Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 13

FRIDAY, 10 May 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Doenitz resumed the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I understand there are some supplementary applications for witnesses and documents, which would probably not take very long to discuss. Is that so?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have not actually received the final instructions. I can find out in a very short time. I will get Major Barrington up. I am told that is so.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, therefore, proposes to sit in Open session tomorrow until a quarter to 12 dealing with the Trial in the ordinary course and then to take the supplementary applications at a quarter to 12 and then to adjourn into closed session.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we shall be ready for them at a quarter to 12 tomorrow.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, the first document that I want you to look at with regard to the Fuehrer Commando Order of 18 October 1942 is on Page 65 of the English document book and on Page 98 of the German document book. It is Document Number C-178, Exhibit USA-544. You will see that that document is dated 11 February 1943. That is some 12 days after you took over as Commander-in-Chief and you will see from the reference that it went to "1. SKL Ii." That is the international law and prize law division of your operations staff, isn't it-Admiral Eckardt's division?

DOENITZ: No. It is addressed to the first section of the Naval Operations Staff, that is, the operational section. It originates with Eckardt and is sent to the first section, that is, to the section chief.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But I think I am quite right- the reference about which I asked you, 1. SKL Ii, that is Admiral Eckardt's department. That is the reference for Admiral Eckardt's international law department?


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DOENITZ: No, no, no. It is the department in which Admiral Eckardt was also an official. Admiral Eckardt was an official in that department.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the third SKL in the next line is the press department as you said, isn't it?

DOENITZ: No. The third section of the SKL collected information sent in for the Navy and reported on it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I note it was intelligence and press. Is that right or not?

DOENITZ: Yes, it was intelligence and press.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to help the Tribunal on three points in this document. You remember I asked you yesterday about the secrecy standard of the original Fuehrer order of 18 October. If you will look at the second paragraph you will see that it says:

".. . was given the protection of top secret merely because it is stated therein (l) that . . . sabotage / organization . . . may have portentous consequences... and (2) that the shooting of uniformed prisoners acting on military orders must be carried out even after they have surrendered voluntarily and asked for pardon."

Do you see that?

DOENITZ: Yes, I have read it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that that was one of the reasons for giving the order top secrecy?

DOENITZ: This exchange of notes between Eckardt and the section chief was not submitted to me, as is obvious from the initials noted in the book...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the reason for you not answering my question? Do you agree that that is the reason for giving top secrecy to this document?

DOENITZ: I do not know. I cannot tell you that, because I did not issue this Commando Order. It says in the Commando Order, on the one hand that these people had killed prisoners. That is to e way I had read it as Commander, U-boat Fleet; and on the other hand . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall give you one more opportunity of answering my question. You were Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. Do you say that you are not able to answer this question: Is the reason stated in Paragraph 2 of this document a correct reason for attaching top secrecy to the Fuehrer order or


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18 October? Now you have this final opportunity of answering that question. Will you answer it or won't you?

DOENITZ: Yes, I will do that. I consider it possible, particularly as the legal expert here thinks so. I do not know if it is correct, because I did not issue the order. On the other hand, it says in the order that these things would not be published in the army orders.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the next point. The next paragraph says that what is to be published in the army orders is the annihilation of sabotage units in battle, not, of course, if they are shot-as I would say, murdered-quietly, by the SD after battle. I want you to note the next paragraph. The next paragraph raises the difficulty as to how many saboteurs were to be considered as a sabotage unit and suggests that up to ten would certainly be a sabotage unit.

Now, if you look at the last paragraph-I will read it to you quite slowly:

"It is to be assumed that Counterintelligence III is acquainted with the Fuehrer orders and will therefore reply accordingly to the objections of the Army General Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff. As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure"-note the next words-"after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that all departments concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of Commando units."

Are you telling the Tribunal that after that minute from Eckardt's department, which was to be shown to 1. SKL, your Chief-of-Staff's department., that you were never consulted upon it?

DOENITZ: Yes, I do say that, and I will prove by means of a witness that there are no initials or distribution list here; and this witness will prove quite clearly that I did not receive a report on it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Admiral Wagner was your Chief of Staff?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we will not occupy further time.

DOENITZ: He was not my Chief of Staff; he was chief of this section. He was Section Chief 1. SKL, to which this order was directed. He knows beyond doubt that no report was made to me. The circumstances are perfectly clear.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will leave that, if you say that you have not seen it; and I will ask you to look at Document Number 551-PS.


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My Lord, I will pass the Tribunal a copy. This is Exhibit USA-551, and it was put in by General Taylor on 7 January.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, that is a document which is dated 26 June 1944; and it deals with the Fuehrer order; and it says how it will apply after the landing of the Allied Forces in France; and if you will look at the distribution, you will see that Number 4 is to the OKM, 1. SKL. That is the department on which you were good enough to correct me a moment ago. Now, did you-were you shown that document, which says that the Fuehrer order is to apply to Commando units operating outside the immediate combat area in Normandy? Were you shown that document?

DOENITZ: No, that was not shown to me in any circumstances- and quite rightly, as the Navy did not take part in the affair.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told me yesterday that you were concerned with the matter and that you had small boats operating in the Normandy operations. That is what you told me yesterday afternoon. You have changed your recollections since yesterday afternoon?

DOENITZ: No, not at all. But these one-man submarines were Boating on water and had nothing to do with Commandos on the land front. That is clear from this document, too-I do not know if it is the original of the 1. SKL because I cannot see the initial. I am convinced, however, that it was not submitted to me, because it had nothing to do with the Navy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Will you just look at Document Number 537-PS, which is dated 30 July 1944.

My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-553, also put in by General Taylor on 7 January.

DOENITZ: Where is it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The sergeant major will point to the place. That is the document applying the Commando Order to "military missions," and you will see again later that the distribution includes OKM, Department SKL. Did you see that order?

DOENITZ: Yes, I can see it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you see it at the time that it was distributed, at the end of July 1944?

DOENITZ: It is quite certain that this order was not submitted to me because again it has nothing to do with the Navy. The Navy had nothing to do with fighting partisans.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now just to look very quickly, because I do not want to spend too much time on it, at Document Number 512-PS.


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My Lord, that is Exhibit USA-546, which was also put in by General Taylor on 7 January.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, that is a report dealing with the question of whether members of Commandos should not be murdered immediately in order that they could be interrogated, and

the question is whether that is covered by the last sentence of the Fuehrer order, and I call your attention to the fact that it refers, with regard to interrogations, in the second sentence:

"Importance of this measure was proven in the cases of Glom

fjord, the two-man torpedo at Trondheim, and the glider plane at Stavanger."

DOENITZ: I cannot find it at the moment.


THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps you ought to read the first sentence.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.

DOENITZ: This document dates from 1942. At that time I was Commander of U-boats from the Atlantic Coast to the Bay of Biscay. I do not know this paper at all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your answer, but it is 14 December 1942; and the point is put up which is raised in the first sentence which My Lord has just directed be read:

"Top secret: According to the last sentence of the Fuehrer order of 18 October, individual saboteurs can be spared for the time being in order to keep them for interrogation."

Then follows the sentence I have read. That was the point that was raised, and what I was going to ask you was, did that point come up to you when you took over the Commandership-in-Chief of the Navy in January 1943? Just look at the last sentence.

"The Red Cross and the BDS protested against the immediate

carrying out of the Fuehrer order..."

DOENITZ: I beg your pardon, but I still cannot find where that is. I have not yet found the last sentence. Where is it?

THE PRESIDENT: Our translation says "after the immediate carrying out...."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "After," My Lord: I am sorry. It is my fault. I am greatly obliged to Your Lordship. "Protested after the immediate..." I beg Your Lordship's pardon-I read it wrong.

DOENITZ: That dates from December 1942.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is only six weeks before you took over.


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DOENITZ: Yes. I do not know this teleprint. In any case, that is probably not Red Cross, but probably Reiko See, Reich Commissioner for Shipping-or so I assume. BDS is probably the SS Leader in Norway.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the point that I thought might have some interest for you was the two-man torpedoes. I thought that might have been referred to you as a matter of Navy interest. However, if it was not I will come to a document after you took over. Give the defendant Document Number 526-PS, on 10 May 1943.

My Lord, that is USA-502, and was put in by my friend Colonel Storey on 2 January.

[Turning to the defendant.] You see that that is an account-it is from the Defendant Jodl's department, and it is annotated for the Defendant Jodl's department-about an enemy cutter which carried out an operation from the Shetlands, a cutter of the Norwegian Navy; and it gives its armament, and it says that it was an organization for sabotaging strong points, battery positions, staff and troop billets, and bridges and that the Fuehrer order was executed by the SD. That was a cutter which was blown up by the Norwegian Navy, I suppose after they were attacked, and ten prisoners were murdered. Was that brought to your attention?

DOENITZ: This was shown to me during an interrogation, and I was also asked if I had not had a telephone conversation with Field Marshal Keitel. It was afterwards found to be the Wehrmacht area commander who had contacted the OKW. It was a matter for the Army and for the SD, not for the Navy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you deny that you ever heard about that, will you turn to Page 100 of the document book.

My Lord, it is Page 67 of the British document book.

[Turning to the defendant.] And that is a summary, a summary of the trial of the SD. ..

DOENITZ: Where is it? I cannot find it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 100, I have told you. If you will look for it, I think you will find it. It is Page 67 of the English, if you prefer to follow it in that language.

Now I will explain to you; I think you have read it before because you have referred to it. That is a summary by the judge advocate at the trial of the SS men of the evidence that was given, and I just want to see that you have it in mind.

If you will look at Paragraph 4, you will see that they set out from Lerwick, in the Shetlands, on this naval operation for the


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purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coasts and for the purpose of laying mines. Paragraph 5:

"The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture; and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniforms at all times after their capture."

Now. you mentioned this yesterday. You see that in Paragraph 6:

"Deponent states that the whole of the crew was captured and taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral Von Schrader, the Admiral of the West Coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus; and there they were interrogated by Lieutenant H.P.K. W.Fanger, a lieutenant of the Naval Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitan Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Counterintelligence; and this interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the Admiral of the West Coast. Lieutenant Fanger reported to the officer in charge of the intelligence branch at Bergen that, in his opinion, all members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the West Coast."-And that is Admiral Von Schrader.

Now I want just to read you the one sentence which, in view of that, I do not think you will think is taken out of context of the evidence given by Lieutenant Fanger at this trial. He was asked:

"Have you any idea at all why these people were handed over to the SD?"

In answering that question I want you to tell me who was responsible for their being handed over. This was your officers, your outfit; that was the general in command of the Norwegian coast, Admiral Von Schrader in command of this section, whose people captured the crew. That is your own officers. Is it true what you told the Court yesterday that the crew were captured by the SD? Have you any reason to believe Lieutenant Fanger is not telling the truth?

THE PRESIDENT: What is that you were quoting from then?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is the shorthand notes taken on the trial of the SS.

THE PRESIDENT: Has it been admitted?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, it has not been, but it was within Article 19.


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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I do not know the document which has been used. May I have it, please? Shorthand notes which I have not seen are being used; and according to the Tribunal's ruling on cross-examinations they must be given to me when the witness is heard.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, with great respect, but this point arose yesterday when the defendant made certain statements with regard to Admiral Von Schrader. I am questioning these statements, and the only way I can do it is to use documents which I did not otherwise intend to use. I shall, of course, let Dr. Kranzbuehler see them in due course.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you a copy of the German? That was to have been given in German, that evidence.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have only the English transcript and I am willing to let- Dr. Kranzbuehler see it, but it is all I have.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any other copy you can hand him?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I only was sent one copy.

THE PRESIDENT: After you are through with it, will you please hand that copy to Dr. Kranzbuehler?



SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, have you any reason to suppose, Defendant, that your officer, Lieutenant Fanger, is not telling the truth when he says that these men were captured by Admiral Von Schrader?

DOENITZ: I have no reason to question that statement because the whole affair is completely unknown to me. I have already stated that the incident was not reported to me nor-as I can prove-to the High Command of the Navy; and I told you yesterday that I could only assume, in consequence, that these men-here it is, in Paragraph 6-were captured on an island, not by the Navy but by a detachment of the Police. Consequently Admiral Von Schrader said that they were not Navy prisoners but Police prisoners and must be handed back to the Police; and for this reason he did not make a report.

I assume that that is what happened. I myself cannot furnish the full details of this story or explain how it came about, because it was not reported to me at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the point I will get to in a moment. It nowhere states in this document that they were


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captured by the Police, and in fact that they were captured by the forces under Admiral Von Schrader, who attacked this island to which this boat was moored.

DOENITZ: I do not know about that. The document says that the men reached the island-the reason is not clear. That the men were brought back from the island afterwards in some sort of boat is quite clear; but naturally they might remain Police prisoners if they were captured there by the Police or the coast guards. That is the only explanation I can think of, in view of Admiral Von Schrader's personality.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I lust asked you-your own officer, Lieutenant Fanger, says they were captured by Admiral Von Schrader's troops, and you say if Lieutenant Fanger says that you have no reason to believe he is not telling the truth, is that right?

DOENITZ: Yes. My estimate of Von Schrader's personality caused me to assume yesterday that it happened like that. Since I am informed today of a Lieutenant Fanger's statement, things may have happened differently for I may be wrong.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you look at the end of Paragraph 8, the last sentence:

"There was an interview between Blomberg of the SS and

Admiral Von Schrader...." And then the last sentence:

"Admiral Von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this

torpedo boat were to be handed over in accordance with the

Fuehrer orders to the SD."-and then they were handed over.

And the official of the SD who carried out this interrogation stated at the trial:

". . . that after the interrogation he was of the opinion that the

members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners

of war, and that he so informed his superior officer."

Despite this report and the representations of a superior officer the crew were dealt with under the Fuehrer order and executed, and it describes how they were shot and their bodies secretly disposed of. Do you say you never heard about that?

DOENITZ: No. I do say that and I have witnesses to prove it. If the SD official thought that these men did not come under that head, he would have been obliged to report that to his superiors and his superiors would have been obliged to take the appropriate steps.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say, you already take the position that the Navy had interrogated them, the Navy Intelligence said they should be treated as prisoners of war, and Admiral Von Schrader said they should be handed over to the SS and that the SS examined them and said they should be treated as prisoners of war,


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and despite that these men are murdered? And you say you knew nothing about it? Did your Kapitan zur See Wildemann say anything to you concerning this? W-i-l-d-e-m-a-n-n.

DOENITZ: I do not know him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to bring him to your recollection. At this time he was an officer on the staff of Admiral Von Schrader and dealt with this matter. NOW, Kapitan Wildemann, and I suppose we should assume, unless you know anything to the contrary, that he is a trustworthy officer, says:

"I know that Von Schrader made a written report on this action, and I know of no reason why the handing over of the prisoners to the SD should not have been reported on."

Do you still say you never got any report from Von Schrader?

DOENITZ: Yes, I still say that I did not receive any report, and I am equally convinced that the High Command of the Navy did not receive it either. I have a witness to prove that. I do not know where the report went. Admiral Von Schrader was not directly responsible to the High Command of the Navy; and the report may have been sent to the OKW, if this report was made at all. At any rate the High Command of the Navy did not receive a report on this particular matter, hence my assumption that these men were captured on the island in the first place by the Police. Otherwise, I think Admiral Von Schrader would have reported it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you make any further statement, I would like you to have in mind something further that Kapitan Wildemann said, which you know probably quite well, "After the capitulation Admiral Von Schrader many times said that the English would hold him responsible for handing over the prisoners to the SD," and Admiral Von Schrader was under orders to proceed to England as a prisoner when he shot himself. Did you know Admiral Von Schrader shot himself?

DOENITZ: I heard it here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know he was worried about being held responsible for this order?

DOENITZ: No, I had not the slightest idea of that. I only heard of his suicide here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you still telling the Tribunal that Admiral Von Schrader made no report to you? Do you remember a few days after the capture of this M.T.B. Admiral Von Schrader received the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross?

DOENITZ: Yes, but that has no connection with this matter. He did not make a report on this matter and he did not go to Berlin for his Knight's Cross either, as far as I remember.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Two other officers, Oberleutnant Nelle and Seeoberfahnrich Bohm were decorated; and in the recommendations and citations the capture of this M.T.B. was given as the reason for this decoration. You say you knew nothing about it?

DOENITZ: I know nothing about it and I cannot know anything about it, because the competent superior officers would have dealt with these decorations and not myself. The High Command of the Navy did not receive a report on this matter; otherwise it would have been passed on to me. I have that much confidence in my High Command, and my witness will testify that he did not receive it either and that he must have done so if it had gone to the Navy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My final question, and I leave this subject: Admiral Von Schrader was your junior officer, and according to you, a very gallant officer. Do you want the Tribunal to understand that the responsibility which broke and made Admiral Von Schrader commit suicide was his responsibility, that he never consulted you and you were taking no responsibility for his acts? Is that what you want the Tribunal to understand?

