices themselves then approached the foreign governments and their executive organs in the countries occupied at that time. Consequently one can no longer say that the Foreign Office had the sole right to negotiate with the governments. But in some countries, as in the North and the East, we no longer had any of our people at all, and Hitler had issued the order that we withdraw our observers
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from the other countries, such as Holland, Belgium and so on. However, we did not do so.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You say that in France you had an ambassador reporting direct to Ribbentrop, did you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And his duties included advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically important documents and securing and seizure of public property; further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn't that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I already emphasized yesterday that only since 1943 had I anything at all to do with political affairs. If I understood your question correctly, Mr. Prosecutor, you are of the opinion that the Secret State Police and the German executive organs in France were under our jurisdiction. That is incorrect.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. I asked you if the Minister Abetz had not got those duties.
VON STEENGRACHT: He did not have the assignment of confiscating any French property or carrying out any action against the Jews. No orders of that kind went through my hands during my time, and he could ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: [Handing the document to the witness.] Will you look at Document 3614-PS.
My Lord, that was put in as French Exhibit Number RF-1061 on the 4th of February. It is a letter dated the 3rd of August 1940, signed by Ribbentrop, to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). It reads:
"The Fuehrer has appointed the former Minister Abetz Ambassador and after my report has decreed as follows:
"I. Ambassador Abetz has the following tasks in France..."
then it sets out a number of tasks and Number 6 is the one I put to the witness:
"6. Advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police in connection with the impounding of politically important documents.
"7. Securing and seizure of public art property; further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of instructions specially given for this case."
Then the concluding paragraphs:
"II. The Fuehrer has hereby expressly ordered that Ambassador Abetz is exclusively responsible for the handling of all
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political questions in Occupied and Unoccupied France. Insofar as his functions touch military interests, Ambassador Abetz will act only in agreement with the Military Commander in France.
"III. Ambassador Abetz is attached to the Military Commander in France as his Commissioner. His seat remains Paris as heretofore. He receives instructions for carrying out his tasks from me and is responsible exclusively to me on these matters." -- Signed -- "Ribbentrop."
I want to ask you one or two questions about the Jews. You have told us that you and the Defendant Ribbentrop...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like to know why this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not have the task of confiscating property.
[Turning to the witness.] Why did you say that?
VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz had no executive powers, and he was expressly forbidden to intervene in French internal affairs. He could therefore, address himself exclusively to the French Government, and if the French Government did anything by means of their executive power, then that was a transaction on the part of the French Government but never a confiscation carried out by Abetz.
COL. PHILLIMORE: That is not an answer to the question. The question is why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task of advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police on the impounding of politically important documents, did you not say so?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said that no order went through my hands, since I did not become State Secretary until May 1943. This is an order of 3 August 1940. But here we are concerned only with an official directive addressed to Ambassador Abetz.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At this time you were Ribbentrop's personal adjutant, weren't you?
VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, but not political secretary. I was only ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were adjutant?
VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, that is to say I was concerned with technical matters. At that time I never presented a political report to him. But I should add, if I may, this concerns a directive to Ambassador Abetz and this directive was completely outdated by actual conditions. Because advising the Secret Field Police ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: How do you know that, if you were only personal adjutant and not acting in political matters?
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VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz was ambassador until May 1945. Therefore from 1943 to 1945 I continuously corresponded with him, and during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought against the measures which were carried out by the Secret State Police anyway. It was a bitter struggle and he was personally threatened in all possible matters. One can talk about advice, but whether people heeded him -- he had no power -- that is quite another question.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Does it come to this, that your answer about occupied territories applies only after 1943?
VON STEENGRACHT: From my own experience I can speak only about the period after 1943.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to turn to the question of Jews. You have told us that you and Ribbentrop, by adopting a policy of delay, prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress in 1944; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you were against the policy of persecution of the Jews.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And so was the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I want you to look at Document 3319-PS. [Handing the document to the witness.]
My Lord, that is a new document. It will be Exhibit GB-287.
[Turning to witness.] Now you have got a photostat there. Will you look at Page 4 of the German -- that's the first page of the English. That is a letter dated the 28th of April on the subject of anti-Jewish action in foreign countries. It is marked at the bottom of Page 4.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have not found it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you look at Page 4, marked in a black square at the bottom of the page. You see a letter dated the 28th of April 1944, Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, and it is addressed to practically every German legation and mission abroad.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Turn to Page 10. You will see that it purports to be signed by you; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
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COL. PHILLIMORE: You remember the letter? I will read you the first paragraph to refresh your memory. "The Reich Foreign Minister... "
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
"...has ordered the creation of Information Department XIV (Anti-Jewish Action Abroad) under the leadership of Envoy I. K. Schleier, whose task it is to deepen and strengthen the anti-Jewish information service abroad by the incorporation of all experts of the departments and working units of the Foreign Office who have an interest and take part in the anti-Jewish information service abroad, in close co-operation with all offices outside the Foreign Office which are engaged in anti-Jewish work and with the German missions in Europe."
Then you set out the co-workers, number of departments of the Foreign Office, and then one permanent representative of the Reich Security Main Office -- that's Himmler's office, isn't it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And one representative of the office of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. That department just up above "Inland II," that is the Foreign Office which had liaison with the SS, isn't it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At that time the chief was a man called Wagner and the assistant chief, Von Thadden?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you still say that you were against the policy of persecution of the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I maintain that now as before. I also say, as I have already said during earlier interrogations, that even the holding of an anti-Jewish congress in its effect would not have been directed against the Jews because what was happening in Germany was all taking place under the seal of secrecy and no one was informed in any way. The Jews disappeared. But if there had been an international congress, one would have been forced in the first place to bring up the question: where are these Jews anyway? What is actually happening to these Jews?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Is the point this, that you wanted to put off an anti-Jewish congress because that would be known to the world, but you were quite prepared to set up an organization in the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: Gentlemen, we must separate two completely different problems here. The one problem is this: There were
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offices in Germany which conducted and carried out anti-Jewish measures. These organizations also reached abroad and there, without the knowledge and without the participation of the Foreign Office, did away with the people in foreign countries. Consequently, an improvement and a policy guided to some extent into normal channels could exist only if some German department had really assumed responsibility for these things at that time. For we did not hear of these matters; we always heard the complaints which we received from foreign mission heads about events which took place. But we had no means of control. If I applied to the inner German offices ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Was this set up to control the anti-Jewish policy, this department?
VON STEENGRACHT: Apparently we are discussing two different matters here today. The anti-Jewish congress had been ordered. The fact that Rosenberg's office was holding an anti-Jewish congress ...
THE PRESEDENT: You are not answering the question. The question was: Was this organization, referred to in this letter, set up to control the organization of anti-Jewish work abroad? That is the question. Can you not answer that by "yes" or "no"?
VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office could not exercise general control since all anti-Jewish questions were principally dealt with in Rosenberg's office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Well then, what was the purpose of this organization of the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: By Hitler's order we had to contact all German departments and archives in order to collect all the material there, and we attached importance ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: And this was ordered by Ribbentrop, wasn't it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: As set out in your letter?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. And we thought it important that we get an idea in this way of what was actually happening to the Jews, et cetera, and therefore we drew in people from all offices.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you in a minute what was actually happening and out of your own files, but I just want to put this to you:
The point of your putting off the anti-Jewish congress was simply because you did not want the world to know. You had not the slightest objection to setting up an anti-Jewish organization in Germany.
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Now, will you look at Page 32 of the German text.
My Lord, that is on Page 23 of the English text.
You will see there a letter from Rosenberg's office to the Foreign Office, signed by Brautigam, Page 32 of the German text. It is marked at the bottom of Page 32.
Brautigam was your liaison officer with Rosenberg, wasn't he, Witness? Was Brautigam your liaison officer in Rosenberg's office?
VON STEENGRACHT: No. Brautigam was, I think, in the Foreign Office in 1941.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And in 1942.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but in 1941, since he had previously been working on Eastern problems in the Foreign Office, he had been transferred and was now in the Rosenberg office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. And you will see there he is referring to a conference with ObersturmbannFuehrer Eichmann, that is, the chief of the Jewish section of the Gestapo, and a Dr. Wetzel, and he sends you a copy of an agreement made at Tighina in Romania on the 30th of August 1941 with the request for acknowledgment.
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, there could be an error here. This letter is dated 11 March 1942. I became State Secretary in May 1943. I therefore know nothing about this matter. I should like to remark ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: You just listen and wait until you are asked a question. We shall get on faster if you just listen to the letter:
"I point out especially Number 7 of the agreements ... I have already taken a position in my letter of 5 March 1942."
Now, that enclosed an agreement made between the German and Romanian General Staffs, and, if you will look at Paragraph 7, on Page 38 of the German, Page 27 of the English, this was the agreement they made:
"Deportation of Jews from Transnistria. Deportation of Jews across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore, be collected in concentration camps and set to work until a deportation to the east is possible after the end of operations."
And then there's a note on the file on the next page of the German, still on Page 27 of the English:
"According to information from Director General Lecca, today 110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessarabia into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he could learn, this action is based upon an order issued by Marshal Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these Jews."
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Now, do you doubt that that agreement, enclosed with that letter sent to the Foreign Office, would have reached the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Well. I see this document and this agreement for the first time today. Nothing of this entire affair...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Would you answer the question? Do you doubt that that letter and that agreement enclosed with it would have been shown to the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time there was an Under Secretary of State Luther in the Foreign Office who acted quite independently; and I fought a bitter battle against him although I was not called upon to do it, because he wanted to introduce National Socialist methods. Whether he submitted this matter to Ribbentrop or not I cannot decide.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We come to a time when you were the State Secretary. Would you look at Page 31 of the German text, Page 20 of the English.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the words that follow the passage you have just read mean on Page 27: "Bucharest, 17 October 1941 (Signature illegible)" -- and below -- "To be discussed with Vice Minister President Antonescu. Confidential, Bucharest, 16 October 1943"?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is badly typed. "Bucharest, 17 October 1943" and then follows the next letter. The previous part is a note on the file.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a note on the German Legation file on Bucharest.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I have not troubled the Tribunal with the following letters. They deal with the earlier date on the expulsion of Jews from firms owned by citizens of the German Reich.
[Turning to the witness.] Now would you look at Page 31 of the German, Page 20 of the English. You will see there a document sent to ...
THE PRESIDENT: When you started that document you didn't give the date in full. The year there appears to be 1944, doesn't it?
COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not. In 1942, I think, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: It should be April 29, 1942? Is the date at the head of the document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the letter I read was dated March '42 and marked with a foreign office stamp "Received 13th of March 1942..."
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THE PRESIDENT: I am speaking of the whole document, Page 1 of the document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is a file, one of those rather inconvenient documents, a file, and it starts with the earliest date at the bottom and then works up to 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then the part you read first ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: That was 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. What page are you going to now?
COL. PHILLIMORE: I was going to Page 20 now, My Lord.
[Turning to the witness.] Now, this is a communication from Von Thadden who was, as you have told us, assistant in the Department Inland II, to the German Legation in Bucharest. It is dated 12 October 1943, and it is stamped as received on 18 October. And he encloses a letter signed by Muller in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, to all German police authorities abroad. You will see that it goes to the commander of the Security Police in Prague, The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Metz, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Krakow, Kiev, Smolensk, and so on. October '43. That is after you had become Secretary of State, isn't it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were appointed in April?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Turning to the substance of the letter, the subject is the treatment of Jews with foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power:
"In agreement with the Foreign Office, all Jews who remain in the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called home-bringing action and who have the citizenship of the following countries may now be included in the evacuation measures: Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey.
"Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet take place at the present time, for reasons of foreign policy, a temporary stay is provided in Concentration Camp Buchenwald for male Jews over 14 years of age and in the Concentration Camp Ravensbruck for Jewesses and children.
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"A special application for protective custody is not required for the transfer to the concentration camp, but the concentration camp headquarters are to be notified that the transfer to the concentration camp is taking place in keeping with the evacuation measures."
And then there are arrangements about baggage. And if you look at 31-e, you will see at the foot of Page 22, on the English, that that had been signed by Muller and then was signed again by a clerk of Himmler's office. And then on the next page of the English, still on 31-e of the German, Himmler's office sends it to the Foreign Office, to Von Thadden, on 2 October.
Now, did you not see that document when it got to the Foreign Office?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I see this document today for the first time.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You were the State Secretary?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. This obviously concerns a measure which was ordered by another office. Within the German Reich the Foreign Office had no executive powers at all and no possibilities and consequently...
