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DR. THOMA: High Tribunal, Mr. President, I stated yesterday that the Lapouge passage was not marked red in my document book and should not be read. My assertion was not correct. I made this assertion for the following reasons:
My client, Herr Rosenberg, sent me the following note yesterday while I was delivering my case: "The passages in the document book to be cited are certainly marked in red; the other parts do not have to be translated at all." The passages referred to in the French text had not been marked. I consequently assumed that the passages should not be translated. This communication from Rosenberg, however, had a different meaning. Rosenberg had made a sign in certain documents that were marked in red to indicate that these passages do not have to be read. That includes the quotation from Lapouge, and therefore the error occurred.
I also said yesterday that the passage cited by Mr. Justice Jackson was incorrectly translated. That, too, was an error which occurred on my part apparently because the emphasis of the word "Bastardisierung" shocked me. I presume that "miscegenation" was meant. I request the translation department to pardon me. The document book itself...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal quite understand that there must have been some mistake, and no one, I hope-and certainly not the Tribunal-is accusing you of any bad faith in the matter at all. The Tribunal quite understand that there must have been some misunderstanding or some mistake which led to whatever happened.
DR. THOMA: I thank you very much.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, permit me to ask the Tribunal a short question related to procedure matters in the case of Westhoff. Yesterday I stated the reasons why I believed I could forego calling the witness Westhoff. According to the explanation of the British Prosecution the error has been cleared up, and therefore my assumption is no longer true. I should like now to ask the Tribunal, "Is the original situation thereby automatically restored, and may I also claim to examine this witness before the Court as a defense
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witness, or must I make a formal application to be authorized to call this witness again?"
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal do not desire you to make any formal application. You can ask the witness any questions when he has answered the questions which the Tribunal will put to him, and the Prosecution, of course, can also ask him questions.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl, I think you wanted to put some questions to this witness, did you not, on behalf of the Defendant Frank? We hope that they won't be very long.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution asked you a question yesterday in connection with the AB Action. For your information AB Action means extraordinary pacifying operations. It was necessary in connection with uprisings during 1940 in the Government General. In this connection the Prosecution read you a quotation from Frank's diary of 16 May 1940. I want to read to you, first of all, one further sentence from this same citation, from the same entry. It reads as follows:
"Every arbitrary action is to be prevented with the most severe measures. In every case the point of view which takes into consideration the necessary protection of the Fuehrer's authority and of the Reich must be in the foreground. Moreover, action will be postponed until 15 June 1940."
The Prosecution then read you a further citation from 30 May from which one could draw the conclusion...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not think that you fealty can read passages of Frank's diary to the witness. I mean, you are reexamining to clear up. He had not seen the diary.
DR. SEIDL: I shall ask him a question. Before that, however, I must read another short passage; otherwise he cannot understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the question? You can put the diary to Frank when you call Frank.
DR. SEIDL: The witness was heard yesterday in connection with this AB Action, and he was presented with a passage from this diary that must have given him the impression that a rather large number of Poles had been shot without any court proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: What question do you want to put?
DR. SEIDL: I want to ask him whether he knows Ministerial Counsellor Wille, what position he occupied in the Government General, and what kind of assistance this Dr. Wille could possibly give if he had anything at all to do with this action.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, ask him that, Dr. Seidl, if you like, but the diary has no relevance to that question at all.
DR. SEIDL: But the question can only be answered sensibly if I, Mr. President, read him the corresponding passage from the diary. Otherwise he certainly won't see the connection.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not see the connection, either, and the Tribunal thinks there is no point in reading the diary to him.
DR. SEIDL: That will become apparent, Mr. President. I ask to be allowed to read one more passage from the diary, namely of 12 June 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Seidl. You can ask him your question, but you can't read the diary to him. You stated what the question was, whether he knew somebody held a certain position in the Government General. You can ask him that question.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you know Ministerial Counsellor Wille?
LAMMERS: No, I can't remember him.
DR. SEIDL: You also do not know that he was the head of the main justice division in the Government General?
LAMMERS: No; that, too, I do not remember.
DR. SEIDL: Then the one question is already settled.
The second question which I had to present to the witness is related again to an entry in Frank's diary in connection with concentration camps. I can, however, also ask this question only if beforehand I can read the witness a corresponding passage from the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Tell us what the question is.
DR. SEIDL: The question would have read, "Is the point of view expressed in the entry in Frank's diary"-which I intended to read-"the correct point of view? Does it agree with his first explanation on Monday, or is the view expressed in the passage from the diary which the Prosecution presented yesterday the correct one?"
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal think you can put the question, if you put it in the form, "Do you know what was the attitude of Frank towards concentration camps?"-if you put it in that way-"and what was it?"
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness has already answered this question in his direct examination. He declared that Frank held a negative attitude toward concentration camps. Yesterday, however, an excerpt was read to him from Frank's diary which could prove the opposite. However, there are dozens of entries in Frank's diary that corroborate the point of view of the witness and which
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contradict that which was presented by the Prosecution. I can therefore only ask the witness a sensible question if I read him something from the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, all those matters can be gone into with Frank. You can prove then every passage that ended in argument; you can prove every passage in the diary which is relevant; and you can put the most necessary passages to Frank.
DR. SEIDL: The third question would have been in reference to the telegram...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, it is only a very exceptional privilege that you, as counsel for Frank, are allowed to reexamine at all, and the Tribunal have expressed the opinion to you that they do not think this is a matter on which you ought to be allowed to reexamine. The person to reexamine is the one who calls a witness in the first place. We can't allow, in ordinary cases, reexamination by everyone.
DR. SEIDL: I then renounce any further question to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
And now the Tribunal wishes to have General Westhoff brought in.
Sir David, could you find me the German version of General Westhoff's statement in these papers here?
SIR DAVID MAXWEL-FYFE: I looked for it, but could not find it, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: You can't find it?
[The witness Westhoff took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name?
ADOLF WESTHOFF (Witness): Adolf.
THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?
WESTHOFF: Adolf Westhoff.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
General Westhoff?, you made a statement before Brigadier Shapcott or before Captain J.B. Parnell, did you not?
WESTHOFF: I do not know the captain's name. I made a statement in England.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. On the 13th of June 1945?
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WESTHOFF: That is possible, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You don't know English, I suppose?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will read you-have the Prosecution got another copy of this document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, Sir David, if you would follow me whilst I read it and draw my attention to any passages which are really relevant...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: it is a considerably long document, I don't wish to read it all to the witness.
What the Tribunal wants to know, General Westhoff, is whether you adhere to this statement or whether you wish to make any alterations in it. And I will read to you, so that you may remember it, the material passages from the statement.
WESTHOFF: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: "I was in charge of the 'General' department (Abteilung 'Allgemein') when the shooting of the escaped R.A.F. P.W. from Stalag Luft III took place. It was the first occasion on which Feldmarschall Keitel had sent for me. I went with General Von Graevenitz. He had been sent for and I was to accompany him. A certain number of officers had escaped from the Sagan Camp."
Am I going too fast?
"I don't remember how many, but I believe about 80..."
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, can I be of service to the Tribunal by handing him a German translation which has been placed at my disposal by the Prosecution?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to Dr. Nelte.
THE PRESIDENT: General Westhoff, would you read that statement of yours through as quickly as you can? You will be able to see what are the really material passages, and then tell the Tribunal whether that statement is correct.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is still another part of the statement which I have also received from the Prosecution. It was a very extensive compilation. May I also in addition submit this to the witness?
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THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that he has not the whole document?
DR. NELTE: No, he does not have all of it yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, certainly.
DR. NELTE: I received it from the Prosecution in three sections and I should now like to give him these three parts so he may have it complete.
THE PRESIDENT: The statement that we have here in English is five pages done in type, and is certified in this way:
"This appendix contains an accurate translation of oral statements made to me by Major General Westhoff on 13 June 1945 in reply to questions concerning the shooting of 50 R.A.F. officers from Stalag Luft III. Dated this 23rd day of the ninth month of 1945. J. E. Parnell, Captain, Intelligence Corps."
Is that on...
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I do not know whether General Westhoff was not perhaps interrogated several times. In this document he also made statements regarding the whole policy regarding prisoners of war-in other words, not only about the Sagan case. We are here concerned with a continuous report, and the witness. . .
THE PRESIDENT: The only document which is in evidence is this document which I have in my hand, which is annexed to the report of Brigadier Shapcott.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I looked at the document, the part that Dr. Nelte has. I think my German is sufficient to identify it. It is the same document. If Your Lordship will look at Page 2, Your Lordship will see the passage, "Generalinspekteur, General Roettig." My Lord, that is where it starts, and I have checked it as to the last paragraph. It is the same, "I cannot remember having received any reports...." As far as my German goes, that is the same here; so this part of the document is the last half of the document that Your Lordship has.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Yes, Dr. Nelte, and Sir David, perhaps the best course would be if Sir David put the passages upon which he relies to the witness, and the witness could then be asked whether those were accurate.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And Dr. Nelte can ask any questions that he wishes to after that.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, counsel is going to ask you questions upon this document now, so you need not go on reading.
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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, have you had a chance of reading the first paragraph of this statement?
WESTHOFF: Yes, I have read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is that correct? Is that true?
WESTHOFF: There are a few things in it that are not entirely correct. For instance, on the first page there is...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it, then I read it to you, and see how far it is correct:
"I was in charge of the 'General' department (Abteilung 'Allgemein') when the shooting of the escaped R.A.F. P.W. from Stalag Luft III took place." That is correct, is it not?
WESTHOFF: Here is missing the phrase, ". . . when the shooting took place."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Now: .
"It was the first occasion on which Feldmarschall Keitel had sent for me. I went with General Von Graevenitz. He had been sent for and I was to accompany him." Is that right?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "A certain number of officers had escaped from the Sagan Camp. I do not remember how many, but I believe about 80." That is correct, too?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next sentence:
"When we entered, the 'Feldmarschall' was very excited and nervous, and said, 'Gentlemen, this is a bad business.' " Is that correct?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then:
"We were always blamed whenever P. W. escaped. We could not tie them to our apron strings!" That is your own comment. Then you go on as to what the Field Marshal said:
"This morning, Goering reproached me in the presence of Himmler for having let some more P.W. escape. It was unheard of!" You go on with your comment that:
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"Then they must have had a row because the camp did not come under us; it was a G.A.F. camp."
Is that correct, that the Field Marshal said:
"This morning, Goering reproached me in the presence of Himmler for having let some more P.W. escape?"
WESTHOFF: Not in Himmler's presence, but in Hitler's presence. Hitler's presence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It ought to be in Hitler's presence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next sentence:
"All G.A.F. camps came directly under the G.A.F. itself, but the inspector of P.W. camps was in charge of all camps for inspection purposes. I was not inspector yet."
We have had all that explained. I do not think that there is any dispute about the organization. I won't trouble you about that. We have gone into that in this court in some detail. Unless the Tribunal want it, I did not intend to trouble this witness again. You say, "I was not inspector yet. General Von Graevenitz was inspector, and all camps came under him in matters concerning inspection and administration."
Then you say:
"Goering blamed Keitel for having let those men escape. These constant escapes were a bad show. Then Himmler interfered- I can only say what the Feldmarschall told us-and he complained that he would have to provide another 60,000 or 70,000 men as 'Landwachen,' et cetera."
Is that right? Did the Field Marshal say that?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the second paragraph:
"Feldmarschall Keitel said to us, 'Gentlemen, these escapes must stop. We must set an example. We shall take very severe measures. I can only tell you that the men who have escaped will be shot; probably the majority of them are dead already.' Keitel said that to us at the conference."
Is that correct?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you say:
"We were amazed as that was a conception we had never come across before. The affair must have happened in March. We were sent to the 'Feldmarschall' in Berlin a few days after
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the escape, not on that account but for some other business. We knew they had escaped, and we were taken by surprise by that declaration at the conference."
Then you go on again with your account of the conference:
"General Von Graevenitz intervened at once and said, 'But, Sir, that is out of the question. Escape is not a dishonorable offense. That is specially laid down in the Convention.' "
Is that correct, that General Von Graevenitz said these words?
WESTHOFF: General Von Graevenitz made objections with reference to the Geneva Convention, but there is missing in this report the fact that the Field Marshal said to General Von Graevenitz that this was a matter of a Fuehrer decree. That is missing here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look at the next sentence that I was going to read to you, you say:
"He"-that is General Von Graevenitz-"raised these objections, whereupon Keitel said, 'I do not care a damn; we discussed it in the Fuehrer's presence, and it cannot be altered.' "
Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: No. The Field Marshal said, "That is a matter of indifference to me. That is a matter of indifference to me."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be easier, General, if you told the Tribunal now, to the best of your recollection, what did the Field Marshal say after General Von Graevenitz had made his objections?
WESTHOFF: I have deposed a sworn statement to the Court on that subject, which I might perhaps read:
"Regarding the presence of General Von Graevenitz and myself at the headquarters in March of 1944, Field Marshal Keitel . . ."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Westhoff, the Tribunal may want that later. It would be easier if you would try to stick to this statement for the moment-whether it is right or wrong at the moment-and then we will deal with any other one later on. It is just this point, if you could direct your mind to it: After General Von Graevenitz had made his objection, as you have told us, on the ground of the Convention, what did the Field Marshal say? What did he say at that point? If you would just try and do that, it would be a great help to us all.
WESTHOFF: The Field Marshal then said, "It is now a matter of indifference; we must set an example."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought you said that he did mention that there was a Fuehrer decree to that effect, or a Fuehrer order, or something of that sort. Did he mention that?
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WESTHOFF: That he had already said at the very beginning, that this was a matter of a Fuehrer decree.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In the next paragraph you point out in this statement-and I think it is only fair to yourself to read it it is the second sentence:
"But in this case none of our men"-the men of the Wehrmacht-"had shot any of the P.W. I made inquiries at once."
Then you say:
"None of them had been shot by a soldier, but by Gestapo men only or else police sentries. That proves that probably Himmler-of course, I do not know whether he made the suggestion to the Fuehrer, or how they arranged it. It should be possible to find that out from Goering, who was present at the conference. Naturally, I do not know."
Do you remember making these answers?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, you say again:
"At any rate, it is a clear fact that our men did not shoot any of them; they must all have been shot by policemen."
And you point out in the last sentence:
"But in this particular case, only those caught by our people were brought back to the camp, that is; those caught by soldiers."
Now, in the next paragraph you say that you had no authority to give the police orders, and you repeat that the members of the Wehrmacht did not shoot any of them. And then in the third sentence you say:
"I had a report sent me at once, and told General Von Graevenitz, 'Sir, the only thing we can do is to see that no dirty business is carried out where we are in charge."'
