ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH DAY
Wednesday, 17 April 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Rosenberg resumed the stand.]

MR. DODD: Just before recess yesterday afternoon the Tribunal inquired as to the status of the Frank Document Book, and where I informed the Tribunal that we were prepared to be heard Dr. Seidl advised that we had a pact to which we had agreed. I was not aware of that at the time. I think we were both a little bit in error. The situation is that last night about 6 o'clock we did reach an agreement so that there is no difficulty at all about the Frank books.

DR. THOMA: I would like to make a brief correction. Yesterday I spoke about the request for a document on the setting up of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. My client has repeatedly asked me to bring in this document. However, there is a possibility that I confused this document with other documents which I requested, but which were not granted. I just wanted to make that correction.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You do not want to do anything more than just make that verbal correction? Very well.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other defendant's counsel who wishes to ask any questions?

DR. HAENSEL: Witness, you were the Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for the ideological objectives of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations. Are you of the opinion that what you did as Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer in carrying out your duties and everything you said and wrote for these aims and for the systematic so-called ideological combating of Jewry may be considered as an official outline of the activity of the Party and its affiliated organizations?

ROSENBERG: If I may answer this long series of questions one by one I would like to say the following: My office, as far as ideological education was concerned, worked with the SS Main Office for Political Training. We were, of course, in constant contact with them. The so-called 'guiding pamphlets" of the SS, which appeared as an instruction periodical, were read in my office. I myself had it repeatedly in my hands, and during these years I found that in this Office for Political Training, in these periodicals, a great number of very valuable articles with mostly very decent

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ideas was contained. This is one of the reasons why, through all these years, I did not enter into any conflict with the SS.

As far as the Jewish question is concerned, the objective as to this problem was expressed in the program of the NSDAP. That is the only official statement which guided the Party members. Anything which I said about it, and what others wrote about it, were just reasons that were set forth. Certainly much of that was accepted, but as far as the Fuehrer and the State were concerned these proposals were not binding rules.

DR. HAENSEL: Was the objective of your fight against Jewry limited? Did you envisage that the Jews were to be eliminated from economic and State administration, or did you from the first have a vague notion of stronger measures, such as extermination, et cetera? What was your objective?

ROSENBERG: In agreement with the Party program, I had the one objective in mind-to change the leadership in the German State as it existed from 1918 to 1933! That was the vital aim. As to elimination, even from economic life, we did not talk about it at that time; and yesterday I already referred to two of my speeches -which are available in print-in which I declared that after the end of this harsh political battle an investigation or examination of the problem would have to take place. There was even earlier tam about the demand for Jewish emigration from Germany, quite rightly. Later, when matters became more critical, I expressed this idea again in conformity with the proposals of very prominent Jewish leaders that German unemployed be deported to Africa, South America, and China.

DR. HAENSEL: Then, following your train of thought of yesterday and today, one could differentiate three kinds of measures against the Jews: First, until 1933-up to the seizure of power- were the propagandistic measures; second, after 1933, those measures which found their expression in the anti-Jewish laws; and then, finally, after the outbreak of the war certain measures which without doubt can be considered as Crimes against Humanity. Do you agree with this tripartite arrangement?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it is approximately right.

DR. HAENSEL: Then I would like to call your attention to Group 2, that is, to those measures which were instituted after the taking over of power, and which were laid down in laws against the Jews. Did you participate in the formulating of the laws?

THE PRESIDENT: You are counsel, are you not, for the SS?

DR. HAENSEL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What have those questions got to do with the SS?

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DR. HAENSEL: The questions concern the SS in the following way: If the Party as a whole had the objective of a clearly formulated anti-Jewish legislation, which was in the beginning quite orderly, then the SS was bound to this objective and for the time being had none beyond that point. I wanted to establish when the legislation and the measures against Jews turned into criminal acts, and that up to that time the SS in no manner took criminal measures against the Jews.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he said already that the Jewish problem was contained in the Party program, and that is all that you want, is it not?

DR. HAENSEL: I wanted only to show that the fact that the Jewish problem was contained in the Party program does not prove that it was in the Party program as a Crime against Humanity. In the Party program there was simply a general sentence which I do not believe can be construed as a Crime against Humanity. In addition to that, there must be...

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of construction of the Party program. It is not a matter for him to give evidence about. It is in a written document-the Party program is contained in the written documents.

DR. HAENSEL: But, in addition to the Party program, a great number of decrees and laws were issued later which expanded the Party program, and the question...

THE PRESIDENT: They are also documents which this Tribunal has to construe-not for this witness to construe.

DR. HAENSEL: The question is, insofar as the defendant can tell us, how far the SS participated in the carrying out of these regulations.

THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us the facts. He cannot tell us the laws or the interpretation of documents. If you are asking him about facts, well and good; but if you are asking him to interpret the Party program or to interpret the decrees, that is a matter for the Tribunal.

DR. HAENSEL: Very well.

[Turning to the defendant.] In your books you advocated the objective that all Germans should be unified in a Greater Germany, and that point is also set down in the Party program?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you believe that this was possible only through the preparation for a war, or did you believe that it was just as possible through peaceful means?

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ROSENBERG: In the beginning of my testimony I referred to a speech of mine made before an International Congress in 1932. Here this proposal was expressly approved by the Fuehrer to the effect that the four great powers should investigate and examine the entire European problem. This proposal said that we would give up all claims to German colonies, to Alsace-Lorraine, to the Southern Tyrol as well as claims to the separated German...

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this before from the Defendant Goering and the Defendant Ribbentrop, and we said that we did not want to go into it again. In any event, it has nothing to do with the SS-nothing directly to do with the SS.

DR. HAENSEL: [To the defendant.] Just one more question. Do you know that the SS, as far as the Jews were concerned, followed secret aims and objectives, others than those that were published officially?

ROSENBERG: That I learned here.

DR. HAENSEL: You do not know that from your own knowledge?

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have one single question to put to you. Under Document 091-PS the Prosecution submitted a letter which you, as the Chief of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, sent to Dr. SeyssInquart in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands. In that letter you demanded that the library of the so-called Social Institute at Amsterdam be handed over to you. I do not know whether you recall this library. It was rather voluminous and of Socialist-Marxist content. The Prosecution did not submit the answer given by my client. Therefore, I have to ask you: Do you remember this matter and what answer did SeyssInquart give you?

ROSENBERG: I remember this library very well, for I was told about it. To my knowledge it represented the establishment of a spiritual center of the Second International in Amsterdam, in which the history of social movements in various countries was to be summarized in a library, so that on the basis of this scientific material now a spiritual political fight, a scientific fight...

DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. We want to be brief, and you know what I am talking about. What answer did you receive? Did SeyssInquart permit this library to be transferred to Germany, or did he demand that it remain in Holland?

ROSENBERG: It was at first agreed that this library would remain in Holland, and that the cataloging and classifying of this collection, which was not yet classified, was to take place in Amsterdam. In the course of the next few years this took place in

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Amsterdam. Only in the year 1944, when either the invasion had already begun or was surely imminent, when bombing attacks also increased in this area, part of this library was taken to Silesia; the other part, to my knowledge, did not get through, but remained in Emden; and the third part, I believe, was not removed.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it then correct that Seyss-Inquart prevented the taking away of this library from the Dutch working class?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: Before we begin our discussion of some matters that we would like to go over, I wonder if you would be good enough to write your name a few times on these pieces of paper, both in pen and in pencil.

[Paper, pen, and pencil were handed to the defendant.]

Would you write "A. Rosenberg," please, with pen, and "Alfred Rosenberg" with the pen; and would you handwrite the first initial of your last name with a capital?

Now, would you do the same thing with pencil on another piece of paper, "A. Rosenberg" in pencil, "Alfred Rosenberg," and the first initial of your last name?

And then would you do one thing more, please. Would you print the first initial of your last name?

[The signatures were passed to Mr. Dodd.]

Now, yesterday afternoon, while you were on direct examination through your own counsel, you stated before the Tribunal that you did have a discussion with Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer SS, about concentration camps, and if I remember correctly, you said that that was some time in 1938; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I testified that I discussed the concentration camps with him once, but I cannot say with certainty that it was in 1938, as I did not make a note of it.

MR. DODD: Very good. He offered to have you go through one or the other of these camps, Dachau or some other camp; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he then told me that I should take a look at the Dachau Camp.

MR. DODD: And you declined the invitation?

ROSENBERG: Right.

MR. DODD: And I understood you-if I recollect correctly, you said because you were quite sure that he would not show you the unfavorable things that were in that camp?

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ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed more or less that in case there really were unfavorable things, I certainly would not see them anyway.

MR. DODD: You mean that you simply assumed that there were unfavorable things; that you did not know there were unfavorable things?

ROSENBERG: I heard this through the foreign press and it is about. . .

MR. DODD: When did you first hear that through the foreign press?

ROSENBERG: That was already in the first months of 1933.

MR. DODD: And did you continuously read the foreign press about the concentration camps in Germany from 1933 to 1938?

ROSENBERG: I did not read the foreign press at all for unfortunately I do not speak English. I received only some excerpts from it from time to time, and in the German press there were occasional references to it with the strict declaration that these allegations were not true. I can still remember the statement by Minister Goering in which he said that it was beyond his comprehension that something like that could be written.

MR. DODD: But you thought they were true to the extent that there were unfavorable things in that place that Himmler might not show you.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed that in such a revolutionary process surely a number of excesses were taking place, that in some districts also on occasion there might be conflicts, and that the fact that murders of National Socialists in the months subsequent to the seizure of the power continued most probably resulted in sharp countermeasures here and there.

MR. DODD: Did you think that was still going on in 1938, these measures against the National Socialists?

ROSENBERG: No. The chief reports upon the continuance of murders of members of the Hitler Youth, of the Police, and of members of the Party were made especially in 1943 and 1944, but I do not remember that many reports still were published about this in subsequent years...

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 1943 and 1944 or 1933 and 1934? Which is it?

ROSENBERG: 1933 and 1934, excuse me.

MR. DODD: But, in any event, in 1938 you had some knowledge in your own mind which made you think that it would not be profitable for you to inspect these camps because some things were

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going on there that would not be shown to you. Now, that is so, isn't it?

ROSENBERG: No; but I said very frankly that under some circumstances excesses might be taking place, and I talked to Himmler about this matter so that he in any case knew that we were informed about such things from abroad and that he should watch his step. Only once did I receive a complaint directly myself.

MR. DODD: Now, turning to another matter, we also understood you to say yesterday that when you wrote your book, The Myth of the 20th Century, you expressed your personal opinion and you did not intend it to have any great effect upon state affairs. Is that a fair statement of your testimony of yesterday with respect to your book?

ROSENBERG: I did not quite follow the last sentence. I must say, I wrote The Myth of the 20th Century during the years 1927 and 1928 approximately, after certain historical and other preliminary studies. It was published in October 1930 with an introduction to the effect that this was a purely personal opinion, and that the political organization of which I was a member was not responsible for it.

MR. DODD: Very good. I will ask that you be shown Document 3553-PS. That is also, if Your Honor pleases, Exhibit Number USA-352. It is already in evidence.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, you wrote a preface or a little introduction for that edition of that book. It is right there before you. You said in it:

"To the 150,000th copy: The Myth has today drawn deep, ineffaceable furrows into the emotional life of the German people. Every new edition is a clear indication that a decisive spiritual and mental revolution is growing into a historical event. Many things which in my book seemed to be a peculiar idea have already become a reality of State policy. Many other things will yet, I hope, materialize as a further result of this new vigor."

You wrote that?

ROSENBERG: That is certainly entirely correct. This book of 700 pages does not concern only those points of which I am accused here. This book deals with a large number of problems, the problem of the peasants, of the world states, of the concept of socialism, of the relation between leadership, industry, and labor, a presentation of the judgment...

MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. I don't think it is necessary for you to give us a list of the table of contents of the book. I simply asked you if you wrote that introduction.

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ROSENBERG: Yes, of course.

MR. DODD: Now, with respect to the well-known forced labor program. I think it is perfectly clear to everyone who has been in attendance at these sessions before this Tribunal, and of course to yourself, that there was a forced labor program in effect, or a so-called slave labor program, both in the East and in the Western occupied countries. Isn't that a fact?

ROSENBERG: Yes, the law of 21 March is concerned therewith with workers from the occupied countries who were to be taken to Germany. In Germany there was also a compulsory labor law.

MR. DODD: Now, there are only two possible offices under the then German State which can, by any stretch of the imagination, be held responsible either in part or altogether for that forced slave labor program. Isn't that so? Two principal offices, at least.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And they were your own ministry and the of lice of the Defendant Sauckel. That is pretty simple. Is that true or not?

ROSENBERG: It is correct that Gauleiter Sauckel had been given the authority to pass orders to me and to all the supreme Reich authorities. It was my duty to make known and carry through these orders in the Occupied Eastern Territories according to my powers, my judgment, and my instructions.

MR. DODD: Did you carry out the compulsory labor directives under your ministry, force people to leave their homes and their communities to go to Germany and to work for the German State?

ROSENBERG: I fought for about three-quarters of a year for this recruitment of workers in the East to be put on a voluntary basis. From my record of a discussion with Gauleiter Sauckel still in the year 1943, it is very evident that at all times I made efforts to do this. I also mentioned how many millions of leaflets, of posters, and pamphlets I distributed in these countries so that this principle would be carried through. However, when I heard that if the number of German workers who had to go to the front could not be replaced, the German Army reserves would be at an end, then I could not protest any longer against recruitment of certain age-classes, or use of local authorities and forces of the gendarmerie to assist in this work. Yesterday I already...

MR. DODD: What you are telling us is you tried to get them voluntarily and you found they would not go, so then you forced them to go. Isn't that so?

ROSENBERG: That coercion took place here is true and is not disputed. Where an excess took place-and some terrible excesses took place-I did my utmost to prevent it or alleviate it.

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MR. DODD: All right. You, of course, had promulgated an order in your own ministry concerning compulsory labor, had you not?

ROSENBERG: Yes. In the beginning, a general compulsory labor service law was promulgated.

MR. DODD: That's right, on the 19th of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: It may be that it was promulgated about that time.

MR. DODD: Well, you can accept that as being so, I think, that that is the date of your decree concerning compulsory labor, the compulsory labor, significantly-I want to make this very clear to you-in the Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: That order was promulgated by you as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I ask that you be shown Document 1975-PS. It is Exhibit Number USA-820, already in evidence-not in evidence, I'm sorry. I am now offering it.

[The document was submitted to the defendant.]

I don't care to stress this document too much except to have you verify the fact that this is the order which you promulgated, and in the first paragraph with the small Figure 1, you stated, "All inhabitants of the Occupied Eastern Territories are subject to the general liability for work according to their capacity." And I wish to point out the paragraph under that small Number 1, with the Number 3, where you say, "A special ruling is drawn up for Jews." That is the 19th day of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: The document which has been submitted to me is signed by the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine and is concerned with a skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I ask that I be shown the skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Easter Territories in order that I may judge correctly the carrying out provisions issued by the Reich Commissioner.

MR. DODD: Well, we can make that available to you. This is taken from the official gazette of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. You are not disputing, are you, the fact that you promulgated this order and that these two paragraphs I read to you were in it?

ROSENBERG: That I am not disputing.

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MR. DODD: All right. If you care to look at all at the other paragraphs and at other parts, I will see that they are made available to you, but for the present purposes I can assure you there is no trick in connection with this.

I want to move on to another document.

ROSENBERG: I would like to refer to just one point. Under Paragraph 1 it says expressly that people not completely able to work are to be used according to their capability for work. This shows the state of health had been considered.

MR. DODD: Yes, I read that to you.

Now, you had a permanent state secretary by the name of Alfred Meyer, isn't that so?

ROSENBERG: I do not find anything here regarding the laws about Jews. There was a point mentioned about the directive for Jews, only it is not here.

MR. DODD: You will find it just below the sentence to which you made reference a minute ago, two paragraphs below it. There is a Figure 3 in parentheses and then this statement: "A special ruling is drawn up for Jews."

Don't you find that there?

ROSENBERG: I do not find it here-oh, on this page, yes. That refers to another law, yes.

MR. DODD: That's all right. I just asked you if it was there, and it is. Let's go on.

I asked you if you had a permanent staff secretary by the name of Meyer, Alfred Meyer, Meyer.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I want to show you Document 580-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-821. Now, this is an order from your Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and it is signed by your permanent staff! secretary, Alfred Meyer, and it is addressed to the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, a man by the name of Lohse, Lohse, and also to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, a man by the name of Koch about whom we have heard a good deal in this Trial

I want to have you agree, if you will, that the order calls for 247,000 industrial workers and 380,000 agricultural workers.

Now, I want you to turn specifically to Page 2 of the English translation and to Page 2, as well, of the German text, and Line 14 of the English text and Line 22 of the German text. The paragraph has before it the Figure 6, and it says:

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"The workers are to be recruited. Forced enlistment should be avoided; instead, for political reasons, the enlistment should be kept on a voluntary basis. In case the enlistment should not bring the required results and there should be a surplus of workers still available, use may be made in case of emergency, and in agreement with the Commissioner General of the decree dated 19 December 1941 concerning the introduction of compulsory labor in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Promises..."

So that this order, signed by Meyer of your staff, directing the Reich commissioners in the Eastern Occupied Territories, was founded on your decree of 19 December 1941 for compulsory labor.

