4000bce - 399
400 - 1399
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1500 - 1599
1600 - 1699
1700 - 1799
1800 - 1899
1900 - 1999
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to deal with these questions?
MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, I am prepared to do so. Shall I proceed to take up those documents about which we have some difficulty?
THE PRESIDENT: If you will, yes.
MR. DODD: Altogether, there are some 118 documents submitted on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach. As a result of our conversations we have agreed on all but-I believe the number is twelve.
The first group, Numbers 30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 109, 124, and 133, are all excerpts from a book entitled, Look, the Heart of Europe, written by a man named Stanley McClatchie. They are excerpts referring to the Hitler Youth organization, and we do object to them on the ground that they are all irrelevant and immaterial here. They describe Hitler Youth meetings at homes and Hitler health programs and Hitler athletic competitions and Hitler Youth Land Service and that sort of thing. There are general descriptions by Mr. McClatchie of some activities of the Hitler Youth organization. They are all, I say, from that same book-none of them written by the defendant himself. They were published in 1937.
Then, Document Number 118 (a) is a letter. It is unsigned, except that it is typewritten. It is by Colin Ross and his wife and it appears to be a suicide note setting forth the reasons why Ross and his wife intended to commit suicide. We have been unable to determine its probative value and do not see any probative value in it, insofar as the issues concerning this defendant are concerned. He apparently was acquainted with the Defendant Von Schirach and that is the claim, I assume, of counsel for Von Schirach, that it sheds some light of some kind on Von Schirach's attitude. But it is not clear to us.
The third document is Number 121. This is a quotation from the United States Army newspaper, The Stars and Stripes, issue of the 21st of February 1946. It is about the training of young people in
30 April 46
Yugoslavia at the present time. With respect to this we also say that we believe it to be immaterial here and not relevant and not bearing on the issues concerning this defendant as charged in the Indictment.
Those three-the first group and the two, 118 and 121, are the only documents concerning which we have any controversy.
THE PRESIDENT: Eleven.
MR. DODD: I am sorry. I said twelve.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): Mr. President, the first group of documents to which the Prosecution has objected are from a book by an American, McClatchie.
This American, as he himself writes in the book, is of Scottish descent, and in the year 1936-that was the year of the Olympic Games-visited Germany he was able to see for himself the conditions in Germany and the development of the German people during the first years of the Hitler regime, and here he describes the impressions he received.
Normally I would not attach any special value to this book, if it were not for the fact that the preface shows that the book was written on suggestion of the Defendant Baldur von Schirach.
The defendant, as he will explain in the course of his own examination, began very early to build up a pleasant and friendly relationship especially with the United States, and this book by McClatchie is one of the many means which the Defendant Von Schirach used for that purpose. The author himself admits in the preface of his book that he obtained a large part of the material for the book from the Defendant Von Schirach. This fact lends to the book an importance, with respect to its relevancy for the purposes of this Trial in the defense of Von Schirach, entirely different from what it would have been had it been written quite independently of Von Schirach. That is, we have to evaluate the statements and descriptions in this book more or less as though they were statements of the Defendant Von Schirach himself. This is the main reason why I have submitted the book with the request that I be permitted to quote in evidence some short passages, particularly those referring to the Youth Leadership. The rest of the book, which is also interesting but has no direct connection with the Youth Leadership of the Defendant Von Schirach, I have not mentioned; I refer only to a few short extracts which shed light exclusively on the activity and the aims of the Defendant Von Schirach; and, besides, they are intended to show you, Gentlemen, what impression even a foreigner gained of this activity, although naturally he had come to Germany with a certain prejudice which had to be overcome by his personal impressions.
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That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to the first group, which the prosecutor listed individually from Numbers 30 to 133.
The second group consists of Number 118(a) of the Document Book Schirach, and that is a letter of farewell which the explorer, Dr. Colin Ross, left behind.
If the prosecutor objects that the letter bears no signature, the fact, in my opinion, is not particularly important. What we have submitted is the original copy of that last letter, and this original copy was found among the papers of Dr. Colin Ross.
Now, the Prosecution ask: What has that farewell letter by Dr. Colin Ross to do with the charges against Schirach? I ask the Tribunal to recall that the name of Dr. Colin Ross has been mentioned here repeatedly. He is the explorer-I believe an American by birth but I am not certain at the moment. He is the man who for many years was not only a close friend of Schirach's but one whom the Defendant Von Schirach used again and again in order to prevent the outbreak of a war with the United States, and later, to terminate the war and to bring about peace with the United States. When the evidence is presented, these points will be clarified in detail, I believe. I now submit the last letter of Dr. Colin Ross . . .
THE PRESIDENT: When was it dated?
DR. SAUTER: One moment please. The date is 30 April 1945. I consider the letter-it is only one page long-important for the reason that in it a man, at a moment before he committed suicide with his wife because he was desperate about the future of Germany, at this moment-in the face of death, he again confirmed the fact that he, together with the Defendant Von Schirach, continuously endeavored to maintain peace particularly with the United States. I believe, Gentlemen, that such a man. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Where was he at the time when, as I understand you to say, he committed suicide?
DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach . . .
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, the man who wrote the letter.
DR. SAUTER: One moment, please. The Defendant Von Schirach had a small house in Upper Bavaria in Urfeld on the Walchensee, and in that house Colin Ross lived at the time with his wife, and it was here in Schirach's house that he committed suicide.
The letter is only one page, and it would not cause any considerable delay in the proceedings if it were read.
Then, Gentlemen, the third group to which the Prosecution objects again consists of one number only-a comparatively short article from The Stars and Stripes, Number 121. That edition of
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which I shall submit the original in evidence is of 21 February 1946, that is, of this year. It explains in detail how the education of youth in Yugoslavia has now been reorganized by Marshal Tito, and the Defendant Von Schirach attaches particular value to this document because it proves that in Yugoslavia a definitely military education of youth has been decided upon this very year. The Defendant Von Schirach therefore desires to make a comparison between the kind of education which he promoted and the Yugoslav education of youth which has been adopted only this year, and which goes very much further than the program of the Defendant Von Schirach did at any time.
That is all.
MR. DODD: Mr. President; may I make just one or two short observations? I realize that ordinarily the Tribunal does not want to hear from counsel twice, but there are two matters I feel I should clear up.
First of all, this book, Look, the Heart of Europe, which may have been written by this man McClatchie, who, counsel says, is an American of Scotch ancestry-I think it is important that the Tribunal know that it was published in Germany. I am sure that counsel did not mean to imply that it was an American publication because, other than having been written by this man, it was published over here after he attended the Olympic Games in 1936.
THE PRESIDENT: And in the German language, I suppose?
MR. DODD: Yes, and the German title was Sieh: Das Herz Europas. Then with respect to the Colin Ross note, I think it is important to observe that no one knows whether Ross committed suicide or not-at least insofar as the Allied countries are concerned. His body has never been found and only this note which counsel says was found among his effects.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I make another remark concerning the first group? This book by McClatchie was published by a German publisher. The efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach made the publication possible. That again speaks for the fact that Von Schirach in furthering the publication had a certain purpose in view. That purpose was to bring about enlightenment between America and Germany and to smooth over the difficulties which he was afraid could one day lead to war. The book by McClatchie appeared not only in German, but also in the English language, and it was sold in large numbers in England and in the United States. Of course, it also appeared in German and the German language edition was sold in Germany.
That, I believe, is all I wish to say at this point.
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THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell the Tribunal what these other documents are that Mr. Dodd has not objected to? Because we understand that there are 160 documents which he has not objected to. What are they all about, and how long are they?
DR. SAUTER: They are short. I have submitted only one Document Book. That is, I have limited myself to the absolute necessities, Gentlemen.
THE PRESIDENT: Of how many pages?
DR. SAUTER: Altogether, 134 pages. Of course, some cover only one-half or one-third of a page, since the majority are relatively short quotations. It was necessary for me to submit these excerpts, because I can produce evidence of the activities of the Defendant Von Schirach as Reich Youth Leader only by showing the Tribunal just what the Defendant Von Schirach told the youth of the German nation, what his teachings were, what his directives to his subordinate leaders were. And in order to do so, I must submit, as I believe the Prosecution realizes, a short report covering the entire period during which Von Schirach was Reich Youth Leader, so as to show that the opinions and theories of the Defendant Von Schirach during the last year of his activity as Reich Youth Leader were exactly the same as those during his first year. He is one of the few men within the Party who did not, in the course of the years, allow themselves to become violent, he did not go to extremes as did most of the others; and that is what I want to show by these comparatively short excerpts.
I believe that is all at the moment.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have the supplementary applications for witnesses, have you not?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You'd better deal with those, had you not?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, one of them, I understand, is a person who made an affidavit which has been used by the Prosecution.
DR. SAUTER: I believe that is the witness Uiberreither.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it is the other one, is it not? Who are the two?
DR. SAUTER: One is, I believe. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Marsalek.
DR. SAUTER: No, not Marsalek, but Uiberreither. Marsalek, Mr. President, . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I have your application before me for Marsalek. You do not want Marsalek?
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DR. SAUTER: No, that must be an error.
THE PRESIDENT: Dated the 15th of April 1946. Anyhow, you do not want him?
DR. SAUTER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you only want one, do you?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And that is Uiberreither?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution any objection to him?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, we have not, Your Honor. That affidavit I believe, was introduced by us in connection with the Kaltenbrunner case, an affidavit by Uiberreither.
THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Dr. Sauter. We will consider your application in respect of documents and the witness. We will consider your application, and we will now proceed with the case of Streicher.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to make a motion to the case of Streicher. I desire to move that Streicher's testimony found on Pages 8495, and 8496 of April 26th be expunged from the Record, and on Page 8549 of yesterday's testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you wish to say anything about that?
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Unfortunately, I did not completely understand the motions made by the Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Justice Jackson. because at that moment I was busy with something else. As far as I understood, he dealt with the deletion.
THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you what the motion was. The motion was that passages on Pages 8494, 8495, and 8496, and on Page 8549 be expunged from the record.
DR. MARX: I understand. I would like to say, from the point of view of the Defense, that I agree that these passages be expunged from the record, because I am of the opinion that they are in no way relevant for the defense of the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: The passages to which Mr. Justice Jackson has drawn our attention are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, highly improper statements made by the Defendant Streicher. They are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, entirely irrelevant, and they have
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been admitted by counsel for the Defendant Streicher to be entirely irrelevant, and they will, therefore, be expunged from the record.
And now, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: May I now, with the permission of the Tribunal, continue with the examination of witnesses? I now call the witness Friedrich Strobel to the stand.
[The witness Strobel took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
FRIEDRICH STROBEL (Witness): Friedrich Strobel.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God--the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Witness, on 3 December 1938 were you at a meeting of the Jurists' association (Rechtswahrerbund) in Nuremberg?
DR. MARX: During that meeting the Defendant Streicher is supposed to have spoken; is that correct?
DR. MARX: Would you please tell us what the Defendant Streicher stated on that occasion concerning the demonstrations of 9 November 1938?
STROBEL: He said, "I should not have carried out this action in this way. In such a manner it is impossible to fight a power like World Jewry." Then he added, "What has been done cannot be undone," and some more phrases of that kind.
DR. MARX: Is it correct that at that time you were surprised that Streicher in public objected against that action, which had been ordered by the highest authorities?
STROBEL: Yes. Streicher frequently spoke against measures and directives of the Government when he was of a different opinion, as on this occasion. I had the impression that apparently he had been passed over; for in his speech there was a certain malicious undertone to the effect that the matter was having unfavorable aftereffects. I wondered at the time whether Streicher really had a lucid interval and realized how harmful that anti-Jewish action was, or whether merely his vanity was wounded, or whether he felt that a too quick and radical an extermination of the Jews would put an end also to his own importance.
DR. MARX: Witness, these are opinions which you are stating and not facts; I did not ask you about that.
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STROBEL: Well, that was my impression.
DR. MARX: All right, I ask you now: On 9 and 10 November 1938 were you present in Nuremberg?
STROBEL: Yes, I believe so. I do not remember exactly, but I believe it was on the night of 8 to 9 November 1938 that that action was carried out. It was on 7 November that Herr Vom Rath was shot, and on the 8th he died, and the night after these things occurred.
THE PRESIDENT: We needn't argue about whether it was the 8th or the 9th. It doesn't matter, does it?
DR. MARX: The question which I want to put to you now is: After that night during which the demonstrations against the Jewish population took place, what observations did you make on the following morning and later, about the attitude of the population in Nuremberg toward these demonstrations?
STROBEL: I was informed about that action by the personnel in my office. Thereupon I walked into the city and looked around in the streets. People were standing in front of the damaged stores. I had the impression that the vast majority of the population was benumbed and speechless. People shook their heads, looked at each other, muttered something, and then walked away. But, generally, I had the impression that people could not speak aloud, and later I heard that those who had objected to these things were treated rather badly, when they were overheard by informers.
DR. MARX: But the general impression was, was it not, that the population definitely disapproved of that action, and that general indignation was recognizable though not loudly expressed?
STROBEL: Yes. The Russian radio at the time hit the nail on the head by saying, "Let it be said to the credit of the German people that they had no part in the events and that they were sleeping."
In fact most people heard of the events of the night only on the following morning.
THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the Defendant Streicher?
DR. MARX: Well, the Defendant Streicher has been accused of openly approving this action in his speech on 10 November. The Defendant Streicher also maintains in his defense that it was an action ordered by the top authorities and not a spontaneous demonstration of the people.
THE PRESIDENT: The fact that a number of people in Nuremberg, or even the whole of the people of Nuremberg, disapproved of it wouldn't show that Streicher disapproved of it.
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DR. MARX: Yes, but he maintains that there could have been no question of an incitement, since the action had been ordered and directed from the top, whereas, in the case of an incitement, the action would have been started by the people themselves. That was his conclusion.
STROBEL: May I state my opinion about that? The action was definitely not started by the people themselves, because even the majority of the SA men who took part in it did so against their will. It was an order from above; it was an organized affair. The assertion of Dr. Goebbels that the German people had risen spontaneously was an intentional incrimination of the German people.
DR. MARX: I have no more questions to ask of this witness, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants' counsel wish to ask him any questions?
[There was no response.]
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
[There was no response.]
Then the witness can retire.
DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Ernst Hiemer.
MARSHAL: There is no witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Is he not there?
MARSHAL: We have no witness there.
THE PRESIDENT: He says, Dr. Marx, that he is not there, and that there are no witnesses there.
DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. The witness Hiemer is in the prison here, and I talked to him personally.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you inform the prison authorities yesterday that you were going to call him?
DR. MARX: I spoke to the Marshal on Monday and asked that Hiemer be brought up on Tuesday, as far as I can recall. There must be a misunderstanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, have you got any other witnesses besides Hiemer?
DR. MARX: Yes, the witness Wurzbacher.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is he? Where is Wurzbacher?
DR. MARX: Wurzbacher is also here in prison.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, while he is being brought, can you take up the time in dealing with your documents?
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DR. MARX: Yes. We can do that.
