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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I continue to submit documents concerning naval warfare. My next document is printed on Page 149 of Document Book Number 3. It is a declaration of 26 September 1939 by the British First Lord of the Admiralty concerning the arming of the British merchant fleet. In this declaration he announces that within a 'short time the entire British merchant fleet will be armed. Then he speaks about the training of the crews, and in conclusion he thanks his predecessors for the care with which they prepared that work before the beginning of the war.
I submit Document Doenitz-60. Doenitz-60 is a large collection of documents concerning laws of naval warfare. It contains altogether 550 documents. In accordance with the request of the President, I have given special numbers to the later documents.
I come now to some documents which deal with the treatment of ships which acted suspiciously and were for that reason attacked by U-boats. The first document of this series is Doenitz-61, Page 150. It is a warning to neutral shipping against suspicious tactics. That warning was sent in a note to all neutral missions. At the end it points out that ships should avoid being mistaken for enemy warships or auxiliary cruisers, especially during the night. There is a warning against all suspicious tactics, for instance, changing course, use of wireless on sighting German naval forces, zigzagging, blacking-out, not stopping upon demand, and the acceptance of enemy escort.
That warning is repeated in Document Doenitz-62, which is on Page 153, a renewed note of 19 October 1939 to the neutral governments. Document 63 is an example of how a neutral government, namely the Danish Government, in accordance with the German notes, warned its merchant shipping against suspicious conduct. It is found on Page 154. I should like to remind you again that the first warning was given on 28 September.
My next Document, Doenitz-64, shows that on 2 October the order was issued to the submarines to attack blacked-out vessels in certain operational areas close to the British coast. That order is particularly significant in view of the cross-examination of yesterday
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where the question was put as to whether an order of that kind had been issued at all, or whether that subject was transmitted to the commanders orally with instructions to falsify their logs. I read the order of 2 October 1939 on Page 155.
"Order by the SKL (Naval Operations Staff) to the Front:
"Inasmuch as it must be assumed that blacked-out vessels encountered on the English and French coasts are warships or auxiliary warships, full armed action is authorized against blacked-out vessels in the following waters."
An area around the British coast follows. The excerpt under it is taken from the War Diary of Commander of Submarines of the same date and shows the transmission of this order to the submarines.
The readiness of British merchant shipping to commit aggression against German submarines is motivated or furthered by the next document which I am going to show. It is numbered Doenitz-101 and is on Page 156. The old number was Doenitz-60, Mr. President. It is an announcement by the British Admiralty, which I will read:
"The British Admiralty circulated the following warning to
the British merchant marine on 1 October:
"Within the last few days some German U-boats have been attacked by British merchant marine vessels. In this connection the German radio announces that the German U-boats have so far observed the rules of international law in warning the merchant marine vessels before attacking them.
"Now, however, Germany intends to retaliate by considering every British merchant marine vessel as a warship. While the first-mentioned fact is absolutely untrue, it may indicate an immediate change in the policy of German submarine warfare. "Be prepared to meet it. Admiralty."
On Page 157 there is a second report of the same date. "The British Admiralty announces that German submarines are pursuing a new strategy. English boats are called upon to ram every German submarine."
The next document, Doenitz-65, contains orders issued as a result of the armament of, and armed resistance by, merchant vessels. I read the order of 4 October 1939, which was issued by the SKL to the Front.
"Immediate attack in any manner available is permitted submarines against enemy merchant vessels which are obviously armed or have been proclaimed as such on the basis of conclusive evidence received by the Naval Operations Staff. As far as circumstances permit, measures are to be taken to save the crew after every possibility of danger for the submarine
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has been eliminated. Passenger ships not used to transport troops are still not to be attacked, even if armed."
The excerpt below shows the transmission of the order to the submarines. The experiences gained in the war up to that period are summarized in a document on Page 159, which is an excerpt from the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-196, "Standing War Order 171," by Commander of Submarines. I should only like to read from Paragraph 4, the first sentence:
"Tactics of Enemy Merchant Vessels. The following instructions have been issued for British shipping . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this document?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The document was issued
before May 1940. I shall have to call on a witness to give the correct date, Mr. President; I assume it was in October 1939:
"The British Merchant Navy has received the following instructions:
"(a) To fight every German submarine with all the means at hand, to ram it or attack it with depth charges, if equipped to do so."
Further details follow.