COL. PHILLIMORE: No executive powers, but it was sent to you for information.
VON STEENGRACHT: That was sent to us, this affair, solely for our information, and it was not given to me, this affair.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You had a departmental liaison with the SS, a Mr. Von Thadden. Was he not a competent official?
VON STEENGRACHT: The exact content of this affair I do not even know now, because I have not read it through at leisure. I can imagine only the following in reference to this whole matter: The question whether the Jews who were in Germany could be returned to their home countries was discussed for a long time. This, I think, is what we are concerned with here?
COL. PHILLIMORE: I don't think we are interested in your imagination. Either you know or do not know. I asked you whether Von Thadden was a competent official.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have not seen this document.
COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. Was Von Thadden a competent official?
VON STEENGRACHT: Von Thadden was a man from the Foreign Office who knew his job.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, knew his job. And do you not think that as State Secretary he ought to have shown you this document?
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VON STEENGRACHT: He should have done that, certainly, if this matter was not arranged in another office, and I was completely excluded from the anti-Jewish action. Also instructions about anti-Jewish actions abroad never went through my office. I pointed out yesterday, at the beginning of my statement, that many matters were arranged directly in the highest places, and that the Foreign Office also was not notified afterwards, and orders in these matters...
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a document you were informed about?
VON STEENGRACHT: Muller sent it to the Foreign Office.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And you sent it to your legation at Bucharest?
VON STEENGRACHT: He ought certainly to have put that before me. But I did not see it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: And if you just look again at the letter, you notice how Muller's instructions start. He begins, "In agreement with the Foreign Office..."
VON STEENGRACHT: Where does it say so? Unfortunately I have not found it.
COL. PHILLIMORE: At the start of the letter: "Subject: Treatment of Jews of foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power." And then he begins: "In agreement with the Foreign Office..." Does that just mean in agreement with Mr. Von Thadden?
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that this type of thing went to the competent experts, and since this concerns a basic matter it was put directly before Herr Von Ribbentrop. I request that Herr Von Ribbentrop should be asked whether he knows of this matter or not. I have not seen this matter.
COL. PHILLIMORE: This is a matter of such importance that it could not have been agreed with the Foreign Office without Ribbentrop being consulted; isn't that the case?
VON STEENGRACHT: In my opinion, I would never have decided alone on this matter if it had been put before me. I am of the opinion that it was an affair which would have to be put before Von Ribbentrop.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Good. And, of course, Von Ribbentrop was one of the most ruthless persecutors of Jews, wasn't he?
VON STEENGRACHT: That is not correct.
COL. PHILLIMORE: I am going to read you a short passage from a conference between the Fuehrer, Ribbentrop and the Hungarian Regent, Horthy. This is Document D-736, which was put in as Exhibit GB-283 by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, to the Defendant Goering. This
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was a meeting at Klesshelm Castle on the morning of 17 of April 1943. And you see the minutes are signed by Schmidt.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. PBILLIMORE: The question of Jews was raised:
"The Fuehrer replied that it was the fault of the Jews who considered hoarding and profiteering as their main sphere of activity, even during the World War; in exactly the same way as in England, sentences for rationing offenses, and the like, now chiefly concern Jews. To Horthy's counterquestion as to what he should do with the Jews, now that he had deprived them of almost all possibilities of livelihood -- he could not kill them off -- the Reich Foreign Alinister declared that the Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps. There was no other possibility."
And then, you see, the Fuehrer goes on to describe them as tuberculosis bacilli. Now, in the face of that document, do you still say that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and extermination of the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday already that Herr Von Ribbentrop, when he was with Hitler ...
COL. PHILLIMORE: Never mind what you said yesterday. I am putting it to you now, today. You have now seen that document. Do you still say that Ribbentrop was against the policy of persecution and extermination of the Jews?
VON STEENGRACHT: Here, too, I should like to make a distinction between the real instincts of Von Ribbentrop and what he said when he was under Hitler's influence. I said already yesterday that he was completely hypnotized by Hitler and then became his tool.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, became his tool. And from then on, he was prepared to do anything that Hitler wanted and was as violent a Nazi as anyone; isn't that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: He followed blindly the orders given by Hitler.
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. And to the extent of conniving at any and every atrocity, isn't that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: Since he had no executive powers he personally did not commit these cruelties.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other chief prosecutors want to cross-examine?
COL. AMEN: You testified yesterday that you did not consider Ribbentrop to be a typical Nazi; is that correct?
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VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Do you consider Goering to be a typical Nazi?
VON STEENGRACHT: Goering made speeches at every type of meeting and fought for the seizure of power, and accordingly he had a completely different position in the party than Ribbentrop.
COL.AMEN: I think you can answer my question "yes" or "no." We are trying to save time as much as possible.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.
COL. AMEN: Do you consider Goering to be a typical Nazi according to the same standards that you were using with Ribbentrop yes or no?
VON STEENGRACHT: This question one cannot answer in that way with "yes" or "no." I am trying every...
COL. AMEN: You answered it that way with respect to Ribbentrop, didn't you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Goering was a peculiar type of person. I cannot class him with the ordinary Nazis, as one usually expresses it.
COL. AMEN: In other words, you don't know whether you think he is a typical Nazi or not, is that what you want the Tribunal to understand?
VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical Nazi one understands the "average" Nazi. Goering is a unique person and one cannot compare his manner of living with the other National Socialists.
COL. AMEN: Well, are you acquainted with all of the gentlemen in the box there in front of you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Now, will you tell me which of those individuals you consider to be a typical Nazi, according to the standards which you applied yesterday to Ribbentrop?
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I do not want to interrupt your cross-examination, but want to say that there is too much laughter and noise in Court, and I cannot have it. Go on, Colonel; with your cross-examination.
COL. AMEN: Do you understand my last question? Please name those of the defendants in the box whom you consider to be typical Nazis, on the same standard which you yesterday applied to Ribbentrop.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I am convinced that here the witness is making a decision which in my opinion should be made by the
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Court at the end of the proceedings. That is an evaluation which the witness cannot make.
COL. AMEN: This is the subject that was brought up by this very Counsel yesterday with respect to Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it a perfectly proper question. They understand that the phrase "a typical Nazi" was used by the witness himself.
COL. AMEN: And please just give us the names and not a long explanation, if you can.
VON STEENGRACHT: I said yesterday that by "typical Nazi" I meant people who are familiar with the dogma and doctrine. I want to add today that by "typical Nazis" I mean further those people who during the time of struggle represented National Socialist ideology and were propagandists of National Socialism. Rosenberg's book is known, Herr Frank, as President of the Academy for German Law is known, these are really -- Hess, of course, too -- and these are people whom I want to put into the foreground very particularly because by their writings and so forth and by their speeches they became known. No one ever heard Ribbentrop make an election speech.
COL. AMEN: But you are not answering my question. Am I to assume from that that in your opinion Rosenberg, Frank and Hess are the only persons whom you could characterize as being typical Nazis, according to your standards?
VON STEENGRACHT: Well, shall I go through the ranks of the defendants to give an opinion on each one?
COL. AMEN: Precisely. Just give me the names. No, I do not want your opinion. I want to know under your standards which of them you consider to be typical Nazis.
VON STEENGRACHT: I have already stated the standard before. It can be proved by whether the people unreservedly represented the National Socialist ideology in words or at meetings and in this respect I named the prominent ones.
COL. AMEN: And you consider all of the others not to be typical Nazis? Correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. Then I would have to go through them individually.
COL. AMEN: I have asked you to do that three times. Will you please name them individually?
VON STEENGRACHT: I also see Herr Sauckel. Herr Sauckel was Gauleiter and was active as a leader in the National Socialist
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movement. Then I see the Reich Youth Leader, who educated the Hitler Youth.
COL. AMEN: Who else? Just give me the names. Do not give these explanations, please.
VON STEENGRACHT: Well, I think that with that I have pointed out the typical representatives of the Party.
COL. AMEN: Well, how about Streicher?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not see him here, or I would have answered in the affirmative.
COL. AMEN: In other words, you consider him to be a typical Nazi under your standards?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but please do not attribute his abuses to all National Socialists.
COL. AMEN: Now, while you were working with Ribbentrop, do I understand that you knew nothing about the murders, tortures, starvations and killings which were taking place in the concentration camps?
VON STEENGRACHT: By the fact that foreign diplomats applied to me, and by the fact that I was informed by opposition elements in Germany, and from enemy propaganda, I knew of the existence and some of the methods. But, I emphasize, only a part of the methods. I learned about the total extent and degree only in internment here.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that priests were being tortured and starved and killed in concentration camps while you were working with Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, I heard nothing specific regarding individual things that occurred there, and if that had happened or has happened to priests, then I would consider the only authentic information to be that which the Nuncio or the Vatican had given me; but that did not occur. But in spite of the fact that, as I said yesterday, the Vatican had no jurisdiction, I took care of all cases based on humanity, that is, all humanitarian cases. I took care of them, and always strove to handle them successfully. I handled 87 cases in which my activity threatened to bring about my death. I intervened in hundreds of cases, and thus saved, or at least improved, the lives of thousands and thousands of people.
COL. AMEN: If you don't confine your answers directly to my questions, it is very difficult to get through and to save time. Now, will you please try to answer my questions "yes" or "no," if possible, and make your explanations short. Do you understand?
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VON STEENGRACHT: I understand perfectly. As far as I can, I shall of course do so.
COL. AMEN: Did you know that nuns were being tortured and starved and killed in concentrations camps, while you were working with Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
COL. AMEN: You did not know either about what was happening to priests or the nuns or to other inmates of concentrations camps? Correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I have just said that I have intervened in hundreds of cases, in which I was approached by the Nuncio even when it concerned Jews, for whom the Nuncio was not authorized to act, and in cases in which the Nuncio was acting on behalf of Polish clergymen, also a sphere for which he was not authorized. In spite of the fact that I had strictest orders not to receive such cases, I did receive the cases; and, in spite of the "Nacht und Nebel" decree, I always gave information when I could get any information. Details other than those which I received officially I did not have.
COL. AMEN: And who gave you the instructions not to do anything about these complaints?
VON STEENGRACHT: These orders came directly from Hitler and came to me through Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: How do you know?
VON STEENGRACHT: I have already said yesterday that the two notes which before my time were passed by State Secretary Von Weizsacker to Hitler through Ribbentrop were rejected with the remarks that they were blunt lies and, apart from that, this was not within the jurisdiction of the Nuncio; these notes were to be returned and in the future such documents were not to be accepted. Furthermore, there were to be no discussions and that applied, not only to the Nuncio, it applied to all unauthorized actions particularly when foreign diplomats intervened in matters in which they had no jurisdiction.
COL. AMEN: But do you want the Tribunal to understand that you went ahead and tried to do something about these complaints, whereas Ribbentrop did nothing; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I tried to settle within my own sphere of jurisdiction all cases which, according to instructions, I was not permitted to accept at all. But if a case here and there was of primary importance, or where the lives of several people could have been saved, I always applied to Ribbentrop. In most of these cases Ribbentrop took the matter before Hitler, after we had invented a
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new competence, so that he could not raise the objection that the Nuncio had no jurisdiction. Upon this, Hitler either absolutely rejected them or at least said that the police would have to investigate the case first. This presented the grotesque picture that in a humanitarian matter or an affair which under all circumstances had to be handled as foreign politics, the Foreign Minister no longer made the decision, but the Criminal Inspector Meier or Schulze who only needed to state "Undesirable in the interests of state security."
COL. AMEN: Did Ribbentrop obey the instructions which you say were received from the Fuehrer not to do anything about these complaints or did he not? "Yes" or "no"?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question since I do not know how many orders he received from Hitler and whether he obeyed in each individual case.
COL. AMEN: Well, you have been testifying that you received instructions not to do anything about these complaints from the Vatican; is that not correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, and I did not obey them.
COL. AMEN: Well, I am now asking you whether Ribbentrop obeyed those instructions or whether he did not.
VON STEENGRACHT: But he was in a higher position. What orders Hitler gave to Ribbentrop privately I cannot say since I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Where did you receive your instructions from?
VON STEENGRACHT: From Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: Ribbentrop has testified under interrogation that he knew nothing of what went on in any of these concentration camps until the Fuehrer ordered Luther to be placed in a concentration camp. Do you know who Luther was?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: Who was he, please?
VON STEENGRACHT: Luther was an Under Secretary of State of the Foreign Office who was the head of the "Deutschland" department.
COL. AMEN: And when was he placed in a concentration camp?
VON STEENGRACHT: That must have been about February 1943.