MARSHAL: They will be here in about 5 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: Mr. President, before coming to the question of the documents, I should like to point out the following: During the session yesterday afternoon the Prosecution submitted several documents which were new to me, and I have not yet had an opportunity of stating my position with regard to them. Nor have I yet had a chance of speaking to the Defendant Streicher about them. From the point of view of the Defense, I consider it necessary to explain my position with regard to these very important documents; and I believe that I must now examine all the articles of Der Stuermer to see whether Streicher used in some way or other the various pieces of information from the Israelitisches Wochenblatt; for his defense is, "I did not believe what I read there." If he did not use these items of information in any of his articles, then his answer is, to a certain extent, corroborated. Therefore I have to review the matter...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. In one particular article it was demonstrated yesterday in cross-examination, as I understood it, that he had used an article from the Jewish paper.
DR. MARX: Yes. I know that article. It is one of 4 November 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Marx, what exactly are you applying for now? What is your motion?
DR. MARX: My motion is that the Tribunal permit me to supplement my document book so as to be able to state my position with regard to yesterday's presentation of documents by the Prosecution by submitting counter documents of my own. My presentation of documents would be incomplete if I had no chance of replying to these new documents submitted by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Marx; the Tribunal grants your motion provided you make it in the ordinary way, in writing, referring to any passages which you contend throw light on the passages which have been put in by the Prosecution.
DR. MARX: Yes. May I now begin to discuss the individual documents? Document Number Streicher-1 shows that the newspaper Der Stuermer, according to the decision of the Fuehrer, was not an official Party organ and was not even entitled to carry the state insignia while all other press organs displayed the insignia conspicuously. That is evidence that the paper Der Stuermer was a private publication of the Defendant Streicher.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you are going to offer these documents in evidence and give them exhibit numbers, are you not?
30 April 46
DR. MARX: I consider these documents as submitted; I have discussed the subject with the Prosecution, and the Prosecution had no objections.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, there is a written transcript being taken down, and unless you offer each document in evidence and say that will be exhibit number so-and-so, it does not get into the transcript. If you like you can do it in a group and say, "I offer in evidence such and such documents as Exhibits 1 to 100," or whatever number you wish.
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The book I have before me does contain certain exhibit numbers; for instance, Page 1 to 4 appears to be Exhibit Number Streicher-1 and Page 5 is Exhibit Number Streicher-5; Page 6 is Exhibit Number Streicher-6; Page 7 is Exhibit Number Streicher-7.
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that Page 4 is Exhibit Number Streicher-l; is it?
DR. MARX: The pagination made here is completely different from the one I made and consequently it is now arranged altogether differently.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let us get on. You only have to tell us what documents you are offering in evidence and under what exhibit numbers. Dr. Marx, you can do it later if you want to.
DR. MARX: I further submit Exhibit Number Streicher-5, an excerpt from an editorial of Der Stuermer of July 1938. Number 28. This article, which was not written by the Defendant Streicher but by Karl Holz, is worded in very sharp language and says that vengeance will break loose one day and all Jewry will be exterminated. But the salient point here-the article seems to have been provoked by a letter which was sent from Nuremberg to New York, and which stated that Germany in the case of war, would be destroyed from the air. And so this article also falls under the claim which the defendant made yesterday, namely that his sharp language was always caused by some preceding action from another side. That is Document Number Streicher-5 and I ask permission to submit it as an exhibit under that number.
Then I submit as Document Number Streicher-6, an excerpt from Number 40 of Der Stuermer of October 1938. I think I can dispense with comment on it because my argument can be seen from the document itself; or is it necessary to speak about it?
THE. PRESIDENT: No, you need not speak about them; just put them in.
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DR. MARX: I submit as Document Number Streicher-7, an excerpt from the Voelkischer Beobachter of 25 February 1942, in answer to Document M-31 of the trial brief against the defendant.
Then I submit Document Number Streicher-8, an excerpt from the Voelkischer Beobachter of 8 February 1939, Page 2.
Then as Document Number Streicher-9, an excerpt from the political testament of Adolf Hitler, dated 29 April 1945.
As Document Number Streicher-10, an excerpt from Der Stuermer, February 1935, Number 8, Page 4.
As Document Number Streicher-11, an excerpt from Der Stuermer of September 1935, Number 38.
I am giving the next page the Document Number Streicher-12. That is an excerpt from Der Stuermer, of September 1935, Number 38, Page 9.
Document Number Streicher-13 is an excerpt from Der Stuermer, of January 1938 Number 1.
Document Number Streicher-14, an excerpt from Der Stuermer of May 1938, Number 20.
As Document Number Streicher-15, an excerpt from Der Stuermer of 5 November 1943, Number 45.
As Document Number Streicher-16, of the Defense, a document submitted by the Prosecution under number 759-PS.
As Document Number Streicher-17, speeches made by Himmler in April 1943, on 4 October 1943, and 28 September 1943 at Posen and Kharkov.
As Document Number Streicher-18, a photostat of the special issue of Der Stuermer of May 1939, Number 20.
I ask to have these documents admitted. I have limited myself to the utmost.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it?
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are the witnesses ready yet? Perhaps we might as well adjourn for 10 minutes now.
[A recess was taken.]
[The witness Ernst Hiemer took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
ERNST HIEMER (Witness): Ernst Hiemer.
DR. MARX: May I just interrupt for a minute, Mr. President. First of all I would like to state that I am by no means holding
30 April 46
the Marshal responsible for the mistake. The matter was as follows: The mistake in requesting the witness...
THE PRESIDENT: It is quite all right, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: I consider it my duty to state here that the Marshal is not responsible for the mistake about the bringing in of the witness. One of my assistants spoke yesterday with a gentleman. . .
THE PRESIDENT: We quite understand, Dr. Marx.
DR. MARX: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit Documents Number Streicher 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 up to 18. I do not know whether it is clear now. The numbers are 1 and 5, and from 6 through 18. Lacking are 2, 3, and 4, which were dropped. All other exhibit numbers are contained therein, Numbers 1 and from 5 through 18.
THE PRESIDENT: You include 19, don't you?
DR. MARX: No, Numbers 19 and 20 are not necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I beg your pardon. I think I must have been wrong. I have taken down 19, but you haven't got 19, have you?
DR. MARX: Number 18 is my last one, Your Honor, and I ask to have that included in the record.
THE PRESIDENT: And now you are going to go on with the witnesses?
DR. MARX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.
ERNST HIEMER: Ernst Hiemer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Since when have you known Herr Streicher, how did you get into contact with him, and what position did you have on Der Stuermer?
HIEMER: At the end of 1934 I was introduced to the then Gauleiter Julius Streicher in the Deutscher Hof in Nuremberg. Streicher gave me the assignment of working for his public health journal, Die Deutsche Volksgesundheit. In 1935 I also wrote reports for Der Stuermer. Streicher then had me transferred to the editorial staff of Der Stuermer.
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Eventually, under Streicher's direction and the direction of other staff members of Der Stuermer, I did editorial work as a co-editor. The responsible editor of Der Stuermer was Karl Holz, Streicher's deputy, but the leading spirit of the paper was Streicher himself. In the year 1938 instructions came from Berlin to the effect that Holz was permitted to contribute to Der Stuermer, but in his capacity as state official-he was the Deputy Gauleiter-he was no longer to be mentioned in the editions of Der Stuermer. Thereupon, on instruction from Streicher, my name was entered in Der Stuermer as responsible editor. The over-all direction of the paper and all authority connected therewith remained in Streicher's hands, and Streicher retained this position until the collapse.
DR. MARX: What was the main idea of Der Stuermer's policy? What was the Leitmotiv?
HIEMER: Streicher wanted by means of Der Stuermer, in the simplest and most popular language, to convey to every man and every woman of the German nation knowledge about the Jews. Streicher wanted the entire German people to realize that the Jew was a stranger among them.
DR. MARX: Herr Hiemer, I do not want to know that. I want you to tell me whether Herr Streicher, let us say, wished to advocate emigration or whether he followed a different train of thought. Long expositions on the Jewish problem are not required.
HIEMER Streicher was of the opinion that in Germany the Jewish question should be solved by emigration. He repeatedly criticized the leadership of the Reich because the emigration of Jews was not being carried through in the manner desired by Streicher. When the war came, Streicher asserted that the Jewish problem would no longer have had any significance for a Germany at war if in accordance with his idea it had been solved by complete emigration of the Jews during the preceding time of peace.
DR. MARX: Is it correct that the Palestine and Madagascar problem was discussed in the journal?
HIEMER: Yes. Streicher stated his opinion in word as well as in writing, that Palestine and Madagascar would be suitable localities for absorbing the Jews living in Germany. However, he did not follow up this thought, since not Germany but only England and France could dispose of Palestine and Madagascar.
DR. MARX: What do you think about the influence exerted by Streicher and Der Stuermer since 1933? Is it not true that since 1933 its influence among the German people was much in decline?
HIEMER: Yes, that is correct. In many circles it was known that the influence of Streicher and of his paper on the movement
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did decrease. After 1933 Streicher had many conflicts with other Party leaders, and he made many enemies. Particularly from the year 1937, Streicher was pushed more and more into the background. Within the Party the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem, under the leadership of Rosenberg, dealt with the theory of the Jewish problem, and actual authority over the Jews belonged, as is well known, exclusively to Himmler.
When finally in the year 1940 Streicher was relieved of his post as Gauleiter, he was completely isolated. From then on he lived on his farm and worked there as a farmer; he wrote articles only for Der Stuermer.
DR. MARX: What was the circulation of Der Stuermer from 1933? Can you give us figures? Of course, only after the date when you joined the paper.
HIEMER: This question of the circulation could, of course, be answered best by the publication manager, who was concerned with it. However, I remember approximate figures. Der Stuermer was in 1933 a very small paper; but by the year 1935 its circulation increased to about 800,000. After that however, there was a sharp decline.
Of course, during the war Der Stuermer had a smaller circulation. I cannot give you any exact figures and during the last months the circulation of the paper was, of course, extremely small. On the average, I might say that Der Stuermer had a circulation of perhaps half a million. Of course, there were special issues which had a much larger circulation.
As I said, only the publisher could authenticate these figures.
DR. MARX: What can be the reason for the increase in the year 1935?
HIEMER: It is very difficult for me to answer that question.
DR. MARX: Wasn't it because Party authorities-because subscriptions were made compulsory in factories and other places?
HIEMER: You are putting questions to me which really only a publisher can answer. I myself cannot answer the question with assurance, and therefore must remain silent; my testimony would not be reliable.
DR. MARX: Of course, if you don't know, you are free to say, "My knowledge on this point is not sufficient." Did Herr Streicher know of the happenings in the East, especially in the concentration camps, and what did he personally tell you about these things?
HIEMER: Streicher himself never told me that he knew about the happenings in the concentration camps. On the contrary,
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Streicher said he learned of these things only in 1944 through the Swiss press. Streicher received the Swiss newspapers regularly, in particular the Israelitisches Wochenblatt of Switzerland, and in 1944 this journal published rather detailed descriptions about what was going on in the concentration camps.
Streicher at first refused to credit these reports in the Swiss press and called them premeditated lies. He declared that these reports were being printed merely for the purpose of undermining the prestige of the German people abroad. It is true Streicher soon changed his opinion. He began to doubt that his opinion was right and finally he believed that the occurrences in concentration camps, as pictured in the Swiss press, did after all correspond to the facts. Streicher said that Himmler was the only man who could have authorized such crimes.
DR. MARX: You said that Streicher soon changed his opinion. What does that mean?
HIEMER: In the beginning he had decidedly said that these reports could not be true. Then he became uncertain and said that perhaps they might be true. I had the impression that either the detailed manner of the reports in the Swiss press had convinced Streicher that these things had actually occurred or that Streicher, from one source or another, either through personal contact or through letters, had received knowledge that these happenings were actually taking place in the concentration camps. To that I ascribe his change of view.
DR. MARX: And when was that, approximately?
HIEMER: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in the middle of 1944.
DR. MARX: What attitude did he take when he was finally convinced? Did he express satisfaction at the fact that so many people had been killed?
HIEMER: No. Streicher definitely deprecated what was done in the concentration camps. It did happen that Streicher, in anger-if he had been especially upset by political events-often or at times, asserted that Jews, as an enemy of the German people, should be exterminated. However, Streicher talked in that way only in the first phase of excitement. When he was calmed, he always opposed the extermination of the Jews.
DR. MARX: But repeatedly in articles of Der Stuermer there is talk of the extermination of the Jews?
HIEMER: Yes. It is a fact that in reports of Der Stuermer the extermination of Jewry is spoken about. However, on the other hand. Streicher again and again opposed the murder of the Jews,
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and I am quite convinced that Streicher and Der Stuermer had nothing whatever to do with the happenings in concentration camps. I do not believe it.
For it is known now that these crimes in the concentration camps were committed on the instructions of individual leading men; that is, on official orders, and it is my firm conviction that neither Streicher nor Der Stuermer had anything to do with them.
DR. MARX: How were the articles which you wrote prepared? Did you receive directives for the articles from Streicher and then merely edit them, or were you the real author?
HIEMER: Streicher was the founder and the publisher of Der Stuermer. But he was in fact also the chief editor, and all his colleagues, no matter whether it was his deputy, Holz, or others -all of them had to submit their articles to Streicher before they were printed. Streicher then ordered changes if the need arose; he also gave the editors assignments for articles, that is, he told them with what arguments these articles were to be drawn up; and Streicher knew of all the articles which appeared in Der Stuermer. In fact, he was the responsible head, the editor of Der Stuermer. All others were his assistants. He himself was, as he often said with pride, one and the same with Der Stuermer. "Streicher and Der Stuermer are one and the same." That was his maxim.
DR. MARX: That, of course, he admits; he says that he assumes the responsibility.
What can you tell us about the so-called pornographic library?
HIEMER: Der Stuermer was in possession of a large archive. This archive consisted of many thousands of German and foreign-language books, documents, edicts, and so forth. These books were either put at the disposal of the Stuermer archive by friends of Der Stuermer, or they came from Jewish apartments. The police put books which were found in Jewish houses at the disposal of Rosenberg's Institute for the Study of the Jewish problem for research purposes. Whatever remained in the Jewish dwellings in Nuremberg was turned over to the Stuermer archive. Among these books there were also numerous which dealt with sexual knowledge, books by Magnus Hirschfeld, Bloch, and some which were simply pornographic. These, then, consisted both of books which had been sent in by friends of the Stuermer, and books which had been found in Jewish dwellings.
These books were kept in a special section of the Stuermer archive under lock and key, and the public did not have access to them. This literature was no personal pornographic library of Streicher, but formed a part of Der Stuermer's archive. Streicher never read these books. They were to be reviewed after the war in
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the course of the reconstruction. All those which were not of direct Jewish origin were to be removed, but as I said, Streicher did not read these books.
DR. MARX: Where were these books kept? Were they in the publishing house, or how is it that a part...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, there is no charge here with respect to this particular sort of books.
DR. MARX: This is my last question. I just wanted to clarify this matter, since it played an important part in the public mind. I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any questions from the other Defense Counsel?
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): I have one question only.
[Turning to the witness.] Did Rosenberg have any connections with the editorial staff of Der Stuermer?
HIEMER: To my knowledge, his connections were almost nonexistent. I knew personally only Dr. Ballensiefen, who worked with Rosenberg. I also knew Dr. Pohl personally, but no relations existed between the Der Stuermer and the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem for the purposes of co-operation.
DR. THOMA: Did Ballensiefen and Pohl have connections with Der Stuermer?