DOENITZ: Yes. I will swear to that; because if Admiral Von Schrader really committed suicide on account of this incident, then he did make a mistake because he treated naval personnel, engaged in a naval operation, in a wrong manner. If that is correct, he acted against orders. In any case, not even the slightest hint of the affair reached me.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, will you ask the witness what he meant when he said that Von Schrader was not directly under the Navy? He was under Admiral Ciliax, wasn't he, who was on leave at this time?

DOENITZ: I said that he was not directly under the High Command of the Navy in Berlin. So if Admiral Von Schrader made any report on the affair, the report did not come to me directly but went to his immediate superior, who was in Norway.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that immediate superior was Admiral Ciliax who was on leave-but omit the leave for the moment; his immediate superior was Admiral Ciliax?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to put it perfectly fairly: Do you mean that for operations in Norway Admiral Ciliax was acting under the commander-correct me if I am wrong-was it General Von Falkenhorst? I cannot remember, perhaps you can help me. Do you remember that this Admiral was acting under the commander-in-chief in Norway so that you will tell the Tribunal. . .


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DOENITZ: Yes, as far as territory was concerned Admiral Ciliax was not under the High Command of the Navy but under the Wehrmacht Commander for Norway, General Von Falkenhorst; but I can only say that if Schrader's suicide is connected with this affair, then the Commando Order was not properly carried out when these men, who were naval personnel and had been sent into a naval action, were not treated as prisoners of war. If that is what happened- I do not know-then a mistake was made locally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But at any rate you say that despite these decorations for this action you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy knew nothing about it at all. That is what you say?

DOENITZ: I awarded the Knight's Cross to Admiral Von Schrader for entirely different reasons. I awarded it. I knew nothing about decorations awarded to the other people you mentioned. It has nothing to do with me because their immediate superiors would attend to that. Nor do I know whether these awards are really connected with the story or if they were given for other reasons. I still cannot imagine-and I do not believe-that a man like Admiral Von Schrader would treat naval personnel in this way. The document does not say that they were killed in a naval action but that the>, were captured on an island. It seems to me peculiar that the High Command of the Navy should have received no report on it, since orders to that effect had been given, and that the Wehrmacht report should make no reference to it in accordance with the Commando Order. All these factors are against it. I personally am unable to form an opinion as to the affair.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I am not going into details. You may take it from me that the evidence at the trial has been that this cutter was attacked by two naval task forces. If Dr. Kranzbuehler finds I am wrong I will be happy to admit it. But we will pass on to another subject. Time is going.

Would you turn to Page 105 of the document book?

DOENITZ: Then I can only say that it is a clear violation of orders and that the High Command of the Navy was not informed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to come to this next point, 105 in the German, 71 in the English document book. Now we needn't have any trouble about this document because it is signed by you. It is a memorandum about the question of more labor for shipbuilding; and you are probably very familiar with it. But will you look at the first sentence?

DOENITZ: I beg your pardon, but what page is it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 105, Exhibit GB-211 (Document Number C-195), English Page 71.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you would look at the first sentence,

"Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working

party by prisoners from the concentration camps...."

I don't think we need trouble with coppersmiths, but if you will look at the end of the document, the very last, you will see Item 2 of the summing-up reads:

"12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the

shipyards as additional labor. Security service agrees to this."

Now, that is your document, so...


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So we may take it that you were familiar with the fact of the existence of concentration camps?

DOENITZ: I have never denied it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And I think you went further, didn't you, when asked about this on 28 September? At that time you said:

"I generally knew that we had concentration camps. That is


"Question: 'From whom did you learn that?'

"Answer: 'The whole German people knew that.' "

Don't you remember saying that?

DOENITZ: Yes. The German people knew that concentration camps existed; but they did not know anything about the conditions and methods therein.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It must have been rather a surprise for you when the Defendant Von Ribbentrop said he only heard of two: Oranienburg and Dachau? It was rather a surprise to you, was it?

DOENITZ: No, it was not at all surprising, because I myself only knew of Dachau and Oranienburg.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you say here you knew there were concentration camps. Where did you think you were going to get your labor from? What camps?

DOENITZ: From these camps.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you think that all your labor was going to be German or that it was going to be partly foreign labor?

DOENITZ.: I did not think about that at all. I should like to explain now how these demands came to be made.


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At the end of the war I was given the task of organizing largescale transports in the Baltic Sea. Gradually the necessity arose to move the hundreds of thousands of poverty-stricken refugees out of the coastal areas of East and West Prussia where they were exposed to starvation, epidemics, and bombardment and to bring them to Germany. For this reason I made enquiries about merchant shipping, which was not actually under my jurisdiction; and in so doing I learned that out of eight ships ordered in Denmark, seven had been destroyed by saboteurs in the final stage of construction. I called a meeting of all the departments connected with those ships and asked them, "How can I help you so that we get shipping space and have damaged ships repaired more quickly?" I received suggestions from various quarters outside the Navy, including a suggestion that repair work, et cetera, might be speeded up by employing prisoners from the concentration camps. By way of justification, it was pointed out, in view of the excellent food conditions, such employment would be very popular. Since I knew nothing about the methods and conditions in the concentration camps, I included these proposals in my collection as a matter of course, especially as there was no question of making conditions worse for them, since they would be given better food when working. And I know that if I had done the opposite I could have been accused here of refusing these people an opportunity of having better food. I had not the slightest reason to do this, as I knew nothing about any concentration camp methods at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure we are grateful for your explanation. But I just want you to tell me, after you had proposed that you should get 12,000 people from concentration camps did you get them?

DOENITZ: I do not know. I did not do anything more about that. After the meeting I had a memorandum prepared and submitted to the Fuehrer...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Keep to the answer. The answer is that you do not know whether you got them or not, assuming that you did get them.

DOENITZ: I did not get them at all. I had nothing to do with shipyards and consequently I do not know how those responsible for the work in the shipyards received their additional workers. I just do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you held a position of some responsibility; if you get 12,000 people from concentration camps into the shipbuilding industry, they would have to work alongside people who weren't in concentration camps, would they not?

DOENITZ: Certainly, yes.


10 May 40

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling this Tribunal that when you ask for and you may have got 12,000 people out of concentration camps, who work alongside people not in concentration camps, that the conditions inside the concentration camps remain a secret to the other people and to all the rulers of Germany?

DOENITZ: First of all, I do not know whether they came. Secondly, if they did come, I can very well imagine that they had orders not to talk; and thirdly, I do not even know what camps they came from and whether they were not people who had already been put into other camps on account of the work they accomplished. At any rate, I did not worry about the execution or methods, et cetera, because it was none of my business; I acted on behalf of the competent non-naval departments which required workmen in order to carry out repairs more quickly, so that something could be done about repairs for the merchant navy. That was my duty, considering the arrangements which I had to make for the re-transport of these refugees. I would do exactly the same thing again today. That is the position.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look a little down the document to the fourth paragraph, after it says, "Translator's note." If you will look at the English, the paragraph beginning: "Since elsewhere..." Have you found that? This is as you have told us, after you express your worry about the sabotage in the Danish and Norwegian shipyards. I just want you to look at your proposal to deal with saboteurs.

"Since elsewhere measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties among whom sabotage occurred have proved successful and, for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration."

That is what you were suggesting, Defendant, a collective penalty against the whole working party where any sabotage occurred; isn't that so?

DOENITZ: Yes. May I give an explanation in that connection?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. But otherwise, it is so?

DOENITZ: Agencies outside the Navy connected with shipbuilding stated at that meeting that sabotage had been prevented in France by the introduction of certain measures for exacting atonement. Through an affidavit by an officer who attended the meeting and drafted the minutes or the short memorandum, I have now ascertained that these measures at that time meant the withholding of the additional rations issued by the management of the shipyard.


10 May 46

That is what that meant. And, secondly, to come to Norway and Denmark, I told these people:

"It is impossible for us to build ships there with our foreign currency and our materials, only to have them smashed up by sabotage-and assuredly with the co-operation of the shipyard workmen-when they are nearly ready. What can we do against that?"

The answer I received was that the only way was to keep them away from saboteurs and to round them up in camps.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The whole of this explanation that you have given us is in this document which is in front of the Tribunal. Have you anything to add to what is in the document?

DOENITZ: Right. I have to add that the workmen were to be treated in exactly the same way as our own workmen who were also housed in barracks. The Danish and Norwegian workers would not have suffered the slightest discomfort.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at one more sentence:

"By the employment of the working parties concerned as concentration camp workers, their output would not only be increased by 100 percent but the cessation of their previously good wages might possibly result in their being considerably deterred from sabotage..."

That fairly represents your view of the way to treat Norwegian and Danish workers, does it not?

DtiNITZ: This was a safety measure to allow us to get control of the sabotage.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn back to Page 70 of the English document book, Page 103 in the German document book. This is an extract from the minutes of a meeting between you and Hitler on 1 July 1944, signed by yourself. Have you got it?

D0NITZ: Not yet.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 70 in the English, Page 112 in the German text (Exhibit Number GB-210).

D0NITZ: I have got it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In connection with the general strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says:

"The only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court-martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody's lips whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court-martial proceedings."


10 May 46

Silence with regard to those who are condemned without trial! Do you agree with that statement of Hitler's?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why did you distribute it to Operations for circulation if you didn't approve of it?

DOENITZ: I do not agree with this procedure, but it expresses an idea of the Fuehrer's. This was not a discussion between the Fuehrer and myself; it represents notes on the military situation generally, made by the officer who accompanied me, and contains widely differing points.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you try and answer my question? It is a perfectly simple one. It is: Why did you distribute that to Operations for circulation? What was there in these few lines that was of interest to your officers? What did you think was valuable for your officers to know in that dreadful piece of savagery that I have just quoted to you?

DOENITZ: It is very easy to explain that. The officer who made the minutes included it in order to inform our shipyard establishments that there was a general strike in Copenhagen. That one paragraph from the long situation discussions was included so that the shipyard establishments would know that there was a strike in Copenhagen. That was the whole point.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting to you, Defendant, that you circulated that to your officers to inculcate ruthlessness among them. That is my suggestion. What do you say to that?

DOENITZ: I say that is entirely wrong. I may tell you also that I did not even hear the Fuehrer make that statement, but it is possible that it was taken down by the accompanying officer, Wagner, for the reason which I have just given you, to warn our people of the general strike in Copenhagen.

SIP DAVID-MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to argue with you about your knowledge of documents you have signed. I have questions which deal with documents you haven't signed, so let's pass on to the next one.

DOENITZ: I know the document. I know it because I have signed it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 69, that is Page 4 in the English document book or Page 102 in the German document book (Exhibit Number GB-209), the minutes of the conference on 19 February 1945, between you and Hitler.

D0NITZ: No, that is not correct.


10 May 46

SIR DAVID MAXW1;LL-FYFE: No, I beg your pardon. It is an extract from the minutes of the Hitler conference on 19 February 1945; and then there is a note. ..

DOENITZ: No. It says here: Participation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in situation discussion with the Fuehrer. It was not a special conference on the general military situation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to say "special." I said the Hitler conference on the 19th.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now the first sentence of Paragraph 1 says:

"The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention "

The last sentence:

"The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of this step and to state his opinion as soon as possible."

And if you look down at the next minutes of the conference on 20 February, which is headed, "Participation of C-in-C Navy at a Fuehrer conference on 20 February at 1600 hours," it reads as follows: "The C-in-C Navy informed the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Generaloberst Jodl, and the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Fuehrer's headquarters, Ambassador Hewel, of his views with regard to Germany's possible renunciation of the Geneva Convention. From a military standpoint there are no grounds for this step as far as the conduct of the war at sea is concerned. On the contrary, the disadvantages outweigh the advantages. Even from a general standpoint it appears to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that this measure would bring no advantage."

Now look to the last sentence:

"It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary without warning and at all costs to save face with the world." That means, put in blunt and brutal language, "Don't denounce the convention, but break it whenever it suits you," doesn't it?

DOENITZ: No, that is not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What does it mean? Let's take it word for word. "It would be better to carry out measures considered necessary...." Aren't these measures contrary to the rules of the Geneva Convention?

DOENITZ: I must give an explanation of that.


10 May 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Answer my question first and then make a statement. You have done it before but try to answer my question: "These measures considered necessary"-If they don't mean measures contrary to the terms of the Geneva Convention, what do they mean? Answer that question first.

DOENITZ: They are measures against our own troops. I had heard, or I was told that the Fuehrer intended, or had said, that because the front was yielding in the West and he feared that American and British propaganda might induce men to desert, he intended to leave the Geneva Convention, so I said to my staff, "How is it possible in this connection to contemplate abandoning lock, stock, and barrel a system of international law almost a century old?" I may have said something like this, "The necessary measures must be taken." There was no thought of concrete measures in that connection and no such measures were introduced. My own views on the treatment of prisoners of war can best be heard from the 8,000 British prisoners of war who were in my camps. That is the situation regarding this matter. All the chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches protested against the idea of renouncing the Geneva Convention. They were not in favor of this idea.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that your total explanation of "to carry out measures considered necessary"? You have nothing else to add on that point? Well, I shall pass to another one. Do you remember saying to Dr. Kranzbuehler yesterday that when you became Commander-in-Chief of the Navy the war was purely a defensive war? Do you remember saying that to your counsel yesterday?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was not your fault, was it? It was not your fault that it remained limited to the countries engaged when you took over? Do you remember your advice to Hitler on the meeting of 14 May 1943?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let me just suggest to you, do you remember the discussion about the sea transport for Sicily and Sardinia? Do you remember having a discussion on that, and do you remember your warning Hitler that your U-boat losses were 15 to 17 U-boats a month and that the position as to the future of the U-boat war looked rather gloomy? Do you remember that?

DONIT7,: Yes, I do.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember Hitler saying, "These losses are too heavy. This cannot go on." And did you say to Hitler:


10 May 46

"Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay, and control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up ten days. C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar."

And did Hitler remark:

"In 1940 this would still have been possible with the co-operation of Spain; but now, and against the will of Spain, our resources are no longer adequate."

Do you remember suggesting that to Hitler on 14 May 1943, and Hitler saying his resources were no longer adequate?

DOENITZ: I do not think that I had proposed to the Fuehrer that we should occupy Spain. I described the situation very clearly; I said that we were blocked in that small corner of the Bay of Biscay and that the situation would be different if there was much more room. That, however, does not suggest that, in consideration of the defensive situation, we should occupy Spain.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us get it clearly, I am quoting you now from Admiral Assmann's headline diary, a verbatim translation.

The original is in London, My Lord. I will get the copy and put it in and certify it. This point again only arose yesterday and I haven't got it. I will have the original given and I will show Dr. Kranzbuehler this entry.

[Turning to the defendant.] These are the words that Admiral Assmann records:

"C-in-C Navy continues: 'Now our only small outlet for sorties is the Bay of Biscay, and control of this involves great difficulties and already takes up 10 days.'

"C-in-C Navy sees best strategic solution in occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar."

Did you say that "the best strategic solution lies in the occupation of Spain, including Gibraltar"?

DOENITZ: That is possible. If that is the wording you have got there, it is possible that that is the way I said it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I was going to pass on from these general. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you passed altogether from C-158 on Page 69?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I had, but I can easily return to it, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the second sentence in Paragraph 1 appears to have some bearing upon the answers which the defendant has given.


1O May 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am sorry, but I tried to cut it as short-to the bare bone-and I am sorry if I omit matters.

[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant, would you return to the last document, C-158. That's the one about the Geneva Convention; it's Page 69 of the English book; 102 of the Gerinan, whichever you're following. The sergeant major will help you to find it.

Now, if you'll look at' the first paragraph, after the sentence I read, "The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention," it goes on:

"Not only the Russians but also the Western Powers are

violating international law by their actions against the de-

fenseless population and the residential districts of the towns.

It therefore appears expedient to adopt the same course in

order to show the enemy that we are determined to fight with

every means for our existence and, also, through this measure

to urge our people to resist to the utmost."

Were not these, that are referred to there as the "same course"- were not these the "measures considered necessary" to which you were referring in the second minute?

DOENITZ: The witness who drew up these two records will be able to explain exactly where and when this information was given. I myself was only told, just as the Reich Marshal testified, that the Fuehrer was upset because our Western Front was not holding, and men were quite pleased to become American and English prisoners of war. That was how the whole thing began; and that was the information which I originally received.