COL. AMEN: Now, as a matter of fact, is it not true that Ribbentrop had a whole deskful of complaints from the Vatican about killings, atrocities, the starving of priests and nuns, to which he never made any reply at all, even an acknowledgment?
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VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor; what happened before May 1943, I do not know. As long as I was State Secretary, I never failed to accept a note or failed to answer it. On the contrary, I accepted all notes and attempted, as I said before, to assist these people. Regarding conditions before my term of service, I cannot give you any information because I do not know them.
COL. AMEN: Well, I am not talking about that time; I am talking about the period immediately before and following your appearance there in '43. Now I want to read you from ...
VON STEENGRACHT: I am sorry. I would gladly answer your question if I knew anything about the matter. During my time -- I cannot say anything about it because I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Well, I will read to you from the interrogation of Ribbentrop and ask you whether what he says conforms with your recollection of the facts.
VON STEENGRACHT: I should, only like to say that until May 1943 I was not active politically, so that from my own knowledge I cannot make a statement about it.
COL. AMEN: Well, as I read the testimony to you, you will find that the interrogation refers to communications which remained in his desk unanswered for an indefinite period of time. Did you have access to Ribbentrop's desk? Did you knovr what was in it?
VON STEENGRACHT: No.
"Question: 'Did you receive from the Vatican a communication dated 2 March 1943 calling your attention to a long list of persecutions of bishops and priests, such as imprisonment, shooting, and other interferences with the exercise of religious freedom?'
"Answer: 'I do not recollect at the moment, but I know that we had protests from the Vatican, that is, we had a whole deskful of protests from the Vatican.'"
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: That was, I must unfortunately say again, before my time. I cannot know whether he had a whole drawer full of things.
COL. AMEN: If they had remained in his desk from March until May, then you would know about them; isn't that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I? No. I was not Herr Ribbentrop's servant, who went over his chairs or drawers.
COL. AMEN: So that your testimony is that you knew nothing about any protests from the Vatican other than those which you have already referred to?
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VON STEENGRACHT: Apart from those I have mentioned, I know nothing about protests. I emphasize again that during my time in office I accepted them all and answered them all.
COL. AMEN: I will read you further from the interrogation:
"Question: 'Did you reply to these Papal protests?'
"Answer: 'I think there were very many we did not reply to -- quite a number.'"
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON SEEENGRACHT: Certainly, that is correct. That was in accordance with the instructions which were originally given.
COL. AMEN: By whom?
VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler's instructions.
COL. AMEN: To whom?
VON STEENGRACHT: Certainly to Ribbentrop.
COL. AMEN: Those are the instructions which you say that you were violating on the side, is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: Which I did not obey, for otherwise I would not have been allowed to accept the notes from the Vatican in all those cases where the jurisdiction was questioned; nor would I have been allowed to accept, for example, protests from the Swedish Ambassador regarding mistreatment in Norway, which, however, I also accepted.
COL. AMEN: I will continue to read from the interrogation:
"Question: 'Now, do you mean to say that you did not even read a protest from the Vatican that came to your desk?'
"Answer: 'It is really true. It is so that the Fuehrer took such a stand in these Vatican matters that from then on they did not come to me any more.'"
Does that conform with your recollection?
VON STEENGRACHT: That Ribbentrop did not receive the protests any more? Yes, that is correct, that tallies with what I said, that in all these cases, where we could not accept them, I tried to settle them on my own responsibility, since it was against orders.
COL. AMEN: And in the course of reading these complaints from the Vatican which went unanswered, both you and Ribbentrop learned full details of exactly what was going on in the concentration camps, did you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: There was never anything about that in these notes -- the ones I saw -- there was never anything about the treatment in them. Instead they were concerned only with complaints asking why the death sentence was ever imposed, or why
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the clergyman was ever arrested, or similar cases, or the closing of churches or the like.
COL. AMEN: I do not want to take the time of the Tribunal to read to you the documents which are already in evidence. I am referring to Document Numbers 3261-PS, 3262-PS, 3264-PS, 3267-PS, 3268-PS and 3269-PS, but in those documents -- I am sorry, sir, 3269 is not in evidence. But in those documents, Witness, are set forth the details of numerous individual and collective cases of just what went on in concentration camps. You say you were not familiar with any of those matters?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, I do not think that I expressed myself in that way. I gave you to understand that everything communicated to me by foreign diplomats I do, of course, know. In other words, if detailed reports were received during my term of office, then of course I know it. I never denied it.
THE PRESIDENT: What you said, Witness, was -- at least what I took down and understood you to say was -- that nothing was ever mentioned in the notes about the treatment in concentration camps.
VON STEENGRACHT: But I remarked with reference to the previous question, when the question was put generally as to whether I knew about conditions in concentration camps and the ill-treatment, I said that I knew everything that had been reported to me by foreign diplomats, by people of the opposition, and what I could learn from the foreign press. In other words, if these documents contained details during my time in office, then I know that too. But may I ask the date of the documents?
COL. AMEN: There are many documents with many dates, which can be obtained, but we don't want to take too much of the Tribunal's time. What I want to find out is whether or not you and Ribbentrop did not know all about the murders, tortures, starvations, and killings that were taking place in the concentration camps, and which were the subject of constant and continuous protests from the Vatican, which Ribbentrop has testified were not even read or acknowledged? Do you understand that, Witness?
VON STEENGRACHT: I understand that. I knew nothing at all of the ill-treatment in concentration camps to the degree and in the bestial way that I have heard about here. I must strongly protest against the suggestion that I had heard things like that through the Vatican at that time. Also, I am convinced that Herr Von Ribbentrop had no idea of the details as we have heard them here and as'they have been shown in the films.
COL. AMEN: Isn't it a fact, Witness, that if you had followed up any of these complaints from the Vatican which Ribbentrop, has
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testified were ignored, you would have found out everything which was going on in the concentration camps to the last detail? "Yes" or "no."
VON STEENGRACHT: No, that is not correct. I said yesterday already that perhaps the key to it can be found in the speech made by Himmler on 3 October 1943, in which he said that the action against Jews and the matter of concentration camps were to be kept just as secret as the matter of 30 June 1934. And the great majority of the German people will confirm the fact that until a short time ago they could not discover anything at all about these events. If I went to GruppenFuehrer Muller or other officials I was always told that everything in those concentration camps was functioning beautifully and that there could be no question of illtreatment. Then I insisted that the foreigners, particularly the Red Cross, inspect a concentration camp, and the Danish Red Cross was taken to the Concentration Camp Theresienstadt. After that inspection took place -- this was a camp for Jews -- the Danish Minister came to me and told me that contrary to expectation everything had been favorable there. I expressed my astonishment and he told me, "Yes, our people were there, there was a theater there, and their own police force, their own hospital, their own money; the thing is well-run." I had no reason, therefore, to doubt that it was true. But I myself could get no idea of the true conditions from any German department, since they would certainly have been afraid to tell a member of the Foreign Office anything about it. But I want to emphasize again that we really had no idea of the atrocities and such things.
COL. AMEN: Why in the world should they be afraid to advise the Foreign Office of these atrocities? Had the Foreign Office ever done anything to discourage them?
VON STEENGRACHT: In all matters which were violations of international law we attempted to bring the case to the attention of the Red Cross in one way or another. We did this particularly in all matters relating to prisoners of war and if anything appeared to be wrong we drew the attention of the Swiss Delegate to it, on our own initiative: "Go to this place and see what is going on." And in this case too, if I had gone to the Swiss and told them in confidence that this and that has occurred in the concentration camps, Switzerland and the Red Cross would probably have interfered, which could ultimately have led to unpleasant measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I think we ought to have an adjournment for 10 minutes.
COL. AMEN: I have only a few more questions.
[A recess was taken.]
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COL. AMEN: So far as you know, after Ribbentrop had received this deskful of complaints from the Vatican, which he neither read nor acknowledged, did Ribbentrop take any steps or do anything to find out whether those complaints were justified and true, or did he not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the complaints made before my time, I have no idea.
COL. AMEN: I am asking you about any complaints that were received from the Vatican that ever came to your attention, with particular reference, of course, to the deskful to which Ribbentrop himself has testified. Do you know of any steps that were ever taken by Ribbentrop in connection with complaints received from the Vatican about the atrocities taking place in concentration camps? Please try to answer "yes" or "no."
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I recall he submitted complaints of this sort to Hitler, when he had the opportunity, and then waited for Hitler's order.
COL. AMEN: All right. And when Hitler told him to pay no attention whatsoever to these complaints, he, as usual, did exactly what the Fuehrer told him to do, namely, nothing. Is that correct, so far as you know?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, he obeyed Hitler's orders.
COL. AMEN: And did nothing?
VON STEENGRACHT: If that is how the order read, he did nothing, yes.
COL. AMEN: Well, didn't you tell the Tribunal that is what the directive from the Fuehrer was, to pay no attention to these complaints? "Yes" or "no," please.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And so, I say, Ribbentrop, as usual, did nothing about any of these complaints after the Fuehrer instructed him to disregard them. Is that right?
VON STEENGRACHT: I could not quite understand that question.
COL. AMEN: I say after Ribbentrop received instructions from the Fuehrer to disregard these complaints from the Vatican, Ribbentrop, as usual, did what he was directed, namely, nothing.
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume so, except for those cases where he nevertheless tried again and then received the same answer. I also know that he once appealed to Himmler and requested on principle that the actions against the Jews should not be carried out; and he proposed that Jewish children and women should, I believe, be turned over to England and America.
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COL. AMEN: And you also know what reply he received to that suggestion, don't you?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know the answer.
COL. AMEN: Well, you are certainly familiar with the fact that no such thing was ever done, are you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: That it was never carried out? I did not understand the question.
COL. AMEN: The suggestion which you claim that Ribbentrop made to Himmler. That suggestion was never carried out, was it?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand; in what way not carried out? So far as I know -- Ribbentrop appealed directly to the foreign countries at that time. I also do not know what answer he received at that time, at least not in detail.
COL. AMEN: Well, so far as you know, nothing ever came of that suggestion, correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: No, nothing came of it.
COL. AMEN: And, as a matter of fact, you know that Ribbentrop and Himmler were not on good terms anyway, do you not?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: That was a matter of common knowledge to everybody, wasn't it?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, the enmity became greater in the course of time.
COL. AMEN: So far as you know, did Ribbentrop take bromides every day?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I do not know. He...
COL. AMEN: You never saw him taking any?
VON STEENGRACHT: It could be; I do not know.
COL. AMEN: Well, did you ever see him taking any, or did he ever tell that he was taking them?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I remember now that he took some sort of red substance but I did not pay particular attention to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we have anything to do with whether he took bromides?
COL. AMEN: Yes, your Lordship, we will, because in his interrogations he claims that his memory as to many of these events has been obscured or removed by the over-use of such medicine.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
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COL. AMEN: Now, Witness, were you incarcerated at one time at a place known as "Ash Can"?
VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can?
COL. AMEN: Outside of Luxembourg.
VON STEENGRACHT: In a refuse can? I cannot remember it.
COL. AMEN: Near Luxembourg.
VON STEENGRACHT: Locked in a refuse can? No, I do not remember.
COL.AMEN: After you were taken prisoner, where were you incarcerated?
VON STEENGRACHT: Mondorf.
COL. AMEN: For how long a period of time?
VON STEENGRACHT: In Mondorf altogether 11 weeks.
COL. AMEN: And at that time were numerous of the defendants in this case also incarcerated there?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And while you were there you were free to have conversations with some of the inmates?
VON STEENGBACHT: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you did, from time to time, have such conversations? Right?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I was not together with them all the time, because I was transferred to another camp.
COL. AMEN: Now, in the course of your conversations with one or another of the inmates there, did you make the statement which I am about to read to you, either in exact words or in substance? Do you understand the question? "Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth. The conception does not exist for him." Please answer "yes" or "no." Did you say that, Witness, did you say that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I should be grateful if I could hear that exactly again what I am supposed to have said.
COL. AMEN: Now remember, I am asking you whether you said it either in the exact words or in substance. Do you understand that?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not precisely understand the German translation of your question.
COL. AMEN: Do you now understand it?
VON STEENGRACHT: I do not understand. I did not exactly understand the German translation.
COL. AMEN: Yes, but do you understand my question, namely, that you are to say, whether you used these exact words or some other similar words? I will now read it to you again. Do you understand?
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VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I would be grateful.
COL. AMEN: "Ribbentrop is lacking in any notion of decency and truth. The conception does not exist for him."
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot recall that I ever made such statement. I would have to know to whom I am supposed to have said it.