Is that right: Does that correctly describe what you did, General?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you go on to say, a sentence or two later, that you were faced with a fait accompli; and then you say, after repeating General Von Graevenitz's protests to Field Marshal Keitel, when he had said, "That's quite impossible, we cannot shoot any people"
"How the shooting was carried out I heard from the representative of the protecting power, Herr Naville, of Switzerland."
Is that right?
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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did you hear of the shooting?
WESTHOFF: I turned to the Gestapo and wanted the particulars of the shootings for the Foreign Office, and I did not get them. The representative of Switzerland, Herr Naville, whom I had sent to the camp, visited me on his return, and from him I learned the only thing that I ever heard about this matter, namely, that apparently a prisoner of war who had returned to the camp had seen that the escaped airmen had been driven out of the Gorlitz Prison on a truck heavily chained and under strong guard. That is the only thing I learned about this affair at all, and I have up to now not found out in what way these airmen perished. The Gestapo refused to inform me of this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is correct that generally what information you did receive you received from the representative of the protecting power. I don't know if you remember whether his name was Naville or not. But it is right, isn't it?
WESTHOFF: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What information you did receive-you tell us that it was very lithe-you received from the representative of Switzerland, of the protecting power. Is that right?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want to deal with the next bit in the statement where you tried to get in touch with the Foreign Office, and if you look down the paragraph you will see that you say:
"At any rate, we did not get any news, and so it was pointed out to the Field Marshal that such a state of affairs was impossible, that we had to get in communication with the Foreign Office. Then he emphatically stated that it was forbidden to get in touch with the Foreign Office."
Is that correct?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will read on, two sentences:
"Then the affair was raised in the House of Commons in England, and then a note was sent by our side. Then I was quite suddenly called up by Admiral Burckner of the Foreign Department (Amtsgruppe Ausland) in the OKW, which keeps contact with the Foreign Of lice. He called me up by telephone at night and said, 'The Feldmarschall has given me orders to prepare an answer for England immediately. What is it all about? I don't know anything about the case.' I said,
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'Herr Admiral, I am sorry, but General Von Graevenitz received strict orders not to talk to anyone about it. Nothing was allowed to be put down in writing either. Apart from that, we ourselves were faced with an accomplished fact. This order was apparently issued by Himmler, and the position was such that we could do nothing more at all about it."
Is that a correct account?
WESTHOFF: Here again the word "Himmler" stands where the word "Hitler" should stand.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That should be Hitler. Apart from that, that is correct? I mean, in substance is that a correct account of the conversation between Admiral Burckner and yourself?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You then go on to say that Admiral Burkner wanted you to tell him about the affair; that you only knew what the gentlemen from Switzerland had told you; and that you had made various attempts to approach the Gestapo. And then, if you look at just before the end of that paragraph:
"Then the Foreign Office itself got into touch and took charge of this affair. Then another of my men, Lieutenant Colonel Krafft, went to Berchtesgaden while I was on a journey. At that time a note to England was to be prepared. Then, when we read this note to England in the newspaper, we were all absolutely taken aback. We all clutched our heads. Mad! We could do nothing about the affair."
Is that correct? Did you say that, and is that correct?
WESTHOFF: The matter was then turned over to the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office was charged with the preparation of a note to England. At this discussion Lieutenant Colonel Krafft was apparently called in as a specialist for the Sagan case to clarify any doubts, if such were still at hand. That is not to mean at all, however, that Lieutenant Colonel Krafft was in any way concerned with the preparation of the note; that was purely a matter for the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office had only called him in so that, if there were still any doubts about the matter, they could be clarified on the spot.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General, the next part of the statement I did not intend to read unless the Tribunal wanted it, because you are making quite clear that in your opinion the Inspector General, General Roettig, had nothing to do with the affair at all. And if you accept it from me that that is the substance of the next two paragraphs, I won't trouble you with it in detail. You are making clear that General Roettig had nothing to do with it. Is that right?
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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. If you will look at the first sentence-I thought it represented it fairly. Look at the first sentence:
"Generalinspekteur General Roettig had nothing to do with it, nothing at all. He did not have any hand in the affair at all. He was completely excluded from it by the fact that these matters were taken out of his hands, apparently at that conference with the Fuehrer in the morning, that is to say, the conference between Himmler, Field Marshal Keitel, and Goering, which took place in the Fuehrer's presence."
Is that right? I only wanted to put it shortly that you were trying to, and quite rightly if it is true, to give your view that General Roettig had nothing to do with it. Is that right, that is, that sentence I read to you?
Did you say, "yes"?
WESTHOFF: The Inspector General was responsible for measures to prevent escape, but had nothing to do with this matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no difference between us. That is what I was suggesting. Now, I'd like you to look at the next paragraph. It also deals with General Roettig. Then, after that, you explain the position of the officers. You say this:
"I only know an order existed that only officers, and, I believe, only those who were caught by the Gestapo, should be handed over to them."
Then you say-you talk about intelligence-I don't want to trouble you about that. Then, if you would look at the next paragraph:
"I received a report from the camp saying so and so many men had been shot whilst attempting to escape. I did not hear from the Gestapo at all. It is like this. The reports ate sent to the camp. Then the camp informed us that a certain number of men had been recaptured and a certain number shot. Things are reported in that way. The Gestapo sent me no information whatsoever; they merely told us casually whenever we made inquiries, that they had recaptured a certain number."
Now the next sentence I want you to look at carefully:
"The Field Marshal gave us detailed instructions to publish a list at the camp, giving the names of those shot, as a warning. That was done. That was a direct order which we could not disobey."
Is that correct?
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WESTHOFF: It was ordered that a list of all those who were shot be posted up in the camp as a warning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then the next sentence says:
"Apparently the bodies were burned and the ashes put into urns and sent to the camp."
And then there is arrangement about the burial.
Then you say that that raised great difficulties. A sentence or two later you say that matters of that sort were always passed to higher authority. They went to the Party Chancellery, and then there was hell to pay. The cremation of prisoners of war was forbidden.
And then later on, when you say that you raised the question of it being contrary to the Convention, you say:
"Whenever I addressed the Officers' corps and said, 'Gentlemen, we only act according to the Convention,' someone from higher authority from the Party Chancellery, arrived the following day and said, 'Gentlemen, the Convention is a scrap of paper which doesn't interest us."'
Is that correct as to the general procedure?
WESTHOFF: It is not entirely correct. The OKW took the point of view that the Convention should be observed; but the prisoner-of-war affairs as such in Germany were only apparently in the hands of the OKW. The people who really formed the decisions on prisoner-of-war affairs were the Party and economic offices. Thus, for example, my office had to submit to the deputy of the Party Chancellery every order that was issued, and the Party Chancellery decided how this order was to be issued, and not the OKW at all.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't want to go into it in detail. You had an interview with Bormann's deputy, Friedrich, at the Party Chancellery. And then in the next long paragraph beginning, "The Air Force P.W. camps were under G.A.F. administration..." We have gone into that, if Your Lordship agrees, in detail-the Air Force side of it. I did not intend to put that.
Then I want you to come to where it says, in the paragraph after you talked about the question of handing over prisoner-of-war camps to Himmler's organization-you see it reads, "We were told all men who get away are to be shot'" It may be the beginning of the next paragraph in my English version. Do you see it after a long paragraph about Air Force camps?
WESTHOFF: What page please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The trouble is the pages are different, but it begins, "We were told all men who get away are
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to be shot..." It is the third last paragraph of the document. If you start from the end of the document, you will see a paragraph: "I cannot remember..." One before it: "We arranged with the 'Feldmarschall' . . ." It is the one before that: "We were told all men who get away are to be shot..." Have you got it?
"The 'Feldmarschall' prohibited anything concerning this to be put into writing. Nothing at all. Only the camp was to be informed in order to put them in the picture. I discussed the matter with Graevenitz once more. I can't tell you the exact details anymore. We contacted the Gestapo regarding the return of the bodies. We had to have them back. Then Von Graevenitz left for the front."
Now it is the next bit I want you to look at carefully.
"I then said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, 'I won't do it like that; I am going to cover myself at all costs so that we are not involved in it afterwards. It is true the "Feldmarschall" has forbidden it to be put in writing, but I want to have it in writing. It must be signed by the Fuehrer.' "
Now that is what you said to Krafft-comparatively unimportant.
WESTHOFF: That is not entirely correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell us what you would like altered in it.
WESTHOFF: I wanted it in writing, signed by the Field Marshal, and for this purpose I issued a memorandum describing this discussion. And thus I had the Field Marshal's signature with my office for future events so that I would have something in writing to prove it actually true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at the next sentence. I think that entirely agrees with what you have said:
"Contrary to Feldmarschall Keitel's orders-I pretended that I had not understood properly-I worked the thing out on paper. I said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, 'I want to have the word "shoot" included so that Keitel can see it in writing. He may adopt a different attitude then.'
"When I got the thing back, he had written the following in the margin: 'I did not definitely say "shoot"; I said, "Hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo." "'
WESTHOFF: That is not entirely correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What change would you like to make in that, General?
WESTHOFF: I stated that clearly in my sworn statement, that the Field Marshal had written on the margin, "I did not say 'shoot,' but 'turn over to the Gestapo."'
10 April 46
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the same as is in this statement? It says he wrote in the margin, " 'I did not definitely say 'shoot.' I said, 'hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo."'
WESTHOFF: Well, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted this to be quite clear, General. The draft order or note of information that you had put up to the Field Marshal contained the word "shoot"?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now there is only one other bit. You go on to say:
"We arranged with the 'Feldmarschall' to have the matter submitted to the Fuehrer. We had the feeling that there was something not quite in order."
And then you say that you had to approach the police authorities on a slightly lower level, and about 10 lines down you say this:
"In the end, I could not get where I wanted with this affair. So I went to Berlin myself-it was the only time I ever saw Kaltenbrunner-and I said to Kaltenbrunner, 'This matter is still outstanding. It should be submitted to the Fuehrer. I can't carry on like this. A decision must be made some time. But apart from that, I am of the opinion that the whole affair should be dropped. The whole thing is madness. It has already let us into so much unpleasantness and is so monstrous that I am still of the opinion that this affair should either be stopped in some way or the Fuehrer be dissuaded from continuing it any further.' "
Is that generally, again, in substance, a correct version of what you said to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
WESTHOFF: This does not directly concern this matter, however, but rather an order that was to be issued by Wagner in connection with it and to be submitted to the Fuehrer in two ways, one via the chief of the OKW and the other via Himmler. This order had been submitted to Keitel in draft form which then went to the Gestapo. The Gestapo read this draft, and then the matter was carried no further. I was never able to find out why this was so, and for this reason I myself duly addressed Kaltenbrunner about this matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was this the order in its final form, that escaped prisoners of war should be handed over to the Gestapo or the police?
10 April 46
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. So this, General Westhoff, if I may have your attention, was really dealing with the future, was it? This was dealing with what was to be done in the future?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I don't think one need go into it in details again, unless the Tribunal want. My Lord, the rest of the statement is only a general account of the attitude of the :British prisoners of war, and I have no complaint about it at all.
My Lord, there is one problem that has arisen which perhaps the Tribunal would now consider the convenient time. My friend, Colonel Pokrovsky, has certain quite different matters with regard to the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war which he wanted to raise with this witness, and perhaps the Tribunal would consider it a convenient. time to do it.
THE PRESIDENT: It probably would be more convenient if Dr. Nelte put his questions to this witness, if he has any, first, before Colonel Pokrovsky.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should respectfully agree to clear up this topic first.
THE PRESIDENT: Unless Colonel Pokrovsky's questions might relate to the Defendant Keitel?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE They do relate, of course, to the position of the OKW with these prisoners of war, but they have nothing to do with Sagan.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, have you any questions you want to put to this witness?
DR. NELTE: Witness, what was just read to you was called a "statement" and was presented here. Have you ever given this statement in complete form orally or in writing?
WESTHOFF: I was interrogated on different occasions, and this interrogatory which has been presented to me is a summation of my testimony. Of course, I found errors here and there because it has been summarized, and the questions have been omitted.
DR. NELTE: In other words, this is a summation of the answers you gave to questions at various interrogations?
DR. NELTE: Was this summation ever submitted to you?
DR. NELTE: I had the impression that the passages read to you here just now were on occasion very long and that you actually answered always only the latter part of these passages. I should
like to ask you whether after this interrogation in London you were not again interrogated?
WESTHOFF: I was interrogated here in Nuremberg.
DR. NELTE: By Colonel Williams?
DR. NELTE: What did Colonel Williams say to you at the conclusion of this interrogation? What did he request of you?
WESTHOFF: At the conclusion of the interrogation, Colonel Williams asked me to describe briefly the basic central point of my testimony and to sum it up in a sworn statement.
DR. NELTE: Did you swear to this statement before Colonel Williams?
WESTHOFF: Yes, I swore to it.
DR. NELTE: Now, I should like first of all to go through with you the interrogation that you had with Colonel Williams, and which is to be found in Document RF-1450. I am having this document handed over to you.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by Document 1450?
DR. NELTE: RF-1450 is contained in the document book, in my document book as Number 5.
THE PRESIDENT: But you mean RF-1450, do you?
DR. NELTE: Yes, RF. This document is entitled, "Summary of Interrogation of General Adolf Westhoff by Colonel Curtis L. Williams, on 2 November 1945."
THE PRESIDENT: Just one minute, Dr. Nelte. Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal think that you can put to this witness, "Did you or did you not make a different statement in an interrogation at some other time?" But the document that you are referring to now is a document which the Tribunal refused to admit on your objections. When the French presented that document, you objected to it and it was therefore not allowed to be put in, so that the proper way in which to put the question now is, "Did you say to Colonel Williams so and so?"
DR. NELTE: I have here a compilation of those points in the document or in the notes of Colonel Williams which according to your declaration are supposed not to be correct. I now ask you, what did you, or did you not upon being questioned by Colonel Williams . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it is not right for you to say that they are different-you must ask him questions about it, not make statements yourself.
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DR. NELTE: What did you say to Colonel Williams to his question, whether the prisoner-of-war camps in their entirety were supposed to be subordinate to the OKW and to Field Marshal Keitel?
WESTHOFF: The prisoner-of-war camps were subordinate to the OKW only to the extent that the OKW had the legal control of them and insofar as the protective powers, that is, the International Red Cross was involved. The OKW did not have the power to give orders or dole out punishment in the camps.
DR. NELTE: What did you answer to Colonel Williams' question, on the right of the OKW regarding the inspection of the camps?
WESTHOFF: The OKW was entitled to inspect. That can be seen also in my official orders in which it states clearly that the inspector was entitled to inspect the camp.
DR. NELTE: What did you answer to Colonel Williams' question, to whom Stalag Lust III, Sagan, was subordinate?
