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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I left off yesterday at the last document of Volume I. It is the affidavit of the witness Ernst von Palezieux, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The affidavit is given the document number Frank-9, and that completes the first volume.
THE PRESIDENT: The first volume, what page?
DR. SEIDL: That was Page 92 of the first volume, Document Frank-9.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is the end of the first volume, isn't it?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the end of the first volume. Volumes II, III, and IV of the document book comprise extracts from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank. I do not propose to number all these extracts individually, but I ask the Tribunal to accept the whole diary as Document Frank-10 (Document 2233-PS), and I propose to quote only a few short extracts. For example Pages 1 to 27, Mr. President, are extracts from the diary which have already been submitted by the Prosecution. I have put the extracts submitted by the Prosecution into a more extensive context, and by quoting the entire passages I have attempted to prove that some of these extracts do not represent the true and essential content of the diary. Those are Exhibits USA-173, on Page 1 of the document book, USSR-223 on Page 3, USA-271 on Page 8, USA-611 on Page 11 of the document book. On Page 14 of the document book there appears to be a misprint. The USA number is not 016 but 613.
THE PRESIDENT: It begins on Page 13 in my copy, doesn't it?
DR. SEIDL: No, it is on Page 14. It is an entry dated 25 January 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the document that I have and which I think you are referring to, is Document 2233 (aa)-PS, Exhibit USA-613. That is on Page 13. I don't think it makes any difference.
DR. SEIDL: In that case it must be an error by the Translation Department. At any rate I do not think it is important, I mean this quotation.
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I now turn to Page 20 of the document book, a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. On Page 22 there is a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution. Page 24 of the document book contains quotations by the Prosecution of both the United States and of the Soviet Union. Exhibit USA-295. Perhaps I may point out that these extracts are only a few examples merely to show that in a number of cases the impression obtained is different if one reads either the entire speech or at least a portion of it.
I then turn to Page 32 of the document book, an entry dated 10 October 1939, in which the Defendant Dr. Frank gives instructions for negotiations with the Reich Food Ministry regarding the delivery of 5,000 tons of grain per week-Page 32 of the document book.
On Page 34 there is an entry of 8 March 1940, and I quote the first three lines. The Governor General states:
"In close connection therewith is the actual governing of Poland. The Fuehrer has ordered me to regard the Government General as the home of the Polish people. Accordingly, no Germanization policy of any kind is possible."
I now pass on to Page 41 of the document book; an entry dated 19 January 1940. I quote the first five lines:
"Dr. Walbaum (Chief of the Health Department): The state of health in the Government General is satisfactory. Much has already been accomplished in this field. In Warsaw alone 700,000 typhus injections have been given. This is a huge total, even for German standards; it is actually a record."
The next quotation is on Page 50 of the document book, an entry dated 19 February 1940:
"The Governor General is further of the opinion that the need for official interpretation of Polish law may become greater. We should probably have to come to some form of Polish government or regency, and the head of the Polish legal system would then be competent for such a task."
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there seems to have been some slight difference in the paging and therefore if you would give us carefully and somewhat more slowly the actual date of the document we should be able to find it perhaps for ourselves. The pages do not seem to correspond.
DR. SEIDL: The last quotation which I read was dated 19 February 1940.
I now turn to a quotation, that is, an entry of 26 February 1940, and I quote
"In this connection the Governor General expresses.."
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This is on Page 51 in my book. The entry is of 26 February 1940.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 40 in ours.
DR. SEIDL: "In this connection the Governor General expresses the wish of Field Marshal Goering that the German administration should be built up in such a way that the Polish mode of living as such is assured. It should not give the impression that Warsaw is a fallen city which is becoming germanized, but rather that Warsaw, according to the Fuehrer's will, is to be one of the cities which would continue to exist as a Polish community in the intended reduced Polish state."
A further entry, dated 26 February 1940, deals with the question of higher education. I quote:
"The Governor General points out in this connection that the universities and high schools have been closed. However, in the long run it would be an impossible state of affairs, for instance, to discontinue medical education. The Polish system of technical schools should also be revived and with the participation of the city."
The next quotation is on Page 56 of my document book. An entry of 1 March 1940.
"The Governor General announces in this connection that the directive has now been issued to give free rein to Polish development as far as it is possible within the interests of the German Reich. The attitude now to be adopted is that the Government General is the home of the Polish people."
A further entry deals with the question of workers in the Reich territory. Page 60 of my document book, entry of 19 September 1940-I beg your pardon, 12 September 1940. I quote:
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. You mean the first of September, do you?
DR.SEIDL: 12 September-no, it should be 12 March; there is obviously a misprint; 12 March 1940, Page 197 of the diary. I quote:
"Governor General Dr. Frank emphasizes that one could actually collect an adequate number of workers by force following the methods of the slave trade, by using a sufficient number of police, and by procuring sufficient means of transportation; but that, for a number of reasons, however, the use of propaganda deserves preference under all circumstances."
The next quotation is on Page 68 in my document book; an entry of 23 April 1940. I quote the last five lines. The Governor General states:
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"The Governor General is merely attempting to offer the Polish nation protection in an economic respect as well. He was almost inclined to think that one could achieve better results with Poles than with these autocratic trustees...."
I now turn to Page 71 of my document book, an entry dated 25 May 1940. Here the Governor General gives an explanation to the President of the Polish Court of Appeal, Bronschinski. I quote the last four lines:
"We do not wish to carry on a war of extermination here against a people. The protection of the Polish people by the Reich in the German zone of interest gives you the possibility of continuing your development according to your national traditions."
I turn to Page 77 of my document book, an entry from Volume III, July to September, Page 692. I quote:
"The Governor General then spoke of the food difficulties still existing in the Government General"-this was to Generaloberst von Kuechler-"and asked the general to see to it that the provisioning and other requirements of new troops arriving should be as light a burden as possible on the food situation of the Government General. Above all, no confiscation whatsoever should take place."
I turn to Pages 85 and 86; entries in Volume III, July to September 1940, Page 819 of the diary. This entry deals with the establishment of the medical academy which was planned by the Governor General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this fact.
The next quotation is on Page 95 of the document book, an entry dated 9 October 1940, from the speech of the Governor General on the occasion of the opening of the autumn trade fair at Radom. I quote Line 5.
"It is clear that we. . . "
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the important things for us are the page in the diary and the date. We seem to have the pages in the diary and the dates, so if you will tell us them that will be of the greatest help to us.
DR. SEIDL: The date Is 9 October 1940; Pages 966-967 of the diary, I quote Line 6:
"It is clear that we do not wish to denationalize, nor shall we germanize."
The next quotation...
THE PRESIDENT: The translation in our book of that sentence is:
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"It is clear that we neither want to denationalize nor degermanize."
DR.SEIDL: That is apparently an error in the translation.
THE PRESIDENT: In which translation? In the one I have just read out?
DR.SEIDL: In the English translation. I shall now quote literally
"It is clear that we neither wish to denationalize nor shall we germanize." The other makes no sense.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I read. Well, it is right in our book anyhow.
DR.SEIDL: The Governor General wished to say that we did not want to deprive the Poles of their national character and that we did not intend to turn them into Germans.
I now turn to Page 101, to an entry dated 27 October 1940, Pages 1026 to 1027 of Volume IV of the diary. A conference with Reich Minister of Labor Seldte. I quote, Line 7:
"He, the Governor General, had complained to the Fuehrer that the wages of Polish agricultural laborers had been reduced by 50 percent. In addition, their wages had for the most part been used for purposes which were completely foreign to the idea of this exchange of workers."
The next quotation is dated 29 November 1940. It is on Page 1085 in Volume IV, of the year 1940. I quote:
"Hofrat Watzke further states that Reichsleiter Rosenberg's office was attempting to confiscate the so-called Polish Library in Paris, for inclusion in the Ahnenerbe in Berlin. The Department of Schools was of the opinion that the books of this Polish library belonged to the state library in Warsaw, as 17,000 volumes were already in Warsaw.
"The Governor General ordered that this Polish library should be transferred from Paris to Warsaw without delay."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the next entry, dated 6 and 7 June 1940, which refers to an economic conference. I shall not read from the entry.
The next quotation is dated 25 February 1940. It deals with a conference of the department chiefs, prefects, and town majors of the district of Radom. I quote Page 12:
"Thereupon the Governor General spoke, and made the following statements:"
It goes on from Page 13:
"I shall, therefore, again summarize all the points.
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"1. The Government General comprises that part of the occupied Polish territory which is not an integral part of the German Reich...
"2. This territory has primarily been designated by the Fuehrer as the home of the Polish people. In Berlin the Fuehrer, as well as Field Marshal Goering, emphasized to me again and again that this territory would not be subjected to Germanization. It is to be set aside as the national territory of the Polish people. In the name of the German people it is to be placed at the disposal of the Polish nation as their reservation."
The speech of the Governor General ends two pages further. I quote the last paragraph:
"There is one thing I should like to tell you: The Fuehrer has urged me to guarantee the self-administration of the Poles as far as possible. Under all circumstances they must be granted the right to choose the Wojts and the minor mayors and village magistrates from among the Poles, which would be to our interest as well."
I now turn to the entry of 4 March 1940. From the volume of conferences, February 1940 to November 1940, Page 8:
"The Governor General submits for consideration the question of whether a slight pressure could not be exerted through proper use of the Compulsory Labor Order. He refuses to ask Berlin for the promulgation of a new decree defining special measures for the application of force and threats. Measures which might lead to unrest should be avoided. The shipping of people by force has nothing in its favor."
The last quotation in my document book is on Page 143. It is an entry dated 27 January 1941, Volume I, Page 115. A conference between State Secretary Dr. Buehler and the Reich Finance Minister, Count Schwerin von Krosigk. I quote the last paragraph:
"It is due to the efforts of all personnel employed in the Government General that, after surmounting extraordinary and unusual difficulties, a general improvement in the economic situation can now be noted. The Government General, from the day of its birth, has most conscientiously met the demands of the Reich for strengthening the German war potential. It is, therefore, permissible to ask that in future the Reich should make no excessive demands on the Government General, so that a sound and planned economy may be maintained in the Government General, which, in turn, would prove of benefit to the Reich."
That completes Volume II of the document book.
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I now come to Volume III and I ask the Tribunal to refer to a quotation on Page 17 in my document book. It is an entry following a government meeting of 18 October 1941. I quote the eighth line from the bottom; it is a statement of the Governor General:
"I shall first of all state, when replying to these demands"- that means, the demands of the Reich-"that our strength has been exhausted and that we can no longer take any responsibility as regards the Fuehrer. No instructions, orders, threats, et cetera, can induce me to answer anything but an emphatic 'no' to demands which, even under the stress of wartime conditions, are no longer tolerable. I will not permit a situation to arise such as you, Mr. Naumann, so expressly indicated, such as, for example, placing large areas at the disposal of the troops for maneuvers and thus completely disrupting the food supply which is already utterly insufficient."
The next quotation is on Pages 36 and 37 of my document book. It is an entry dated 16 January 1942, and the quotation to which I am referring is on the next page-Pages 65 and 66 of the diary:
"Later on a short discussion took place in the King's Hall of the Castle."
It took place with the chief of the Ukrainian committee. I quote:
"The Governor General desires a larger employment of Ukrainians in the administrative offices of the Government General. In all offices in which Poles are employed there should also be Ukrainians in proportion to the number of their population. He asked Professor . . . "
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if you will give us the page in your document book now, that will be sufficient for the present, because they seem to correspond.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes.
DR. SEIDL: I then come to Page 38 in the document book. This entry deals with a law drafted by Himmler, which has already been mentioned, regarding the treatment of aliens in the community. I quote:
"The Governor General orders the following letter to be sent to Landgerichtsrat Taschner:
" 'Please inform Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of my opinion which follows with my signature certified by yourself: I am opposed to the law on the treatment of people foreign to the German community, and I request that an early date be set for a meeting of leading officials with regard to the draft so
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that it may be possible to set forth the principal legal viewpoints which today still emphatically contradict this proposal in its details. I shall personally attend this meeting. In my opinion it is entirely impossible to circumvent the regular courts and to transfer such far-reaching authority exclusively to police organizatio
ns. The intended court at the Reich Security Main Office cannot take the place of a regular court in the eyes of the people.' "
On Page 39 I quote the last paragraph but one:
"For that reason I object to this draft in its present form, especially with regard to Paragraph 1 of the decree concerning the order of its execution."
Page 40 is an entry dated 7 June 1942 which also deals with that question of denationalization so emphatically denied by the Governor General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The next quotation is on Page 47 and deals with the acquisition of Chopin's posthumous works. I quote Paragraph 2:
"President Dr. Watzke reports that it would be possible to procure in Paris the major part of Chopin's posthumous works for the State Library in Krakow. The Governor General approves of the purchase of Chopin's posthumous works through the government of the Government General."
Page 50 deals with an entry in the diary which concerns the securing of agricultural property. I quote Page 767 of the diary, Paragraph 2:
"It is my aim to bring about agricultural reform in Galicia by every possible means, even during the war. I thus have kept the promises which I made a year ago in my proclamation to the population of this territory. Further progress of a beneficial nature can therefore result through the loyal cooperation of the population with the German authorities. The German administration in this area is willing, and has also been given orders to treat the population well. It will protect the loyal population of this area with the same decisive and fundamental firmness with which it will suppress any attempt at resistance against the order established by the Greater German Reich. For this purpose, for the protection of the individual farmer, I have issued an additional decree concerning the duties of the German administration for food and agriculture in Galicia."