COL. AMEN: Do you deny having made that statement, or is it simply that you can't remember whether you did or not?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot remember having said that.
COL. AMEN: Is it possible that you did?
VON STEENGRACHT: It could be that I made such a statement in some connection.
COL. AMEN: Very good.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the other prosecutors wish to ask any questions?
MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): To save time, I shall restrict myself to a few question only. Insofar as I can understand the translation of your testimony which you submitted yesterday, you testified to the fact that besides the Ministry for Foreign Affairs many individuals and organization, had influenced Germany's foreign policy.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Tell me, which of the defendants in the present Trial whom you see in the dock attempted to influence and did, to a certain extent, influence Germany's foreign policy.
VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy was, of course, after the beginning of the war...
GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you here and now not to make any declaration on Germany's foreign policy, but to indicate precisely, in the form of a reply to my question, which of the defendants in the present Trial attempted to influence and did influence Germany's foreign policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: The basic lines of foreign policy were determined solely by Hitler. The fact that we had occupied many countries and in these various countries had occupied the mos varied positions ...
GEN. ZORYA: We know all about that. I ask you to indicate by name, which of the defendants in the present Trial attempted to influence and did influence Germany's foreign policy. Is my question clear to you?
VON STEENGRACHT: Foreign policy, as I stated yesterday, was in its broad outlines determined by Hitler alone; but those people who were assigned to special fields naturally exercised some
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influence in one respect or another. For example, some one who had a special assignment concerning the police, carried out police measures; some one who had to take care of labor problems conducted labor affairs. The same is true of other sectors.
GEN. ZORYA: You still do not answer my question. I ask you to indicate, regardless of the form and extent of his influence, which of the defendants in the current Trial attempted to influence, and did influence, in one form or another, Germany's foreign policy, and this apart from representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
VON STEENGRACHT: I assume that you are asking this question in relation to Russia; as the Foreign Office no longer had jurisdiction after the entrance of German troops into Russia ...
GEN. ZORYA: I request you to understand my question thoroughly and to answer which of the defendants, and in what form, regardless of concrete facts of foreign policy, attempted to influence this foreign policy of Germany and did, in effect, so influence it.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. As regards Russia, the Eastern ministry was competent for these questions.
GEN. ZORYA: No, not as regards Russia.
VON STEENGRACHT: In Norway Terboven laid down the policy. Quite naturally he influenced Hitler in his attitude toward Norway and Norwegian problems. In the same way the individual chiefs of the administrations in the individual countries exerted influence depending on how close they could come to Hitler with their reports.
THE PRESIDENT: We don't want you to make speeches; we want you to answer the question. You weren't asked who influenced the foreign policy, but which of the defendants influenced foreign policy. You may say none, or you may say some. It is a question that you must be able to answer.
VON STEENGRACHT: I would assume that Rosenberg had something to say regarding Russia, Frank had something to say regarding Poland, Seyss-Inquart had something to say regarding Holland. Other matters touched only special sectors. Naturally the SS had something to say; the Wehrmacht had something to say, also the various other offices and they naturally all exerted a certain influence but only a certain influence. However, the basic policy was conducted solely by Hitler.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you not wish in this connection to name the Defendant Goering?
VON STEENGRACHT: Goering carried on the Four Year Plan and in this capacity he naturally also exercised a certain influence on Russia.
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GEN. ZORYA: What did this influence consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: There again I must say that I and the Foreign Office had nothing to do with Russia, and that we were strictly forbidden to intervene in Russian affairs. In the sphere of propaganda and the press we were in no way permitted to become active. For this reason I am especially badly informed on Russian affairs.
GEN. ZORYA: Did the Defendant Goering have any influence in other questions besides the Russian question?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand the question in German.
GEN. ZORYA: Besides the Russian question, did the Defendant Goering exercise any influence on other questions in the sphere of foreign policy?
VON STEENGRACHT: I would say that until the year 1938 he certainly had influence over Hitler in matters of foreign policy.
GEN. ZORYA: You have stated in your testimony that in July '44 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs participated in preparations for the anti-Jewish Congress which, it was assumed, would be held in Krakow. Will you please answer this question briefly, "yes" or "no."
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you know who were the candidates for honorary membership in this congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: Probably there were many, Ribbentrop among others, as far as I still remember today.
GEN. ZORYA: Who else from among the defendants?
VON STEENGRACHT: I really cannot say. As far as I remember, Rosenberg and a large number of other leading personalities, but I cannot recall their names any longer. Naturally there are documents on the subject, so that it can be ascertained without trouble.
GEN. ZORYA: Did Ribbentrop attempt in any form whatsoever to protest against the inclusion of his name in the roster of honorary members of this congress?
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can recall he very unwillingly took over this post, but I do not believe that he really intended to take any active part in this matter.
GEN. ZORYA: If I have understood you correctly, you have recently testified to the fact that relations between Ribbentrop and Himmler were hostile.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, bad relations.
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GEN. ZORYA: But can you state whether any contact existed between Ribbentrop and Himmler in their work, whether they maintained this contact in any one particular sphere or branch of their work?
VON STEENGRACHT: As a matter of fact, there was no working contact such as would have been considered right in a well-organized state. Of course, now and then there were matters somewhere that concerned both of these men, and to that extent they did have contact, yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What was the nature of this contact, and what, exactly, did it represent?
VON STEENGRACHT: It really only amounted to this: that Ribbentrop or Himmler saw each other every few months. Besides that, we had a liaison man in the Foreign Office for the ReichsFuehrer SS Himmler.
GEN. ZORYA: Then how does all this fit in with the hostility which, as you have just mentioned, existed between Himmler and Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: I presume you are referring to the second question I answered. In every normal state it was the case that the ministers saw each other at least once a year and exchanged opinions. This, however, did not take place, since, as we have already heard today at some length, the fields of jurisdiction overlapped to a great extent and the activity of one man touched very closely on the activity of the other. Therefore some connection had to be established whether one wanted it or not.
GEN. ZORYA: Do I understand you to say that Himmler and Ribbentrop never even met?
VON STEENGRACHT: They met perhaps once every 3 months. It might have been every 4 months and they usually met only if, by chance, both Ribbentrop and Himmler were visiting Hitler at the same time.
GEN. ZORYA: And there were no special meetings, no business contact between them at all?
VON STEENGRACHT: Actually not.
GEN. ZORYA: I should like you to familiarize yourself with Document Number USSR-120, which has already been submitted as evidence to the Tribunal. You will see that this is an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop regarding the organization of intelligence work. Are you familiar with this agreement?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: The contact between Himmler and Ribbentrop was evidently closer than you wished to describe.
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VON STEENGRACHT: I do not believe, Mr. Prosecutor, that I wanted to give you any impression other than the one that actually existed. This refers to Hitler's order of 12 February 1944. On the basis of this order Himmler took charge of all activity abroad without the participation of the Foreign Office, and after he had become the successor to Canaris, through this order he secured a predominant position abroad. And if the Foreign Office in one way or another had not tried to contact this organization, then the Foreign Office would have had no influence at all even in foreign countries. We had to fight vigorously over this document, for on the basis of this document Himmler wasobliged for the first time to communicate to us also the information that he brought to Germany. Otherwise he brought these reports in without telling us about them. That was the reason why we reached this working agreement. But so far as I recall, it was not put into practice at all, because Hitler's order was issued on 12 February 1944 and we had not come to an agreement until February 1945. Then it gradually came about. That must be approximately the date. At any rate it took quite a while.
GEN. ZORYA: You say that this agreement never became valid?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not say that. An agreement becomes effective at the moment in which it is signed. But it was not put into practice or hardly put into practice.
GEN. ZORYA: I think we shall have to content ourselves with your reply and pass over to some other questions. Did you ever come in contact with Kaltenbrunner ?
VON STEENGRACHT: Did I come into contact with Kaltenbrunner? Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: On what questions?
VON STEENGRACHT: On precisely those questions which, for example, the Nuncio addressed to me and also about people who because of the Nacht und Nebel decree had been deported from abroad and about whom we were not allowed to give information, I often went privately to Kaltenbrunner and pointed out to him that this order was inhuman. As a favor Kaltenbrunner then frequently gave me information; and I, contrary to the orders, transmitted this information abroad because I considered it justified for humanity's sake. Those were the main points of contact which I had with Kaltenbrunner.
GEN. ZORYA: Did you, in particular, have any conversation with him on the subject of the Danish policemen interned by the Gestapo,in a concentration camp without any concrete charges presented against them? Please reply to this question by saying "yes" or "no."
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
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GEN. ZORYA: During one interrogation, an interrogation conducted by an American interrogator, you stated that, although these policemen were eventually sent back to Denmark, they were very badly treated.
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: What did this ill-treatment consist of?
VON STEENGRACHT: I learned at that time, I believe through the Danish Minister, that 1600 Danish policemen...
GEN. ZORYA: I must ask you to be brief. Of what did the ill-treatment consist which was meted out to the Danish policemen who were interned in a concentration camp without any concrete charges being presented against them?
VON STEENGRACHT: These policemen were transported from Denmark. When I learned of it, I went to Kaltenbrunner on the same day and asked him under all circumstances to treat these people as civilian internees or as prisoners of war.
GEN. ZORYA: I beg your pardon, but you are not answering my question. What did the ill-treatment of the Danish policemen consist of ?
VON STEENGRACiIT: I assume that you want to know whether Kaltenbrunner is personally responsible for it and to this I would have to tell you the opposite. I am ...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question? It was repeated. You must understand what the question is: What was the bad treatment? Either you know or you do not know. If you know, you can say so.
VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I can remember, 10 percent of these prisoners died.
GEN. ZORYA: Is that all you can say in reply to the question?
VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding details of the ill-treatment I was informed by Denmark that the men were not allowed to keep their uniforms and had to wear concentration camp clothes, that this concentration camp clothing was too thin and the men frequently died of inflammation of the lungs, also that the food was insufficient. I did not learn any more at the time. They were also flogged.
GEN. ZORYA: Witness, please tell us: Did you ever come across the activities of the Defendant Sauckel?
VON STEENGRACHT: I came into touch with Sauckel's activities only insofar as we objected that so many people from abroad were brought into Germany by force.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember a conference at which both you and Sauckel were present? You have already mentioned
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this fact in the course of your interrogation prior to the opening of the current Trial.
VON STEENGRAGHT: Yes.
GEN. ZORYA: Do you perhaps remember you testified in the course of this interrogation: "But the measures adopted for recruiting people in Russia and similar countries are beyond description."
VON STEENGRACHT: In the session -- I did not understand the question.
GEN. ZORYA: You stated, during the interrogation of 28 Septeniber 1945 -- I am quoting verbatim: "But the measures adopted for recruiting people in Russia and similar countries are beyond description." Do you remember your testimony?
VON STEENGRACHT: I confirm that statement.
GEN. ZORYA: Then you confirm it? Will you kindly enumerate, if only in brief, what precisely were the indescribable measures adopted by the Defendant Sauckel in Russia and other countries?
VON STEENGRACHT: I know of only one case that was reported to me at the time. It concerned the fact that in a certain sector, people were invited to a theatrical performance and the theatre was surrounded, and the people who were inside were brought to Germany for forced labor. It concerns these measures of which I have heard.
GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.
COL. POKROVSKY: I request permission to ask one more question, or rather, to have one more question elucidated.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal has already indicated that it wishes the cross-examination to be cut down as far as possible, and it really cannot hear more than one counsel on behalf of each of the four countries. It doesn't wish to hear more than one on behalf of each of the four countries. I am afraid we can't hear any further cross-examination from you.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question is not a new one. The witness has not answered a question which was repeated four times.
THE PRESIDENT: It is a new counsel though.
COL. POKROVSKY: No. The Soviet Prosecutor asked which of the defendants influenced the foreign policy of Germany. The witness replied, "The Armed Forces." I wished to ...
THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Colonel Pokrovsky, but I have given you the Tribunal's ruling. We cannot hear more than one counsel. I hope, as I say, that the prosecutors will make their examination as short as possible.
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M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): This witness having been already interrogated at considerable length, I wish to ask only a very short question.
Witness, I should like you to confirm precisely what you have already declared, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of Ribbentrop and was responsible only to him; is that correct?
VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question in German.