Experiences drawn from the entire operations of the British
Merchant Service are summarized in the next document in an order. It has been numbered Doenitz-66, and is on Page 161. I shall read the order, which is dated 17 October 1939:
"At 1500 hours the following order was issued to Commander
"Submarines are permitted immediate and full use of armed force against all merchant vessels recognizable with certainty as being of enemy nationality, as in every case attempts to ram or other forms of active resistance may be expected. Exceptions to be made as hitherto in the case of enemy passenger boats."
On Page 162 I have reproduced another part of Document Doenitz-62, which has been submitted already. It is a note to the neutral countries dated 22 October 1939, defining conduct on the part of ships which is, according to German opinion, incompatible with the peaceful character of a merchant ship. I read from the long paragraph, the second sentence:
"According to previous experiences such tactics may be expected with certainty from English and French boats, particularly when sailing in convoys: inadmissible use of wireless, sailing without lights, and in addition armed resistance and aggressive action."
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In the next, the German Government warns neutral nations against the use of enemy ships for this reason. The German orders were issued in consequence of the experiences gained by our U-boats.
I have already submitted the next document, Doenitz-67, on Page 163 et sequentes and I only wish to explain on the basis of a report made by the British Admiralty, which is on Page 163, that the orders for merchant shipping were published in the Handbook for the Defense of Merchant Ships of January 1938-they were issued before the war.
Now I come to several documents dealing with the treatment of passenger ships. They have an important bearing on the Athenia case, since the Athenia was a passenger ship.
Document Doenitz-68 presents some evidence on the treatment of passenger ships. First comes an order issued on 4 September 1939, which I should like to read:
"On the Fuehrer's orders, no hostile action is to be taken
against passenger ships for the time being, even when in
The next excerpt from the same page contains reports on the use of passenger ships as troop transports.
I will now read an excerpt from the Directives for the Conduct of the War against Merchant Shipping, from October to the middle of November 1939, Page 3. As the fullest possible use was made of enemy passenger boats for the transport of troops, it was no longer possible to justify their being spared, at least when they were sailing in convoy. The following order was issued on 29 October: I will read the order, which is dated 29 October. It is at the bottom of the page:
"Passenger liners in enemy convoys may be subjected to immediate unrestricted armed attack by U-boats."
The next document, Doenitz-69, on Page 170, is to show that in November and December the German press issued a warning against the use of armed passenger ships by publishing lists of these ships.
The next document is Doenitz-70, on Page 171. It is an order issued on 7 November 1939 by the SKL to Commander of U-boats. I read the order:
"U-boats are permitted to attack immediately with all weapons
at their command all passenger ships which can be identified
with certainty as enemy ships and whose armament is detected or is already known."
That was about 6 weeks after permission to attack other armed ships had been given.
Doenitz-71 shows that the U-boats were also not permitted to attack blacked-out passenger ships until as late as 23 February 1940,
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5 months-no, 4 months-after they were given permission to attack other ships.
Now I come to the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-224, which is reproduced on Pages 199 to 203 in Volume 4 of my document book. I should like to emphasize again that the object of this document was to incriminate Admiral Raeder in particular; and that it was described by the Prosecution as a cynical denial of international law. I should like to point out, to begin with, that according to the tine it concerns deliberations by the Naval Operations Staff on the possibilities of intensifying economic warfare against England. I shall read a few paragraphs, or give a short account of them, to show that a very thorough investigation of international law was made. The first paragraph is headed "War Aims."
"The Fuehrer's proposal to restore a just and honorable peace and establish a new political order in Central Europe has been rejected. The enemy powers want war, with Germany's destruction as the goal. In the struggle in which Germany is now forced to defend her existence and rights, Germany must employ her weapons ruthlessly while fully respecting the rules of soldierly conduct in warfare."
Then there follows a paragraph in which it is stated that the enemy is also ruthless in carrying out his plans. On the next page, Page 200, there are a few sentences of basic importance which I should like to read. I read from the paragraph "Military Requirements" the fourth sentence:
"It is still desirable to base military measures in the existing principle of international law; but military measures recognized as necessary must be taken if they seem likely to lead to decisive military successes, even if they are not admitted by international law. For that reason, the military weapon which effectively breaks the enemies powers of resistance must on principle be given a legal base, even if new rules of naval warfare have to be created for the purpose.