I turn to Page 55 of the document book. This concerns a speech made by the Governor General before the leaders of the Polish Delegation, and I quote the last paragraph on Page 56, Line 6:
"I hope that the new harvest will place us in a position to assist the Polish Aid Committee. In any event we will do
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whatever we can to check the crisis. It is also to our interest that the Polish population should enjoy their work and cooperate. We do not want to exterminate or annihilate anybody . . ."
Page 61 of the document book deals with a conference which the Governor General held with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I quote the last paragraph on Page 919 of the diary:
"I would also like to take this opportunity of expressing to you, Party Comrade Sauckel, our willingness to do everything that is humanly possible. However, I should like to add one request: The treatment of Polish workers in the Reich is still subject to certain degrading restrictions."
I turn to Page 62 and quote Line 10:
"I can assure you, Party Comrade Sauckel, that it would be a tremendous help in recruiting workers, if at least part of the degrading restrictions against the Poles in the Reich could be abolished. I believe that could be effected."
I now turn to Page 66 of the document book. This is the only entry in the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank which he has signed personally. It is a memorandum on the development in the Government General after he had been relieved of all his positions in the Party, and had repeatedly stated that he was resigning and hoped that now at last his resignation would be accepted.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this final survey, dated 1 September 1942. It consists of five pages: Pages 66 to 71.
The next quotation is on Page 75 and deals with the safeguarding of art treasures. I quote the fifth line from the bottom. It is a statement made by the Governor General:
"The art treasures were carefully restored and cleaned, so that approximately 90 percent of all the art treasures of the former state of Poland in the territory of the Government General could be made safe. These art treasures are entirely the property of the Government General."
I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 92 of this volume. It is an entry dated 8 December 1942, which was made on the occasion of a meeting of departmental chiefs and which deals with the supply situation.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that entry. The same for the entry on Page 93, in which the Governor General speaks of the question of recruiting workers and most severely condemns all measures of force.
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The next entry, which appears important to me and which should be read into the record, is on Page 108. It concerns a press conference, and I ask the Tribunal to turn directly to Page 110. I quote the third paragraph:
"The Governor General sums up the result of the conference and states that, with the participation of the president of the department for propaganda and the press chief of the Government, all points will be comprised in a directive to be issued to all leading editors of the Polish papers. Instructions for the handling of matters concerning foreigners, in the press and in the cultural field, will be included in this directive. The conciliatory spirit of the Reich will serve as a model." I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 127 of the document book, a conference of 26 May 1943, which deals with the question of food. I quote the eighth line:
"We must understand that the first problem is the feeding of the Polish population; but I would like to say, with complete authority, that whatever happens with the coming rationing period in the Government General, I shall, in any case, allot to the largest possible number of the population such food rations as we can justifiably afford in view of our commitments to the Reich. Nothing and nobody will divert me from this goal..."
Page 131 of the document book deals with a committee of the Governor General for supplies for the non-German working population. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these statements, and I now turn to Page 141. This entry also deals with the food situation. I quote the tenth line from the bottom:
"After examining all possibilities I have now ordered that as from 1 September of this year, the food situation of the Polish population of this territory shall also be regulated on a generous scale. By 1 September of this year we shall introduce, for the population of this territory, the rations which are called the 'Warthegau rations.' "
I ask permission to quote a few sentences from Page 142:
"I should like to make a statement to you now. From the seriousness with which I utter these words, you can judge what I have in mind. I myself and the men of my Government are fully aware of the needs also of the Polish population in this district. We are not here to exterminate or annihilate it, or to torment these people beyond the measure of suffering laid upon them by fate. I hope that we shall come to a satisfactory arrangement in all matters that sometimes separate us. I personally have nothing against the Poles . . ."
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I now turn to Page 143. It is a conference which deals with young medical students. I quote Page 149, Paragraph 2, which is a statement by the Governor General:
"This first-we can safely call it Ministry of Health, even though this expression is not used-is something entirely new. This department for health will have to deal with important problems. For us, the physicians in this territory, there is above all a lack of ..."
Mr. President, I have just discovered that an error may possibly have occurred, since these statements on Page 672 were perhaps not made by the Governor General himself but by the head of the Health Department. I shall examine this question again and then submit the result to the Tribunal in writing.
I now turn to Page 155 of the document book. This entry seems to me of a vital nature. It is dated 14 July 1943 and deals with the establishment of the State Secretariat for Security.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not in our book, apparently. We haven't got a Page 155, and we haven't got a date, I think, of the 14th of July.
DR. SEIDL: It is July 1943. It has probably been omitted. With the approval of the Tribunal I shall read the sentences in question into the record. There are only three sentences:
"The Governor General points out the disastrous effect which the establishment of the State Secretariat for Security has had on the authority of the Governor General. He said that a new police and SS government had tried to establish itself in opposition to the Governor General which it had been possible to suppress only at the expense of a great deal of energy and at the very last moment."
I then ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 166 of the document book. This entry deals with general questions regarding the policy in Poland. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
Page 193 deals with the establishment of the Chopin Museum which was created by the Governor General. I quote Page 1157 of the diary, which is an extract from the Governor General's speech:
"Today I have inaugurated the Chopin Museum in Krakow. We have saved and brought to Krakow, under most difficult circumstances, the most valuable mementos of the greatest of Polish musicians. I merely wanted to say this in order to show you that I want to make a personal effort to put things in order in this country as far as possible."
The last quotation is on Page 199 of Volume II of the document book. It is an extract from a speech which Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler made on the occasion of the installation of the new Higher SS
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and Police Leader in Krakow) before the members of the Government and the Higher SS and Police Leaders. This is the speech which the Defendant Frank mentioned when he was examined. I quote the eighth line from the bottom:
"You are all very familiar with the situation: 16 million aliens and about 200,000 Germans live here; or if we include the members of the Police and Wehrmacht, perhaps 300,000. These 16 million aliens, who were augmented in the past by a large number of Jews who have now emigrated or have been sent to the East, consist largely of Poles and to a lesser degree of Ukrainians."
I turn to the last document of this volume, Page 200, an entry dated 14 December 1943. It concerns a speech which the Governor General made to officers of the Air Force. I quote the second paragraph:
"Therefore, everything should be done to keep the population quiet, peaceful, and in order. Nothing should be done to create unnecessary agitation among the population. I mention only one example here:
"It would be wrong if now, during the war, we were to undertake the establishment of large German settlements among the peasantry in this territory. This attempt at colonizing, mostly through force, would lead to tremendous unrest among the native peasant population. This, in turn, from the point of view of production, would result in a tremendous loss to the harvest, in a curtailment of cultivation, and so on. It would also be wrong forcibly to deprive the population of its Church, or of any possibility for leading a simple cultural life."
I turn to Page 201, and I quote the last paragraph:
"We must take care of these territories and their population. I have found, to my pleasure and that of all of our colleagues, that this point of view has prevailed and that everything that was formerly said against the alleged friendship with the Poles or the weakness of this attitude, has dwindled to nothing in face of the facts."
That completes Volume II of the document book-I beg your pardon, I meant Volume III. Now I come to Volume IV of the document book.
Page 1 of the document book deals with a conversation which took place on 25 January 1943 with the SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger. I quote the last paragraph:
"The Governor General states that he had not been previously informed about the large-scale action to seize asocial elements
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and that this procedure was in opposition to the Fuehrer's decree of 7 May 1942, according to which the State Secretary for Security must obtain the approval of the Governor General before carrying out instructions by the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. State Secretary Krueger states that this concerned secret instructions which had to be carried out suddenly."
I ask the Tribunal to take cognizance of the fact that this is merely an example of many similar discussions and differences of opinion.
I now turn to Page 24 of the document book. This concerns a meeting of the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee on 22 September 1943. I hope that the pages tally again.
THE PRESIDENT: You said Page 24, didn't you?
DR.SEIDL: Page 24, an entry of 22 September 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: It looks as though the paging is right. Our book is Page 24 at the top, so perhaps you will continue to quote the page for a moment or two. We will see whether it goes on right.
DR.SEIDL: This concerns an entry dated 22 September 1943, a meeting of the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee. I quote only the first lines:
"In the course of the past few months, in the face of the most difficult and senseless struggles, I have had to insist on the principle that the Poles should, at last, be given a sufficient quantity of food. You all know the foolish attitude of considering the nations we have conquered as inferior to us, and that at a moment when the labor potential of these peoples represents one of the most important factors in our fight for victory. By my opposition to this absurdity, which has caused most grievous harm to the German people, I personally-and many men of my government and many of you-have incurred the charge of being friendly or soft towards, the Poles.
"For years now people have not hesitated to attack my government of this area with the foulest arguments of this kind, and behind my back have hindered the fulfillment of these tasks. Now it has been proved as clear as day that it is insane to want to reconstruct Europe and at the same time to persecute the European nations with such unparalleled chicanery."
I now turn to Page 34 of the document book, an entry dated 20 April 1943, concerning a government meeting. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the final words only of the Governor General's speech on Page 38 of the document book and Page 41 of
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the diary. Then I turn to Page 39 of the document book, a meeting of 22 July 1943; I quote from the second paragraph, the tenth line:
"The question of the resettlement was altogether particularly difficult for us in this year. I can give you the good news that resettlement in general has been completely discontinued for the duration of the war. With regard to the transferring of industries, we have just started to work at full speed. As you know-I personally attach great importance to it-we have to satisfy this need of the Reich, and in the coming months we shall install great industrial concerns of international renown in the Government General.
"However, with regard to this question we must consider the almost complete reconstruction of the Government General which has consequently been forced upon us. While, until now, we have always figured as a country supplying the Reich with labor, as an agricultural country, and the granary of Europe, we shall within a very short time become one of the most important industrial centers of Europe. I remind you of such names as Krupp, Heinkel, Henschel, whose industries will be moved into the Government General."
I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 41 of the document book. It is the statement which was made by the witness Doctor Buehler on 26 October 1943, in which he states that this report dealt with 4 years of reconstruction in the Government General on the basis of reliable information from the 13 chief departments. The statement includes Pages 42 to 69 of the document book. I do not propose to quote from this statement, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
I go straight o
n to Page 70 of the document book, which concerns a government meeting dated 16 February 1944. I quote the last paragraph, Page 4 of the document book.
"As opposed to this, the fact must be established that the development, construction, and securing of that which today gives this territory its importance were possible only because it was necessary, in opposition to the ideas of the advocates of brute force-so completely untimely during a war-to bring the human and material resources of this area into the service of the German war effort in as constructive a manner as possible."
The next quotation is Page 74; an entry dated 6 March 1944. I quote the last paragraph on Page 75, Page 5 of the diary:
"The Governor General does not, as a matter of principle, oppose the training of the younger generation for the priesthood because, if courses for doctors, et cetera, are arranged,
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similar opportunities must also be created in the field of religion."
Page 77 deals with an order by the Governor General prohibiting the evacuation of the population, or a part of it, which was in the fighting zone near Lublin.
On Page 80 is an entry dated 12 April 1944. I quote the second paragraph:
"In this connection President Gerteis spoke of the treatment of the Poles in the Reich. This treatment, said to be worse than that of any other foreign workers, had led to the result that practically no Poles would volunteer any more for work in Germany.
"There were 21 points on which the Polish workers in the Reich were more badly treated than any other foreign workers. The Governor General requested President Gerteis to acquaint him with these 21 points which he would certainly attempt to have abolished."
I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 100 of the document book. It concerns a conference on 6 June 1944 regarding a large-scale action against the partisans in the Bilgoraje Forest. I quote Page 101, Page 4 of the diary:
"The Governor General wants to be quite sure that protection is given to the harmless population, which is itself suffering under the partisan terror."
Page 102 deals with the views of the Governor General on concentration camps. It is an entry dated 6 June 1944. I quote the last paragraph:
"The Governor General declared that he would never sign such a decree, since it meant sending the person concerned to a concentration camp. He stated that he had always protested with the utmost vigor against the system of concentration camps, for it was the greatest offense against the sense of justice. He had thought there would be no concentration camps for such matters, but they had apparently been silently put into operation. It could only be handled in such a manner that the persons condemned would be pardoned to jail or prison for a certain number of years. He pointed out that prison sentences, for instance, were imposed and examined by state institutions. He therefore requested that State Secretary Dr. Buehler should be informed that he, the Governor General, would not sign such decrees. He did not wish concentration camps to be officially sanctioned. He went on to say that there was no pardon which would commute a sentence into commitment to a concentration camp. The courts-martial are
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state legal organs of a special character and consist of police units; actually they should normally be staffed by members of the Wehrmacht."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, can you explain the translation of the words at the bottom of Page 102 which are in English, "It only could be handled in such a manner that the persons would be pardoned to jail or prison for a certain number of years." Can you explain that from the point of view of meaning?
DR. SEIDL: The meaning of the words becomes clear from the statement made by President Wille in the previous paragraph where, among others, you will find the following statement. It is the tenth line from the top.
"The Reprieve Commission had asked the representative of the Chief of the Security Police, who was present at the session, in what form this pardon was to be effected. As far as he knew, remittance of a sentence had been allowed in one case only. In all other cases it was customary to couple Security Police measures with the remittance of a sentence. It was feared that otherwise these people might disappear."