M. FAURE: Is it correct from your declaration, and from what you know, that the German Embassy in Paris was under the authority of Ribbentrop and that it was responsible only to him?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: Does it mean that every important measure taken by the Embassy would have to be known by the Defendant Ribbentrop?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
M. FAURE: I simply wanted to have this point elucidated in view of the interrogatory of the witness, and I have no further questions to ask.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 2 o'clock.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
27 March 46
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I request permission to ask one question which I could not ask before. The Russian Prosecutor asked whether the witness had discussed the question of the Danish policemen with Kaltenbrunner. In this connection it remained entirely unanswered how Kaltenbrunner himself behaved. I simply want to ask this one question.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, would you please tell the Tribunal how Kaltenbrunner behaved when you discussed with him the question of the Danish police who had been inhumanly treated -- how Kaltenbrunner behaved in this connection and what he did.
VON STEENGRACHT: The question is perhaps not quite correct the way you put it when you say "who had been inhumanly treated," for they could not have been dealt with. They had just been turned over to the concentration camp. So the moment I heard about it I went to Kaltenbrunner and told him that these people could not be put into a concentration camp. They had to be treated either as prisoners of war or as civilian internees.
Kaltenbrunner listened to this and said he was also of that opinion, and in my presence gave the order that these men should be transferred from the concentration camp to a prisoner-of-war camp. I therefore assumed that the matter was thereby settled and then found out a fortnight later that they were still in the concentration camp. I appealed to Kaltenbrunner earnestly. Kaltenbrunner said he could find no explanation for it. I could not find any either, since the order to transfer these people had been given in my presence. We subsequently carried on many negotiations regarding this matter. I had the impression that other influences were at work there and that Kaltenbrunner could not enforce his opinion.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was he against this inhuman treatment?
VON STEENGRACHT: He always told me that he was in favor of their being put in a prisoner-of-war camp. That was naturally a substantial improvement.
DR. KAUFFMANN: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you wish to re-examine this witness?
DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of violating the Treaty of Versailles or was he opposed to that?
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VON STEENGRACHT: I should like to say...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you say "yes" or "no" and then explain later?
VON STEENGRACHT: He wanted a modification.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop in favor of the reoccupation of the Rhineland?
VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I did not know Ribbentrop and consequently cannot answer this question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was Ribbentrop opposed to rearmament?
VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer this question either, because I did not know him at that time. I saw him for the first time in the year 1936.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Anschluss?
VON STEENGRACHT: That I assume.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was he in favor of the Tripartite Pact?
VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
[The witness Von Steengracht left the stand.]
DR. HORN: Yesterday I concluded the presentation of my documents with the submission of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 10 (Document Number Ribbentrop-10) -- on page 35 of the document book. From this document I proved that Von Ribbentrop conducted his foreign policy according to lines laid down by Hitler. I should like to prove with the following documents what the foreign political situation was that Ribbentrop found when he took office in February of 1938. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents, the numbers of which I shall now communicate to the Tribunal, without my reading anything from them, in order that I may later be able to come back to them in my final speech.
The first of these documents is the document which bears the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 14 (Document Number Ribbentrop-14). It is a question here again of an extract from the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 1, and carries the heading "Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German People of 1 February 1933." This document describes briefly Germany's position at that time and the intentions of the Hitler Government that came to power on 30 January 1933.
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The next document that I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of is Ribbentrop Exhibit 15 (Document Number Ribbentrop15). This document is also taken from the first volume of' the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik. It carries the title "Adolf Hitler's Address on the Occasion of the Inauguration on 21 March 1933 in Potsdam". In this document, too, basic expositions are made regarding the internal and external policy agreed upon by the new government.
As the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 16 (Document Number Ribbentrop-16). Again it is a document from the above-mentioned volume of documents. It is headed "Adolf Hitler's Speech on His Program at the Meeting of the Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House on 23 March 1933."
I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the next document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17 (Document Number Ribbentrop-17). It is again an excerpt from the Documente der Deutschen Politik.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would not like to interrupt Dr. Horn, but not one single document among those which he now mentions, beginning with Number 14, and as far as I understand, until Number 44, inclusive, was put at the disposal of the Soviet Prosecution, and I cannot see any possibility of aiding the Tribunal in the study of these documents until we have received them. I suppose that the Tribunal will judge it necessary to put off the studying of these documents until the Soviet Prosecution have received them.
DR. HORN: May I give a short explanation please. I have inquired as to what extent the translations have progressed. Three weeks ago I turned in my documents in the prescribed manner, the last of them about 10 days ago. I was informed that the Translation Division unfortunately had too few French and Russian translators available to have the translation of the documents in these two languages as far advanced as is the case in the English language up to now. These are, of course, things over which I have no influence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal appreciates that you have done what fulfills the obligations which rested upon you and they, therefore, think that the documents should go in, subject of course to any objection being taken to them when the translations are available.
DR. HORN: Yes, Mr.President, as a precaution I have already informed Colonel Pokrovsky that this was the case, without knowing in detail what documents had been translated into Russian. That was as far as I could possibly go to reach an understanding, because the other thing was beyond my control.
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MR. DODD: I wonder if it would be possible for Dr. Horn to indicate very briefly the purpose for which he offers these documents as they come up. We will have objection to some, I know, but some of that objection may be clarified if we hear beforehand just what the purpose of the offer is.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, Dr. Horn is putting in a large number of documents at the present moment and asking the Court to take judicial notice of them and if the Prosecution finds that there is something specific that they want to object to, wouldn't it be best that they should do that hereafter?
MR. DODD: I thought it might be of assistance and save us from rising very often if he gave us some idea of the purpose for which the offer is made.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would take longer probably.
DR. HORN: May I make a short explanation on this subject? Since 1933 my client has occupied official positions that were closely tied up with foreign policy. The direction of a foreign policy that had, as its aim, the waging of aggressive war, has been charged against him. I now submit with these documents the evidence which demonstrates how the policy developed and that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop on his part made long and continuous efforts to avoid a war of aggression, for example, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 17, (Document Number Ribbentrop-17) of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. It is in the document book on Page 40 and contains a speech of 17 May 1933 by Hitler before the German Reichstag on the National Socialist Peace Policy.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: This document of 17 May 1933 1 cite as proof of Germany's general will to disarm and as proof that the Reich Govermnent made efforts to bring about a general pacification of Europe.
As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 18 (Document Number Ribbentrop-18). It is again a document from the same collection and in headed "Treaty of Agreement and Co-operation of 15 July 1933," known in brief as the "Four Power Pact." It is on Page 42 of the document book. This Four Power Pact between Germany, France, England, and Italy was inspired by Mussolini. Its purpose was to bring about general disarmament and particularly, to make effective the revision article -- Number 19 -- in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This pact did not come into being because France did not ratify it.
As to the next document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 20 (Document Number Ribbentrop-20).
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It concerns a "Proclamation of the Reich Government to the German People in Connection with the Withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October 1933," This proclamation of the Reich Government affirms the failure of the disarmament conference and gives a short account of Germany's reasons for withdrawing from the League of Nations. In connection with this proclamation, Hitler on the same day made a speech over the radio in order to state the reasons for Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. I submit this speech to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 21 (Document Number Ribbentrop-21), and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The speech is on Page 45 of the document book.
In order to justify the then existing foreign policy to the people as well as to obtain a confirmation of the policy at that time, Reich President Von Hindenburg, on 11 November 1933, called the German people to the ballot box. The proclamation in that connection is contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 23 (Document Number Ribbentrop-23), which is found on Page 48 of the document book. I present it to the Court again with the request for judicial notice.
I further ask the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibit Number 24 (Document Number Ribbentrop-24) in which the text of the question and the results of the election are to be found. It is on Page 49 of the document book which is before you.
In the course of her disarmament policy, Germany, on 18 December 1933, issued a German Memorandum on the disarmament question and Germany's attitude regarding the disarmament problem. I offer the Court this document for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 25 (Document Number Ribbentrop-25).
The next document is contained on Page 51 of the document book and describes the course of the disarmament negotiations and Germany's attitude toward these negotiations. I submit it to the Court for judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 26 (Document Number Ribbentrop-26). The document is on Page 51 of the document book, and is headed "The German Memorandum on Disarmament of 19 January 1934."
The German view on disarmament is again set forth in the following document, Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 27 (Document Number Ribbentrop-27), set forth on Page 53 of the document book, and is entitled "German Memorandum of 13 March 1934." I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
The German Government answered an English disarmament memorandum on 16 April 1934 with an aide-memoire to the English Government. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 28 (Document Number Ribbentrop-28).
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In the course of the disarmament negotiations, France, in 1934, suggested a pact which became known under the name of the "Eastern Pact." Regarding this Eastern Pact, the German Government expressed their view in a communique of the German Reich Government of 10 September 1934, which is on Page 56 of the document book, and to which I have given the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 30 (Document Number Ribbentrop-30), again with the request that judicial notice be taken of it.
As the next document, which is on Page 57, I present to the Court for judicial notice: Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 31 (Document Number Ribbentrop-31). It concerns a copy of the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 3, and shows the reply of the Reich Government of 14 February 1935 to the suggestion for an air pact. Germany's comments on this air pact include the following -- I read Paragraph 2 from this exhibit and begin the quotation:
"The German Government welcomes the proposal to increase safety from sudden attacks from the air by an agreement to be concluded as soon as possible, which provides for the immediate use of the air forces of the signatories on behalf of the victim of an unprovoked air attack."
In the year 1935 compulsory military service was reintroduced in Germany. On this occasion the German Government addressed a proclamation to the German people. This proclamation is on Page 59 of the document book and carries the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 33 (Document Number Ribbentrop-33). I request that this excerpt from the proclamation be given judicial notice.
As Ribbentrop Exhibit 34 (Document Number Ribbentrop-34), I submit a communique of the German Reich Government of 14 April 1935 on Germany's attitude toward the Eastern Pact. It is on Pages 61 and following of the document book and I ask, without my reading anything from it, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of it.
The introduction of compulsory military service was regarded by the signatory countries of the Versailles Treaty as an infraction of Part V of this treaty. The states protested against the reintroduction of compulsory military service in Germany. A protest was issued by the Reich Government against this decision of the Council of the League of Nations of 17 April 1935. This protest is on Page 63 of the document book. I have this document the Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 35 (Document Number Ribbentrop-35), and ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. In this document the German Government dispute the right of the goverments represented in the Council of the League of Nations, who approved the decision of 17 April, to set themselves up as judges over Germany. In this protest it is stated that this attitude is interpreted
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as a manifestation of renewed discrimination against Germany and consequently is rejected.
I turn now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 36 (Document Number Ribbentrop-36) which is on Page 64 of the document book. This concerns the German memorandum to the Locarno Powers of 25 May 1935, and deals with the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. The Defendant Ribbentrop participated decisively in the negotiations that led to the drawing up of this memorandum and to the presentation of the German point of view before the League of Nations and the Locarno Powers. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the document because it contains Germany's legal attitude toward this problem.
A further memorandum to the Locarno Powers is to be found on Page 68 of the document book (Document Number Ribbentrop-36) Exhibit Number Ribbentrop 36, and it again exposes briefly and clearly the incompatibility of the Soviet Pact with the Locarno Treaty. I ask that also this German memorandum to the Locarno Powers-it is dated 25 May 1935-be given judicial notice.
The legal point of view which formed the basis for this memorandum was presented in a speech by Hitler, concerning the peace policy in the German Reichstag on 21 May 1935, in order again to prove German willingness for peace and disarmament. At the same time a peace and disarmament proposal was submitted in London by Ribbentrop. I ask that this document, this speech by Hitler, be given judicial notice as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 37 (Document Number Ribbentrop-37). It is on Pages 69 and following of my document book.
As the next document to prove that Germany made continuous efforts for disarmament and attempts at agreement, I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38 (Document Number Ribbentrop-38), for judicial notice, which is on Page 77 of my document book. This concerns the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935, in which Ribbentrop played a decisive role, and for the ratification of which Ribbentrop exerted himself particularly. He induced the French Government in particular, by his own efforts, to agree to this treaty. That was necessary because this naval agreement made necessary a change in Part V of the Versailles Treaty, already cited -- it is the part that is concerned with disarmament instructions and armament stipulations. At that time Ribbentrop succeeded in persuading the French Government to give their approval to this agreement. I submit this document as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 38, with the request for judicial notice.
I may, in addition, say in this connection that this treaty was at that time considered, both by Ribbentrop and Hitler, as the cornerstone of a far-reaching proposal for an understanding and an
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alliance with England. During the succeeding years, as well as during the time he served as ambassador in London and also as Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop made constant efforts to bring about such a pact of agreement, in some form or other.
As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 39 (Document Number Ribbentrop-39), which is on Page 79 of the document book.