"After weighing political, military, and economic considerations with regard to the war as a whole, Supreme War Command must decide on the military procedure and legal rules of warfare to be applied."
Then there are a number of excerpts to show the way in which the Naval Operations Staff investigated the legal aspect of the situation; that is to say, the present legal aspect of the situation, the situation which would arise in the case of a siege of England or a blockade against England. The end, which is on Page 203, emphasizes the political character of the final decision. I shall read it:
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"The decision as to the form to be taken by the intensification of economic warfare and the time fixed for changing over to the most intensified and therefore final form of naval warfare in this war is of far-reaching political importance. It can be made only by the Supreme War Command, which will weigh the military, political, and economic requirements against each other."
I should like to add that this document is dated 15 October 1939.
At the end of November 1939 the Naval Operations Staff took the consequent...
THE PRESIDENT: In our document it is 3 November. You said just now it was some date in October.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: 15 October, Mr. President. It is a memorandum dated 15 October, which was submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought you were dealing with Exhibit GB-224. That is the one you have been reading just now.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is headed on our Page 199, 3 November 1939.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. The 3rd of November is the date on which the memorandum was distributed to the High Command of the Armed Forces and to the Foreign Office. I have just been told that in the English text, above the word ''Memorandum,'' the date is apparently not printed. In the original it says, right above the word "Memorandum," ''Berlin, 15 October 1939."
THE PRESIDENT: Very welt
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have already submitted Document Doenitz-73, on Page 206, in which neutrals are warned against entry into the zone which corresponds to the American combat zone declared by President Roosevelt on 4 November.
The German point of view, that entry into this zone constitutes a danger to all neutrals by their own action, was also published in the press. Therefore, I submit Document Doenitz-103 on Page 210. It is an interview given by Admiral Raeder to a representative of the National Broadcasting Company, New York, on 4 March 1940. I should like to read a few sentences from that document. In the second paragraph Admiral Raeder points out the danger existing for neutral merchant ships if they act in a warlike manner and are consequently taken for enemy ships. The last sentence of that paragraph reads:
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"The German standpoint may be concisely expressed by the formula: Whoever depends on the use of arms must be prepared for attack by arms."
I shall read the two last paragraphs:
"In discussing the possibility that there might be frequent differences of opinion, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy mentioned President Roosevelt's order prohibiting American shipping in the dangerous zones around England. He said, 'This prohibition is the best proof against England's practice of forcing neutrals to sail through these zones without being able to guarantee their security. Germany can only advise all neutrals to imitate the policy of your President.'
"Question: 'Thus, according to this state of affairs, there is no protection for neutral shipping in the war-endangered zones?'
"Answer: 'Probably not, so long as England adheres to her methods...."'
With the collapse of France, the entire U.S.A. combat zone was declared a German blockade area. That is shown by the next document, Doenitz-104, Page 212. I read from the middle of the long paragraph on that page:
"The entire sea area around England has thus become a theater of operations. Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other combat means...."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, did you call that Exhibit Doenitz-60 or...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That was originally also one of the documents from Doenitz-60, Mr. President, to which I have now given a new number. It is now Doenitz-104.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: "Every ship sailing this zone runs the risk of being destroyed not only by mines but also by other combat means. For that reason the German Government issues a fresh and most urgent warning against sailing in the danger zone."
At the end of the note, the German Government refuses to assume any responsibility for damage or loss incurred in this area.
I produce as the next document, on Page 214, with the new Exhibit Number Doenitz-105, an official German statement made on the occasion of the announcement of the total blockade of 17 August 1940. I only want to mention it.
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I now come to several documents dealing with the treatment of neutrals outside the declared danger zones. As the first document, I submit, on Page 226, an excerpt of the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-196. It is a standing war order from the Commander of U-boats which was also issued before May 1940. I read the first sentences:
"Not to be sunk are:
"(a) All ships readily recognized as neutral so long as they do not (1) move in any enemy convoy, (2) move into a declared danger zone."
The next Document, Doenitz-76, Page 227, shows the concern of the Naval Operations Staff that the neutrals should really be recognizable as such. I read the first sentences of the entry of 10 January 1942:
"In view of the further extension of the war, the Naval Operations Staff has asked the Foreign Office to point out again to the neutral seafaring nations, with the exception of Sweden, the necessity of carefully marking their ships in order that they shall not be mistaken for enemy ships."