WESTHOFF: Stalag Luft III, Sagan, was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, because the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, on his own wish and already at the beginning of the war, had all prisoner-of-war camps containing airmen placed under his control.
DR. NELTE: Did you answer to one of Colonel Williams' questions that Goering, Himmler, Keitel, and Hitler had decided to shoot the officers who escaped in Sagan?
WESTHOFF: No, that is a mistake. Colonel Williams asked me what the Fuehrer had said to Field Marshal Keitel; thereupon, I answered clearly that I could give no information about this, since I had not taken part in that conference. I could only make statements about the conference which Field Marshal Keitel had with General Von Graevenitz.
DR. NELTE: Did you answer Colonel Williams that Field Marshal Keitel, during this conference with Graevenitz, said, "This is my order"? '
WESTHOFF: No, the Field Marshal could not issue an order regarding the shootings, since the shootings were not within the competence of the Wehrmacht but in that of the Gestapo.
DR. NELTE: During your interrogation, particularly also with Colonel Williams, did you state clearly that it never had been a question of an order issued by Keitel himself or of an order which Keitel transmitted to you on higher orders?
WESTHOFF: It concerned information given to General Von Graevenitz. That is also stated with no reservations in my sworn statement.
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DR. NELTE: Then, if I understand you correctly, you declare that Field Marshal Keitel never issued an order of his own nor ever expressed the idea that he at all wanted to give you an order regarding a shooting of the officers?
WESTHOFF: No, that he could also not do.
DR. NELTE: During the previous interrogation by the prosecutor there was talk of a report which the camp commander at Gorlitz is supposed to have delivered to you. This is also in the notes. Did you ask for or receive a report from the camp commander?
WESTHOFF: I had no personal connection at all with the camp commander at Gorlitz. That must be a confusion with the statement of the Swiss representative, Naville.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that during the discussion between Keitel, on the one hand, and General Von Graevenitz and you, on the other, two matters were brought up: First, the case of the escaped Royal Air Force officers; and, second, the question as to what should be done in the future, or how escapes should be prevented?
WESTHOFF: Yes, that is so.
DR. NELTE: I now have questions to ask you which I request you to answer, if possible, with "yes" or "no." Is it true that in the first case, namely, the affair of the 50 Royal Air Force pilots, only conversation afforded the possibility of gaining information of what had happened in the higher circles?
DR. NELTE: Did General Graevenitz, upon his return from headquarters, not say to you, "What can we do at all if the Gestapo once gets things into their hands"?
DR. NELTE: In other words, it is clear from your whole conversation with Keitel, that it was a question here of an order directed to Himmler from Hitler?
WESTHOFF: In regard to the shooting, yes.
DR. NELTE: After Professor Naville visited the Sagan Camp, did he say to you that his impression was that certainly stronger forces were at work here against which the OKW could do nothing?
WESTHOFF: Yes, he said that.
DR. NELTE: With reference to the escaped pilots, did the OKW do anything regarding their capture or treatment, or was it clear that in this respect this matter was unfortunately settled so far as the OKW were concerned?
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WESTHOFF: The OKW could do nothing further because the matter had been taken entirely out of their hands.
DR. NELTE: Accordingly, then, it is not correct to say that, after this discussion between Keitel, Graevenitz, and Westhoff, a conference was again called by the OKW?
WESTHOFF: No, there was no further conference in the OKW.
DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted in which Colonel Walde-it is Document D731, Mr. President-in which Colonel Walde deposes-and to be sure, he says at the beginning that he had to reconstruct from memory what had happened-according to his recollection, he believed that the OKW had called a conference that took place in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse. Do you know anything about that?
WESTHOFF: I only know about this conference from you yourself. It could not have been called by the OKW, for then it would have been held by us in Torgau. Without a doubt, however, it was held in Berlin, as you told me, and that is no conference called by the OKW.
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that prisoner-of-war officers recaptured by the Wehrmacht were again put in the Sagan Camp and also remained there?
WESTHOFF: Yes, that is right.
DR. NELTE: Were recaptured prisoners of war, who were turned over to the camp in any case, let out again?
DR. NELTE: On the other hand, is it true that you gave the camp commander strict orders on the part of the OKW that recaptured prisoners should under no circumstances be let out of the camp again?
WESTHOFF: The order was not given by me to the camp commander but to the commanders in the military administrative districts in charge of prisoners of war.
DR. NELTE: But by them to the camps?
WESTHOFF: To the camps, yes.
DR. NELTE: An order was mentioned to the effect that the names of the escaped prisoners who had not come back, were to be published. You stated before "as a warning." In order to clarify this question-the purpose of this order which, of course, came from above-I should like to ask you whether Field Marshal Keitel did not say as justification, "I hope, however, that the prisoners will be so shocked by this that in the future they will not escape any more"?
WESTHOFF Yes, the Field Marshal said that.
10 April 46
DR. NELTE: You deposed, or rather, it was read to you that Field Marshal Keitel said to you and General Von Graevenitz that nothing should be put down in writing about the whole matter, nor should it be discussed with any other office.
DR. NELTE: Is it then correct to say that you drew up a memorandum regarding this matter, namely, the conference, and had it submitted to Keitel?
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that Field Marshal Keitel did not find fault with this fact as one might certainly really have expected but wrote his initial "K" on the upper corner of this memorandum?
DR. NELTE: Is it furthermore correct that you, because you had to report, repeatedly got in touch with the Reich Security Main Office in order to find out something about the fate of these unfortunate officers?
WESTHOFF: Not only did I get in touch with the Reich Security Main Office but, since I myself did not succeed in this effort, I also reported the matter to the General Office of the Wehrmacht, but as far as I know, it also did not succeed in this effort.
DR. NELTE: Is it further correct that you asked the representative of the International Red Cross, Dr. Naville, to visit the Sagan Camp in connection with this event?
WESTHOFF: I brought about this visit, yes.
DR. NELTE: Is it furthermore true that Field Marshal Keitel called you up and told you that the Foreign Minister had to have precise knowledge of the whole occurrence, in order to draw up a note of reply?
DR. NELTE: And that consequently you were to tell the Foreign Office about the occurrence in all its details?
DR. NELTE: Did Keitel say on this occasion that you were to conceal anything or to put anything in a false light?
DR. NELTE: Was the OKW involved in the composition of the note as it was sent in final form?
10 April 46
DR. NELTE: Is it correct that your representative, Lieutenant Colonel Krafft, was ordered by the Foreign Office to attend a meeting in Berchtesgaden for the sole purpose of giving correct information in reply to possible further inquiry by the representative of the Foreign Office, in case the information were demanded?
DR. NELTE: Is it finally correct that Lieutenant Colonel Krafft reported to you that the Foreign Of lice had presented a note to Hitler, and Hitler had rejected it and then composed the text himself?
WESTHOFF: So far as I recall, that is right.
DR. NELTE: The second part of the conferences between Keitel, Graevenitz, and Westhoff concerned itself with the question of what action should be taken in the future. You stated in this connection that an order was to be drawn up, and that it was a question of certain spheres of competence that had to be discussed with the Reich Security Main Of lice. Tell me in this connection what, if anything, did the Reich Security Main Office or Himmler have to do with the administration of prisoners of war?
WESTHOFF: Himmler was responsible for the security of the Reich and, insofar as all the prisoners of war were concerned, he had to concern himself with the search for all escaped prisoners.
DR. NELTE: Did he, because of this, come into conflict in any way with your OKW Prisoner of War Department?
WESTHOFF: Insofar as we often asked, whenever prisoners of war escaped, what had been done with them and received no information, or information with which we could do nothing, for which we had no use.
DR. NELTE: Does that mean that it was possible that Himmler or his office gave you no information when they caught prisoners of war?
WESTHOFF: That is absolutely possible, and we also supposed that such was the case repeatedly.
DR. NELTE: Did you on one occasion, while drawing up or drafting orders which were concerned with the treatment of escaped prisoners of war, use the words "Stufe III"?
DR. NELTE: Do you know whether the meaning of these words signifying a death sentence were known at all in the OKW?
WESTHOFF: They were not known to me. I was asked about that the first time in London and had to state then also that I could not give any information about that.
10 April 46
DR. NELTE: When you say, you personally, then you probably mean the organization as well, since you belonged to the OKW.
DR. NELTE: I have a document here, Number 1514-PS. It concerns a collective order of the commander of Wehrkreis VI regarding the treatment of escaped prisoners of war. You will see in this order a whole number of references to years as far back as 1942.
I ask you now according to your knowledge and experience, would not an order supposed to have been issued on 4 March 1944 also have been entered here, had its contents been very important?
WESTHOFF: If it was a question of a secret order, yes.
DR. NELTE: It is in the German . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Nelte. Aren't you getting very far away from the subject upon which this witness was being examined? I mean, he was being examined about an interview which he had with the Field Marshal Keitel, and here you are asking him about something which has nothing to do with that at all, as far as I am able to see.
DR. NELTE: I believe that I shall make clear that this has something to do with the second part of this conference, namely, regarding the treatment of recaptured escaped officers. These are preparatory questions that I must ask to make clear, in my opinion . . .
THE PRESIDENT: But it is a very long crossexamination of a witness whom you did not wish to call. The Tribunal wish you to make your crossexamination as brief as possible.
DR. NELTE: I shall make it as brief as the interests of the defendant permit.
[Turning to the witness.] Is it not customary in the German system of issuing orders that in referring to an order issued by higher authorities the date and archive number is given?
WESTHOFF: Yes, always.
DR. NELTE: Did you ever give any information to the representatives of the protecting powers or to the International Red Cross that prisoners of war, of whose capture you were fully aware, that these had not been recaptured?
DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about-and here I have the last document shown you, 1650-PS...
[Document 1650-PS was submitted to the witness.]
THE PRESIDENT: What was the point of showing 1514-PS to him? He has not been asked any relevant questions about it at all.
10 April 46
DR. NELTE: From this document I found corroboration of the answer of the defendant through the witness that if an order had been issued on 4 March 1944, as it was presented here, it would have had to be contained in this document.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is a waste of time, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: I shall be through in a few minutes, Mr. President.
[Turning to the witness] Witness, would you please look on Page 3 of this document, under Number 2. It reads:
"The OKW is requested to inform the prisoner-of-war camps that in the interest of camouflage the recaptured officers are not to be turned over directly to Mauthausen but to the local State Police authority."
Did you ever in your activity in the OKW know anything of such a request or such an order?
WESTHOFF: That is not familiar to me. That also took place at a time when I was not chief.
DR. NELTE: But on taking over on 1 April 1944 you must have known of all important events or must have taken note of them?
DR. NELTE: Did you ever find out in this connection that such a document had been presented?
WESTHOFF: No, I do not know of it.
DR. NELTE: And now the last question. Look at the first page of this document. It is a teletype from the Chief of the Sipo and SD, of 4 March '44. It reads in the first part as follows:
"The OKW has ordered the following: Every recaptured escaped prisoner of war officer"-et cetera-"is, after his recapture, to be turned over to the Chief of the Sipo and SD with the code word 'Stule III'...."
The Defendant Keitel has stated here that he does not know of such an OKW order.
I ask you, did you find such a command, such an order in the files, in the files which must have been presented to you when you took over office on 1 April 1944?
WESTHOFF: I did not find such an order, but an order of this kind existed without a doubt.
DR. NELTE: In what way?
WESTHOFF: So far as I recall, General Graevenitz brought this order either from the field headquarters or from the General Office of the Wehrmacht.
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DR. NELTE: How is it possible then that such an order was not in your files?
WESTHOFF: Because there was an order that this order was to exist only orally.
DR. NELTE: Then please tell me what the procedure was when such an order was given orally.
WESTHOFF: It could be transmitted orally.
DR. NELTE: That is, your office?
WESTHOFF: It was then transmitted through the Chief of the Prisoner of War Department.
DR. NELTE: Chief?
DR. NELTE: And you know that such an order was transmitted?
WESTHOFF: General Von Graevenitz brought such an order with him and, as far as I know, the order was also transmitted further.
DR. NELTE: Then you certainly must have known what "Stule III" meant?
WESTHOFF: No, that I did not know. I have said that I knew only that there was an order to turn over these recaptured prisoners to the Gestapo but I cannot remember details because I never saw a written order.
DR. NELTE: Can you then state that this order, as you see it there before you, was issued by the OKW?
WESTHOFF: No, that I cannot say.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President; permit me to put only a few questions which refer to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we are going to call the Witness Wielen afterwards. You realize that?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But you want to ask this witness questions, don't you?
DR. KAUFFMANN: The name Kaltenbrunner has been mentioned here, and I have only a few questions.
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[Turning to the witness.] Witness, you mentioned a little earlier that you spoke with the Gestapo, and that you received no information from the Gestapo. Do you know with whom you spoke at that time?
WESTHOFF: No. The conferences with the Gestapo took place continuously. In cases when we missed prisoners of war and we did not know where they were, we continuously made inquiries at the Gestapo. But, on one occasion I was with Kaltenbrunner- namely, on the occasion of some other matter which had nothing to do with Allied prisoners of war-and since this occasion gave me the opportunity to talk to Herr Kaltenbrunner personally, I immediately brought the matter up for discussion and tried to have that order rescinded. Kaltenbrunner and Muller were present at the time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Later on in Berlin after the Sagan case you talked to Kaltenbrunner personally?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the Sagan case discussed there?
WESTHOFF: I talked about the Sagan matter there with Kaltenbrunner and I expressly pointed out that this was an unbearable situation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: About how long after the Sagan case was that?
WESTHOFF: I cannot tell you that any more now; it may have been 4 weeks later.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was Kaltenbrunner's view on this problem? What did he tell you?
WESTHOFF: Kaltenbrunner himself said next to nothing to me, but rather Muller carried on the conversation, and I left without having been given either "yes" or "no."
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was Muller also present during the second conference in Berlin?
WESTHOFF: I was in Berlin only once.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Wasn't the subject of that conversation in any way the question as to how one was to form the prisoner of war system in the future?
DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, the Sagan case was discussed exclusively?
WESTHOFF: Not the Sagan case exclusively. But I was ordered to see Kaltenbrunner for another reason, namely, because of German prisoners of war, but made use of the opportunity to discuss this
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case with him at once. That is the only time that I saw Kaltenbrunner at all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: During that conference you neither received a positive nor negative answer?
WESTHOFF: That is correct.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the impression with which you left that conference?
WESTHOFF: The impression was that apparently not much could be done.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you then report to your superiors about this conference?
WESTHOFF: Yes, I duly informed the General Office of the Wehrmacht about it at that time.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the content of that report?
WESTHOFF: That I had again spoken with Herr Kaltenbrunner about it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Well, that alone, Witness, would certainly not be enough. In this important matter you must certainly have reported then about the business of that conference, not just about the fact?