Again, and in view of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the German Government found themselves compelled on 7 March 1936 to present their attitude, through a memorandum, to the signatory powers of the Locarno Pact. This point of view is found in the document just mentioned and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
The occupation of the Rhineland had led to a protest by the powers interested in it. Ribbentrop replied to this protest with a speech before the Council of the League of Nations in London and then delivered another protest before the Council of the League of Nations against the protest of the signatory powers of Locarno. This protest of the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop, which I present as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 40 (Document Number Ribbentrop-40), which is on Page 83 of my document book, I also submit for judicial notice.
As the next document I present to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 41 (Document Number Ribbentrop-41), on Page 84 of the document book, with the request for judicial notice. It contains the last peace proposals by Germany in connection with the disarmament and peace proposals of that time. It is headed "Peace Plan of the German Government of 31 March 1936."
In subsequent years Germany made repeated efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the war guilt lie. In the year 1937 German and Italian relations became constantly closer; and in connection with these relations Hitler, on 30 January 1937, on the fourth anniversary of the National Socialist revolution, made a proposal before the German Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, that agreements should be reached with other European nations in Europe on the same basis as between Germany and Italy, in order to attain harmonious relations. I ask that this document be accepted as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 (Document, Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document book. In this document the withdrawal of the war guilt lie was clearly requested once more. I quote from the third paragraph of the above:
"Above all, therefore, I solemnly withdraw Germany's signature from that statement, extorted against her better judgment from the weak German government of the day, that Germany is to blame for the war."
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As the next document I bring ...
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Are you referring to 44?
DR. HORN: I was just referring to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 43 (Document Number Ribbentrop-43), which is on Page 88 of the document book. Please pardon me if I left that out.
THE PRESIDENT: There was some passage you read in it which does not appear to be translated here.
DR. HORN: Did I correctly understand you to say, Mr. President, that there was no English translation in the document book?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am not quite sure. I did not catch it myself. Did you read anything which is not in the document book?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, I have cited only what is in the document book. It is on Page 88, Paragraph 3 and it is specifically the paragraph that begins, "And fourthly..."
THE PRESIDENT: Thirdly, isn't it?
DR. HORN: Paragraph 3, and this paragraph is again divided into four subparagraphs and I have read the fourth subparagraph.
I come now to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44 (Document Number Ribbentrop-44), which is on Page 90 in the document book. This document contains the German note on Belgian inviolability, dated 13 October 1937. This document is of importance in view of the events of 1940; and, in order to make clear the German view, I should like to read the last paragraph, which in my document book is on Page 91 and which is preceded by the Roman numeral II. I quote:
"The German Government assert that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are of common interest to the western powers. They confirm their determination not to impair that inviolability and integrity under any circumstances and to respect Belgian territory at all times, excepting of course, in the case of Belgium collaborating in an armed conflict directed against Germany in which Germany would be involved."
I ask that this document be given judicial notice.
With this I conclude the series of documents which are to serve me, in my final speech, as the basis for, expounding the conditions of foreign policy that Ribbentrop found upon his entry into office as Foreign Minister. I shall refer to these documents when the occasion arises.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you filed them in Court with the Secretary?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, in connection with yesterday's discussion I again untied these documents and handed them, signed, to the General Secretary.
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The next documents that I submit serve as substantiation of what I shall say later regarding Ribbentrop's participation in the policy that led to the Anschluss with Austria.
I should like to refer, first of all, to Document 386-PS, already presented by the Prosecution, which is contained in my document book. I am unfortunately not in the position to read off the page numbers to the Tribunal because we ourselves have not yet received the files, that is, the document book which now follows. This document follows Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 44, which was on page 90 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Exhibit Number 44 is the last document in the second document book. There are not any more, are there? There are not any more?
DR. HORN: I was informed today that the English Document Book was finished and had been presented to the Tribunal. We unfortunately have not yet received a copy, so I cannot compare the page numbers.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we haven't got it. We have only those two and the last exhibit in the second book is Number 44, which you have just read. But, Dr. Horn, as the document has already been put into evidence, it is not necessary for you to produce it. You can say that you rely upon it; that is all that is necessary.
DR. HORN: Yes, but I believe that we must immediately decide the question of the continuation of my presentation. I want to make clear again that, after the Tribunal had ruled on the way in which documents were to be presented, I at that time immediately submitted my documents to the Tribunal for translation in the prescribed way, in that I presented 6 document books bearing my signature. Unfortunately the Translation Division was unable to keep up with the pace of the presentation of evidence by the Defense and I am in the uncomfortable position of being unable to provide the Tribunal with the assistance of pointing out the pages in order to continue my delivery smoothly.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn, we think you had better go on, just notifying us which the documents are and whether they are already in evidence or whether you are offering them in evidence now. You have told us Document 386-PS. We can make a note of that -- that is already in evidence. I do not know whether all your other documents are already in evidence or whether there are any documents which are not and which you are now going to offer in evidence.
DR. HORN: The following documents are new. As to Document 386-PS, I should only like to make clear that Von Ribbentrop, was
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not one of those present at that time. He has also learned here for the first time of this document and its contents -- it concerns the well-known Hossbach Document.
The next document to which I shall refer in my final speech is Document Number 2461-PS, already submitted by the Prosecution. It is the official German communication regarding the meeting between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor with the Austrian Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden. on 12 and 15 February 1938. I refer to this document to prove to what extent Ribbentrop participated in this discussion.
The next document to which I shall refer, and which I present to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice, is Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 11 (Document Number Ribbentrop-11), which is in my document book. This document...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think it is really necessary for you to refer to any documents which are completely in evidence already unless you are going to read some passage in them and rely upon some passage in them which has not already been read. I mean, supposing that the Prosecution read a particular sentence out of a particular document and you want to refer to some other sentence in it, then it will probably be right for you to indicate that; but, if the document has been read in full, any further reference is a mere jnatter of argument and is not really a matter of evidence, and you will be at liberty, you see, to argue it whenever you come to make your speech. So that, I mean, as a matter of saving time, it would not be necessary to refer us to 386-PS or 2461-PS unless there is some passage in them which you rely upon and which has not been read by the Prosecution.
DR. HORN: I may then go on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 11 and present it to the Court for judicial notice. It concerns an agreement between the German Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government on 11 July 1936. When, on 12 February 1938, Ribbentrop drove with Hitler to Berchtesgaden to have a conference with Dr. Schuschnigg, then Chancellor of Austria, he was not informed about the deviation of Hitler's plans from the agreement of the year 1936 between Germany and Austria, and he conducted his discussion with Schuschnigg also in the spirit of the agreement of 1936. One month later the Anschluss with Austria came about.
As proof that this Anschluss corresponded to the wish of the Austrian population, I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12 (Document Nuinber Ribbentrop-12), which I present to the Tribunal for judicial notice. It is the result of the national plebiscite and of the election to the Greater German Reichstag of 10 April 1938. From this document it is to be seen that at that time in Austria a total
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of 4,484,475 people had the right to vote, 4,471,477 voted, 4,453,772 voted for the Anschluss, and only 11,929 voted against it.
THE PRESIDENT: Have we got this document? We do not have it in our books. Does the clerk of the Court have it?
DR. HORN: It is in the document book as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 12.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it goes from 10 to 14 for some reason. Let me look at it. There is some mistake, apparently. If has not been copied; that is all. It is not in our books, but here it is, so it is all right. Go on.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, it is to be seen from this document that the Austrian people at that time expressed themselves in favor of the Anschluss with 99.73 percent of the votes cast.
As the next document I submit Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 13 to the Tribunal for judicial notice. I submit this document as proof that the Anschluss would hardly have come about by international negotiations, according to the opinion not only of the German Government, but also of the English Government. I should like as proof of this assertion to read the following from this document. It concerns a statement by Under Secretary of State Butler before the House of Commons, which reads as follows -- it was made on 14 March 1938:
"The English Government discussed the new situation with 'friends of the Geneva Entente' and it was unanimously" -- I emphasize the word unanimously -- "agreed that a discussion in Geneva of the situation in Austria would not bring satisfactory results but that the result would probably again be some kind of humiliation. The Under Secretary of State stated that England had never assumed any special guaranty for the 'independence' of Austria which had been forced in the treaty of St. Germain."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. Subsequently to this the reunion of Austria with the German Reich took place as set down in the law of 13 March 1938, which also was signed by Ribbentrop.
Herewith I end the submission of those documents of mine that are related to the question of Austria. I may now ...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Horn, the only desire of the Tribunal is to save time, and we observe from the index in your document book that there are, I think, over three hundred separate documents upon which you wish to rely, and most of them appear to come from the various books, the German White Books and these other books, which the Tribunal provisionally allowed to you.
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Wouldn't the most convenient course be for you to put them in, in bulk, saying that you are putting in Exhibits 44 to 314, or whatever it may be, rather than simply detail each document by its number? If you have a particular passage which you want to read at this moment, you can do so; but it seems to take up unnecessary time, simply to give each exhibit number one after the other.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President, I shall mention those numbers in this way which I should like only to bring to judicial notice, briefly mention from such and such to such and such, when it is a matter of several numbers; and I shall ask the Court to accept them then.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. HORN: I will now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. The American Prosecutor stated in his presentation on this question that this marked the end of a series of events that struck him as one of the saddest chapters in human history -- the violation and destruction of the weak and small Czechoslovak people. As proof that there was no Czechoslovak people in the usual sense of the term either before or after 1939, I would like to read a few extracts from Lord Rothermere's book Warnings and Prophecies, which has been expressly granted me through a ruling by the Tribunal. This is Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 45 (Document Number Ribbentrop-45).
THE PRESIDENT: Did the Tribunal allow Lord Rothermere's book?
DR. HORN: The Tribunal has granted it to me and even put at my disposal an English copy, which I herewith hand to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the question of admissibility was to be finally determined when each book is offered in evidence, and I think you will remember that the Tribunal stated in one of its orders that the opinions of particular authors upon matters of ethics, history, and events would not be admitted.
Lord Rothermere is apparently an author and was not a member of the British Government; and therefore, unless there is some very particular reason, it would not appear that his books -- or statements in his books -- are in any way evidence.
DR. HORN: The paragraphs to be presented are concerned entirely with matters of fact; and I therefore request that the Tribunal take judicial notice of these facts. There is no question of any polemic discussions.
THE PRESIDENT: The distinction which exists is this: The Tribunal under Article 21 is directed to take judicial notice of official government documents, reports, et cetera. This is not an official government document. Therefore -- you say it is factual evidence --
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it is not evidence, for the purpose of this Tribunal, of any facts stated in it. So far as it is facts, it is not evidence of the facts, and so far as it is opinion, it is Lord Rothermere's opinion.
Well, Dr. Horn, can you tell me what you want to prove by it?
DR. HORN: I should like to prove by it, first, a few historical facts; secondly that the difficulties of a state composed of many nationalities, of which Czechoslovakia is an example, led to this conflict with the German minority and consequently with the German Government. I want to provide you with the reasons and motives that led to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany.
MR. DODD: If Your Honor please, on behalf of the United States I wish to object very strongly to this offer for the reason given by Dr. Horn -- the first reason -- and for the reason given secondly. If I understood the translation correctly, I understood him to say in the first place it was offered to prove that there was no such thing as a Czech people. I don't think that is a matter that can properly be raised certainly here before this Court. We object that it is out of place to offer such proof. We object furthermore for the reason given in the second explanation by Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: May I again point out that I wish to demonstrate by this means, the motives that led to the separation of the Sudetenland in the year 1938?
If I wish to adopt an attitude toward some international offense with which someone is charged and adjudge it, I must also be in a position to judge the motives underlying it. Otherwise it is impossible for me to conduct a legal investigation.
I may also point out that I had first of all asked the Tribunal for documents of the League of Nations as evidence and I would have referred to these official documents if this evidence had come into my possession in time; but as I am not yet in possession of them, I have resorted to presenting facts to the Tribunal instead.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that, about the League of Nations? I did not catch what you said.
DR. HORN: I have asked the League of Nations' Library for the appropriate documents regarding minorities which are in the possession of the League of Nations, in order to submit them as evidence. The office of the General Secretary is obtaining this evidence for me, but so far I have not received it. Consequently I had to refer to this weaker source of evidence in connection with documents which are comparable to the government reports of Article 21, or which are themselves such reports.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you specified the passages in the book to which you wish to, refer? I mean, have you marked them somewhere in some copy of the book?
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DR. HORN: I have requested documents regarding minorities in Czechoslovakia, as far as these questions have been decided by legal proceedings conducted by the League of Nations and by the International Court at The Hague. This is a collection published by the League of Nations regarding minority matters and constantly brought up to date. It is an official collection of documents.