The next Document, Doenitz-77, on Page 228, is an entry dated 24 June 1942, from the War Diary of the Flag Officer of U-boats:
"All commanders will again be given detailed instructions as to their conduct toward neutrals."
I have already submitted Doenitz-78-excuse me, it has not been submitted. Doenitz-78, Page 229, contains examples of the consideration which the Commander of U-boats showed to neutrals. The entry of 23 November 1942 shows that a submarine was ordered to leave one area solely because there was a great deal of neutral traffic in that area. The second entry of December 1942 specifies that Portuguese naval tankers had to be treated in accordance with directives, in other words, allowed to proceed.
On Page 230 there is a document which I have already mentioned. It contains an account of court-martial proceedings taken against a commanding officer who had torpedoed a neutral by mistake.
The next document, Doenitz-79, on Page 231, is an order decreeing the manner of treating neutrals which remained in force up to the end of the war. I do not think I have to read it. It again stresses the necessity of neutral ships being easily recognizable as such and refers to shipping agreements which have been made with a number of countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the correct date of it? You said...
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: August 1944, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: That is on the original...
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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The original date was 1 April 1943. The order was revised on 1 August 1944 on the basis of the revisions necessitated by the shipping agreements.
So far I have dealt with the general principles which have been attacked by the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-l91 and GB-224. Now I should like to submit several documents on individual points contained in the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-l91. Mention is made there of a speech by Adolf Hitler ending with the words:
"Every ship, with or without escort, which comes within range of our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed."
I now wish to present as Doenitz-80, on Page 232, an excerpt from that speech. It shows that in that context the Fuehrer's statement only applied to ships carrying war materials to England.
I now come to two examples mentioned in GB-l91 as characteristic examples of illegal German naval warfare. The first is the case of the Danish steamer Vendia. The Prosecution's document says:
"On 30 September 1939 the first sinking of a neutral ship by a submarine took place without a warning signal having been given. On that occasion some people lost their lives. The ship was the Danish steamer Vendia."
With reference to this I am submitting Doenitz-83, on Page 235. That is the War Log of Submarine U-3, which sank the Vendia. I should like to read parts of it on account of its importance. I begin with the second sentence:
"The steamer turns away gradually and increases speed. The boat comes up only very slowly. Obvious attempt to escape. The steamer is clearly recognizable as the Danish steamer Vendia. Boat reduces speed and uncovers her machine-gun. Several warning shots are fired across the steamer's bow. Thereupon the steamer stops very slowly; nothing more happens for a while. Then some more shots are fired. The Vendia lies into the wind.
"For 10 minutes nothing is visible on deck to remove suspicion of possible intended resistance; at 1124 hours I suddenly see bow waves and screw movements. The steamer swings sharply round toward the boat. The officer on watch and the first mate agree with my view that this is an attempt at ramming. For this reason I turn in the same angle as the steamer. A torpedo is fired 30 seconds later; point of aim, bow; point of impact, extreme rear of stern. The stern is torn off and goes down. The front part remains afloat.
"By risking the loss of our own crew and boat (heavy sea and numerous floating pieces of wreckage) six men of the
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Danish crew are rescued, among them the captain and helmsman. No further survivors can be seen. In the meantime the Danish steamer Swawa approaches and is stopped. She is requested to send her papers across in a boat. She is carrying a mixed cargo from Amsterdam to Copenhagen. The six persons rescued are transferred to the steamer for repatriation."
I read the second to the last sentence on the next page:
"After the crew of the steamer had been handed over, it was learned that the engineer artifices of the steamer had told the stoker Blank that the captain had intended to ram the submarine."
The document on Page 237, an excerpt from the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-82, shows that the Vendia case formed the subject of a protest by the German Government to the Danish Government.
I shall deal now with the sinking of the City of Benares on 18 September 1940. In this connection I should like first to read several sentences from the Prosecution's document, because in my opinion it is characteristic of the probative value of the entire Exhibit GB-l91. I read from the British Document Book, Page 23, starting at the passage where the Prosecution stopped reading. The Tribunal will remember that the City of Benares had children on board. The Foreign Of lice report says here:
"The captain of the U-boat presumably did not know that there were children on board the City of Benares when he fired the torpedoes. Perhaps he did not even know the name of the ship, although there the evidence suggests strongly that he had been dogging her for several hours before torpedoing her. He must have known, however, that this was a large merchant ship, probably with civilian passengers on board, and certainly with a crew of merchant seamen. He knew the state of the weather, and he knew that they were six hundred miles from land and yet he followed them outside the blockade area and deliberately abstained from firing his torpedo until after nightfall when the chances of rescue would be enormously reduced."