HIEMER: Pohl had personal connections with me. He was a student of Hebrew and had made translations of the Talmud; he had also published the Talmudgeist. Through that I got to know him. Ballensiefen also had no personal connection with Der Stuermer.
DR. THOMA: Does this mean that Pohl did have personal connections . . .
HIEMER: Only with me, not with Der Stuermer.
DR. THOMA: . . . or was he sent by Rosenberg in this matter?
DR. THOMA: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have only one matter to ask you about. Do I understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become convinced that the reports in the Swiss newspaper, Israelitisches Wochenblatt, were true?
HIEMER: I did not understand you. Will you please repeat the question?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become convinced of the truth
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of the reports he was reading in the Swiss newspaper about concentration camps?
HIEMER: Yes, I had the impression that Streicher in the middle of 1944...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted an answer "yes" or "no." That is quite sufficient.
Let me just read to you three lines of an article which was published in Der Stuermer on the 14th of September 1944.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:
"Bolshevism cannot be vanquished; it must be destroyed. The same is true of Judaism; it cannot be vanquished, disarmed, or rendered powerless; it must be exterminated."
That is Page 2.
Then the word that you use or is cited for exterminated is ausgerottet, which I understand means completely wiped out. Why was that article appearing in Der Stuermer in September 1944, when it was known by the owner of Der Stuermer what was going on in concentration camps in the East? What was the purpose of that article?
HIEMER: I personally did not write this article. I believe that Streicher wrote it, therefore I myself am not able to judge the intention of the article. But I do maintain that Streicher made statements opposing the murders in the concentration camps, and that he did not want the murder of Jewry.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I will leave that.
My Lord, in the interest of time I do not propose to cross-examine this witness any further. Perhaps I might be allowed to draw the Tribunal's attention to those articles contained in your bundle, which are articles actually written by this witness. There are about seven of them. Page 3A, 35A, 38A, 40A, 49A, 50A and 51A, that is, covering a period from January 1939 up to August 1944.
And, My Lord, the other matter that I would draw the Tribunal's attention to was that this witness was the author of the disgusting children's book which I presented to the Tribunal in putting the individual case against Streicher.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?
[There was no response.]
Dr. Marx, do you wish to re-examine? You heard what counsel said about the various articles written by this witness. You wish to re-examine or not? Have you any questions you wish to ask the witness?
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DR MARX: Yes, please.
Herr Hiemer, perhaps you did not quite understand the question a moment ago. Please tell us again just when Herr Streicher received knowledge, and when he told you that he was convinced of or believed in these mass murders.
HIEMER: It is my opinion and conviction that it was in the middle of 1944.
DR. MARX: But there had been statements to that effect in the Israelitisches Wochenblatt for a number of years prior to that date.
HIEMER: Yes; at that time Streicher did not believe these things. His change of view took place only in the year 1944 and I remember it was not before the middle of the year.
DR. MARX: I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call the witness Philipp Wurzbacher.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[The witness Wurzbacher took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
PHILIPP WURZBACHER (Witness): Philipp Wurzbacher.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
You may sit down.
DR. MARX: Witness, you were an SA Leader in Nuremberg?
DR. MARX: From when?
WURZBACHER: From 1928.
DR. MARX: And what position did you have?
WURZBACHER: At that time I was an SA Standartenfuehrer and had risen from the lowest ranks.
DR. MARX: Witness, please speak more slowly and pause as frequently as possible, as your testimony has to be interpreted into several languages.
How long have you known the Defendant Streicher?
WURZBACHER: I have known him from meetings, since 1923; personally, from the time of my activity as an SA Leader in the year 1928.
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DR. MARX: Were you regularly present at the meetings at which Streicher spoke?
WURZBACHER: I cannot say that I was present regularly, but I attended very frequently.
DR. MARX: Did Streicher in his speeches advocate the use of violence against the Jewish population, or did he predict it?
WURZBACHER: At no meeting did I hear suggestions that violence should be used against the Jewish population. Nor did I ever hear Streicher suggest or announce that he had any such intentions in mind.
DR. MARX: Did an act of violence against the Jewish population, originating from and carried out by the people themselves, take place in Nuremberg or the Gau Franconia at any time in the period from 1920 to 1933?
WURZBACHER: No, I cannot remember any incident of that type.
DR. MARX: Did the SA undertake any such action or was anything like that ordered?
WURZBACHER: The SA never undertook anything like that at that time. On the contrary, the SA had instructions, unequivocal instructions, to refrain from such acts of violence. Severe punishment would have resulted for anyone who did anything like that, or for an SA Leader who gave such orders. Besides, as I have already emphasized, there was never any suggestion or any order to that effect.
DR. MARX: What do you say to the events on the night of the 9 to 10 November 1938?
WURZBACHER: I was not in Nuremberg during the events from the 9 to 10 November 1938. At that time I was in Bad Ems on account of chronic laryngitis. I can only say what I know from stories which I heard afterwards.
DR. MARX: Did you talk with Obergruppenfuehrer Obernitz?
DR. MARX: About these events?
WURZBACHER: Yes, I talked with SA Obergruppenfuehrer Von Obernitz in a brief conversation, when I reported my return. We spoke only a few words, since Obergruppenfuehrer Von Obernitz was called away so that in the course of the conversation I could not return to the subject. I remember that Obergruppenfuehrer Von Obernitz declared at the time that as far as he was concerned the matter had been put in order. That was the sense of what he said.
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DR. MARX: Was there within the SA a uniform opinion, or were there, even in the circles of the SA, men who disapproved of these incredible occurrences?
WURZBACHER: Opinions were, as far as I could determine upon my return-I believe it was on 23 or 24 November-very much divided. A part of the SA was in favor, the other opposed what had happened, but at all events, the majority in general considered it to be wrong and condemned what had been done.
DR. MARX: Was there an increase, I mean, an increase of brutality in these circles after 1933 on account of the growing numbers of the SA?
WURZBACHER: It goes without saying that after the accession to power, when many doubtful elements joined, the situation was completely different from what it had been before. Up to that time, as a responsible Leader, one knew almost every member individually, but now with the tremendous influx of new men, a general survey of the new situation had first to be made. But I believe I may say that an increase of brutality did not occur. Perhaps some undesirable elements which, in the name of the SA, did this or that, had slipped in but in general I cannot say that an overall increase of brutality took place.
DR. MARX: Did you conclude that Der Stuermer exerted an influence in the SA with the result that an anti-Semitic tendency made itself felt among the men under your command? Did you not read a different publication, Der SA Mann?
WURZBACHER: Der Stuermer had a very divided reception, I might say, especially among the people in Nuremberg and in particular in the SA. There were large numbers in the SA who, if they did not exactly reject Der Stuermer, were in fact not interested because of the tedious repetitions contained in it, and for this reason the paper was of no importance to them. Moreover, it was natural that members of the SA read their own paper, Der SA Mann, first.
DR. MARX: When you attended a meeting in which Streicher spoke, what impression did you gain of the objectives which he pursued in his speech with regard to the solution of the Jewish problem?
WURZBACHER: The objectives which were stated by Streicher were, I should say, unequivocal and clear. He pursued the policy that the strong elements of the Jewish people which occupied positions in the German economy and above all in public life and public offices should be removed and that necessarily, expulsion or emigration should be considered.
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DR. MARX: Did you participate in the boycott on 1 April 1933 in any way?
WURZBACHER: Yes, I participated in the boycott. At that time I had instructions from my Gruppenfuehrer to see to it that this boycott should be kept within the limits of order and propriety, and that in this way the success of the boycott would be assured. I instructed the Sturmfuehrer under my command to assign to each department store a guard of two SA men who were to see to it that nothing happened and everything took its course in an orderly and unobjectionable fashion.
DR. MARX: Were there not instructions from Streicher also?
WURZBACHER: Yes. The instructions which I received from my Gruppenfuehrer had been issued by Gauleiter Streicher.
DR. MARX: Were attacks on Jews not to be prevented by all means?
WURZBACHER: That was so not only in this one case, but in all cases. It was repeatedly pointed out that we were to refrain from attacks or unauthorized acts of violence or other hostile acts against the Jewish people or Jewish individuals, especially in Nuremberg, and that it was strictly prohibited...
DR MARX What was Streicher's reaction when he heard that nevertheless such acts of violence had been perpetrated by individuals?
WURZBACHER: I can cite one example in which violence was used. I believe it was a small scuffle, at any rate, something had happened, but I do not recall the details of the case. In any event, he called us very sharply to account, and we SA leaders were severely reprimanded and rebuked.
DR. MARX: And what did he say? Did he make a general statement?
WURZBACHER: If I may give the essence of it, he said that he would not tolerate that human beings be beaten or molested in any way in his Gau, and for the SA leaders he had rather drastic expressions such as ruffians or similar names-I do not recall them exactly.
DR MARX But he was called the Bloody Czar of Franconia. How is that to be explained?
WURZBACHER: Perhaps it was his manner, the way he behaved at times. Sometimes he could be very harsh and outspoken. At any rate I can only say that during my activity I did not experience anything or hear anything suggesting that he was a "bloody czar."
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DR. MARX: Do you know what his attitude was toward concentration camps? Did he visit Dachau? If so, how often, and what did he do about it?
WURZBACHER: I cannot give you any information on that point. I know just one thing and that is that he said repeatedly that people who had been taken to Dachau should be freed as soon as possible if there was no criminal or other charge against them. I also know of several cases of release very soon after the arrest of the people or their removal to a concentration camp. For example the teacher Matt, who was an old adversary of his in the Town Hall of Nuremberg, was released after a very short time-I believe three or four months. Another man, a certain Lefender, who had been active primarily in labor unions, was also released after a very short period of time. If I remember correctly, it was about the year 1935 or perhaps the beginning of 1936 -- I do not know exactly- when the last inmates left the camp at Dachau and were greeted with music upon their return.
DR. MARX: Was it not held against him that he freed so many members of the left-wing parties from Dachau?
WURZBACHER: It was said here and there by members of the SA that the Gauleiter's action could hardly be justified, that he took too light a view of these things and so on, but we also pointed out that after all the Gauleiter bore the responsibility and that he ought to know just what he had to do in this or that case.
DR. MARX: Do you know that Himmler told Streicher of his displeasure at these releases and said that disciplinary action would be taken against him if he continued with them? If you know nothing about this matter, please say: "No."
DR. MARX: Then I have concluded my questioning of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Defense Counsel wish to ask questions?
Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude your case, Dr. Marx?
DR. MARX: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we go on with Dr. Schacht's case next.
DR. DIX: I begin my presentation of evidence with the calling of Dr. Schacht as a witness, and I ask Your Lordship to permit Dr. Schacht to enter the witness box.
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[The Defendant Schacht took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
HJALMAR SCHACHT (Defendant): Hjalmar Schacht.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
You may sit down.
DR. DIX: Please tell the Tribunal briefly about your descent?
SCHACHT: The families of both my parents have lived for centuries in Schleswig-Holstein, which until 1864 belonged to Denmark. My parents were both born as Danish citizens. After the annexation by Germany my father emigrated to the United States, where three of his older brothers had already emigrated, and he became an American citizen. My two brothers, who were older than I, were born there. Later my mother's health prompted my father's return to Germany.
I was educated in Hamburg. I studied at universities in Germany and in Paris, and after receiving my doctor's degree I was active for 2 years in economic organizations. Then I began my banking career, and for 13 years I was at the Dresdner Bank, one of the large so-called "D" banks. I then took over the management of a bank of my own, which was later merged with one of the "D" banks, and in 1923 I abandoned my private career and went into public service as Commissioner for German Currency (Reichswaehrungskommissar). Soon afterwards I became President of the Reichsbank, and I held that office until 1930, when I resigned.
DR. DIX: Why did you resign as President of the Reichsbank at that time?
SCHACHT: In two essential points there were differences of opinion between the Government and me; one was the internal finance policy of the Government. With the terrible catastrophe of the lost war and the Dictate of Versailles behind us, it was necessary in my opinion to use thrifty and modest methods in German politics. The democratic and socialist governments of that period could not see that point, but carried on an irresponsible financial policy, especially by incurring debts which in particular were contracted to a very large extent abroad. It was quite clear that Germany, already heavily burdened with reparation payments, was under no circumstances in a position to build up as much foreign currency as was necessary for the payment of these debts. We were not even able to pay the reparations from our own economy.
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Therefore I objected to the contraction of these debts in which the various governments of that period indulged, and to which they also encouraged communities and private companies. I objected to this financial policy and continually, abroad and at home, warned against such a policy of incurring foreign debts. The foreign bankers did not listen nor did the German Government. It was during that period that if in Berlin one passed the Adlon Hotel, Unter Den Linden, one could not be sure that a financial agent would not emerge and ask whether one did not need a loan.
Later I was strongly opposed by these same people, when Germany was forced to discontinue making payments of her debts. But I wish to state here that I have always and on every occasion been against such a policy of debts. That was the one reason. The other reason was in the field of foreign policy. I had not only contributed my part toward the creation of the Young Plan but in 1929 I also assisted in the setting up of the Young Committee; the so-called Young Plan had resulted in a number of improvements for Germany, which the German Government was now sacrificing step by step during the subsequent negotiations at The Hague. Thus the financial and economic condition of the nation again deteriorated. I revolted against this, and for both these reasons I resigned my office as Reichsbankpraesident in protest, in March 1930.
DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in this connection, may I call your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-6 of my Document Book. If the Tribunal agrees, I should like, in order to shorten the presentation of documents during the examination of the witness, to call your attention to those documents which have a direct connection with the questions with which the witness is dealing. I believe that this arrangement will be agreeable to the Tribunal since it will shorten the presentation of documents. It is Document Number Schacht-6, on Page 12 of the German copy of my document book and on Page 8 of the English copy, Your Lordship, Exhibit Number Schacht-6. That is a record of the statements made by Dr. Schacht during the session of the subcommittee for monetary and credit matters on 21 October 1926. I believe it is not necessary for me to read these statements. They refer to the foreign debts which Dr. Schacht has just mentioned, and contain the same thoughts which Dr. Schacht has just expressed before the Tribunal, and are proof that these thoughts are not views ex post facto. Therefore, without reading it, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the whole of this document.
I shall return to my examination.
[Turning to the witness.] You had resigned your office as President of the Reichsbank. What did you do then?
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SCHACHT: I went to the small estate which I owned in the country and lived there as a private citizen. Then in 1930 I made a trip to the United States. I departed shortly or immediately after the Reichstag elections of September 1930 and went to New York via London. There I lectured for about two months on questions which were presented to me by American friends.
DR. DIX: When did you first get in touch with the National Socialist ideology, with the Party, and with Hitler personally, and when, in particular, did you read the Party program and Hitler's Mein Kampf?
SCHACHT: With the exception of a single occasion I have never in my life concerned myself with Party politics. Even at the age of 26 I was offered a sure electoral district in the Reichstag, which I did not accept, since I have never been interested in Party politics. My interest always lay in the field of economics and financial policy but, of course, for public affairs I always had a general interest, arising from a concern for the future of my country and my people.
Therefore, in 1919, I participated in the foundation of the Democratic Party.