THE PRESIDENT: I was only asking you whether you had specified the particular passages in Lord Rothermere's book which you want to put in.
DR. HORN: I am sorry. I did not understand your question. Could I request you to repeat the question?
THE PRESIDENT: The question I asked was whether you have specified the particular passages in Lord Rothermere's book which you want to use.
DR. HORN: I have marked these passages, and they are on Pages 137, 150, 138, 151, 161 ...
THE PRESIDENT: Not so fast, I want to get them down. 137, 138 ...
DR.HORN: Pages 161, 162, 140, 144, 145, 157. They are in each case just short paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is an appropriate time for us to break off.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will rule upon the admissibility of these passages from Lord Rothermere's book when they have had the translation submitted to them. In the meantime, will you go on presenting your documents in the way that I suggested, and not stopping to detail any of them except those that you particularly want to.
DR. HORN: May I explain very briefly that the oppression of German racial groups in the border territories of Czechoslovakia led to the formation of the Sudeten German Party, and to the co-operation and consultation of the latter with official German agencies. Therefore the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, in his capacity of Reich Foreign Minister and within the scope of the directives he received, held conferences with leaders of the national groups. A number of documents have already been submitted in evidence by the Prosecution and I shall refer to them later. In this connection may I ask to make a correction in Document 2788-PS, where, on Page 2, approximately in the middle, it says "by the extent and gradual" -- there is an error in translation here. Our document says
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"provocation," whereas the original says "specification (Prazisierung) of the demands in order to avoid entering the government." I request the correction of this error, as it distorts the meaning.
In the course of the Prosecution's presentation Von Ribbentrop was said to have supported the high-handed conduct of the Sudeten German leaders. As evidence to the contrary I refer to a part of Document 3060-PS which has not yet been read and from which the contrary can be gathered, that is, that the then Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop took measures against the high-handedness of the Sudeten German leaders with the help of his Ministry in Prague. As evidence of this, may I quote the first and second paragraphs of this document. I quote:
"The rebuff to Frank" -- that is, the leader of the Sudeten German Party at that time -- "has had a salutary effect. I have discussed matters with Henlein, who had avoided me recently, and with Frank, separately, and have received the following promises:
"1. The policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party must follow exclusively the lines of German foreign policy as transmitted through the German Legation. My directives must be obeyed implicitly."
These directives do not apply within the frame of the general policy which had as its aim the avoidance of direct interference in Czech affairs or in the policy of the Sudeten German Party.
Regarding the details of the activity of the German Government and of the Foreign Office in their relations with the Sudeten German Party, I shall question Herr Von Ribbentrop when he is called as a witness.
I now pass on to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 46 (Document Number Ribbentrop-46), which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. This document is a report from the Legation of the Czechoslovak Republic in Paris. It is concerned with the meaning and purpose of Lord Runcimaii1s mission to Prague. It shows that that mission was entrusted to him by England for the purpose of gaining time for rearmament. I should like to read the document.
"Paris, 5 August 1938. Secret. Mr. Minister,
"Massigli considers the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague a good thing. Anthony Eden said, during a conversation with Ambassador Corbin (the French Ambassador to London) that on earnest reflection the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague was a step in the right direction, as he is said to be going to engage England more directly with Central Europe than has been the case up to now. Massigli says that the English know that there will be war, and that they are trying every means
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to delay it. He is perfectly aware that Lord Runcinian's mission to Prague for the purpose of settling that dispute is per se a danger to Czechoslovakia; for Lord Runciman might, for the alleged purpose of gaining time, propose something which could be tremendously, detrimental to Czechoslovakia.
"To this view of Massigh's I add further information which is extremely instructive. During the recent grain conference held in London, the British, the Dominions, the United States, and France conducted separate discussions. The French Delegate had a discussion with Minister Elliot (British Minister of Health) and Morrison (British Minister for Agriculture) as well as with the distinguished expert, Sir Arthur Street, who was in the Ministry of Agriculture and who had been entrusted with a leading post in the Air Ministry. From the speeches, conduct, and negotiations of the British Delegation, the French Delegate gathered the positive impression that the British were interested in organizing grain supplies not so much to prevent the conflict as to win the conflict. The ministers Elliot and Morrison are both supposed to believe in the possibility of a conflict.
"Sir Arthur Street said that in 6 months' time he would have put British aviation on its feet. Therefore much importance is attached to the gaining of time in England.
"I mention this information at this point in connection with Lord Runciman!s mission to Prague; because, as I said already, the question of gaining time plays an important if not decisive role in the sending of Lord Runciman to Prague.
"With best greetings, yours sincerely -- Ususky."
On 29 September 1938, the Munich Pact was concluded, in which Von Ribbentrop also participated. Just how far, is something I shall demonstrate when the defendant is examined in the witness box regarding his policy.
On 30 September there was a mutual declaration, which I submit to the Tribunal as Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 47 (Document Number Ribbentrop-47). That declaration by the Fuehrer and the British Prime Minister Chamberlain, dated 30 September 1938, was planned to serve the purpose of removing all differences still pending between Germany and England.
The reaction to this agreement differed in Germany and in England. As evidence for the British reaction I refer to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 48 (Document Number Ribbentrop-48), which I am offering to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice. This is an extract from the speech of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 3 October 1938. May I quote the following from its first paragraph:
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"If there is a lesson we can learn from the experiences of these last weeks it is the fact that lasting peace cannot be attained by sitting still and waiting for it. Active and positive efforts are required to attain this peace. We, in this country have already been busy for a long time with a rearmament program whose speed and extent increase constantly. Nobody should believe that, because of the signing of the Munich Agreement by the four powers, we can at present afford to reduce our efforts regarding this program...."
As evidence of this rearmament program, which Chamberlain himself said was constantly growing in speed and size, I should like to prove this assertion by reference to Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 49 (Document Number Ribbentrop-49). This is a speech of the British Secretary of State for War, Hore-Belisha, at the Mansion House in London, given on 10 October 1938, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this speech also, from the extracts which I am submitting. May I quote a few words from them?
"More still, however, is to be done to give full force and opportunity to the territorial army as a whole."
I am now skipping one paragraph and read the following paragraph, Paragraph 5, which says:
"As regards the organization of new formations, infantry brigades will in future have three battalions, as in the Regular Army, instead of four. Employing the material that we have, we find that we can form nine complete divisions on the Regular Army model...
"We have provided also a considerable number of modem corps and army units, such as Army Field and Survey regiments. R.A. and Signal Corps will be ready to take their place in such formations should war eventuate. This is also in accordance with Regular Army organization."
So much for the quotation from the speech of the Secretary of State for War.
In Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 50 (Document Number Ribbentrop-50) further stress is laid on armament. It concerns a speech of Winston Churchilrs, of 16 October 1938, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this speech in connection with extracts from it as a document. I am quoting only a few sentences from it:
"We must arm... We shall no doubt arm.
"Britain, casting away habits of centuries, will decree national service upon her citizens. The British people will stand erect and will face whatever may be coming. But arms -- instrumentalities, as President Wilson called them -- are not sufficient by themselves. We must add to them the power of ideas. People say we ought not to allow ourselves to be drawn into
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a theoretical antagonism between Nazidom and democracy, but the antagonism is here now."
I prove the fact that England was arming energetically in the air far beyond the normal needs of defense, by Ribbentrop Exhibit Number 51 (Document Number Ribbentrop-51), which I am offering to the Tribunal with the request for judicial notice. This is, a declaration of the British Secretary of State for Air in the House of Commons, dated 16 November 1938...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I thought you understood what the Tribunal wanted you to do, which was to put in the documents all together. I think I have said from 44 -- wasn't it the document that you had got to? -- to 300 something, that you could put them in all together. But now you have gone through 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and you seem to be going through each one in detail, doing exactly what I asked you not to do. Didn't you understand what I said?
DR.HORN: The way I understood you, Mr. President, was that I may read important parts from them. That is what I did. It concerns only important extracts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to find an important passage in each of the 300 documents?
DR. HORN: No, Mr. President, certainly not; but if I cannot read these documents, these extracts, then I would like to ask the Tribunal to accept my whole document book as evidence so that I can refer to it later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what we intended to do. What we want you to do is to offer in evidence now, stating that you offer from Exhibit 44 up to 300 and whatever the number is, and we will allow you, of course, to refer to them at a later stage when you make your speech; and if there is any passage which the Prosecution object to, they can inform you about it beforehand and the matter can then be argued. But what we do not desire to do is to take up the time of the Tribunal by either offering each of these documents by its number individually, 44, 45, and so on, or that you should read anything except passages which are of especial importance at this moment. After all, you are not putting forward your whole case now; you are only introducing your evidence.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I had.
THE PRESIDENT: I am reminded that of these last few exhibits to which you have been referring, you have referred to about six, all of them upon British rearmament. That is obviously cumulative, isn't it? Therefore, it cannot be that all those are all particularly important to you.
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We only desire to get on, and we desire you, as I have said, to put in these documents, if I may use the phrase, in bulk; and we do not desire you to refer to any of them beyond that.
DR. HORN: In that case I am offering Number 51 ...
COL. POKROVSKY [Interposing]: If I understand rightly, Dr. Horn up to now has not drawn any conclusions from those directions which were given him, time and again, by the Tribunal.
I had an opportunity, that is, as far as I could, actually to acquaint myself with those translations that are gradually coming to me, and, by the way, Dr. Horn turned over these documents, not 3 weeks ago, as he said, but considerably later. As far as I can see up to now, I have a whole series of objections.
Most of the documents in general are altogether irrelevant to the matter, and in particular, absolutely irrelevant to the case of Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we have already indicated that we do not want to deal with questions of admissibility at the moment, because the documents are not before us. I do not understand the purpose of your objections. We haven't got the documents here. How can we tell whether they are admissible or not?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have an objection in principle. Part of the documents -- I will not quote their contents but merely for illustration will name two or three numbers. Some of them are direct filthy and slanderous attacks by private persons against such statesmen as Mr. Roosevelt, the late President of the United States. I have in mind the Documents Number Ribbentrop-290(4), 290(3), 290(l). Some of them are just provocative forged documents. I have in mind Document Number Ribbentrop-286.
There is a whole series of documents which fall directly under the terms of those directions that were given to Dr. Horn by the Tribunal, and it seems to me that if Dr. Horn will continue reading those documents into the record ...
THE PRESIDENT [Interposing]: Colonel Pokrovsky, as I have said, we haven't got these documents before us. You say documents 290(l), 290(3), 290(4), and 286 -- I don't know even what the documents are. I have never seen them.
I think the best way would be for the Chief Prosecutors to submit their objections in writing, and then they will be considered by the Tribunal. The documents aren't here. We can't do anything until we see what the documents are. In order to try and get on with this case, we are allowing Dr. Horn to put in the documents in bulk. But your objections now are really simply taking up time
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and doing no good at all. If you would put in your objections in writing, saying that you object on certain grounds to these documents, that matter would be considered; but we can't consider it without that.
COL. POKROVSKY: My objection was dictated by the wish to save time and is of a very practical nature.
From the moment when a certain document -- well, at least the contents of it -- from the moment even a brief account of it is recorded in the transcript this material becomes the property of the press; and it seems to me that it is not in our interests to have a document which is a known falsification, and the fate of which has not been determined by the Tribunal, that such a document should be turned over to certain circles and that it should be made public.
Meanwhile, among the documents which have been presented by Dr. Horn, there are such documents; and it is not quite clear to me why these particular documents were delayed in translation, why these documents were presented later than others. And on the basis of this consideration I thought it my duty to address the Tribunal, and I think that the Tribunal will consider the reason for my objections.
THE PRESIDENT: I follow what you mean now with reference to documents being communicated to the press, and steps ought to be taken on that. The Tribunal will rule now that documents, upon the admissibility of which the Tribunal has not ruled, are not to be given to the press. I believe there have been some infractions of that in the past; but that is the Tribunal's ruling, that documents should not be given to the press until they have been admitted in evidence before this Court.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: I ought perhaps to add that the Tribunal are not in complete control of this matter. It is for the Prosecution to see -- and also possibly for the Defense -- that documents should not be given to the press until they have been admitted in evidence here.
COL. POKROVSYY: Up to now the order was such if the documents mentioned in Court are recorded in the transcript, then they become public property.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-YYFE: Your Honor, I wonder if I could help on that practical point, because it is one which has given us a little concern.