The next document I submit is Doenitz-84, Page 238, the War Log of U-boat 48, which sank the City of Benares. I read the entry of 17 September 1940:
"Time 1002. Convoy sighted. Course about 240 degrees, speed 7 nautical miles. Contact maintained, since underwater attack is no longer possible because of the heavy swell. No escort can be seen with the convoy."
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I will summarize the entry of 18 September 1940.
It describes the firing of a torpedo on a ship belonging to that convoy-the City of Benares.
A few minutes later, at 0007 hours, the submarine attacked a second ship in the convoy, the British steamer Marina. Both ships sent wireless messages. Twenty minutes later the submarine again had an artillery combat with a tanker from the convoy. That is the true story of the City of -Benares.
I reproduce the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-192 again on Page 240. It concerns the sinking of the Sheaf Mead. In this connection I should like to point out that that ship was heavily armed and that it probably was no merchant vessel but a submarine trap. The Prosecution's Exhibit GB-195, which was dealt with in yesterday's hearing, contains an order issued by the Fuehrer in July 1941 concerning attacks on United States merchant vessels in the blockade zone which had been declared around England. On the basis of this document, the Prosecution charges Doenitz with conducting a cynical and opportunistic warfare against neutrals.
My next document is Doenitz-86, Page 243. It shows the efforts which were made to avoid a conflict with the United States. I read the entry, dated 5 March 1940, from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:
"With reference to the conduct of economic warfare, orders are given to the Naval Forces that U.S. ships are not to be stopped, seized, or sunk. The reason is the assurance given by the Commander-in-Chief to the American Naval Attache, whom he received on 20 February, that German submarines had orders not to stop any American ships whatsoever. All possibility of difficulties arising between the U.S.A. and Germany as a result of economic warfare are thereby to be eliminated from the start."
This order means, therefore, that prize law measures were renounced.
The next document, Doenitz-87, Page 244, shows the practical recognition of the American zone of neutrality. It reads:
"4 April 1941. The following WIT message is directed to all ships at sea:
"American neutrality zone from now on to be observed south of 20° North only at a distance of 300 nautical miles from the coast. For reasons of foreign policy, the hitherto existing limitation will for the time being continue to be observed north of the above-mentioned line."
That means full recognition of the neutral zone.
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The next document, Doenitz-88, shows President Roosevelt's attitude to the question of neutrality toward Germany in that war. It is an excerpt from the speech of 11 September 1941 and is well known:
"Hitler knows that he must win the mastery of the seas if he wants to win the mastery of the world. He knows that he must first tear down the bridge of ships which we are building over the Atlantic and over which we constantly transport the war material that will help, in the end, to destroy him and all his works. He has to destroy our patrols on the sea and in the air."
I should like to say a few words about the view also expressed in Exhibit GB-191, namely, that the crews of enemy merchant ships were civilians and noncombatants. On Page 254 of the document book I have reproduced part of Document Doenitz-67, which I have already submitted. It is an excerpt from the confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders and deals with gunnery training for the civilian crews of merchant ships. I only wish to refer to the first page of these orders which say that, as a general rule, there should be only one navy man at a gun, all the rest being taken from the crew of the ship. I read from the paragraph headed "Training," Section (d):
"In addition to the gunlayer and the men specially trained for serving guns, five to seven men more-depending on the size of the gun-are needed to complete the gun crew and to bring ammunition from the magazine."
This is followed by regulations for training in port and gunnery drill for the crews.
The next document, re-numbered Doenitz-106, is a circular decree issued by the French Minister for the Merchant Marine on 11 November 1939. It deals with the creation of a special badge for men serving on merchant ships who are liable for military service. That is on Page 256. I should like to point out that this decree was signed by the head of the Military Cabinet, a rear admiral. The character of the order is demonstrated by the second to the last paragraph:
"This armband may only be worn in France or in the French colonies. In no case may men issued the armband wear it in foreign waters."
I come now to several documents dealing with the question of the rescue of survivors. These documents can be found in Document Books 1 and 2.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, do you not think it would be sufficient if you were to refer to these documents and give us the numbers without reading from them? They are all dealing, as you say, with rescue.