Now the Governor General was of the opinion that, for example, to transmute a death sentence to a term in prison or penitentiary was possible but that he would have to refuse direct commutation of a death penalty into a suspended prison penalty if the Police in that event were to impose security measures.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that it meant that pardon from a death sentence might be made by a reprieve for a sentence in prison for a certain number of years, but not by sending to a concentration camp, which would be for an indefinite period and under police methods?
DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the sense of it.
I now turn to Page 104 of the document book. This quotation also deals with the general question of treatment of the population in the Government General.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you have been very much longer than you said, and the Tribunal thinks you might be able to cut down a great deal of this. It is all very much on the same lines.
DR.SEIDL: Yes. In that case, I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 112 of the document book, an entry dated 10 July 1944. This entry deals with the official control of art treasures. I quote the second paragraph:
"The Governor General instructs the expert Palezieux to have a complete index made of these art treasures."
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THE PRESIDENT: You have already told us and given us some evidence to support the view that the Defendant Frank was preserving the art treasures and was wishing them to be preserved in Poland, and it is not necessary under those circumstances to go reading passages about it.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that entry; and if the Tribunal agrees, I shall merely give you the pages of the documents in the document book which appear important to me. That is page...
[The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the interpreting system.]
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if the Court is agreeable I should like to give only the numbers of the pages of Volume IV of the document book which seem particularly important to me. These are the Pages 115, 121, 123, 134, 139, 152, and 182. That concludes Volume IV of the document book and I come to the last volume of the document book which will be finished considerably faster.
Volume V deals exclusively with the accusations made by the Prosecution of the United States against the Defendant Frank concerning his activity as President of the Academy for German Law, as President of the National Socialist Lawyers' Association, and similar positions. Page 1 is a document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution, 1391-PS. It still has no USA number and will be Exhibit Number Frank-11. It is the law regarding the Academy for German Law with the necessary statutes and the tasks resulting therefrom.
I turn to page 25 of the document book. This quotation becomes Exhibit Frank-12 (Document Number Frank-12). It deals with a sentence which has been ascribed to the defendant: "Right is that which is good for the people." This quotation should prove only that the Defendant Dr. Frank wanted to express nothing more than that which is implied in the Roman sentence: Salus publica suprema lex (The supreme law is the welfare of the people). I ask the Court to take cognizance of this and turn to Page 26 of the document book, an excerpt from the magazine of the Academy for German Law of 1938. That will be Exhibit Frank-13 (Document Number Frank-13). This quotation also deals with the afore-mentioned sentence: "Right is that which is good for the people."
Page 30 is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-670 (Document Number 3459-PS) and deals with the closing celebration of the "Congress of German Law 1939" at Leipzig, where the Defendant Dr. Frank made the concluding speech before 25,000 lawyers. I quote on Page 31, Line 10 from the bottom:
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"Only by applying legal security methods, by administering true justice, and by clearly following the legislative ideal of law can the national community continue to exist. This legal method which permanently ensures the fulfillment of the tasks of the community has been assigned to you, fellow guardians of the law, as your mission. Ancient Germanic principles have come down to us through the centuries.
"1) No one shall be judged who has not had the opportunity to defend himself.
"2) No one shall be deprived of the incontestable rights which he enjoys as a member of the national community, except by decision of the judge. Honor, liberty, life, the profits of labor are among those rights.
"3) Regardless of the nature of the proceedings, the reasons for the indictment, or the law which is applied, everyone who is under indictment must be given the opportunity to have a defense counsel who can make legal statements for him; he must be given a legal and impartial hearing."
I turn to Page 35 of the document book, which deals with a speech, an address by the Defendant Dr. Frank, made at a meeting of the heads of the departments of the National Socialist Lawyer's Association on 19 November 1941. The speech-that is, the excerpt- becomes Exhibit Number Frank-14 (Document Number Frank-14). I quote only a few sentences at the top of Page 37.
"Therefore, it is a very serious task which we have imposed upon ourselves and we must always bear in mind that it can be fulfilled only with courage and absolute readiness for self-sacrifice. I observe the developments with great attention. I watch every anti-juridical tendency I know only too well from history-as you all do-of the attempts made to gain ever-increasing power in general directions because one has weapons with which one can shoot, and authority on the basis of which one can make people who have been arrested disappear. In the first place, I mean by this not only the attempts made by the SS, the SD, and by the police headquarters, but the attempts of many other offices of the State and the Reich to exclude themselves from general jurisdiction."
I turn to-I would like to quote the last five lines on Page 41. Those were the last words spoken during that session:
"One cannot debase law to an article of merchandise; one cannot sell it; it exists or it does not exist. Law is not an exchange commodity. If justice is not supported, the State loses its moral foundation; it sinks into the abyss of darkness and horror."
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The next document is on Page 42. It is the first address which the Defendant Dr. Frank made in Berlin at the university on 8 June 1942. It will be Exhibit Number Frank-15 (Document Number Frank-15). I quote Page 44, second paragraph, seventh line:
"On the other hand, however, a member of the community cannot be deprived of honor, liberty, life, and property; he cannot be expelled and condemned without first being able to defend himself against the charges brought against him. The Armed Forces serve us as a model in this respect. There everyone is a free, honored member of the community, with equal rights, until a judge-standing independently above him -has weighed and judged between indictment and defense."
I then turn to Page 49 of the document book, the second of these four long speeches. It was held in Vienna, and will become Exhibit Number Frank-15.
DIE PRESIDENT: We have already had Exhibit Frank-15 on Page 41.
DR.SEIDL: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President; it will be Frank-16 (Document Number Frank-16). I quote only one sentence on Page 51.
"I shall continue to repeat with all the strength of my conviction that it would be an evil thing if ideals advocating a police state were to be presented as distinct National Socialist ideals, while old Germanic ideals of law fell entirely into the background."
Now I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 57 of the document book to the speech made by the Defendant Dr. Frank at the University of Munich, on 20 July 1942. This will be Exhibit Frank-17 (Document Number Frank-17). I quote on Page 58, Line 16:
"It is, however, impossible to talk about a national community and still regard the servants of the law as excluded from this national community, and throw mud at them in the midst of the war. The Fuehrer has transferred the tasks of the Reich Leader of the Reich Legal Office and that of the leader of the National Socialist Lawyers' Association to me, and therefore it is my duty to state that it is detrimental to the German national community if in the 'Black Corps' lawyers are called 'sewer-rats.' "
I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 67 of the document book. That is the speech which he made at Heidelberg on 21 July 1942.
That will be Exhibit Frank-18 (Document Number Frank-18). I ask the Tribunal to take official notice of that speech. On Page 69 I quote only one sentence: "But never must there be a police state, never. That I oppose."
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I now come to the last document which the Prosecution of the United States has already submitted under Exhibit Number USA-607 (Document Number 2233(x)-PS), an excerpt from the diary: "Concluding reflections on the events of the last three months."
In these reflections Dr. Frank once more definitely states his attitude towards the concept of the legal state, and I ask the Tribunal to take cognizance particularly of his basic assumptions on Pages 74 and 75 of the document book. Here, Dr. Frank again formulated the prerequisites which he considered necessary for the existence of any legal state. I quote only a few lines from Page 74:
"1) No fellow German can be convicted without regular court procedure, and only on the basis of a law in effect before the act was committed.
"2) The proceedings must carry full guarantee that the accused will be interrogated on all pertaining to the indictment, and that he will be able to speak freely.
"3) The accused must have the opportunity, at all stages of the trial, to avail himself of the services of defense counsel acquainted with the law.
"4) The defense counsel must have complete freedom of action and independence in carrying out his office in order to strike an even balance between the State prosecutor and the defendant.
"5) The judge or the court must make his or its decision quite independently-that is, the verdict must not be influenced by any irrelevant factors-in logical consideration of the subject matter and in just application of the purport of the law.
"6) When the penalty imposed by the sentence has been paid, the act has been expiated.
"7) Measures for protective custody and security custody may not be undertaken or carried out by police organs, nor may measures for the punishment of concentration camp inmates, except from this aspect, that is, after confirmation of the intended measures by regular, independent judges.
"8) In the same manner, the administration of justice for fellow Germans must guarantee full safeguarding of individual interests in all relations pertaining to civil suits proper."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are there any passages in these documents which express the opinion that the same principles ought to be applied to others than fellow Germans?
DR. SEIDL: In this last quotation the Defendant Dr. Frank dealt basically with questions of law without making any difference here
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between Germans and people of foreign nationality. However, in his capacity as Governor General he also fundamentally objected at all times to the transfer of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews to concentration camps. This can be seen from a whole series of entries in the diary.
With this I have come to the end of my evidence for Dr. Frank. There are left only the answers to interrogatories by witnesses whose interrogation before a commission has been approved by the Court. At a later date I shall compile these interrogations in a small document book and submit the translation thereof to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of interrogatories where you have not yet got the answers; is that right?
DR.SEIDL: These are interrogatories to which the answers have not yet been received.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, as soon as you have received them you will furnish them to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker.
DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): In presenting evidence for the Defendant Frick, I shall forego calling the defendant himself as a witness. The questions which require an explanation deal mainly with problems relating to formal authority and also with problems which differentiate between formal authority and actual responsibility. These are problems, part of which have already been elucidated by the interrogation of Dr. Lammers and the rest of which will be cleared up by the submission of documents. One special field, however, cannot be entirely clarified by documents; and that is the question of the actual distribution of authority within the sphere of the Police; but for that special field I have named the witness Dr. Gisevius. He is the only witness whose interrogation seems to be necessary for the presentation of evidence in the case of Frick. Therefore, in the meantime, I have dispensed with other witnesses.
I ask the Court to decide whether I should call the witness Dr. Gisevius first or whether I should submit my documents first. If documents are to be presented first, I believe that I could finish by the midday recess.
THE PRESIDENT: You can finish your documents before the adjournment, do you mean?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. I believe so.
THE PRESIDENT: Until 1:00 o'clock?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
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THE PRESIDENT: Are you indifferent whether you call the witness first or whether you present the documents first?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that perhaps it would be more convenient to give the documents first. They hope that you will be able to finish them reasonably quickly.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the document book (Documents Number 386-PS, W79, and 3726-PS) deal with evidence concerning the question of whether the members of the Reich Cabinet knew about Hitler's preparation for aggressive war. I need not read the documents; they have already been submitted, and they show that Hitler gave information of his plans for aggression only to those of his assistants who had to know of these plans for their own work, but did not inform Frick who, as Minister of the Interior, was responsible for the internal policy.
Within the scope of the war preparation, Frick was made Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration by the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938, which has already been submitted, Exhibit Number USA-36 (Document Number 2194-PS). This law does not indicate that this position had anything to do with the known preparation of an aggressive war; it shows only the participation of the Administration of the Interior in a general preparation and organization in the event of a future war. I have therefore included in the document book an excerpt from this law under Number 4 of the document book, in order to correct an error. The Defendant Frick himself stated in an affidavit on 14 November 1945, that he had held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration from 21 May 1935. This is the date of the first Reich Defense Law, which has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-24 (Document 2261-PS). The first Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, however, does not provide for the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration; that is contained only in the second law of 4 September 1938.
This second law has been submitted under Exhibit Number USA-36. Following this erroneous statement which the Defendant Frick made without having the two laws on hand, the Prosecution has also stated that Frick held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration from 21 May 1935, while actually he held it only from 4 September 1938, that is, the date of the second law.
Numbers 5 and 6 of the document book have already been submitted by the Prosecution. They also prove nothing except the participation of the Defendant Frick in the establishment of civil
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administration with a view to a possible future war. It is not necessary to read this either.
The Prosecution considers Hitler's aggressive intentions to be so well known and so obvious as to require no further proof. The Prosecution on that assumption came to the conclusion that participation in the National Socialist Government, in any field whatsoever, would in itself imply the conscious support of aggressive war. In opposition to that I have referred to evidence in documents from Number 7 to 10 inclusive of the Frick document book (Documents Number 2288-PS, 2292-PS, 2289-PS, and 3729-PS) which have already been submitted by the Prosecution and which show that Hitler in public, as well as in private conversations, from the time he came into power followed a definite policy of declaring his peaceful intentions-a policy, therefore, which for considered reasons, declared to all that to keep peace was right.
I believe that these documents, which have already been submitted to the Tribunal, must also be considered in order to decide whether or not Hitler's official policy, since his coming to power, indicated that he had intentions of waging aggressive war. As evidence in that direction, I should like to submit Number 11 and Number 12 of the document book, which have not been presented until now, and which I will submit as Documents Frick-1 and -2.
The first is a telegram of 8 March 1936 from Cardinal Archbishop Schulte to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. The second document is a solemn declaration by the Austrian bishops occasioned by the annexation of Austria in March 1938.
The first document states, and I quote:
"Cardinal Archbishop Schulte has sent to General Von Blomberg, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, a telegram in which, at the memorable hour when the Armed Forces of the Reich are re-entering the German Rhineland as the guardians of peace and order, he greets the soldiers of our nation with deep emotion mindful of the magnificent example of self-sacrificing love of fatherland, stern manly discipline, and upright fear of God, which our Army has always given to the world."
I particularly selected these two documents because the Catholic Church is not suspected of sanctioning aggressive wars, or of approving of Hitler's criminal intentions in any other way. These statements would have been unthinkable if the accusations of the Prosecution were true, namely, that the criminal aims of Hitler and particularly his aggressive intentions had been known.