I cannot give an opinion on these minutes which were drawn up by an of ricer. The best thing would be for Admiral Wagner to give more exact details of these matters. I cannot say more than that under oath. I was of the opinion that the renunciation of the Geneva Convention was in principle a great mistake and was wrong. I have given practical proof of my views on the treatment of prisoners of war. Everything else is wrong.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make quite clear the point that the Prosecution put against you as this: That you were prepared not to denounce the Convention, but you were prepared to take action contrary to the Convention and say nothing about it; and that's what I suggested is the effect of the last sentence, especially when read with these words in the first paragraph.

My Lord, I am going to pass to the war at sea.

DOENITZ: I beg your pardon, but may I say one thing more? If measures are taken against desertion, they must be made public. They must have a deterrent effect; and so it never entered my head


10 May 46

to keep them secret. On the contrary my only thought was, "How is it possible to leave the Geneva Convention at all?" And that is what I was expressing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The document is clear.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Defendant, did you know that on the first day of the war the Navy put up to the Foreign Office that the maximum damage to England could only be achieved, with the naval forces you had, if U-boats were permitted the unrestricted use of arms without warning against Allied and neutral shipping in a wide area? From the first day of the war, did you know that the Navy put that up to the German Foreign Office?

D0NITZ: I do not believe that the Naval Operations Staff at the time sent me a memorandum of that kind, if it was ever set up, which I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Now, I want you to try and remember because it's quite important. You say that the naval command never informed the Flag Officer of U-boats that that was their view of the war?

DOENITZ' I do not know. I cannot remember that the Naval War Staff ever informed me of such a letter to the Foreign Office. I do not believe they did; I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, perhaps it would assist your memory if you looked at the letter.

My Lord, this is Document Number D-851 and it will become Exhibit Number GB-451.

DOENITZ: No, I do not know this paper.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just will take it by stages because, of course, you wouldn't know the first part; but I'll read it to you and then we'll look at the memorandum together.

"Submitted respectfully to the Secretary of State"-that would be Baron von Weizsacker-"with the enclosed memorandum.

"The Chief of the Operational Department of the Naval High Command, Captain Fricke, informed me by telephone that the Fuehrer was already dealing with this matter. The impression had, however, arisen here that the political connections had again to be gone into and brought to the Fuehrer's notice anew


10 May 46

Captain Fricke had therefore sent Korvettenkapitan Neubauer

to the Foreign Office in order to discuss the matter further."

That's signed by Albrecht on 3 September 1939. Then there is the memorandum:

"The question of an unlimited U-boat war against England is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the Naval High Command.

"The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage to England, which can be achieved with the forces available, can only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping in the prohibited area indicated in the enclosed map.

"The Navy does not fail to realize that (a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of 1936 regarding the prosecution of economic warfare, and (b) a military operation of this kind could not be justified on the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of international law." And then it goes on to deal with it.

Are you telling the Tribunal that the Defendant Raeder never consulted or informed you before these data were submitted to the Foreign Office?

DOENITZ: No, he did not do so, and that is shown by the fact that it is a memorandum from the Chief of the Operations Department to the Secretary of State, that is to say, a negotiation between Berlin and the Foreign Of lice; and the front-line commander, whose station was on the coast and who, for all practical purposes, was in charge of the U-boats, had nothing to do with it.

I do not know this letter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, are you saying that you went on with your activities at the beginning of the war without knowing that this was the view of the Naval High Command?

DOENITZ: I was not informed about this letter. I have said already that my knowledge of it . . .

THE PRESIDENT: That wasn't an answer to the question. The question was whether you knew at the time that this was the view of the Naval High Command. Answer the question.

DOENITZ: No, I did not know that. I knew that the view of the Naval High Command was to follow the measures of the enemy step by step. I knew that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you see, that is the entire difference, Defendant. That is what you said at great length in giving your evidence the day before yesterday and yesterday, that


10 May 46

you were answering, step by step, the measures of the enemy. You gave that evidence. Do you say that you didn't know that this was the view of the Defendant Raeder, formed on the first day of the war? Do you say you didn't know it at all, you had no inkling that that was Raeder's view?

DOENITZ: No; I did not know that because I did not know of this letter; and I do not know if that is Herr Raeder's view. I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I don't want to argue with you; but if the Commander, the Chief of the Navy--and I think at that time he called himself chief of the naval war staff as well-allows the chief of his Operational Department to put this view forward to the Foreign Office-is it the practice of the German Navy to allow post captains to put for-ward a view like that when it is not held by the Commander-in-Chief?

It is ridiculous, isn't it? No Commander-in-Chief would allow a junior officer to put forward that view to the Foreign Office unless he held it, would he?

DOENITZ: Will you please ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder. I cannot give any information as to how this letter came to be written.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do that with very great pleasure, Defendant; but at the moment, you see, I have got to question you on the matters that you put forward, and my next question is: Was it not in pursuance of the view and desire expressed in that memorandum that the U-boat command disregarded from the start the London Treaty about warning ships?

DOENITZ: No, on the contrary, entirely on the contrary. In the

West we wanted to avoid any further complications, and we endeavored as long as possible to fight according to the London Agreement. That can be seen from all the directives that the U-boats received.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you perhaps to draw his attention to the penultimate paragraph in that memorandum?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I probably should. My Lord, I will read the three, because if you will notice it goes on:

"The High Command does not assert that England can be beaten by unrestricted U-boat warfare. The cessation of traffic with the world trade center of England spells serious

disruptions of their national economy for the neutrals, for which we can offer them no compensation.

"Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using military method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if


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England gives us a justification, by her method of waging war, to order this form of warfare as a reprisal.

"It appears necessary, in view of the great importance in the field of foreign politics of the decision to be taken, that it should be arrived at not only as a result of military considerations, but taking into furl account the needs of foreign politics."

I am greatly obliged, Your Lordship.

[Turning to the defendant.] Did you hear of any qualification of this view which was arrived at on considerations of foreign politics? Did you hear anything about that?

DOENITZ: No, I can only repeat that I saw this document here for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well now, I would like you, just before we go on to the question, to look at Page 19 of the English document book, Page 49 of the German.

My Lord, the whole of the treaty, which is very short, is set out there. My Lord, I have the formal copy if Your Lordship would like to see it, but it is set out in these two paragraphs.

[Turning to the defendant.] You see:

"1. In action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subjected.

"2. In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether a surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in position to take them on board."

I had better remind you of that because I have some questions to put to you upon it.

Would you turn over the page and look at the foot of Page 20 in the English document book-it is either Page 50 or 51 in the German document book-where there are some figures set out.

Have you got the page?

D0NITZ: Yes, I have read it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read it. You see that it says in the two sentences before:


10 May 46

"In a certain number of early cases the German commander allowed the crew of the merchant vessel to get clear; and he even made some provision for them before he destroyed the vessel. Such destruction was in accordance with Article 72 of the Prize Ordinance; and therefore, for the purpose of this paper, the Germans have been given the benefit of the doubt in such cases."

The following are the figures on record. This is for the first year of the war:

"Ships sunk: 241..

"Recorded attacks: 221.

"Illegal attacks: 112. At least 79 .of these 112 ships were torpedoed without warning. This does not, of course, include convoy ships."

I wanted you to be quite clear, Defendant, that it excludes, first of all, ships where any measures had been taken for the safety of the crew and secondly, it excludes convoy ships.

Now-, do you dispute these figures in any way, that there were 79 attacks without warning in the first year of the war?

DOENITZ: Yes, I do. These figures cannot be checked. Yesterday I stated that in consequence of the use of arms by ships we had to take other measures. So I cannot check whether this report, which for other reasons looks very like propaganda to me, takes into consideration the behavior of the crews and their resistance, et cetera. That is to say, it is impossible for me to check these figures or to say on what they are based. At any rate, the German point of view was that it was legal considering that the ships were armed and that they transmitted intelligence-were part of an intelligence organization-and that from now on action would be taken against these ships without warning. I have already mentioned the fact that England acted in exactly the same way, and so did other nations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am going to ask you some questions about that, but let's just take one example. Was any warning given before the Athenia was sunk?

DOENITZ: No, I have already stated that that was a mistake; the Athenia was taken for an auxiliary cruiser. The sinking of an auxiliary cruiser without warning is quite legal. I have also stated already that on a thorough examination of the case, I have found that the commander should have been more cautious and that is why he was punished.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get your view, Defendant. Did it ever occur to you that in the case of a merchant ship, if it were sunk without warning, it meant either death or


10 May 46

terrible suffering to the crew and to these merchant seamen? Did that ever occur to you?

DOENITZ: If merchant ships...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just answer the question.

DOENITZ: If a merchant ship acts like a merchant ship, it is treated as such. If it does not, then the submarine must proceed to attack. That is legal and in accordance with international law. The same thing happened to the crews of German merchant ships.

-SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That isn't what I asked you. I wanted to know, because it is important on some of these points: Did it ever occur to you, did you ever consider, that you were going to cause either death or terrible suffering to the crews of merchant ships who were sunk without warning?

Just tell us, did it occur to you or didn't it?

DOENITZ: Of course; but if a merchant ship is sunk legally, that is just war, and there is suffering in other places, too, during the war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you view with pride of

achievement the fact that 35,000 British merchant seamen lost their lives during the war? Do you view it as a proud achievement or do you view it with regret?

DOENITZ: Men are killed during wars and no one is proud of it. That is badly expressed. It is a necessity, the harsh necessity of war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at Page 29 in the English document book, or Page 58 in the German, whichever

you care to look at. It is Document Number C-191, Exhibit GB-193. This is 22 September, 19 days after the beginning of the war.

"Flag Of ricer, U-boats, intends to give permission to U-boats to sink without warning any vessel sailing without lights.

"Previous instructions, permitting attacks on French war and merchant ships only as a defensive measure, purely French or Anglo-French convoys only north of the latitude of Brest and forbidding attacks on all passenger ships, give rise to great difficulties to U-boats, especially at night. In practice, there is no opportunity for attacking at night, as the U-boat cannot identify the target, which is a shadow, in a way that entirely obviates mistakes being made. If the political situation is such that even possible mistakes must be ruled out, U-boats must be forbidden to make any night attacks in waters where French and English naval forces or merchant ships may be moving. On the other hand, in sea areas where only English units are to be expected, the measure desired by the Flag Officer, U-boats, can be carried out. Permission to take this step is not to be given in writing, but need merely be based


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on the unspoken approval of the Naval Operations Staff. U-boat commanders would be informed by word of mouth"- and note the last line-"and the sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or an auxiliary cruiser."

Now, just tell me-take your choice-do you consider that sailing without lights is either persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned or active resistance to visit and search, within the Treaty? Which of either of these things do you consider it to be?

DOENITZ: If a merchant ship acts like a warship . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First of all, you must answer my question, if the Tribunal does not rule otherwise; and then you can give your explanation. My question is this: Do you consider that sailing without lights is either persistent refusal to stop or active resistance to visit and search? Do you consider it to be either one or the other, or both of these things? Do you?

DOENITZ: The question is not correctly expressed, because we are dealing with a certain operational area in which British and French . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you will answer the question, please.

DOENITZ: I beg your pardon?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you consider that sailing without lights is either persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, which is one of the matters, in the Treaty, or active resistance to visit and search, which is the other matter set out in the Treaty? Now, do you consider that sailing without lights is either or both of these matters mentioned in the Treaty?

DOENITZ: If a merchant ship sails without lights, it must run the risk of being taken for a warship, because at night it is not possible to distinguish between a merchant ship and a warship. At the time the order was issued, it concerned an operational area in which blacked-out troop transports were traveling from England to France.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your answer is that it is not covered by the Treaty, but by one of the matters in the Treaty; but your explanation was that you thought you were entitled to torpedo without warning any ship that might be mistaken for a warship. That is your answer, is it?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why didn't the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and all these naval advisers stipulate for that when Germany adhered to this Treaty, if you were going to interpret it


10 May 46


in that way? Were you ever asked about it before Germany adhered to this Treaty in 1936?

DOENITZ: I was not asked before Germany signed this Treaty; Germany adhered to the Treaty in practice, as I know very well, until countermeasures were introduced; and then I received orders to act accordingly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us go through this document and see if you can help me perhaps a little more on some other' points. Why was this action to be based on the unspoken approval of the naval war staff? Why hadn't the naval war staff the courage to speak its approval in an ordinary order if it was all right?

DOENITZ: Yes; the paper you are showing me is a note or memorandum made by a young official on the Naval Operations Staff. In fact-it was the idea of that particular officer on the Naval Operations Staff; and as I have pointed out here, I did not know of the matter-in actual fact, the Naval Operations Staff never gave me such an order. The contents of that paper are fiction.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, of course, they weren't to issue an order at all. You see, this states with great frankness that you were to act on the unspoken approval of the naval war staff, so that the naval war staff could say, as you have said now, "We didn't issue an order;" and the junior officers would be acting on an unspoken word, and I want to know-you have been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy-why is it done in this way, why is it done by unspoken words, on oral orders?

DOENITZ: No, precisely that is not correct. That was this young officer's idea. The order which I received from the Naval Operations Staff stated explicitly that blacked-out vessels could be sunk in this area where English transports were traveling from England to France. So, you see, it contained none of the things stated in this memorandum. There is no doubt that the section chief and likewise the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff refused and rejected that entirely impossible idea and gave me that short and explicit order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you suggesting to the Tribunal that on these vitally important points-"unspoken approval of the war staff, U-boat commanders informed by word of mouth"- that a young staff officer is allowed to put in an incorrect memorandum and get away with it uncorrected? Is that the way, is that the state of efficiency of the staff of the German Navy?

DOENITZ: No, that is a misunderstanding. It actually has been corrected. That is a note submitted by the official on the Naval Operations Staff, of which his superiors on the Naval Operations Staff did not approve. It was corrected. There was no unspoken agreement but an explicit and clear order to myself; so that young


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officer's idea had already been turned down by the Naval Operations Staff itself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that the original is initialed by Admiral Von Friedeburg?

DOENITZ: No, that is quite wrong, that is impossible. "Fd" is written there-that means Fresdorf. That was Kapitanleutnant Fresdorf. He was an official on the Naval Operations Staff-not Friedeburg. He was a young officer in the first department of the Naval Operations Staff. These are all things which I learned of here. His chief, Admiral Wagner, had condemned it already. It was not Friedeburg, but Fresdorf. That is the way this young officer thought about it, but actually a definite order was issued without these things.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Take the next bit. "The sinking of a merchant ship must be justified in the War Diary as due to possible confusion with a warship or auxiliary cruiser." Do you agree with faking the records after you have sunk a ship?

DOENITZ: No, and it was not done. That also belongs to the same category-the ideas of that officer. No order for that -has ever been given. The order of the Naval Operations Staff issued to me in that connection has been submitted and that is a clear and concise order, without the things mentioned here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Of course, you appreciate that these things, according to this memorandum, are to be stated without orders. There has to be no order because an order might come out-because if it is done without an order it won't come out. Are you suggesting-you are putting it on the shoulders of this lieutenant commander, that he invented these three damning facts: Unspoken approval, oral instructions to commanders, and faking the orders? You say that these existed only in the mind of a Kapitanleutnant? Is that what you are telling the Tribunal?

DOENITZ: Yes, yes, of course, because the clear, concise order was given by the Naval Operations Staff to me in which these things were not mentioned. And quite as clearly I passed my orders on. That is how it is. This memorandum, or these ideas of that officer, was already disapproved by his chief of department in Berlin. A clear order was given to me, however, and there was nothing in it about a War Diary and all these things mentioned here. That order is available.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we shall be able to ask, I understand, Admiral Wagner as to where this Kapitanleutnant got hold of these ideas, is that so, or whether he made them out? Is that what you are telling us, that Wagner will be able to deal with this, will he?


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DOENITZ: Admiral Wagner ought to know all about it, because this official was in his department in Berlin.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, if you put that onto the Kapitanleutnant, let's pass on to another point. In mid-November . . .

DOENITZ: I am not laying any blame on anybody, but they are ideas of a young officer which were already disapproved of by his chief of department. I am blaming no one. I do not accuse anybody.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I thought you were.

Well, now, let's pass to another point. In mid-November of 1939, Germany gave warning that she would sink, without warning, merchant ships, if armed. Don't you know that before that warning-if you want to see the point you will find it on Page 21 of the English document book or 51 to 52 of the German document book. It is just before the break, about five lines.

"By the middle of November, a score of"-that is 20- "British merchantmen had already been illegally attacked by gunfire or torpedoed from submarines."

THE PRESIDENT: Which page did you say?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Page 21, about ten lines before the break.

[Turning to the defendant.] You see, what I am suggesting, Defendant, is that the statement, the warning, that you would sink merchant ships, if armed, made no difference to the practice you had already adopted of sinking unarmed ships without warning.

DOENITZ: In the beginning of October, if I remember correctly, I received the order or the permission, the legal permission, to sink armed merchantmen. From that moment on I acted accordingly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me: Was it your view that the mere possession of arms, a gun, on the merchant ship, constituted active resistance to visit or search within the Treaty; or was this a new addition for the guidance of German U-boat warfare which you were introducing completely independent of the Treaty?