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, you read the introduction, and from that we can see also that my deputy clearly tried in every way to avoid forced enlistment and, as he says, the enlistment was to "be kept on a voluntary basis." That is proof of what I already said yesterday, that Meyer, my permanent deputy, most emphatically tried to work along these Ones, and lastly this does not refer to arbitrary measures but rather to a general compulsory labor law in the Occupied Eastern Territories which would prevent hundreds of thousands who could neither work nor study from wandering about idly in the streets. I would however like to read also the end of the paragraph, and that says:

"Promises which cannot be kept may not be given, neither in writing nor verbally. Therefore, the announcements, posters, and appeals in the press and over the radio may therefore not contain any untrue information in order to avoid disappointment among the workers employed in the Reich, and thus reactions against future recruitment in the Occupied Eastern Territories."

I think a more legal attitude in the midst of war is not at all thinkable.

MR. DODD: Very good. All I am trying to indicate here, and to see if you will not agree with it, is that you, nevertheless, despite these remonstrance's and these objections which we do not deny that you made, did authorize your people in the Eastern Occupied Territories actually to conscript and force people to come to work in Germany, and you did it on the basis of your own decree. That is the point I am trying to make with you.

ROSENBERG: A compulsory labor law was issued by me at the end of 1941 for the territory of the Reichskommissariat concerned, that is, for the Ostland and for the Ukraine. The compulsory recruitment of this manpower for the Reich was not taken until much later, and compulsory labor service in the occupied countries

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was, in my opinion, legally necessary so that on the one hand no wildcat recruitment would take place, and also to prevent chaos resulting from the hundreds of thousands loitering in the streets.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. You are giving a long paraphrase for the one word "yes," which is the answer you ought to have made.

ROSENBERG: When compulsory labor service was also instituted for the Reich, I said that I was in favor of voluntary enlistment. I could not persist in this attitude for long and therefore, of course, I agreed that then also compulsory labor laws would have to be instituted. I already admitted that three times yesterday; I have not disputed it.

MR. DODD: Yes, I know you repeated it three times yesterday and again this morning. In your own defense document-Rosenberg-11, I think it is-which is the letter that you wrote to Koch on the 14th of December 1942-I don't think it will be necessary to show it to you again; I think you saw it yesterday-you specifically mentioned to Koch the matter of picking up people from lines in front of theaters and off the streets, those people who were attending movies and matters of that sort. You knew that was going on under your decree of compulsory labor, didn't you? You were objecting to it, but you knew it was going on.

ROSENBERG: Excesses are connected with every law, and as soon as I learned of excesses, I did take steps against them.

MR. DODD: Very good. Now, finally, with respect to this forced labor matter, would you say as a matter of fairness and honesty that your ministry was not very largely responsible for this terrible program of forcing people from their homes into Germany, or do you say that you must accept a very considerable responsibility for what happened to these hundreds of thousands of people out of the Eastern occupied areas?

ROSENBERG: I, of course, will take the responsibility for these laws which I issued, and for any framework of directives which were issued by my ministry. The territorial governments were legally responsible for their execution. Where they went beyond these measures-they were 1,500 kilometers away from me- I concerned myself with every case. Many exaggerations were made and excesses also took place. I admit that terrible things did occur. I tried to intervene, to apply punitive measures and because of this quite a number of German officials were taken to court and were sentenced.

MR. DODD: Leaving aside the terrible things that happened to people, attuning that no great violence took place, the very fact

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of forcing them against their wills to leave is something else that you will accept responsibility for, I assume.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And you also feel that a considerable part of this. . .

ROSENBERG: [Interposing.] I accept the responsibility due to a State law which empowered Gauleiter Sauckel to place these claims to me which I applied in legal form to the Eastern territories.

MR. DODD: Briefly, I want to remind you, while we are on this subject, that you acknowledged yesterday that you did consent to the taking of children as young as 10, 12, and 14 years old and removing them to Germany, and I think you told us that at first it did disturb you, but when you found out there were happy recreational circumstances, your mind was eased. Is that a fair statement of your position on forcing those children from the East?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I do not know just what the translation of the document was, but the opposite was true. I wanted to prevent anything from happening in any action in the operational zone which might, under certain circumstances, be of gravest importance for many children. Then, upon the request of the Army Group Center-which anyway would have done it on its own-I took over the care of these children on condition that I take most scrupulous care of them and care for their own mothers, that they have contact with their parents, and so that they might be returned to their homeland again later on. That is certainly the exact opposite of what the Prosecution has submitted from this document here.

MR. DODD: Well, I don't want to dwell much longer on it except to remind you that that document which you have seen and which you discussed yesterday, states, among other things, that by removing these children out of the East you will be doing more than one thing; you will be destroying the biological potentiality of those people in the East. That is what you approved among other things, isn't it?

ROSENBERG: Yes. That is contained in the first point of the Prosecution and it was already read. I have made it clear by reading the whole document that my approval did not depend at all on that point, that in the first report I definitely refused that as an argument, and that only after hearing other information did I find a method, for which the women thanked me despite the fact that not I but the Hitler Jugend in

Dessau and elsewhere deserve the credit for taking care of them in this way.

MR. DODD: Actually, I understand from all your testimony that, with the possible exception of the little while of which we

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have been talking, you have been very benign and humane towards these people under your jurisdiction in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You wanted to be very kind to them.

ROSENBERG: I do not want at all to claim for myself any such sentimental phraseology. However, in the midst of this terrible war in the East, which brought with it the continual murder of German employees and German agricultural officials, I only tried to carry on an intelligent policy and to induce the people to heartfelt voluntary cooperation.

MR. DODD: Yes. Now I ask that you be shown Document 1058-PS, which is Exhibit USA-147.

[The document was submitted to the defendant.]

You now have that before you. It is an extract from a speech which you made with your closest collaborators, and it has been referred to before. It is a speech that you made on the 20th of June 1941, the day before the attack was launched against Soviet Russia. I want to refer to the very first paragraph, and the only one on the paper. It says: "The job of feeding the German people stands in these years without a doubt...."

ROSENBERG: What page is that?

MR. DODD: It is the first page; there is only one page. Oh, you have the whole document. You referred to it yesterday; I think you will be able to find it. It is at Page 8, Line 54. You may recall it; you talked about it yesterday. As a matter of fact, you said it was an impromptu speech. Do you find it on Page 8?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have found it.

MR. DODD: In that paragraph you say, among other things- and I want to call it to your attention for a specific purpose-you say that the job of feeding the German people is at the top of the list, and that the southern regions and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. And you go on to say that you see no reason why there is any obligation to feed the Russian people with the surplus products of the territory. Then you say, "We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings."

You then go on to say, "A very extensive evacuation will undoubtedly be necessary and the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians."

Now, you read us some parts of that speech yesterday that you seemed to think were quite to your credit. Were all parts of the speech impromptu or are you suggesting that only the parts that seem damaging to you now were impromptu?

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ROSENBERG: I just used a few key words and gave the speech that way. This paragraph has been read by the Prosecution three or four times. Yesterday when we discussed this speech I myself expressly referred to this paragraph. Beyond that, I admitted that I was told by people connected with the Four Year Plan that it was not certain whether the industry of the Moscow industrial region could be fully maintained after its conquest-here the "wagon factories" are mentioned. Restriction might be necessary to some key industries, and through that a difficult problem in the supply of this area would arise. My remarks pointed out that, of necessity, these unemployed would probably have to be evacuated. I expressly referred to this document, namely, the first document of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on this question where, under seven most important points for the civilian administration, Point 3 concerns the feeding of the civilian population. Later in the document it says that famines are to be avoided in any event and that in such a case the population was to receive special rations. I believe that in these hard times, in view of the laws and directives, it was impossible for me to do more than that. My entire political and spiritual position is to be concluded from what I said yesterday about the demand for liberty and culture in the Ukraine, about the sovereignty of the Caucasians, and also about the Russian State and its big...

MR. DODD: All right. I don't want you to go into all that. I understand you thoroughly, and I think everyone else does. I merely wanted to point out to you that on that early date you did say there would be harsh necessities and that there would be very many hard years for the Russians. That is all. And if you don't want to acknowledge that you were serious in saying that, as you were in saying the other things, then I won't press you on it.

I want to turn to document...

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, I believe that not much more could have been done for this problem than by planning beforehand how to master the difficulties rather than afterwards. Other occupation forces have had the same experience.

MR. DODD: All right.

I ask that you be shown Document 045-PS, Exhibit USA-822.

[The document was submitted to the defendant.]

ROSENBERG: Perhaps I might say something more about the translation of this passage. It was translated to me that these measures were to be carried through "without any feeling." In the original it says "beyond feeling," or "above feeling."

MR. DODD: All right, I accept your interpretation; we won't have any trouble about that. Now, will you please look at this

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document? This is a memorandum found in your files, for your information.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: You set out there, in the second paragraph, what you call the aim of German politics, notably in the Ukraine, as having been laid down by the Fuehrer. They are, you say, exploitation and mobilization of raw materials, a German settlement in certain regions, no artificial education of the population towards intellectualism, but the preservation of their labor strength; apart from that, an extensive unconcern with the interior affairs.

Then, moving down a little bit-because I don't think it is necessary to read all of it, much of it has been referred to in another document-we come down to the 12th line from the bottom of that paragraph. Beginning at the 14th line:

"After continuous observation of the state of affairs in the Occupied Eastern Territories, I am convinced that German politics may have their own, possibly contemptuous opinion of the qualities of the conquered peoples, but that it is not the mission of German political representatives to proclaim measures and opinions which could eventually reduce the conquered peoples to dull despair instead of promoting the desired utilization of manpower to capacity."

Then, in the next paragraph, you say:

"If at home we had to announce our aims to the whole nation most openly and aggressively, in contrast to the others, the political leaders in the East must remain silent where German policy calls for necessary harshness. They must remain silent as to any derogatory opinions which they may form about the conquered peoples. Yes, a clever German policy may in certain circumstances do more in the German interest through alleviations which do not affect policy and certain humane concessions, than through open, inconsiderate brutality."

Were you honestly expressing your views when you wrote that memorandum on the 16th of March 1942?

ROSENBERG: This document is correct. It was also submitted to me in the preliminary interrogation. It shows that, although I knew that the Fuehrer had not accepted my more far-reaching proposals, I continued to fight for these more far-reaching proposals. And it shows, further, that I saw the Fuehrer personally, so that a few crazy middle-class people in the East would not make derogatory remarks about other nations whose standard of living may to all appearances have been poor at the time. From the many thousands who came in there, I could not expect either

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sympathy or antipathy, but I could demand one thing of them if their attitude was contemptuous, and that was to keep it to themselves and to act decently.

In conclusion I would like to add something which is extraordinarily decisive, namely, it says here in the last paragraph, "I ask that the Fuehrer rule on this record and the draft decree." This instruction is unfortunately not attached to the document; I believe that much would have been proved from it.

MR. DODD: All right. Now let's turn to Document R36, Exhibit USA-699.

[The document was submitted to the defendant.]

You have seen this document before, haven't you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have seen it.

MR. DODD: Now, this is a memorandum submitted to you by one of your subordinates, Dr. Markull, and directly submitted to you by Leibbrandt, also one of your subordinates, one of your top men, on the 19th of August 1942. I want you to follow along with me while I read you certain passages from it.

The first few lines are dated the 5th of September 1942, and it says, "To the Reich Minister; on the premises." It states that there is enclosed a memorandum containing the opinion of Dr. Markull on the matter of the Bormann letter of the 23rd July.

Before we go into this just for a minute-if you will just pay attention to this-you told us yesterday that you were in disagreement with Bormann about some matters. Is that so?

ROSENBERG: I said...

MR. DODD: Just answer the question. Did you tell us that yesterday?

ROSENBERG: On decisive points I did not agree with Bormann. I testified that in the course of years I was assailed in such a way that, on occasion, I had to give him an appeasing answer. My whole policy was to...

MR. DODD: All right. Let's look at this document, which is, as I say, a memorandum about a Bormann letter to you, dated the 23rd of July, I assume 1942:

"On 23 July 1942, Reichsleiter Bormann sent the Minister a letter which enumerates in eight paragraphs the principles which the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Eastern Territories."

It goes on to say that you, in a message to the Fuehrer dated the 11th of August 1942, explained in detail to what extent these principles are already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.

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The next paragraph says:

"Any person reading this correspondence is struck, first of all, by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister"- that is you-"apparently was particularly concerned about two points. The first relates to the protection of German rule against the pressure of the Slav race; the second to the absolute necessity of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive problems, of which more will have to be said."

Then there is this statement:

"For the rest, the Minister"-referring to you-"not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phraseology; on the contrary, he uses them as a basis for his reply anti endeavors to show that they are already being put into practice. When, however, Bormann's letter was read out by Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the department chiefs, grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our Eastern policy."

Then it goes on to say:

"In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is best to start from a supposition which clearly shows the prevailing situation."

Then, under the Number I, Markull writes:

"Let us suppose Bormann's letter were issued to the Reich commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no means unrealistic since the Minister"-and that again refers to you-"appears to hold identical views. Since the Ostland presents a special case, and moreover the Ukraine is, or will become probably the most important region politically, the following discussion will mainly be based on that region."

Then, going on:

"The consequences of a decree of this kind will best be judged by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into practice."

Moving down a little bit, he says:

"Imagine the formulas of Bormann's letter translated into the language of a member of the German civilian administration, and you will get, roughly, the following views:

"The Slavs are to work for us. Insofar as we do not need them, they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and German health service are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice

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abortion, the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces useful coolies for us is admissible. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As for food, they will not get any more than is necessary. We are the masters; we come first." Then it goes on to say:

"These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary they are covered, word by word, by the spirit and the text of Bormann's letter. Already at this point the question arises whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail already today."

Moving on, the next paragraph, with the Number 2, says:

"But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was done in Paragraph 1. The above-mentioned concept of our role in the East already exists in practice. The Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people governed by him in three successive speeches at the inauguration...."-et cetera.

And he goes on to quote those speeches, which have been referred to before this Tribunal.

Then, in the next paragraph, he says that every visitor and every member of the local civil administration can confirm this from his own observations, and they show particularly clearly how well the soil is prepared for the Bormann letter. Then he goes on to quote statements that have been made by saying, "To be exact, we are here among negroes; the population is just dirty and lazy," and so on.

And then, passing on, he says:

"I may add that Kreisleiter Knuth, whom the Gauleiter still retains in spite of the gravest accusations against his professional integrity, declared, in conversations on the Kiev question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics. Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the population starved to death."

Moving on further we come to the third paragraph down. It says: "Finally among the district commissioners 80 percent oppose the views described above. In many conferences with the general commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be treated decently and with understanding."

And, that statements opposing such policies as referred to above will result in a catastrophe. That is what the next paragraph says.

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And then Markull goes on to say:

"For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the 'master race' is to relax the discipline of our officials."

I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with a Number 5:

"However, it must be examined whether there is not in fact an agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of opinion. The Minister's reply"-I remind you each time the Minister refers to you-"of 11 August might be considered to point in this direction."

Then he goes on to say:

"In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister knows very well that it is not possible to reorganize a continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political conditions."-And so on.

And finally he says:

"Another reason why..."

I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver, because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word "liberation" ought never to have been mentioned and no theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university should be allowed to function.

And finally I would like to read you-not finally-but I would like to read you this significant paragraph. It states-and I think you will allow me to summarize it-that this letter of Bormann's, which originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto announced by the Minister-yourself.

And in this connection, a few sentences down, says Markull:

"It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter."

Then, about halfway down the paragraph, it says only you can decide upon this question and he suggests certain considerations which might be useful, recounting some difficulties.

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And finally you come, under Number II to the second paragraph:

"Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of Reichsleiter Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the wording of his letter does not always bring out clearly the importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like 'brisk trade in contraceptives' had better not be brought into connection with the name of the Fuehrer. In the same way abrupt phrases like 'vaccination of the non-German population is completely out of the question,' "-and so on-"would hardly seem to be entirely in keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved here."

Finally, to go on, I want to read you this, under Number III, Markull states:

"The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are, however, dictated by concern and duty."

And finally-well, I don't think there is any necessity to read the last paragraph. It merely talks about the political philosophy which is being raised in a grandiose manner by the Japanese ally in his new districts.

Now, you remember this memorandum that you received through your assistant, Leibbrandt, from your subordinate, Markull? You can answer that "yes" or "no," by the way; that is all I want to know right now-whether or not you remember it. Will you wait just a minute?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I received this report from Dr. Leibbrandt, and I would like to make the following explanation.

MR. DODD: Just before you do that-you will have an opportunity; I won't shut you up on any explanations or even attempt to-I have one or two things I would like to ask you about it, and then if you feel the need to explain them or anything else I feel sure the Tribunal will permit you to do so.

You had written a letter in answer to the Bormann letter, hadn't you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MR. DODD: And you had agreed with these-if I may use the term-shocking suggestions of Bormann? In your letter you had agreed with these shocking suggestions of Bormann? "Yes" or "no"?

ROSENBERG: I wrote an appeasing letter so that I could bring about a pause in the constant pressure under which I was kept, and I would dike to anticipate and say that my activity, and the decrees which I issued after this letter, did not change in any way; but, on the contrary, decrees were issued setting up a school

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system and for the further continuation of health control. I will discuss it further in my reply.

MR. DODD: You wrote this letter to the Fuehrer; you did not write it to Bormann, did you? Your answer went to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I wrote my reply to the Fuehrer, yes.

MR. DODD: And you were appeasing the Fuehrer as well, were you, when you mouthed back the phrases such as are repeated in this letter about the use of contraceptives and abortion?

ROSENBERG: No; besides...

MR. DODD: Wait until I finish. I was saying, in your letter to the Fuehrer you wrote back those horrid suggestions of Bormann, didn't you-those nasty, horrid suggestions of Bormann, I might say? You wrote them to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I wrote a letter to the Fuehrer, but did not use the wording of Bormann's letter. I wrote appealingly to the Fuehrer that I was not doing any more than could and had to be done. I wanted to ward off an attack from headquarters for I knew it would come because I did more for the Eastern peoples than for the German people-that I was demanding more doctors than the German people had for their sick, that I was doing more in my capacity as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for the health problem and thereby for the Eastern people than German doctors could do for the German people. The attack had reached such proportions that Koch finally accused me of promoting a policy of immigration. That was the reason why the conflict arose shortly thereafter and was brought to the Fuehrer.