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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, the Tribunal would like to know what is the source of this telegram from the Archbishop, Number Frick-11.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I took the telegram, Number Frick-11, from the Voelkischer Beobachter of 9 March 1936.
THE PRESIDENT: And the other one?
DR. PANNENBECKER: The other document is from the Voelkischer Beobachter of 28 March 1938.
Number 13 of the document book contains only one sentence, taken from a speech made by Frick, from which it is evident that Frick shared the same opinion. He states in this speech, and I quote:
"The national revolution is the expression of the will to eliminate by legal means every form of external and internal foreign domination."
THE PRESIDENT: You gave that the number 13, did you?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. That should be 3.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, that is what I wanted to say. I submit it as Document Number Frick-3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. PANNENBECKER: The Defendant Frick has been accused particularly of working for the League for Germans Abroad. The Prosecution saw in this activity a contribution by the Defendant Frick to the preparation of aggressive wars. Frick's actual attitude regarding the aims of the League for Germans Abroad can be seen from Number 14, which will be Document Number Frick-4. In a speech made by Frick, it states, and I quote:
"The VDA (League for Germans Abroad) has nothing to do with political aims or with frontier questions; it is, and is intended to be, nothing more than a rallying point for German cultural activities . . . the world over."
In Number 15, which is Exhibit Frick-5 . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, I perhaps ought to say that in the index of this document book it looks as though the exhibit numbers were the numbers of the documents in the order in which they are put in the book, but that will not be so.
DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it will not be so.
THE PRESIDENT: That last document which you just put in as Exhibit Number 4 is shown in the book to be Exhibit Number 14, which is a mistake. It is Document Number 14, but not Exhibit Number 14.
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DR. PANNENBECKER: Number 14 of the document book, Exhibit Number Frick-4 (Document Number Frick-4).
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Dealing with the same subject I have entered in Number 15, Exhibit Number Frick-5 (Document Number 3358-PS), a decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior of 24 February 1933, which also deals with the question of the work of the League for Germans Abroad. It states, and I quote...
THE PRESIDENT: Has that not already been put in? I see it has a PS number.
DR. PANNENBECKER: It has a PS number, but it was not then submitted as evidence by the Prosecution. Therefore I quote:
"The suffering and misery of the times, the lack of work and food within Germany, cannot divert attention from the fact that about 30 million Germans, living outside of the present contracted borders of the Reich, are an integral part of the entire German people; an integral part, which the Reich Government is not able to help economically but to which it considers itself under an obligation to offer cultural support through the organization primarily concerned with this task- the League of Germans Abroad."
In the documents from Number 16 to 24 inclusive of the document book, which I need not read in detail, I have placed together the legal decrees which deal with the competence of the Reich Ministry of the Interior as a central office for certain occupied territories. The tasks of this central office, which had no authority to issue orders and no executive authority in any occupied territories, have already been described by the witness Dr. Lammers; and these tasks are specially entered in Number 24 of the document book. I do not need to submit it in evidence. It is an official publication of the Reichsgesetzblatt and has, in addition, already been submitted as 3082-PS. In accordance with the fact that the central office had no authority to issue orders in the occupied territories, there is in the diary of Dr. Frank a confirmation that the Governor General alone had authority to issue orders for the administration of his territory. I do not need to quote this passage as it has already been submitted to the Tribunal.
Police authority in the occupied territories was transferred to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler; but Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior had nothing to do with this either, since that authority was vested exclusively in Himmler in his capacity as Reichsfuehrer SS. That can be seen from Number 26 of the document book, which also already has been submitted as Exhibit USA-319 (Document Number 1997-PS).
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The Prosecution further considers the Defendant Frick responsible for the crimes committed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia since August 1943, on the grounds that Frick had been Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia since August 1943. In this connection, I refer to Numbers 28 and 29 of the document book (Documents Number 1366-PS and 3443-PS), from which it is evident that, at the time that Frick was appointed, the former powers of the Reich Protector had been subdivided between a so-called German State Minister in Bohemia and Moravia-who, under the immediate supervision of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, had to manage all government affairs-and the Reich Protector Frick who was given some special powers and in principle had the right to grant reprieves on sentences passed by the local courts.
Frick has also been accused of being responsible for the Political Police, that is, the Secret State Police, and the concentration camps. Until 1936 police matters were the affair of the individual states in Germany; consequently in Prussia, Goering as Prussian Prime Minister, and Prussian Minister of the Interior, built up the Political Police and established the concentration camps. Frick, therefore, as Reich Minister of the Interior, had no connection with these things.
In the spring of 1934 Frick also became Prussian Minister of the Interior. Previously, however, Goering had by a special law taken the affairs of the Political Police out of the jurisdiction of the office of the Prussian Minister of the Interior and placed it under the immediate supervision of the Prime Minister, an office which Goering retained for himself.
The corresponding decrees have already been submitted by the Prosecution as Documents Number 2104-PS, 2105-PS, and 2113-PS.
The same is evident from Document Number 30 in the document book, which has also been submitted as Exhibit USA-233 (Document Number 2344-PS).
Thus, in the Political Police sphere, Frick, until 1936, had only a general right of supervision, such as the Reich had over the individual states. He had, however, no special right of command in individual cases, only the authority to issue general directives; and in Numbers 31-33 of the document book I have entered a few of these directives issued by Frick.
I quote Number 31, which will be Exhibit Frick-6 (Document Number 779-PS):
"In order to correct the abuses resulting from the decree for protective custody, the Reich Minister of the Interior, in his directives of 12 April 1934 to the Land governments and Reichsstatthalter anent the promulgation and execution of decrees for protective custody, has determined that protective custody may be ordered only: (a) for the protection of the
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arrested person; (b) if the arrested person by his behavior, and especially by activities directed against the State, has directly endangered public security and order. Therefore, protective custody is not permissible when the above-mentioned cases do not apply, especially (a) for persons who merely exercise their public and civil rights; (b) for lawyers for representing the interests of their clients; (c) in the case of personal matters, as for instance, insults; (d) because of economic measures (questions of salary, dismissal of employees, and similar cases).
"Furthermore, protective custody is not permissible as a countermeasure for punishable actions, for the courts are competent to deal with those cases."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?
DR. PANNENBECKER: It is a document which the Prosecution has submitted as 779-PS and which was taken from the files of the ministry. There is no date on the document but it must have been in the spring of 1934, as can be seen from the first sentence of the document. The Voelkischer Beobachter mentions the same decree in its issue of 14 April 1934. I have included that as Number 32 in the document book; it will be Exhibit Frick-7 (Document Number Frick-7).
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, are you offering that as an exhibit or has it already been put in evidence?
DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it has not, as yet, been submitted. I offer it as Exhibit Number Frick-7.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told the date is April 12.
DR. PANNENBECKER: In the spring of 1934, yes, shortly after.
THE PRESIDENT: 12th of April, 1934.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.
The Volkischer Beobachter also mentions this decree in its issue of 14 April 1934. We are concerned with Document 32 of the document book, which will be Exhibit Number Frick-7. I do not need to read it in detail.
The same is evident from Number 33 of the book, which will be Exhibit Number Frick-8 (Document Number I-302).
Number 34 of the book-which will be Exhibit Number Frick-9 (Document Number 775-PS) shows that the Gestapo actually did not adhere to Frick's directives, and that Frick was powerless in that connection. Nevertheless, the document appears important to me because it shows that Frick tried repeatedly with great pains to counteract the abuses of the Gestapo, whim, however, with the
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support of Himmler, was stronger than he-especially since Himmler enjoyed the direct confidence of the Fuehrer.
On 17 June 1936, the affairs of the Political Police came under the jurisdiction of the Reich. Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police and, though formally attached to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, he functioned, in fact, as an independent Police Ministry under the immediate authority of Hitler; and, as a minister, he was privileged to look after his affairs in the Reich Cabinet himself.
This can be seen from Document Number- 35 of the document book-an excerpt from the Reichsgesetzblatt which has been submitted as 2073-PS. I do not believe that I have to give it an exhibit number; it is an official announcement in the Reichsgesetzblatt.
In this connection the Prosecution has submitted Document 1723-PS as Exhibit USA-206. I have entered an extract from this document as Number 36 in the document book in order to correct an error. The document is an extract from a book written by Dr. Ley in his capacity as Reich Organization Leader. In that book Dr. Ley gives directives to the Party offices regarding co-operation with the Gestapo, and at the end of the extract Ley reprinted a decree by Frick which shows how Frick attempted to counteract the arbitrary measures of the Gestapo.
However, in presenting evidence on the morning of 13 December 1945, the Prosecution read the entire document as an order by Frick. I should therefore like to correct that error.
Since Himmler and the chiefs of the Gestapo did not heed Frick's general directives, Frick tried, at least in individual cases, to alleviate conditions in concentration camps; but generally he was not successful. To quote an example, I have included-under Number 37 of the document book-a letter by the former Reichstag Delegate Wulle, which he sent to me of his own accord. This letter will be Exhibit Number Frick-10 (Document Number Frick-10). The letter states, and I quote:
"He"-Frick-"as my former counsel told me, has at various times tried to persuade Hitler to release me; but without success as it was Himmler who made all decisions regarding concentration camps. However, I owe it to him that I have been treated in a comparatively decent manner at the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. . . He stood out from among the Nazi demagogues because of his impartiality and reserve; he was a man who by nature disapproved of any act of violence... Since the spring of 1925 I have been involved in a sharp struggle against Hitler and his party. I consider it even more to Frick's credit that despite this antagonism and his comparatively powerless position with respect to Himmler,
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he tried in every way to help my wife and me during the bitter years of my imprisonment in the concentration camp . . ."
The Prosecution has asserted, on the basis of the statements made by the witness Blaha before this Tribunal, that Frick knew of the conditions in the Dachau concentration camp through having visited it in the first half of the year 1944.
Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal I submitted an interrogatory to the witness Gillhuber, who accompanied Frick on all his trips and. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Pannenbecker. The Tribunal considers that it cannot entertain an affidavit upon oath from the Defendant Frick, who is not going into the witness box to give evidence on oath, unless he is offered as a witness, in which case he may be cross-examined.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, but the last document was not an affidavit by Frick, but by Gillhuber, a witness, who has received an interrogatory. It is Number 40 of the document book. I am just informed that by an oversight this exhibit has not been included in the book; I shall have to submit it later.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well! Tell us what it is.
DR. PANNENBECKER: It is an interrogatory of, and the answers by, the witness Gillhuber. Gillhuber, for the personal protection of the Defendant Frick, accompanied him on all his official travels. In answering the interrogatory, he confirmed the fact that Frick had never visited the camp. The interrogatory, with the answers, has still to be submitted in translation. It is contained in my book.
THE PRESIDENT: You may read the interrogatory, unless the Prosecution has any objection to its admissibility, or the terms of it, because the interrogatory has already been provisionally allowed.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I read, then, from Number 40 of the
Frick document book, which becomes Exhibit Frick-11 (Document Number Frick-11), the following:
"Question: From when until when, and in what capacity, were you working for the Defendant Frick?
"Answer: From the 18 March 1936 until the arrival of the Allied Troops on 29 or 30 April 1945, as an employee of the Reich Security Service, as guard and escort.
"Question: Did you always accompany him on his travels for his personal protection?
"Answer: From 1936 until January 1942 only intermittently, but from January 1942 as office chief, I accompanied him on all his trips and flights.
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"Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick visited the concentration camp of Dachau during the first six months of 1944?
"Answer: To my knowledge, Frick did not visit the Dachau concentration camp.
"Question: Would you have known it had that been the case, and why would you have known it?
"Answer: I would have had to know it had that been the case. I was always close to him; and my employees would have reported it if he had left during my absence.
"Question: Do you still have the log book of the trips you made, and can you produce it now?
"Answer: From about 1941 log books were no longer kept. Instead of that, monthly reports of trips were sent to the Reich Security Service in Berlin. The copies which were kept in my office were, according to orders, burned with all the rest of the material in April 1945.
"Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick ever visited the Dachau camp?
"Answer: To my knowledge Frick never visited the Dachau Camp.
"Moosburg, 23 March 1946".-Signed-"Max Gillhuber"- Signed-"Leonard N. Dunkel, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry."
To comment on the question whether an official visitor to a concentration camp could always get a correct picture of the actual conditions existing there, I ask permission to read an unsolicited letter which I received a few days ago from a Catholic priest, Bernard Ketzlick. This letter which I have submitted as Supplement Frick Number...
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, the Prosecution makes objection to this because it is a character of evidence that there is no way of testing. I have a basket of such correspondence making charges against these defendants, which I would not think the Tribunal would want to receive. If the door is open to this kind of evidence, there is no end to it.
This witness has none of the sanctions, of course, that assure the verity of testimony, and I think it is objectionable to go into letters received from unknown persons.
DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say just one word on this subject? I received the letter so late that I did not have an opportunity to ask the person concerned to send me an affidavit. Of course, I am prepared to submit such an affidavit later, if such an affidavit should have greater probative value.
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THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the letter cannot be admitted, but an application can be made in the ordinary way for leave to put in an affidavit or to call the witness.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. Then, at a later date, I shall submit a written request.