DOENITZ: It is a matter of course that if a ship has a gun on board she will use it. It would have been a one-sided obligation if the submarine, in a suicidal way, were then to wait until the other ship fired the first shot. That is a reciprocal agreement, and one cannot in any circumstances expect the submarine to wait until it gets hit first. And, as I said before, in practice the steamers used their guns as soon as they came within range.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you know, the arming of merchant ships, Defendant, was well known in the last war. It was, well known for 20 years before this Treaty was signed. And you will agree with me, won't you, that there is not a word in the Treaty forbidding the arming of merchant ships? Why didn't you give these ships the opportunity of abstaining from resistance or of stopping? Why did you go in the face of the Treaty which you had signed only 3 years before? That is all I want to know. If you can't tell me, if you say it is a matter for argument, I will ask Admiral Raeder. At the moment, will you tell us, or can you tell us, why didn't you keep to the Treaty?

DOENITZ: That was not an infringement of the Treaty. I am not an expert on international law. I am soldier; and I acted according to my military orders. Of course, it is suicide for a submarine to wait till it receives the first hit. It goes without saying that the steamer is not carrying guns for fun, but to make use of them. And I have already explained what use was made of them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just one other matter, because I must cover these points in view of your evidence.

Did you order your commanders to treat the use of wireless as active resistance? Did you consider that the use of wireless for merchant ships was active resistance within the Treaty?

DOENITZ: On 24 September, the Naval Operations Staff's order . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no, just answer the question first, Defendant, and then give your explanation. I said that to you quite 20 times yesterday and today. Did you consider the use of wireless by merchant ships as active resistance?

DOENITZ: It is generally laid down by international law that a merchant ship can be fired on if it makes use of its wireless when stopped. That is also in the French Ordinance, for instance. In order to avoid more severe measures we had not, as a rule, done so yet. Not until the end of September, when I received a definite order or permission to do so, was that rule, which is in accordance with international law, put into effect.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me, didn't the German Admiralty know in 1936 that most merchantmen had wireless?

DOENITZ: Of course, but according to the International Conference on International Law-I happen to know this because it appeared as a footnote in the Prize Ordinance-according to this conference of 1923, they were not allowed to use wireless when being stopped. That is international law and is found in all instructions. I know for certain that the French instructions say this too.


10 May 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate again, the German Admiralty and the German Foreign Office did not make any mention of use of wireless in this Treaty.

What I am suggesting-I want to put it quite clearly to you-is that you were not bothering about this Treaty at all in any case where it didn't suit you in the operations in this war.

DOENITZ: That is not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let's pass on to neutrals. I haven't heard you suggest that you were dealing with neutrals because they were armed, but let's take a concrete example.

"On 12 November 1939..."

DOENITZ: I have never said that neutrals were armed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I thought. Well, we will rule that out. We will take the example.

My Lord, it is given on Page 20 of the document book, and in the middle of the middle paragraph (Exhibit Number GB-191).

[Turning to the defendant.]

"On 12 November, the Norwegian Arne Kjode was torpedoed in the North Sea without warning at all. This was a tanker bound from one neutral port to another."

Now, Defendant, were you classing tankers bound from one neutral port to another as warships; or for what reason was that ship torpedoed without warning? The master and four of the crew lost their lives. The others were picked up after many hours in an open boat. Why were you torpedoing neutral ships without warning? This is only the 12th of November in the North Sea, a tanker going from one neutral port to another.

DOENITZ: Well, the submarine commander in this case could not see, first of all, that the ship was traveling from one neutral port to the other, but this ship...


DOENITZ: No, not for that reason; no. But that ship was heading for England, and he confused it with an English ship. That is why he torpedoed it. I know of that case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You approve of that action by the submarine commander?

DOENITZ: No; that is an assertion made by yourself and it is in practice refuted by our clean submarine warfare and by the fact that it was done by mistake.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When in doubt, torpedo...

DOENITZ: That is one of the cases...


10 May 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don't you approve of that: when in doubt, torpedo without warning? Is that your view?

DOENITZ: No, no; that is merely what you assert. If one or two instances of mistakes are found in the course of 51/a years of clean submarine warfare, it proves nothing; but it does contradict your assertion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, now, let's look at your clean U-boat warfare, if you want. Will you turn to Page 30 of the English book or Page 59 to 60 of the German book.

Now, the first of these-this is the note on the intensification of U-boat warfare. You say that on the directive of the Armed Forces High Command of 30 December-this is on the 1st of January 1940:

". . . the Fuehrer, on report by the C-in-C Navy"-that is the Defendant Raeder-"has decided: (a) Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the zone around Britain declared barred by the U.S.A."

There is a mistake, My Lord, in the translation. You see it says "blockaded by the U.S.A. and Britain." The proper translation should be "in the zone around Britain declared barred by the U.S.A."

Now, Defendant, I don't want to make any bad point, at any rate intentionally. Were you including Greek ships because you believed that most of the Greek merchant navy was on British charter, was being chartered by Britain? Was that the reason?

DOENITZ: Yes. That was probably why the Naval Operations Staff gave the order, because of the Greek fleet sailing in England's service. I assumed that those were the reasons of the Naval Operations Staff.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Assumed that was the reason. I do not want to occupy time on the point. What I want to know is this: Did that mean that any Greek ship in these waters would be sunk without warning?

DOENITZ: Yes. It says here that they were to be treated like enemy ships.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE In sum, then, that means that a Greek merchantman from then on would be sunk without warning if it came into the zone around the British coast.

Now, you mentioned the Bristol Channel, and you have given your explanation of the next sentence. You say all ships may be attacked without warning. For external consumption, these attacks should be given out as hits by mines.

I just want to get it clear from you. You are not suggesting that the reason of the Naval High Command was to conceal the maze of


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operations of the U-boats; the reason was to avoid trouble with neutrals whose good will you wanted to keep, was it not?

DOENITZ: I already stated my position on that yesterday. These are matters connected with the political leadership and I know nothing about them. I myself, as Commander of U-boats, looked at them only from the angle of military advantage or expediency, just as England did in similar cases. What the political reasons may have been, I cannot say.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is my whole suggestion to you, you know, Defendant, that you were acting on the military necessity stated in that memorandum of the Naval Command that the maximum damage to England could only be achieved with unrestricted use of arms without warning. But let us just look at the next one now.

DOENITZ: There were certain areas which neutrals had been warned not to cross. I stated yesterday that the same procedure was followed in English operational areas. If a neutral in spite of these warnings entered those areas, where military actions were constantly being carried on by one side or the other, it had to run the risk of suffering damage. Those are the reasons which induced the Naval Operations Staff to issue these orders.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you mentioned that, I shall deal first with your areas. Your zone, which is published, was from the Faroes to Bordeaux and 500 miles west of Ireland. That is, your zone was 750,000 square miles; isn't that right? Your zone around Britain was from the Farces to Bordeaux, and 500 miles west of Ireland?

DOENITZ: Yes, that is the operational area of August 1940.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, of August 1940.

DOENITZ: And it is in accord in extent with the so-called combat zone which America forbade her merchant ships to enter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say it is in accord. Let us just look at it and see what the two things were. The United States at that time said that its merchant ships were not to come into that zone. You said that if any merchant ship came into that zone, 750,000 square miles in extent, none of the laws and usages of war applied, and that ship could be destroyed by any means you chose.

That was your view, was it not?

DOENITZ: Yes, that is the German point of view in international law, which was also applied by other nations, that operational areas around the enemy are admissible. I may repeat that I am not a specialist in international law but a soldier, and I judge according to common sense. It seems to me a matter of course that an ocean


10 May 46

area, or an ocean zone, around England could not be left in the undisturbed possession of the enemy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think you are disputing it at all; but I want to get it quite clear. It was your view that it was right that if you fixed an operational zone of that extent, any neutral ship-and you agree that it is a neutral ship-coming unarmed into that zone could be destroyed by any means that you cared to use? That was your view of the way to conduct a war at sea; that is right, is it not?

DOENITZ: Yes; and there are plenty of British statements which declare that in wartime-and we were at war with England-one cannot permit neutrals to enter and give aid to the belligerents, especially if they had previously been warned against doing so. That is quite in accordance with international law.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will discuss the matter of law with the Tribunal. I want to get at the facts.

That is the position which you adopt? And equally, if you found a neutral vessel outside the zone using its wireless, you would treat it as if it were a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not? If a neutral vessel used its wireless after seeing the submarine, you would treat it as a ship of war of a belligerent power, would you not?

DOENITZ: Yes, according to the regulations of international law.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. As I say, the matters of law rest with the Tribunal. I am not going to argue these with you. But, apart altogether from international law, did it ever strike you that that method of treating neutral ships was completely disregarding the life and safety of the people on the ships? Did that ever strike you?

DOENITZ: I have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to cross the combat zones. If they entered the combat zones, they had to run the risk of suffering damage, or else stay away. That is what war is. For instance, no consideration would be shown on land either to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition or supplies to the enemy. It would be fired on in exactly the same way as an enemy transport. It is, therefore, quite admissible to turn the seas around the enemy's country into a combat area. That is the position as I know it in international law, although I am only a soldier.


D0NITZ: Strict neutrality would require the avoidance of combat areas. Whoever enters a combat area must take the consequences.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is your view? I do not think it could possibly be put more fairly.


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DOENITZ: And for that reason the United States explicitly prohibited entry into these zones in November, because it refused to enter the combat zone.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your view, any neutral ship which entered a zone of 750,000 square miles around Britain was committing an unneutral act and was liable to be sunk without warning at sight. That is your view of how war at sea should be conducted; that is right, is it not?

DOENITZ: Yes. Special lanes were left open for the neutrals. They did not have to enter the combat area unless they were going to England. Then they had to run the risk of war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE;: I just want you to tell me, if you will look back to Document C-21; that is, on Page 30 of the English book and Pages 59 to 60 of the German, you see that in all these cases-you take the one in Paragraph 2, Page 5:

"Conference with the Chief of Naval Operations Staff"-on 2 January; that was the "intensified measures" in connection with the "Case Yellow," that is, the invasion of Holland and Belgium-"the sinking by U-boats. . . without any warning, of all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed."

Why, if, as you have just told the Tribunal several times, you were acting in accordance with what you believe to be international law, why did you so act only in areas where mines could be employed?

DOENITZ: I have already explained that that was a question not of legality but of military expediency. For military reasons I cannot give the enemy explicit information as to the means of combat I am using in an area which may be mined. You operated in the same way. I remind you of the French danger zone which was declared, corresponding to the mined areas around Italy. You did not state which weapons you were using, either. That has nothing to do with legality. That is purely a question of military expediency.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, I think you will appreciate that the point that I am putting to you is this: That you were pretending to neutrals that you were acting in accordance with the London Treaty, whereas you were actually acting not in accordance with the Treaty, but in accordance with instructions you laid down for yourself, based on military necessity.

What I am suggesting to you is that what the Naval High Command was doing was pretending to, and getting the advantage fraudulently of appearing to, comply with the Treaty. And that, I suggest, is the purpose of these orders that you would only do this where mines could be laid. Isn't that what was in your mind?


10 May 46

DOENITZ: It is not true that we tried to fool the neutrals. We warned the neutrals explicitly that combat actions were going on in these operational areas and that if they entered they would suffer damage. We pretended nothing; we told them explicitly: "Do not enter these zones." England did the same.

TEIE PRESIDENT: Sir David, doesn't the next sentence bear upon that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, Your Lordship; I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.

[Turning to the defendant.] Would you look at the next sentence in II-1, where it says the following?

"By the present order, the Navy will be authorized, in keeping with the general intensification of the war, to sink by U-boats, without any warning, all ships in those waters near the enemy coasts in which mines can be employed. In this case, for external consumption, pretense should be made that mines are being used. The behavior of, and use of weapons by, U-boats should take this into consideration."

Do you say, in the face of that sentence, that you were not trying to fool the neutrals-to use your own phrase? Do you still say you were not trying to fool the neutrals?

DOENITZ: No, we did not fool them because we warned them beforehand. In wartime I do not have to say what weapon I intend to use; I may very well camouflage my weapon. But the neutrals were not fooled. On the contrary, they were told, "Do not enter these zones." After that, the question of which particular military method I use in these areas no longer concerns the neutrals.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to tell the Tribunal, what was your view of your responsibility to the seamen from boats that were sunk? Would you have in mind the provisions of the London Treaty, and will you agree that your responsibility was to save seamen from boats that were sunk wherever you could do so without imperiling your ship? Is that, broadly, correct?

DOENITZ: Of course, if the ship herself behaved according to the London Agreement, or unless it occurred within the operational areas mentioned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh? Do you really mean that? That is, if you sank a neutral ship which had come into that zone, you considered that you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to look after the safety of the crews?

DOENITZ: In operational areas I am obliged to take care of the survivors after the engagement, if the military situation permits. The same held good in the Baltic and in many operational areas.


10 May 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I put to you, Defendant. Please believe me, I don't want to make any false point. I put to you: If they could do so without imperiling their ships, that is, without risking losing their ships. Let us get it quite clear: Do you say that in the zone which you fixed there was no duty to provide for the safety of the crew, that you accepted no duty to provide for the safety of the crew?

DOENITZ: I have stated that I was obliged to take care of the survivors after the engagement, if the military situation permitted. That forms part of the Geneva Convention or the agreement on its application.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then it didn't matter whether the sinking was in the zone or out of the zone. According to what you say, you undertook exactly the same duty towards survivors whether it was in the zone or outside the zone. Is that right?

DOENITZ: No, that is not correct, because outside the zone neutrals were treated according to the Prize Ordinance, only inside the zone they were not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I can't understand is this-and really, I hope I am not being very stupid-what was the difference? What difference did you consider existed in your responsibility towards survivors if the sinking was inside the zone or outside the zone? That is what I want to get clear.

DOENITZ The difference was that neutrals outside the zone were treated according to the Prize Ordinance. According to the London Agreement, we were obliged, before sinking the ship, to see that the crew were safe and within reach of land. There was no obligation to do so inside the zone. In that case we acted according to the Hague Agreement for the application of the Geneva Convention, which provides that the survivors should be taken care of after the fight if the military situation permits.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree that an order in express terms to annihilate, to kill, the survivors of a ship that is sunk would be an appalling order to give?

DOENITZ: I have already stated that the attacks on survivors were contrary to a soldier's idea of fair fighting and that I have never put my name to any order which could in the slightest degree lead to anything of the kind-not even when it was proposed to me as a reprisal measure.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree that even with the discipline in your own branch of the service, there was a possibility that some U-boat commanders would have refused to comply with an order to annihilate survivors?


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DOENITZ: No such order was ever given.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it is quite a fair question. What if it were given in express terms, "Annihilate survivors after you sink a ship"? You know your officers. Would there, at any rate, have been some danger that some of them would have refused to carry out that order?

DOENITZ: Yes. As I know my U-boat forces, there would have been a storm of indignation against such an order. The clean and honest idealism of these would never have allowed them to do it; and I would never have given such an order or permitted it to be given.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what I put to you.

Now, just look at Page 33 of the English document book. That contains your own Standing Order Number 154 (Exhibit Number GB-196). Let me read it to you, rather slowly, if the Tribunal does not mind. It says:

"Do not pick up survivors and take them with you; do not worry about the merchant ship's boats; weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war."

First of all, tell me, what do you mean by "your next success"? Doesn't that mean the next attack on a vessel?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at that order of yours and compare it with the words of the London Treaty. The Treaty, you remember, says that a warship, including a submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without first having placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose, the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land or the presence of another vessel.

Defendant, you had that article of the London Treaty in front of you, had you not, when you were drafting this order? And you were deliberately excluding from your order the matters mentioned in the London Treaty? Listen to your order: "Do not worry about the boats; weather conditions"-one thing mentioned in the Treaty- "and distance from land"-another thing mentioned in the Treaty- "play no part."

Your order could have been put in other language almost as clearly: "Disregard all the matters that are stated in Paragraph 2 of the London Treaty."


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Now tell me, didn't you have the London Treaty in front of you when you drew that order?

DOENITZ: Of course I had the London Treaty in my mind and in front of me. I stated in detail yesterday, however, that we were thinking in terms of an engagement, a ship under escort, as is shown by the order as a whole. You have taken just one paragraph. There was, therefore, no question of applying the London Agreement, which does not refer to ships under escort.