MR. DODD: Just so there will be no doubt about this-I don't want there to be any misunderstanding and nobody else does-are you telling us that you did not write back almost word for word what Bormann wrote to you?

ROSENBERG: I do not have the letter here verbatim.

MR. DODD: But you have the Markull memorandum here, which says that the Minister not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phraseology. Now surely one of your subordinates would not be impertinent enough to write you a memorandum like that unless it was perfectly true that you had done so?

ROSENBERG: I welcomed very much that my collaborators always had the courage to contradict me and give me their opinion, even concerning something I myself requested. Dr. Leibbrandt came and said to me, "Herr Reich Minister, that certainly is not in accord with what we are all doing here." I said, "Dr. Leibbrandt, please calm yourself. I have written an appeasing explanation. Nothing

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will be changed. Later I will also speak to the Fuehrer personally about these matters."

MR. DODD: Your subordinate was not afraid to tell you that you had written such a letter in which you agreed word for word with Bormann. I have no trouble with you on that score. That is all I am trying to get you to tell this Tribunal, because it is true that you did write back expressing these word-for-word sentences.

ROSENBERG: That is not correct. The author-I rather say Dr. Leibbrandt-when he gave me this memorandum, read it through in a hurry saying, "There seems to be a gentleman who believes that I cannot do anything else but what I consider right." But in this case I am facing a serious conflict, and I will maintain my position as I consider it right. That may be seen in the documents covering a period of 3 years which I read yesterday. May I give my opinion now on this document?

MR. DODD: Answer this question: Who were you appeasing, Hitler or Bormann? Or both of them?

ROSENBERG: First, I concurred with my collaborator, Dr. Leibbrandt, in the idea that ministerial decrees in that sense would never be released by me. Second, I regulated by a decree the school system in the Ukraine including a 4 year elementary school, trade school, and professional colleges.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. That is not an answer to the question. You said that you wrote an appeasing answer. The question is whom were you trying to appease. Was it Hitler or was it Bormann or was it both?

ROSENBERG: Yes, both of them; yes.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, would this be a convenient time to break off?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have stated yesterday that the document books for Frank have already been translated. However, it appears-I have just found this out-that the document books are not yet bound because the office authorized to do that has not yet received permission from another competent office. Perhaps the Tribunal could order the binding of the document books, or else the whole translation is useless.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: I did not know there was any delay, but I will see to it right away that they get it as far as we are able to do it.

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ROSENBERG: May I say something about this document? This memorandum, as I stated in the beginning, is based on the supposition of a possible ministerial decree. It obviously uses phrases which Bormann had used in his letter, but my letter which I sent to the Fuehrer cannot possibly contain these phrases. It may have contained appeasing statements to the effect that I did nothing in the Occupied Eastern Territories for which I was reproached; that is to say, that I did nothing for the German population but that I established large health departments, school departments, education departments, et cetera; and that now I was absolutely compelled to simplify these administrative departments. But that Bormann made these statements, that he used these phrases! It is regrettable that he expressed himself in this way; and during the last few years we were compelled to observe an unnecessarily large number of similar instances.

I may add briefly that he himself stated that the Minister apparently intervened to clarify these things there, but I want to indicate one decisive point, and that is that the opinions advanced by Bormann were also familiar to Koch's circle. During these tragic years my entire efforts were directed against Koch's personal circle, especially in the training of administrative leaders; and that can be seen from Paragraph 3, where it says, "Moreover, at least 80 percent of the district commissioners are opposed to the views described."

MR. DODD: I think we all know what is in it. If you have any explanation, I think you ought to make it.

ROSENBERG: Yes. On Page 4, it says the great majority of the administrative leadership corps set their hopes in the Minister- that is, myself-and I endeavored and tried to fulfill these hopes of the administrative leadership corps, which I attempted to educate by means of my decrees because these thousands of people could not know the vast Eastern territories, these thousands who, even in the fight against Bolshevism, sometimes had no very clear conception of the state of things in the East; and I must emphasize the fact that the author here says that the decree issued by the Minister on 17 March 1942 reemphasizes his former decrees in a more rigorous form. The decree of 13 May 1942 attacks the view that the Ukrainians were not a race at all and attacks the false conception of superiority. Thus, these are two decrees which I have not received and which are here; and furthermore, Mr. Prosecutor, I say that he points out quite correctly that of course the Minister- that is, myself-knows very well that such a continent has to be treated differently than in accordance with these suggestions which we have heard. As a consequence of these proceedings, however, I have positively established that after that correspondence between Koch and Bormann I introduced the orderly setup of a school

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administration in the Ukraine by issuing a detailed decree. Secondly, I requested the extension of the...

MR. DODD: I am not interested in that. Just a minute.

ROSENBERG: Well, I have to answer these accusations.

MR. DODD: That is no answer to this, if Your Honor pleases, and no explanation of this document. He is launching off on one of these long speeches again about what he did after the document was received or after he wrote the letter, and I ask that he be instructed to answer that question and not to go on into statements about what he did in the administration in the Ukraine. I don't think it is pertinent.

ROSENBERG: I spoke to the Fuehrer personally about this and told him-that decree of May 1943 is in my file-I told him that it was impossible to work in the East with this kind of talk from Koch and his following.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is a letter in your file or if there is not a letter in your file, your counsel can reexamine you upon crossexamination, but you cannot in crossexamination go into long explanations. You must answer the question "yes" or "no" and explain, if you must explain, shortly. You have been explaining this document for a long time.

MR. DODD: When did you first meet Erich Koch?

ROSENBERG: Erich Koch?

MR. DODD: Yes.

ROSENBERG: In the twenties. It may have been 1927 or 1928 . . .

MR. DODD: Apparently you have known him, then, a great many years?

ROSENBERG: I have not seen him often, but as Gauleiter I talked to him personally now and again.

MR. DODD: When did he become a Gauleiter?

ROSENBERG: I believe in the year 1928 he became Gauleiter in East Prussia, but I cannot give the exact date when he became Gauleiter.

MR. DODD: That is all right. I want an approximate date. Did you have much to do with him from the time that he was appointed Gauleiter, let us say, until 1940?

ROSENBERG: During the fighting years, I had practically nothing at all to do with him. Then later, after 1933, I talked to him several times.

MR. DODD: You had a pretty good knowledge, I assume, in any event, of his general reputation among his friends and acquaintances?

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ROSENBERG: I knew Koch had a very excitable temperament' going from one extreme to the other and hard to keep steady, and therefore not reliable in carrying out a steady policy.

MR. DODD: I take it from your answer, that you were not aware, however, before he became the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, of his temperament in this way, that you did not know that he did these terrible things, which he did do while Reich Commissioner in the Ukraine, did you?

ROSENBERG: No, and...

MR. DODD: That is an answer and there is no need to explain that.

ROSENBERG: I even knew that Koch had expressed the opposite opinion previously, and that he had said that the youth of the East embraces also the German youth. He previously wrote that.

MR. DODD: So I take it you were surprised when this man turned out to be the kind of man that he did turn out to be. Is that a fair statement?

ROSENBERG: That only came to light gradually later on. Another person could not foresee that this temperament would involve such results and it would not have gone so far had he not been supported by somebody else.

MR. DODD: You don't think he was quite so good a man as appears from the record, but was rather encouraged by some others; is that what you are trying to tell us?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that, of course, contributed.

MR. DODD: I am going to ask that you be shown Document 1019-PS; it becomes Exhibit USA-823. By the way, before we look at that document, Koch is the man whom you blame to a very great extent for many of these terrible things that happened under your ministry in the Ukraine, isn't he? There isn't any doubt about that. You told us about that all day yesterday.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, could you go just a little bit slower?

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I will.

[Turning to the defendant.] If you look at this document, you will see that it is a memorandum about your recommendations as to the personnel for the Reich commissions in the East and for the central political office in Berlin; and it was written on the 7th day of April 1941, and I take it that that was only a few days after Hitler talked to you about your new assignment in the East, 4 or 5 days at the most; isn't that so? Will you answer that question?

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ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: Now, in this memorandum you set out that you recommended Gauleiter Lohse and we know from the documents and the testimony that he was appointed; isn't that a fact?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: All right. Now, turn to the next page of the English text; it is the paragraph beginning as follows:

"In addition it will eventually become necessary to occupy with troops not only Leningrad, but also Moscow. This occupation will probably differ considerably from that in the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It will be aimed at the suppression of any Russian and Bolshevik resistance and will necessitate an absolutely ruthless person both as regards the military representation and also the eventual political direction. The problems arising from this need not be detailed here. If it is not intended to maintain a permanent military administration, the undersigned would recommend the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, as Reich Commissioner in Moscow."

Did you recommend Koch for that job as a particularly ruthless man in April of 1941? "Yes" or "no"?

ROSENBERG: Yes...

MR. DODD: Just a minute. You have done a lot of talking here for the last day and today if you will just give me a chance once in a while.

He is the same man you told us a minute ago you did not know to be particularly ruthless until after he did these terrible things in the Ukraine. Now, it is very clear you did know it in April of 1941, isn't it? What is your answer to that?

ROSENBERG: That is not correct; that is not laid down here. I have stated that I know from Koch's writings from 1933 and 1934 that he had a special liking for the Russian people. I knew Koch as a man of initiative in East Prussia. I had to expect that at the center of Moscow and around Moscow a very difficult job would have to be done. For here was the center of gravity of Bolshevism and here under certain circumstances the greatest resistance would arise. Then I did not want to have Koch in the Eastern territories and not in the Ukraine because I did not believe I had to fear such resistance there. There was, on one side, Koch's devotion to the Russians, on the other side he was a man with economic initiative; finally I knew he was supported in such a manner that he was intended for some job in the East by the Fuehrer as well as by the Reich Marshal.

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MR. DODD: When you were looking for a ruthless man you suggested Koch as early as April of 1941.

ROSENBERG: This expression refers here rather to initiative and, of course, to the view that he would fight any Bolshevik resistance ruthlessly; but not in the sense that he would suppress a foreign race or try to exterminate foreign cultures.

MR. DODD: The truth of the matter is that you had some peculiar and odd interest in the Ukraine and you had somebody else in mind for that job but you knew Koch was a bad actor and you wanted him in another part of Russia, is it not?

ROSENBERG: No, for the Ukraine I wanted State Secretary Backeor my Chief of Staff Schickedanz, as can be seen from this document. I wanted State Secretary Backe because he is a German from the Caucasus and speaks Russian, knows the entire southern territory and probably could have worked very well there. I did not get him and I was forced to accept Koch, I would like to say' against my personal protest in the meeting of 16 July 1941.

MR. DODD: Well, if that is your answer I do not care to go any further with it.

With respect to your attitude towards the Jewish people, in your Frankfurt speech in 1938 you suggested that they all had to leave Europe and Germany, did you not?

ROSENBERG: This phrasing was used.

MR. DODD: All you need to say is "yes" or "no." Did you do that or not in your speech in Frankfurt in 1938?

ROSENBERG: Yes, but I certainly cannot answer "yes" or "nor on an incorrect quotation!

MR. DODD: I do not think you need to explain anything at all. I merely asked you whether you said that in Frankfurt in your Party Day speech.

ROSENBERG: Yes, in substance that is correct.

MR. DODD: Now, in your Party Day speech to which you made reference yesterday, you said you used harsh language about the Jews. In those days you were objecting to the fact that they were in certain professions, I suppose, and things of that character. Is that a fair statement?

ROSENBERG: I said yesterday that in two speeches I demanded a chivalrous solution and equal treatment, and I said the foreign nations might not accuse us of discriminating against the Jewish people, so long as these foreign nations discriminate against our nation . . .

MR. DODD: Yes, very well. Did you ever talk about the extermination of the Jews?

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ROSENBERG: I have not in general spoken about the extermination of the Jews in the sense of this term. One has to consider the words here. The term "extermination" has been used by the British Prime Minister...

MR. DODD: You will get around to the words. You just tell me now whether you ever said it or not? You said that, did you not?

ROSENBERG: Not in a single speech in that sense...

MR. DODD: I understand the sense. Did you ever talk about it with anybody as a matter of State policy or Party policy, about the extermination of the Jews?

ROSENBERG: In a conference with the Fuehrer there was once an open discussion on this question about an intended speech which was not delivered. The sense of it was that now a war was going on and that this threat which had been made should not be mentioned again. That whole speech was also not delivered.

MR. DODD: When was it you were going to deliver that speech? Approximately what was the date?

ROSENBERG: In December 1941.

MR. DODD: Then you have written into your speech remarks about the extermination of Jews, haven't you? Answer that "yes" or "no."

ROSENBERG: I have said already that that word does not have the sense which you attribute to it.

MR. DODD: I will get around to the word and the meaning of it. I am asking you, did you not use the word or the term "extermination of the Jews" in the speech which you were prepared to make in the Sportpalast in December of 1941? Now, you can answer that pretty simply.

ROSENBERG: That may be, but I do not remember. I myself did not read the phrasing of the draft any further. In which form it was expressed I can no longer say.

MR. DODD: Well then, perhaps we can help you on that. I will ask you be shown Document 1517-PS. It becomes Exhibit USA-824.

[Document 1517-PS was submitted to the defendant.]

Now, this is also a memorandum of yours written by you about a discussion you had with Hitler on the 14th of December 1941, and it is quite clear from the first paragraph that you and Hitler were discussing a speech which you were to deliver in the Sportpalast in Berlin, and if you will look at the second paragraph, you will find these words:

"I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after

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the conclusion (of matters ~ the East). I took the standpoint not to speak of the extermination (Ausrottung) of Jewry. The Fuehrer affirmed this view and said that they had laid the burden of war on us and that they had brought the destruction; it is no wonder if the results would strike them first."

Now, you have indicated that you have some difficulty with the meaning of that word, and I am going to ask you about the word "Ausrottung." I am going to ask that you be shown-you are familiar with the standard German-English dictionary, Cassell's, I suppose, are you? Do you know this word, ever heard of it?

ROSENBERG: No.

MR. DODD: This is something you will be interested in. Will you look up and read out to the Tribunal what the definition of "Ausrottung" is?

ROSENBERG: I do not need a foreign dictionary in order to explain the various meanings "Ausrottung" may have in the German language. One can exterminate an idea, an economic system, a social order, and as a final consequence, also a group of human beings, certainly. Those are the many possibilities which are contained in that word. For that I do not need an English-German dictionary. Translations from German into English are so often wrong-and just as in that last document you have submitted to me, I heard again the translation of "Herrenrasse." In the document itself "Herrenrasse" is not even mentioned; however, there is the term "ein falsches Herrenmenschentum" (a false master mankind). Apparently everything is translated here in another sense.

MR. DODD: All right, I am not interested in that. Let us stay on this term of "Ausrottung." I take it then that you agree it does mean to "wipe out" or to "kill off," as it is understood, and that you did use the term in speaking to Hitler.

ROSENBERG: Here I heard again a different translation, which again used new German words, so I cannot determine what you wanted to express in English.

MR. DODD: Are you very serious in pressing this apparent inability of yours to agree with me about this ward or are you trying to kill time? Don't you know that there are plenty of people in this courtroom who speak German and who agree that that word does mean to "wipe out," to "extirpate?"

ROSENBERG: It means "to overcome" on one side and then it is to be used not with respect to individuals but rather to juridical entities, to certain historical traditions. On the other side this word has been used with respect to the German people and we have also not believed that in consequence thereof 60 millions of Germans would be shot.

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MR. DODD: I want to remind you that this speech of yours in which you use the term "Ausrottung" was made about 6 months after Himmler told Hoess, whom you heard on this witness stand, to start exterminating the Jews. That is a fact, is it not?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct, for Adolf Hitler said in his declaration before the Reichstag: Should a new world war be started by these attacks of the emigrants and their backers, then as a consequence there would be an extermination and an extirpation. That has been understood as a result and as a political threat. Apparently, a similar political threat was also used by me before the war against America broke out. And, when the war had already broken out, I have apparently said that, since it has come to this, there is no use to speak of it at all.

MR. DODD: Well, actually, the Jews were being exterminated in the Eastern Occupied Territories at that time and thereafter, weren't they?

ROSENBERG: Then, may I perhaps ray something about the use of the words here? We are speaking here of extermination of Jewry; there is also still a difference between "Jewry" and "the Jews."

MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that at that time and later on Jews were being exterminated in the Occupied Eastern Territories which were under your ministry? Will you answer that 'yes" or "no"?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I quoted a document on that yesterday.

MR. DODD: Yes, and after that you told the Tribunal or, as l understood you at least, you wanted the Tribunal to believe that that was being done by the Police and without any of your people being involved in it; is that so?

ROSENBERG: I have heard from a witness that a district commissioner is said to have participated in these things in Vilna, and I have heard from another witness that in other cities the report came through that the Police would carry it out. From Document 1184 I gathered that a district commissioner opposed in every possible way and protested against this so-called "Schweinerei" (scandalous doings).

MR. DODD: Dr. Leibbrandt was your subordinate; he was in charge of Division II in your Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, wasn't he?

ROSENBERG: Yes, for a time.

MR. DODD: Now, for the second time, I'll ask that you be shown Document 3663-PS, Exhibit USA-825.

[Document 3663-PS was submitted to the defendant.]