I shall not read Number 38 of the document book since it concerns a statement made by Frick; and I refer, finally, to an excerpt from the book Inside Europe by John Gunther which will be submitted as Exhibit Frick-12 (Document Number Frick-12). The excerpt is contained under Number 39 in the document book I quote-it concerns a book which appeared originally in the English language, and I therefore quote it in English:
"Born in the Palatinate in 1877, Frick studied law and became a Beamter, an official. He is a bureaucrat through and through. Hitler is not intimate with him, but he respects him. He became Minister of the Interior because he was the only important Nazi with civil service training. Precise, obedient, uninspired, he turned out to be a faithful executive; he has been called the 'only honest Nazi.' "
As the last document, may I be permitted to refer to an extract from the book To the Bitter End by Gisevius. I believe I do not need to quote these passages individually, since the witness himself will be questioned. The extract will be Exhibit Number Frick-13 (Document Number Frick-13).
There are still left two answers to interrogatories by the witnesses Messersmith and Seger. I ask to be permitted to read these answers later, as soon as the answers have been submitted to me.
That concludes the presentation of documents. I believe there would be no purpose in calling the witnesses now.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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THE PRESIDENT: Are you prepared to call your witness, Dr. Pannenbecker?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, Mr. President, that is my request. I now ask permission to call the witness Gisevius. He is the sole witness in Frick's case. I have especially selected witness Gisevius to clarify the question of the state of the police authority in Germany, as he, from the very beginning, has been on the side of the opposition and is best qualified to give a picture of the state of that authority in Germany at that time.
[The witness Gisevius took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
HANS BERND GISEVIUS (Witness): Hans Bernd Gisevius.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, were you a member of the NSDAP or one of its affiliated organizations?
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that you personally participated in the events of 20 July 1944, and that you were also present in the OKW at that time?
DR. PANNENBECKER: How did you get into the police service?
GISEVIUS: In July 1933 I passed the state examination in law. As a descendant of an old family of civil servants I applied for a civil service appointment in the Prussian administration. I belonged, at that time, to the German National People's Party and to the Stahlhelm, and by the standards of that day I was considered politically reliable. Consequently, at the first stage of my training as a civil servant I was assigned to the Political Police, which meant my entry into the newly created Secret State Police. In those days I was very glad to have been assigned to the police service. I had already at that time heard that abominations of all kinds were going on in Germany. I was inclined to consider these as the final outburst of the situation, akin to civil war, which we were experiencing at the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933. So I hoped to contribute to the re-establishment of a proper executive organization which would provide for law, decency, and order. But this happiness was doomed to be short-lived.
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I had scarcely been 2 days in this new police office, when I discovered that incredible conditions existed there. These were not police who took action against riots, murder, illegal detention, and robbery; these were police who protected those guilty of such crimes. It was not the guilty persons who were arrested, but rather those who asked the police for help. These were not police who took action against the crime, but police whose task seemed to be to hush it up or, even worse, to sponsor it; for those SA and SS Kommandos who played at being police in private were encouraged by this so-called Secret State Police and were given all possible aid. The most terrible and, even for a newcomer, most obvious thing was that a system of unlawful detention was gaining more and more ground-a worse and more dreadful system than which could not be conceived.
The offices of the new State Police were in a huge building which was, however, not large enough to take all the prisoners. Special concentration camps for the Gestapo were established, and their names will go down in history as a mark of infamy. These were Oranienburg and the Gestapo's private prison in Papestrasse, Columbia House, or, as it was cynically nicknamed, "Columbia Hall."
I should like to make it quite clear that this was certainly rather amateurish compared with what all of us experienced later. But so it started, and I can only convey my personal impression by describing a brief incident I remember. After only 2 days I asked one of my colleagues, who was also a professional civil servant-he had been taken over from the old Political Police into the new one, and he was one of those officials who were forced into it -- I asked him "Tell me, am I in a police office here or in a robber's den?" The answer I received was, "You are in a robber's den and you can expect to see much more yet."
DR. PANNENBECKER: Under whom was the Political Police at that time and who was the superior authority?
GISEVIUS: The Political Police was under one Rudolf Diels. He too, came from the old Prussian Political Police. He was a professional civil servant, and one might have expected him still to retain the ideas of law and decency: but in a brutal and cynical way he set his mind on making the new rulers forget his political past as a democrat and on ingratiating himself with his superior, the Prussia Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Goering. It was Diels who created the Gestapo office; he suggested to Goering the issue of the first decree for making that office independent. It was Diels who let the SA and the SS enter that office; he legalized the actions of these civil Kommandos. But soon it became evident to me that such a bourgeois renegade could not do so much wrong quite by himself. Some very important person must have been backing him;
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in fact, I very quickly saw also that somebody was taking a daily interest in everything that happened in that office. Reports were written; telephone inquiries were received. Diels went several times daily to give reports, and it was the Prussian Minister of the Interior Goering who considered this Secret State Police as his special preserve.
During those months nothing happened in this office which was not known or ordered by Goering personally. I want to stress this, because in the course of years the public formed a different idea of Goering because he noticeably retired from his official functions. At that time, it was not yet the Goering who finally suffocated in his Karinhall. It was the Goering who looked after everything personally and had not yet begun to busy himself with the building of Karinhall or to don all sorts of uniforms and decorations. It was Goering still in civilian clothes, who was the real chief of an office, who inspired it, and who attached importance to being the "iron" Goering.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I believe you can describe some points more concisely. As to what you have just said, do you know this from your own experience, or where did you learn of it?
GISEVIUS: I not only heard and saw it myself, but I also learned much from a man
who in those days was also a member of the Secret State Police, and whose information will play an important part in the course of my statements.
At that time a criminologist had been called into the Secret State Police, probably the best known expert of the Prussian police, Oberregierungsrat Nebe. Nebe was a National Socialist. He had been in opposition to the former Prussian police and had joined the National Socialist Party. He was a man who sincerely believed in the purity and genuineness of the National Socialist aims. Thus I saw for myself how this man found out on the spot what was actually going on and how he inwardly recoiled.
I can also state here, as it is important, the reasons why Nebe became a strong opponent, who went with the opposition up to 20 July and later suffered death by hanging. At that time, in August 1933, Nebe was ordered by the Defendant Goering to murder Gregor Strasser, formerly a leading member of the National Socialist Party, by means of a car or hunting accident. Nebe was so shocked at this order that he refused to carry it out and made an inquiry at the Reich Chancellery. The answer from the Reich Chancellery was that the Fuehrer knew nothing of this order. Thereupon Nebe was summoned to Goering, who reproached him most bitterly for having made an inquiry. Nevertheless, when he finished these reproaches he considered it advisable to promote him, because he thought he would thereby silence him.
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The second thing which happened at that time, and which is also very important, was that the Defendant Goering gave the Political Police so-called open warrants for murder. At that time there were not only so-called amnesty laws which gave amnesty for infamous actions, but there was also a special law according to which investigations, already initiated by police authorities and by the public prosecutor, could be quashed, on condition, however, that in these special cases the Reich Chancellor, or Goering, personally signed the pertinent order. Goering made use of this law by giving open warrants to the Chief of the Gestapo, with which all that had to be done was to fill in the names of those who were to be murdered. Nebe was so shocked by this that from that moment on he felt it his duty to fight against the Gestapo. At our request he remained with us there, and afterwards in the Criminal Police, because we needed one man at least who could keep us informed about police conditions in case our desire for a revolution should materialize.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, what did you do yourself when you saw all these thongs?
GISEVIUS: I, for my part, tried to contact those bourgeois circles which through my connections were open to me. I went to various ministries: to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, to State Secretary Grauert, and several ministerial directors and counsellors. I went to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of Justice, to the Foreign Office, and the Ministry of War. I spoke repeatedly to the Chief of the Army High Command, Colonel General Von Hammerstein. Among all these connections I formed at that time, there is one other who is particularly important for my testimony.
At that time I met in the newly formed intelligence department of the OKW a Major Oster. I gave him all the material which by then had already accumulated. We started a collection-which we continued until 20 July-of all the documents we could get hold of; and Oster was the man who from then on, in the Ministry of War never failed to warn every officer he could contact officially or privately. In course of time, by flavor of Admiral Canaris, Oster became Chief of Staff of the Intelligence. When he met his death by hanging he was a general. But I consider it my duty to testify here, in view of all this man has done-his unforgettable fight against the Gestapo and against all the crimes which were committed against humanity and peace-that among the inflation of German field marshals and generals there was one real German general
DR. PANNENBECKER: How did the work develop, according to your observations in the Gestapo?
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GISEVIUS: At that time conditions in Germany were still such that people kept their eyes open in the ministries. There was still an opposition in the bourgeois ministries; there was still the Reich President Von Hindenburg. Thus, at the end of October 1933 the Defendant Goering was forced to dismiss Diels, the Chief of the State Police. At the same time a commission of investigation was set up in order to re-organize that institution thoroughly. According to the ministerial decree, Nebe and I were members of that commission. But that commission never met, for the Defendant Goering found ways and means to thwart this measure. He appointed as Chief and successor of Diels a still worse Nazi named Hinkler, who some time before had been acquitted in a trial because of irresponsibility; and this Hinkler acted in such a way that before 30 days had passed he was dismissed. Then the Defendant Goering was able to restore his Diels to the office.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything of the events which led to the Prussian law of 30 November 1933, by which the functions of the Gestapo were taken away from the office the Minister of the Interior and transferred to the office of the Prussian Prime Minister?
GISEVIUS: That was just the moment of which I am speaking. Goering realized that it would not serve his purpose if other ministries were too much concerned in his Secret State Police. Though he was Prussian Minister of the Interior himself, he was disturbed by the fact that the police department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior could look into the affairs of his private domain; and so he separated the Secret State Police from the remaining police and placed it under his personal direction, thereby excluding all other police authorities. From the point of view of a proper police system this was nonsense, because you cannot run a Political Police properly if you separate it from the Criminal Police and the Order Police. But Goering knew why he did not want any other police authority to look into the affairs of the Secret State Police.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you remain in the police service yourself?
GISEVIUS: On that day when Goering carried out his little- and I can't find another word for it-coup d'etat by assigning to himself a state police of his own, this Secret State Police issued a warrant of arrest against me. I had expected this and had gone into hiding The next morning I went to the Chief of the Police Department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, Ministerial Director Daluege-who was a high SS general-and said that it was really not quite in order to issue a warrant of arrest against me.
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A criminal commissioner of the Secret State Police came to arrest me in the room of the Chief of the Prussian police. Daluege was kind enough to allow me to escape through a back door to State Secretary Grauert. Grauert intervened with Goering, and as always in cases of this kind, Goering was very surprised and ordered a thorough investigation. That was the usual way of saying that such incidents were to be pigeonholed. After that I was no longer allowed to enter the Secret State Police, but I was sent as an observer to the Reichstag Fire trial at Leipzig, which was just drawing to an end. During these last days of November I was able to get some insight into this obscure affair and having already tried, together with Nebe, to investigate this crime, I was able to add to my knowledge here.
I assume that I shall again be questioned about that point and, therefore, shall now confine myself to the abatement that, if necessary, I am prepared to refresh Defendant Goering's memory concerning his complicity in and his joint knowledge of this first "brown" coup d'etat and the murder of the accomplices.
DR. PANNENBECKER: On 1 May 1934 Frick became Prussian Minister of the Interior. Did you get into touch with Frick himself or his ministries?
GISEVIUS: Yes. Immediately after the Reichstag Fire trial was over-that is, at the end of 1933 -- I was dismissed from the police service and transferred to a Landrat office in East Prussia. I complained, however, to State Secretary Grauert about this obvious disciplinary punishment. As he and Ministerial Director Daluege knew of my quarrel with the Secret State Police, they got me into the Ministry of the Interior and assigned to me the task of collecting all those reports which were still being incorrectly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior and of forwarding them to the Prussian Prime Minister who was in charge of the Secret State Police and who dealt with these matters.
As soon as Goering found out about this he repeatedly protested against my presence in the Ministry, but the Minister of the Interior was adamant and I succeeded in keeping that post.
When Frick came I did not get in touch with him immediately as I was only a subordinate official. I assume, however, that the Defendant Frick knew about my activity and my views, because I was now encouraged to continue collecting all those requests for help which were wrongly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, and a large number of these reports I submitted through official channels to Daluege, Grauert, and Frick. There was, however, the difficulty that Goering, in his capacity of Prime Minister of Prussia, had prohibited Frick, as his Prussian Minister of The Interior, to
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take cognizance of such reports. Frick was supposed to forward them to the Gestapo without comment. I saw no reason for not submitting them to Frick all the same, and as Frick was also Reich Minister of the Interior-and in this capacity could give directives to the Laender and, therefore, also to Goering-he took cognizance of these reports in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and allowed me to forward them to Goering with the request for a report. Goering protested repeatedly, and I know this resulted in heated disputes between him and Frick.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Is anything known to you about the fact that at that time the Reich Minister of the Interior issued certain directives to restrict protective custody?
GISEVIUS: It is correct that at that time a number of such directives were issued, and the fact that I say that a number of such directives were issued already implies that generally they were not complied with by subordinate authorities.
The Reich Minister of the Interior was a minister with no personal executive power, and I will never forget the impression it made on me, while training as a civil servant, that we officials in the Secret State Police were instructed in principle not to answer any inquiries from the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Naturally, at intervals the Reich Minister of the Interior sent reminders, and the efficiency of a Gestapo official was judged by the number of such reminders he could show his chief, Diels, as proof that he did not pay any attention to such matters.