May I say a few words here about my background and spiritual upbringing? My father, throughout his life, adhered to democratic ideals. He was a Freemason. He was a cosmopolitan. I had, and I still have, numerous relatives on my mother's side in Denmark and on my father's side in the United States, and to this day I am on friendly terms with them. I grew up among these ideas and I have never departed from these basic conceptions of Freemasonry and democracy and humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideals. Later I always remained in very close contact with foreign countries. I traveled much, and with the exception of Ireland and Finland there is no country in Europe which I have not visited. I know Asia down to India, Ceylon, and Burma. I went to North America frequently, and just before the Second World War broke out I intended to travel to South America.
I want to emphasize this in order to show that I was never interested in Party politics. Nevertheless, when in the elections of September 1930 Hitler's party suddenly and surprisingly obtained 108 seats, I began to take an interest in the phenomenon; and on board ship going to the United States I read Mein Kampf and, of course, also the Party program. When I arrived on the other side the first question was what was my opinion about Hitler and the Party, because naturally everyone was talking about this event in Germany. In my first publication at that time-it was an interview-I uttered an unequivocal warning and said, "If you people abroad do not change your policy towards Germany, then you will
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soon have very many more adherents of Hitler in Germany than there are now." Throughout that period of 2 months I spoke about 50 times in public meetings, and I always met with understanding in the question of reparations, the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, and the economic difficulties of Germany, and I returned with the impression that the whole American attitude, the attitude of the American people toward us, was indeed rather friendly. Not on my initiative but by coincidence, I got in touch with the adherents of the National Socialist Party. A friend of mine, a bank director, invited me at the beginning of December 1930 to dine with him at his house and to meet Hermann Goering there. I did so and gained no really definite impression from Goering's statements and conduct. He was in every respect reserved, modest, and well-mannered, and he invited me to his house in order to meet Hitler. At the beginning of January my wife and I dined with Goering and his wife one evening at their home, and on that occasion Fritz Thyssen was also invited. It had been planned that Hitler should come also and talk with us. I say again now that Goering's apartment was extremely modestly and simply styled. We had a plain pea soup and bacon and particularly Goering's first wife made an excellent impression. After supper Hitler appeared, and the ensuing conversation was conducted in such a way that, let us say, 5 per cent of it was contributed by us, and 95 per cent by Hitler. What he said concerned national questions, in which he agreed absolutely with us. No extravagant demands were stated, but on the other hand the national necessities of Germany were definitely emphasized. In social questions Hitler expressed a number of good ideas; he was especially intent on avoiding class struggle and on eliminating strikes, lock-outs, and wage disputes by decisive intervention of the State in labor relations and the direction of economic affairs. There was no demand for abolishing private enterprise, but merely for influence in its conduct. It seemed to us these ideas were quite reasonable and acceptable. Aside from that, he revealed practically no knowledge in the field of economy and financial policy, though on that evening he did not claim to know anything about these subjects. He merely asked that we as representatives of economy should have understanding for his ideas and give him factual advice. That was the purpose of that evening.
DR. DIX: I shall refer to this first conversation with Adolf Hitler later, but I should like to return now to the question I have put before concerning your attitude to the Party program and the ideology developed in the book, Mein Kampf. I am stressing this because, as you have heard, the gentlemen of the Prosecution are of the opinion that certain parts of the Party program as such and also parts of the book, Mein Kampf, are of a criminal character, and
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that their criminal character was recognizable immediately upon their publication. Therefore I should like to ask you to explain in detail your attitude at the time, and possibly also your attitude today, toward the Party program and the ideology of National Socialism as it appears in the book Mein Kampf.
SCHACHT: From the proceedings in this Court so far I have not gained the impression that the opinion of the Prosecution concerning the criminal character of the Party program is a uniform one. I am unable to see in the Party program as such any sign of criminal intentions.
Federation of all Germans, which always plays a great role, is always claimed only on the basis of the right for self-determination. A position for Germany in foreign politics is demanded as constituting equality of the German nation with the other nations; that this involved the abolition of the discriminations which were imposed upon the German people by the Versailles Treaty is quite clear.
Land and soil was demanded for the nutrition of our people and the settlement of our excess population. I cannot see any crime in that, because after land and soil was expressly added in brackets the word "colonies." I have always considered that as a demand for colonies, which I myself supported a long time before National Socialism came into existence. Rather strange and, in my opinion, going somewhat beyond the limits were the points concerning the exclusion of Jews from civil rights, but on the other hand it was reassuring that the Jews were to be under the protection of the Aliens' Law, that is, subject to the same laws which applied to foreigners in Germany. I would have wished and always demanded that this legal protection should under all circumstances be given to the Jews. Unfortunately they were not given that protection. For the rest it was emphasized that all citizens should have equal rights and duties.
Promotion of popular education was stressed as being beneficial, and also gymnastics and sports were demanded for the improvement of public health. The fight against deliberate political lies was demanded, which Goebbels afterwards conducted very energetically. And, above all, demand was made for the freedom of all religious denominations and for the principle of positive Christianity.
That is, in essence, the content of the National Socialist Party program, and I cannot see anything criminal in it. It would, indeed, have been quite peculiar if, had this been a criminal Party program, the world had maintained continuous political and cultural contact with Germany for two decades, and with the National Socialists for one decade.
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As far as the book, Mein Kampf, is concerned, my judgment has always been the same from the very beginning as it is today. It is a book written in the worst kind of German, propaganda of a man who was strongly interested in politics, not to say a fanatical, half educated man, which to me Hitler has always been. In the book Mein Kampf and in part also in the Party program there was one point which worried me a great deal, and that was the absolute lack of understanding for all economic problems. The Party program contained a few slogans, such as "Community interests come before private interests," and so on, and then the "breaking up of subjection to financial interests" and similar phrases which could not possibly signify anything sensible. The same held true for Mein Kampf, which is of no interest from the point of view of economic policy and consequently had no interest for me.
On the other hand, as regards foreign policy Mein Kampf contained, in my opinion, a great many mistakes, because it always toyed with the idea that within the continent of Europe the living space for Germany ought to be extended. And if nevertheless I did co-operate later on with a National Socialist Reich Chancellor, then it was for the very simple reason that expansion of the German space toward the East was in the book made specifically dependent upon the approval of the British Government. Therefore, to me, believing that I knew British policy very well, this seemed Utopian and there was no danger of my taking these theoretical extravagances of Hitler any more seriously than I did. It was clear to me that every territorial change on European territory attempted by force would be impossible for Germany, and would not be approved by the other nations.
Besides that, Mein Kampf had a number of very silly and verbose statements but, on the other hand, it had many a reasonable idea, too; I want to point out that I liked two things especially: first, that anyone who differs with the government in political matters is obliged to state his opinion to the government; and secondly, that, though the democratic or rather parliamentary government ought to be replaced by a Fuehrer government, nevertheless the Fuehrer could only remain if he was sure of the approval of the entire people, in other words, that a Fuehrer also depended on plebiscites of a democratic nature.
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have now described the impression which you gained from your first conversation with Adolf Hitler, as well as from a study of the Party program and Mein Kampf. Did you believe that you would be able to work with Adolf Hitler and what practical conclusions did you derive from that first conversation with Hitler?
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SCHACHT: To work with Adolf Hitler was out of the question for me personally, since I was a private citizen and not interested in Party politics and consequently after that conversation I did nothing at all to create for myself any personal relations with the Hitler circles. I simply went back to my farm and I continued to live there as a private citizen. So personally, for myself I did not draw any conclusions but I drew another conclusion. I have already said that naturally I had the future of my country at heart. After that conversation I repeatedly emphasized to Reich Chancellor Bruening and implored him when forming and heading the Cabinet to include the National Socialists in it, because I believed that only in this way the tremendous impetus, the tremendous propagandistic fervor which I had noticed in Hitler, could be caught and harnessed-by putting the National Socialists to practical government work. One should not leave them in the opposition where they could only become more dangerous, but one should take them into the government and see what they could achieve and whether they would not acquire polish within the government. That was the suggestion and the very urgent request I made to Bruening, and I might say that according to my impression Hitler would at that time have been quite ready to do that. Bruening could under no circumstances be won over to such a policy and in consequence was later crushed.
DR. DIX: Let us stop for a moment and deal with the Party. The Indictment states that you were a Party member. Now, Goering has already said that Hitler conferred the Golden Party Emblem only as a sort of decoration. Do you have anything new to add to that statement made by Goering?
SCHACHT: I do not know whether it has been mentioned here; the Golden Party Emblem was in January 1937 given to all Ministers and also to all military personalities in the Cabinet. The latter could not become Party members at all; therefore the award of the Party emblem did not entail membership. As to the rest I think Goering has testified from the witness stand. I might mention one more thing. If I had been a Party member, then doubtlessly when I was ousted from my position as Minister without Portfolio in January 1943, the Party Court would have gone into action, since a case of insubordination to Hitler would have been evident. I was never before the Party Court and even when on the occasion of my dismissal the return of the Golden Party Emblem was demanded from me, I was not told that I was being dismissed from the Party, since I was not in the Party: I was only told "return the Golden Emblem of the Party which was conferred upon you," and I promptly complied.
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I believe I could not add anything else to the statements already made.
DR. DIX: Then the Indictment is wrong in this point?
SCHACHT: Yes; in this point it is absolutely wrong.
DR. DIX: Why did you not become a Party member?
SCHACHT: Excuse me, but I was opposed to quite a number of points of the National Socialist ideology. I do not believe that it would have been compatible with my entirely democratic attitude to change over to a different Party program, and one which, not in its wording but through its execution by the Party had certainly not-in the course of time-gained any more favor with me.
DR. DIX: Therefore, you did not become a Party member for reasons of principle?
SCHACHT: Yes, for reasons of principle.
DR. DIX: Now, a biography of you was published by one Dr. Reuther in 1937. There, also, it is correctly stated that you were not a Party member; but the biographer gives different, more tactical reasons for your refusing to join the Party; and he mentions the possibility of being more influential from outside the Party and so on. Maybe it is advisable, since the biography has been referred to in the course of the proceedings, that you shortly state your views on this point?
SCHACHT: I believe that at the time Hitler had the impression that I could be useful to him outside of the Party and it may be that Dr. Reuther got knowledge of this. But I would rather not be made responsible for the writings of Dr. Reuther, and in particular I should like to object to the fact that the Prosecutor who presented the brief against me described this book by Dr. Reuther as an official publication. Of course this book is the private work of a journalist for whom I have respect but who certainly states his own opinions and ideas.
DR. DIX: Did you speak in public on behalf of Hitler before the July elections in 1932?
SCHACHT: Before the July elections of 1932, which brought that tremendous success for Hitler, I was never active either publicly or privately on behalf of Hitler, except once, perhaps, or twice-I remember now, it happened once-Hitler sent a Party member to me who had plans on economic, financial, or currency policies; Hitler may have told him that he should consult me as to whether or not these plans could be put into practice. I might tell the story briefly: It was Gauleiter Roewer of Oldenburg. In Oldenburg the Nazis had already come to power before 1932 and he
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was the Minister President there. He wanted to introduce an Oldenburg currency of its own, a consequence of which would have been that Saxony would have introduced its owns Saxon currency, Wuerttemberg would have introduced its own currency, and Baden would have had its own currency, and so on. I ridiculed the whole thing at the time and sent a telegram to Hitler, saying that the economic needs of the German Reich could not be cured by such miracles. If I disregard this case, which might have constituted some sort of private connection, then I may say that neither privately nor publicly, neither in speeches nor in writing, have I at all been concerned with Hitler or his Party and in no way have I recommended the Party.
DR. DIX: Did you vote National Socialist in July 1932?
SCHACHT: No, I would not think of it.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution now lists a number of points by which it wants to prove that you were an adherent of the National Socialist ideology. I am going to name them one by one, and I ask you to state your view on each of them. First, that you were an opponent of the Treaty of Versailles. Would you like to say something about that?
SCHACHT: It surprised me indeed to hear that reproach from an American Prosecutor. The lieutenant who spoke is perhaps too young to have experienced it himself, but he should know it from his education; at any rate, for all of us who have lived through that time, it was one of the outstanding events that the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the United States, and, if I am not wrong, rejected with the resounding approval of the entire American people.
The reasons prompting that action were also my reasons for rejecting the Treaty: it stood in contradiction to the Fourteen Points of Wilson, which had been solemnly agreed upon, and in the field of economics it contained absurdities which certainly could not work out to the advantage of world economy. But I certainly would not accuse the American people of having been adherents of the Nazi ideology, because they rejected the Treaty.
DR. DIX: The Prosecution also assert that you had already been for a long time a German National Socialist, not merely a German patriot, but a German nationalist and expansionist. Would you like to state your position in that respect?
SCHACHT: You, yourself, by emphasizing the word "patriot" have recognized that one must be clear on just what a nationalist is. I have always been proud to belong to a nation which for more than a thousand years has been one of the leading civilized nations
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of the world. I was proud to belong to a nation which has given to the world men like Luther, Kant, Goethe, Beethoven, to mention only a few. I have always interpreted nationalism as the desire of a nation to be an example to other nations, and to maintain a leading position in the field of spiritual and cultural achievement through high moral standards and intellectual attainment.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If it please the Tribunal, it seems to me that we are getting very far from the relevant charges in this case, and particularly if they are going to be preceded by a statement of the Prosecution's position.
We have no charge against Dr. Schacht because he opposed the Treaty of Versailles; we concede it was the right of any German citizen to do that by any means short of war. Nor do we object to his being a patriotic German by any means short of war. The only purpose has been to find out what his attitude in those matters was in connection with the charge that he prepared and precipitated war.
To deal with philosophical matters separately from the war charge seems to me entirely irrelevant, and I assure the Tribunal we have no purpose in charging that it is a crime to oppose the Treaty of Versailles. Many Americans did that. It is no crime to be a German patriot. The crime is the one defined in the Indictment, and it seems to me we are a long way off from that here, and wasting time.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Dix?
DR. DIX: I was eager and glad to hear what Justice Jackson just said, but I must quote from Wallenstein, "Before dinner we heard another version." There was no doubt-and once, because I thought I had misunderstood, I even asked again-that the criminal character of the Party program, the criminal character of the contents of Mein Kampf-reproachable in itself and, to say the least, indicative of crimes committed later-the willful opposition to the Treaty of Versailles-and further the accusation of having been an expansionist and nationalist, all these things have repeatedly in the course of the proceedings here been held against Dr. Schacht in order to strengthen the foundation of the charges made against him.
If Mr. Justice Jackson now with gratifying frankness states, "We do not at all blame Schacht for opposing the Treaty of Versailles; we do not assert that he was more than a patriot, that is to say, a nationalist in the sense described before, and we do not maintain either that these our statements are circumstantial evidence for his later co-operation, his financial co-operation, in the rearmament program, which in turn is proof indicative of his intent to assist in
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waging a war of aggression"-if that is now stated unequivocally by the Prosecution, then we can dispense with a great many questions which I intended to put in the course of my examination of the witness; I would then gladly leave the whole subject of Schacht's expansionism and nationalism. We have not yet mentioned expansionism; Mr. Justice Jackson has not mentioned it either. I do not believe, however, that the Prosecution will withdraw the accusation of expansionism, that is the expansion of German living space in Europe. I am not sure of this but we shall certainly hear about it. As I said, if these accusations which have been made are withdrawn, then I can dispense with these questions and my client need not answer them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course, I made no such statement as Dr. Dix has assumed. My statement was clearly made in the opening and clearly is now, that he had a perfect right to be against the Treaty of Versailles and to be a German nationalist and to follow those aims by all means short of war. I do not want to have put in my mouth the very extensive statements made by Dr. Dix.