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Now, this document consists of three parts as you will notice. The first page is a letter written by Dr. Leibbrandt on the stationery of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and it is dated 31 October 1941; that's not too many days before you had your conversation with the Fuehrer about your speech, and it is addressed to the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland in Riga. That was Lohse, the man whom you recommended. The letter says:

"The Reich Security Main Office has complained that the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland has forbidden execution of Jews in Libau. I request a report in regard to this matter by return mail. By order"-signed-"Dr. Leibbrandt."

Now, if you will turn to the next page, you will see the answer Turn that document over if you have the original-do you? You will see the answer, dated Riga, the 15th of November 1941, to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin. "Subject: Execution of Jews, re: Decree." It refers to the letter of Leibbrandt, apparently, of the 31st of October 1941, and it says:

"I have forbidden the wild execution of Jews in Libau because they were not justifiable in the manner in which they were carried out. I should like to be informed whether your inquiry of 31 October is to be regarded as a directive to liquidate all Jews in the Ostland. Shall this take place without regard to age and sex and economic interests of the Wehrmacht, for instance in specialists in the armament industry?"

And there is a note in different handwriting:

"Of course, the cleansing of the Ostland of Jews is a main task. Its solution, however, must be harmonized with the necessities of war production."

It continues:

"So far, I have not been able to find such a directive, either in the regulations regarding the Jewish question in the 'Brown Portfolio' or in other decrees."

Now, that has the initial "L" for "Lohse," doesn't it, at the bottom of it? And then, if you'll look at the third page-no, it is another document. There are only two parts to that document.

Now, I wish that you would look at Document 3666-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-826.

THE PRESIDENT: That has on it the initial "L," has it?

MR. DODD: The original has, Your Honor; yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And the defendant agrees that that is the initial of Lohse; is that right?

ROSENBERG: That could hardly be Lohse. I do not know Lohse's initial. I do not know.

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MR. DODD: Well, it's very . . .

ROSENBERG: It could also be Leibbrandt; I do not know.

MR. DODD: You're not willing to say that that second letter was from Lohse and that that is his initial on the bottom of it?

ROSENBERG: That I cannot say.

MR. DODD: All right.

ROSENBERG: That I cannot say because usually typewritten letters are sent anywhere.

MR. DODD: Well, we're...

ROSENBERG: This note in the back is not quite clear to me. Essentially, however, it means that this was a protest against police measures which had become known and that an instruction...

MR. DODD: We will go into what it means in a minute. We're just talking about the initial "L." While we're tallying about the initial, will you look at it and see if there are any "R's," capital "R"?

ROSENBERG: Yes, here is an "L."

MR. DODD: Yes, "R"?

ROSENBERG: Yes, here are two "R's."

MR. DODD: Did you put those on there?

ROSENBERG: No.

MR. DODD: You initialled them, did you?

ROSENBERG: I cannot decipher that as my "R."

MR. DODD: You say that it is not your "R"? We will have to be clear about this. You'd have to know your own initial when you saw it anywhere.

ROSENBERG: I never made such a pointed "R" on the top. You can compare it with my handwriting.

MR. DODD: We'll do that; don't worry. I just want to ask you now if that is your initial or not?

ROSENBERG: I cannot identify that as my initial.

ME. DODD: Do you say that it is not your initial?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: All right. Now, I wish you'd look at Document 3666-PS, which is also related to these other documents, and that is also a letter written on the stationery of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and it is dated December 18, 1941. Subject: Jewish Question. Re: Correspondence of 15 November 1941. This is an answer then to the letter marked "L," inquiring whether or not execution of the Jews is to be understood as a fixed policy.

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"Clarification of the Jewish question has most likely been achieved by now through verbal discussions. Economic considerations should on principle remain unconsidered in the settlement of the problem. Moreover, it is requested that questions arising be settled directly with the Higher SS and Police Leader. By order (signed) Brautigam."

Have you seen that letter before?

ROSENBERG: No, I have not seen it; in my opinion no. Here I see again such an "R." pointed on the top, and I cannot identify that as my "R" either.

MR. DODD: So that you do not identify that as having your initial, either?

ROSENBERG: Well, I could simply not identify that as my "R" because this was a letter, signed by Brautigam sent from the Ministry of the Eastern Occupied Territories to the Ostland, and the notes on the top are from an office that has received that letter.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to an explicit error here? This "R" is in connection with a "K." That apparently means "Reichskommissar."

MR. DODD: I am not discussing the "R" on the top of the letter; I am discussing the one of the handwritten letter.

ROSENBERG: Well, it can be seen from this "R" now quite unequivocally that this concerns the man who received the letter. "Received on 22 December-R." And it is addressed from the Ministry to the "Ostland." That note, therefore, was written by a person living in Riga, and that is the same "R" which can be found also on the other document.

MR. DODD: Who is your Reich Commissioner in the East for Riga?

ROSENBERG: Lohse.

MR. DODD: His name didn't begin with "R." did it?

ROSENBERG: Yes, but it is clear that this letter obviously was initialled in his department.

DR. THOMA: May I also help the Tribunal in this matter? In the handwritten thing with the German "L" you will find on the left margin "WV 1112/41," which means to be presented again (Wiedervorlage). And then you find "presented (vorgelegt) 1/12141 R." That appears to have taken place in the office of the Reich Commissioner and it is a first draft and therefore it was marked only with the first letter of his name.

MR. DODD: We do not accept that as being any statement with which we can prove this at this Trial. I think the matter as to whose initial it is will be presented later for determination.

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THE PRESIDENT: What do the words at the top mean, "The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories"?

MR. DODD: That is the stationery upon which it is written. It is handwritten on this particular paper because this whole letter was handwritten on the back of the first letter. These were both found in this defendant's office in Berlin.

[Turning to the defendant.] Well, now, I'd like to call your attention to another document, Number 36.

ROSENBERG: I maintain emphatically that that initial "R" was put down by the person who received the letter, to whom the letter was addressed.

MR. DODD: Wells we'll get around that. Document Number 36-I ask that you be shown Document Number 3428, which becomes Exhibit USA-827.

THE PRESIDENT: Give me the number again, will you?

MR. DODD: I am sorry. 3428-PS becomes 827, USA-827.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, this is a letter written from Minsk in the occupied area on July 31, 1942, and it is written by Kube, Kube. He was another one of your subordinates, wasn't he? Will you answer that please?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: And it is written to Lohse, the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern territory, isn't it?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that's right.

MR. DODD: Now, then, let's look at it: "Combating of partisans and Action against Jews in the District General of White Ruthenia." It says:

"In all the clashes with partisans in White Ruthenia it has been proved that Jewry, in the former Polish part"-and so on-"is the main exponent of the partisan movement. In consequence, the treatment of Jewry in White Ruthenia is mainly a matter of political concern...."

Then, moving down a sentence or two:

"In exhaustive discussions with the SS Brigadefuehrer Zenner and the exceedingly capable leader of the SD, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. jur. Strauch, it was ascertained that we have liquidated in the last 10 weeks about 55,000 Jews in White Ruthenia. In the area of Minsk, Jewry has been completely eliminated, without endangering the manpower commitment. In the predominantly Polish district of Lida, 16,000 Jews; in Slonim, 8,000 Jews"-and so forth-"have been liquidated. Owing to an encroachment by the Army supply and

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communications zone already reported to you, the preparations made by us for liquidation of the Jews in the Glebokie area, have been disturbed. The Army supply and communications zone, without contacting me, has liquidated 10,000 Jews, whose systematical elimination had been provided for by us in any event. In the city of Minsk approximately 10,000 Jews were liquidated on 28 and 29 July, 6,500 of them Russian Jews, predominantly aged persons, women and children; the remainder consisting of Jews unfit for commitment to labor, the greater majority of whom were deported to Minsk in November of last year from Vienna, Brunn, Bremen, and Berlin, by order of the Fuehrer.

"The area of Sluzk, too, had been relieved of several thousand Jews. The same applies to Novogrodek and Vileika. Radical measures are imminent for Baranowicze and Hanzewitschi. In Baranowicze alone, approximately 10,000 Jews are still living in the city itself; of these, 9,000 Jews will be liquidated next month."

And it goes on to say:

"In the city of Minsk 2,600 Jews from Germany are left over. In addition, all 6,000 Russian Jews and Jewesses who during the action stayed with the units to which they were assigned for work are still alive. Even in the future Minsk will still retain its character as the strongest center of the Jewish labor commitment, necessitated for the present by the concentration of the armament industries and by the rail problems. In all other areas, the number of Jews to be drafted for labor commitment will be limited by the SD and by me to 800 at the most, but if possible to 500..."

And so on. It tells of other situations with respect to Jews, all of which I do not think it is necessary to read. But I do want to call your attention to the last paragraph, the last sentence:

"I fully agree with the Commander of the SD in White Ruthenia, that we shall liquidate every shipment of Jews which is not ordered or announced by our superior offices, to prevent further disturbances in White Ruthenia."

And up above I did omit one sentence or two that I wanted to read:

"Naturally, after the termination of the economic demands of the Wehrmacht, the SD and I would like it best definitely to eliminate Jewry in the District General of White Ruthenia. For the time being, the necessary demands of the Wehrmacht, which are the main employers of Jews, are considered."

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I ought to tell you as well that this document was also found in your office in Berlin. Now, that is a letter...

ROSENBERG: That seems very improbable to me, that it has been found in my office in Berlin. If so, it can be at most only that the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland had sent all his files to Berlin, packed in boxes. It was not in my office at that time, and this letter was also never presented to me. There is stamped here, "The Reich Commissioner for the Ostland," not the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I stated yesterday, however, that a number of such happenings were reported to me as individual actions in the fighting, and that I received this one report from Sluzk personally, and Gauleiter Meyer was immediately charged to protest to Heydrich and to order an investigation. That presupposes that he, the Gauleiter Meyer, did not know of and did not think of such a general action on order of a central command.

MR. DODD: Well, I only want to suggest to you that it is a strange coincidence that two of your top men were in communication in this tone in 1942 without your knowledge.

Did you also tell the Tribunal yesterday that you understood that most of the difficulty or a large part of the difficulty in the East for the Jewish people came from the local population? Do you remember saying that yesterday?

ROSENBERG: I did not receive this translation.

MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that yesterday you told the Tribunal that much of the difficulty for the Jews in the East came from the local population of those areas.

ROSENBERG: Yes. I was informed about that in the beginning by returning personalities, that it was not due to local authorities but to parts of the population. I knew the attitude in the East from before and could well imagine that this was true.

Secondly, I have stated that I had been informed that along with executions of various other nests of resistance and centers of sabotage in various cities, a large number of Jews were shot by the police. And then I have treated the case of Sluzk here.

MR. DODD: I think you will agree that in the Ukraine your man Koch was doing all kinds of terrible things, and now I don't understand that you dispute that Lohse and Kube were helping to eliminate or liquidate the Jews, and that Brautigam, an important member of your staff, and that Leibbrandt, another important member of your staff, were informed of the program. So that five people at least under your administration were engaged in this kind of conduct, and not small people at that.

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ROSENBERG: I should like to point out that a decree by the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland is at hand, which in agreement . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question first? Do you agree that these five people were engaged in exterminating Jews?

ROSENBERG: Yes. They knew about a certain number of liquidations of Jews. That I admit, and they have told me so, or if they did not, I have heard it from other sources. I only want to state one thing: That according to the general law of the Reich, the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland issued a decree according to which Jewry, which of course was hostile to us, should be concentrated in certain Jewish quarters of the cities. And until the end, until 1943-1944, I have heard that in these cities such work was still carried out in these Jewish ghettos to a very large extent.

And may I supplement this with still another case which came to my knowledge, namely that a district commissioner...

MR. DODD: I don't want you to point out anything else. You have answered the question, and you have explained your answer. I don't ask you further...

ROSENBERG: What I wanted to add explains another part of my answer in a very concrete case, namely, a district commissioner in the Ukraine had been accused before the court of having committed blackmail in a Jewish community and having sent furs, clothes, et cetera to Germany. He was brought before court, he was sentenced to death, and was shot.

MR. DODD: Well, that is very interesting, but I don't think it is a necessary explanation of that answer at all. And I would ask that you try to confine these answers. I would like to get through here in a few minutes.

You are also, of course, the man who wrote the letter, as you told the Tribunal yesterday, suggesting the out-of-hand execution of 100 Jews in France, although you said you thought that was what? a little bad judgment, or not quite just, or something of the kind? Is that right?

ROSENBERG: I made my statement about that yesterday.

MR. DODD: I know you have, and I would like to talk about it for a minute today. Is that what you said about it, that it was not right, and that it was not just? "Yes" or "no," didn't you say that to the Tribunal yesterday?

ROSENBERG: You have to quote literally, word for word, if you want me to answer "yes" or "no."

MR. DODD: I will ask you again. Didn't you say yesterday before this Tribunal that your suggestion in that letter, in Document 001-PS,

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was wrong and was not just? Now, that is pretty simple and you can answer it.

ROSENBERG: I stated that it was humanly unjust.

MR. DODD: It was murder, isn't that what it was, a plan for murder? "Yes" or "no"?

ROSENBERG: No. But I considered the shooting of hostages, which was publicly made known by the Armed Forces, as an obviously generally accepted fact under the exceptional conditions of war. These shootings of hostages were published in the press. Therefore, I had to assume that according to international law and certain traditions of warfare this was an accepted act of reprisal Therefore, I cannot admit...

MR. DODD: Well, were you talking then as the benign philosopher or as a soldier? When you wrote this letter, 001-PS, in what capacity were you writing it, as a benign, philosophical minister on ideology and culture, or were you a member of the Armed Forces?

ROSENBERG: As can be seen from the document, I have spoken about the fact that certain sabotage and murder of German soldiers was being committed here, so that good future relations, which I also aimed for, between Germany and France would be poisoned forever. For that reason this letter was written, although I regret it from the human point of view.

MR. DODD: It comes a little late, don't you think?

The witness Hoess you were in the courtroom when he testified, Hoess, Hoess?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I heard him.

MR. DODD: You heard that terrible story of 21/2 to 3 million murders which he told from the witness stand, very largely of Jewish people?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: Although it was not brought out here, you can take it from me as being so. If you care to dispute it, you may, and we will establish it later. You know that he was a reader of your book and of your speeches, this man Hoess?

ROSENBERG: I do not know whether he read my books. Anti-Jewish books have existed for the last 2,000 years.

MR. DODD: Now, you offered to resign in October 1944 from your position as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories?

ROSENBERG: October 1944.

MR. DODD: You did not have very much to resign from on that date, did you? The Germans were practically out of Russia, isn't that

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a fact? On October 12, 1944, the German Army was practically out of Russia. It was on the retreat, isn't that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes. It was' the question of my further tasks for the political and psychological treatment of several millions of Eastern workers in Germany; it was furthermore a question of refugee

s who came from the Eastern territories and from the Ukraine to Germany, and of the settlement of economic problems, and above all I still had the hope even at that hour that a military change also might still occur in the East.

MR. DODD: And everybody, pretty nearly everybody who was informed at all in Germany knew that the war was lost in October of 1944, isn't that so? You knew that the war was lost in October of 1944.

ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.

MR. DODD: You did not know that?

ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.

MR. DODD: I will accept that answer. That is all. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, do you wish to reexamine? [There was no response.]

General Rudenko, have you got some additional questions you want to ask?

GEN. RUDENKO: I have some questions to ask in connection with the defendant's activities in the Eastern territories.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, General.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, at what time did you begin, personally and directly, to participate in preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union?

ROSENBERG: Not at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was your appointment of 20 April 1941 to the post of the Fuehrer's Commissioner in central control for all questions relating to the Eastern European territories not directly connected with Germany's attack on the Soviet Union?

ROSENBERG: That was no longer a planning in which I took part, but it was the consequence of a decision which had already been made and about which my advice had not been asked. I was notified that a decision had been made and military orders had been given. Therefore I have nothing... Well, if I have to answer the question as much as possible with "yes" or "no," I have just answered this, on the basis of the wording, with "no."

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GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny the fact that this appointment took place in April 1941?

ROSENBERG: That is evident, that I received a task.

GEN. RUDENKO: With this nomination Hitler gave you very wide powers. You collaborated with the highest authorities of the Reich, received information from them and summoned the Reich authorities to meetings. In particular you collaborated with Goering, with the Minister for Economy, and with Keitel. Do you confirm this? Please reply briefly.

ROSENBERG: There are, again, three questions. As to the first question, whether I received wide powers, plenipotentiary powers, I had not received plenipotentiary powers at all. The answer would be "no."

To the second question, whether I had conferences, the answer is "yes." As a matter of course, I conferred with the supreme Reich authorities who were concerned with the East, as was my duty in connection with my task.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please reply briefly to the following question: Immediately after your appointment of 20 April 1941, did you hold a conference with the Chief of the OKW?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I visited Field Marshal Keitel.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conversation with Brauchitsch and Raeder in connection with your appointment, regarding the solution of the Eastern problems?

ROSENBERG: According to my recollection I did not speak to Brauchitsch and I also have no recollection of having had any conversation at that time with Raeder.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conference with the Defendant Funk, who appointed Dr. Schlotterer as his permanent representative?

ROSENBERG: The then Reich Minister Funk, of course, was shortly informed of this task given me and he named Dr. Schlotterer for purposes of liaison.

GEN. RUDENKO: You had several conversations with General Thomas, State Secretary Korner, State Secretary Backe, and Ministerial Director Riecke, regarding the economic exploitation of the Eastern territories?

ROSENBERG: I do not believe that I spoke to Thomas, and I met the other gentlemen gradually, one by one. Later I took over Riecke as liaison man to the Economic Staff East in the Ministry. I must have met Backe also later on, as is natural in the course of time. I do not know at all whether I ever met General Thomas personally, maybe I met him in passing.

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GEN. RUDENKO: Then I shall have to produce documents where you yourself speak about it.