DRY PANNENBECKER: On 30 June 1934 the so-called Rohm Putsch took place. Can you give a short description of the conditions prevailing before this Putsch?
GISEVIUS: First I have to say that there never was a Rohm Putsch. On 30 June there was only a Goering-Himmler Putsch.
I am in a position to give some information about that dark chapter, because I dealt with and followed up this case in the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, and because the radiograms sent during these days by Goering and Himmler to the police authorities of the Reich came into my hands. The last of these radiograms reads: "By order of Goering all documents relating to 30 June shall be burned immediately."
At that time I took the liberty of putting these papers into my safe, and to this day I do not know whether or not they survived Kaltenbrunner's attempts to get them. I still hope to recover these papers, and if I do, I can prove that throughout the whole 30 June not a single shot was fired by the SA. The SA did not revolt. By this, however, I do not wish to utter a single word of excuse for the
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leaders of the SA. On 30 June not one of the SA leaders died who did not deserve death a hundred times - but after a proper trial.
The situation on that 30 June was that of a civil war; on one side were the SA headed by Rohm, and on the other side, Goering and Himmler. It had been arranged for the SA, several days before 30 June, to be sent on leave. The SA leaders had been purposely called by Hitler for a conference at Wiessee that 30 June, and it is not usual for people who intend to effect a coup d'etat to travel by sleeping car to a conference. To their surprise they were seized at the station and at once driven off to execution.
The so-called Munich Putsch took place as follows: The Munich SA did not come into it at all, and at 1 hour's driving distance from Munich the alleged traitors, Rohm and Heines, fell into the sleep of death completely ignorant of the fact that, according to Hitler and Goering, a revolt had taken place in Munich the previous night.
I was able to observe the Putsch in Berlin very closely. It took place without anything being known about it by the public and without any participation by the SA. We in the police were unaware of it. It is true, however, that 4 days before 30 June one of the alleged ringleaders, SA Gruppenfuehrer Karl Ernst of Berlin, came to Ministerial Director Daluege looking very concerned and said that there were rumors going round in Berlin that the SA were contemplating a Putsch. He asked for an interview with Minister of the Interior Frick, so that he, Ernst, could assure him that there was no such intention.
Daluege sent me with this message to the Defendant Frick, and I arranged for this strange conversation where an SA leader assured the Minister of the Interior that he did not intend to stage a Putsch.
Ernst then set out on a pleasure trip to Madeira. On 30 June he was taken from the steamer and sent to Berlin for execution. I saw him arrive at the Tempelhof airport. This struck me as particularly interesting, because a few hours before I had read the official report about his execution in the newspaper.
That, then, was the so-called SA and Rohm Putsch. And because I am not to withhold anything, I must add that I was present when on 30 June the Defendant Goering informed the press of the event. On this occasion the Defendant Goering made the cold-blooded remark that he had for days been waiting for a code word which he had arranged with Hitler. He had then struck, of course with lightning speed, and had also extended the scope of his mission. This extension of his mission caused the death of a large number of innocent people. To mention only a few, there were Generals Schleicher-who was killed together with his wife-and Von Bredow, Ministerial Director Klausner, Edgar Jung, and many others.
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DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you were in the Ministry of the Interior yourself at that time. How did Frick hear about these measures, and was he himself in any way involved in the quelling of this so-called Putsch?
GISEVIUS: I was present when, at about half past 9, Ministerial Director Daluege came back quite pale after seeing Goering and having just been told what had happened. Daluege and I went to Grauert and we drove to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to Frick. Frick rushed out of the room-it may have been about 10 o'clock- in order to go to Goering to find out what had happened in the meantime, only to be told that he, as Police Minister of the Reich, should go home now and not worry about further developments. In fact, Frick did go home, and during those 2 dramatic days he did not enter the ministry.
Once during this time Daluege drove over with me to see him. For the rest, it was given to me, the youngest official of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to inform the Reich Minister of the Interior on that bloody Saturday and Sunday of the atrocious things which in the meantime had happened in Germany.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you just told us of an instruction Frick had received not to worry about these things. Who gave him this instruction?
GISEVIUS: As far as I know, Goering gave or conveyed to him an instruction by Hitler. I do not know whether there was a written instruction; neither do I know whether Frick had asked about it. I should think that Frick, on that day, probably considered it would be wise not to ask too many awkward questions.
DR. PANNENBECKER: After these things had been concluded, did Frick in any way attempt to smooth matters over?
GISEVIUS: To answer this question correctly I have to say first that on Saturday, 30 June, we at the Ministry of the Interior knew very little about what had happened. On Sunday, 1 July, we learned much more, and after these bloody days had passed, there is no doubt that Frick had on the whole a clear idea of what had happened. Also, during these days he made no secret of his indignation at the murders and unlawful arrests which apparently had taken place. In order to stick to the truth I have to answer your question by saying that the first reaction of the Defendant Frick which I knew about was that Reich law in which the Reich Ministers declared the events of June 30 to be lawful. This law had an unprecedented psychological effect on the further developments in Germany, and it has its place in the history of German terror. Apart from this, many things happened in the Third Reich which a normal mortal could not understand, but which
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were well understood in the circles of ministers and state secretaries. And so, I have to admit that, after that law, the Defendant Frick made a serious attempt to remedy at least the most obvious abuses. Maybe he thought other ministers in the Reich Cabinet should have spoken sooner. I am thinking now of Reich War Minister Von Blomberg, two of whose generals were shot, and who, in spite of that, signed this law. I intentionally mention Blomberg's name, and ask to be permitted to pause here to tell the Tribunal about an incident which occurred this morning. I was in the room of the defendants' counsel and was speaking to Dr. Dix. Dr. Dix was interrupted by Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Goering. I heard what Dr. Stahmer told Dr. Dix . . .
DR OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): May I ask whether a personal conversation which I had with Dr. Dix has anything to do with the taking of evidence?
GISEVIUS: I am not speaking...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, don't go on with your evidence whilst the objection is being made. Yes, Dr. Stahmer.
GISEVIUS: If you please, I didn't understand. . .
DR. STAHMER: I do not know whether it is in order when giving evidence to reveal a conversation which I had with Dr. Dix in the Defense Counsel's room.
GISEVIUS: May I say something to that?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent.
GISEVIUS: May I finish my statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you keep silent, sir.
DR. STAHMER: This morning in the room of the Defense Counsel, I had a personal conversation with Dr. Dix concerning the Blomberg case. That conversation was not intended to be heard by the witness. I do not know the witness; I didn't even see the witness, as far as I can remember, and I don't know whether this should come into the evidence by making such a conversation public here.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This incident has been reported to me, and I think it is important that this Tribunal know the influence-the threats that were made at this witness in this courthouse while waiting to testify here, threats not only against him but against the Defendant Schacht. Now, the affair was reported to me. I think it is important that this Tribunal know it. I think it is important that it come out. I should have attempted to bring it out on cross-examination if it had not been told, and I think that the witness should be permitted. These other parties have had great
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latitude here. This witness has been subjected to threats, as I understand it, which were uttered in his presence, whether they were intended for him or not, and I ask that this Tribunal allow Dr. Gisevius, who is the one representative of democratic forces in Germany, to take this stand to tell his story.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal would like to hear first of all anything further you have to say upon the matter. They will then hear what Dr. Dix has to say, if he wishes to say anything; and they will then hear whether the witness himself wishes to say anything in answer.
DR. STAHMER: I have no qualms about telling the Court exactly what I said. Last night I discussed the case with the Defendant Goering and told him the witness Gisevius...
THE PRESIDENT: We don't want to hear any communications which you had with the Defendant Goering other than those you choose to make in support of your objection to this evidence that has been given.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President; but I must say briefly that Goering told me that it was of no interest to him if the witness Gisevius did incriminate him, but that he did not want Blomberg, who died recently-and I assumed it was only the question of Blomberg's marriage-he, Goering, did not want these facts concerning the marriage of Blomberg to be discussed here in public. If that could not be prevented, then of course Goering, in his turn-and it is only a question of Schacht, because Schacht, as he had told me, wanted to speak about these things-then he, Goering would not spare Schacht.
That is what I told Dr. Dix this morning, and I am sure Dr. Dix will confirm that, and if I may add . . .
THE PRESIDENT: We will hear you in a moment, Dr. Dix.
DR. STAHMER: I said-and I was not referring to Schacht, to the witness, or to Herr Pannenbecker-I said, for reasons of professional etiquette, that I should like to inform Dr. Dix. That is what I said and what I did. In any case I did not even know that the witness Gisevius was present at that moment. At any rate, it was not intended for him. Moreover, I was speaking to Dr. Dix aside.
THE PRESIDENT: So that I may understand what you are saying: You say you had told Dr. Dix the substance of the conversation you had had with the Defendant Goering, and said that Goering would withdraw his objection to the facts being given if the Defendant Schacht wanted them to be given. Is that right?
DR. STAHMER: No, I only said that Goering did not care what was said about himself; he merely wanted the deceased Blomberg
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to be spared, and he did not want things concerning Blomberg's marriage to be discussed. If Schacht did not prevent that-I was speaking only of Schacht-then he, Goering, in his turn, would have no consideration for Schacht-would no longer have any consideration for Schacht. That is what I told Dr. Dix for reasons of personal etiquette.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait, wait, I can't hear you. Yes.
DR. STAHMER: As I said, that is what I told Dr. Dix, and that finished the conversation. And I made it quite clear to Dr. Dix that I told him that only as one colleague to another.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is all you wish to say?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
DR. DIX: I remember the facts, I believe, correctly and reliably, as follows: This morning I was in the room of the Defense Counsel speaking to the witness Dr. Gisevius. I believe my colleague, Professor Kraus, was also taking part in the conversation. Then my colleague, Stahmer, approached me and said he would like to speak to me. I replied that at the moment I was having an important and urgent conversation with Gisevius, and asked whether it could wait. Stahmer said "no," and that he must speak to me at once. I then took my colleague Stahmer aside, probably five or six paces from the group with whom I had been speaking. My colleague Stahmer told me the following-it is quite possible, I don't remember the actual words he used, that he started by saying that he was telling me this for professional reasons, as one colleague to another. If he says so now, I am sure that it is so. Anyhow I don't remember that any longer. He said to me, "Listen, Goering has an idea that Gisevius will attack him as much as he can. If he attacks the dead Blomberg, however, then Goering will disclose everything against Schacht-and he knows lots of things about Schacht which may not be pleasant for Schacht. He, Goering, had been very reticent in his testimony; but if anything should be said against the dead Blomberg, then he would have to reveal things against Schacht."
That was what he meant-that he would bring things up against Schacht. That was the conversation. I cannot say with absolute certainty whether my colleague told me I should call Gisevius' attention to it. If he says he did not say so, then it is certainly true, and I believe him; but I could only interpret that information to mean that I should notify Gisevius of this development promised by Goering. I therefore thought-and did not have the slightest doubt- that I was voicing Goering's intention, and that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer wished, and that that was the purpose of the whole thing. What else could be the reason for Dr. Stahmer's telling me at that moment, immediately before my discussion with Gisevius,
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even while I was in conversation with Gisevius, that he could not wait, that I must break off my conversation? Why should he inform me at that time, unless he meant that the mischief hinted at and threatened by Goering might possibly be avoided-in other words, that the witness Gisevius, on whom everything depended, should think twice before making his statement? I did not have the slightest doubt that what Stahmer meant by his words to me was that I should convey them to Gisevius. As I said, even if Stahmer had not asked me-and he was certainly speaking the truth when he said he did not ask me to take action-I would have replied, if I had been questioned before he made this statement, and that probably with an equally good conscience, that he had asked me to pass it on to Gisevius. But I will not maintain that he actually used those words. Anyway, it is absolutely certain that this conversation did take place, and it was in the firm belief that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer and Goering intended that I went straight to Gisevius. He was standing only five or six steps away from me, or even nearer. I think I understood him to say, when I addressed him, that he had heard parts of it. I don't know whether I understood him correctly. I then informed him of the gist of this conversation. That is what happened early this morning.
DR. STAHMER: May I say the following: It goes without saying, that I neither asked Dr. Dix to pass it on to Gisevius, nor did I count upon his doing so; but I surmised that Gisevius would be examined this morning, and that Dr. Dix would question the witness concerning the circumstances of Blomberg's marriage. That is what I had been told previously-namely, that Dr. Dix intended to put this question to the witness. Therefore, I called Dr. Dix's attention to it, assuming that he would abstain from such a question concerning Blomberg's marriage. That was not intended for the witness in any way, and I know definitely that I said to Dr. Dix that I was telling him this merely as one colleague to another, and he thanked me for it. He said, "Thank you very much." At any rate, if he had said to me, "I am going to tell the witness," I would have said immediately, "For heaven's sake; that is information intended only for you personally." Indeed, I am really surprised that Dr. Dix has in this manner abused the confidence which I placed in him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts, and we do not think we need hear anything more about it beyond considering the question as to whether the witness is to go on with his evidence.
Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer and Dr. Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were proposing to deal with reference to Field Marshal Von Blomberg? Is there anything further that you need say about it?
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GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I did not quite understand the question.