My statement was made clear in the opening, and these matters as to the Versailles Treaty and nationalism and Lebensraum, as political and philosophical matters, are not for the Court to determine. We are not going to ask you to say whether the Treaty of Versailles was a just document or not. It was a document. They had a right to do what they could to get away from it by all means short of war.
The charge against Dr. Schacht is that he prepared, knowingly, to accomplish those things by means of aggressive warfare. That is the nub of the case against him.
DR. DIX: Then on this point there is...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think the case for the Prosecution has been clear from the outset, that all these matters are only relied upon when they were entered into with the intention of making war.
DR. DIX: Very true. I need not put these questions if the Prosecution no longer uses these accusations as circumstantial evidence for his intent to wage a war of aggression, but Mr. Justice Jackson has not yet made a statement to that effect. But there seems to be no doubt-and I do not believe that I misunderstood the Prosecution-that in order to prove Dr. Schacht's intention to wage a war of aggression, the Prosecution did refer to Schacht's opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, to his nationalism and expansionism that is, extension of Lebensraum. We do not want to make academic or theoretical statements about the ideas of Lebensraum and nationalism, but as long as these ideas, which the Prosecution
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concedes he is justified in holding, as long as these characteristics are considered to be in part proof of his intent, my client must have the opportunity of telling the Tribunal just what he meant by Lebensraum if he ever spoke of it, which I do not yet know. But I think, nevertheless, that there is still a matter not quite clear between Mr. Justice Jackson and me, and that I do not quite agree either with what was said by Your Lordship...
THE PRESIDENT: What you were asking him about was his views on nationalism. That is what you were asking him about, his views upon nationalism, and that seems to be a waste of time.
DR. DIX: I put to him that he was accused of being a nationalist and an expansionist, and that the Prosecution therefrom drew the conclusion that he planned an aggressive war by financing armament; now he has to show, of course, that...
THE PRESIDENT: What Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out is that the Prosecution have never said that he simply held the views of a nationalist and of an expansionist, but that he held those views and intended to go to war in order to enforce them.
DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, but it is held that these opinions were proof-one proof among others-that he had the intention of waging aggressive war; that they therefore constitute what we jurists should call circumstantial evidence for his intent to wage war, and as long as this argument-it is no longer a charge maintained by Justice Jackson but it is an argument of the Prosecution. . .
THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue about it. He agrees that he did hold these views. Therefore it is quite unnecessary to go into the fact. The Prosecution say he held the views; he agrees that he held the views. The only question is whether he held them with the innocent intention of achieving them by peaceful methods, or whether he had the alleged criminal intention of achieving them by war.
DR. DIX: I only wish to say one more thing to that. Expansionism has not yet been discussed. Should Dr. Schacht have had expansionist tendencies, then Mr. Justice Jackson certainly would not say that he has no objection. Therefore...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think that you may ask him questions about the expansionists, his ideas of what expansionists were, what he meant by expansion, but for the rest it seems to me you are simply proving exactly the same as the Prosecution have proved.
DR. DIX: I fully agree. Dr. Schacht, were you . . .
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]
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DR. DIX: I believe, Dr. Schacht, that both of us will have to speak a little more slowly and pause between question and answer.
Now, please reply to the accusation by the Prosecution that you were an expansionist. Please define your position.
SCHACHT: Never in my life have I demanded even a foot of space that did not belong to Germany, nor would I ever entertain such an idea.
I am of the opinion that neither is it national to try to dominate and govern foreign peoples, nor is appropriation of foreign territory a politically just action.
These are two questions with which we are much concerned at present.
I might perhaps add, in order to clarify my position, just what I understand by nationalism, and just why I was against each and every form of expansionism. Just one sentence will suffice, a sentence from a speech which I made in August of 1935. On that occasion I said, and I quote:
"We want to express the belief that self-respect requires respect for others, and the upholding of our national individuality must not mean disparagement of the individuality of others; by respecting the acts of others we respect our own action; and a battle of economic competition can be won in the end only through example and achievement and not through methods of violence or craft."
DR. DIX: According to the opinion of the Prosecution, in the year 1936 you made a public threat of war, on which occasion you are alleged to have said that the spirit of Versailles was instrumental in keeping alive war mania. I am referring to Document EC-415, a document to which the Prosecution has referred.
SCHACHT: I never understood, in the course of this proceeding, how there could be a threat of war in this quotation. The quotation concludes with the words-and I must quote in English because I just have the English words before me:
"The spirit of Versailles is perpetuated in the fury of war, and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning."
The conclusion says that the German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning. It seems to be a matter of course that hereby expression is given to the fact that I am warning others from persisting in war mania. I am not warning ourselves, but the entire world, to avoid perpetuating the spirit of Versailles.
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DR. DIX: The Prosecution further accuses you in this connection that you publicly approved the idea of Lebensraum, for the German people. In this special connection reference was made to the speech you made at Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, in which you said: "Germany has too limited Lebensraum for her population."
SCHACHT: This speech of 9 December 1936 was a speech which was solely concerned with a restoration of the colonial rights of Germany. I have never demanded any Lebensraum for Germany other than colonial space. And in this instance, again, I am surprised that just the American Prosecutor should accuse me on my efforts in this direction, because in the Fourteen Points of Wilson, which regrettably were not adhered to later on, the colonial interests of the Germans are taken into consideration. In consequence, I said, again and again: "If you want peace in Europe, give Germany an economic outlet into which Germany can develop and from which she can satisfy her needs. Otherwise Germany will be a center of unrest and a problem for Europe."
I would like to quote one sentence only from the speech I made:
"Peace in Europe, together with the peace of the entire world, is dependent upon whether or not the densely populated areas of Central Europe will have the means of existence."
I emphasized this viewpoint again and again, but at no time did I connect these views with the idea of an armed conflict.
I would like to quote another sentence from this same speech:
"I did not mention this consideration as to the parts of Germany which were separated from her"-and I am speaking of the losses suffered by Germany-"in order that we might draw the conclusion of war-like intentions; my entire position and my work are marshaled to the objective of bringing about peace in Europe through peaceful and sensible considerations and measures."
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give me the PS numbers and the exhibit numbers of those two speeches?
DR. DIX: I cannot at this moment, Your Lordship, I am sorry, but I will try to get them and submit them in writing. The last is the speech at Frankfurt, and the others...
THE PRESIDENT: That is quite all right. You will let us know in writing, will you?
DR. DIX: Yes, indeed.
SCHACHT: Perhaps if it is permitted I might refer to two other sentences from my article which was published in Foreign Affairs, the well-known American magazine, in the year 1937. I
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have the German translation before me, which says, in the introduction, and I quote:
"I am making these introductory remarks in order to clarify the situation. The colonial problem today, as in the past, is for Germany not a question of imperialism or militarism, but still surely and simply a question of economic existence."
Perhaps I might refer to the point that very influential Americans were in constant accord with this view. I have a statement made by the collaborator of President Wilson, Colonel House, who made the well-known distinction between the "haves" and "have nots," and who was especially influential in advocating consideration for German colonial interests. Perhaps I can dispense with the quotation.
DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to point to the document submitted by the Prosecution, Document L-111, Exhibit USA-630. This document is concerned with the conversation which you had with the American Ambassador Davies, and in which you are accused of having indirectly threatened a breach of peace.
SCHACHT: I have already set forth just now that I constantly said that Europe cannot have peaceful development if there are no means of livelihood for the completely overpopulated Central Europe, and I believe conditions at present show how absolutely right I was-just what an impossibility it is to feed these masses of people within Europe. And beyond that I had a keen interest in diverting Hitler's quite misguided ideas from Eastern Europe and therefore was constantly at pains to direct his attention to the colonial problem so that I could turn his thought from the mad ideas of expansionism in the East. I recall that in 1932, shortly before he assumed office, I had a conversation with him in which for the first time I approached him on these facts and particularly told him what utter nonsense it would be to think of an expansion in the East.
Then, constantly, in the subsequent years, again and again, I spoke about the colonial problem, until at the last in the summer of 1936 I had the possibility of pursuing my ideas and Hitler gave me the mission, which I had suggested to him, of going to Paris to discuss with the French Government the possibility of a satin factory solution of the question of colonies for Germany. This actually happened in the summer of 1936. And for the satisfaction of myself and all other friends of peace, I might say that the Government of Leon Blum, which was in office at the time, showed gratifying appreciation of this solution for Europe's food and economic problems, and for their part stated that they were ready to deal with the colonial problem with the aim of perhaps returning
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one or two colonies to Germany. Leon Blum then undertook, in agreement with me, to inform the British Government about these conversations in order to secure their consent or to bring up a discussion of this problem within the British Government. That actually did take place, but the British Government hesitated for months before they finally could decide on any position in this matter and so the discussion dragged on up to the initial months of the Spanish civil war and was eclipsed and supplanted by the problems of the Spanish civil war, so that a continuation of the discussion on this colonial problem never came about.
At that time, in January of 1937, when the American Ambassador to Moscow, Ambassador Joseph Davies, visited me at Berlin, I was rather irritated by the slowness with which the British Government was meeting these suggestions, and consequently I came forth with a request for understanding and support and told Ambassador navies about this whole matter. I tried constantly and repeatedly to gain the understanding support of representatives of the American Government. I tried again and again to advise these gentlemen about domestic conditions and developments within Germany, to tell them as much as was possible and compatible with German interests and to keep them informed. That applies to Ambassador Davies, Ambassador Dodd, Ambassador Bullitt when he was in Berlin, and so on.
This conversation with Ambassador Davies is referred to in the document which the Prosecution has submitted, Document L-111, and which is taken from the book which Ambassador Davies wrote about his mission in Moscow, and we will perhaps come back to this book later.
As the gist of my conversation with Davies I would like to quote just one sentence again, which I must again quote in English, since I have only the English book at my disposal.
"Schacht earnestly urged that some such feasible plan could be developed if discussions could be opened; and that, if successful, would relieve the European war menace, relieve peoples of enormous expenditures for armaments, restore free flow of international commerce, give outlet to thrift and natural abilities of his countrymen and change their present desperation into future hope."
DR. DIX: In this connection the affidavit of Fuller plays an important part, that is Exhibit USA-629, and Document EC-450. According to this affidavit, you allegedly declared to Fuller that if Germany could not get colonies through negotiations she would take them. Please define your position as to this statement.
SCHACHT: In a German drama an intriguer is being instructed by a tyrant to bring a man of honor to ruin, and he says in reply,
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"just give me one word said by this man, and I will hang him thereby." I believe, My Lord Justices, that in this courtroom there is not a single person who at one time or another in his life has not said a rather unfortunate word. And how much easier is it when he is speaking in a foreign language of which he is not completely master.
Mr. Fuller is known to me as a respectable business man, and this discussion which he has here reproduced is indubitably done according to the best of his knowledge. He himself rightly says that even had he tried to put down the exact words he could not guarantee that each and every word has been said. But if I did say these words, then it seems only that I said we Germans must have colonies and we shall have them. Whether I said, "We shall take them," or "We shall get them," that, of course, it is impossible for me to say with certainty today after a period of 10 years.
The representative of the Prosecution also thought the expression, "We will take them," a little colorless in effect and therefore I believe he just added a trifle, for he said twice in his presentation of the charges that I had said, "We will take these colonies by force," and on a second occasion he even said, "We will take these colonies by force of arms." But "force" or "force of arms" are not mentioned in the whole of Fuller's affidavit. And if I had used that word or even used it only by implication, Mr. Fuller would have had to say with reason: "So you want to take colonies by force; how do you expect to do that?" It would have been utter nonsense to assert that Germany would ever have been able to take overseas colonies by force. She lacked-and always will lack-domination of the seas, which is necessary for this.
Fuller did not take exception to my manner of expression and in his conversation he immediately continued-and I quote:
"You mentioned a little while ago that necessary raw materials could not be obtained, owing to German lack of foreign exchange. Would stabilization help you?"
Therefore, rather than to become excited about the fact that I wanted to take colonies by force.-something which I never said and which is contrary to my views, as I have already stated-he immediately goes on to foreign exchange and to stabilization.
DR. DIX: The prosecutor asserts further that you were interested in the conquest of neighboring territory in Europe.
SCHACHT: This matter is not quite so harmless as the previous mistake of the Prosecution. In a previous interrogation, I was accused as follows, and the prosecutor, in presenting his charges here, referred to the fact-I quote the prosecutor:
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"On 16 April, on the occasion of the Paris conference on reparation payments, Schacht said, 'Germany in general can pay only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia are returned to Germany.' "
This is the interrogation of 24 August 1945. According to the verbatim record of the interrogation, I answered:
"It may be that I said such a thing."
Of course, as far as the wording of a statement, which I had made 10 to 15 years before, I did not recall it. But I did remember that in connection with the Corridor and Upper Silesia I had made a remark, and since I had to assume that if the Prosecution submitted this record to me it would be an accurate stenographic record, for that reason I did not dispute this remark which I had allegedly made and said that it might be that I said something to that effect. The Prosecution takes a "maybe" and out of that reconstructed the following sentence:
"This quotation was read to Schacht, and he said it was correct."
This assertion by the Prosecution is therefore wrong. I said, "It may be that I said something to that effect," but I did not say that this statement that was submitted to me was correct.
Then, fortunately, in my imprisonment here, I succeeded in getting hold of my book, a book which I wrote about the termination of reparation payments, which was published in 1931 and in which I luckily put down the text of my statement about the matter we are dealing with now. I have the exact text, and I would like to say that this book has been submitted in evidence, and from this text appears what I said verbatim:
"Regarding the problem of German food and food supplies, it is especially important that import of foodstuffs has been decreased"-I beg your pardon-"that import will be decreased."-I am sorry again. I cannot read this-"that the import of foodstuffs will be decreased and partially made up through home production. Therefore, we cannot let the fact be overlooked that important agricultural surplus territories in the eastern part of Germany have been lost by cession and that a large territory which was almost exclusively agrarian has been separated from the Reich. Therefore the economic welfare of this territory, East Prussia, is decreasing steadily and the Reich Government must support and subsidize it. Constantly, therefore, suitable measures should be taken to eliminate these injurious conditions, which are hindering considerably Germany's ability to pay."
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DR. DIX: Your Lordship, this is from our document book, Document Schacht-16, German Page 38, English Page 44.
SCHACHT: This quotation absolutely does not agree with the statement submitted to me in the interrogation, and in no way can we draw the conclusion in consequence that I was in favor of a return of these areas. What I demanded was that the separation of these areas be taken into consideration when Germany's ability to pay and the payments were determined. When the prosecutor in his speech added: "I would like to point out that this is the same area over which the war started in September 1939," I believe it is an insinuation which characterizes the prosecutor, rather than me, against whom it was intended.
DR. DIX: As part of the circumstantial evidence, that is, the indirect evidence for the will to aggression, with which you are charged, the Prosecution includes your wish-your alleged wish- for the Anschluss of Austria. Will you please take your position as to this accusation?