You were negotiating with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and. as a result, the Defendant Ribbentrop appointed Grosskopf to act as permanent liaison officer with your organization, and placed on the other hand Dr. Brautigam in charge of the political section. Is that corrects

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct, because the Foreign Minister was, of course, informed briefly and appointed the then Consul General Grosskopf as ambassador...

GEN. RUDENKO: You received competent representatives of the Ministry of Propaganda such as: Fritzsche, Schmidt, Glasmeier, and others?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that may have been so. I met most of these gentlemen for the first time then, and it goes without saying that I had to inform myself about the task.

GEN. RUDENKO: You negotiated with the Chief of Staff of the SA and requested him to place at your disposal the most experienced of the SA leaders.

ROSENBERG: Of course I also spoke to the Chief of Staff of the SA about possible capable assistants in the event of an occupation of the Eastern territories.

GEN. RUDENKO: In this connection, therefore, you will not deny that a coordinating center did actually exist for preparing measures of attack against the Soviet Union.

ROSENBERG: Not in that form, because all the tasks connected with the conflict with the Soviet Union were divided up from a military point of view. They were assigned to Goering in the field of economic planning; they were, as became evident later on, clearly defined with the Police. I had been given a political liaison office in order to discuss the political problems of the East, and to give the different offices ideas about the eventual political administration and the direction of this policy. In the main I did that in the sense which you find in my speech of 20 June

GEN. RUDENKO: Very welt One and a half months before the treacherous attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, you drafted a directive for all Reich commissioners in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You do not deny that?

ROSENBERG: I already mentioned that yesterday. In the line of duty, some provisional drafts were worked out by myself and my assistants. These drafts which we have here, or which have been shown to me up to now, were not sent out in this form.

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall return to this question later.

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In your report which you submitted to Hitler on 28 June 1941, regarding the preliminary work on questions connected with the Eastern territories, you stated that you had had a talk with Admiral Canaris, during which you asked Canaris, in the interests of counterintelligence work, to choose certain persons who, while working on counterintelligence, would also be able to do political work. Do you confirm this statement?

ROSENBERG: No' that is not correct. But I heard that Admiral Canaris had organized a certain group of Ukrainians, I believe, and other nationals for some sabotage or other work. He visited me once and I asked him not to meddle with the political work, that is with the political preparatory work, and he assured me he would not.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny your meeting Canaris?

ROSENBERG: The meeting-no.

GEN. RUDENKO: And the conversation in which you asked him, in the interests of Intelligence, to select certain people to help you. Do you deny that?

ROSENBERG: No-yes, I deny that. However, I do not deny the fact that, of course, if Canaris had an interesting political report it would be proper for him to inform me about it on occasion. I had no counterintelligence organization or espionage organization. During these years I never...

GEN. RUDENKO: We are going to submit this document to you.

[Turning to the President.] Mr. President, perhaps we can declare recess now, because I still have a series of questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

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Afternoon Session.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn the hearing of this case at 4 o'clock in order to hear supplementary applications for witnesses and documents. The Tribunal hope, therefore, that we may be able to conclude the case of the Defendant Rosenberg before that I mean, to conclude the case of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his only other witness, or any other witness.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, you replied to me that the conversation with Admiral Canaris did not take place.

ROSENBERG: On the contrary, I said that such a conference with Admiral Canaris did take place.

GEN. RUDENKO: Then maybe this was wrongly translated.

ROSENBERG: Probably.

GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you whether you requested Canaris in the course of your conversation, in the interests of the counterintelligence service, to choose men who, while working as counterintelligence agents, would be able to do simultaneously political work. Do you remember my question?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was that the main subject of your conversation?

ROSENBERG: That is not correct. Admiral Canaris had . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: That is not correct? Well, let us not go into that tin detail.

In order to speed up the interrogation, I will show you a document, and I will read this passage into the record.

Show this document to the defendant. [Turning to the Tribunal.] I mean, gentlemen of the Tribunal, Document 1039-PS, on Page 2. The part is underlined. I will read this passage.

[Turning to the defendant.] This is your report on the preliminary work concerning the organization of the territory of Eastern Europe I read:

"A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect that, under the existing confidential circumstances, my office could in no way negotiate with any representatives of the peoples of Eastern Europe. I asked him to do this insofar as counterespionage work required it and then to name persons to me who, over and above counterespionage service, might be regarded as political personalities, in order to determine their possible utilization later. Admiral Canaris said that of course he would take into consideration my request not to

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recognize any political groups among the emigrants, and that he intended to act in line with my statements."

ROSENBERG: That is in accord with what I said.

THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you are going a little too fast.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.

[Turning to the defendant.] I ask you, do you confirm this quotation?

ROSENBERG: Yes, in the German wording but not in the Russian translation. I understand Russian also and can, therefore, determine that the translation is not entirely correct; for it says here that I, under the existing confidential circumstances, naturally could not negotiate with other countries for eventual collaboration in a civilian administration. That is the first point. And point two is that, since Admiral Canaris had to do with various groups of Ukrainians, Russians, and other people, I was asking him-apart from counterintelligence, that is-not to do espionage work for me or ask me to do espionage work but that he should point out to me people of other nationalities whom I could use later-under given conditions- in civilian administration. That was the meaning; and furthermore, at the end it is quite correct that he agreed not to carry on any political work himself.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, this absolutely follows the Russian text. What you just told us now means exactly the same in Russian.

ROSENBERG: According to the German translated into Russian it must have been that. I can recognize only the German text, not the Russian translation, which is not in accord with this meaning. You interpret this text as though I were trying to carry on espionage work. I asked Admiral Canaris, since I could not carry on political negotiations with representatives of the Eastern people, simply to tell me from his personal knowledge, apart from his official capacity, what people of the Eastern regions, under certain circumstances, might later work in the civilian administration for me. That is the meaning. The translation is, therefore, not entirely correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well; but you confirm the German text?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: It means you were connected with counterespionage?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I only received Admiral Canaris and told him that, in his official capacity in which he had to function, he should not deal with political negotiations and plans, because I was now being given that task.

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GEN. RUDENKO: You heard the admonition of the President of the Tribunal about answering briefly, and I beg you to do so.

ROSENBERG: I would answer more briefly if the questions were put to me factually.

GEN. RUDENKO: I will put to you several questions concerning the aims of the war against the Soviet Union. Do you admit that Nazi Germany, having prepared and pursued war against the Soviet Union, aimed at plundering the economic riches of the Soviet Union, the extermination of her people, the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or not?

ROSENBERG: Five questions are being put to me again, and if . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you please answer briefly: Do you admit the aims of the aggression as I have put them to you? You will be able to give your explanation later.

THE PRESIDENT: You can answer that question "yes" or "no."

ROSENBERG: I must answer "no" to all four questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: You deny it. All right. Let us turn to a new document in this connection. I mean the Document 2718-PS, which is in the minutes of the morning session of 10 December 1945. That is your memorandum dated 2 May 1941. [The document was handed to the defendant.] Wilt you please follow? This document reads as follows:

"1) The war can be continued only if all the Armed Forces are fed with stocks from Russia in the third year of the war. "2) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people will die of starvation if we take out of this country everything that we need."

I ask you now, did you write that?

ROSENBERG: I neither wrote that nor did I participate in this session, and I cannot determine whether any one of my collaborators knew anything at all about this meeting. It says here, "Senior officers only, two copies, one for the files (Ia) and the second General Limbert." Therefore, only two people in the Armed Forces knew about this.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into that in detail, Defendant. You do not know about this?

ROSENBERG: This document has been submitted twice already.

GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on to the next one.

THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew of this document.

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ROSENBERG: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: We come to the next document, which determines the aims of the war. This is your instruction to the Reich Commissioner for the Baltic countries and for Bielorussia. You stated the following-I mean now the Document 1029-PS; the part which I will read is marked in the margin:

"The aim of a Reich Commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bielorussia must be to strive for the creation of a German protectorate, with a view to transforming these regions later into a part of Greater Germany by the Germanization of racially admissible elements, the colonization of Germanic peoples, and the resettlement of undesirable elements."

Do you remember these instructions? Please reply first.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I am familiar with this document, I already remarked yesterday that at the beginning all sorts of drafts were made in my office which were not approved by me. The corrections were made by me.

GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you very clearly, do you know these instructions or not?

ROSENBERG: But I still heard the wrong translation. Nothing is mentioned about "destruction," but "incorporation," and the Russian translation again said "destruction." If it is translated that way, then my question appears in the Russian language as an approval of destruction; and that is a wrong translation which is being made here, which I can follow only because I speak Russian.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you can be heard perfectly well without shouting.

ROSENBERG: I beg your pardon.

GEN. RUDENKO: You are only correcting an error in the translation. Now as regards the rest-Germanization and colonization-is that right? Does that sound right in German? Answer me. Is that right or not?

ROSENBERG: Even in that way it is not translated quite correctly. Here it says "colonization of German peoples," and now you are translating "Germanization and colonization." These are two substantives which again give correspondingly different sense, and I would like to add that these drafts made by a collaborator of mine were not actually issued, and that they in no way constitute instructions.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you, was it issued or not; but I ask you, was there such a draft? Will you deny that?

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ROSENBERG: I am not disputing that such a draft was submitted to my office.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We pass on.

These instructions concern the aims of the war. They are instructions for all Reich Commissioners of the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 8 May 1941. This is Document 1030-PS. I will read only a short excerpt, which states-I quote from Page 4. This excerpt is marked in the margin. In these instructions you state that this coming struggle would be a struggle for the supplying of Germany and all of Europe with raw materials and foodstuffs. Do you confirm this?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Then you confirm that.

ROSENBERG: Yes, of course. This document was presented in my office as a draft. That is correct, and I am not disputing it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into details again. I will remind you once more, please reply briefly. You confirmed this point, and that is enough.

ROSENBERG: This document, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. This statement was made by you previous to the attack on the Soviet Union. I will remind you, but I will not submit the document to you since it has already been presented to the Tribunal several times and is at the disposal of the Tribunal. I mean a conference which took place in Hitler's office on 16 July 1941.

[Turning to the Tribunal.] This is Document 221, Mr. President.

[Turning to the defendant] You were present at this conference, were you?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Hitler said then that the Baltic States would have to become an integral part of the Reich, and the same applied to the Crimea with adjacent territories as well as to the Volga districts and also the Baku area. Do you recall these statements of Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I have seen this document, purporting to be Bormann's observations, here for the first time. At that time the Fuehrer made very long, passionate statements. I did not take any exact notes at that conference, but he did in fact speak about the Crimea, and he said that, because of the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, no bearers of arms should be allowed there later and. . .

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask why. I ask you: did he say that?

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THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you are going too fast. You must wait until the man is finished.

GEN. RUDENKO: He is going into too many details, Mr. President.

[Turning to the defendant] Well, you admit the Crimea. You agreed with Hitler's idea concerning the seizure of these territories?

ROSENBERG: You can see from the document and you can see from my speech how I pictured the self-determination of all the peoples in the East in a new order of states; and I controverted the declarations of the Fuehrer. That can be seen here. That was how I argued.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you about that. I am asking you whether you agreed with these ideas of Hitler, or whether you objected to them.

ROSENBERG: Yes, it can be proved that I protested, and it is even shown in the record.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are not concerned with whether or not it can be proved. The question is: did you agree or not. You can answer that, I suppose. Did you agree, or did you not agree?

ROSENBERG: I agreed with many points and rejected other points; but this is a compilation of at least 10 to 15 points.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is an answer.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We will return to this question in a few minutes.

I am now passing on to your own directives, which you issued as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. These documents were already presented to the Tribunal as 1056-PS and EC-347. First of all, I would like to ask you one question: What is this "Brown Folder"?

ROSENBERG: The Brown Folder was compiled by the administrative department of the Eastern Ministry in response to certain requests of industry, of my political department, of the personnel department, and of the technical supply department for officials in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine. Thus it was the first attempt at a general regulation.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, then that is a sort of "Green Folder." It is quite clear.

Now, let us turn to your directives, Document EC-347. We will show you this document right away. Will you note the passage which has been underlined, on Page 39 of the document, if I am not mistaken. I will read this paragraph:

"The first task of the civilian administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories is to represent the interests of the Reich."

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I omit a few lines.

"The stipulations of the Hague Convention regarding land warfare, which deal with the administration of territories occupied by a foreign power, do not apply, since the U.S.S.R. can be considered as nonexistent...."

Then further:

"Therefore, all measures which the German administration deems necessary or suitable in order to carry out this extensive task are admissible."

Do you agree that this exposes, your secret designs, although you somehow too hastily proclaimed the Soviet Union as destroyed?

ROSENBERG: In the Russian translation I again heard the word "plundering," but the word "plundering" does not appear in this German text. If the German text is translated in such a way that the word "plundering" appears everywhere, although in the German . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: I interrupt you and say that the word "plundering" is not in the Russian text, which I just read into the record; so I believe you are simply inventing, or at least you did not hear rightly.

ROSENBERG: May I say a few words in this connection?

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you, did you write this?

ROSENBERG: I did not, in fact, write it, but it was a circular letter which was issued by the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories, and, therefore, I am officially responsible for this Brown Folder. But I would like to say a few words of explanation in regard to this-the explanation about the status of international law in the East I received from the Fuehrer's headquarters. It stated that, in accordance with the attitude of the Soviet Union toward certain conventions, as far as the Hague Convention was concerned, it did not apply to the Soviet Union in this instance. Furthermore, as this document contains many pages, I was not able to read it in its entirety at the time; but on the second page I have already found a paragraph which shows very obviously what lines the wording followed. It states as follows...

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, one minute, please.

ROSENBERG: But I must be allowed to read from the document.

THE PRESIDENT: We must try and conduct this crossexamination in an orderly fashion. Now, what is the question?

[Turning to General Rudenko.] What is your question?

GEN. RUDENKO: I put to him the question, whether he admitted that he knew of the tasks put before the civilian administration in

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the occupied territories as they are set forth in the quotation which I just read. He said that he did know. I have exhausted my questions in this particular sphere. The document is in possession of the Defense and the Defense will be able to quote other parts of this document which have not yet been read into the record. This is a very long document. If I had tried to quote it to the Tribunal in its entirety it would have taken too much time.

THE PRESIDENT: [To the defendant.] You answered the question. I understood what the question was, and that you were told that the Hague Convention did not apply to Russia.

ROSENBERG: Yes. May I quote this one paragraph on Page 40, the next to the last paragraph:

"The most important prerequisite for this "-that is, for the development of the East-" is the treatment of the country and of the people in a corresponding manner. The war against the Soviet Union is-with all necessary regard to the securing of foodstuffs-a political campaign with the establishment of lasting order as its objective. The conquered territory as a whole is, therefore, not to be considered an object of exploitation, even if the German food and war economy must lay claim to considerable areas on Q large scale."

And I believe I may say that the fact that the necessities of the inhabitants are taken into consideration cannot be expressed more clearly.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I will put to you a few more questions as to how you treated the population, although we have heard quite a lot about this treatment, as you have too. We pass on.

I asked you about the Crimea and you said, "Yes, Hitler proposed to annex the Crimea to Germany." Do you remember that you did not only approve of these plans, but you also invented new names for towns-for instance, Simferopol was to be called "Gotenburg" and Sevastopol was to become "Theodorichshafen." Do you remember that?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct. The Fuehrer told me that I should think of a change of names for these cities. The renaming of very many other cities was discussed, too. .

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, of course.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I am expected to conclude my entire presentation of evidence with respect to Rosenberg by 4 o'clock. I do not know how I can do that.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not laid that down as a condition. I did not make any order about it. I said only that the Tribunal hoped, and the "hope" was addressed more to the Prosecution than it was to the Defense.

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DR. THOMA: Mr. President, if I may be permitted to say so, the Soviet Prosecutor has submitted documents again which I already submitted yesterday, and on which the defendant has already given answers. I am referring to Documents 1029-PS and 1030-PS. The defendant himself already said...

THE PRESIDENT: You are wasting the time of the Court by making this entire interposition.

GEN. RUDENKO: Thus you admit the change of the names of Simferopol and Sevastopol.

Next question: You also worked on the reorganization of the Caucasus, and you had organized a special staff. Will you answer 'yes'' or "no"?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Furthermore, you favored Prince Bagration-Mukhransky, an adventurer from the migr circle, as candidate for the throne of Georgia. Is that true? Answer briefly.

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is true. We did mention that-we spoke about him-but we turned down such a candidacy.

GEN. RUDENKO: He was turned down. Is that so? Very well.

As regards the reorganization of the Caucasus, on 27 July 1942 you compiled a special report; is that true?

ROSENBERG: It may be that a report was made. Yes-yes, naturally, it is quite a lengthy report. It has been submitted here.

GEN. RUDENKO: And I will show you this report in order to draw your attention to one shorn' quotation.

[Turning to the President] I have in mind, Mr. President, a document which has already been submitted as Exhibit USSR-58.

[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, please pay attention to Page 7, a passage which is marked, which says first that the German Reich must seize all the oil. Have you found this passage?

ROSENBERG: On Page 7 of the text I find the passage-yes, I have found it.

GEN. RUDENKO: The text reads:

"From the economic point of view the German Reich must take control of the total oil supply. The necessary participation in the riches could be discussed in the future."

Do you confirm that this statement was made by you?

ROSENBERG: This document is a memorandum of my office, and I confirm that it is true.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.