Secondly, we were thinking of an area in the immediate vicinity of the permanent positions. enemy defenses off the harbors on the British coast. The London Agreement has nothing to do with fighting ships under escort. Those are two entirely different things; and that order applied to this area and the combating of ships under escort. I explained that in detail yesterday.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you say that that only applied when it was a question of attacking ships in convoy, would you look at Page 26 of the English document book and at Page 57 of the German document book? There you will find the account of the sinking of the Sheaf Mead on 27 May 1940. And if you will look at the U-boat's log, opposite the time group 1648 hours-which is on Page 27 of the English and Page 57 of the German (Exhibit Number GB-192)-this is what the log says:

"A large heap of wreckage floats up. We approach it to identify the name. The crew have saved themselves on wreckage and capsized boats. We fish out a buoy; no name on it. I ask a man on the raft. He says, hardly turning his head 'Nixuame.' A young boy in the water calls, 'Help, help, please.' The others are very composed; they look damp and somewhat tired and have a look of cold hatred on their faces. Then on to the old course."

If you turn to Page 57 of the German document book, or Page 28 of the English, you will find the last sentence from the survivors' report describes the submarine as doing this:

"They cruised around for half an hour, taking photographs of us in the water. Otherwise they just watched us but said nothing. Then she submerged and went off without offering us any assistance whatever."

There you see the point, Defendant, that your own commander says that there was a young boy in the water calling, "Help, help, please," and your submarine takes a few photographs, submerges, and then goes off.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, ought you not to refer to the passage just after the name of the vessel, under 1648, "It is not clear...."?


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "It is not clear whether she was sailing as a normal merchant ship. The following seemed to point to the contrary."

And then, My Lord, it gives a number of matters.

Of course, My Lord, I am on the point of survivors at the moment. I am not taking this instance as a matter of wrongful sinking; I am taking it as an instance of carrying out this order.

I am very much obliged to Your Lordship, but that is why I didn't do it.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]


10 May 46

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant has now had the opportunity of looking at the log of U-37. Was it not your practice in May 1940 to see personally the logs of all U-boats when they arrived?

DOENITZ: I had the commanders of submarines report verbally to me every time. The logs, which arrived or were finished several weeks later or some time after the entries were made since they had to be written in the port, were only submitted to me by my Chief of Staff if they contained something special in addition to the verbal report.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you remember seeing the log of U-37 that was involved in this incident?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-E: Do you now observe that the Sheaf Mead was not sailing in convoy?

DOENITZ: Yes I know that. And I know that she was an armed ship and that, according to the orders which the commander had, he was justified in sinking her as an armed ship. It also appears from his log that he could not decide on firing the torpedo until he had ascertained that the ship was armed. That is very clearly expressed here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I please explain to His Lordship that I am not on the question of sinking. I am on the question of survivors. Did you take any action with the U-boat commander, Kapitanleutnant Ernst, for not having assisted in the rescue of survivors?

DOENITZ: No. But I did tell him that if he was on the spot where this rescue went on he should also have helped.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was he not simply carrying out your Order 154 of November or December 1939?

DOENITZ: No, he was not.


DOENITZ: I have already stated to which waters it applied and that it only applied to ships which were protected.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look at Page 34 in the English document book, Page 69 in the German document book. That is the report of the conversation between Hitler and Oshima, and you say that you were told nothing about it. Now I want you just to follow about halfway down, halfway through the extract, where it says:


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"After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer pointed out that however many ships the United States built, one of its main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason merchant ships would be sunk without warning, with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of seagoing personnel takes a long time."

Now, did you agree with that argument of Hitler's that once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people? Did you think that that was a sound argument on the question of sea warfare against the United States?

DOENITZ: I have already given my answer to that question in writing to the Foreign Office, and I clearly stated my opinion, which was that I did not believe that it would take a long time to train seamen, and that America had no lack of them. Consequently I would also not be of the opinion that this would serve as a deterrent if they had enough men.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you do not agree with the Fuehrer's reasoning on that point?

DOENITZ: No, I do not agree with the last part, namely, that there would be a shortage of seamen.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, it is the first point that I want your opinion on expressly: "Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people." That is, I suggest to you, that the new people would be scared off by the news of the sinking and killing of the first people. Did you agree that that was a sound argument? That is what I want your view on.

DOENITZ: That is his personal point of view. Whether they would be scared off or not is an American matter which I cannot judge.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at your own document book, Volume 1, Page 29 in the English version, which is your report to the Fuehrer on 14 May 1942. Do you see the last sentence where you are advocating a range pistol? You say:

"A range pistol will also have the great advantage that the crew will not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the torpedoed ship. This greater loss of crews will no doubt cause difficulties for the assignment of crews for the great American construction program."


10 May 4B

DOENITZ: It is perfectly clear, it is correct. If I have not got the old crews any more, I have to have new ones. It makes it more difficult. It says nothing about scaring off there, but the positive fact is stated that new crews have to be trained.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So are we to take it that you did not think that would have any frightening or terrorizing effect on the getting of new crews, if the old crews were sunk under conditions where they would probably lose their lives.

DOENITZ: That is a matter of opinion, it depends on the courage, the bravery of the people. The American Secretary Knox said that if in peacetime-in 1941-the sinkings of German U-boats were not published he expected it would have a deterrent effect on my U-boats. That was his opinion. I can only say that the silent disappearance through American sinkings in peacetime did not scare off my U-boats. It is a matter of taste.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, on 14 May the Fuehrer was pressing you to take action against the crews after the vessel was sunk. Is that nut so?

DOENITZ: Yes. He asked whether we could not take action against the crew and I have already said, after I heard of the Oshima discussion here, that I believe this question to Grossadmiral Raeder and myself was the result of that Oshima discussion.

My answer to that, of course, is known; it was "no."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your answer was "no," it would be far better to have a range pistol and kill them while they were still on the boat. That was your answer, was it not?

DOENITZ: No. My answer was: Taking action against shipwrecked personnel is out of the question, but it is taken for granted that in a fight one must use the best possible weapon. Every nation does that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but the object of your weapon, as quite clearly set out, was that the crew would not be able to rescue themselves on account of the quick sinking of the ship. That is why you wanted to use the range pistol.

DOENITZ: Yes. And also of course, because we considered the crews of the steamers as combatants since they were fighting with weapons.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going back to deal with that point again, but that was in your mind. Now, the Fuehrer raised this point again on 5 September 1942, as is shown in your document book, Volume II, Page 81.

DOENITZ: I do not have it. Where is it?


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It begins with the discussion in the OKW on 5 September 1942. It is Exhibit DOENITZ-39, Page 81, and it is in the English document book, Volume II.

DOENITZ: Yes, I have it now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It arises out of an incident of the sinking of the mine boat, film, and there is a question of whether British destroyers had fired with machine arms on soldiers in lifeboats; and the Fuehrer gave orders to the Naval Command to issue an order, according to which "our warships would use reprisals"; and if you look a little lower down, you will see that the matter had been investigated by your operations staff, and it is stated:

"It could not be proved beyond a doubt that the fire had been aimed at the crew boarding the lifeboats. The enemy fire was evidently aimed at the ship itself."

Then you discuss the question of applying reprisals, at the foot of that page, and you say:

"It is the opinion of the Naval Operations Staff that before issuing reprisal orders, one should take into consideration whether such measures, if applied by the enemy against us, would not in the end be more harmful to us than to the enemy. Even now our boats are able only in a few cases to rescue shipwrecked enemy crews by towing the lifeboats, et cetera, whereas the crews of sunken German U-boats and merchant vessels have so far, as a rule, been picked up by the enemy. The situation could therefore only change in our favor if we were to receive orders, as a measure of reprisal, that shipwrecked enemy crews should not only not be saved, but that they should be subdued by fire. It is significant in

_ this respect that so far it could not be proved that in the cases on record where the enemy used arms against shipwrecked Germans such action was the result of, or was covered by, an order of an official British agency. We should therefore bear in mind the fact that knowledge of such a German order would be used by enemy propaganda in such a manner that its consequences could not easily be foreseen."

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I object against this manner of procedure. The document about which this cross-examination is being made is a document from me, and I have not submitted it yet. I do not know whether it is customary in this Trial that exhibits of the Defense are submitted by the Prosecution. For this reason I had suggested at the time to begin with the documentary evidence so that the Prosecution should also have an opportunity to use my exhibits in cross-examination.


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THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to the document which is in your document book being offered in evidence?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOHLER: I only want to avoid having my documents presented by the Prosecution in crossexamination because this upsets my entire documentary evidence. This particular case does not play a decisive role for me, but if the Prosecution proposes to present other documents of mine which have not yet been submitted, I should like to ask that the cross-examination be interrupted and I first be afforded an opportunity to submit my documents.

THE PRESIDENT: That will only waste time, will it not? It would not do any good; it would only waste time.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I do not think it would be a waste of time if I, as Defense Counsel, ask that I be allowed to submit my own documents to the Tribunal myself and that they shall not be quoted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution from my document book, because the manner of presentation and the questions asked by the Prosecution do, of course, give these documents a quite definite meaning.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal thinks there is no objection to the course that is being taken. You have had the opportunity already of puffing this document to the witness. You will have a further opportunity of putting it to him again in re-examination.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that there was fresh pressure put on you to take this course, that is, to fire on the crews of sunken vessels and that in September, was there not?

DOENITZ: No, that is not correct. I only learned of this document of the naval war here; I was not under pressure, therefore; but it is true that, in accordance with this document, the Naval Operations Staff had apparently had orders from the OKW to compile a list of all such cases and that the Naval Operations Staff very correctly took the point of view that one would have to be very careful in judging these cases and that it advised against reprisal measures. It appears to me that the compilation of this document served to convince us that in principle one should keep away from these reprisal measures.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that on the instructions of Hitler the OKW had put through an inquiry to the naval war command on this point in September?

DOENITZ: No, I did not know that. I just said I do not know about this entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff and the appendix which is attached to it. I first heard of it here.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You first heard of it here?

DOENITZ: I did not know about the entry in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. That was done in Berlin, and I was Commander of the Submarine Fleet in France at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Weil, if you tell the Tribunal that you did not know about it in September, then we will pass on to another document. That is what you say, that you did not know about it in September 1942?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you-I do not want to take you through the Laconia in any detail, but I want you just to tell me about one, I think, one or two entries. I think it is Page 40 of your own document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that not on Page 41?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.

[Turning to the defendant.] It is Page 41, at the bottom. It is on 20 September, 1320 hours. That is your wireless message to the U-boat Schacht. Do you see that?

DOENITZ: Yes, and I explained that in great detail yesterday.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I just want to know: Is it true what is stated in your wireless message that the boat was dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true?

DOENITZ: That is correct, because the vessel had reported to me that it had four boats in tow-and it says on Page 40, ". . . with British in tow." It was clear, considering the whole situation, that a submarine with vessels in tow could not remain on the surface without the greatest danger to itself. Hence on Page 40 under heading 2 the order and the instructions given, "Boats with British and Poles to be cast adrift." I wanted to get rid of the boats. That was the only reason. And it was only afterwards- Page 41-when a long radio message came from him, which in itself was a repetition but which was interpreted to mean that after the two air attacks had taken place he had again endangered his boat by stopping and picking up men, only then did he receive this wireless message, after it had gradually dawned on me- during the first four days, or perhaps three days, I had nothing against rescuing the British-that the Italians, who after all were our allies, were getting the worst of it, which indeed proved to be the case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have given a long explanation. Now, is that wireless message true, that the boat was


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dispatched to rescue Italian allies, not for the rescue and care of Englishmen and Poles? Is that true or not true?

DOENITZ: Of course; this wireless message contained both instructions and it becomes unequivocally clear from these two instructions as well as from the impression I had that the British who were rescued far outnumbered the Italians, who were left to drown.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is one point I want you to make a little clearer, When you were interrogated about this matter, you said that you were under great pressure at the time; and, I think, that the pressure came to you from Hitler only through Captain Fricke. Is that right?

DOENITZ: No, "only" is not correct. It was "also." The pressure, as I have very clearly explained here, was due to worry and anxiety regarding the fate of my submarines, because I knew that they were now being greatly jeopardized. We had evidence of that already from the bombing attacks; secondly, of course, from the Fuehrer's orders which Fricke gave. But I have also stated here that in spite of that order, even if it was not militarily correct to act in this way, I continued rescuing. However, the pressure, my worry and anxiety, were mostly caused by the fate of the submarines themselves.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that at this time you had had the report to the Fuehrer on 14 May; you had then had the Laconia incident, and during that incident you had had the pressure from the Fuehrer. Now, was it not because of this...

DOENITZ: I beg your pardon, but...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Allow me to ask my question.

DOENITZ: I think there is an error that has crept in here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well, I will correct it. You had had the report to the Fuehrer on 14 May. You have told me that. There was then the Laconia...

DOENITZ: That has nothing to do with the Fuehrer's order in the case of the Laconia. In the case of the Laconia the Fuehrer had given orders, and quite rightly, that no boats should be endangered by the rescue. That is something quite different from the subject of 14 May.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am trying to assemble for the moment what matters you had to deal with. You had had the 14th of May, the Laconia incident, and then an order to stop, coming through from the Fuehrer.

DOENITZ: No, in the case of the Laconia incident I never thought at all of the order or of the discussion of 14 May with the Fuehrer,


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and I could not, because that was an entirely different subject. This is quite another matter, here it was purely a matter of rescue. There is no connection whatsoever between the two.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will see about that. Turn to Page 36 in the British document book, or Pages 71 to 75 in the German document book.

Now, you have told us that what mainly concerned you was the safety of your own boats and of your own personnel.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you put into the order, "The elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews are contrary to rescuing"? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews?

DOENITZ: I explained that in great detail yesterday. I preached during all these years: You must not rescue when your own safety is in danger. In the case of the Laconia I myself in my anxiety and worry wirelessed that to the troops many times. Apart from that, I found again and again that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the air too lightly. I also showed how that is to be explained psychologically. I described yesterday the overwhelming increase of the air force, and consequently in no circumstances would I have again given my people as a reason that, if there is danger from the air, or since you are being endangered from the air, et cetera, you must not rescue, or rescuing would be contrary to the elementary demands of warfare; because I did not want to leave it to my commanders to discuss whether there was danger from the air or not. After all my experience of the losses suffered and in view of the ever present air force, which as history has shown was becoming stronger and stronger, I had to give a clear-cut order to the commanders based on that experience: "You cannot go on like that, or while we rescue the enemy we shall be attacked and killed by the enemy." Therefore this reasoning must not enter into it. I did not wish to give the commanders another opportunity of deliberating or discussing. I told you already yesterday that I could have added, "If now, in view of the danger from the air, we are killed by that selfsame enemy while rescuing him, then rescue is contrary to the elementary demands of warfare." I did not want to do that, because I did not want any more discussion. We all had the impression that this refrain, "Do not rescue if there is danger from the air," was outworn, because this would have meant that the commanders would nevertheless lose their liberty of action, and might slip into this thing.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you had simply said, "You are forbidden to rescue," and if you had wanted to give a reason, "You are forbidden to rescue because in view of the Allied

air cover it is a matter of too great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at all," that would have been quite clear. Why did you not put it that way?

DOENITZ: No, that is just what I could not do. I have just said so, because some commander in some naval theater might get the idea that there was no danger from the air, and the next moment the plane would appear and he would be struck down. I have already said all that in reply to your suggestion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had two experienced staff officers with you at the time that you got this order out- Captains Godt and Hessler, had you not?

DOENITZ: Yes, that is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And both Captain Goat and Captain Hessler advised you strongly against the issue of this order, did they not?

DOENITZ: As far as I can remember, they said something like this, "The bulk of the submarines"-I have said that here-"the bulk of the U-boats, that is, more than 90 percent of the U-boats, are already fighting the convoys, so that such an order is out of the question for them."

That was the question: Should we issue such a general order at all, and would not the further developments which forced us all the time to issue new orders, namely, "Remain on the surface as little as possible," make such an order superfluous? However, since I was responsible for warding off every possible danger to a submarine, I had to give this order and my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you not say when you were interrogated on 22 October and on other occasions: "Godt and Hessler told me, 'Do not send this wireless message-you see, one day there may be a wrong impression about it; there may be a misinterpretation of that.' " Did you not say that?

DOENITZ: Yes, I said that, and it is true too that such a remark may have been made. But it was not misinterpreted by the U-boats; nobody thought of that or we would not have issued the order. But we were thinking of the effects on the outside world.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And was not the effect that you wanted to produce: That you would have an order which could be argued was merely a prohibition of rescue, and would encourage the submarine commanders who felt that way to annihilate the survivors of the crews?


10 May 46

DOENITZ: No, that is absolutely wrong, and it is also proved by the documents which we have submitted.

Apart from the Mohle case, nobody misunderstood this order and when we compiled the order we were aware of that fact. That becomes clear from the communications which we had with U-boat commanders, and it becomes clear from my searching inquiries when I asked whether they had in any way thought of that. The order does not show that at all, neither does the reason which led to it. The fact is that we were rescuing for all we were worth. The question was, "to rescue or not to rescue," and nothing else. That is the key to the Laconia case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said that "we issued the order." Do you remember saying this in an interrogation on 6 October: "I am completely and personally responsible for it, because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or likely to be misinterpreted."