SCHACHT: From 1919 I considered the Anschluss of Austria inevitable and, in the national sense, that is, spiritually and culturally, it was welcome. But that economically the Anschluss of Austria would not be for Germany so much an aggrandizement as a liability, I always knew. But the wish of the Austrian people to belong, to be incorporated into Germany-I took that wish as my own and said that if here there are six and a half million people who spontaneously in 1919 and later in innumerable demonstrations expressed their wish of being incorporated into the brotherhood of Greater Germany, that was an event to which no German could be opposed, but in the interest of Austria must hail with gladness. In that sense I always favored and respected the wish of Austria to belong to the Reich and wanted it carried through as soon as external political conditions permitted it.
DR. DIX: My attention has just been called to the fact that you are still speaking too fast and that the interpretation is lagging behind a little bit. Will you please speak a little more slowly.
What was your opinion as to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany?
SCHACHT: Concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland, I never thought of any such thing. Of course, Czechoslovakia was a European problem, and it was regrettable that in that state, which had five and a half million Czechs, two and a half million Slovaks and about three and a half million Germans, the German element had no means of expression. But just because the Czechoslovakian problem was not a purely German-Czech but also a Slovak-Czech problem, I sought a solution of this problem in such a way and
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wished it to be in such a way that Czechoslovakia should constitute a federated state, similar perhaps to Switzerland, divided into three different, culturally separate, but politically unified areas, which would be a guarantee for the unity of a German-Czech-Slovak state.
DR. DIX: What was your opinion and attitude to the problem of war; by that I mean, as far as philosophical, ideological, and practical considerations are concerned?
SCHACHT: I always considered war as one of the most devastating things to which mankind is exposed and on basic principles throughout my entire life I was a pacifist.
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, during your meditative and thoughtful life you have certainly considered the fundamental and profound differences between legitimate and ethically based soldiership and militarism in its various degenerate forms. What did you mean by the latter and what was your attitude toward it, that is, militarism?
SCHACHT: Of course I saw the necessity of a country's defense in case of war or threats, and I stood for that theory. In that sense I was always in favor of a Wehrmacht, but the profession of a soldier I consider to be full of deprivations and characterized by willingness and readiness to sacrifice, not because perhaps during a war the soldier has to give up his life-that is the duty of every citizen of military age-but because his whole aim and aspiration must be directed to the end that never must the craft which he has learned be exercised. A soldier, a career officer, who is not intrinsically a pacifist, has really in my opinion missed his calling. Consequently, I was always an opponent of every military digression and excess. I was always against militarism, but I consider that soldiership conscious of its responsibility is the highest calling which a citizen can pursue.
DR. DIX: Now, George Messersmith, as you know, the Consul General of the United States at Berlin at one time, says in one of his various affidavits produced by the Prosecution that you had told him, and repeatedly told him about Nazi intents of aggression. Will you please state your position in that regard?
SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to remark that of course I never made a statement of that sort, neither to Mr. George Messersmith nor to anyone else. As far as these three affidavits of Mr. Messersmith, which were submitted by the Prosecution, are concerned, I would like to make a further statement.
Mr. Messersmith asserts that he had frequent contact and numerous private conversations with me, and I would like to state here now that, according to my exact memory, I saw Mr. George Messersmith perhaps two or three times in my entire life. Mr.
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George Messersmith represents himself as having had numerous contacts and many private conversations with me, and he asserts further that his official capacity brought him in contact with me as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister of Economics.
I do not recall once having received Mr. Messersmith in my office. Mr. George Messersmith takes these two or three discussions and proceeds to characterize me. He calls me cynical, ambitious, egotistic, vain, two-faced. I am, unfortunately, not in a position to give an equally comprehensive picture of the character of Mr. Messersmith. But I must definitely dispute his trustworthiness.
And as a first reason for this I should like to quote a general remark by Mr. Messersmith. In his affidavit of 30 August 1945, Document 2385-PS, Mr. George Messersmith says, and I quote: `'When the Nazi Party took over Germany, it represented only a small part of the German population."
Contrary to that, I say that before the Nazi Party took over Germany it occupied about forty percent of Reichstag seats. That percentage Mr. Messersmith calls a small part of the German population. If diplomatic reports are everywhere as reliable as in this instance, it is small wonder that nations do not understand each other.
I would still like to correct a specific remark by Mr. Messersmith. Mr. Messersmith asserts, as I have quoted just a minute ago, that his duty brought him in contact with me as Minister of Economics. In his affidavit of 28 August, 1760-PS, Mr. Messersmith says, and I quote: "During the wave of terrorist activity in May and June of 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American Charge d'Affaires in Vienna." In August of 1934 I became Minister of Economics, whereas, on the other hand, Mr. Messersmith, already in May of 1934, assumed his official duties in Vienna; but this does not prevent Mr. Messersmith from asserting that his official duties brought him in frequent contact with me as Minister of Economics. I believe this will suffice to gauge the capacity of Mr. Messersmith's memory correctly.
DR. DIX: In a similar connection, the Prosecution repeatedly referred to the diary of the former ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, which was published on the basis of his private notes by his children after his death. This document has the Document Number EC-461. The Prosecution quotes from this diary repeatedly to prove that Mr. Dodd, too, considered you a warmonger. I know, of course, that you were a friend of Mr. Dodd's, a fact which is shown in his diary. Can you tell me how the two facts can be reconciled?
SCHACHT: First of all, I might say that Ambassador Dodd was one of the most undefiled personalities I have met, an upright
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character, a man of unflinching fidelity to his convictions. He was a professor of history, undoubtedly a good historian. He had studied at German universities. I believe that he would turn in his grave if he could know that the notes which he put down casually in his diary were put together by his two children without commentary and printed without investigation.
Mr. Dodd, I am sorry to say, had one characteristic which made dealing with him a little difficult. I think the reason for this lay in his steadfastness of conviction, which from the first often made him appear averse to outside influence. He found it rather hard to make himself understood easily and fluently, and he was even less in a position to view opinions of others in the right light. Many things that were told him he misunderstood and saw in a wrong light.
On Page 176 in his diary, in the lower part, there is one sentence I would like to quote to illustrate the point I am trying to make. Here he says: "I talked fifteen minutes with Phipps"-the British Ambassador at that time-"about the accumulated evidence of Germany's intense war activities." This statement dates from the autumn of 1934 and I believe no one is able to say that in the autumn of 1934 there was any talk of a war activity on the part of Germany. Mr. Dodd uses the expression "war" undoubtedly in the place of "armament"; he says "Krieg" instead of "Aufruestung." In that sense, I believe he misunderstood the words.
And, as further evidence for the difficulty which one had in making the Ambassador understand, I might say that the Foreign Office asked him once to bring a secretary who would take notes of discussions with representatives of the Foreign Office, so that misunderstandings could be avoided.
I believe, therefore, that all these statements by Mr. Dodd are apt to be misunderstood. As for myself I can only say what I have already said about Mr. Messersmith, that of course I never talked about war intentions.
DR DIX: Now, in this diary it says that he was favorably disposed towards you. Do you have any proof for this friendly attitude to you?
SCHACHT: May I perhaps refer to the correspondence with Henderson . . .
DR. DIX: Yes, we can deal with that later.
SCHACHT: Then I shall just confine myself to your question. Dodd was entirely friendly to me, and I respected him deeply. I saw a sign of his friendship in that shortly before his departure from Berlin in December of 1937 he visited me at my home, and this incident is also dealt with in his diary, and I would like to
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quote just one sentence: "I went to Dr. Schacht's house in Dahlem. I wished especially to see Schacht, whose life is said to be in danger."
In other words, Mr. Dodd had heard of an imminent attack on my life on the part of National Socialists, and considered it important enough and a reason for coming to my home personally in order to warn me.
A second piece of evidence of his friendship towards me can be seen from the final visit he paid me just a few days before returning to America. At that time he again called on me and told me urgently that I should go to America with him, or as soon after him as possible, that I should change my residence to America, and that I would find a pleasant welcome there. I believe he would never have said that to me had he not felt a certain degree of friendship for me.
DR. DIX: These are express services of friendship, and it can hardly be assumed that the deceased Ambassador would have done you these good services if he had considered you a warmonger and friend of the Nazis, and especially-and I would like to say this to the High Tribunal-if one remembers that Mr. Dodd was one of the few accredited diplomats in Berlin who very obviously had no sympathy of any sort for the regime in power, in fact he was wholly and fully opposed to it.
I intentionally say "the few diplomats" and, Dr. Schacht, I would like you to define your opinion on what I am saying. You will remember that those diplomats who kept aloof from Hitler's regime politically and socially, such as the Dutch Minister, the magnificent grand seigneur Limburg-Stirum, or the Minister from Finland, the true-hearted and great Social Democrat, Wuolijoki, that most of these diplomats were recalled by their Governments. How is it that an opponent of the Nazis like Dodd did such open services of friendship to someone whom he considered a friend of the Nazis? Do you agree with my opinion?
SCHACHT: Yes. I am entirely of the same opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly object to going into this kind of sermonizing back and forth between the box and the bar. It seems to me that the witness has been allowed to say everything that Mr. Dodd has ever written and to put in his mind what he thinks Dodd meant. He has allowed him to go to great lengths characterizing all American representatives, but it seems to me that this is utterly off the track and improper for this witness to give a characterization of him in comparison with other ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives.
There is no request here for information about facts. I reiterate, we are not accusing Dr. Schacht here because of his opinions. We
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are accusing him because of very specific facts which there seems great reluctance to get to and deal with.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should go on, Dr. Dix, and pass from this part of it, pass on from these documents.
DR. DIX: Perhaps I might mention very briefly that it is entirely far from me or from Dr. Schacht to feel impelled to express here our opinions on political or diplomatic personalities, but, on the other hand, if the Prosecution produces affidavits or diaries of these diplomats and uses these documents as pieces of evidence against the defendant in this proceeding, the defendant...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would put questions and put them shortly, it would be much better, and we should get on much faster.
DR. DIX: Yes. In general I have put brief questions, Your Lordship. I only said this now, because I would like to follow the procedure approved, I believe, by the High Tribunal, of dealing with part of the evidence at this stage; and so I would like to bring up the reliability of Dodd's Diary. That is Document Schacht-43 in my document book; German text, Page 194; English text, Page 202. Here we are concerned with the correspondence between the publisher of Dodd's diary and Sir Nevile Henderson, which deals with several misstatements in the diary. I will dispense with the rather long letter by Sir Nevile Henderson-there are five folio pages-and will cite just a few sentences.
On Page 196 of the German text, Sir Nevile Henderson writes:
"Take, for instance, the first statement attributed to me about Neurath. It is entirely impossible, that I, in front of Hitler . . ."
and so on and so forth.
Then on the same page, in the middle of the page, next paragraph:
"And it is the same with the general discussion. It is quite inconceivable that I should have spoken, as there recorded, about Bismarck and the annexation of Czechoslovakia and other countries."
And on the same page, a little further down, next to the last paragraph, it says:
"Nor could I possibly have said that 'Germany must dominate the Danube-Balkan zone.'"
And on the next page, second paragraph:
"The remark attributed to me that England and Germany 'must control the world' is pure balderdash and hardly fits in with the preceding sentence about the United States."
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Now, there are other similar passages on this and the following page, but I do not believe it necessary for me to quote them. I request the High Tribunal to take official notice of this document in its entirety, and I would like to submit it as such.
[Turning to the defendant.] Dr. Schacht, a little while ago you mentioned a warning on the part of Ambassador Dodd with regard to a danger which was threatening you. Was it an attack on your life?
SCHACHT: At that time-and I only heard about this in January after Mr. Dodd told me-I was informed that the SS was planning an attack on my person. The intent was, as the technical expression then had it, "to remove" me. Something like that must have been in the air; otherwise, a foreign ambassador and the circles close to me would not have known about it.
DR. DIX: Just a little while ago you set forth how your policy rejected the use of arms in bringing about equality of German rights and means of livelihood. Did you try to do anything in a practical way to further your policy of peaceful agreement with foreign countries, for example, when you were President of the bank?
SCHACHT: My entire work as President of the Reichsbank was primarily based on the principle of working with the banks in foreign countries as harmoniously as possible, of pursuing a policy of mutual assistance and support.
Secondly, I tried to enter into personal, friendly relations with the directors of all these banks in the hope of meeting understanding for German problems, and thus of contributing to a solution by way of co-operation and mutual solution of these difficult problems which had arisen in Central Europe. The word "co-operation" (Zusammenarbeit) was the leitmotif of our circle.
DR. DIX: To turn from the directors; of the banks, what about your foreign creditors?
SCHACHT: As I already said a little while ago, from the start I was in disfavor with all the money makers, those people who had profited from German loans in foreign countries for I was against Germany's being involved in debts abroad, and I took my stand very firmly on this point.
Then later, after the misfortune which I had always predicted actually did come to pass, after the financial crash in the year 1931, these self-same financiers and money men blamed me for the fact that the interest on their money was no longer being transferred to them. Therefore in those circles I did not gain any friends, but
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among serious bankers and large banking institutions which were interested in constant and regulated business with Germany, I believe I made no enemies, because all measures which I later had to take in order to protect the German currency and to maintain Germany's foreign trade, all these measures I always discussed jointly with the representatives of foreign creditors. Approximately every six months we met, and I always gave them a detailed account of German conditions. They were permitted to look into the books of the Reichsbank. They could examine and interrogate the officials of the Reichsbank and they always confirmed that I told them everything in the most frank and open manner. So that I may say that I worked in a fair and friendly way also with these men.
DR. DIX: And how did your policy of peaceful agreement affect foreign trade, export, credit, and so forth?
SCHACHT: I believe that after the happenings that have now taken place it is today even clearer than before that Germany cannot and could not live without foreign trade, and that the maintenance of export trade must be the basis for the future existence of the German nation. Consequently, I did everything in order to maintain German foreign trade. I can cite a few specific examples to supplement the general principles. I tried, for example, to do business with China in order that we might export to China. I was ready to give China credit and did. I hailed the fact that the Soviet Union kept up an extensive flow of trade with us, and I always advocated expanding and stabilizing this foreign trade in the case of Russia as well as China. About the ability and readiness to pay and the promptness of payment of the opposite parties I never had any doubts.
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into unnecessary detail in support of the allegation that he tried to maintain export trade. We do not surely need details.
DR. DIX: As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, this exposition is of great significance and relevance. It shows Schacht contrary and in opposition to the policy carried out by Hitler. Hitler was hostile to the Soviet Union and this hostility is counterbalanced by open friendliness on the part of and in the person of the Minister of Economics. If I want to prove that Schacht was pioneer of a policy of understanding between nations, even in phases where Hitler carried on a peaceful battle, so to speak, with another country, such as the war of propaganda against the Soviet Union, then, in my opinion, this point is very important for Schacht's fundamental attitude-on one side war and on the other understanding. This is of absolute relevance.
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THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has made the allegation. It is for the Prosecution to dispute it in cross-examination and if they do, then the details might become material in re-examination.
DR. DIX: I believe the question has been answered, and now I shall turn to an entirely new phase of questioning.