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ROSENBERG: May I make a remark in addition? Here we are not talking about the oppression of a people but of an assurance of autonomy and of every possible mitigation for these people. Only I cannot locate that at once from a document which has 14 pages if I only read one sentence.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have just questioned you concerning the tasks of the German Reich with regard to this matter of oil. Now if you look at Page 14 of this same report you will find it at the very end-this is how you define the tasks:

"The problem of the Eastern territories consists of a transference of peoples from a Baltic to a German field of culture and the preparation for the military frontiers of Germany on a vast scale. The task of the Ukraine is to provide Germany and Europe with foodstuffs and the continent with raw materials. The task in the Caucasus is, above all, of a political nature and represents the decisive extension of continental Europe, under German direction, from the Caucasian isthmus to the Near East."

Did you read this passage?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these were the actual plans?

ROSENBERG: I affirm that this is set down correctly, and that it is in accord with our hope that eastern continental Europe might, some time, be incorporated into the total economic system and economic supply of the rest of the continent, as had been the case before 1914; for at that time the Ukraine was an important country of exports of raw materials and foodstuffs.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, your plan concerning the Ukraine is well known. In this connection I will put the last question concerning aggression. After having seen these documents, which you do not deny, do you admit the aggressive and plundering character of Germany's war against the Soviet Union and your personal responsibility for the planning and carrying out of this aggression? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or do you not?

ROSENBERG: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: No? Very well.

ROSENBERG: No, because I did not consider this a war of aggression on our part but just the opposite.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course; but we will not go into details.

I have a few more questions to put to you concerning the German administration and the German policy in the Occupied Eastern Territories.

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Who was the highest official in the civil administration in the Reich Commission?

ROSENBERG: The Minister tot the Occupied Eastern Territories was responsible for the administration and legislation in the Eastern Territories, and the Reich Commissioner, for the territorial governments.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal have already heard all about the administration the former administration-and personnel of the administration.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I have only two or three more questions in this particular sphere.

[Turning to the defendant.] Did the Reich Commissioner have the authority to issue orders for the arrest and execution of hostages?

ROSENBERG: At this moment I cannot recall whether he had such authority by law, or whether that came under direct police jurisdiction. I cannot answer this question with assurance, for at the moment I do not recall a decree to that effect, but it is not entirely impossible; I do not know.

GEN. RUDENKO: It was possible? Very well.

I would like to remind you that you foresaw in your directive this authority of the commissioners to shoot hostages. We will pass right on.

A lot has been said here about German policy in occupied territories. I will, therefore, put only a few questions to you.

First of all, as regards the Ukraine, you have here described the situation in such a light as to show that Koch was the sole person responsible, whereas you have always asserted that, on the contrary, you were the benefactor of the Ukrainian people.

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; I never said that I was a benefactor.

GEN. RUDENKO: In your document, which has been submitted by your defense counsel and which I will therefore not submit to you, Document Rosenberg-l9, Riecke wrote, in a letter to all Reichsleiter of the press in November 1942:

"Koch has declared 'that the Ukraine is for us only an object of exploitation, and that it must pay the expenses of the war, and that in a certain way the population must, as a second rate people, be utilized for the tasks of the war, even if they have to be caught with a lasso."'

This was the policy of Koch in the Ukraine. This document was submitted by your counsel. I will ask you now: Did you write to Koch on 14 December?

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ROSENBERG: May I reply to that? I do not have the verbatim document in front of me. I only know that it was a letter written by Riecke to me with the big complaint which so many others had also had, and that he requested me...

GEN. RUDENKO: Koch?

ROSENBERG: Yes-to complain, and that he used rather drastic language, and that we both strove to reach orderly methods of work here.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have been all over this matter of Koch as to the Ukraine today, and so it is not helping the Tribunal to go over it again.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.

[returning to the defendant.] Yesterday you stated here repeatedly in your explanations as regards the atrocities and extermination of the Soviet population that you were not informed, and that these were police measures. Did I understand you correctly?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not exactly true. I was informed of many combats with partisans and of bands and, as I have stated, of some shootings; and also I was told about the fact that German agricultural leaders, German officials and policemen, and peaceful Soviet farmers were attacked by these partisans and bands and were murdered by thousands.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We know that the partisans who fought against the enemies of their country were called bandits by you and treated accordingly. I do not argue that. But I am speaking of the extermination of the civilian population, of old men, women, and children. Did you have knowledge of this?

ROSENBERG: In these combats we tried especially to protect the farming population and others too; and when we heard about what appeared to us to be excessive measures by the Police, we put the most severe demands to them that even in the full heat of battle these matters were to be considered; and the Police told us that it was easy to make those demands from behind a desk, but, if in White Ruthenia the partisans murder and burn 50Q White Ruthenian burgomasters with their families in their houses and we are shot at from the rear, then terrible conflicts must follow.

GEN. RUDENKO: I will remind you that, in your directive concerning occupied territories and organization of administration and the primary task for administration, you personally planned the police measures as your first task. Do you deny this now? I ask you, do you deny this now?

ROSENBERG: If it is Document 1056-PS, I proposed seven urgent measures. I cannot tell you at the moment which is the first one here. I ask that you submit this document to me.

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GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I will ask that one paragraph of this document be shown to you, "Police measures," which is in the very first place.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this document been put to him?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the use of going into it again?

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, Defendant Rosenberg asked for it. I would like to say simply that the defendant tried to make me believe that he was not informed and that these were purely police measures. I am going to prove that he put as his primary task the carrying out of these police measures.

ROSENBERG: It goes without saying that in an occupied territory in the middle of such a war the Police are responsible for police protection measures. And the third point is "the supply of the population with foodstuffs in order to avoid famine." I repeat, "supply of the population in order to avoid famine."

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Very well. We heard about this in detail yesterday. I have a few last questions to put to you. First of all, I would like to ask you about the Zuman incident. The document has already been submitted to the Tribunal, but I consider it my duty as a representative of the Soviet Union to put to you this question concerning the shooting of Soviet citizens for the sole purpose of obtaining a stretch of land needed as a hunting ground. You remember this document?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I gave an extensive explanation on it yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, this has been gone into before before the Tribunal. Why should the Tribunal's time be taken up by going over and over again on the same grounds? We have said that we would not have things done cumulatively.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, a few details of this question are of great importance, and the defendant did not explain them; therefore, I would like very much to ask this question.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, the Tribunal will rise tomorrow afternoon at half past 4.

Now, as to this question, the Tribunal think that the matter has been sufficiently gone into; but, if there is a particular point which has not been dealt with before, a question may be asked in that connection.

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GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, Mr. President.

[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, on 2 April 1943, you addressed a letter to Himmler regarding this incident regarding the shooting of hundreds of Soviet citizens in the region of Zuman, because this place was needed as a hunting ground. Did you not address such a letter to Himmler? Until June 1943, furthermore, you were interested in receiving a reply. What were the results of this letter?

ROSENBERG: First, I wrote to the Chief of the German Police and I had to wait for what he, as the official responsible for the measures of security in the Ukraine, might cause to be done. Where I did not receive any further information, I brought this case as a personal complaint before the Fuehrer.

GEN. RUDENKO: When did you report it to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: This complaint to the Fuehrer was dealt with in the middle of May 1943 and, since it was a rather lengthy complaint probably reached him several weeks in advance, that is, 5 or 6 weeks elapsed between 2 April and the day it was dealt with, the middle or end of May. I believe that is a very short time for dealing with a complaint because: First it had to be investigated rather thoroughly by Lammers and Bormann; then it had to be reported to the Fuehrer; the Fuehrer then had to make his decision and give his directives; and then I was summoned.

GEN. RUDENKO: When was this complaint discussed for the last time?

ROSENBERG: In May-between the middle and the end of May 1943.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was it discussed in the presence of Koch?

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that Koch presented a report to Hitler-a memorandum from the Forestry Office. Is that true?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, this memorandum confirmed that it was a fight against the partisans?

ROSENBERG: Not quite exactly like that, but it said that this forest district had to be utilized for the necessary supply of lumber for the Armed Forces or the Administration and that these needed forests harbored many restless partisans and guerrilla bands. Therefore there was great danger for the workers in these districts and it had come to shootings between them and partisans and guerrilla bands; and, since one could not watch over all of them, a transfer of

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certain groups from these forest districts into forest areas farther south took place. Koch added that then many of these people who had been transferred expressed their thanks for having received better land than they had had before. That was the information that Koch had given.

GEN. RUDENKO: They were grateful that one December night they were evicted from their houses and taken away hundreds of kilometers and hundreds of them shot. They appreciated that very much. I should like to ask you the following, however. In your letter to Himmler on 2 April 1943, you also attached a memorandum from the Forestry Of lice; and in this memorandum it is stated-I am going to read this passage-you should remember this incident-this terrible incident when men were shot because hunting ground was needed. In the memorandum of the Forestry Office it is stated, "There is no doubt that several villages located in the forest region of Zuman were evacuated principally in order to create a hunting area." This is stated in the memorandum of the Forestry Office.

ROSENBERG: I only want to point out that we are dealing here with an assistant of the Forestry Office in Berlin, who had added that on the basis of his reports. What Koch had produced was a report from the Chief of the Forest Administration in the Ukraine, himself.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. The last question in connection with this incident: Did you believe Koch when he stated that?

ROSENBERG: If I am asked on my conscience, that is hard to answer; but there was a. . .

GEN. RUDENKO: It is exactly on your conscience, if you like.

ROSENBERG: A description of actual conditions by the Forestry Administration was included, and I could not protest against such a presentation since it appeared well-founded, and I had to admit to myself that I had made a mistake in protesting.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not protest against that, I quite understand. I shall finish by just reminding you of one quotation from your letter:

"Hundreds of people in and around Zuman were shot by using a whole police company 'because they were communistically inclined.' No Ukrainian believes that. The Germans are also astonished by this argument; because, if this was done for the safety of the country, then the communist infected elements in other regions should have been executed at the same time."

I have here to put to you the last question. Here in the Tribunal yesterday you declared several times that you wanted to resign from your post. Moreover, you spoke about your letter to Hitler, dated

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12 October 1944, where you asked for directives for the future. Regarding this my colleague, Mr. Dodd, has already reminded you that at that date, 12 October 1944, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories no longer had any territories, because the Germans were out of Russia by that time. I would like to ask you the following question: How could you ask to be relieved of your post, you, who for years had dreamed about getting this position of Reich Minister and even becoming a member of the Secret Cabinet? You asked Hitler to grant you this position of Reich Minister. Do you remember that?

ROSENBERG: In the first place I was never a member of the so-called Secret Cabinet. That is not correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I shall correct myself. You dreamed of becoming a member of the Secret Reich Cabinet.

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: And also dreamed of becoming Reich Minister; is that also true?

ROSENBERG: When the question as to my task became acute, there was a long discussion one way and another about the form of that task. Dr. Lammers, commissioned by the Fuehrer, told me that the Fuehrer intended either to appoint a Reich inspector because he wanted both Reich Commissioners to. . .

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, please. So that we shall not linger too long on that question, I am going to submit to the Tribunal a document. This is your personal letter-the last document . . .

THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, I do not know what the question is, and you are interrupting the witness before he has answered any question.

GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. I have but one aim here, because I should also like to shorten my interrogation in accordance with the desire of the Tribunal. So I am going to submit the letter of Rosenberg of 6 February 1938, addressed to Hitler, wherein he requests the post of Reich Minister from Hitler. That is a short letter. I ask permission to submit this document as Document USSR-117. c

[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, I am going to read this document into the record. It is not very long:

"6 February 1938. My Fuehrer, because I was unable..."

THE PRESIDENT: The document is translated into German, is it not?

GEN. RUDENKO: The original is in German.

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THE PRESIDENT: It is in German to start with. It is not necessary to read it all; you can put it in like other documents.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.

[Turning to the defendant.] In this letter you expressed your resentment in connection with the appointment of the Defendant Ribbentrop as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Is that correct?

ROSENBERG: Yes, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You thought that the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Hitler Cabinet could have been filled by yourself, Defendant Rosenberg; is that correct?

ROSENBERG: Yes, and I do not find it so extraordinary that I should not have expressed my wish to be used in the State service of the German Reich after so many years of activity.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You speak in this letter of the existence of a secret cabinet; is that correct?

ROSENBERG: Well, may I read through this letter a little? Because I cannot answer fragmentary questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, yes. [Handing the document to the defendant.] Please read it through.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have read this.

GEN. RUDENKO: Everything that is contained in it is correct?

ROSENBERG: Certainly, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is your own letter?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You asked to be appointed into this secret Reich Cabinet?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You asked for the position of Reich Minister?

ROSENBERG: I reported that I had spoken to Party Member Goering about the question of this appointment; and since the Fuehrer had charged me with the ideological education of the Party and since the foreign political office of the Party still existed and the impression might thereby arise in the Party that I had somehow been refused by the Fuehrer, I therefore asked the Fuehrer to receive me personally to discuss this matter. I think it quite understandable that I should express the wish to speak about a matter which was important to me personally.

GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore here is my last question-you were the closest collaborator of Hitler in carrying out all his plans and his ideas?

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ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; that is absolutely wrong.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, let us consider it as a reply to my question. I have finished, Mr. President.

M. HENRI MONNERAY (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): I have only a few questions to ask the defendant.

[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Rosenberg, is it correct that the deportation and the execution of the Jews in France put your organization in a position to seize furniture and valuables which belonged to these Jews?

ROSENBERG: It is quite true that I received a governmental order to confiscate archives, works of art, and later, household goods of Jewish citizens in France.

M. MONNERAY: The mass deportation of Jews could only increase the profits of your confiscation and seizures; is that not so?

ROSENBERG: No. The deportation of Jews has nothing to do with that. The suggestion for these measures was given only when I was informed that the Jewish people in question no longer inhabited their institutions, castles, and apartments-that they had left Paris and other places and had not returned.

M. MONNERAY: Once the Jews were deported they were absent; is that not true?

ROSENBERG: When the German troops marched in, Paris was almost entirely depopulated. The rest of the Parisians and inhabitants of cities in the north of France returned in the course of time; but, as I have been informed, the Jewish population did not return to these cities-particularly not to Paris. Therefore they had not been deported, but they had fled. I believe the number of those who had fled was given as 5, 6, or 7 millions or more. ~

M. MONNERAY: Do you mean to say by that, Defendant Rosenberg, that in the time that followed, when new deportation measures were carried out in the course of the German occupation of France, the apartments and homes of people deported were not seized by your organization?

ROSENBERG: No, I cannot express it that way. It may very well be that the apartments of Jewish persons who had been arrested had also been confiscated under certain circumstances, but I cannot give any exact information about that.

M. MONNERAY: One can, therefore, say that the deportation measures gave to your organization a greater chance of success in seizures and confiscations; is that not true?

ROSENBERG: No, that does not agree with the facts; but, as may be seen from the report which the French Prosecution made

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here, what actually happened was that confiscated apartments generally were sealed by the Police. Two months were allowed to elapse to see whether or not the owners of these apartments would return, and only after the fact had been established that this was not the case were the household goods transferred to Germany for those whose homes had been damaged by bombs. That can be seen from the report which the French Prosecution has submitted here.

M. MONNERAY: I suppose that there are very few cases-and I am sure you would agree with me on this-of people who had been deported returning after two months?

ROSENBERG: On the contrary! I was informed about such cases. Even in Document 001-PS, regrettable as it is from the humane point of view, it is clearly stated that we had heard that a large number of Jewish personalities, who had been formerly arrested, had been released again.

M. MONNERAY: You remember, certainly, the memorandum which you sent to Hitler on 3 October 1942, which has already been presented to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-1327. In that document you remind Hitler of your jurisdiction and your powers; and you say that it is a matter for you, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, to seize the homes of Jews who had taken flight, who were absent, or who were called upon to leave. I can submit this document to you in order to refresh your memory if necessary.

[The document was submitted to the defendant.]

The first lines of that document are the ones I am referring to. I emphasize the words "the Jews who were called upon to leave later." It is a document of 3 October 1942, which has already been submitted.

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct-that is according to the facts. And as I have already said before, it is possible that a number of apartments of arrested people-other people who were absent-were included in that; but as I said before, in the other report there was more detailed information. But this document as such corresponds to the facts; it is a letter from me.

M. MONNERAY: The consequence of this act was that you were entrusted not only with the seizure of apartments which you found vacant at the time of the arrival of the Germans in Paris but also of apartments of people who were, as you say, "called upon to leave" in the following period. ,

You surely know, Defendant Rosenberg, under what conditions, in territories occupied by the Germans in the West as well as in the East, Jews were called upon to leave-namely, in special trains which generally led directly to concentration camps?

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ROSENBERG: No, I did not know about those trains. We definitely dealt with deserted apartments, and I was probably informed that eventually also the apartments of people who had been arrested, people who were still living, or had long since fled would be taken into consideration. Nothing more is stated here, and I could not give you any further information. As to the reports which have. been submitted here at the Trial, I have seen them here for the first time. I can only tell you that in the end I was informed that, before the conquest of Paris by Allied troops, all available furniture and household equipment was turned over to the French Red Cross.

M. MONNERAY: Do you agree with me on the following point: That your organization had the right to seize valuables and apartments which had become vacant after the arrival of the German troops in Paris? Do you agree with me on that point?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

M. MONNERAY: Defendant, you have just said that 'you had no knowledge whatsoever of the deportations in special trains to special destinations. Do you know-and I suppose you do know it since the document to which I am referring has already been produced before the Tribunal that in Paris every Tuesday since 1941 and until the end of the German occupation conferences called "Tuesday meetings" brought together the representatives of the various German organizations in Paris-that is to say, the experts in Jewish affairs in the different German administrative organs-to be exact, a representative of the German Military Command, a representative of the Civilian Administration, a representative of the Police Department, and a representative of the Economics Department? At these meetings there was also present a representative of the German Embassy in Paris and also a representative of your Special Staff.

I am referring to Document Number RF-1210, which is are part of Dannecker of 22 February 1942. He was the responsible chief and the main expert on anti-Jewish terrorist action in Paris during the occupation. If you wish, I will submit that document to you.