Do you remember saying that, "I am completely and personally responsible" because both your staff officers had pointed out that it was ambiguous? Did you say that?

DOENITZ: I do not think so. I cannot think I said it that way. I am not sure, but I will say the following:

During the interrogation I was told that Captains Goat and Hessler made this order, and in reply to that I said, "It is quite immaterial, I am responsible for the order." Moreover, the main point of discussion on that order was whether one ought to issue such an order. That it should ever have entered Captain Godt's or Captain Hessler's mind that such an order could be misunderstood by us-by the U-boats-is completely erroneous. I emphatically stated that, too, during the interrogation. I clearly stated that this consideration and the discussion of the question whether the order was to be issued or not had nothing whatever to do with it as far as these two gentlemen were concerned. That is quite clear; and that also was contained in the interrogation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were making clear that it was the first occasion. I made it clear that you were not blaming your junior officer who had advised you against this, and you were taking the responsibility on this occasion yourself. That is true, these junior officers advised you against it? In your own words, they both expressly stated that they considered the telegram ambiguous and liable to be misinterpreted; that is right, is it not, they did say that?

DOENITZ: I did not see the discussion after it was put down, and I did not sign it. I can tell you quite clearly-and this is clear from


10 May 46

another discussion-that I said that I myself will assume full responsibility. For me that was the essential thing. The only reason why the whole question came up was because the interrogating officer told me these officers had drafted the order, and then, as I recall it, the idea was that on no account should these officers be held responsible for my order. That was the point of the matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate, you are not changing what you said a few minutes ago that both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler advised you against issuing this order, are you?

DOENITZ: According to my recollection, at first both advised against it. I have now heard that both are saying they did not advise against it, but that perhaps I or somebody else might have advised against it. I do not know for certain. I recollect that at first both advised me against issuing such an order at a time when 90 percent of our submarines were already engaged in fighting convoys and when we were being forced under the water anyway and it was absolutely impossible to make any more rescues since we were below the surface; and I said, "No; there will surely still be cases where such a thing can happen and where the commander will be faced with an awkward situation and in that case I want to relieve him of such a decision." That was the reason and the meaning of the discussion, nothing else.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will continue. That is the first part of the order. Now take Paragraph 2, "Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply." Now, Defendant, you know perfectly well that in order to find the captain or chief engineer, the U-boat has got to go around the lifeboats or wreckage and make inquiries, "Where is the captain?" And you know very well that the usual practice of the British merchant navy was to try and hide the captain and prevent them finding out who he was. Is that not the practical position that had to be met, that you had to go around the lifeboats asking for the captain if you wanted to bring him in? Is that not so?

DOENITZ: Not exactly, no. I stated quite clearly yesterday that, first, the risk of taking aboard one man was much less as far as time was concerned, and would not limit the crash diving ability of the boat, whereas rescuing activities would limit severely the crash diving ability. Secondly, that that had a military aim ordered by the Naval Operations Staff for which, as is always the case in war, a certain risk would have to be taken; and, thirdly, that the significance of that paragraph appeared to all of us to be unimportant, the results being always poor. This order, if you want to construe it like this and take it out of its context, militates against your contention that I wanted to destroy these people;


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because I wanted to take prisoners, and if I intended to kill somebody first, then I certainly could not have taken him prisoner.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I am putting it to you that the second part of the order is that you are to bring in captains and chief engineers to find out what you can from them.

Look at the third paragraph: "Rescue ship crews only if their statements will be of importance for U-boats," that is, of importance for you to learn from them the position of Allied ships or the measures the Allies are taking against submarines. That is the point against two and three, is it not? You are only to take prisoners if you can find out some useful thing from them?

DOENITZ: I think it is taken for granted that we should try to get as much information as possible, and since I cannot take the whole crew as prisoners on a U-boat, I have to confine myself to the most important persons. Therefore I remove these people from further engagement, whereas the others may engage again. Of course, in view of the limited room on a U-boat, I do not take unimportant people but the important ones.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not want to take up a lot of time, but I want you to tell me this: Did I' understand your explanation of the word "again" in the War Diary to be that you had drawn the attention of certain submarine commanders to your telegrams during the Laconia incident, is that your explanation?

DOENITZ: No, it did not refer. to U-boat commanders; and I believe the word "again," as my staff says, referred to those four wireless messages which we have read as meaning this during the last few days and which were submitted to the Tribunal yesterday.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you a moment ago a question and you said the "again" refers to the messages you sent out during the Laconic incident. I think you agree with that, do you not? Do not be afraid to agree with what I say. When was that?

DOENITZ: Yesterday it was explained to me that there were four wireless messages, and I assumed that the person was summarizing the whole event, and that was probably his way of putting it. He was a chief petty officer and I do not know what he meant when he used the word "again."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say you had never heard of the Hitler and Oshima conversations which I put to you a few moments ago?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Therefore, one may assume, may one not, that Lieutenant Heisig, who gave evidence, had not


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heard of the Hitler and Oshima conversations either; do you not think he could not have heard about it?

DOENITZ: I assume it was out of the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you notice that Heisig said in his evidence that during a lecture he heard you put forward the same argument as Hitler put forward in his conversations with Oshima?

DOENITZ: First of all I want to state that Heisig here in this witness box said something different from what he said during his interrogation. During cross-examination he has admitted here that I have not said anything about fighting against shipwrecked personnel; secondly, everything else he said is so vague that I do not attach much value to its credibility; thirdly, he stated quite clearly that I did not say this in a lecture but during a discussion, which is in itself of no importance; and fourthly, it may well be that the subject of America's new construction program and the manning of the new ships by trained crews was discussed. It was possible during that discussion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now say you agree you never opened any discussion having reference to the American shipbuilding program and the difficulty of finding crews? Do you agree with Heisig on that?

DOENITZ: The German press was full of that. Everybody read and knew about the shipbuilding program. Pictures were made...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the argument I am suggesting to you, you know, was that the building program would be useless if you could destroy or frighten off sufficient merchant navy crews. That is the point in Himmler's conversation, and that Heisig said you said. Did you say that?

DOENITZ: I have always taken the view that losses of crews would make replacement difficult, and this is stated in my war diary together with similar ideas, and perhaps I said something of the kind to my midshipmen.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Page 37 of the Prosecution document book, Page 76 in the German translation? It is an order dated 7 October 1943 (Document Number D-663, Exhibit Number GB-200). I just want you to look at the last sentence: "In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, their sinking is of great value."

DOENITZ: I have read it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, their sinking is of great value," and it is continually pressing, the need for ships' crews.


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DOENITZ: Yes, of course, but in the course of fighting. It is perfectly clear that these rescue ships were heavily armed. They had aircraft and could be sunk just like other convoy ships. If there were steamer crews on hand it was naturally our desire to sink them since we were justified in sinking such crews. Moreover they were used as U-boat traps near the steamers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On the question of the rightness or wrongness of sinking rescue ships, the destruction of ships' crews, now, I want to ask you one or two questions about Mohle. He commanded the U-boat Flotilla from 1942 until the end of the war. That is nearly three years; and as he told us, he has a number of decorations ' for gallant service. Are you telling the Tribunal that Commander Mohle went on briefing submarine commanders on a completely mistaken basis for three years without any of your staff or yourself discovering this? You saw every U-boat commander when he came back.

DOENITZ: I am sorry that Korvettenkapitan Mohle, being the only one who said he had doubts in connection with this order, as he declared here, did not report this right away. I could not know that he had these doubts. He had every opportunity of clearing up these doubts and I did not know, and nobody on my staff had any idea, that he had these thoughts.

SIR DAVID MAXWEL-FYFE: Now, I have a letter here, a letter from a widow of one of your submarine commanders. I cannot get the commander and this is a letter from his widow. I want you to say what you think of a passage in it.

She says-in the second paragraph-"Captain Mohle says he has not found one U-boat commander who objected to the order to fire at helpless seamen who were in distress in the water."

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBt1HLER: I object to the use of this letter. I think this is the sort of letter which cannot be used as an exhibit. It is not sworn, and it is a typical example of the kind of letter which Mr. Justice Jackson has already repeatedly characterized.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The only point I make is this: The man himself has not come back. His widow can give information as to how he understood his orders before he went out. I should have submitted it with probative value. I think it occurs in Article 19. I will not use it if there is the slightest doubt about it before the Tribunal.

DOENITZ: It is full of incorrect statements, too. It says there that he, Prien, died in a concentration camp, which is not true.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait just a minute.


10 May 46

DOENITZ: It is not true.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOEHLER: Mr. President, I have only just finished reading the whole letter.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal is considering the matter at the moment.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: May I state one argument in this connection first?

THE PRESIDENT: Welt we have heard your argument and we are considering the matter.

The Tribunal thinks that it is undesirable and that this document should not be used.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As Your Lordship pleases.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now I want to deal just for one moment with a passage in your own document book which Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday. It is Volume 2, Page 92, Exhibit 42. Before I ask you a question about it, there is one point that I would like you to help me on. In your interrogation you said that on 22 October that about two months after that order of 17 September you issued orders forbidding U-boats to surface at all. Is that right? You gave orders forbidding U-boats to surface, is that right?

DOENITZ: So far as it is possible for a submarine not to do so at all. We were always making changes, day and night, and it depended upon the degree of danger and weather conditions whether we gave orders for the U-boats to surface and re-charge when on the move.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were not to surface after attacks, were not to surface at all before or after attacks; is that not the effect of your order?

DOENITZ: Of course submarines, for example at night, had to be on the surface for attacks, but the main thing was to avoid every risk when on the move.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then two months later there was an order that they were to surface as little as possible, and you tell me it was your order?

DOENITZ: As far as possible they were to try by all means to avoid danger from the air.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you give orders as to surfacing?

DOENITZ: I gave them quite a number of orders, as I have already said, according to the weather, according to what part of the sea they were in, and whether it was day or night. The orders were different according to these factors, because the danger depended


10 May 46

on these elements and varied accordingly. There were changes too; if we had bad experiences, if we found that night was more dangerous than day, then we surfaced during the day. We had the impression that in the end it was better to surface during the day, because then one could at least locate beforehand the aircraft attacking by direction-finding, so we changed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is a fact that quite soon after this order the Allied air cover became so heavy that-I quote your own words; you say, "Two months later submarines were no longer in a position to surface." That is, as I understood it, surfacing became very difficult in view of the heavy nature of Allied air attacks, is that right?

DOENITZ: Yes, they did not have a chance to come to the surface in certain waters without being attacked immediately. That is just the point. The submarines were however in readiness, in the highest degree of readiness-and that is the big difference, for in rescue work readiness is disrupted; yet these heavy losses and difficulties occurred at the height of readiness.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to look at Page 93. It is the page after the one I referred you to in Volume II of your document book; do you see Paragraph 1?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "The percentage of merchant vessels sunk out of convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent; in the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 percent; in the last quarter of 1942 to 57 percent; in January 1943, to about 65 percent; in February to about 70 percent; and in March to 80 percent."

Your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942, is that not so? That appears from your own figures.

DOENITZ: Which "worst period"? What do you mean? I do not understand.

SIR DAVID MAXW1;LL-FYFE: Well, it is Page 93, Paragraph 1.

DOENITZ: Yes, but how do you mean, "worst period"?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Well, the percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys in 1941 amounted to 40 percent.

DOENITZ: You mean merchant ships?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I am reading your own war diary, or rather the naval war staff War Diary. "In the entire year of 1942 to barely 30 percent..."

DOENITZ: From convoys?


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Convoys, yes. So that the worst period that you had was the first three quarters of 1942?

DOENITZ: No. In 1942, as I have already said in my description of the entire situation, a large number of submarines were just outside the ports, they were off New York, off Trinidad, et cetera, so that they are not mentioned here. In this list only the sinkings carried out by those packs which were attacking the convoys in the North Atlantic are mentioned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But is it not right that these figures mean that your worst period was the first three quarters of 1942? It must have been around 30 percent.

DOENITZ: No, my most successful period was the year 1942.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how can you call it the most successful period if for the entire year of 1942 your percentage of sunk merchant vessels in convoys is only 30 percent, whereas in January and February and March 1943, it got up to 65, 70, and 80 percent?

DOENITZ: Quite right, that is so. Of the merchant ships sunk in 1942, 30 percent were sunk in the Atlantic, but the total figure was much larger than, for instance, in 1943, when 65 and 70 percent were sunk; and that is simply because at that time in 1943 we could no longer remain outside a port like New York. This indicates percentages of sinkings in the Atlantic from convoys only.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see what I am putting to you is this, that in 1942, when your percentage from convoys was low, when you had had that pressure that I have gone into with you before, there was every reason for you to issue an unequivocal order which would have the effect of getting submarine commanders to destroy the crews of the ships. In 1943 your U-boats were not surfacing, your convoy proportions had gone up, and there was not any reason to make your order more explicit. That is what I am suggesting to you, Defendant.

D0NITZ: I consider that that is quite wrong.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want to...

DOENITZ: It was like this. As I already said, from the summer of 1942 onwards we found that the danger from the air suddenly increased. This danger from the air was making itself felt in all waters, also in those waters where submarines were not fighting convoys or were not fighting just outside the ports.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I just want you to help me on one other point. Dr. Kranzbuehler put to you yesterday that Kapitanleutnant Eck said that if he had come back he would not have expected you to have objected or been angry with him for


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shooting up the crew of the Peleus. You said you knew that Eck was carrying this order of yours in his locker when he did shoot up the crew of the Peleub?

DOENITZ: Yes, but I also know that this order did not have the slightest effect on his decision but that, as Eck has expressly said, his decision was to shoot up the wreckage; and he had quite a different aim, namely, to remove the wreckage because he was afraid for his boat which would have been smashed to pieces just like other boats in those wakes. He stated clearly that there was no connection whatsoever in his mind between the order with reference to the Laconia, which he had on board quite accidentally, and his decision.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you know there are two other cases before the Tribunal, the Noreen Mary and the Antonico, which are on Pages 47 and 52 of the Prosecution's document book, where witnesses give specific evidence of the U-boat carrying out attacks on them when they are in one case on wreckage and in the other case in the lifeboat. Will you look at the Noreen Mary on Page 47 of the document book? The testament of the survivor is on Pages 49 and 50. He deals with this point; he says in the fourth paragraph-Page 85 of the German book...

DOENITZ: I have the English document book.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 50 of the English one; I have got the English document:

"I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only about 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat."

The statement by the Brazilian gentleman you will find on Page 52. Have you got it?

DOENITZ: Yes, I have got it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Fifteen lines from the foot, he says, ". . . the enemy ruthlessly machine-gunned the defenseless sailors in Number 2 lifeboat..."

Assuming-of course one has to assume-that Mr. McAllister and Senhor de Oliveira Silva are speaking the truth, are you saying that these U-boat officers were acting on their own?

DOENITZ: It is possible that the men might have imagined these happenings. I want to point out, however, that in a night


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fight-let us take the case of the Antonico first-which lasted 20 minutes, it could very easily have been imagined that these were shots, or that shots directed against the ship hit a lifeboat. At any rate, if someone makes a report on a night attack lasting 20 minutes, then it is a subjective report and everyone who knows how these reports vary, knows how easily a seaman can make a mistake. If, during such a night fight, the U-boat had wanted to destroy these people, then it would not have left after 20 minutes, particularly as the person states that he could not see the submarine in the darkness. These are certainly all very vague statements.

The case of the Noreen Mary is quite similar. A large number of statements are made in this deposition which certainly are not true; for instance, that the submarine bore a swastika. Not a single submarine went to sea painted in any way. If someone is on some wreckage or in a lifeboat and there are shots nearby. then he very easily feels that he is being shot at. It was for this very reason that quite a number of cases of the Anglo-American side have been mentioned by us; not because we wanted to make an accusation, but because we wanted to show how very skeptical one has to be regarding these individual reports.

And the only cases in 5.5 years of war, during several thousand attacks, are the ones brought up here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, and of course for the 2.5 of these years that the submarine commanders have been shooting up survivors, you are not likely to get many cases, are you? I just want to ask you one other point...

DOENITZ: Submarine commanders with the exception of the case of Eck have never shot up shipwrecked persons. There is not a single instance. That is not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what you say.

DOENITZ: In no case is that proved. On the contrary, they made the utmost efforts to rescue. No order to proceed against shipwrecked people has ever been given the U-boat force, with the exception of the case of Eck, and for that there was a definite reason. That is a fact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, tell me this: Did you know that the log of the Athenia was faked, after she came in?