Since it is typical of his desire for understanding and his direct basic opposition to the policy of Hitler, I would like to refer to Document Number Schacht-34, which is an affidavit of Schniewind, the banker and Swedish Consul General at Munich. This is Exhibit 34, Page 114, of the English translation, and I would like to quote a short paragraph on Page 112 of the German text, which confirms Dr. Schacht's remarks. Schniewind, who was a high official in the Ministry of Economics, says here:
"My department dealt with the Reich guarantees for deliveries to Russia, and thus I was in position to know that Schacht considered Hitler wrong in fighting Russia. Through much effort, he obtained Hitler's permission to send extensive supplies, especially machines to Russia. Frequently I gained the impression that Herr Schacht favored these deliveries because, while instrumental in giving employment, they did not benefit rearmament. Herr Schacht on several public occasions pointed out with satisfaction that trade shipments to Russia were proceeding promptly and smoothly."
There are just a few more minutes before the customary recess, Your Honor, and before we take our recess, I ask that I be permitted to reply shortly to Your Lordship's remarks of a few minutes ago. The defendant must conduct what is, to a certain degree, a very difficult defense. The Prosecution very simply argued: "You helped to finance rearmament and this rearmament in the final analysis ended in war and not only a war but a war of aggression; therefore, you as a defendant are either a conspirator or an accomplice, and that is a war crime."
As far as this argument is concerned, it must in my opinion be open to the defendant, first-and we shall deal with that later-to point out that rearmament as such by no means constitutes a desire for aggressive war; and secondly, to show that his acts actually indicate the exact opposite, namely, his desire for concord and peace; and for these fundamental reasons, I do beg the Tribunal not to cut me short in this evidence but rather to give me the time to carry it through in detail. This explains my desire to set forth Schacht's policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy in which he was in direct opposition to Hitler, to bring it forth in its entirety, and also my wish to show that he worked for agreement on all levels- with directors of banks and credit furnishers-that is, he advocated
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a policy of give and take rather than one of unilateral terrorizing and strife.
Gentlemen of the Bench, it is chiefly on a psychological plain on which I have to conduct the defense; that is a very sensitive and delicate field, and I again ask that my task may not be made more difficult. Then, when the witnesses are called, I for my part will most likely dispense with every witness except one, and I beg that you show me some consideration. Does Your Lordship consider it time for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Dix. I thought that the Tribunal has shown you every consideration, and we will now certainly have a recess.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, what was your attitude toward the Leadership Principle? Did you not realize the danger of giving a blank check, the danger of losing your own capacity of responsibility? You have heard that Sir David considers the Leadership Principle in itself to be criminal.
SCHACHT: As to whether the Leadership Principle is criminal or not, opinions throughout history have been much divided. If we look back through Roman history we see that from time to time in dire periods of distress a leader was selected to whom everyone else was subordinate. And if I read Failure of a Mission by Henderson there, too, I find sentences in which he says:
"People in England sometimes forget and fail to realize that even dictators can be, up to a point, necessary for a period and even extremely beneficial for a nation."
Another passage from the same book says:
"Dictatorships are not always evil."
In other words, it depends on just what is attributed to a Fuehrer, how much confidence one has in a Fuehrer, and for how long a time. Of course, it is a sheer impossibility for someone to assume the leadership of a country without giving the nation from time to time an opportunity of saying whether it still wants to keep him as Fuehrer or not. The election of Hitler as Fuehrer was in itself no political mistake; in my opinion one could have introduced quite a number of precautionary limitations with a view to averting the danger you have mentioned. I regret to say that that was not done, and that was a great mistake. But perhaps one was entitled to rely on the fact that from time to time a referendum, a plebiscite, a new expression of the will of the people would take place by which the Fuehrer could have been corrected, because a leader who
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cannot be corrected becomes a menace. I recognized that danger very well, I was afraid of it, and I attempted to meet it. May I say one more thing? Limitless Party propaganda attempted to introduce the idea of a Fuehrer as a lasting principle into politics. That of course is utter nonsense, and I took the opportunity-I always took such opportunity whenever it was possible-of expressing my dissenting opinions publicly. I took the opportunity in an address to the Academy of German Law, of which not only Nazis but lawyers of all groups were members, and in that speech I lectured about the Leadership Principle in economics. And I expressed myself ironically and satirically, as unfortunately is my wont, and said that it was not necessary to have a leader in every stocking factory, that in fact, this principle was not a principle at all, but an exceptional rule which had to be handled very carefully.
DR. DIX: I know that, because I was present on the occasion of that address. What did you think about the ideology of the master race (Herrenvolk)?
SCHACHT: I have always considered it a very unhappy precedent to speak of a "chosen people," or of "God's own country," or of things like that. As a convinced adherent to the Christian faith I believe in Christian charity, which bids me extend love to all men without regard to race or faith. I would like to mention also that the silly talk about the master race, which some Party leaders made their own, was held up to constant ridicule by the German public. That was not surprising, because most of the leaders of the Hitler Party were not exactly ideal types of the Nordic race. And in that connection, when these things were discussed among the German population, little Goebbels was referred to as "Der Schrumpfgermane"-the shrivelled Teuton.
Only one thing-I have to say this to be just-did most of the leaders of the Party have in common with the old Teutons-and that was drinking; excessive drinking was a main part of the Nazi ideology.
DR. DIX: What did you think of the so-called National Socialist Weltanschauung?
SCHACHT: Weltanschauung in my opinion is a summation of all those moral principles which enable me to acquire a clear judgment on all aspects of life. Therefore it is a matter of course that a Weltanschauung cannot take root in the tangible world, but must rise above it; it is something metaphysical, that is to say, it is based on faith, on religion. A Weltanschauung which is not rooted in religion is in my opinion no Weltanschauung at all. Consequently I reject the National Socialist Weltanschauung which was not rooted in religion.
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DR. DIX: In the trial brief against you it is expressly stated that there are no charges against you with regard to the Jewish question. Nevertheless I am putting to you a few questions on this topic, because the trial brief by its very words takes from you what in the Jewish question it conceded you; that is to say, the trial brief accuses you repeatedly of Nazi ideology, in which strict observance of anti-Semitism is integral.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I simply cannot be bound by silence after this flagrant misstatement of our position made in conjunction with this witness' testimony. It is not true that we make no charges against Dr. Schacht with reference to the Jews. What is true is that we say that he was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi program which involved a wholesale extermination of the Jews, and he was for that reason attacked from time to time. It is further conceded that he gave aid and comfort to individual Jews, but we do charge that he believed the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens, and that he aided and participated in their persecution. And I do not like to have our position misstated and then be met with a claim of estoppel by silence.
DR. DIX: I have to thank you, Mr. Justice Jackson, for your clarifying statement, and it is now all the more necessary that I put in questions to Dr. Schacht, but at this moment I want to point out . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Please put it then.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is not only a question, but it is a problem, and I should like to ask the Prosecution to clarify it now, because it still needs clarification even after the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson. If the Tribunal do not think that this is the opportune time I can bring it up later. I believe, however, that it would be right to bring it up now.
As I see it, there is a contradiction in the Indictment, and I would like it clarified, so that we shall not be at cross-purposes in our final speeches.
I can put it quite briefly. It is the question of whether Dr. Schacht is accused also of Crimes against Humanity, that is, not only the crime of conspiracy concerning the war of aggression, but also the typical crimes against humanity, for on this point the individual passages, both of the Indictment and of the Prosecution speech in which the charges were presented, are at variance. I wanted to take the liberty of pointing out the contradictory passages and to ask the Prosecution to be kind enough to state conclusively at some future occasion whether Schacht is accused also on Count Three and Four of the Indictment. In presenting the
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charges the Prosecution stated, and that indicates that the Prosecution will limit itself to Counts One and Two:
"Our evidence against the Defendant Schacht is limited to the planning and preparation of aggressive war and his participation in the conspiracy for aggressive war."
Similar statements are on Page 3 of the trial brief. Also, in Appendix A of the Indictment the charges against Schacht are limited to Counts One and Two. However, on Page 1 of the Indictment we find the following:
". . . accuse as guilty . . . of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes...."
And then all the defendants are listed, including the Defendant Hjalmar Schacht.
On Page 17 of the German text of the Indictment we read:
"On the basis of the facts previously stated, the defendants"- that is, all the defendants-"are guilty."
That is, all the defendants are guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, Four. It also states, on Page 18 of the Indictment:
"All defendants committed, from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945, War Crimes in Germany and in countries and territories occupied by German troops after 1 September 1939 and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the high seas."
On Page 46 it reads:
"During several years before the 8th of May 1945, all defendants committed Crimes against Humanity in Germany" -and so forth.
Therefore, some parts of the oral presentation and of the Indictment show that the Prosecution limits its charges against Schacht to Counts One and Two, but other passages express beyond doubt that he is also accused of Crimes against Humanity.
I think it would be helpful-it need not be done immediately, but I wanted as a precaution to express it now-if at the proper time the Prosecution would state to what extent the charges apply to Schacht.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, it will take only one moment to answer that, and I think the cross-examination-the examination should not proceed under any misapprehension.
At all times, and in all documents that I am aware of, the Defendant Schacht has been accused of being guilty of Count One.
Count One, as the statement of the offense, states:
"The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace in that the defendants planned,
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prepared, and initiated wars of aggression . . . In the development and course of the Common Plan it came to embrace the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon, and carried out ruthless war . . ."
And that included also Crimes against Humanity.
Our contention is that, while the Defendant Schacht himself was not in the field perpetrating these individual atrocities, he is answerable for every offense committed by any of the defendants or their co-conspirators up to the time that he openly broke with this outfit with which he became associated.
That is our contention and Dr. Dix should conduct his examination on the assumption that every charge is a charge against Schacht up to the time that he openly, and on record so that somebody knew it, became separated from the company with which he chose to travel.
DR. DIX: It is probably my fault, but I still cannot see clearly. First, I do not know what date the Prosecution means when it admits that Schacht openly broke with the regime. I must, during my examination...
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must make up your own mind as to what time it was, the time at which he openly broke.
Are you not able to hear?
DR. DIX: I have to make up my mind now?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think you had better go on with the evidence.
DR. DIX: All right. I can refer to the subject again later.
[Turning to the defendant.] Well then, please do not make any statements of principle concerning the Jewish question, but tell the Tribunal, and give a few examples, of what your attitude was on the Jewish question.
SCHACHT: The Jewish question came up quite early, when, in 1933, a New York banker, the late James Meier, announced his intention to visit me. I went to Hitler at that time and told him, "Mr. James Meier, one of the most respected New York bankers and a great benefactor of his old home country, Germany, will come to visit me, and I intend to give a dinner in his honor. I assume that you have no objection." He immediately said, in a very definite and pronounced manner, "Herr Schacht, you can do everything." I assumed that he gave me absolute freedom to keep in contact with my Jewish friends, which I did. The dinner actually took place.
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I only mention this because it was the first time the Jewish question was brought up between us. At every occasion I took a definite position on the Jewish question-and wherever possible, publicly-I have always looked for that opportunity.
I will give only two examples of that.
There was a branch of the Reichsbank in Arnswalde in the Province of Brandenburg. The name of the manager of that branch office was one day posted up in one of the public Stuermer boxes in his town, and termed a traitor to the people because his wife had bought 50 pfennings worth of ribbon or the like in a Jewish-store. I at once approached the competent official at Arnswalde and demanded the immediate removal of the placard and an immediate correction to the effect that the man was no traitor to the people. That was refused; whereupon, without asking anyone, I closed the Reichsbank branch at Arnswalde. It took a number of weeks until, in the end, the Oberpraesident, who was of course also a Nazi boss, came to me and asked me to reopen the branch office. I told him, "As soon as they repudiate that affair publicly I shall reopen the branch office at Arnswalde." It took only a few days before the Oberpraesident and Gauleiter of Brandenburg, Grube, had the announcement made public in the Arnswalde newspaper, in large print, and so I reopened the branch office in Arnswalde. That is one example.
The second example has been mentioned briefly; I just want to sum it up once more because its effect was penetrating.
On the occasion of a Christmas celebration for the office messengers of the Reichsbank I referred to the pogrom of 9 November 1938, and I told the boys, in the presence of many-parents, Party leaders, and Party members-that I hoped they had nothing to do with these things, which should make every decent German blush with shame. But if they did they should leave the Reichsbank at once, because in an institution such as the Reichsbank, which was built up on good faith, there was no place for people who did not respect the property and life of others.
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you, Dr. Schacht, and point out to the Tribunal that in Document Number Schacht-34, which has been submitted and is an affidavit of Dr. Schniewind, on Page 118 of the German text and on Page 126 of the English text the same incident which Dr. Schacht has just related is mentioned. May I quote quite briefly:
"It is known that at the Christmas celebration of the Reichsbank in December of 1938 he"-that is Schacht-"said the following in his address to the young office boys:
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" 'A few weeks ago things occurred in our fatherland which are a disgrace to civilization and which must turn every decent German's face red with shame. I only hope that none of you office boys participated in them, because for such an individual there is no place in the Reichsbank.' "
[Turning to the defendant.] Excuse me. Please continue. You wanted to add something?
SCHACHT: When in August of 1934 I took over the Reich Ministry of Economics, of course I first put the question to Hitler: "How are the Jews in our national economy to be treated?" Hitler told me then, literally, "The Jews can be active in domestic economy in the same way as before."
That was the directive that Hitler had promised to me, and during all the time when I was in charge of the Ministry of Economics I acted accordingly.
However, I have to add that every few weeks there was a quarrel on some Jewish question with some Gauleiter or other Party official. Also, I could not protect Jews against physical mistreatment and the like, because that came under the competence of the Public Prosecutor and not mine; but in the economic field I helped all Jews who approached me to obtain their rights, and in every individual case, I prevailed upon Hitler and succeeded against the Gauleiters and Party officials, sometimes even threatening to resign.
I believe that it is notable that the pogrom of November 1938 could only have taken place after I had resigned from my office. Had I still been in office, then that pogrom doubtlessly would not have occurred.
DR. DIX: The witness Gisevius has already testified that in the course of developments from 1933 on, fundamental changes took place in your judgment of Adolf Hitler. I ask you now, because this is a very decisive question, to give the Tribunal a detailed description of your real attitude and your judgment of Adolf Hitler in the course of the years-as exhaustively, but also as briefly, as possible.
SCHACHT: In former statements which I have made here, I have spoken of Hitler as a semi-educated man. I still maintain that. He did not have sufficient school education, but he read an enormous amount later, and acquired a wide knowledge. He juggled with that knowledge in a masterly manner in all debates, discussions, and speeches.
No doubt he was a man of genius in certain respects. He had sudden ideas of which nobody else had thought and which were at times useful in solving great difficulties, sometimes with
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astounding simplicity, sometimes, however, with equally astounding brutality.
He was a mass psychologist of really diabolical genius. While I myself and several others-for instance, General Von Witzleben told me so once-while we were never captivated in personal conversations, still he had a very peculiar influence on other people, and particularly he was able-in spite of his screeching and occasionally breaking voice-to stir up the utmost overwhelming enthusiasm of large masses in a filled auditorium.
I believe that originally he was not filled only with evil desires; originally, no doubt, he believed he was aiming at good, but gradually he himself fell victim to the same spell which he exercised over the masses; because whoever ventures to seduce the masses is finally led and seduced by them, and so this reciprocal relation between leader and those led, in my opinion, contributed to ensnaring him in the evil ways of mass instincts, which every political leader should avoid.