WESTHOFF: Of course, I reported about the business; that I had brought the matter up again, and that the Gestapo took the attitude that they wanted to wait.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
DR. OTTO STAHMER: (Counsel for Defendant Goering): Witness, did you depose the statement from your own knowledge or did you learn of this fact only through Field Marshal Keitel, namely, the fact that the meeting mentioned by you between Hitler, Himmler, and Keitel regarding the escape of these 80 flyers is supposed to have taken place in the presence of Reich Marshal Goering?
WESTHOFF: I learned of it through Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
[Dr. Laternser approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, if you are going to ask questions on behalf of the High Command-is that what you wanted to do?
DR. LATERNSER: I was going to ask the witness a few questions on behalf of the OKW and the General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has given his evidence about the fact that the OKW had nothing to do with these matters in
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connection with prisoner-of-war camps and he has not been cross-examined with reference to that by the Prosecution; so that the matter is not in dispute. And therefore it appears to the Tribunal that no question need be put by you.
You better specify your question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, up to now the procedure has been that whenever a witness appeared, every Defense Counsel had the opportunity to ask this witness questions which he considered necessary. Are we now going to depart from that?
THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you to argue the matter; I asked you to specify your questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Very well.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, were you yourself active in the Eastern campaign?
DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?
WESTHOFF: First of all in command of a battalion and then a regiment.
DR. LATERNSER: In what sector was your unit engaged?
WESTHOFF: To begin with, in the Ukraine; later before Leningrad, and then at StarayaRussa.
DR. LATERNSER: Before the beginning of the Eastern campaign did you give special instructions to your company commanders?
WESTHOFF: In what respect?
DR. LATERNSER: After you had received the order to attack, I assume you must have gathered your company commanders together as battalion commander and discussed some orders with them before the beginning of the campaign.
WESTHOFF: I told them how they had to conduct themselves during the battle, how they had to behave' toward the Russian population, and how they had to act toward the prisoners of war.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, and what kind of instructions did you give your company commanders?
WESTHOFF: I very briefly gave the company commanders instructions that every prisoner of war was to be treated as he would like to be treated himself were he to become a prisoner.
DR. LATERNSER: You said that specifically?
WESTHOFF: Yes, that was ordered.
DR. LATERNSER: How did the troops behave when they marched in?
10 April 46
WESTHOFF: We fought practically all the way to Kiev, and were marching, and had hardly any contact with the civilian population.
DR. LATERNSER: During the advance into Russia did you notice considerable destruction?
WESTHOFF: Partly, yes; in part, villages had been destroyed. Also small towns had been destroyed.
DR. LATERNSER: Railways?
WESTHOFF: Railways also, yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Industrial works?
WESTHOFF: Yes-I saw that afterwards outside of Leningrad- yes indeed!
DR. LATERNSER: In your sector was the order carried out by which Soviet Russian commissars were to be shot after being taken prisoners?
WESTHOFF: We had nothing to do with that. Prisoners of war that we took were all sent back to the division right away. We ourselves, the troop commanders-regimental and battalion commanders-had nothing to do with it, had even no opportunity at all to do this.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you have not answered my question correctly. I have asked you whether you had applied the order.
WESTHOFF: I know nothing about it.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you ever receive the order to take action against the Jewish population in Russia?
DR. LATERNSER: Did your troops illtreat or shoot civilian persons or prisoners?
WESTHOFF: No! There was a special order for the maintenance of discipline, stating that this was not to be permitted.
DR. LATERNSER: Was plundering allowed?
WESTHOFF: No, this was strictly forbidden.
DR. LATERNSER: Did any plundering occur?
WESTHOFF: Not by my troops.
DR. LATERNSER: Did members of your unit commit rape?
WESTHOFF: No; in no case known to me.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the civilian population compelled to clear the houses for complete occupation by the troops?
WESTHOFF: No. There was merely an order saying that those houses in which the offices were set up had to be cleared. Other
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houses did not have to be evacuated, and as a rule the system was that I, for example, whenever I was billeted, would always sleep in the same room with the people who lived there.
DR. LATERNSER: Have you experienced destruction which was not due to military necessity?
DR. LATERNSER: Have you on occasion or frequently fed the hungry civilian population from the field kitchens?
WESTHOFF: The regiment was ordered that all food which was surplus in the regiment was to be issued to the population mostly at midday or in the evening, so far as we had any contact at all with the population.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And then one last question: Do you consider it possible that German soldiers invited Russian children for coffee, and then killed these children by giving them poisoned cake?
DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: You aren't suggesting, are you, that this witness is one for the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: No, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting that you ought to be entitled to examine every witness who has any military rank on behalf of the High Command.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as far as I understood it, it has been the rule up to now, and the procedure has been, that every means of evidence-thus also witnesses who are brought in here- could be examined by everyone of Defense Counsel; and I have adhered to that rule up to now, and also felt that it was my duty to put those questions which I have put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I asked you very simply: Are you suggesting that you are entitled to ask questions on behalf of the High Command of every person who is called here who has any military rank?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it seems to me that would be highly cumulative. We shall then have evidence on behalf of the High Command from possibly 30 or 40 witnesses. And when you say that it has been allowed in the past, every other member of the Defense has been confined to evidence, so far as possible, which is not cumulative. That is the reason why I interrupted you, because it seems
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to me if you are going to do that, to claim the right to ask questions of everybody who has military rank-and you have done it up to now-the evidence is going to be extremely cumulative on your part.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President. . .
THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Laternser, the questions you have been putting to this witness are questions directed to show that the regimental officers and soldiers in the German Army behaved properly and could not be expected to behave improperly. That does not seem to be really relevant to the questions to whether the High Command is a criminal organization or not. And in any event it is-in my opinion, at any rate-cumulative if you do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, already so much heavily incriminating material regarding the Wehrmacht has been presented, especially by the Russian Prosecution, that the Russian Prosecution are definitely of the opinion that relevant orders were issued from above, that is to say, issued by the people comprising the circle of the General Staff and the OKW. By questioning this witness, who was a regimental commander, I wanted to establish whether any effects extended downwards. This statement has confirmed me in the fact that this is not the case. Otherwise, I must. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Anyhow, Dr. Laternser, we have your position now, and the Tribunal will consider how far you may be allowed to proceed in future.
DR. LATERNSER: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Colonel Pokrovsky.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me, Witness, that on 28 December 1945 you were interrogated by a representative of the Soviet Prosecution; is that not so?
WESTHOFF: Yes, sir.
COL. POKROVSKY: You gave correct and accurate testimony, did you not? ,
COL. POKROVSKY: Would you please confirm some of your answers to the questions that you were asked then? I will help you to recollect the questions that were put to you.
COL. POKROVSKY: In your section there were, as you stated, six different subdivisions or departments?
COL. POKROVSKY: You said that the first subdivision of the section-that is, I mean the section (Allgemeine Abteilung) which
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you headed from 1 March 1943 up to 31 March 1944-was dealing with prisoners of war. Is that correct?
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, the first subdivision of this section was concerned in general with the treatment of prisoners of war and, in particular with the questions of punishments and legal proceedings. This subdivision got the reports on the moods and reactions and was in constant touch with the Abteilung Abwehr (counterintelligence section). Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: With the Abwehr, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, in connection with the reply which you gave to that question, I would like you to state to the Tribunal right now, just how much or what did you know about the way the Soviet prisoners of war were treated, both in concentration camps and during transference from one camp to another.
WESTHOFF: As far as I know, until 1942, the Russian prisoners of war were treated on the basis of purely political considerations. After 1942 this was changed, and in 1943, as long as I was in the German High Command, prisoners of war were treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention, that is to say, in all points their treatment was adapted to that of the other prisoners of war. Their rations were the same as those of the others, and their employment and their treatment was in every detail in accordance with the treatment given prisoners of war of other powers, with certain exceptions.
COL. POKROVSKY: If I am not mistaken, the fourth subdivision of your department was especially concerned with the questions of feeding and clothing the prisoners of war. Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: The task of Group IV was matters of administration. It had to elaborate the instructions regarding rations, along with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. It also had to deal with clothing.
COL. POKROVSKY: If I understand you correctly you have stated that until you took charge of the Prisoner of War Department the information which you received about the Soviet prisoners of war was to the effect that the Soviet prisoners of war were not treated according to international law. Is that correct?
WESTHOFF: No, I said that prisoners of war during the first years were treated on the basis of political considerations, which originated not from the OKW but from Hitler personally.
COL. POKROVSKY: Just what do you want to say about that?
WESTHOFF: I want to say that they were not treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention until 1942.
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COL. POKROVSKY: In other words, not according to international law, right?
WESTHOFF: I cannot give you any more detailed information on that, since at that time I was still serving at the front and did not know details regarding these regulations.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Tell me, was there in the OKW a special group or section which dealt exclusively with railway transportation of prisoners of war?
WESTHOFF: The OKW had attached to me a group which brought about the transport of prisoners of war. The transport itself was not a matter for the OKW but a matter for the individual camp commanders.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you aware under what conditions the transport of the prisoners of war from one camp to another took place?
WESTHOFF: Transports of prisoners of war were ordered by the OKW. The execution of such transports of prisoners of war was a matter for the individual camp commandants who received their orders in this respect from the commanders of prisoners of war in the military administrative districts. The OKW had nothing to do with the actual transport.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question I asked is whether you are aware or were informed under what conditions the transport from one point to another took place. Do you know that thousands of prisoners died en route from cold and hunger? Do you know anything about it at all?
WESTHOFF: The transports, during which prisoners of war died, can at most be traced back to the earlier years when I was not yet in the High Command. As long as I was there, I had no reports on a large scale saying that people lost their lives in large numbers. The orders which the OKW gave regarding transports of prisoners of war were clear-cut and so given that the commanders of the camps concerned were responsible for these transports being carried out in an orderly manner.
COL. POKROVSKY You have just confirmed that you were aware of the fact that en route prisoners of war died by thousands. Now I would like you to look at a document, Document Number 1201-PS, Exhibit Number USSR-292. It consists, Your Honors, of the minutes of the meeting of the war economy administration of the OKW. It has not been submitted to the Tribunal so far. It is dated 1000 hours, 19 February 1942. The minutes were taken of the meeting which took place at the Reich Chamber of Commerce. The report by Ministerial Director Dr. Mansfeld of the office of the
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Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was heard. The three lines which particularly interest me are underlined with red pencil on the copy that is before you right now. Look at it, Witness. It states there:
"The utilization of these Russians is exclusively a question of transportation. It is senseless to transport this manpower in open or unheated closed boxcars and then to unload corpses at the place of destination." Have you found this place?
COL. POKROVSKY: Have you heard anything about transports of this kind, wherein, in place of a train of living persons, corpses were unloaded? Have you heard anything about that before you took charge of your particular job in the OKW? Has anyone reported to you about these things?
WESTHOFF: I have heard nothing about these transports, as that did not come under the jurisdiction of the OKW, but came, as is clear from this document, within the sphere of the operational sectors. The jurisdiction of the OKW comprised mainly the German Reich and the border states, and only here did the OKW have authority over the prisoners of war-not in the operational sector, not in the rear army area. To this extent, it is a matter which did not come to the OKW at all. We received the prisoners of war from the Army, and then we were informed that we would receive so-and-so many prisoners of war, and we took them into our camps. What happened to those people in the operational territory was something we could not control in detail.
Apart from that, this story also goes back to 1942-the time when I was still at the front.
COL. POKROVSKY: Look at the left side of the document at the top. There is a note there that this comes from the War Economy and Armament Office of the OKW does it not? Left, at the top, under the number K 32/510.
WESTHOFF: My office never had anything at all to do with the Armament Office.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Does it not seem to you that this document confirms the fact that the OKW knew about these transports?
No more questions, Mr. President, to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, as this document has not been put in before, and as it does not appear whether it has been translated, should you not read the first paragraph of it? It seems to contain material evidence.
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COL. POKROVSKY: I will read it now. The first paragraph of the document, the way it appears in the Russian translation, reads like this:
"File note. Subject: Report of the Ministerial Director, Dr. Mansfeld, of the Office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, on General Questions Regarding the Allocation of Labor.
"Time: 19 February 1942. 1000 hours; place: Reich Chamber of Economy; present: Dr. Grotius, Wi Ru Amt KVR.
"The present difficulties in the question of the utilization of manpower would not have arisen had we decided in time to utilize the Russian prisoners of war on a larger scale."
This is the first paragraph, Mr. President. Further down there are three lines which interest me in this document:
"There were 3,900,000 Russians at our disposal, of which at present there are only 1,100,000 left. From November 1941 to January 1942 alone 500,000 Russians died."
Have I read sufficiently, Mr. President? It seems to me that that is clear, and further reading of the document is superfluous.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
COL. POKROVSKY: "It will hardly be possible to increase the number of the Russian prisoners of war employed at present (400,000). If the typhus cases do decrease there may be a possibility of employing from 100,000 to 150,000 more for the economy. In contrast with that, the employment of Russian civilians is constantly gaining greater importance. There are, all together, between 600,000 and 650,000 Russian civilians available, among whom 300,000 are skilled industrial workers and from 300,000 to 350,000 agricultural workers. The utilization of these Russians is exclusively a question of transportation. It is senseless to transport.... "-and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what you read before.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is right. I would like to direct your attention once more to the fact that there is a stamp on the document, "The War Economy and Armament Of lice of the OKW.... "- left corner, at the top.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, that does not appear in our translation, but I guess you are right. At least, I don't see it. Could you let us see your document?
COL. POKROVSKY: The original will be shown to you immediately. The stamp is at the top, in the left corner.
THE PRESIDENT: These letters and numbers indicate OKW although they don't say it?
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COL. POKROVSKY: That is right.
THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say that? I mean, the actual letters which are there look to me like Ru III Z St AZ i K 32i510 Wi Ru Amt/Ru III Z St.
COL. POKROVSKY: When you decipher these abbreviations, which has already been done by our American colleagues, then those letters and figures can be understood as corresponding with the facts regarding the structure of the OKW which are at the disposal of the American Prosecution. These are customary abbreviations for the departments and offices.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to ask the witness whether he knows anything about the employment of the man mentioned a little way further down at the right, Dr. Grotius.
I will ask him.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, do you know who Dr. Grotius was and whether he was employed in the OKW or in the Army?
WESTHOFF: No, I have never heard the name "Dr. Grotius"; I also never had anything to do with him.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the document before you?
WESTHOFF: No, I have not got it any longer.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Just look at it and see whether the letters which are put in the front of Dr. Grotius' name indicate that he was a member of the OKW?
COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I did not put the question concerning Dr. Grotius since the witness, as he has already told me, entered the Army administration later, in 1943, whereas the document is dated 20 February 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: [To the witness.] Do those letters in front of Dr. Grotius' name indicate that he divas in the OKW? '
WESTHOFF: I do not know what the letters are supposed to mean; the OKW has also nothing at all to do with this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know what the letters on the top left hand side of the document mean-the ones I read out just now to you?
WESTHOFF: Ru III?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
WESTHOFF: That is probably the Armament Office III. That is what it probably means.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that would be in connection with the OKW, would it not?
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WESTHOFF: I am not informed about that since I have never had anything to do with the armament departments. The High Command of the Army, at least my office, had written communications only with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor and the Speer Ministry. Just how it was organized in detail is unknown to me.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you know of, or did you know, Dr. Mansfeld?
WESTHOFF: I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you know Dr. Mansfeld?
WESTHOFF: No, I did not know him, and I have never heard his name.
COL. POKROVSKY: The question about Dr. Mansfeld could be asked probably of the Defendant Sauckel.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, technically speaking, the Tribunal can't accept from you that these letters at the top mean the OKW. It may be perfectly true, but you can't give evidence about it. So you can prove it some other way perhaps.
COL. POKROVSKY: The scheme of the OKW has already been reported to the Tribunal. Those persons who deciphered these abbreviations are sufficiently competent in this matter, and it seems to me that the witness' affirmation in the court fully proves that the document in question concerns Section III of the OKW. But, generally speaking, it would, of course, be quite easy to prove by comparing it with the scheme of the OKW. We will do it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
The Tribunal will adjourn now, and they will want the other witness, Wielen, here at 2 o'clock.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE My Lord, I do not know if Your Lordship wanted the words for which these short collections of letters stand. I have them if Your Lordship wants them-on the last document, 1201-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, thank you very much; yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think all that Your Lordship need look at is where the name Dr. Grotius appears.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Wi. Ru Amt is the Wirtschaftsrustungsamt, the Economic and Armament Office, which is, Your Lordship will remember, General Thomas' department of the OKW.
My Lord, the other letters "KVR" are Kriegsverwaltungsrat, War Administration Counsellor.
My Lord, I do not think there could be any dispute that the document comes from General Thomas' department of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I say something in regard to this document. I want only to point out certain considerations. It must be ascertained from where the heading comes, that is, the first line. The second line, which Sir David lust referred to, begins with the letters "AZ." AZ (Aktenzeichen) means "file number," in other words, a reference to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office. It does not explain however, the author of this document, which can only be ascertained when we find out what the heading, or the first line, means.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you understand it?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I understand it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. LATERNSER: The author of this writing can be ascertained only if we find out what the first line means; because the second line is only the document file number, which is to be seen from the first two letters, "AZ," which means Aktenzeichen; and in this letter, reference seems to be made to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office.
That is all I have to say in regard to this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if Your Lordship wants any further information. It seems to me quite clear. That is, it is from the file of the department I mentioned, the Wirtschaftsrustungsamt.
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THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You mean it goes back to the same letters.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The same letters, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It has just been explained to me that what Dr. Laternser was saying is that the letters "AZ i. K. 32/510" only mean that it is from the file of that department.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. Then, to find the office whose file it is, you get Wi. Ru again, which is the Wirtschaftsrustungsamt, which is the Economic and Armament Office, and it is the Armament Department, Number III.
Am; PRESIDENT: Yes.
Sir David, the Tribunal thought that the best way would be to put this witness in the box and then to leave him to Counsel for the Prosecution and the Defense.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, my friend, Mr. Roberts, is going to deal with this witness, and, My Lord, he has selected the passages quite shortly from the statements which will be read.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness Wielen took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you stand up please?
MAX WIELEN (Witness): Yes, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?
WIELEN: Max Wielen.
IBM; PRESIDENT: Your full name?
WIELEN: Max Wielen.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): Max Wielen, you made two statements in London through Colonel Hinchley Cook.
MR. ROBERTS: And are these photostats of the two statements- the first one dated 26 August 1945, and the second dated 6 September 1945?
[The documents were submitted to the witness.]
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Are those the photographs of your true statements? Do you identify them? Do you see your signature at the end of each?
MR. ROBERTS: And in those two statements did you tell the truth?
WIELEN: Yes, I told the truth.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, perhaps I should now read some passages so that they may go into the record.
[Turning to the witness,] If you take the first statement first-the statement begins with your name and the positions which you held in the SS and in the Criminal Police. That is right, is it not?
MR. ROBERTS: And now, will you just follow the beginning of this statement.
WIELEN: Of which declaration, 6 September?
MR. ROBERTS: I said the first one.
WIELEN: The first one? I see.
MR. ROBERTS: Just follow it while I read. I will read the whole of the first page:
`'Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer . . ."
WIELEN: Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat of the Criminal Police, not of the SS . . .
MR. ROBERTS: I do not want you to read it, just listen to me.
. . formerly officer in charge of the Criminal Police at Breslau.
'`I have to state in answer to the question, whether I know anything about the shooting of English prisoners of war, Air Force officers of the prison camp at Sagan, that I have knowledge of this matter and wish to make the following statement without reserve.
"The shooting took place on the express personal orders of the former Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, and was carried out by the officials of the Geheime Staatspolizei.
"The officer in charge of the Staatspolizeileitstelle at Breslau was Oberregierungsrat, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Scharpwinkel. His immediate superiors were the Chief of the Sipo, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, and the Chief of Amt IV of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, SS Gruppenfuehrer Muller. I am unable to give the names of the officers in
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charge of other districts of the Geheime Staatspolizei who carried out shootings in their districts.
"I insert here a small chart showing the organization of the Sicherheitspolizei...."
I now go to the bottom of Page 3 in the English copy, and it is at the bottom of Page 3 in the copy in German, which the witness has in his hands:
"During the course of time"-and this is talking about Stalag Luft III_c99 escape tunnels had been dug. All of them had been discovered by the military. The hundredth tunnel, dug in March 1944, proved successful to the extent that 80 officers were able to escape.
"On receipt of a telephone message from the camp headquarters to the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle, I gave the order for 'Kriegsfahndung,' in accordance with the emergency instructions laid down. At Dr. Absalon's suggestion, and having regard for the time lag, 'Grossfahndung' was ordered. Moreover, the officer in charge of the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt had to be informed, who approved and confirmed the order for 'Grossalarm.'
'Gradually the search, which was carried out in all parts of Germany led to the rearrest of practically all the escaped English officer prisoners, with the exception of three, I believe. Most of them were recaptured while still in Silesia. A few had got as far as Kiel, Strasbourg, and the Allgau.
`'It was then that one day at noon I received a telegraphic instruction from General Nebe to proceed at once to Berlin to be informed of a secret order. When I arrived in Berlin that evening, I saw General Nebe in his office Am Werdierschen Markt 5/7. I gave him a short, concise report on the whole matter as it stood at the time. He then showed me a teleprint order signed by Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in which was stated that, on the express personal orders of the Fuehrer, over half of the officers escaped from Sagan were to be shot after their recapture. The of ricers in charge of Department IV, Gruppenfuehrer Muller, had received corresponding orders and would give instructions to the Staatspolizei. Military offices had been informed.
"General Nebe himself appeared shocked at this order. He was very distressed. I was afterwards told that for nights on end he had not gone to bed but had passed the night on his office settee.
"I, too, was appalled at the horrible step to be taken and opposed its execution. I said that it was against the laws of war; and that it was bound to lead to reprisals against our
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own officers who were prisoners of war in English camps, and that I absolutely refused to take any responsibility. General Nebe replied that in this particular case I had indeed no responsibility whatever, because the Staatspolizei would act completely independently, and that, after all the Fuehrer's orders had to be carried out without demur. I want to point out that when I first refused I acted on impulse and feeling, well knowing that I could not hope to prevail in view of the conditions that had recently arisen within the Sicherheitspolizei.
Nebe then added that I, on my part, was, of course, under an obligation to preserve absolute secrecy, and that I had been shown the original order so that I should not make any difficulties vis-a-vis the Staatspolizei. My own duties as regards the transport of some of the prisoners would be transferred to the Staatspolizei.
"In this connection I want to explain that until then the bringing back of prisoners to the camp had been the responsibility of the Kriminalpolizei; either they had to take them back to the camp themselves, or they had to hold them until they were fetched by the camp staff. In answer to a question, I declare that Oberregierungsrat Dr. Schulze was present at the discussion with General Nebe. He nodded his head in agreement when I raised my objection, but otherwise took no part in it.
"On my return to Breslau, I learned from Dr. Scharpwinkel that the Geheime Staatspolizei had been duly informed by Gruppenfuehrer Muller. I was not apprised of the actual instructions. I also do not know whether a similar order was issued to every officer in charge of the Staatspolizeileitstellen, or whether orders were only given to those in whose areas arrests had been made and executions were to be carried out. "According to instructions the police in the districts where arrests had been made had to inform the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt (Kriegsfahndungszentrale) by telegram or telephone that officer prisoners of war had been taken into custody. The Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau was also to be informed.
"How the shooting was carried out, I do not know; but I presume that after the Staatspolizei had collected the officers concerned from the prisons, they were shot in some remote spot-forests, et cetera-with pistols, service pistols of the Stapo.
"In answer to the question whether the officers were possibly beaten to death, I state that I do not believe this, because the Fuehrer's order specifically mentioned 'shooting.'
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"The Staatspolizei had, in accordance with instructions received from RSHA, Department IV, described the shooting as if it had occurred in transit for the purpose of self-defense or to prevent reescape. This I afterwards learned from Dr. Scharpwinkel.
"Later the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau received a letter from the RSHA, Department V, which had to be communicated to the camp commandant with the request that its text should be made known to the English officer prisoners of war in order to frighten them. The letter explained that the shooting had occurred for the abovementioned reason. The text of the letter was communicated to Oberst Lindeiner or one of the camp staff officers.
"As regards the selection of the officers to be shot, a list had been prepared by the camp authorities, at the request of Department V, in which those officers who were regarded as disturbing elements-plotters and escape leaders-had been specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the commandant or by one of his of ricers. Thereupon the shooting of officers mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department IV and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei of the district concerned."
I omit the next paragraph, and I go to the bottom of the English copy, Page 4; at the bottom of the witness' copy, Page 7. Witness, would you turn to Page 7, please. You will find the passage marked in pencil at the bottom of Page 7. Have you got the page? I carefully numbered the pages.
WIELEN: There is nothing marked in this.
MR. ROBERTS: I know, but if you turn over the page you will get something which is marked.
WIELEN: Nothing is marked on Page 7, but on Page 8 . . .
MR. ROBERTS: You will find something marked at the very bottom of Page 7. At any rate, just follow these words-follow these words, will you:
"To revert to the shooting. . . "
WIELEN: Yes, I have found it now.
MR. ROBERTS: " . . . approximately 40 English officers who had not been arrested by the Staatspolizei but by the Kriminalpolizei had meanwhile been taken back to camp."
When you said that-you just answer this question, Witness; you said approximately 40 officers-you didn't know the actual numbers, did you?
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WIELEN: The number is not correct. It was not 40. I did not know at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: That's right, because it isn't the correct number. I think, 50.
WIELEN: I made a mistake at that time.
MR. ROBERTS: That's right.
"They had come to no harm whatsoever; I must assume that . . ."
WIELEN: Fifteen additional were brought back.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, yes. I just want you now to listen to it, if you will be kind enough:
". .. I must assume that their treatment was perfectly correct. It had been impossible to avoid putting them into police prisons due to the general conditions then prevailing.
"I do not know who interrogated the officers in the police prisons. I assume this was done by the local police authorities, as an interrogation must necessarily follow every notification of arrest. I do not know the names of the officials of the Staatspolizei or the Gemeindepolizei (small local police force) who cooperated in this matter, but Dr. Absalon should be able to supply the answer to this question."
I go on to the paragraph beginning, "The urns. . . " if Your Lordship please:
"The urns containing the ashes of the officers who had been shot were transmitted by the Staatspolizei to the Kriminalpolizei. Which crematoria had been used by the Staatspolizei, I am unable to say. The urns were handed over to the camp commandant by order of the RSHA for a military funeral. By this means the return of the urns through the Kripo-the fact that the Staatspolizei was connected with the matter was to be camouflaged."
Then I miss the next paragraph. Then I read one sentence, the next line:
"I do not know why five officers were interrogated in Berlin."
And then, My Lord, I turn to Page 6.
And, Witness, would you go to the bottom of your Page 10-the bottom of your Page 10-you just turn over the page in the ordinary way. My Lord, I take the middle paragraph. Just two paragraphs out of Page 6:
"In a general way it may be of interest that, even before my departure for Berlin, Kriminalkommissar Dr. Absalon had told me that he had heard in Camp Sagan-he was told this in
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a very secretive way-that shootings were to take place in order to deter the of ricers. From this may be deduced the fact that the camp had already been informed through military channels of the order to shoot issued by Dr. Kaltenbrunner.
"It would be useful to ascertain what Goering knows about the whole affair, because the Fuehrer must surely have informed him of the order, since it concerned a camp of the Luftwaffe." (Document Number UK-48.)
My Lord, that is all of that statement that I think I need to read. My Lord, I am anxious to avoid reading as much of the second statement as I possibly can, because there is a good deal of repetition.
Will you take the second statement now, Witness? That one, I am afraid, has not been marked.
The third paragraph, My Lord, the third and fourth paragraphs on the first page of the statement:
"As to when the Staatspolizei had begun with the shootings, I am not in a position to say; but I imagine it happened when only very few prisoners were still at large and their recapture could no longer be reckoned with.
"As regards the lapse of time between the order for 'Grossfahndung' and being shown the order for the shootings, this could only have been a matter of a few days. I can no longer recall exact dates. I do know however, for certain, that no shootings had taken place anywhere at the time when the order was shown to me."
Then, perhaps, I could read the last paragraph but one on that page:
"Before the last mass escape had taken place, I had heard nothing about the prospect of more drastic measures to be taken against the prisoners. I heard of it only after the final escape, but before I had been shown in Berlin the order for the shootings. It was then that Dr. Absalon had told me that he had heard in Sagan Camp-from whom I do not know, although I believe it was from Colonel Lindeiner-that in future shootings would take place. When this particular order was shown to me in Berlin, it appeared to me to be merely a proof that the military were behind this brutal measure or at least had had knowledge of it before the RSHA.
"As regards the expression 'more than half' in the order of Kaltenbrunner, this is how the wording is now fixed in my mind. It is, however, quite possible that a specific number was given, and that I, in quickly glancing through the order, interpreted it thus in my mind, 'but that is more than half,' and this is what has now stuck in my memory."