ROSENBERG: I remember these declarations made during the Trial very well, but I have never received a report about these Tuesday conferences which took place regularly. The fact that my deputy for the furniture action had to maintain closest liaison with the Police Divas a matter of course, since the confiscations of such articles could not be carried out by my office, that being an exclusive right of the Police. Therefore, one had to speak to the Police about these matters. It was not reported to me that there were regular Tuesday conferences. I believe that if such a report had been consistently turned in it would have been submitted to me.

M. MONNERAY: You agree, however, that these Tuesday meetings were extremely useful to the interests of your organization. As

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a matter of fact, the various collective actions which were taken against the Jews-that is to say, arrests, police raids, and deportations-were discussed in those meetings. Did it not, therefore, seem completely logical and natural for your organization to be regularly informed of these actions in order that it might take the resulting economic steps-namely, seizures of property?

ROSENBERG: In my opinion that is not logical at all, because if that certain Chief of Police sent secret transports of that kind into these camps, as has been revealed here, then it does not follow that he would report about that every Tuesday to the other gentlemen. Neither do I believe that this Chief of Police informed the representative of the Foreign Of lice about these things in detail.

M. MONNERAY: You are perhaps badly informed on this point, but I would like to read again the concluding passage of the report which says, "The conference had as a result an alignment of Jewish policy as complete as could be realized in the occupied territory . . ."

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has said, has he not, that he does not know anything about these Tuesday meetings-he received no reports of them?

M. MONNERAY: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Then why are you asking about them?

M. MONNERAY: The agencies in Paris collaborated actively in the terrorist policy of the Police and benefited by it through the economic step which followed-namely, the seizure of valuables.

THE PRESIDENT: You have not been able to connect him with these reports-with the document. He has not signed the document. Nothing shows on the document that he received it-at least, I suppose not-or you would have put it to him. He says he did not know the document.

M. MONNERAY: Allow me, Mr. President, in that case to ask, whether he contests the reality of the evidence concerning the representation of his Paris organization at this meeting.

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you deny its presence at this meeting?

ROSENBERG: I cannot give any information about that, because I have not received any report.

M. MONNERAY: I would like to conclude this crossexamination by reminding you of a document which has already been produced, quoted, and discussed-that is Document 001-PS. In that document the defendant proposes, in the first paragraph, the transport of all seized household goods to the East, and in Paragraph 2 he suggests to Hitler that French Jews instead of other Frenchmen should be shot as hostages.

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Considering, as a result of the questions and answers, that the organization of the defendant could benefit by these measures of execution and deportation, it seems that the real motive of this document is very clear. It is necessary-is not that your opinion, Defendant-first to get rid of the people in order to be able afterwards to seize their property?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not true.

M. MONNERAY: I have no more questions to ask, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask anything of the witness, Dr. Thoma?

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I quite briefly ask the defendant whether he wants me to ask him another question? I believe I shall have finished immediately.

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. THOMA: Thank you. The defendant does not want any more questions. Then, with the permission of the Court, I should like to call the witness Riecke.

THE PRESIDENT: Will he be long or not?

DR. THOMA: Half an hour at most.

THE PRESIDENT: All right. Well then, the defendant may retire.

[The witness Riecke took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

HANS JOACHIM RIECKE (Witness): Hans Joachim Riecke.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

Dr. Thoma, will you spell the name, please?

DR. THOMA: Riecke.

[Turning to the witness.] Witness, what position did you have in the Economic Staff East and in the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories?

RIECKE: I held both positions upon orders from Goering. I was in charge of the food and agriculture department.

DR. THOMA: What was the task of these offices?

RIECKE: The first main task of this office was the reconstruction of Russian agriculture; the second task was the utilization

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of the surplus areas in the south for the Armed Forces and for nutrition purposes.

DR. THOMA: What offices were established for administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories?

RIECKE: In addition to the Foreign Ministry there existed a number of special assignments: Goering for agriculture, Himmler for police, and Sauckel for the recruitment of manpower.

DR. THOMA: Who was in charge of agriculture?

RIECKE: Agriculture-and also the entire economy-was under Goering. He gave his instructions directly or through State Secretaries Korner and Backe.

DR. THOMA: Were the figures for delivery-the quota in agriculture-higher than those imposed under the Soviet administration?

RIECKE: The figures imposed for delivery were adjusted to the former Russian figures. During the first year the actual quantities delivered were lower than during the Russian era. In the next year, as far as crops were concerned, they were lower; as far as livestock was concerned, higher.

DR. THOMA: Were the actual deliveries according to Goering's directives?

RIECKE: No, Goering had expected considerably higher figures.

DR. THOMA: Did Germany ship agricultural machinery-scythes and so on-into the Occupied Eastern Territories and in what quantities?

RIECKE: A large-scale program for agricultural machinery under the name of the Eastern Agricultural Program was set up in Germany whereby, with regard to war conditions, large amounts of agricultural machinery and equipment were shipped into the occupied Russian territories. The reason for that was the removal and large-scale destruction of agricultural machinery and equipment by the Russians during their retreat.

DR. THOMA: On 5 February 1942 an agricultural decree was issued. What were the reasons for that?

RIECKE: The main purpose of that agricultural decree was to get the population to cooperate voluntarily. In the beginning it was intended to maintain the collective economy. That proved to be impossible, because-as has been mentioned-part of the heavy machinery, especially tractors, was no longer available. On the other hand, it was not possible to resort to individual farming, as some of the population wished, because smaller equipment was also lacking. Therefore a compromise solution was reached by so-called agricultural cooperatives whereby the Russian peasants got

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a share of the land to work, but a part of the work was still carried on collectively.

DR. THOMA: What was the result?

RIECKE: The result of the agricultural decree was generally favorable. The extent and quantity of the tillage increased. A particularly good example of the results was the conditions in the so-called Kharkov Basin, where in the spring of 1942 the farms which had been converted to agricultural cooperatives had already achieved more than 70 percent of the spring tillage, whereas the unconverted collective farms had achieved only about 30 percent.

DR. THOMA: On 3 June 1943 the so-called private property declaration was issued. What were the principles involved?

RIECKE: The basic purpose of the private property declaration was to turn over to the Russian peasants as personal property the shares of land which had been allotted to them by the agricultural decree.

DR. THOMA: How was the vegetable supply of large cities handled-for example, in the Ukraine?

RIECKE: Around the large cities considerable lands for garden plots were allotted to the working population.

DR. THOMA: Now some questions about Latvia. Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?

RIECKE: No; on the contrary. The nationalization measures taken by the Russians during the occupation were discontinued. The land which had been separated from the farms for purposes of settlement was returned to the former owners. To say it in one sentence: The conditions existing before the Russian occupation were reestablished.

COL. POKROVSKY: I beg to be excused, but I cannot understand-with the best of wishes-what all these questions, even in the remotest way, have to do with the case of the Defendant Rosenberg. It seems to me that further questions of the defense counsel, if they are along these same lines, should not be allowed.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you ought to show that what the witness is testifying about is connected in some way with the Defendant Rosenberg.

DR. THOMA: With this question I want, first, to refute the Soviet assertion that after the occupation the Barons had their land returned to them-I refer to the Soviet Prosecution's document, Document Number USSR-395, which I submitted to the Tribunal yesterday. Secondly, I want to prove with it that that area was supposed to be administered in an orderly way and in such

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a manner that the population cooperated voluntarily. Thirdly, I want to prove that during the entire German occupation not one Ukrainian nor one citizen of the Soviet Union starved, because the agricultural work was conducted accordingly. But I can demonstrate this proof only through statements of an expert. I believe that I have only a few more questions, and then I shall have finished with this subject of evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?

RIECKE: I have answered that question already. On the contrary, socialization was revoked, and the land separated for settlement purposes was returned to the Latvian peasants. In a word, conditions as existing before the Russian occupation were reestablished.

DR. THOMA: Were former large German estates reinstated?

RIECKE: No. On the contrary, Latvian peasants' property- which after 1919 had been created at the expense of large German estates-was left in their hands. It remained their property.

DR. THOMA: What were the ideas behind the so-called reprivatization?

RIECKE: Reprivatization was intended to give the Latvian peasants the feeling of security derived from working their own property.

DR. THOMA: Did this law also apply to Estonia and Lithuania?

RIECKE: The law applied in a similar manner also to Estonia and Lithuania.

DR. THOMA: Do you know about a statement of Darre's to the effect that the local small farmers should be removed from their property and be proletarianized?

RIECKE: I do not remember any such statement.

DR. THOMA: Do you know about the Society for the Administration of the Eastern Territory?

RIECKE: There were two societies by that name. I assume that the one you are referring to was the one founded in order to take care of the state-owned property and the plants which were shown to have been formed during the Russian occupation in the Baltic provinces, and which were still left after the return to private ownership. In the former Russian territories of the so-called Reich Commission, the MTS organization also took care of these areas.

DR. THOMA: What was the attitude of Rosenberg toward the various measures, such as labor recruitment, delivery of foodstuffs, et cetera?

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RIECKE: Rosenberg could not escape the orders given by the Fuehrer. Yet he always advocated that these measures be carried out without coercion against the population, and that they be coordinated with each other.

DR. THOMA: Who took care of the Eastern Workers in the Reich?

RIECKE: To my knowledge the Labor Administration, through its labor offices.

DR. THOMA: How were the Eastern Workers quartered in the country in the Reich? Do you know anything about it?

RIECKE: The provisioning and quartering of the Eastern Workers in the country in the Reich were quite satisfactory on the whole. I received reports directly by way of the offices of the Reich Food Estate.

DR. THOMA: Can you tell us something about Rosenberg's general attitude toward the Eastern people?

RIECKE: As I have said before, Rosenberg personally wanted to get the Eastern people to cooperate. This was true especially in the matter of cultivating and maintaining their cultural life. For instance, Rosenberg, as far as I know, always intervened for the reopening of the colleges and special schools.

DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg have any restrictions in this sphere? Did he have to oppose other points of view to attain this goal?

RIECKE: Strong forces were at work counteracting Rosenberg's efforts; and especially in the Fuehrer's headquarters there were Bormann and Himmler, whose opinions were strongly supported by Reich Commissioner Koch, and who in turn was supported by Bormann and Himmler in his work. That led to the fact that a large proportion of the measures which Rosenberg had planned, especially in the Ukraine, were sabotaged by Koch.

DR. THOMA: Now one last question: What do you know about the concentration camps and about the treatment of the inmates in protective custody?

RIECKE: I, of course, knew of the existence of concentration camps but not their number and what happened in them. During the years of 1933 and 1934 various representations were made about individual cases of maltreatment. Later, persons who visited concentration camps turned in definite, positive reports. In the last days of April of last year, near Berlin, I met inmates of concentration camps being marched to the rear. Conditions were so terrible that I immediately saw Himmler and asked him not to let these people go on marching but to turn them over to the enemy. That discussion took place in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel. Himmler unfortunately gave only an evasive answer.

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DR. THOMA: There is one more question that just came to my mind. In addition to providing food for the Armed Forces, were measures taken in the Occupied Eastern Territories to get foodstuffs for the German people?

RIECKE: About two-thirds of the supplies of foodstuffs from the Occupied Eastern Territories went directly to the Armed Forces. The remaining third was shipped to Germany, and we always considered it as compensatory for the feeding of the foreign workers, whose number was increasing continuously.

DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture; is that correct?

RIECKE: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Chief of the Main Department for Food and Agriculture in the Government General was frequently in Berlin in order to try to fix quotas there which would be bearable to the population?

RIECKE: As I recall, he several times expressed that opinion during the regular negotiations which took place with the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: According to your own observations, what was the food situation of the population of the Government General?

RIECKE: According to my own observations and the reports which I received, the rations which had been fixed were far lower than in the Reich, but considerable compensation was achieved through both the black market and the open market.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that every effort was made by the administration of the Government General to increase agricultural production?

RIECKE: Considerable efforts were made by the Government General to promote agriculture; and one can even say that the entire remaining industry, insofar as it was not used for armament, worked exclusively for the production of food. Furthermore, fertilizer was shipped from the Reich, although only in limited quantities, as well as machinery and equipment, in accordance with the program for the Eastern territory.

DR. SEIDL: What percentage of the total German food supply did the occupied countries deliver?

RIECKE: According to the calculations which were made independently by our Ministry, the deliveries from occupied territories

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in 1942 and 1943 amounted to about 15 percent of the total food supply of Germany, during the other years around 10 percent, usually less.

DR. SEIDL: Now one last question: The Soviet Prosecution have submitted a document, Document USSR-170. It deals with a meeting of the chiefs of the German offices in the occupied territories which took place on 6 August 1942 under the chairmanship of the Reich Marshal. I will have this document handed to you, and I want you to tell me whether the description given in that document correctly characterizes the relations between Germany and the occupied territories. You were present at that meeting yourself.

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

RIECKE: The document represents the minutes of the meeting in which I took part. First, I have to say that the document-that is to say, the minutes-principally contains the speech of the Reich Marshal, and does not indicate the actual relations between Germany and the occupied territories with regard to the food situation. The demands which Goering made in this meeting were so high that they could not even be taken seriously. It was also clear to us, engaged in the food sector, that in the long run we could never achieve anything by force. The additional demands which Goering made in that meeting were actually never fulfilled. I do not think that Goering himself believed that these quotas could be fulfilled. As far as I know, Goering's additional demands were never submitted at all to France; Belgium in spite of a prohibition received grain; and Czechoslovakia got fats in spite of another prohibition.

On the day before that meeting, there had been a conference of the Gauleiter which-as well as I can remember-was dominated by the increasing air attacks in the West and the augmenting difficulties, especially for the population, resulting therefrom. The western Gauleiter were of the opinion that the food supply for Germany was becoming insufficient in view of the increasing burdens for the population, but that, on the other hand, a large part of the occupied territories was still enjoying a surplus. The Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture and the representatives of the occupied territories themselves were in a certain sense accused of not demanding and delivering enough from the occupied territories. Goering followed up these demands; and, due to his disposition and his temperament, this led to the strong exaggerations contained in the minutes and in this document.

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, how were foreign workers fed in Germany?

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RIECKE: All groups of foreign workers, with the exception of the Eastern Workers, received the same rations as the German population.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what about the supplies for the Eastern Workers?

RIECKE: For certain items the Eastern Workers received less than the others; and in the case of bread and potatoes, higher rations.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was the food supply such that the state of health of the workers was endangered?

RIECKE: That question cannot be answered in a clearcut fashion. It must be considered in connection with the performance demanded of the workers. For normal work these rations should have been entirely sufficient.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel intervene especially for better nutrition of these workers?

RIECKE: As far as I know, Sauckel appealed several times to my minister on behalf of a better supply of food, whereupon Backe always answered with the counter demand that no additional workers should be brought to Germany. Backe repeatedly suggested that the number of workers be limited and that they be supplied with better food instead.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in your capacity as State Secretary for Agriculture, did you not also go to Holland at the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945?

RIECKE: Yes; at that time I was in the Netherlands.

DR. STEINBAUER: On that occasion, was it not the case there that the Wehrmacht offices and the Police raised serious complaints about sabotage of Dutch agriculture, particularly about the responsible government agencies in Holland?

RIECKE: I do not remember a conversation of that kind.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart intervened for the reduction of food exports from Holland to Germany?

RIECKE: Yes, on various occasions, and also in that meeting which this document describes.

DR. STEINBAUER: And also, in spite of complaints, that he left the Dutch officials in the Food Department?

RIECKE: Yes, that is the case.

DR. STEINBAUER: That is all.

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DR. HANS FLACHSNER: (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Mr. President, may I put several questions to the witness?

[Turning to the witness] Witness, could you give me information about the following questions? Did the inmates of concentration camps who worked in the armament industry get the same supplementary rations for heavy and very heavy labor as the other workers?

RIECKE: During the time when I was charged with these problems, it was decided to give all prisoners, including concentration camp inmates, the same rations as the rest of the population, if they were working. Therefore, they should have received the same rations.

DR. FLACHSNER: Was the Defendant Speer, or the Ministry under his direction, competent for the orderly maintenance of the rations in the plants insofar as the latter-the plants-were in charge of the food supply?

RIECKE: No, Speer's Ministry was not competent in these matters. As far as delivery upon demand was concerned, the food offices were competent. The distribution of delivered foodstuffs in the plants, however, was the affair of the camp or plant administrations.

DR. FLACHSNER: And one further question: What measures had Speer taken in order to prevent a general food catastrophe which would have affected the millions of foreign workers in Germany in an equal manner?

RIECKE: Beginning in December 1944, Speer purposely subordinated armament tasks to the problem of nutrition with the idea in mind of a changeover to a new regime, a new administration, an occupying power. From this time on

, Speer gave food transport priority over armament transport. He saw to it that seed for the, spring tillage was distributed with the transportation means at his disposal. Speer emphatically advocated reconstructing food processing plants damaged by air attack even before armament plants. And above all, during that last phase, Speer helped us prevent the senseless destruction of food processing plants, against the instructions issued by Hitler. He did this with complete self-abnegation and without consideration for any possible consequences.

DR. FLACHSNER: Thank you.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, did you participate in the Western campaign?

RIECKE: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?

RIECKE: As commander of a battalion in the field.

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DR. LATERNSER: During the Western campaign, did you receive any dubious orders-I mean to say, orders which were in violation of international law?

RIECKE: I received no such orders.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you have any reason to believe, or did you establish, that looting was tolerated by higher military authorities?

RIECKE: No. On the contrary, looting was most severely punished.

DR. LATERNSER: Later you were also in the East, but-as I have heard not as a soldier. Could you look into the operational areas there, as well as the regions governed by the commissions?