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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I believe I can do this with most of them. On Page 9 there is reproduced the Hague Convention regarding the application of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare. Page 10 is Document Doenitz-8, the order of 4 October 1939 concerning the sinking of armed merchantmen. It contains the order already read, namely, that rescues should be effected wherever possible without endangering their own ship.
Doenitz-9, Page 12, gives examples of exaggerated rescue measures by German submarines which even let enemy ships pass without attack while so engaged. Doenitz-10 deals with the same subject and gives a further example.
The collection of statements made by commanding officers in Doenitz-13 can be found on Pages 19 to 26. I should like to deal with it along with War Order 154, which is the Prosecution's Exhibit GB-196. These statements contain numerous examples, taken from all the war years, of rescue measures on the part of German submarines. One of these statements is supplemented by photographs- Page 21-which are included in the original. The facts stated in these statements are confirmed by Document Doenitz-14, Page 27, where there is a report on rescue measures in the war diary of a submarine; and at the end we find the sentence: "Taking British airmen on board is sanctioned." It is signed by the Commander of U-boats.
The next document, Doenitz-15, is again an excerpt from the war diary, giving an example of rescue measures after a battle with a convoy on 21 October 1941. It is on Page 28. The next two documents concern the Laconia order. The Tribunal has permitted me to use Standing War Orders 511 and 513 in cross-examining Mohle. They deal with the capture of captains, chief engineers, and air crews. I submit them as Doenitz-24 and 25, and they can be found on Pages 46 and 47. I should like to point out that both orders explicitly state that capture should only be effected as far as is possible without endangering the boats.
Document Doenitz-24 explains that the British Admiralty, on their part, had issued orders to prevent the capture of British captains by German submarines. The next excerpt, on Page 48, cites an example showing that this British order was carried out and that a U-boat searched in vain among the lifeboats for the captain.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, could you inform the Tribunal what Paragraph 2 on Page 46 refers to and means?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The paragraph refers to Standing War Order Number 101, that is, the order specifying which neutral ships can be sunk. That is, of course, in the blockade area.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it mean that those officers have to be sunk with the ship, or what?
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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: No, Mr. President. That means that captains and ships' officers of neutral ships might be left in the lifeboats and need not be taken aboard the submarine from the lifeboats. The fact that it was actually much safer in the lifeboats than on the submarine is seen from the English order instructing captains to remain in the lifeboats and hide from the U-boats.
THE PRESIDENT: What if they do not have lifeboats?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I believe, Mr. President, that that case has not been ruled on here. I know of no case where a ship did not have lifeboats, especially in 1943, in which year the order originated. Every ship was provided not only with lifeboats but also with automatically inflating rafts.
Figure 2 refers only to the question of capture of neutral captains. May I continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: A number of instances showing that captains were rescued after these orders were issued are quoted in the statements by commanders reproduced on Pages 22, 25, and 26, under Exhibit Number Doenitz-13.
I now come to the case of Submarine U-386, which figures very largely in Korvettenkapitan Mohle's statement. The Tribunal will remember that this case was the decisive reason for the way in which Mohle interpreted the Laconia order. With reference to this case, I submit Exhibit Number Doenitz-26, the affidavit made by Captain Witt. I should like to read a few paragraphs from that.
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: On Page 50, Mr. President.
"In November 1943, in the course of my official duties as a member of the staff of Commander of U-boats, I had to interview Lieutenant Albrecht, commander of U-boat U-386, on his experiences during the action which had just terminated. Albrecht reported to me that in the latitude of Cape Finisterre he had sighted in daylight a rubber boat with shipwrecked British airmen in the Bay of Biscay. He did not take any steps to rescue them because he was on his way to a convoy in process of formation. He could only reach his position by continuing without a stop. Besides he was afraid..."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it necessary to go into the details of each particular case? I mean; they all depend upon their own particular circumstances. You need not read the documents very carefully. It is not necessary at this stage of the case.
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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Very well, Mr. President, I shall only report.
The affidavit states briefly that the commander has been informed that he should have brought the airmen back. That is, in other words, the opposite of what Mohle has said in this courtroom. The correctness of Captain Wit's statements is confirmed by the next document, Doenitz-27, which is the U-boat's war log and contains the comments of the Commander of U-boats expressing disapproval of the fact that the Englishmen floating on the raft were not taken aboard.