Concerning Blomberg, at this point I did not want to say anything further; I merely wanted, on the first occasion that Blomberg's name came up, to make it clear that the whole thing gave me the feeling that I was under pressure. I was standing so near that I could not help hearing what Dr. Stahmer said, and the manner in which Dr. Dix told me about it-for I had heard at least half of it- could not be understood in any other way than to mean that Dr. Dix in a very loyal manner was instructing me, a witness for the Defendant Schacht, to be rather reticent in my testimony on a point which I consider very important. That point will come up later and has nothing whatsoever to do with the marriage of Herr Von Blomberg. It has to do with the part which the Defendant Goering played in it, and I know quite well why Goering does not want me to speak about that affair. To my thinking, it is the most corrupt thing Goering ever did, and Goering is just using the cloak of chivalry by pretending that he wants to protect a dead man, whereas he really wants to prevent me from testifying in full on an important point- that is, the Fritsch crisis.
THE PRESIDENT: [turning to Dr. Pannenbecker.] The Tribunal will hear the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the witness to give.
GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in connection with the Blomberg case is finished. I merely wanted to protest at the first opportunity when the name was mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel will continue his examination and you will give such evidence as is relevant when you are examined or cross-examined by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, after the events of 30 June 1934, had the position of the Gestapo become so strong that no measures against it had any chance of succeeding?
GISEVIUS: I must answer this in the negative. The Secret State Police doubtlessly gained in power after 30 June, but because of the many excesses committed on 30 June, the opposition in the various ministries against the Secret State Police had become so strong that through collective action the majority of ministers could have used the events of 30 June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally made repeated efforts in that direction. With the knowledge of the Defendant Frick I went to see the Minister of Justice Guertner and begged him many times to use the large number of illegal murders as a reason for action against the Secret State Police. I personally went to Von Reichenau also, who was Chief of the Armed
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Forces Offices at that time, and told him the same thing. I know that my friend Oster brought the files concerning this matter to the knowledge of Blomberg, and I wish to testify here that, in spite of the excesses of the 30 of June, it would have been quite possible at that time to return to law and order.
DR. PANNENBECKER: After that, what did the Reich Minister of the Interior do-that is, what did Frick do to steer the Secret State Police to a course of legality?
GISEVIUS: We started a struggle against the Secret State Police and tried at least to prevent Himmler from getting into the Reich Ministry of the Interior. Shortly before Goering had relinquished the Ministry of the Interior to Frick, he had made Himmler Chief of the Secret State Police in Prussia. Himmler, starting from that basis of power, had attempted to assume police power in the other Laender of the Reich. Frick tried to prevent that by taking the stand that he, as Reich Minister of the Interior, had an equal voice in appointing police functionaries in the Reich. At the same time, we tried to prevent an increase in the numbers of the Secret State Police by systematically refusing all requests by the Gestapo to increase its body of officials. Unfortunately here also, as always, Himmler found ways and means to overcome this. He went to the finance ministers of the individual states and told them that he needed funds for the guard troops of the concentration camps, for the so-called "Death's Head" units, and he drew up a scale whereby five SS men were to guard one prisoner. With these funds Himmler financed his Secret State Police, as, of course it rested with him how many men he wanted to imprison.
In other ways too, we in the Reich Ministry of the Interior attempted by all possible means to block the way of the Gestapo; but unfortunately, the numerous requests we sent to the Gestapo remained unanswered. Again it was Goering who forbade Himmler to answer and who protected Himmler when he refused to give any information in reply to our inquiries.
Finally, a last effort was made during my term of office in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State Police at least to some extent by introducing into protective custody the right of supervision and complaint. If we could have achieved the right of review of all cases of protective custody, we would also have been able to get an insight into the individual actions of the Gestapo. A law was formulated, and this law was first submitted to the Ministerial Council of Prussia, the largest of the states. Again it was the Defendant Goering who, by all available means, opposed the passing of such a law. A very stormy cabinet meeting on the matter ended with my being asked to leave the Ministry of the Interior.
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DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I have shown you a memorandum . . .
THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wishes me to say that it anticipates that you will put any questions which you think necessary with reference to the alleged intimidation of the witness when you come to cross-examine.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir; thank you.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to talk about the efforts which were made by the Ministry of the Interior to stop the arbitrary methods of the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the concentration camps. I therefore ask you to look at a memorandum which originates from the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It is Document 775-PS, which I submitted this morning as Exhibit Frick-9 when I presented the evidence for Frick. It is Number 34 in the document book. Do you know that memorandum?
GISEVIUS: No, I don't. It appears that this memorandum was drawn up after I had left the Ministry of the Interior. I assume this from the fact that in this memorandum the Reich Minister of the Interior appears to have already given up the fight, since he writes that as a matter of principle it should be made clear who bears the responsibility, and, if necessary, the responsibility for all the consequences must now-and I quote-"be borne by the Reichsfuehrer SS who, in fact, has already claimed for himself the leadership of the Political Police in the Reich."
At the time when I was at the Reich Ministry of the Interior we tried particularly to prevent this from happening-namely, that Himmler should take over the Political Police. This is evidently a memorandum written about 6 months later when the terror had become still greater. The facts which are quoted here are known to me.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you say anything about this? Does it not deal with the Puender case and the case of Esterwege, Oldenburg?
GISEVIUS: The Esterwege case can be told most briefly. It is one of many.
So far as I can recollect, an SA or local group leader was arrested by the Gestapo because he got excited about the conditions in the Papenburg concentration camp. This was not the first time either. I don't know why the Defendant Frick picked on this particular
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case. Nevertheless, one day Daluege showed me one of those customary handwritten slips sent by Frick to Himmler. Frisk had written to Himmler in the margin in large green letters that an SA man or local group leader, or whatever he was, had been arrested illegally, that this man must be released at once, and that if Himmler did that sort of thing again he, Frick, would institute criminal proceedings against Himmler for illegal detention.
I remember this story very well, because it was somewhat peculiar-considering the police conditions which existed at the time- that Himmler should be threatened by Frick with criminal proceedings, and Daluege made some sneering remarks to me regarding Frick's action.
That is the one case:
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?
GISEVIUS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I should say in March or April.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, do you know how Himmler reacted to that threat of criminal proceedings?
GISEVIUS: Yes. There was a second case. That is this Puender affair which is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both, and therefore it might be better if I first relate the Puender affair in this connection. It concerned a Berlin attorney, who was a lawyer of high standing and legal adviser to the Swedish Embassy. The widow of the Ministerial Director Klausner, who had been murdered on 30 June, approached Puender, as she wanted to sue the life insurance companies for payment of her annuity. But as Klausner had allegedly committed suicide on that day, no director of any insurance company dared pay the money to the widow. Consequently, the attorney had to sue. But the Nazis had made a law according to which all such awkward cases-awkward for the Nazis-were not to be tried in court: they were to be taken to a so-called Spruchkammer in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. If I am not mistaken, this law was called "Law for the Settlement of Civilian Claims." They were never at a loss for fine-sounding names and titles at that time. This law forced the attorney to submit his claim to the court first. He was apprehensive. He went to the Ministry of the Interior and told the State Secretary, "If I comply with the law and sue, I shall be arrested." The State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior forced him to sue. Thereupon the very wise attorney went to the Ministry of Justice and told State Secretary Freisler that he did not want to sue as he would certainly be arrested by the Gestapo. The Secretary in the Ministry of Justice informed him that he would have to send in a claim in any case, but that nothing would happen as the courts had been instructed to
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pass such cases on without comment to the Spruchkammer in the Ministry of the Interior. Thereupon the attorney sued and the Gestapo promptly arrested him for slander because he had stated that the Ministerial Director Klausner had not met his death by suicide. This was for us a classical example of what we had come to in Germany as far as protective custody was concerned.
I had taken the liberty of selecting this case from among hundreds, or I should say thousands of similar cases and of suggesting to Frick that this matter should be brought to the notice not only of Goering, but of Hitler as well this time. Then I sat down and drafted a letter or a report from Frick to Hitler, which also went to the Ministry of Justice. There were more than five pages, and I discussed from every angle the facts concerning Ministerial Director Klausner's suicide, with the assistance of the SS, and the ensuing lawsuit. This report to Hitler concluded with Frick's remark that the time had now come to have the problem of protective custody settled by the Reich and by lawful means.
And now I answer your question regarding what happened. It roughly coincided with Frick's letter to Himmler regarding deprivation of liberty. Himmler took these two letters to a meeting of Reichsleiter, that is, the so-called ministers of the movement, and he put the question to them, whether it was proper to allow one Reichsleiter, namely Frick, to write such letters to another Reichsleiter, that is, to Himmler. These worthy gentlemen answered this question in the negative and reprimanded Frick. Then Himmler went to the meeting of the Prussian cabinet where the protective custody law, which I mentioned, was being discussed.
Perhaps I may draw your attention to the fact that at that time it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of Prussian ministers. There was a time in Germany-and it was quite a long period-when Himmler was not the powerful man which he afterwards became because the bourgeois ministers and the generals were cowards and gave way to him. Thus, it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of the Prussian Ministerial Council at all, and that particular meeting ended by my being discharged from the Ministry of the Interior.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to quote to you two sentences from the memorandum which I have just shown to you-that is, 775-PS-and ask you to tell me whether the facts are stated correctly. I quote:
"In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the attorney Puender, who was taken into protective custody together with his colleagues, merely because, after making inquiry at the Reich Ministry of the Interior and at our
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ministry, he had filed a suit, which he was obliged to do under a Reich law."
GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.
DR. PANNENBECKER: And then the other sentence. I quote:
"I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence which you have just read?
DR. PANNENBECKER: In the Frick Document Book under Number 34, second sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: Which page?
DR. PANNENBECKER: In my Document Book it is Page 80.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Paragraph 3 on Page 70?
DR. PANNENBECKER: No, Mr. President, I have just discovered that this particular sentence in the document has not been translated. Perhaps I may read one more sentence which apparently has been translated. It can be found in Paragraph 3 of the same document.
"I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because, as it turned out afterwards, he had sent a correct report to the head of his district concerning abuses by the SS."
GISEVIUS: Yes, that corresponds to the facts.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you yourself have any support from Frick for your personal protection?
GISEVIUS: Yes. At that time, of course, I was such a suspect in the eyes of the Secret State Police that all sorts of evil designs were being made against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that I should be protected in my home by the local police. A direct telephone from my home to the police station was installed, and I had only to pick up the receiver and someone at least would know in case I had surprise visitors. Furthermore, the Gestapo used their usual methods against me by accusing me of criminal acts. Apparently the files were taken to Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, and Frick intervened, and it was soon discovered that this concerned a namesake of mine! Frick said quite openly on the telephone that these fellows-as he put it-had once more lied to the Fuehrer. This was the signal for the Gestapo, who were, of course, listening in on this telephone conversation, that they could no longer use these methods.
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Then we advanced one step further through Heydrich. He was so kind as to inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten that he could pursue his personal and political opponents to their very graves. I made an official report of that threat to Frick, and Frick, either personally or through Daluege, intervened with Heydrich, and there is no doubt that he thereby rendered me a considerable service, for Heydrich never liked it very much when his murderous intentions were talked about openly.
DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, would then, at least a minister of the Reich have no cause for alarm about his own personal safety if he tried to fight against the terror of the Gestapo and Himmler?
GISEVIUS: If you ask me that now, I must say that Schacht was the only one who was put into a concentration camp. But it is true that we all asked ourselves just how long it would take for a Reich Minister to be sent to a concentration camp. As regards Frick, he told me confidentially, as far back as 1934, that the Reich Governor of Bavaria had given him reliable information, according to which he was to be murdered while taking a holiday in the country, in Bavaria, and he asked me whether I could find out any details. At that time I went with my friend Nebe to Bavaria by car, and we made a secret investigation which, at any rate, proved that such plans had been discussed. But, as I said, Frick survived.
DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions.
DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide on the following question? I have called Gisevius. He is a witness called by me, and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I am putting, but I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion, therefore, that it is right and expedient that I should now follow up the examination by my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other colleagues who also want to put questions follow the two of us. I ask the Tribunal to decide on this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only defendants' counsel who asked for this witness to be called on behalf of your client?
DR. DIX: I called him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; but are you the only defendants' counsel who asked to call him?
DR. DIX: I believe, Sir, I am the only one who has called him.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next.
DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned the fact that you have published a book entitled To the Bitter End. I have submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as
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evidence, and they have been accepted as documentary evidence by the Tribunal. For this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of that book historically true; did you write it only from memory, or is it based on notes which you made at the time?
GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and with a good conscience, that the contents of the book are historically true. In Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was possible. I have said here that my dead friend Oster had in the War Ministry a considerable collection of documents to which I had access at all times. In writing about any important matter in which I made reference to friends in the opposition group, I never did so without having first consulted them many times about it. And since 1938 I have been in Switzerland, first as a visitor and later on for professional reasons, and there I was able to continue my notes undisturbed. The volume which has been submitted to the Tribunal was practically completed in 1941, and in 1942 had already been shown to several friends of mine abroad.
THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough.
DR. DIX: Since when have you known the Defendant Schacht?
GISEVIUS: I have known the Defendant Schacht since the end of 1934.
DR. DIX: On what occasion and in what circumstances did you meet him?