RIECKE: Both were open to my observations.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the treatment of the local population by the German soldiers?

RIECKE: Taken as a whole it can be said that, especially in the Ukraine, the treatment of the civilian population in the army's sector-in the operational area-was better than elsewhere; consideration was shown for the necessities of the civilian administrative sector.

DR. LATERNSER: And what do you think is the reason for that difference?

RIECKE: I attribute it to a different basic attitude of the soldier who was free of political tendencies and also to the fact that the troops, of course, wanted to have peace and quiet in the rear areas.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution want to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: I can be through in 2 minutes, if Your Honor please.

[Turning to the witness.] Were you a member of the Nazi Party?

RIECKE: Yes.

MR. DODD: When did you join?

RIECKE: In 1925.

MR. DODD: 1925?

RIECKE: Yes.

MR. DODD: You were also a member of the SA?

RIECKE: Yes.

MR. DODD: What rank did you hold in the SA?

RIECKE: My last rank was Gruppenfuehrer of the SA.

MR. DODD: Previously, you were an SA Sturmfuehrer, were you not?

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RIECKE: In 1930, yes.

MR. DODD: When did you become an SS Gruppenfuehrer?

RIECKE: In October 1944.

MR. DODD: That is all. I have no other questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions to ask in reexamination?

DR. THOMA: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that concludes your case in behalf of the Defendant Rosenberg, does it not?

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like to state that the Document Rosenberg-l9, which General Rudenko referred to, was not submitted to the Tribunal as an exhibit by me. Furthermore, I should like to inform the Tribunal that a number of affidavits, which have been approved, have not as yet been received.

THE PRESIDENT: You can mention them later, of course.

DR. THOMA: I should further like to make the request that my document book Number 1 be not accepted in evidence but considered the same as before, that is, as having general probative value according to the decision of 8 March 1946; therefore, not as evidence, not as a matter of proof, but just as argument. I assume that it had been approved in this sense previously, and that it was only rejected as evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: I anticipate that we shall not interfere in your argument.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to give an explanation-that is, about the fact that Document Rosenberg-l9 represents a letter from Riecke addressed to Rosenberg, dated 12 March 1943. This document was submitted by the defendant's counsel, Dr. Thoma. It is found in the Rosenberg Document Book Number 2, Page 42, and has been translated into all four languages. It is in the possession of all the prosecutors and is also in the document book which has been submitted to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has ruled to accept this document from the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, the position is this: That a document does not go into evidence unless it is offered in evidence. Dr. Thoma has not offered this document in evidence, and I understand that the Soviet Prosecution has not offered it in evidence. If you want to offer it in evidence, and the document is an authentic document-which I suppose it is-you can offer it in evidence.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We did not offer it as evidence, only because we thought that it was already contained in the document book presented by the Defense; and, therefore, we had no

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need to present it again. If the defendant's counsel, Thoma, refuses to present it, then we shall do so.

THE PRESIDENT: You are wrong in assuming this. You see, documents do not go into evidence unless they are offered in evidence. The fact that they are in the books does not mean that they are in evidence; therefore, if you want to offer it in evidence, you must do so.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In that case, Mr. President, we are going to offer it in evidence now.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you will give it a USSR number.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, we are going to give it a USSR exhibit number and, with your permission, will offer it in evidence tomorrow.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, we will proceed to deal with the supplementary applications. The witness can retire.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application is that of Dr. Seidl's with regard to two witnesses. First of all witness Hilger, who was previously granted as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop but withdrawn by counsel on the 2nd of April. I believe that the witness is in the United States and that there is a report that he is too ill to travel. But apart from finis, My Lord, the purpose of the witness is to give evidence as to the discussions and treaty negotiations which took place in the Kremlin at Moscow before the German-Soviet agreement of the 23rd of August 1939; and the allegation states the conclusion of the alleged secret agreement dealt with in the affidavit of the witness Gaus.

My Lord, the other application is for a witness Von Weizsacker, who is going to deal with the same point.

The Prosecution, of course, loyally accept the decision of the Tribunal on the admissibility of the Gaus affidavit, but they respectfully submit that that does not affect this point. What is desired is to call witnesses as to the course of the negotiations before these treaties-before an agreement was arrived at in respect to these treaties-and that is a point which we have had several times; and, of course, while all circumstances have a slight difference, the Tribunal have-as far as I know-ruled universally up to now that they will not go into antecedent negotiations which have resulted in agreements.

There is also the position that, of course, Dr. Seidl has put in the Gaus affidavit, and he has had his opportunity to examine the

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Defendant Von Ribbentrop; and the Prosecution respectfully submit that to call two secondary witnesses-without any disrespect to their position in the German Foreign Office, they are witnesses of a secondary importance compared with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop-to discuss these negotiations seems to the Prosecution to be going into irrelevant matter and entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case.

I confess I do not myself appreciate any special relevance that these witnesses could have to the case of Hess, but I do not put it so strongly on that ground; I put it on the ground which I have just outlined to the Tribunal.

With regard to the third application of Dr. Seidl, I am not quite sure whether he means that he wants the Prosecution to provide him with an original or certified copy of the secret agreement, or whether he desires to tender a copy himself. But with regard to that, again the Prosecution take the line that that point-which, after all, is only one tiny corner of one aspect of the case-is sufficiently covered by the evidence which has already been brought out before the Tribunal from the affidavit of Ambassador Gaus and the evidence of the Defendant Ribbentrop.

That is the position of the Prosecution with regard to that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the affidavit of the Ambassador Dr. Gaus, which has been accepted by the Tribunal as Exhibit Hess-16, describes only a part of the negotiations. Ambassador Dr. Gaus was not present at the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the pacts. I have, therefore, made the additional application to call Embassy Counsellor Hilger as a witness after his having already been approved as a witness for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.

I have, furthermore, requested that the Tribunal procure the text of that secret supplementary appendix. I have to admit, however, that this request no longer has the importance it had at the time it was made. In the meantime we have received a copy of that secret supplementary appendix.

Furthermore, I have a copy of the secret appendix to the German-Soviet border pact of 28 September 1939; and I have an affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus of 1 April of this year certifying that these copies are identical with the text of the secret agreements drafted on 23 August and 28 September 1939.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that document being produced for the consideration of the Tribunal?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, My Lord. As I say, the Tribunal have considered our objection on relevance, and we

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have lost on it; and, therefore, it is not really open to me to argue any question of the relevance of the document in view of the decision of the Tribunal.

The only point that I make is that if Dr. Seidl produces an alleged copy of the treaty, supported by an affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, then it immensely strengthens my argument, I submit, against him being allowed to call the witness.

COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, on the question which is now being discussed by the Tribunal, have submitted today a document to the General Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal. If this document is already in your possession, then I need not talk about our position here; but, if you find it necessary, Your Honors, I am going to set it forth here. We object on the ground of considerations, which are set forth in this document signed by General Rudenko.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you presenting an argument or a document of some sort?

COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not going to argue about it nor return to this question if you have this document.

THE PRESIDENT: You misunderstood me. You mentioned a document which you asserted was in the possession of the Tribunal. I am not aware that we have any document from the Soviet Prosecution. It may be that it has been received; and, if so, we will consider it of course.

What I wanted to know is whether it was an argument or an original document of some sort.

COL. POKROVSKY: The document deals with the official answer of the Soviet Prosecution on the question as to whether we consider it necessary to grant the request of Dr. Seidl regarding a group of questions connected with the German-Soviet Pact of 1939.

THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the document.

COL. POKROVSKY: You think it would be possible to be content with just the document which is in your possession now?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, certainly-unless you wish to say anything. We will consider the document.

COL. POKROVSKY: There is going to be no further information regarding it. Our position has been defined in detail in this document signed by General Rudenko; and, if you have this document before you now, I have nothing more to add regarding it.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, on 13 April I made a written motion to be permitted to submit a documentary supplement as Exhibit Hess-17. I submitted six copies of this document with the request to have it translated. The following documents are included:

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1) The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which was already submitted by the Prosecution under Exhibit GB-145; 2) the related supplementary protocol of the same date; 3) the German-Soviet Friendship and Border Pact of 28 September 1939; 4) the secret supplementary protocol of the same date which is related to it; and 5) the second affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus, mentioned before.

Furthermore, on 15 April I made the motion to call the witness Dr. Gaus-who is in Nuremberg-here before this Court if the Tribunal do not consider the affidavit sufficient. I ask the Tribunal to make its decision about these motions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.

Now, with reference to Von Neurath.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is an application for a witness Dieckhoff, in regard to whom interrogatories have already been granted. As I understand, the reason is that the witness Tschirschky has been found to have retired from the German Foreign Of lice some 18 months earlier than was thought. Baron Von Ludinghausen has suggested that, to balance the calling of Dieckhoff as a witness, he will give up the calling of the witness Zimmermann and have an affidavit or interrogatory instead. My Lord, that seems to the Prosecution a very reasonable suggestion, and we have no objection.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean, no objection to Dieckhoff as a witness and Zimmermann for an affidavit or interrogatories?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is all with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, with regard to the Defendant Schacht, it is only the petition of the witness Huelse; and the Prosecution do not really mind whether Dr. Dix calls him or puts in an affidavit. I think that it is only a question of whether the witness will be available to come here from Hamburg; and, if he is available, we have no objection to him being called as a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, My Lord, the next one on the list is an application on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel: Withdrawal of interrogatories for Mende granted on 23 March, as the prospective witness is not located; and interrogatories for Marenbach in place of Mende, who can give the same testimony. Dr. Servatius

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believes that Marenbach is located at the Garmisch internment camp. The Prosecution have no objection to that.

My Lord, I think there was a formal one from Dr. Thoma with regard to the use of the sworn statement by Professor Denker, but there is no objection to that.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already allowed that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have already allowed that; this is only the formal application.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Then we will consider those matters. There are a number of documents for the production of which the Defendant Sauckel's counsel is applying.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It has been suggested to us that counsel for the Defendant Sauckel and Counsel for the Prosecution could help us over that matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, my friend, Mr. Roberts, has been dealing with Dr. Servatius upon this point; so, perhaps he could help the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, will it take a long time for that or hot?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think so. The Tribunal, I understand . . .

COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to inform the Tribunal that the Soviet Prosecution did not receive any documents which the British Prosecutor has just mentioned, and we ask that these documents not be discussed until the moment when we shall have the opportunity to get acquainted with them.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that these documents have not been translated yet. The question really is the preliminary one of which documents should be translated, and we were only going through the documents in order to see which documents were sufficiently relevant to be translated; so that it would not be...

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the Tribunal-I understand-have made a preliminary order of just striking out the documents which Dr. Servatius and I agree should not be presented. My Lord, that leaves a very large number of documents, of which I think the Tribunal has a list. My Lord, the first 68 documents-or rather from documents 6 to 68-are regulations dealing with the conditions of the employment of labor in Germany. My Lord, I have seen Dr. Servatius' proposed document book, and he has marked certain passages

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which he would desire to read, and which would have to be translated, My Lord; and that does cut down the bulk of the documents very considerably.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, we have not read all these documents yet, and they are not translated. Can you indicate to us whether you have any objection to them being translated?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think I could object to those first documents from 6 to 68-the passages marked "being translated," because from their description they appear to be relevant.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, 6 to 68.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the passages which are actually marked?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Then will you go on?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: 69 to 79 he has already struck out.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, 80 and 81 I object to. They are documents making allegations of breach of the Hague Regulations by the Soviet nation. My Lord, I submit that that is not relevant.

THE PRESIDENT: The allegations of illegal acts by the Soviet Government with reference to individuals?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, I submit that that could not be relevant at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and 82 to 89; you do not object to these?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not object to these-the passages as marked.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Dr. Servatius promised, as far as he could, to cut down the passages which were going to be marked.

My Lord, 90 and 91 I object to. Dr. Servatius wants to put in, under the description of documents, a large number of affidavits, the number of which I think is not yet ascertained-affidavits by various

persons as to the conditions of labor and the conditions under which foreign workers were employed. My Lord, the Defendant Sauckel has been allowed a certain number of witnesses and also affidavits or interrogatories from other people. My Lord, I submit that this application under 90 and 91-two files of affidavits-is not really an application for documents at all, and it should be disallowed.

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My Lord, Number 92...

THE PRESIDENT: Number 92 he has struck out.

MR. ROBERTS: 92 has been struck out.

My Lord, Number 93 is, in fact, a book which was referred to by the French prosecutor; and, therefore, of course, Dr. Servatius would be entitled to refer to it in his case.

THE PRESIDENT: Are the passages marked in that or not?

MR. ROBERTS: Well, he has not marked any yet. There are some pictures, My Lord, of...

THE PRESIDENT: He only wants the pictures?

MR. ROBERTS: I think so, My Lord, showing the cherubic happiness of the foreign workers in Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 94 is an affidavit of Sauckel's son. It is only required, I understand, if one of three other witnesses who have been allowed is not available. My Lord, it is to deal with the allegation that Sauckel ordered the evacuation of Buchenwald; and, My Lord, I cannot object to this very short affidavit, if Dr. Servatius cannot produce one of the three witnesses who have been allowed to him.

My Lord, 95 is Sauckel's speeches, and Dr. Servatius again has promised to cut down the passages which he has marked. It is difficult to object to that in view of the allegation of conspiracy.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 96 and 97 are books in which there are very short extracts which have been marked, and, again, as it deals with a relevant period of the alleged conspiracy, My Lord, I do not see how I can object to that.

THE PRESIDENT: In the same category, yes. Does that meet with your views, Dr. Servatius?

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I discussed the matter with a representative of the Prosecution and that represents in principle the result. I would like to add, however, something with reference to a few document namely, Documents 80 and 81. One is the photostat copy of a deportation order in the city of Gels, the other an affidavit concerning forced labor in Saaz. I need the first document in order to prove that the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare was obsolete- that is to say, that before the armistice, while fighting was still going on, the population of the Eastern German provinces was sent to Russia for forced labor. I supplemented the motion orally at that time, because I considered the proof for the deportation of a large part of the population for forced labor, obtained by questioning the

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mayors of cities from Upper Silesia to East Prussia, as insufficient. I believe that this is of great importance for the defense of. my client, as it proves that the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare was considered nonexistent in the East.

Document 81 deals with the state of affairs after the armistice- but which appears as only a continuation of what previously occurred in the Eastern territories-and confirms the fact that, under the occupation of the Soviet Army, such conditions generally continued to exist-namely, the recruitment of the population for work not in the sense of the Hague Convention for the repair of local roads, for instance, but rather for the purpose of working in industry and for activities outside the framework of the Hague Convention and for work outside the country. I do not believe that I should be refused this evidence.

Now as to Documents Number 90 and 91, their contents have already been presented. They are two folders with a collection of affidavits. The attempt is made to bring evidence in refutation of a government investigation such as we have met up with here. We have received reports from the Soviet and French Prosecution; we have received reports from Czechs; all of which constitute a huge quantity of material of mosaic like patterns that can only be dealt with in this manner.

I once before explained that I do not have a government at my disposal which could prepare such a report, and so I suggest bringing a collection of affidavits. Now I do not intend to read every one of these affidavits here. My motion is that the Court appoint a deputy who would study that folder and prepare a brief report about it for presentation to the Tribunal. A similar problem will arise later when questions concerning the political organizations are dealt with-namely, the problem as to how these immense quantities of material can be presented to the Tribunal.

If I bring one witness, one witness only, it will be said, "Well, one witness cannot, of course, cover the entire ground." On the other hand, I cannot have a hundred or more witnesses. So this would be a middle way: That a person appointed by the Tribunal study these affidavits and then give a report. That is the content of these two folders.

THE PRESIDENT: How many affidavits have you in mind or have you obtained?

DR. SERVATIUS: So far I have received very little. It proves that those who could give information are very reticent, because they are afraid that they might be prosecuted on that account. I hope, however, to be able to make a selection of reasonable statements, which I believe will amount to about 20 or 30 affidavits. I would limit it to that, because I do not care to take up the Court's

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time with unnecessary work dealing with these affidavits. Judging from the present state of my collection, I may even have to consider withdrawing my motion altogether, because I have to admit myself that the amount of material reaching me is very small; but I ask to be given another chance, and at the appropriate moment I shall present the case to the Court again.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Is that all you want to say?

DR. SERVATIUS: There is still Document Number 93, the illustrated booklet, Europe Works in Germany. I should like...

THE PRESIDENT: Did the Prosecution object?

DR. SERVATIUS: No, the Prosecution does not object. I should like to project some pictures on the screen for the purpose of showing particularly under what conditions these people from the East arrived and what their condition was later, insofar as it can be shown from a propaganda pamphlet.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.

MR. ROBERTS: There was one other point which I ought to mention. Perhaps Dr. Servatius would be good enough to listen.

My Lord, Dr. Servatius has applied in writing to the Tribunal, by letter dated 5 March 1946, for all medical reports of Dr. Jager, who was a chief camp doctor at Krupp-Essen; secondly, all monthly reports of a man called Groene, who was a colleague of Dr. Jager; thirdly, all minutes of monthly conferences which the chief camp leader held with his subordinate camp leaders at Krupps.

My Lord the position is this: That the French put in-oh, I think our American colleagues put in-an affidavit of Dr. Jager, and Dr. Jager himself has been granted as a witness for Sauckel, and so he will be seen in the witness box.

My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to Dr. Jager being asked, I suppose, to bring his reports with him if they are available. We do not have them, and I do not think we know where they are.

THE PRESIDENT: But the witness is being called.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have received a portion of these documents already, and I assume that the rest may also reach me. I believe the material which I have now is sufficient for my purposes so that the Prosecution need not take further pains.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean we need make no order?

DR. SERVATIUS: It is not necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 18 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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