As Your Lordship knows, the practice has been that the documents have been given some 24 hours before they are produced
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in Court, on the understanding which has been practically entirely, completely, complied with, that the press would not publish until the document is put in evidence. And, My Lord, I am sure that if the Tribunal expressed the wish that where any objection is taken to a document and the Tribunal reserves the question of admissibility, the press would, in the spirit with which they have complied with the previous practice, comply at once with the Tribunal's desire and not publish it in these circumstances. I think that in practice that would solve the difficulty which Your Lordship has just mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: The only thing is, of course, that we are now dealing with a very large number of documents which Dr. Horn wants to submit; and, as you have heard, for purposes of trying to save time we have asked him to submit those documents in bulk.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And of course it is very difficult, if not impossible, for members of the Prosecution to make their objections to documents when they are offered in bulk in that way. Therefore, I think the most convenient course would probably be if, as soon as the translation of those documents has been made, the Prosecution could indicate any objections they have to them and the Tribunal would consider them. And after the order of the Tribunal has been made upon them, they should then be made available to the press.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I respectfully and entirely agree. My Lord, the Prosecutors did confer. Of course the only material that they had to confer upon was the short description of the document in Document Book Number 1, and on that it appeared to all of us that there were a number of documents which might be and probably were objectionable. But, clearly, from our point of view it would be much more satisfactory if we had the opportunity of seeing the actual document in translation, and then we should gladly comply with what Your Lordship has suggested, namely, that we will make the objections in writing to such of those as we think are objectionable and let the Tribunal have them.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them, I believe, are in English, and you could let us have your objections as soon as possible. Perhaps the press would act in accordance with our wishes and not make public those documents to which objection is taken until we have ruled upon them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, yes. We will make our objections as soon as we have had the opportunity of reading the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
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DR. HORN: May I, Mr. President, state that none of my material has been handed to the press by me up to now. I may further state that by an order of the Tribunal only that part was to be translated which was considered relevant by the Prosecution. On the basis of this ruling I cannot rightly comprehend the one point of Colonel Pokrovsky's objection regarding the intrinsic value of the documents. I do not believe that the Prosecution, on the strength of that ruling, would translate anything which, as Colonel Pokrovsky emphasized, must be designated as dirty in its contents. I think that would have been rejected already before now by the Prosecution and therefore the danger does not exist at all that any such translation or original will reach the press.
THE PRESIDENT: I haven't seen the documents, so I can't say, but if you would continue in accordance with the scheme that I have suggested to you, I think that would be the best course for you to take.
DR. HORN: May I now submit the documents referring to armament, military as well as economic, which at the same time show the co-operation between Britain and France? These are the Documents Number Ribbentrop-51 to 62, in my document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents.
I come to the question of Czechoslovakia. As evidence for the fact that Slovakia requested to be taken under German protection I shall present to the Court Ribbentrop Exhibit Numbers 63, 64, and 65 (Documents Ribbentrop-63, 64, and 65) with the request that they be given judicial notice. Furthermore, I shall examine the Defendant Ribbentrop concerning this subject when he takes the stand and, as far as is necessary, I shall have him express an opinion regarding these particular documents. Now I shall submit Documents Numbers 66 to 69 (Documents Ribbentrop-66 to 69) to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They contain statements regarding the reaction in Britain to the occupation of the rest of the Czech country on 15 March 1939 by Germany. Regarding the details as to how the creation of the protectorate came about I shall again question the Defendant Von Ribbentrop concerning the individual documents.
As the next group of exhibits, I present to the Tribunal the document which refers to Article 99 of the dictate of Versailles and which specifically refers to the international legal position of the Memel territory. We are concerned here with Documents Ribbentrop-70 and 71 of my document book.
Regarding the fact that in accordance with the presentation of evidence up to now, I had timed myself not to proceed any further today than to this document, I should like to ask your Lordship's permission to submit the rest of the documents to the Tribunal
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tomorrow. For up to now, on the strength of the existing practice of the Tribunal that the documents be partly read with connecting text, I had expected not to go any further than to this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, why don't you put them all in now? You say you have an index of them. All you have to say is that you offer in evidence the documents from 71 to 300 and something and then they go in, and then if the Prosecution should take an objection to them, of course you can be heard upon the question of the objection.
DR. HORN: May I have your permission to confer with my colleague for one moment and see how much material he has here, so that I can then offer evidence on the separate subjects to the Tribunal? May I again ask Your Lordship? -- I gather from this ruling of the Tribunal that submission of evidence here is no longer to take place but merely presentation of exhibits quite apart from the contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably when these documents are submitted for translation which I understand you say you have done -- but at any rate, if you haven't done it already you will be doing it -- you will mark the passages upon which you rely. Some may be in books, and there you will indicate only certain parts; in documents you will indicate the parts upon which you rely, which is what we desired you to do. You described all these documents by numbers and gave them exhibit numbers in your document book and all we want you to do now is to offer them in evidence and then the Prosecution, when they have been translated, will have the opportunity of objecting to them on the ground of their being cumulative or of their being inadmissible for some other reasons; and, if necessary, you will be heard upon that. All we want you to do now is to get on. What difficulty there can be in submitting these documents, all of which you have indexed in your document book, the Tribunal is quite unable to see.
DR. HORN: Until now, however, the ruling of the Tribunal was to this effect that we, in the Defense presentation, were not only allowed to submit our documents but also to deliver them with a connecting text so as to indicate the attitude of the Defense. Just recently, Mr. Justice Jackson suggested that, on the contrary, the documents should be handed over in their entirety and that objections could be raised subsequently by the Prosecution against the individual documents without their being presented. This suggestion was turned down on the strength of representations made by Dr. Dix, and the Tribunal intended to continue the established procedure, namely, that the documents could be read and brought forward with a connecting text. Now, we come today to a complete departure from this procedure, in which only the documents, and
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these in bulk, are presented to the Tribunal for judicial notice. That is naturally such a deviation that one first of all has to regroup all these documents, in order to be able to submit them to the Tribunal in their proper order, for up to now we had planned to deliver at least some part of the contents.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware of any order of the Tribunal which refers to an interconnecting text. We did not rule that you should not be allowed to read any passage from the documents, but what we did rule was that we wished the documents to be presented and put in evidence and that the passages upon which you relied should be marked and that the Prosecution should, if they wished to object to them as being so irrelevant that they needn't be translated, that they should do so, and that the Tribunal should rule, if there was a conflict upon that. Dr. Horn, of course, you can put any document to your witnesses in the course of their examination and ask them to explain it. It isn't as though you are confined to this presentation of the documents in bulk.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I add another word? This matter appears to me to be again such a question of principle that I do not wish to prejudice my colleagues and I should like to have an opportunity first of all to confer with my colleagues about it. That is indeed a basic departure from the established procedure which was allowed the Defense. I would not like therefore to take it upon myself now simply to alter these matters for myself and then in so doing, also commit my colleagues. I hope that Your Lordship will understand that.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the only material order which the Tribunal has made, as far as I am aware, is this: It is the order of the 4th of February 1946, 2(a):
"During the presentation of a defendant's case, the defendant's counsel will read documents, will question witnesses and will make such brief comments on the evidence as are necessary to insure a proper understanding of it."
DR. HORN: Mr. President, this ruling could naturally only be interpreted by us to the effect that we were granted approximately the same procedure as the Prosecution, for that certainly belongs to the fundamental principles of any trial, that a certain equality of rights exists between Prosecution and Defense.
So as to save time, we are prepared to adapt ourselves to the Court to the extent that we submit the documents to the Tribunal in bulk, insofar as they refer to a definite problem; but still with the reservation to make those statements upon their contents required in order to understand the whole problem. This possibility, however, is taken away from us, if we must now simply submit the
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entire documentary material and can make no statements about it at all; for we certainly cafmot make any comments on a document if I now, for example, submit 10 pieces altogether for a specific problem.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal will adjourn now for a few minutes to consider this question and will return in a short time and announce their decision so that you can prepare yourself for tomorrow on the lines which they wish.
DR. DIX: Before the Tribunal confer, may I ask only one question. I have understood the course of the discussion up to now in this way: That the difficulty has arisen owing to the fact that as the Russian and French translations are not available, some of the Prosecution are still unable to form an opinion with reference to this material and consequently cannot decide whether they wish to raise objections or not. On the other hand the Tribunal wants to avoid quotations being read here concerning matters on which it has not yet been decided whether the Prosecution want to raise objections. This is the situation which appears to me to be the cause of the difficulties arising at present.
I have not understood the statements of the Tribunal, of His Lordship, to mean -- I beg to be corrected if I am wrong -- that there is to be a deviation from the already announced decision or from the procedure followed up to now, that we may quote essential and important portions of the documents submitted by us, when they have been admitted as relevant by the Tribunal.
I believe that I am right in my impression that no exception is to be made to this principle and that no basic new decision is to be made here now, but only an interim ruling is being sought: How can we surmount the difficulties that Dr. Horn may not at the moment read individual passages from his documents because the Tribunal is not yet in a position to decide their relevancy and admit them, because the Tribunal cannot yet hear the attitude of the Prosecution?
Before we adjourn, therefore, so that we have a definite basis for our discussion, I should like to ask the Court if my interpretation is correct. Is it now merely a question of finding a way out while basically maintaining the right of the Defense to speak connecting words, words of explanation of the documents, that is, such words without which the documents could not be understood, and to read individual relevant parts, but that on principle only these technical interim questions are to be decided?
I should be grateful to Your Lordship if I could be told if this conception of mine, regarding the nature of these difficulties which have arisen, is correct.
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THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now and we will return to Court very shortly and we will consider what you have said.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: On the 22 March 1946, the Tribunal made this ruling, repeating a ruling of 8 March 1946:
"To avoid unnecessary translations Defense Counsel shall indicate to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have an opportunity to object to irrelevant passages.
"In the event of disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense as to the relevancy of any particular passage, the Tribunal will decide what passages are sufficiently relevant to be translated. Only the cited passages need be translated unless the Prosecution require translation of the entire document."
That rule has not, for very likely sufficient reason, been able to be carried out, and therefore certainly the Tribunal have not got the translations, and they understand that the Prosecution have not got, at any rate, all the translations. The difficulty which has arisen, the Tribunal think, is in part, at any rate, due to that fact.
The Tribunal, in citing that order of 8 March 1946, on 22 March 1946, said this:
"In considering the matters which have been raised this morning the Tribunal has had in mind the necessity for a fair trial and at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has decided that for the present it will proceed under rules heretofore announced, that is to say:
"First, documents translated into the four languages may be introduced without being read, but in introducing them counsel may summarize them or otherwise call their relevance to the attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed important.
"Second, when a document is offered the Tribunal will hear any objections that may be offered to it."
In this connection the Tribunal then went on to read the order of 8 March, which deals with translations.
Now, in the present case, the translations not being in the hands of the Tribunal or of all the prosecutors, it has been iml5ossible for the prosecutors to make their objections and impossible for the Tribunal to rule upon the admissibility of the documents. Therefore, it is natural that the Prosecution have objected to the Defense reading from documents which they had not seen.
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The Tribunal understands that the translations of these documents of Dr. Horn's will be ready tomorrow. They hope, therefore, that the order which I have just read will be able to be carried out tomorrow, and they propose for the present, and if the order is reasonably and fairly carried out by Defense Counsel, to adhere to it. They would draw the attention of the defendants' counsel again to the first paragraph of the order and would remind them that they must adhere strictly to that order:
"The documents having been translated into the four languages may be introduced without being read, but in introducing them counsel may summarize them, or otherwise call their relevance to the attention of the Court and may read such brief passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed important."
In that connection I would add: "and are not cumulative".
The Tribunal cannot sit here and have three or four hundred documents read to them and commented upon and argued, and therefore it is absolutely essential in the opinion of the Tribunal that counsel must summarize briefly and indicate the relevance of the documents briefly and read only such passages as are really strictly relevant and are not cumulative.
The Tribunal are prepared to adhere to that rule, as I say, if counsel will adhere strictly to it themselves, and they think if Dr. Horn will state, after offering the documents either in one complete bulk or in a group or in groups, the relevancy of each group and confine himself to the reading of only passages which are really necessary to be read in order to understand the documents, that will be satisfactory to them. But they cannot sit here to hear either each of those documents offered in evidence by its number or to hear a short speech or even a longer speech about the relevancy of each of the documents or to hear passages read from each of those documents. The number of documents is very great and it is impossible for the Tribunal to carry on an expeditious trial unless the rule which they have laid down is interpreted in the way in which I have indicated.
As I have already indicated in the emphasis which I threw upon the words, this rule was expressly made for the present and unless it is marked by the Defense Counsel in a reasonable way the rule will be altered.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 28 March 1946 at 1000 hours.]