DOENITZ: No, it was not faked, but there was a clear order that the case of the Athenia should be kept secret for political reasons and, as a result, the log had to be changed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You do not like the word "faked." Well, I will use the word "changed"; that a page was


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cut out of the log and a false page had been put in. Did you know about that?

DONLTZ: I cannot tell you that today. It is possible. Probably Captain Lemp received the order either from me or my staff: "The case is to be kept secret." And following that, he or the flotilla took the log, which went to ten different departments of the Navy, and altered it. What else could he do? He could not do otherwise.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, was it your order and with your knowledge that that log was altered from, I suppose, the truth into the falsity in which it exists today? That is a simple question. Can you answer it?

DOENITZ: Yes. Either it was done by my order or, if it had not been done, then I would have ordered it, because the political instructions existed that "it must be kept secret." The fighting men had no other choice, therefore, but to alter the log. The U-boat commanders never received the order to make a false entry, but in the particular case of the Athenia, where it was ordered afterwards that it must be kept secret, it was not noted in the log.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I have only one other point to deal with you, and I can deal with it quite shortly. You were q firm adherent of ideological education for service personnel, were you not?

DOENITZ: Yes, I have explained my reasons.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Well, I just want to get thus, and then you can explain your reasons afterwards. You thought it nonsense that a soldier should have no politics, did you not? If you want to...

DOENITZ: Of course. The soldier had nothing to do with politics; but, on the other hand, he naturally had to stand by his country during the war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you wanted your come` menders to indoctrinate the Navy with Nazi ideology, did you not?

DOENITZ: I wanted the troops' commanders to tell them that the unity of the German people as it existed then was a source of strength for our conduct of the war and that consequently, since we enjoyed the advantages of this unity, we also should see to it that the unity should continue, because during the World War we had had very bad experiences precisely because of that. Any lack of unity among the people would have necessarily affected the conduct of the war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Look at Page 7 in the English document book (Document Number D-640, Exhibit Number GB-186).


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I think it puts it almost exactly as in my question. The last sentence:

"From the very start the whole of the officers' corps must be so indoctrinated that it feels itself coresponsible for the National Socialist State in its entirety. The officer is the exponent of the State. The idle chatter that the officer is nonpolitical is sheer nonsense."

That is your view, is it not?

SPRITZ: I said that. But you have also got to read from the beginning, where it says that our discipline and our fighting strength is miles above that of 1918 and the reason is because the people as a whole are behind us, and if that had not been the case then our troops would have become disintegrated long ago; that is the reason why I said that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell me, how many men were you attempting to apply this to, or how many men had you got in the Navy on the 15th of February 1944? I want to see what body you were trying to affect. How many? A quarter of a million?

DOENITZ: 600,000 or 700,000.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like you to turn to the next page, Page 8 in the British document book, which gives your speech on Heroes' Day, 12 March 1944. You say this:

"What would have become of our country today if the Fuehrer had not united Us under National Socialism? Split parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry, and vulnerable to it because we lacked the defense of our present uncompromising ideology, we would long since have succumbed under the burden of this war and delivered ourselves up to the enemy who would have mercilessly destroyed us." (Document Number 2878-PS)

What did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry"?

DOENITZ: I meant that we were living in a state of unity and that this unity represented strength and that all elements and all forces...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not what I asked. I am asking you, what did you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry"? It is your phrase, and you tell us whet you meant by it.

DOENITZ: I could imagine that it would be very difficult for the population in the towns to hold out under the stress of heavy bombing attacks if such an influence was allowed to work, that is what I meant..


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE; Well, now, can you tell me again; what do you mean by the "spreading poison of Jewry?"

DOENITZ: It means that it might have had a disintegrating effect on the people's power of endurance, and in this life-and-death struggle of our country I, as a soldier, was especially anxious about this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is what I want to know. You were the Supreme Commander and indoctrinated 600,000 or 700,000 men. Why were you conveying to them that Jews were a spreading poison in party politics? Why was that? What was it that you objected to in Jews that made you think that they had a bad effect on Germany?

DOENITZ: That statement was made during my memorial speech on Heroes' Day. It shows that I was of the opinion that the endurance, the power to endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved than if there were Jewish elements in the nation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This sort of talk, "spreading poison of Jewry," produced the attitude in the mind which caused the death of five or six million Jews in these last few years. Do you say that you knew nothing about the action and the intention to do away with and exterminate the Jews?

DOENITZ: Yes, of course I say that. I did not know anything at all about it and if such a statement was made, then that does not furnish evidence that I had any idea of any murders of Jews. That was in the year 1943.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, what I am putting to you is that you are joining in the hunt against this unfortunate section of your community and leading six or seven hundred thousand of the Navy on the same hunt.

Now, just look at Page 76 of the document book in this last reference to you...

DOENITZ: Nobody among my men thought of using violence against Jews, not one of them, and nobody can draw that conclusion from that sentence.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, just look at Page 76. This is where you are dealing with the promotion of under officers and men who have shown themselves to be personalities in warfare. You first of all say:

"I want the leaders of units responsible for ratings and the flotilla commanders and other commanders superior to them to interest themselves more in the promotion of those petty officers and men who have shown in special situations in the


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war that, thanks to their inner attitude and firmness, their energetic and inner drive, in short, owing to their personal qualities, they are capable of taking the right decisions independently and of carrying them out without wavering in their aim and with willing acceptance of responsibility. "One example: On the auxiliary cruiser Cormoran, which was used as a place of detention in Australia, a warrant officer, acting as senior camp officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camps systematically and unobtrusively done away with. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and its execution; and after his return I shall do everything I can to promote him, as he has shown he is fitted to be a leader." Was that your idea of leadership in this National Socialist indoctrinated Navy; that he should murder political opponents in a way that would not be found out by the guards?

DOENITZ: No, it was not so. It has been reported to me that there was an informer there who, when new crews were brought in, was smuggled into the camp and, after listening around, passed information on to the enemy. The result was that on the strength of that information U-boats were lost. And it was then that the senior man in the camp, a petty officer, decided to remove that man as a traitor. That is what was reported to me and what I shall prove by a witness. In my opinion, and every nation will recognize that, the man acted like anyone else who finds himself in an extremely difficult situation and he had to...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you not say that, Defendant? If you had stated that this man had killed a spy, who by the spreading of information was dangerous, I would not have put this to you. But what you say is that it was communists who made themselves noticeable, and this man had killed them without knowledge of the guard. Why do you put communists in your order if you mean a spy?

DOENITZ: I think this is an order from a Baltic station. I had been told that it concerned a spy, and it is something that a witness will prove. If there were reasons-perhaps intelligence reasons- for not divulging that...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you putting the responsibility for this order on one of your junior officers? Are you saying it was one of your junior officers who put the order out like this? It was not what you meant at all? Is that what you are saying?

DOENITZ: I have merely said how the order came about; up to now, I have not once shirked the responsibility.


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THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?

COLONEL POKROVSKY: My Lord, the Soviet Prosecution has several questions to ask the Defendant DOENITZ.

[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant DOENITZ, your address to the German people and your order to the Armed Forces in connection with Hitler's death were drafted by you on 30 April 1945, is that not so?


COL. POKROVSKY: In these documents you informed the people that Hitler's successor, appointed by Hitler himself, was you. That is correct, is it not?


COL. POKROVSKY: Did you ask yourself then for what particular reason Hitler selected you?

DOENITZ: Yes, I put that question to myself when I received that telegram, and came to the conclusion that after the Reich Marshal had been removed, I was the senior officer of an independent branch of the Armed Forces, and that that was the reason.

COL. POKROVSKY: In your address to the Army and to the people, you demanded the continuation of military operations, and all those who were opposed to resistance were called traitors and cowards, is that not so?


COL. POKROVSKY: A few days afterwards, you gave an order to Keitel to capitulate unconditionally, is that not right?

DOENITZ: Yes. I said quite clearly in the first order that I would fight in the East until troops and refugees could be rescued from the East and brought to the West and that I would not fight one moment longer. That was my intention, and that is also clearly expressed in that order.

COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, there was not a word about it in this order, but that is not so important. Do you agree that on 30 April...


COL. POKROVSKY: First listen to my question and then answer. Do you agree with the fact that on 30 April also, right on the


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day when you published the two documents that we are talking about now, it was absolutely clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely aimless and useless?

Do you understand my question? Do you agree with that?

DOENITZ: Yes, I understood the question. May I say the following: I had to continue fighting in the East in order to rescue the refugees who were moving to the West. That is certainly very clearly stated. I said that we would continue to fight in the East only until the hundreds and thousands of families from the German eastern area could be safely transferred to the West.

COL. POKROVSKY: Still you did not answer my question, DOENITZ, did you, even though it was very clearly put. I repeat it once again so that you can manage to understand it. Do you agree with the fact that already on 30 April it was fully clear that further resistance of Hitlerite Germany was absolutely aimless and useless? Answer me "yes" or "no."

DOENITZ: No, that was not clear. From the military point of view

the war was absolutely lost, and there was then only the problem of saving as many human beings as possible, and therefore we had to continue resistance in the East. Therefore that resistance in the East had a purpose.

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I understand you, but will you deny that your order, which called for a continuation of the war, led to further bloodshed?

DOENITZ: That is extremely small, compared to the one or two millions which otherwise would have been lost.

COL. POKROVSKY: One moment, please; will you wait. Do not try and make any comparisons. First answer and then explain. That is the order that we have to follow here all the time. First "yes,' or "no," and then an explanation, please.

DOENITZ: Of course, in the fighting in the East during those few days there might be further losses, but they were necessary in order to save hundreds of thousands of refugees.

COL.POKROVSKY: You did not answer my question. I shall repeat it for the third time.

THE PRESIDENT: He did answer; he said "yes," that bloodshed would be caused. That is an answer to your question.

COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.

[Turning to the defendant.] I would like you to explain exactly

the question of whether you look upon yourself, first and foremost, as a politician, or do you look upon yourself as a soldier who obeyed

direct orders of his own superiors without any analysis of the political meaning and content of such orders?


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DOENITZ: I do not understand that question completely. As head of State, from 1 May on, I was a political man.

COL. POKROVSKY: And before that time?

DOENITZ: Purely a soldier.

COL. POKROVSKY: On 8 May 1946, at 1635 hours, in this room you mentioned, "As a soldier I did not have in mind such political considerations as might have been in existence." On 10 May, at 1235 hours, here, you said, when the question of submarine warfare was taken up, "All this concerns political aims; but I, as a soldier, was concerned with military problems." Is that not so?

DOENITZ: Yes, it is quite correct. I said that before 1 May 1945 I was purely a soldier. As soon as I became the head of State I relinquished the High Command of the Navy because I became the head of State and therefore a political personality.

COL. POKROVSKY: Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, about 15 minutes ago, addressed you also and referred to two documents, and in particular to Document GB-186, D-640; and he cited one sentence from this, one sentence which grossly contradicts what you said just now. You remember this sentence "idle chatter"?

DOENITZ: Yes, I know exactly what you mean.

COL. POKROVSKY: I want to ask you: How can you reconcile these two extremely contradictory statements, the statement about "idle chatter," about the fact that the officer is not a politician. This statement took place on 15 February 1944, at the time when you were not the supreme head of the State. Is that not so?

DOENITZ: If a soldier during the war stands firmly behind his nation and his government, that does not make him a politician; that is said in that sentence and that was meant by that sentence.

COL.POKROVSKY: All right. We will be more exact about whether this is really the fact. Several times, in a very definite manner, you testified here before the Tribunal that for many years before the war and during the war you were indoctrinating the Navy in the spirit of pure idealism and firm respect for the customs and laws of war. Is that so?

DOENITZ: Right; yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: In particular, on 9 May, yesterday, at 1254 hours, you said, "I educated the submarine fleet in the pure idealism and I continued such education during the war. It was necessary for me in order to achieve high fighting morale." Five minutes later on the same day, you said, when speaking about the Navy, "I never would have tolerated that orders were given to these people which would be contradictory to such morale, and it is out of the question


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that I myself could have given such an order." You acknowledge that those were your words, or approximately your words, allowing for the possible inexactness of translation; is that not so?

DOENITZ: Of course, that is what I said.

COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to take a look at the document which is in your possession now, the document presented by your defense counsel as DOENITZ-91. In this document your defense counsel presents an excerpt from the testimony, the affidavit made by Dr. Joachim Rudolphi. In order not to waste the Tribunal's time, I would like you to tell us briefly in one word, "yes" or "no," whether Rudolphi is correct in his testimony; that you always strongly opposed the introduction into the German Armed Forces of the Hitlerite so-called "People's Courts." Did you understand me?

DOENITZ: I was against handing over legal cases from the Navy to other courts. I said that, if one bears the responsibility for a branch of the Armed Forces, one also must have court-martial jurisdiction. That is what it says.

COL. POKROVSKY: And you are familiar with Rudolphi's affidavit?

DOENITZ: Yes, I know it.

COL. POKROVSKY: You remember that on the first page of that excerpt presented to the Tribunal it says:

"Early in the summer of 1943, the first threatening attempt to undermine the nonpolitical jurisdiction of the Armed Forces was made."

Is Rudolphi correct in explaining this question and is it true that you were against this attempt to introduce special political courts into the Navy and Armed Forces? Is that correct?

DOENITZ: According to my recollection, my resistance began in the summer 1943. It may be that already in the spring the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht was threatened. That may be, but I did not learn of it.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you acknowledge, DOENITZ, or not, that these so-called "People's Courts" were to deal, as Rudolphi puts it, with anything that smacked, even remotely, of politics? That is his sentence which you can find on the first page of Document D-91.

DOENITZ: As I have already stated, my point of view was the following: I wanted to keep my soldiers under my own jurisdiction. I could not judge proceedings outside the Navy, because I did not know the legal procedure. My point was that my soldiers should remain with me and be sentenced by me.

COL. POKROVSKY: For all kinds of crimes, including political crimes, is that not so? Did I understand you correctly?


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DOENITZ: Yes, I meant that; I have stated that I was of the opinion that they should remain under Navy jurisdiction.

COL. POKROVSKY: Will you deny, DOENITZ, that you were always preaching and always encouraging in every way the murder of defenseless people from among the members of the German Armed Forces for purely political reasons and that you always looked upon such murders as acts of military valor and heroism?

DOENITZ: I do not understand you. I do not know what you mean.

COL. POKROVSKY: You did not understand my question?

DOENITZ: No, I have not understood the meaning of your question at ale

COL. POKROVSKY: I can repeat it. Perhaps it win be clearer to you. I am asking you: Will you deny the fact that you preached in favor of the murder of members of the German Armed Forces, by other members of the German Armed Forces and purely for political reasons? Now, is the question clear to you?

DOENITZ: How do you come to ask this question?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not find your question quite clear.

COL. POKROVSKY: What I have in mind, My Lord, is the Order Number 19 for the Baltic Fleet, which in part was dealt with by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. There is one point of this order which elucidates, with absolute precision, the motives for publishing and promulgating this order. One idea is expressed there in a very clear manner-and with your permission I shall read one paragraph from this document. "One example"-it says in Order Number 19, last paragraph but one-"On the auxiliary cruiser Cormoran, which was used as a place of detention in Australia a warrant officer. . ."

THE PRESIDENT: Which paragraph?

COL.POKROVSKY: The last paragraph but one of Document D-650, Page 4 of the English text. I beg your pardon, Page 4 of the German text, and the last paragraph on the third page of the English copy.

THE PRESIDENT: It was read already in cross-examination.

COL.POKROVSKY: This particular part was not read in the cross-examination, and it is really very important for the case.

THE PRESIDENT: We have just heard this very question, this very example, read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, not half an hour ago.

COL. POKROVSKY: But Sir David, in reading this example, did not read one particular sentence which is of great importance to me and which clarifies Dorfitz' position; and that is the reason why I


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permitted myself to come back to this particular passage. It is only one sentence which interests me.

THE PRESIDENT: What sentence are you referring to?

COL. POKROVSKY: The first sentence in the second paragraph from the end. It is the paragraph which begins, "One example: In a prisoner-of-war camp..."

THE PRESIDENT: You are entirely wrong. He read the whole of the paragraph. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe read the whole of the paragraph.

COL.POKROVSKY: When, with your permission, I shall read these few words, then you will convince yourself, Sir, that these particular words were not read.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have a note in my notebook made at the time, which shows that the whole of this was read; that the defendant was cross-examined about the meaning of the word "communist"; and that he explained it by saying that he was referring to a spy among the crew who might give away submarine secrets. The whole matter was gone into fully by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, and the Tribunal does not wish to hear any more about it.

COL.POKROVSKY: It is absolutely necessary for me to read two expressions from this sentence which were not read into the record here, and I ask your permission to read these two words.

THE PRESIDENT: Which two words do you say were not read? State the two words.