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My Lord, perhaps I might read-omitting the first several paragraphs which are really repetitions-a paragraph just a little more than halfway down the page. It begins:
"I do not know how the Geheime Staatspolizei took over from the local police prisons those officers who were to be shot. It is, however, possible that the Stapo got into touch with the local of flees of the Kriminalpolizei.
"In Lower Silesia, the firing squads were detailed by the officer in charge of the Staatspolizei, Dr. Scharpwinkel, or by his orders. I never heard who belonged to these squads."
Then the last paragraph on that page:
"I declare, in answer to the question as to why the Kripo did not carry out the shootings, that in the execution of its duties the Kriminalpolizei feel themselves bound by the provisions of the Stoatsprozessordnung and the Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, and that their personnel were trained in accordance with these standards. On the other hand, during the war, the Staatspolizei had, incised by Himmler, become less scrupulous. They carried out executions on the orders of the RSHA, or with the approval of that department, whenever required. That is the reason why the German citizens' general detestation of the Staatspolizei did not extend to the Kriminalpolizei.
"The urns were obviously returned to the Kriminalpolizei for the sole reason that the intervention of the Staatspolizei should not become publicly known; that is, the English officers in the camp should not become aware of it."
My Lord, I think that is all I need read.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions of the witness?
DR. NELTE: Witness, during your activities and during this terrible matter, were you in touch with the OKW or the defendant, Field Marshal Keitel, in any way?
WIELEN: No, neither with the OKW nor with Field Marshal Keitel, nor with any of the other high officers.
DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly when you stated that the order that we are talking about here, so far as you know, went through the following channels: From Hitler to Himmler, to the Reich Security Main Office, and then the other offices?
WIELEN: Yes, that is the correct organizational path.
DR. NELTE: By whom was the list of which you spoke demanded, the list that was to contain the names of those who were the disturbing element?
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WIELEN: That was asked for by the Reich Security Main Office.
DR. NELTE: In the second half of what was read just now, a sentence is contained that reads: "The camp commander must have been informed through military officers of the intended shooting ahead of time."
Would you, with regard to this sentence. . .
WIELEN: Well, I should not like to repeat that here so strongly. It is possible, since shootings might have been discussed in the camp, or the fact that more ready use of firearms in general would be taken towards English officers if escapes continued; but in this connection I know nothing more specific, namely, in the connection in which this remark was made.
DR. NELTE: Then you do not want to insist on the fact that we are here dealing with remarks that were made before the escape?
WIELEN: Well, at least not so far as these shootings are concerned; at least not in direct relationship to this particular escape.
DR. NELTE: But it is not possible to know ahead of time if someone is going to escape. For that reason I ask you whether this remark is related to some discussion that took place subsequent to the flight of these officers and which perhaps was directed toward the future prevention of escapes?
WIELEN: That is altogether possible because at Sagan attempts to escape were made daily.
DR. NELTE: Then would you like to clarify the statement, according to which Colonel Lindeiner is said to have stated that military officers stood behind these measures and had been previously informed of them? That is how...
WIELEN: I do not believe that I expressed myself just that way. Could you please repeat that?
DR. NELTE: According to my notes, you said that Colonel Lindeiner stated that military officers stood behind this measure and had been informed of it ahead of time.
WIELEN: I do not think that I could have made such a statement.
DR. NELTE: Then do you want to say that you cannot state that Colonel Lindeiner made such an assertion?
WIELEN: I never had the impression that Lindeiner was personally informed in this matter. At any rate, I have not the slightest reason to believe so.
DR. NELTE: No further questions, thank you.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, according to the minutes, you stated that the Criminal Commissioner Absalon had informed you even
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before your departure for Berlin that he had heard in Camp Sagan that shootings were to take place.
WIELEN: I just spoke in connection with this same matter, yes.
DR. STAHMER: Is that what you just . . .
WIELEN: That is the same matter.
DR. STAHMER: Another question: During the discussion that you had with General Nebe in Berlin, General Nebe said to you that the military offices were informed, and stated more precisely what military offices were concerned?
WIELEN: No, that was not told to me. Nor do I know whether this intention was at all realized, because the military offices were actually not to be informed, and this whole matter was to be regarded as secret and was to be kept secret.
DR. STAHMER: In your testimony here, you mentioned Reich Marshal Goering. Have you any documentary proof that Reich Marshal Goering knew of these shootings, or is that merely conjecture on your part?
WIELEN: No, please consider from what was said and the way it was said, that I wanted to leave that question entirely open. Therefore, I also said that I did not know it positively, and had no evidence for it; but since it concerned a Luftwaffe camp I ask or propose that the Reich Marshal be heard, since he should be able to give information about it.
DR. STAHMER: In other words, it was only a suggestion on your part to interrogate the Reich Marshal as to whether he was informed?
WIELEN: Because I had to leave this matter open, I made the suggestion only in order to proceed further in the matter at all.
DR. STAHMER: That is all.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you stated that the order had been given by Kaltenbrunner and Muller. Now I ask you, was this order in the form of a teletype or a telegraphic communication, or did you see the order with the original signature?
WIELEN: I believe I can state definitely that it was a teletype communication.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know for sure it was not an original signature?
WIELEN: It was not an original signature. In fact I felt doubts about this later. You can very well imagine that I thought about it hundreds of times, wondering whether it were not entirely possible . . .
DR. KAUFFMANN: Speak more slowly.
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WIELEN:...that it was Himmler's signature; but from the organizational point of view it would have had to be Kaltenbrunner who signed it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: So, if I understood you correctly, you can also not state definitely that the teletype really had Kaltenbrunner's signature under it, but rather you simply assume that from your knowledge of the organization.
WIELEN: I was so impressed by the contents of the communication, by the results, and by the necessity to prepare the working out of the whole affair that I paid little attention to the mechanical matters, that is, the externals involved. As a result, they did not imprint themselves on my memory in such a way that I could make a statement about them with definite reliability.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
Dr. Nelte, does that close the case for the Defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: As far as witnesses are concerned, that closes the case for Keitel. I have a few further remarks to make with regard to the presentation of evidence.
The Tribunal have approved an affidavit by Krieger by its ruling of 6 April 1946. I ask the Tribunal to permit me to put this affidavit in evidence as Document Keitel-15. I have the German original here and I should like to read only that part of the affidavit that describes the relations between Hitler and Keitel. This involves three short paragraphs:
"The relations between Hitler and former Field Marshal Keitel were officially correct and, on Hitler's part, appeared confiding as a whole, springing from appreciation of or respect for a zealous coworker. Keitel's attitude was upright and soldierly. There was, however, no further friendly or confidential note between them. Apart from official receptions, and so forth, Keitel, as far as could be ascertained, hardly took part with Hitler in informal conversations nor shared any meals with him. Also, summons to discussions with Hitler outside the official conferences, when there were no stenographers present, were not observed.
"In preparing decisions or in formulating orders, Keitel gave expression to his own opinions, even if they happened to differ, in an unbiased, clear, soldierly manner. He apparently knew exactly, from many years of collaboration with Hitler, the limits of possibility as far as influencing his opinions or decisions or changing his mind was concerned. For that reason
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he generally accepted Hitler's decisions as orders in a soldierly manner. In individual cases he tried and succeeded by
emphatic reasoning in changing decisions, or at least in delaying them in order to have them further examined.
"That Hitler, at least at times, did not trust Keitel completely I believe I can conclude from one of Hitler's remarks . . . "
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it appears to the Tribunal that it is not really necessary to read this. Keitel has already said it, it is cumulative to him, and the document itself is in evidence so we can read it ourselves.
DR. NELTE: It is not necessary, but it simply corroborates what has been testified to here. Therefore, I can. ..
THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient that you tell us that.
DR. NELTE: I have further received the answers to several interrogatories that were permitted by the Tribunal.
First, there is the answer to the interrogatory by Herr Romilly. I can put this sworn interrogatory in evidence before the Tribunal and can forego any reading of it.
The same is true of the answers teethe interrogatory submitted to the witness Rotraud Roemer as to the question of the branding of Russian prisoners of war.
The interrogatories of Professor Naville and Ambassador Scarpini are not yet at hand. I shall submit them as soon as they arrive. There remains...
THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution had these documents?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you given numbers to these? You gave Document Keitel-15 to the last affidavit. You ought to number the others.
DR. NELTE: Romilly is Document Keitel-16, and Roemer is Document Keitel-17.
I have now only the affidavit of the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg. As ruled by the Tribunal on 26 February, it was allowed that he be interrogated. I have sent the original to the Prosecution and I ask to be allowed to put in evidence the sworn answers of Von Blomberg. It is in Document Book 1 and is known both to the Tribunal and to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: That concludes my case.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you-Now, Dr. Horn, I think-Dr. Nelte, you are lodging these original documents that are numbered
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Keitel-16, 17, and la, you are lodging them with the General Secretary?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they been translated?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Nelte, we have not seen a translation of Keitel-16, but you are sure that it has been translated, are you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have seen an English translation of it.
THE PRESIDENT: You have?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was shown to me when it came in. I am quite sure I remember reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, perhaps the General Secretary's department will see that we are furnished copies of it.
Yes, I think that is the one. That is Keitel-16.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, I think Romilly is Keitel-16. I have seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Horn, do you remember that we read these documents at the time that we approved of their admissibility?
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: So perhaps it won't take you long to introduce them in evidence?
DR. HORN: I shall limit myself to a minimum, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. HORN: I should like to ask the Tribunal first to take judicial notice of Document Ribbentrop-75, contained in Volume III, on Page 191, of Ribbentrop's document book. It is a question here of an agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland of the year 1919. This agreement defines the rights of the German minority in Poland. In Article 12 of this Treaty, which is on Page 3 of this document, it is said that Poland agrees that insofar as the provisions of the above article apply to persons of racial, religious, or linguistic minorities, these provisions form the basis for obligations of international interest and are placed under the supervision of the League of Nations.
In subsequent years Poland repeatedly violated this Treaty. That can be seen from the two following documents, Document Ribbentrop-82, on Page 208 of Document Book Number 4.
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This is a legal judgment by the Permanent International Court. It is of 10 September 1923. In order to save time I might just read the conclusion, where it is said:
"The Court is of the opinion that the attitude of the Polish Government defined under Points 'a' and 'b' does not stand in accord with Poland's international obligations."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, as well as the next document, Document Ribbentrop-84, which is on Pages 212 and 212a of the Ribbentrop Document Book Number 4. This, too, is a statement on the part of a judicial committee of the League of Nations on minority questions. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this report.
Immediately after the Government had been taken over by Hitler, this Government attempted to establish a good relationship with Poland. As evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-85, which is on Page 213 of the document book. I am reading from Page 2 of that document.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is that Ribbentrop Document Book 4?
DR. HORN: It is Ribbentrop Document Book 4, Mr. President, Page 213. I am reading from Page 214, center of the last paragraph, as follows:
"He, the Chancellor, wished only that the pending political questions existing between Germany and Poland could be examined and treated without passion by the statesmen of both countries. He was convinced that some way out of the present untenable position could be found. Germany desired peace. The forceful expropriation of Polish territory was not his intention, but he was reserving for himself those rights to which he was entitled according to the pact, and he would insist upon them at any time and whenever he thought fit."
Concerning this conference, two official communiqués were issued by request of the Polish Ambassador. This is Document Ribbentrop-86, which is the German communiqué, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it and also the next document, Document Ribbentrop-87, on Page 216 of the document book, which is the Polish communiqué. So as to save time, I do not propose to read these communiqués.
On 15 July 1937 considerable parts of the German-Polish pact which was signed in Geneva in 1922, regarding Upper Silesia, expired. The necessity arose, therefore, to create a new pact between the two countries, particularly since difficulties again arose due to the question of minorities and the treatment of German minorities. As evidence for this I refer to Document Ribbentrop-117,
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on Page 257 of the document book, and I should like to read the second paragraph where it says:
"The Reich Minister also pointed out to the Polish Ambassador that the rigorous Polish point of view regarding the expulsion of those who had indicated a preference for Germany could not be accepted by us."
THE PRESIDENT: I could not see that on Page 254.
DR. HORN: Page 257, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see it.
DR. HORN: The result of those conferences between Poland and Germany is the pact which has been submitted as Document Ribbentrop-12a, on Page 263 of the document book. This is a coordinated declaration by the Polish and German Governments regarding the protection of their respective minorities, which was published on 5 November 1937. So as to save time, I can point out that the German minorities were given those rights which are usual between civilized states in similar cases. May I also point out that this agreement does not contain anything which can be considered the sanctioning of any wrong previously committed in this field, a point of view which was recently presented by the Prosecution.
So as to remove the difficulties between the Free City of Danzig and the Polish Government which had arisen with regard to minorities and economic matters, an agreement was reached on 5 August 1933, which is Document Ribbentrop-127 and found on Page 270 of the document book. May I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, too?
Since, in spite of these treaty agreements on the question of minorities and the problem of the Free City of Danzig, difficulties between the two nations continued to arise, Hitler gave the order to the Defendant Ribbentrop, after the solution of the Sudeten-German question in October 1938, to commence negotiations regarding the Danzig and Corridor questions as well as the question of minorities. For this reason the then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, was invited to come to Berchtesgaden. The discussions which took place on that occasion between Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister are contained in Document Ribbentrop-149, on Page 301 of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. May I quote from Page 2 of the document to explain what the main features of this conference were? On Page 6, it says:
"For Germany there was not only the Memel question, which would be settled in a manner consonant with German views- for it looked as if the Lithuanians would be willing to cooperate in finding a reasonable solution-but within the direct German-Polish relationship there was also the problem
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of Danzig and the Corridor to be solved, which, from the point of view of sentiment, was very serious for Germany."
On Page 3 of the same document, last line of the next to the last paragraph, it says Foreign Minister Beck promised that "he would, however, be glad to give calm consideration to the problem."
With that Germany considered that negotiations regarding this problem had begun.
On 24 January, that is to say the following day, the then Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had another discussion with the Polish Foreign Minister Beck during which the question of minorities was once more touched on. That discussion is contained in Document Ribbentrop-150, on Page 304. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
By invitation of the then Foreign Minister Beck, Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop went to Warsaw on 24 January 1939. Once more the entire problem was discussed there.
On 21 March, after the Czech question had been settled, a reorganization in the East became necessary. The then Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, therefore, asked the Polish Ambassador on 21 March 1939 to come to visit him. The account of that conference is contained in Document Ribbentrop-154, on Page 310 of the document book. May I quote the third paragraph, Page 2, which is the leading point regarding that conference:
"Generally, the decision on the Corridor was considered the heaviest burden put on Germany by the Versailles Treaty."