GISEVIUS: I met him when I worked in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and was collecting material against the Gestapo. I was consulted by various parties, who either feared trouble with the Gestapo or who had had trouble. Thus, one day Schacht, who was then Minister for Economy, sent a man to me whom he trusted -it was his plenipotentiary Herbert Goering-to ask me whether I would help Schacht. He, Schacht, had for some time felt that he was being watched by Himmler and the Gestapo and lately had had good reason to suspect that an informer, or at least a microphone, had been installed in his own house. I was asked whether I could help in this case. I agreed to do so and, with a microphone expert from the Reich post administration, on the following morning I visited Schacht's ministerial residence. We went with the microphone expert from room to room and-did not have to search very long. It had been done very badly by the Gestapo. They had mounted the microphone all too visibly and, moreover, had engaged a domestic servant to spy on Schacht. She had a listening device attached to the house telephone installed in her own bedroom, which was easy to discover, and so we were able to unmask the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first spoke to Schacht.
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DR. DIX: And what was the subject of your conversation? Did you at that time already speak about political matters to him?
GISEVIUS: We spoke about the matters and the somewhat peculiar situation which had brought us together. Schacht knew that I was very active in opposing the Gestapo, and I, for my part, was aware that Schacht was known for his utterances against the SS and the Gestapo on numberless occasions. Many middle-class people in Germany placed their hopes in him as the only strong minister who could protect them if need be. Particularly the industrialists and businessmen, who were very important at the time, hoped for, and often found his support. So that it was quite natural that immediately during the first conversation I told him everything that was troubling me.
The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the removal of the Nazi regime. Therefore our conversation was highly political, and Schacht listened to everything with an open mind, which made it possible for me to tell him everything.
DR. DIX: And what did he say?
GISEVIUS: I told Schacht that we were inevitably drifting towards radicalism, and that it was doubtful whether, the way things were going, the end of the present course would not be inflation, and, that being so, whether it would not be better if he himself were to bring about that inflation. That would enable him to know beforehand the exact date of such a crisis, and together with the generals and anti-radical ministers make timely arrangements to meet the situation when it became really serious. I said to him, "You should bring about that inflation; you yourself will then be able to determine the course of events instead of allowing others to take things out of your hands." He replied, "You see, that is the difference which separates us: You want the crash, and I do not want it."
DR. DIX: From that, one might draw the conclusion that at that time Schacht still believed that the crash could be averted. What reasons did he give for this view?
GISEVIUS: I think that at the time the word "crash" was too strong for him. Schacht was thinking along the traditional lines of former governments, but he saw that here and there a change had come about-especially since Bruening's time-by emergency laws and certain dictatorial measures. But as far as I could see at the time, and during all our subsequent conversations, uppermost in his mind was still the idea of a Reich government which met and passed resolutions, where the majority of ministers were bourgeois, and where at a given moment-which might be sooner or later-one might steer a radically changed course.
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DR. DIX: What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time?
GISEVIUS: It was quite clear to me that at that time he still thought very highly of Hitler. I might almost say that at that time Hitler was to him a man of irreproachable integrity.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of?
GISEVIUS: I am now speaking of the time of my first meetings with Schacht, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935.
DR. DIX: What was your profession at that time? Where were you? Where did you work?
GISEVIUS: I had succeeded in leaving the Reich Ministry of the Interior in the meantime and had been transferred to the Reich Criminal Office, which was in the process of being formed. When we realized that the Gestapo were extending their power, we believed we could establish some sort of police apparatus side by side with the Gestapo-that is, purely criminal police. My friend Nebe had been made Chief of the Reich Criminal Department to build up a police apparatus there which would enable us to resist the Gestapo if need be. The Ministry of the Interior gave me the task of organizing and sent me to this government office about to be formed, to give advice for its establishment.
DR. DIX: We now slowly approach the year 1936-the year of the Olympic Games. Did you have a special assignment there?
GISEVIUS: Yes. At the beginning of 1936 it was decided to make me Chief of Staff of the police at the Central Police Department on the occasion of the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was an entirely nonpolitical and technical affair. Count Helldorf, who was then Commissioner of the Police; thought that because of my connections with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice this would be useful. But I was quickly removed from this position. Heydrich discovered it and intervened.
DR. DIX: Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I do not propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf and calls his attention to the fact that, during the time of your office at the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, you always put every possible difficulty in the way of the Secret State Police, and that relations with you had been extremely unpleasant. He continues:
"I fear that his participation in the police preparations for the Olympic Games, even in this sphere, would not promote co-operation with the Secret State Police, and it should, therefore, be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced by another suitable official. Heil Hitler. Yours, Heydrich." Is that the letter which affected your position?
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GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that job. I had to wait only a few more weeks and Himmler became the Chief of Police in the Reich. And on the very day that Himmler became the Reich Police Chief I was definitely removed from any kind of police service.
DR. DIX: And where did you go?
GISEVIUS: After my discharge from the police service I was sent to the government in Muenster, where I was assigned to the price control office.
DR. DIX: Could you, while in the price control office in Muenster, continue your political work in any way and make the necessary contacts?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I had plenty of opportunity to make official journeys. I made a thorough study not only of prices, but also of the political situation, in the Rhineland and in Westphalia, and wend to Berlin nearly every week so as to keep in touch with my friends
DR. DIX: Were you in touch with Schacht?
GISEVIUS: From that time on I met him very nearly every week.
DR. DIX: Did you, from Muenster, make contacts with other persons in prominent positions to further the work you were doing?
GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Muenster was that the president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a man of the old school-clean, correct, a professional civil servant and politically a man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended on the gallows after 20 July 1944. I also got into touch in Duesseldorf with Regierungspraesident State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately upon my arrival in Muenster I did everything to get into touch with the commanding general there, Von Kluge, who later became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too, I tried at once to continue my old political discussions.
DR. DIX: We shall revert to General Kluge later on. I now ask you this: At that time when you were working in Muenster, did you perceive a change in Schacht's attitude towards the regime and in his attitude towards Hitler, as distinct from what you described to the Tribunal as existing in 1934?
GISEVIUS: Yes. By a steady process Schacht withdrew himself further and further from the Nazis. If I were asked to describe the phases, I would say that in the beginning-that is to say, in 1935- he was of the opinion that the Gestapo only was the main evil and that Hitler was the man who was the statesman-or could at least become the statesman-and that Goering was the conservative strong
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man whose services one ought to use, and could use, to oppose the terror of the Gestapo and the State by establishing orderly conditions. I contradicted Schacht vehemently regarding his views about the Defendant Goering. I warned him. I told him that in my opinion Goering was the worst of all, precisely because he was hiding under the middle class, conservative cloak. I implored him not to effect his economic policy with Goering, since this could only come to a bad end.
Schacht-for whom much may be said, but not that he is a good psychologist-denied this emphatically. Only then in the course of 1936 he began to realize more and more that Goering was not supporting him against the Party, but that Goering supported the radical elements against him, only then did Schacht's attitude begin to change gradually, and he came to regard not only Himmler but also Goering as a great danger. For him Hitler was still the one man with whom one could create policy, provided the majority of the cabinet could succeed in bringing him over to the side of law and order.
DR. DIX: Are you now talking approximately of the time when Schacht was handing over the foreign currency control to Goering?
GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the moment when I warned him and, as I said, he became apprehensive about Goering and realized that Goering was not supporting him against the radical elements. That was the time I meant.
DR. DIX: By handing over the foreign currency control to Goering he showed a negative, a yielding attitude. But now that he was gradually changing his views, did he not have any positive ideas as to how to bring about a change?
GISEVIUS: Yes. He was entirely taken up with the idea, like many other people in Germany at that time-I might almost say the majority of the people in Germany-the idea that everything depended on strengthening the middle class influence in the cabinet, and above all, and as a prerequisite, that the Reich Ministry of War, headed by Blomberg, should be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. Schacht had, if you want to put it like that, the very constructive idea that one must concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. That was precisely where I agreed with him for it was the same battle which I, with my friend Oster, had tried to fight in my small department, and in a far more modest way.
DR. DIX: Had he already done anything to achieve that end at that time?
DR. DIX: As a cue I mention the steps taken by Dreyse, the Vice President of the Reichsbank.
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GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all, he tried to establish close contact with the competent expert in the Ministry of War, General Thomas, who later on became Chief of the Army Economic Staff. Thomas was a man who, right from the beginning, was skeptical about National Socialism, or even opposed it. As by a miracle, he later on emerged from the concentration camp alive.
Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I took part in that fight because Schacht used me as an intermediary through Oster, and I was also informed about these connections through Herbert Goering. Moreover, I learned about these things from many discussions with Thomas. I can testify here that, even at that time, it was extraordinarily difficult to establish connection between Schacht and Blomberg, and I was naive enough to tell Schacht repeatedly simply to telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview. Schacht replied that Blomberg would certainly be evasive and that the only way was to prepare the meeting via Oster and Thomas. This was done.
I know how much we expected from the many discussions Schacht had with Blomberg. I was, of course, not present as a witness, but we discussed these conferences in great detail at the time. I took notes and was very pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely with the recollections of Thomas, whose handwritten notes I have in my possession. Thomas was repeatedly reprimanded by Blomberg and was told not to bother him with these qualms on Schacht's part. He was told that Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas, should...
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: Yes, I believe, Your Lordship, that it will be necessary. This change from a convinced follower of Hitler to a resolute opponent and revolutionary, even a conspirator, is of course so complicated a psychological process that I believe that I cannot spare the Tribunal the details of that development. I shall certainly be economical with nonessential matters, but I should be grateful if the witness could be given a certain amount of freedom during this part of the testimony, as he is the only witness I have on this subject.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks that you can give the essence of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible
DR. DIX: I shall be glad to do that.
Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal and you will no doubt bring out only the essential facts.
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Is there any other essential fact in the affair of Blomberg via Thomas that you wish to state, or can we conclude that chapter?
GISEVIUS: No, I shall now try to give a brief description of the other channels which were tried. I do not know how much the Tribunal wishes to hear about it, but I will say that Schacht tried to approach Baron Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, he was very difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to establish the contact. We also made one big attempt to approach Fritsch and Blomberg through General Von Kluge.
DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What were the generals supposed to do-I mean these generals mentioned by you?
GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to Blomberg that things were taking a more and more extreme turn, that the economy of the country had deteriorated, and that the Gestapo terror must be stopped by all possible means.
DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about the economy and the terror which reigned-not about the danger of war, not yet?
GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism.
DR. DIX: We now turn to 1937. You know that was the year of Schacht's dismissal as Reich Minister of Economy. Did Schacht say anything to you as to why he remained in office as President of the Reichsbank?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I witnessed in detail the struggle for his release as Reich Minister of Economy. On the one side there was his attempt to be released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this was not so easy. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he did not receive the official notification of his release by a certain date, he would consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. On that occasion scores of people implored Schacht not to resign. Throughout those years, whenever a man wanted to resign from his post, there was always the question whether his successor might not steer an even more radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave, lest radicalism should gain the upper hand in the economic field also. I only mention here the name of Ley, as head of the labor front. Schacht replied that he could not bear the responsibility, but that he hoped he would be able as President of the Reichsbank to keep one foot in, as he expressed it. He imagined that he would be able to have a general view of the overall economic situation and that through the Reichsbank he would be able to conserve certain economic political measures. I can testify that many men, who later became members
24 April 46
of the opposition, implored Schacht to take that line and to keep at least one foot in.
DR. DIX: Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude to, and his judgment concerning some of the generals particularly Colonel General Fritsch?
GISEVIUS: Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch was a strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers but also high ministerial officials told me over and over again that there was no need to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was only waiting for the right moment; Fritsch would one fine day bring about a revolt and end the terror. General Von Kluge, for instance, told me this as a fact-and he was a close friend of Fritsch. And so we all lived in the completely mistaken belief-as I can now say-that one day the great revolt would come of the Armed Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous Fritsch crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was relieved of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope . . .
DR. DIX: Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritsch crisis later, which was in 1938 . . .
DR. DIX: I should like now to finish speaking about Schacht's efforts and actions in 1937 and to ask you-it is mentioned in your book-whether some unsuccessful attempt to approach General Von Kluge and a journey by Schacht to Muenster did not play a part?
GISEVIUS: Yes. I thought that I was supposed to be brief about that. Although Schacht made a great effort to get in touch with Fritsch, it was not possible to arrange a conversation in Berlin. It was secretly arranged that they should meet in Muenster, as General Von Kluge was too scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a lot of beating about the bush, the net result was that the two gentlemen did not meet. It was not possible to bring together a Reich minister and a commanding general. It was all most depressing.
DR. DIX: Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still at Muenster, or was there a change?
GISEVIUS: I was still in Muenster at that time, but in the middle of 1937 Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. The greater his disappointment, the more he was inclined to take seriously my warnings against an increasing radicalism and an SS revolt.
24 April 46
By the autumn of 1937 things in Germany had reached such a point that everybody in the opposition group felt that evil plans were being made. We thought at that time that there would be another day of blood like 30 June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in touch with Canaris through Oster and expressed the wish that I should be brought back to Berlin in one way or another. At that time there was no government office which would have given me a post. I had no other choice but to take a long leave from the civil service, alleging that I wanted to devote myself to economic studies. Schacht, in agreement with Canaris and Oster, arranged for me to be given such a post in a Bremen factory, but I was not allowed to show myself there, and so I came to Berlin to place myself completely at the disposal of my friends for future happenings.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now coming to January 1938 and the Fritsch crisis. I do not think that it would be helpful to interrupt that part of the witness' testimony. If I may, I would suggest that Your Lordship now adjourn the session, or else we would have to go on at least another half-hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we'll adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
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