COL.POKROVSKY: "Systematically" and "unobtrusively," that is, according to plan. They are not talking about one particular instance, but they are talking about the whole definite plan, about the system.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that was all read, Colonel Pokrovsky. You must have missed it.

COL. POKROVSKY: I am not saying that Sir David has omitted that.

THE PRESIDENT: That was read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and put to the witness, to the defendant.

COL.POKROVSKY: Perhaps Sir David may have accidentally omitted this, but it is really very important for me, because DOENITZ testified here to the killing of only one spy; but what is really meant here is that there was a plan to exterminate all communists, or rather men who were supposed to be communists, according to the idea Of some petty officer.

THE PRESIDENT: It is exactly what Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put to the witness. He said, "How can you say that this refers to a


10 May 46

case of spies or one spy, when it is referring to all communists"? It is exactly the question he put to him.

COL.POKROVSKY: Perhaps I did not understand quite correctly what our interpreter translated, but in our translation this was not mentioned.

Then with your permission I will go to the next question.

[Turning to the defendant.] Will you deny, DOENITZ, that in this order, as the one example of high military valor-that military valor which serves as the basis or the reason for extraordinary promotion of noncommissioned officers and officers-you used, as one example, the treacherous and systematic murder of people for political reasons? Do you deny that this order was correctly understood?

DOENITZ: No, that is quite wrong. This order refers to one incident in a prisoner-of-war camp, and it should be considered in what serious dilemma the senior member of the camp found himself and that he acted in a responsible and correct manner by removing in the interests of our warfare as a traitor that communist who was at the same time a spy. It would have been easier for him if he had just let things take their course, which would have harmed the U-boats and caused losses. He knew that after his return home he would have to account for it. That is the reason why I gave this order.

COL.POKROVSKY: Perhaps you will agree that the incidents, as you explain them now, are absolutely different from what is written in your order.

THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that the Tribunal does not wish to hear further cross-examination upon this subject. You are now continuing to do that, and I must draw your attention again clearly to the ruling of the Tribunal that the Tribunal will not hear further cross-examination upon this subject.

COL.POKROVSKY: In the light of this document, I ask you how do you explain your statements about your alleged objections in principle to special political courts being introduced into the Navy, that is, the considerations in principle which were testified to by Dr. Rudolphi? How do you explain this contradiction?

DOENITZ: I did not understand what you said.

COL.POKROVSKY:You say here that the document does not deal with political acts, whereas the order is formulated very precisely and Dr. Rudolphi testified to the fact that you were against introducing political courts into the Army and the Navy. Obviously there is a contradiction in terms here, and I would like to have this contradiction explained.


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DOENITZ: I do not see any contradiction, because Dr. Rudolphi says that I was against handing over legal cases to courts outside of the Navy and because the case of the Cormoran deals with an action by the senior camp member, far away in a prisoner-of-war camp in a foreign land. He decided on this action only after grave deliberation, knowing that at home he would have to answer for it before a military court. He did this because he considered it necessary, in the interests of the conduct of the war, to stop the loss of submarines by treason. Those are two entirely different things. Here we deal with an individual case in the Cormoran camp.

COL.POKROVSKY: What you are testifying to now is a repetition of what you said before; and, as you heard, the Tribunal does not want to listen to it any more. This is really not an answer to my question.

DOENITZ: Yes. In answering your question I cannot say anything but the truth, and this is what I have done.

COL. POKROVSKY: Of course our ideas of truth may be altogether different. I, for instance, look upon this question in an altogether different manner. This fact . . .

DOENITZ: Will you excuse me. I am under oath here, and you do not want to accuse me of telling an untruth, do you?

COL. POKROVSKY: We are not talking about false testimony, but we are talking about a different approach to the idea of truth. I, for instance, consider that by this order you revealed yourself as a real...

DOENITZ: No, I cannot agree with that.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly put the question if you want to put a question?

COL. POKROVSKY: I want to ask him one question, My Lord, and I must explain to him why I am asking this question.

[Turning to the defendant.] I consider this order a revelation of your loyalty, your fanatical loyalty, to fascism; and in this connection I want to ask you whether you consider that it was because of the fact that you showed yourself to be a fanatical follower of fascism and fascist ideas that Hitler chose you to be his successor- because you were known to Hitler as a fanatical follower who was capable of inciting the Army to any crime in the spirit of the Hitlerite conspirators and that you would still call these crimes pure idealism. Do you understand my question?

DOENITZ: Well, I can only answer to that that I do not know. I have already explained to you that the legitimate successor would have been the Reich Marshal; but through a regrettable misunderstanding a few days before his appointment, he was no longer in the


10 May 46

game, and I was the next senior officer in command of an independent branch of the Wehrmacht. I believe that was the determining factor. That fact that the Fuehrer had confidence in me may also have had something to do with it.

COL.POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, My Lord, has no more questions to ask of this defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, do you want to re-examine?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to put a few more questions, Mr. President.

[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, during the cross-examination by Sir David you were asked about your knowledge of conditions in concentration camps; and you wanted to make an additional statement, which you could not do at the time. What personal connections did you have with any inmates of concentration camps, or did you have any connections at all?

DOENITZ: I had no connections with anybody who had been sent to a concentration camp; with the exception of Pastor Niemoller. Pastor Niemoller was a former comrade of mine from the Navy. When my last son was killed, he expressed his sympathy; and on that occasion I asked him how he was.


DOENITZ: That was in the summer of 1944, and I received the answer that he was all right.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Did you write him directly, or how did it happen?

DOENITZ: No. I received this information through a third person.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Was that the only message you received from a concentration camp?

DOENITZ: The only one I received.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In the cross-examination a report by Captain Assmann was presented about a conference with the Fuehrer in May 1043. You remember its contents. You are alleged to have said that in view of the present naval war situation, it was desirable that Germany should get possession of Spain and Gibraltar. Did you make a positive suggestion in that direction? One cannot see that from the document.

DOENITZ: Of course, when I discussed the situation, I mentioned the danger of the narrow strip along the Bay of Biscay; and I said that it would be more favorable to us if we could start our U-boats from a wider area. At that time nobody even contemplated a move against Spain, either with the consent of Spain or in the form of an attack. It was quite obvious that our forces were in no way sufficient


10 May 46

for that. On the other hand, it is quite understandable that, in showing my concern about that narrow strip, I should say that it would have been better if the area had been larger. That is what I meant by that statement. I was referring to U-boat warfare and not to any move against Spain on land. It certainly would have been impossible for me as a naval officer to make a suggestion to attack Spain.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In connection with the sinking of the Athenia it has been hinted that your statement was considered an excuse; that is, that the commanding officer of the submarine confused the Athenia with an auxiliary cruiser. Therefore, I should like to put to you an excerpt from the war diary of the officer commanding in that action and I want you to confirm that it is really by the same commanding officer. I shall read from the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-222, on Page 142 of my document book, Volume III. It is the war diary of the submarine U-30. The excerpt is dated 11 September 1939, Page 142 in document book, Volume III.

"Sighted a blacked-out vessel. Got on its trail. In zigzag course recognized as merchant ship. Requested to stop by morse lantern. Steamer signals 'not understood,' tries to escape in the thick squall and sends out SOS 'chased by submarine' and position by radiotelegraphy.

"Gave 'stop' signal by radio and morse lantern.

"Ran ahead. First 5 shots with machine gem C/30 across the bow. Steamer does not react. Turns partly, about 90°, directly toward the boat. Sends 'still chased.' Therefore, fire opened from aft bearing with 8.8 cm. English steamer Blairlogie, 4,425 tons.

"After 18 shots and three hits, steamer stops. Crew boards boats. Last message by radio, 'Shelled, taking to boats.' Fire immediately ceased when emergency light was shown and steamer stopped.

"Went over to life boats, gave orders to pull away toward south. Steamer sunk by torpedo. Afterwards both boat crews supplied with Steinhager and cigarettes. 32 men in two boats. Fired red stars until dawn. Since American steamer, American Skipper, was nearby, we departed. Crew was rescued."

Can you confirm, Admiral, that this was an entry by the same commanding officer who nine days before had torpedoed the Athenia?

DOENITZ: Yes, that is the same commander of the same operation who shortly before had committed this error.


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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: In the cross-examination it was once more maintained, and very definitely, that you had sent an order to destroy to the commanders. I should like to put to you a letter which is signed by various U-boat commanders. You know the letter and know the signatures, and I should like to ask you to tell me whether the U-boat commanders who signed were taken prisoner before September 1942, that is, before your alleged orders to destroy, or whether they were captured afterwards.

I am reading from the document book, Volume II, Page 99, DOENITZ-53, which I submit to the Tribunal. It is addressed to the camp commander of the prisoner-of-war camp, Camp 18, in the Featherstone Park camp in England. I received it through the British War Ministry and the General Secretary of the Court. I read finder the date of 18 January 1946, and the text is as follows:

"The undersigned commanders, who are now here in this camp and whose U-boats were active on the front, wish to make the following statement before you, Sir, and to express the request that this statement should be forwarded to the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg.

"From the press and radio we learn that Grossadmiral DOENITZ is charged with having issued the order to destroy survivors from the crews of torpedoed ships and not to take any prisoners. The undersigned state under oath that neither in writing nor orally was such an order ever given by Grossadmiral DOENITZ. There was an order that for reasons of security of the boat, because of increased danger through defense measures of all kinds, we were not to surface after torpedoing. The reason for that was that experience had shown that if the boat surfaced for a rescue action, as was done in the first years of the war, we had to expect our own destruction. This order could not be misunderstood. It has never been regarded as an order to annihilate shipwrecked crews.

"The undersigned declare that the German Navy has always been trained by its leaders to respect the written and unwritten laws and rules of the sea. We have always regarded it as our honor to obey these laws and to fight chivalrously while at sea."

Then come the signatures of 67 German submarine commanders who are at present prisoners of war in British hands.

I ask you, Admiral-you know these signatures-were these commanders captured before September 1942 or after September 1942?

DOENITZ: Most of them beyond doubt were made prisoner after September 1942. In order to examine that exactly from both sides,


10 May 46

I should like to see the list again. But most of them beyond doubt were captured after September 1942.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That is enough. I have no further questions.

DR.LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to clarify only one point which came up during the cross-examination.

Admiral, during the cross-examination you have stated that you were present at the situation conferences on 19 and 20 February 1945, and you said. . .

DOENITZ: No, that this date...

DR. LATERNSER: I made a note of it and you will recognize the conference at once. During the situation conference of 19 February, Hitler is alleged to have made the suggestion to leave the Geneva Convention. I ask you now to tell me: Which high military leaders were present during that situation conference?

DOENITZ: I believe there is a mistake here. I did not hear this question or suggestion of the Fuehrer from his own lips, but I was told about it by a naval officer who regularly took part in these situation conferences. Therefore I do not know for certain whether the date is correct, and I also do not know who was present when the Fuehrer first made that statement. In any case, I remember the matter was again discussed the next day or two days later; and then I believe the Reich Marshal, and of course Jodl and Field Marshal Keitel, were present. At any rate, the whole of the Wehrmacht were unanimously against it; and to my recollection, the Fuehrer, because he saw our objection, did not come back to this question again.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.

[The defendant left the stand.]

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, after the experience of the cross-examination of today, I consider it proper to submit my documents to the Tribunal now, if it pleases the Tribunal, before I call further witnesses. I believe that I can thereby shorten the questioning of the witness and that it will be more easily understood.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Kranzbuehler.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBOHLER: May I first remind the Tribunal that the Prosecution Exhibits GB-224 and GB-191 contain the same general accusations against U-boat warfare as are referred to in many of my following documents. The documents dealing with these general accusations are in Document Books 3 and 4.


10 May 46

First, I submit Document D5nitz-54 which contains the German declaration of adherence to the London Submarine Protocol. I do not need to read it because it has already been mentioned repeatedly.

Then, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the German Prize Ordinance, an excerpt of which can be found on Page 137. I should like to point out that Article 74 agrees word for word with the regulations of the London Protocol.

May I point out at the same time that, as shown on Page 138, this Prize Ordinance was not signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. That is a contribution to the question as to whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was a member of the Reich Government. He had no authority to sign this ordinance.

The next document which I submit is D6nitz-55. That is the order of 3 September 1939, with which the U-boats entered the war. I do not know whether these documents are so well known to the Tribunal that I need merely sum them up or whether it is better to read parts of them.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you might mention them together, really, specifying shortly what they relate to.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. The order of 3 September directs the boats to pay strict attention to all the rules of naval warfare. It orders the war to be conducted according to the Prize Ordinance. Furthermore, it provides for a preparatory order for the intensification of economic warfare, because of the arming of enemy merchant ships. This order is on Page 140. Since I shall refer to that later when examining a witness, I need not read it now.

I should like to read to the Tribunal from an English document, to show that the boats were really acting according to these orders. It is Exhibit Number GB-l91. It is in the original on Page 5, Mr. President. That sentence is not in the English excerpt, and that is why I will read it in English from the original:

"Thus the Germans started with the Ordinance which was, at any rate, a clear, reasonable, and not inhuman document.

"German submarine commanders, with some exceptions, behaved in accordance with its provisions during the first months of the war. Indeed, in one case, a submarine had ordered the crew of a trawler to take to their boat as the ship was to be sunk. But when the commander saw the state of the boat, he said: 'Thirteen men in that boat! You English are no good, sending a ship to sea with a boat like that.' And the skipper was told to re-embark his crew on the trawler and make for home at full speed, with a bottle of German gin and the submarine commander's compliments."


10 May 46

That is an English opinion taken out of a document of the Prosecution.

My next document is Doenitz-56, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 9 September 1939, on Page 141.

"English information office disseminates the news through Reuters that Germany has opened total U-boat warfare."

Then, as Doenitz-57, on Page 143, I should like to submit to the Tribunal an account of the experiences which the Naval Operations Staff had in U-boat warfare up to that date. It is an entry of 21 September 1939 in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read under Figure 2:

"The commanders of U-boats which have returned report the

following valuable experiences:

". .. (b) English, partly also neutral steamers, sharp zigzags, partly blacked-out. English steamers, when stopped, immediately radio SOS with exact position. Thereupon English planes come in to fight U-boats.

"(c) English steamers have repeatedly tried to escape. Some

steamers are armed, one steamer returned fire.

"(d) Up to now no cases of abuse by neutral steamers."

The document on Page 144 of the document book is already in evidence. It is an excerpt from Exhibit GB-222, war diary of the U-boat U-30, of 14 September. I will only read a few sentences from the beginning:

"Smoke clouds. Steamer on sharp zigzag course. Easterly course. Ran towards her. When recognized, turns to countercourse and signals SOS.

"English steamer Fanad Head, 5200 tons, bound for Belfast.

"Pursued at full speed. Since steamer does not react to order to stop, one shot fired across her bows from a distance of 2,000 meters. Steamer stops. Crew takes to the boats. Boats pulled out of the danger zone."

I summarize the following: It shows how the U-boat, as a result of the wireless message from the steamer, was attacked by airplanes, what difficulties it had in getting the prize crew on board again, and how, in spite of the bombing attacks of the planes, it did not sink the steamer until two English officers who were still on deck had jumped overboard and had been rescued by the U-boat. The depth charge pursuit lasted for ten hours.

The next document, Doenitz-58, shows that merchant ships acted aggressively against U-boats; and that also is an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. I read the entry of 24 September:


10 May 46

"Commander, Submarine Fleet, reports that on 6 September the English steamer Manaar, on being told to stop by U-38 after a warning shot, tried to escape. Steamer sent wireless message and opened fire from rear gun. Abandoned ship only after four or five hits, then sank it."

Then, another message of 22 September:

"English reports that, when the English steamer Akenside was sunk, a German U-boat was rammed by a steam trawler."

From the document of the Prosecution, Exhibit GB-193, which is copied on Page 147, I should only like to point out the opinion from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff as to radio messages. I read from Figure 2, two sentences, beginning with the second:

"In almost every instance English steamers, on sighting U-boats, have sent out wireless SOS messages and given their positions. Following these SOS messages from the ship, after a certain time English airplanes always appeared which makes it clear that with the English it is a matter of a military measure and organized procedure. The SOS call together with the giving of the position may therefore be considered as the giving of military information, even as resistance."

The next document, Doenitz-59, shows the approval of the entry submitted by the Commander of the Submarine Fleet that ships which used their wireless when stopped should be sunk. I read the entry of 24 November 1939. It is quite at the bottom, Figure 4:

"On the basis of the Fuehrer's approval, the following order is given to Groups and Commander, Submarine Fleet:

"4) Armed force should be employed against all merchant vessels using wireless when ordered to stop. They are subject to seizure or sinking without exception. Efforts should be made to rescue the crew."

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 11 May 1946, at 1000 hours.]


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