A few lines later the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop explained:
"A prerequisite for this was, however, that the purely German city of Danzig should return to the Reich, and that an extraterritorial motor road and railway connection be established between the Reich and East Prussia.
"He promised that Germany would in exchange guarantee the Corridor.
"Ambassador Lipski promised to inform M. Beck accordingly and then to give an answer."
May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well?
Although the German Government at that time expected that on the strength of these discussions the question of the minorities and the question of Danzig and the Corridor would find some solution, these discussions had the opposite effect.
It appears from Document Ribbentrop-155, on Page 313, and Document Ribbentrop-156, on Page 314 of the document book, that
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Poland at that time ordered partial mobilization. That partial mobilization could have been directed only against Germany.
Moreover, the settling of the Czechoslovakian question on 15 March 1939 had led to a change of attitude on the part of Britain. The then Prime Minister, Chamberlain, under pressure from the opposition, had opened consultations with various European states. As evidence of this fact, I refer to Document Ribbentrop 159, which is Page 317 of the document book. This is a conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, Von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berlin on 26 March 1939. May I quote the beginning, which is as follows:
"On 21 March the British Government proposed first in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and Moscow, that a 'formal declaration' by the British, French, Russian, and Polish Governments shall be made."
I shall then skip a few lines and quote further as follows-Line 7 from bottom:
"The Polish Government, which ordered partial mobilization on 23 March, was in no way satisfied with this British proposal for negotiations but rather demanded far more concrete commitments from England on behalf of Poland. Therefore, also on 23 March, Foreign Minister Beck instructed the Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczynski, to submit to the British Government the following proposal for an Anglo-Polish union:
"'Referring to the English proposal"'-it says further on- "'of 21 March, I request you to ask Lord Halifax if: (1) In view of the difficulties and the unavoidable complications and ensuing loss of time..,."'
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I see no reason-if I may say so with greatest respect-for reading any part of any of these documents. They are all in evidence, or will be, I assume. All that needs be done, it seems to us, is to give them numbers. I know that eve read and commented at the time we put in the Prosecution's case, but the compelling reasons for that system are not present now and cannot apply as far as these defendants are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to know what the compelling reasons were that you were referring to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I shall be glad to. At that time it was physically impossible for the Prosecution to have its material all translated in the four languages, or the three languages in addition to the one in which the original was written. Now the defendants do have those facilities. Had we been able to have our papers all translated, we would have submitted them and we would not have commented;
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but the necessity for comment seemed very real to us, because we had to read everything that we wanted into the record over the speaking system, and if we read a lot of disjointed excerpts from documents we could not have presented any reason of evidence before this Tribunal. But I say that now the Defense can do so, it can submit the whole document, and later on, as I understand the rules and the Charter, Counsel will have an opportunity to argue and comment about it as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: But you will remember that this matter was argued-I think it was a week or so ago. And if I remember rightly, Dr. Dix argued in favor of the defendants' counsel being still entitled to read such passages as they wanted, and with short connecting remarks; and we adhered to that rule.
MR. DODD: I did not understand that Your Honors had already ruled. I remember Dr. Dix's statement. One of his principal reasons was that he wanted an opportunity to make this information available to the press or the public. If that is still his reason, they are all available; the press can have them without having them read over this microphone. However, I won't press the matter if the Court has already ruled.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like to say a few words on the subject of Mr. Dodd's proposal. I fully support...
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I just pointed out to Mr. Dodd that we have made a specific ruling upon this subject, and, in the opinion of the Tribunal, Dr. Horn has been performing his task with great discretion.
GEN. RUDENKO: I still would like to be permitted to make a few remarks in regard to Mr. Dodd's proposal.
As the Tribunal will remember, just before the start of the questioning of the Defendant Keitel the Defense gave full documentation for Keitel, and the Tribunal looked into the matter of what document was to be accepted as evidence and what was to be declined. . .
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if you are repeating, you are repeating the very words I used to Dr. Horn when he began, and, as I say, in the opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has met the views of the Tribunal and has made his reading of these documents reasonably short.
GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to remark that the Soviet Prosecution consider that Dr. Horn's comments are superfluous as the defendant has already given us too many comments on the subject.
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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I am sure you will continue to use every possible means of cutting it short as much as you can.
DR. HORN: I hope, Mr. President, that I have convinced the Tribunal that I will be as brief as possible and that I shall read as little as possible, only that which is Necessary make understandable why I am presenting the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
[A recess was taken.]
DR. HORN: I had last quoted some passages from Document Ribbentrop-159, Page 317 of the document book, and I wish to briefly summarize what these documents refer to.
This document contains the request from England to the Polish Government to formulate the consultation into a concrete agreement. This agreement was then in fact made, between 21 March and 26 March, between England and Poland.
Furthermore, and as a parallel to this, there is the coalition policy on the part of England which is proved by Documents Ribbentrop-182 to 186, on Pages 370 and following of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. As is shown in Document 182, the following states were concerned. I am quoting from Document 182, at the bottom of Page 6:
"The following countries are said to have been invited to participate in the question of guarantees: Russia, Poland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. It is said to be definitely established" -it says further-"that Hungary was not approached. It was left up to Poland to approach Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The same is supposed to apply to Turkey with regard to Greece."
As evidence of this policy of coalition, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-185, Page 372 of the document book. This is a telegram from the German Charge d'Affaires in London to the Foreign Office, and I should like briefly to quote a few passages from that. They read:
"The available news proves clearly that the plan for a declaration preannounced by telegram on the part of Britain can actually be divided into two parts. The first part deals with guarantees to Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland; the second part aims to protect the Eastern countries against aggression. The British Cabinet is said to have been informed by a military spokesman that Romania, because of her oil wells, will definitely have to be protected against German military seizure."
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The same subject is dealt with in Document Ribbentrop-186. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading from it. And I also ask that Document Ribbentrop-183, which is on Page 375 of the document book, be taken judicial notice of; once more, so as to save time, I do not propose to read it.
Based on this policy of coalition on Britain's part which was directed against Germany, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy was concluded on 22 May 1939. I am submitting it as Document Ribbentrop-187, on Page 376 of the Ribbentrop document book. I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading it.
The result of the guarantee given by England to Poland was that Ambassador Lipski, on 26 March 1939, on the occasion of a conference with the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, declared -and I am here referring to Document Ribbentrop-162, and quoting from the third paragraph:
"Mr. Lipski replied that it was his unpleasant duty to point out that any further pursuance of these German plans, particularly regarding a return of Danzig to the Reich, would mean a war with Poland."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The same applies to the previous document, Document Ribbentrop-160, on Page 320 of the document book, which refers to the consultations between Britain and the governments previously mentioned.
On the strength of the declaration of Lipski which I have just read-namely, that further pursuance of an attempt to alter the status quo regarding the Corridor and Danzig would mean war-the Reich Foreign Minister declared to the Polish Ambassador on 27 March 1939-I again quote from Document Ribbentrop-163, on Page 335 of the document book-that this attitude of Poland could not be the basis for a settlement of these questions so far as Germany was concerned. The corresponding passage is the next to the last paragraph on Page 2 of this document, where it says:
"In conclusion, the Foreign Minister remarked that he no longer knew what to make of the attitude of the Polish Government. They had given a negative answer to the generous proposals which Germany had made to Poland. The Foreign Minister could not regard the proposal, submitted yesterday by the Polish Ambassador, as a basis for the settlement of the problems. The relations between the two countries were, therefore, more and more strained."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
So as to prove that the Anglo-Polish Pact for Mutual Assistance was clearly aimed against Germany, I submit to the Tribunal as
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evidence Document Ribbentrop-164, which is on Page 338 of the document book. I quote the last two lines, where it says:
". .. that the pact applied only in the case of an attack by Germany. The Polish Government affirms that this is so."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document.
The result of the Anglo-Polish agreement of 6 April 1939, which has been submitted by the Prosecution as Document Number TC-72, and which appears on Page 337 of my document book, was the termination of the Polish-German agreement of 26 January 1934, since Germany was convinced that the Anglo-Polish guarantee declaration was contrary to the spirit of this agreement.
Subsequently there were a number of excesses against the German minorities in Poland. The documents referring to this are contained in my document book under Documents Ribbentrop-165 to 181. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these numbers, and to save time I shall limit myself to very short quotations.
I refer to Document Ribbentrop-166, which states that serious incidents occurred in Pommerellen, Njevo, and Bromberg.
I also refer to Document Ribbentrop-167, on Page 353 of the document book. This document shows that in the last days there was a public declaration in Warsaw which openly appealed for a boycott of German trade and handicraft.
Furthermore, as evidence for my statement, may I refer to Document Ribbentrop-180, which is on Page 368 of the Ribbentrop document book. May I read this brief report, which I quote as follows:
"During the last few months the German Foreign Office has continuously received reports from the German Consulate in Poland about the cruel treatment to which racial Germans are subjected by the Poles, who have been more and more stirred up and have abandoned themselves to unbridled fanaticism. In Appendix 38 especially grave cases have been collected."
From Document Ribbentrop-181, on Page 369 of the document book, it appears that these clashes, as a matter of fact, took place with the knowledge and under the protection of Polish statesmen and high officials. As evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-181, but for reasons of time I am not going to read from it, but ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
At the beginning of August 1939 an acute crisis developed in German-Polish relations. As evidence of this I present Document Ribbentrop-188, on Page 381 of my document book. The cause was actually a small one. There was dispute regarding the functions of the customs officials on the Danzig frontier. Because of this dispute,
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the diplomatic representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig made a protest to the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig. This protest is contained in Document Ribbentrop-188. It contained an ultimatum, which becomes clear from Paragraph 3 of the document.
On 7 August the then President of the Free City of Danzig replied to him as appears in Document Ribbentrop-189. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also.
In Document Ribbentrop-190, on Page 383, the Reich Government warns Poland not to deliver any ultimatum. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, and I do not propose to read from it.
The next document I am presenting is Document Ribbentrop-192, which is on Page 385 of the document book. This is a document from the Under State Secretary at the Polish Foreign Ministry to the German Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw, and it is dated 10 August 1939. It appears from the last two lines of the document that Poland would consider any intervention of the Reich Government to the detriment of Danzig's rights an aggressive act.
These notes created an even more critical situation in German-Polish relations. The Reich Government and their departments attempted, in the time that followed, to avoid a threatening conflict. As evidence of this I submit Document Ribbentrop-193, which is on Page 404 of the document book; and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
This is a memorandum of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office regarding-it is in Ribbentrop Document Book 6, Page 404- this is a memorandum regarding a visit of the French Ambassador to the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, Weizsacker. During that conversation the then State Secretary, Weizsacker, emphasized that Germany had no more urgent wish than German-Polish agreement regarding Danzig. The French Ambassador assured him that his Government would cooperate in these attempts.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, Document Ribbentrop-193, and the next document, Number 194, on Page 406 of the document book.
The last document concerns the discussion between the State Secretary and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, during which the German State Secretary pointed out the seriousness of the situation.
I read from Page 1 of the document, the third paragraph, fifth line, the following sentence which characterizes the situation:
"Danzig was only protecting itself against its protector."
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Apart from that, the State Secretary pointed out that the situation regarding Danzig had now reached extreme tension.
The next document I refer to is Document Ribbentrop-195, on Pages 408 to 415 of the document book. This document refers to a conference between Hitler and Ambassador Henderson on 23 August 1939. This conference is contained in Document Ribbentrop-199, on Page 422 of the Ribbentrop document book. I also ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, and, so as to clarify the content of that conference briefly, I am going to refer to Page 4 of the document, where it says:
"He once more drew attention to the Danzig and Polish question in connection with which England's attitude was, 'Better war than something to Germany's advantage."'
The second paragraph after that reads:
"The Fuehrer stated that the fact that England opposed Germany in the Danzig question had deeply shaken the German people.
"Henderson then stated that one was merely opposing the principle of force, whereupon the Fuehrer wanted to know whether England had ever found a solution by negotiation for any of the idiocies of Versailles.
"The Ambassador had no reply to this, and the Fuehrer then stated that, according to a German saying, It took two to make a friendship."
Because of the tense relations the late Prime Minister Chamberlain, on 22 August 1939, wrote a letter directly to Hitler. This letter is Document Ribbentrop-200, on Page 426 of the document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also.
The next document is Document Ribbentrop-201, and it contains Hitler's reply to the British Prime Minister Chamberlain.
On 25 August 1939 there was yet another meeting between Hitler and Ambassador Sir Revile Henderson. That meeting is contained in Document Ribbentrop-202, which is on Page 431 of the Ribbentrop document book. May I refer to Paragraph 5, where Hitler emphasized once more that, "The problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved." On the following page, in Paragraph 3 on Page 2, Hitler says:
"But after the solution of this problem he is prepared and determined to approach England with a major, all-inclusive proposal."
This offer is contained in detail in the same Document Number 202. Henderson made an entry regarding this discussion in his diary, which is Exhibit Ribbentrop-195, and on Page 415 he refers to this last-mentioned meeting of 25 August 1939:
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"My interview with Hitler"-says Henderson-"at which Herr Von Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt were also present, lasted over an hour on this occasion. The Chancellor spoke with calm and apparent sincerity. He described his proposals as a last effort for conscience's sake to secure good relations with Great Britain and suggested that I should fly to London myself with them."
Under Number 8, on the same page, 415, Henderson continues to say:
"Whatever may have been the underlying motive of this final gesture on the part of the Chancellor, it was one which could not be ignored..."
The next document, which gives in detail the course of events and the crisis which led up to the outbreak of war, is Document Ribbentrop-208, on Page 451 of the document book. To the extent that I do not read from it, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the entire document.
The first extract from this document, which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw, states the following, and I quote:
"Our proposed reply to Herr Hitler draws a clear distinction between the method of reaching agreement on German-Polish differences and the nature of the solution to be arrived at. As to the method, we wish to express our clear view that direct discussion on equal terms between the parties is the proper means."
This request for direct negotiations is an essential part of the events which followed.
Under Number 5 of the same document, on Page 452 of the document book, it states as follows:
"As the Polish Government appear in their reply to President Roosevelt to accept the idea of direct negotiations, His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that, in the light of the considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraph, the Polish Government will authorize them to inform the German Government that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussions with Germany."
In the following document, which has the same number and is on the same page, is a telegram from Sir Revile Henderson to Lord Halifax, which was dispatched on 29 August 1939. Great Britain's role as mediator is once more clarified. It says under Number 3 of this document:
"Note observes that German proposals have never had for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and
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declares that the German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary. German Government, note adds, counts on arrival of Such plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, 30th August.
"I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but, after some heated remarks, both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face."
These proposals, which I have previously submitted in a special exhibit, had the following reaction in Great Britain-I read from Page 453 of Ribbentrop's document book. It is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Nevile Henderson of 30 August 1939. It says:
"We shall give careful consideration to German Government's reply, but it is, of course, unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and German Government must not expect this."