One more thing was to be admired in Hitler. He was a man of unbending energy, of a will power which overcame all obstacles, and in my estimate only those two characteristics-mass psychology and his energy and will power-explain that Hitler was able to rally up to 40 percent, and later almost 50 percent, of the German people behind him.
What else shall I say?
DR. DIX: Well, I was mainly concerned with bringing up the subject of your own change of opinion. You have said that the break in your attitude toward Hitler was caused by the Fritsch incident. You are the best witness who can give us an explanation not of Hitler's but of your own development and your changing attitude towards Hitler.
SCHACHT: Excuse me. I think there is a basic error here. It appears from this as if I had been a convinced adherent of Hitler at some time. I was never that. On the contrary, out of concern for my people and my country, after Hitler gained power, I endeavored with all my strength to direct that power into an orderly channel, and to keep it within bounds. Therefore, there was no question of a break with Hitler. A break could only be spoken of had I been closely connected with him before. At heart I was never closely connected with Hitler, but to all appearances I worked in the Cabinet and I did so because he was after all in power, and I considered it my duty to put myself at the disposal of my people and my country for their good.
DR. DIX: All right, but at what time, by what conditions, by what realization were you influenced to begin that activity which the witness Gisevius has described?
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SCHACHT: My serious criticism of Hitler's doings started already at the time of the so-called Roehm Putsch on 30 June 1934. I should like to point out first that these things occurred quite unexpectedly and took me by surprise, because I had not at all anticipated them. At that time I had told Hitler, "How could you have these people just simply killed off? Under all circumstances there should have been at least a Summary trial of some sort." Hitler swallowed these remarks and merely mumbled something about "revolutionary necessity," but he did not really contradict me.
Then in the course of the second half of the year 1934 and the first half of the year 1935 I noticed that I had been under a misconception when I believed that Hitler did not approve of what might be considered revolutionary and disorderly Party excesses, and that he was really willing to restore a respectable atmosphere. Hitler did nothing to put a stop to the excesses of individual Party members or Party groups. Very likely the idea which recently -or I believe today-was mentioned by a witness was always in his mind: let the SA have its fling for once. That is to say, for the masses of the Party he sanctioned, as a means of recreation, so to speak, behavior which is absolutely incompatible with good order in the State. In the course of the following months my suspicions were confirmed and increased, and then for the first time, in May 1935, I took occasion to bring these matters up with him quite openly. I do not know if you want me to discuss these things now, but I am ready to tell about them.
DR. DIX: I consider it important that the Tribunal should hear from you how your original attitude towards Hitler, which you have just described, changed, and you became a conspirator against him.
SCHACHT: Well, the decisive change in my attitude came about by reason of the Fritsch incident, at the very moment when I had to recognize-and, of course, that did not come with lightning speed, but in the course of weeks and months it crystallized-that Hitler aimed at war, or at least was not prepared to do everything to avoid a war. At that moment I told myself that this was a tremendous danger which was raising its head, and that violence could be crushed only by violence.
Any opportunity of political propaganda within the German people was of course out of the question. There was no freedom of assembly. There was no freedom of speech. There was no freedom of writing. There was no possibility of discussing things even in a small group. From beginning to end one was spied upon, and every word which was said among more than two persons was spoken at the peril of one's life. There was only one possibility in the face of that terror, which was beyond democratic reform and
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which barred every national criticism. That was to meet this situation with violence.
Then I came to the conclusion that in the face of Hitler's terror only a coup d'etat, a Putsch, and finally an attempt at assassination was possible.
DR. DIX: And is Gisevius right in saying that the peripeteia, the decisive turning-point in your attitude resulted from your impressions and experiences in the so-called Fritsch crisis?
SCHACHT: Aside from the inherent falsehood which appeared in all actions and measures of the Party men, the Fritsch crisis provided the absolute assurance that a basic change was occurring in the conduct of political affairs, for within about 10 days Blomberg was removed, Fritsch was removed, Neurath was removed, and Hitler not only appointed so unsuitable a person as Ribbentrop to be Foreign Minister, but also in his speech in the Reichstag soon afterwards announced that from now on rearmament had to be increased even more. Consequently the Fritsch crisis was the decisive turning point in my attitude, and from then on I knew that every further peaceful attempt at controlling the torrent would fail and that only violent means could meet it.
DR. DIX: For an estimate of the Fritsch crisis may I quote now from the document which I already wanted to produce on the occasion of the interrogation of Gisevius but could not because the document was not then available to the Prosecution. The same view about the Fritsch crisis which Gisevius and now Dr. Schacht have put here was also expressed abroad by an intelligent officer with political foresight. May I point to Exhibit Number 15 of my document book (Document Number Schacht-15)? That is Page 41 of the English text, and 35 of the German text. It is a biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War for the period of 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945. I quote one sentence from it:
"The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of personalities, in which military judgment was increasingly subordinated to Hitler's personal dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Von Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective conservative influence on German foreign policy."
So here also that turning point has been clearly understood. And in summary I would like to ask this question of Dr. Schacht.
[Turning to the defendant.] Were you only disappointed by Hitler, or did you consider yourself deceived by Hitler at that time? Will you answer that?
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SCHACHT: The answer is that I have never felt disappointed by Hitler, because I had not expected more of him than my appraisal of his personality allowed me. But I certainly consider myself deceived, swindled, and cheated by him to the highest degree, because whatever he had previously promised to the German people and thereby to me, he did not keep afterwards.
He promised equal rights for all citizens, but his adherents, regardless of their capabilities, enjoyed privileges before all other citizens. He promised to put the Jews under the same protection which foreigners enjoyed, yet he deprived them of every legal protection. He had promised to fight against political lies, but together with his Minister Goebbels he cultivated nothing but political lies and political fraud. He promised the German people to maintain the principles of positive Christianity yet he tolerated and sponsored measures by which institutions of the Church were abused, reviled, and damaged. Also, in the foreign political field he always spoke against a war on two fronts-and then later undertook it himself. He despised and disregarded all laws of the Weimar Republic, to which he had taken the oath when he became Chancellor. He mobilized the Gestapo against personal liberty. He gagged and bound all free exchange of ideas and information. He pardoned criminals and enlisted them in his service. He did everything to break his promises. He lied to and deceived the world, Germany, and me.
DR. DIX: Let us return to the period of the seizure of power. In November 1932, you stated publicly that Hitler would become Reich Chancellor. What caused you to make that statement?
SCHACHT: That statement was caused by the fact that Hitler in the July elections of 1932 obtained 40 percent of all seats in the Reichstag for his Party. That is an election result which, if I am informed correctly, had never occurred since 1871, when the Reichstag was founded; and to me, as a democrat and a follower of democratic parliamentary government, it was quite inevitable that that man was now to be entrusted with forming a cabinet. I do not know of any alternative at the time. There was only one other possibility, one alternative, and that was a military rule. But the Cabinet of Von Papen already had had some special presidential authority and still could not maintain itself in the face of the Reichstag; and when Herr Schleicher attempted to establish a military regime without the participation of the Nazis, he failed after just a few weeks, because he found himself confronted with the alternative either of starting a civil war or of resigning.
Hindenburg and at first Schleicher as well-although at the last moment he acted differently-were always of the opinion that the
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Armed Forces could not face a civil war, and Hindenburg was certainly not ready to tolerate a civil war. But very unwillingly he saw himself forced by necessity to put the reins of government into the hands of the man who, thanks to his own propaganda and the incapability of all preceding governments, thanks also to the inconsiderate policy of the foreign countries toward Germany, had won the majority of German votes.
DR. DISK: You know that the Prosecution accuses you of having assisted Hitler and the Nazi regime to power. I therefore want to ask you now whether between the July elections 1932, and the day when Hitler became Chancellor-that is the 30th of January, 1933- you spoke publicly for Hitler.
SCHACHT: I want to state first that Hitler's power was an accomplished fact in July 1932, when he secured 230 Reichstag seats. Everything else that followed must be viewed as a consequence of that Reichstag election. During that entire period-with the exception of the one interview you mentioned, in which I said that according to democratic principles Hitler must become Reich Chancellor-I can say that I did not write or publicly speak a single word for Hitler.
DR. DIX: Did you, during the time when the reorganization of the Reich Cabinet was discussed, speak to Hindenburg on behalf of Hitler's Chancellorship?
SCHACHT: I have never in consultations with any of the competent gentlemen, be it Hindenburg, Meissner, or anyone else, contributed towards exerting any influence in favor of Hitler, nor did I participate in any way in the nomination of Hitler to be Reich Chancellor.
DR. DIX: The prosecutor accuses you in that connection of putting the prestige of your name at the disposal of Hitler in November 1932, and he refers to a statement made by Goebbels in the latter's book, From the Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery. What can you say about that?
SCHACHT: I would never have expected that this apostle of truth, Goebbels, would once more be mobilized against me here, but it is not my fault if Herr Goebbels made a mistake.
DR. DIX: The prosecutor also states that you provided the funds for Hitler in the Reichstag elections of 5 March; that is said to have happened in an industrial meeting on which there is an affidavit by the industrialist Von Schnitzler, Document Number EC-439, Exhibit USA-618. What do you have to say about that? It is our Number 3 of our document book, Page 11 of the English copy.
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SCHACHT: In February of 1933, at the time when Hitler was already Reich Chancellor and the elections of 5 March were to furnish a basis for the shape of the new government, Hitler asked me whether, at the occasion of a meeting which Goering was to call and which would have the purpose of raising funds for the elections, I would be good enough to take the role of his banker. I had no reason for refusing to do that. The meeting took place on 26 February.
And now the prosecutor has made it appear that during that meeting I had solicited election funds. The Prosecution themselves, however, have presented a document, D-203, which apparently is meant to be a record of the election speech made by Hitler on that evening . . .
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you and point out to the Tribunal that it is our Exhibit Number Schacht-2, on Page 9 of the English text. Excuse me. Please, will you kindly go on.
SCHACHT: D-203. That document closes with the following sentence:
"Goering then passed very cleverly to the necessity that other circles not taking part in this political battle should at least make the financial sacrifices required."
Therefore from that report which was submitted by the Prosecution, it can be seen very clearly that not I but Goering pleaded for funds. I only administered these funds later, and, in the affidavit by Schnitzler, Document EC-439, Page 11, the Prosecution have carefully left out these decisive passages which do not accuse, but exonerate me. I quote the two sentences, therefore, as follows-I am sorry, I have to quote in English because I have only the English text in front of me:
"At the meeting Dr. Schacht proposed raising an election fund of as far as I remember three million Reichsmarks. The fund was to be distributed between the two 'allies' according to their relative strength at the time. Dr. Stein suggested that the Deutsche Volkspartei should be included, which suggestion, if I remember rightly, was accepted. The amounts which the individual firms were to contribute were not discussed."
It can be seen from this that the election fund was not collected only for the Nazi Party, but for the Nazi Party and the national group which was its ally and to which, for instance, also Herr Von Papen and Hugenberg belonged, and which during that very meeting was extended to comprise a third group, the German People's Party. It was, therefore, a collective fund for those parties who went into the election campaign together, and not just a Nazi fund.
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DR. DIX: The Prosecution have mentioned those laws which were decreed after the seizure of power, and which introduced and then established the totalitarian rule of the Nazis and of Hitler. We have to consider the question of your personal responsibility as a later member of the cabinet and I must discuss these laws with you in detail; for the present I just want to remind you of them generally: First, the Enabling Act; then the law about the prohibition of parties and the establishment of one Party; the law about the unity of Party and State; the law decreeing the expropriation of the SPD and the trade unions; the law about civil service associations; the law about the legal limitation of professions for Jews; the law instituting the Peoples' Court; the law legalizing the murders of 30 June 1934; and the law about the merger of the offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President in the person of Hitler. How do you, as a member of the Cabinet, define your personal responsibility with respect to these laws?
SCHACHT: When all these laws were issued I was not a Cabinet member. I had no vote in the Cabinet. I had a vote in the Cabinet only after 1 August 1934, at which time the last disastrous law, the merger of the offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President was decreed. I did not participate in the discussions preceding this law, nor did I vote on it. I had absolutely no part in any of these laws.
DR. DIX: I do not know whether I mentioned it, but I want to protect you against a misunderstanding. This does not apply to the merger of the offices of the Reich President in the person of Hitler, after Hindenburg's death?
SCHACHT: Of course, I did not take part in that either.
DR. DIX: And why not?
SCHACHT: Because I was not then in the Cabinet. I received my official nomination as Minister on 3 or 4 August. I did not take part in the deliberations on that law. I did not vote for it, and did not sign it.
DR. DIX: But in the Indictment it is stated that you were a member of the Reichstag. Then as a member of the Reichstag you would have voted for these laws, inasmuch as, actually, after 1933 only unanimous votes were cast in the Reichstag?
SCHACHT: Yes. Unfortunately, there is much in the trial brief which is not correct. During my entire life I was never a member of the Reichstag. One look into the Reichstag Handbook could have enlightened the Prosecution that also during that time I was not a member of the Reichstag.
I had nothing to do with all these laws either as member of the Cabinet or of the Reichstag, because I had been neither during that time.
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DR. DIX: Did Adolf Hitler actually take an oath to the Weimar Constitution?
SCHACHT: Of course Hitler took an oath to the Weimar Constitution when he became Reich Chancellor, to Reich President Von Hindenburg. In taking that oath he swore not only to respect the constitution but also to observe and fulfill all laws unless they were lawfully changed.
DR. DIX: Was the Weimar Constitution ever formally repealed?
SCHACHT: No, the Weimar Constitution has never been repealed.
DR. DIX: In your view was the Leadership Principle established anywhere legally or constitutionally?
SCHACHT: The Leadership Principle was not established by a single law, and the subsequent attempt to reduce the responsibility of the individual ministers-and that affects me, too-by saying that it had become prescriptive law, is not correct. The responsibility of the ministers continued to exist, my own also, and was kept down only by the terror and the violent threats of Hitler.
DR. DIX: The questions whether the Enabling Act referred to the Fuehrer or to the Cabinet, whether the first Cabinet after 1933 was a National Socialist one or a combination of the parties of the right; and the question of the development of Hitler into an autocratic dictator, all these I have already put to the witness Lammers. I do not wish to repeat them, but do you have to add anything new to what examiners has testified?
SCHACHT: I made only two notes. In Hitler's Reichstag speech on 23 March 1933 he said, "It is the sincere desire of the National Government . . ."-not the National Socialist, as it is always referred to later, but the National Government.
And the second point: In the proclamation to the Wehrmacht which Defense Minister Von Blomberg issued on 1 February 1933 this sentence occurs:
"I assume this office with the firm determination to maintain the Reichswehr, in accordance with the testament of my predecessors, as a power factor of the State, above Party politics."
This and other factors already mentioned convinced me that the Cabinet would be a national coalition cabinet, whereas Hitler, by his rule of terror and violence, formed a pure Nazi dictatorship out of it.
DR. DIX: The quotation mentioned by Schacht is in our document book, Document Number Schacht-4, Page 14 of the English text. Now, when you became Minister of Economics . . .
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THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o'clock; the Tribunal will adjourn.
DR. DIX: Mr. President, may I ask a question? Do we continue tomorrow, because tomorrow is the first of May, and there is some uncertainty whether there will be a session tomorrow or not?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will go on tomorrow.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 1 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
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