In the meantime the situation had become so serious that Sir Nevile Henderson did not consider that a success of Britain's action would be possible. This is shown in the same document on Page 454. This is a telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax. I am reading only a short quotation, to save time, from Point 3 of the telegram:
"While I still recommend that the Polish Government should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifices for preservation of peace...."
The Polish Government was, nevertheless, not willing to enter into direct negotiations. This can be seen from the same document on Page 455, from which I will read only the first three lines. It is a telegram from the British Ambassador in Warsaw to Lord Halifax, and it states:
"I feel sure that it would be impossible to induce the Polish Government to send M. Beck or any other representative immediately to Berlin...."
In the same telegram the British Ambassador emphasizes, under Number 4, and I quote:
"I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government, nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler's reply until I receive instructions, which I trust will be without delay."
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Through the failure to pass on the German Government's proposals to the Polish Government, direct negotiations were frustrated. As evidence of the fact that the Polish Government, too;, had no intention of entering into such direct negotiations, I refer to Page 465 Of the same document, which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw. Once more he is asking the Ambassador to invite the Polish Government to enter into direct negotiations. I will not quote from this document, but I will quote from the next document, Page 466, which is an extract from the British Blue Book, and which refers to the Polish reaction. It is a telegram from Sir Kennard to Lord Halifax, 31 August 1939.
I am going to read the first three paragraphs of this document. From these paragraphs it becomes clear what the Polish attitude was regarding the possibility of direct negotiations. I quote:
"M. Beck has just handed me in writing the Polish reply to my demarche last night."
The second paragraph states:
"I asked M. Beck what steps he proposed to take in order to establish contact with the German Government. He replied that he would instruct M. Lipski to seek an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs or State Secretary in order to say Poland had accepted British proposals. I urged him to do this without delay.
"I then asked him what attitude the Polish Ambassador would adopt if Herr Von Ribbentrop, or whomever he saw, handed him the German proposals. He said that M. Lipski would not be authorized to accept such a document as, in view of past experience, it might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum."
This extract from the British Blue Book proves that, as far as Poland was concerned, all possibilities of clarifying the question of Danzig or the minorities were refused. In this manner it was no longer possible for the German Government or the British Government to discuss this question with Poland any further. As evidence for further efforts, I submit to the Tribunal Document Ribbentrop-209, on Page 494, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. I will not quote from it, or from Document Ribbentrop-210, which I also offer to the Tribunal for judicial notice.
The next document is Document Ribbentrop-213, which is on Page 504b of my document book. This last document is an official German report regarding the subject and basis of negotiations during the time of the Polish-German crisis.
Since Poland was unable to discuss these questions of Danzig or the Corridor with Germany, a war arose between these two countries. In my final defense speech, I shall discuss specifically the
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legal aspect of this war and its nature in respect to international law. What I want to state today is that the lack of any effective international institution for the alteration of the insufferable status quo was the final reason which led to the outbreak of war in 1939.
The nest group of documents which I am submitting to the Tribunal are those which refer to the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany. These are the Documents Ribbentrop-216(a)- on Page 509 of the document book-216(b), and 217. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents, and, as far as evidence and the actual events are concerned, I refer to the documents and statements which my colleague, Dr. Siemers, will submit to the Tribunal when he speaks on behalf of Raeder.
The next group of documents are those which refer to the occupation of Holland and Belgium. They are Documents Number 218 and the following, on Page 518 of the document book. The documents are contained in Document Book Number 7. So as to explain the German viewpoint, I quote from Document Ribbentrop-218 Page 518 in Document Book Number 7. I am going to quote the following brief passages, Paragraph 2:
"As the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr. Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being a natural prerequisite that these two countries, in the event of a war between Germany and England and France, maintain the strictest neutrality.
"Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition."
On Page 2 in the same document, under Number 8, reference is made to the evidence which was known to the German Government at the time and which I will submit in due course in support of the assertion just made. It says:
"Documents at the disposal of the German Government prove that preparations by Britain and France on Belgian and Netherlands territory are already far advanced.
"Thus, for some time, all obstacles on the Belgian border toward France which might hinder the entry of the English and French invasion army have been secretly removed. Air fields in Belgium and the Netherlands have been reconnoitered by English and French officers, and their enlargement has been ordered Belgium has made transport facilities available at the frontier, and recently advance parties of staff personnel and units of the French and English Army have arrived in
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various parts of Belgium and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish conclusive proof that the English and French attack against Germany is imminent and that this thrust will be directed against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands."
As proof of these statements I refer to Documents Ribbentrop-221 through 229, which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They are the Anglo-French plans in preparation for violation of Holland's and Belgium's neutrality in agreement with these countries.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal has to adjourn at 5 o'clock into a closed session. They hope very much that you will conclude your examination of these documents by then.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. So as to save time, I shall only state briefly what these documents are. Document Ribbentrop-221 is the proof of an intended intervention in Belgium. This is a report from the military attaché at the French Embassy in London, General Lelong, addressed to the Chief of the French General Staff for National Defense. I am going to quote a very brief passage from it which says:
"Intervention in Belgium.
"The British Delegation readily recognized how uncertain the conditions are for eventual intervention in Belgium. It was proposed that we, in order to prevent a battle of junction on the Belgian flatlands, must plan to organize our defenses at least along the Schelde, or preferably, along the Albert Canal. By request of the British Delegation, the following points have been considered:
"(1) The possibility of intervention along the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur, assuming that it were possible to organize such a position in good time.
"(2) The importance of holding the Belgian and Dutch territory as a base for a resumption of the offensive against Germany."
Again, to save time, I shall not refer to any other documents in connection with this group. I merely ask the Tribunal that Document Ribbentrop-219, on Page 521 of the document book, which is a memorandum of the German Government to the Luxembourg Government, of 9 May 1940, and Document Ribbentrop-220, should be taken judicial notice of, so that I can refer to them when I present my case. Furthermore, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the Documents Number 230, 230(a), 231, 231(a), 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, and 245, which, again are documents which originate from the French General Staff and are clear proof that on the part of Britain and France, before 9 May 1940,
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detailed plans for military cooperation had been prepared, and that British and American advance parties were already on Belgian and Dutch territory before German troops crossed the border. That is the end of this particular group.
I now come to those documents which I intend to submit to the Tribunal with reference to the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. These are Documents Ribbentrop-272 and the following, Pages 604 and the following, of the document book. Here again, we are concerned with documents which partly come from the files of the French General Staff. The first document of the type is Document Ribbentrop-272, which is a note from the German Government to the Yugoslav Government, dated March 1941. This is concerned with the joining of the Three Power Pact by Yugoslavia. This document shows that Germany and the Axis Powers did not intend to put demands to Yugoslavia during the war at all, least of all with reference to the march of troops through Yugoslav territory. Documents Ribbentrop-273 and 274 contain the minutes of Yugoslavia's entry into the Three Power Pact on 25 March 1941, and connected with it is a note from the Reich Government to the Yugoslav Government. With Document Ribbentrop-277 I submit to the Tribunal a note from the Reich Government to the Greek Government, which was handed to that Government after Greek territory had been occupied by British troops. From Page 3 I quote the following sentence:
"During recent days, Greece had become an operational territory for British forces."
Under Document Ribbentrop-278, I submit to the Tribunal an official statement from the Reich Government, dated 6 April 1941, which is addressed to both Yugoslavia and Greece. In this note the reasons are stated which, after the Simovic revolt, led to military action by Germany in Yugoslavia. These reasons can be found on Page 4 of this document. As evidence that the statements contained therein are true, I am referring to the so-called "Charite Files" which are the files of the French General Staff.
This completes the group of documents with reference to Yugoslavia and Greece, but I should like to add that once again I will rely on further evidence which will be submitted by my colleague, Dr. Siemers, for the Defendant Raeder, and which also refers to the German action against Greece.
The next group of documents refer to Russia. They are the ones in Documents Ribbentrop-279 and the following, which can be found on Pages 619 and the following of the document book. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Numbers 279,280, 282, 283, and 284. During the presentation of my argument I shall refer to these documents further.
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The next and last group of documents are those which refer to the accusation against the Defendant Ribbentrop regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact and his policy in connection with Japan and the U.S.A.
The first document of this type is Document Ribbentrop-291, on Page 652 of the document book. This document contains the text of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Document Ribbentrop-281 refers to the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Three Power Pact of 27 September 1940. I submit these documents to the Tribunal as proof of the fact that Ribbentrop and the Reich Government made efforts, by means of this policy, to keep the United States out of the war. In spite of this policy, an active support of our opponents by the United States took place. As proof of this, I refer to the documents in Document Ribbentrop-306 and Document Ribbentrop-308, on Pages 700 and 702 and following of the document book. These documents are the last I am submitting to the Tribunal with reference to the policy of Germany during the years when the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister. Finally I refer briefly to Document Ribbentrop-313. That is an affidavit from the Legation Counsellor, Bernd Gottfriedsen. This affidavit actually has nothing to do with the aggressive war, but it refers to questions which have been brought up by the Prosecution in connection with the case of Ribbentrop, and this affidavit contains statements regarding the real estate property of the Defendant Ribbentrop and regarding his ownership of art works.
May I point out that Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen, as he has stated in the affidavit, handled the financial affairs of the Foreign Office and particularly those of the Foreign Minister. I will quote a brief passage in connection therewith from question Number 5:
"Question: 'What is the situation with regard to Von Ribbentrop's art possessions?'
"Answer:"-by Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen-" 'Herr Von Ribbentrop vitas a wealthy man before he entered diplomatic life. During the time of his activities in the abovementioned department he acquired some paintings, for the most part on the art market in Germany itself. Every one of these paintings was acquired properly and, above all, at correct prices, and of course paid for out of the private funds of the Reich Foreign Minister.
"'During the time he was Foreign Minister, Herr Von Ribbentrop acquired art objects abroad for purposes of furnishing the Foreign Office and German missions in foreign countries, which became state property and were used accordingly. All these art objects were catalogued and carried in the books as inventory. No foreign art objects were acquired illegally,
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that is by pressure, et cetera. Herr Von Ribbentrop's private art objects, too, were catalogued, and the objects themselves marked distinctly by me."'
I now skip one paragraph and read the end of the statement which says:
"'During the war he did not acquire any art objects illegally from any of the territories occupied by German troops, be it for his own private use or for the Foreign Of lice of the Reich.""
I should like to add that Legation Counsellor Gotfriedsen knew thoroughly the private property affairs of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, and had annually made a survey of them together with a certified accountant for the purpose of taxes and inventory.
Finally, I should like to quote a paragraph from the affidavit which is Document Ribbentrop-317, and which is in the document book on Page 749. This is an affidavit from Frau Von Ribbentrop given before a notary in Nuremberg. It refers to accusations raised by the Prosecution in connection with the Russian policy pursued by Ribbentrop. I am quoting, as follows:
"In 1940 we had a very inadequate air raid shelter in the Foreign Office (official residence). During air-raids, therefore, on the order of Adolf Hitler, we used the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery, since he considered it important that my husband, in his capacity as Reich Foreign Minister, and the documents of the Foreign Office should be safe from air raids. I was at that time expecting my youngest child, which was born on 19 December 1940, and can therefore clearly remember an air-raid which took place shortly before this event, which caused us to go to the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery. On this occasion Adolf Hitler was also present and came into our room in the shelter. He, my husband, and I sat at a table in this room. In the course of our stay my husband spoke at length of his efforts to induce Russia to join the Tripartite Pact. He developed the possibilities of such diplomatic action and his ideas of how he imagined the conclusion of such a pact. I remember clearly that Adolf Hitler closed the conversation with the words, 'Ribbentrop, why shouldn't we be able to manage that, when we have managed so many things?'
"My husband presented his ideas with great elan and with great impressiveness. After he had finished I noticed that Adolf Hitler, who had received my husband's statements without pertinent remarks, seemed to be a little absentminded, so that I had the impression that my husband's statements had not made any convincing impression."
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I have offered this affidavit so as to prove that at that time Ribbentrop was still eager to avoid a conflict with Russia.
This ends the presentation of the documents on behalf of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, could you inform us how far you have been able to get with Dr. Thoma in connection with his documents, that is, the Rosenberg documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the American delegation, the Soviet, and the French are dealing with Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Mr. Dodd can tell us.
MR. DODD: Captain Krieger of our staff, Your Honor, has been in consultation with Dr. Thoma and will continue to be, in an effort to follow the procedures laid out by the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: While on that subject, if I may, I would like to inform the Court that we have concluded our conversations with Dr. Dix, and we are, I think it fair to say, at some differences. I think it would be necessary to have a hearing by the Court on these matters that we do not agree on. However, we have agreed to a considerable number of Schacht items.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to insure is that there shall be no delay at the end of Kaltenbrunner's case with reference to Rosenberg's case. And as I understand it, the documents in the Rosenberg case, which it has been suggested we might have to consider, are very numerous; and the sooner the Tribunal gets to them the better.
MR. DODD: We shall be available at all times to talk with Dr. Thoma and move right along-in the evening if he cares to do it.
THE PRESIDENT: It might possibly be desirable, it seems to me, to have the documents which have been translated presented to the Tribunal before the others; I mean to say not have them all together, because there are, no doubt, various volumes.
MR. DODD: There are three so far; I understand there will be more. But we will press it and continue to talk with Dr. Thoma, and just as soon as possible on the first book we will be prepared to come before the Court for a hearing.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, wouldn't the best thing be for you to submit the volumes which have been translated to the Court so that they can consider them beforehand as we did with Dr. Horn's books?
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DR. THOMA: Yes, My Lord, that is possible. The documents have already been processed. With reference to my Document Books Number 2 and 3, I have discussed them with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, and we came to an agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well you could specify that agreement in the books. I suppose you could show which documents you were prepared to withdraw.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, as soon as possible you will let the General Secretary have those books, showing the agreement which you have made with Captain Krieger; is that right?
DR. THOMA: But I do want to point out that I have come to an agreement with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, only with reference to Books 2 and 3 and that refers only to the Einsatzstab and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
I have not yet come to an agreement regarding the philosophy and writings of Rosenberg, but I shall do that in due course.
THE PRESIDENT: No; one-is that in Book 1?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you are unable to come to an agreement, you can specify that, and we will consider those matters. Possibly you could take some time with Captain Krieger-take time off from Court-in order to come to an agreement with reference to Book 1 and with reference to the other books.
How many more books have you got?
DR. THOMA: All together four document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Four more?
DR. THOMA: All together four document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see. So there is only one more to be translated.
DR. THOMA: Yes.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 11 April 1946 at 1000 hours]