The fact that Admiral Doenitz' attitude toward rescues was not based on cruelty but on military expediency is shown by Page 53 of the following document, Doenitz-28. He is considering the rescue of our own personnel and comes to the conclusion that military considerations may forbid such a rescue. The following Document Doenitz-29 deals with the statement made by witness Heisig. It is on Page 54 and the following. It begins with an affidavit made by the Adjutant, Kapitanleutnant Fuhrmann, who describes the general ideas on which Admiral Doenitz' talks were based. At the end he stresses the fact that he was never, in connection with Admiral Doenitz' pronouncements, approached by young officers, who expressed any doubts as to the treatment of shipwrecked persons.
On Page 56 there is a statement made by Lieutenant Kress, who was present at the same lecture as Heisig. He says that neither directly nor indirectly did Admiral Doenitz order the survivors to be killed.
That is confirmed by Lieutenant Steinhoff's statement on Page 59. The considerations which weighed with the Naval Operations Staff at that time in the question of fighting the crews are illustrated by the following document, Doenitz-30, which is reproduced on Pages 60 and 61. Here again, no mention is made of the killing of survivors. It is the record of a conference with the Fuehrer on 28 September 1942, which was attended by Admiral Raeder and Admiral Doenitz.
The Tribunal will remember Exhibit GB-200 which describes rescue ships as desirable targets. The same document states that they have the significance of submarine traps. For that reason I have reproduced on Page 63 Standing War Order Number 173, dated 2 May 1940. That order states that, in accordance with instructions from the British Admiralty, U-boat traps are employed in convoys. Document Doenitz-34, on Page 67 of Document Book 2, shows that the treatment of rescue ships has nothing to do with the sanctity of hospital ships. It is the last of the Standing Orders referring to hospital ships and is dated 1 August 1944. It begins with the words, "Hospital ships must not be sunk."
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My next document, Doenitz-35, is meant to show that the Naval Operations Staff actually went beyond the provisions of international law in regard to the sanctity of hospital ships, for, as the entry of 17 July 1941 proves, the Soviet Government on its part rejected the hospital ship agreement, basing its action on violations of international law committed by Germany on land. According to Article 18 of the hospital ship agreement, this meant that the agreement was no longer binding on any of the signatories.
In Document Doenitz-36, Pages 69 and following, I submit the only known instance of a U-boat commander's actually firing on means of rescue. This is the interrogation of Kapitanleutnant Eck, carried out on 21 November 1945 by order of this Tribunal. That was 10 days before he was shot.
According to the wish of the Tribunal, I shall confine myself to a summary.
After sinking the Greek steamer Peleus, Eck tried to sink the lifeboats and wreckage by means of gunfire. The reason he gave was that he wanted in this way to get rid of the debris and avoid being detected by enemy aircraft. He states that he had the Laconia order aboard, but that this order had no influence whatsoever upon his decision. In fact, he had not even thought of it. He had received his instructions from Mohle but had heard nothing about the killing of survivors which is alleged to have been desired; and he knew nothing about the instance of U-386. At the end of his examination, Eck states that he expected his action to be approved by Admiral Doenitz. A further reference was made in cross-examination yesterday to the question of whether Admiral Doenitz...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, we will adjourn now for a few minutes-only for a short time.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Very well.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal, as you know, was going to deal with the applications for documents and witnesses, but if you could finish your documents in a short time, they would like to go on with that and get them finished, if you can.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I believe that even at my present speed, I shall need about an hour. I should like to ask you, therefore, for permission to continue on Monday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Kranzbuehler, if you think it will be as long as that, of course we must put it off to Monday morning, but
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the Tribunal does hope that you would not take anything like so long as that, because going in detail into these documents does not really help the Tribunal. They have all got to be gone into again in great detail, both in your speeches and in further consideration by the Tribunal.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I shad confine myself to making clear the connections, Mr. President, but in spite of that, I think it would be better if I did so on Monday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes. Then the Tribunal will now deal with the applications. Yes, Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXVVELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach, who asked for one Hans Marsalek as a witness for cross-examination. The Prosecution have already introduced an affidavit from this man, and they have no objection to him being called for cross-examination.
My Lord, the second application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach is in respect of one Kaufmann. The Defense desires to administer interrogatories to Kaufmann in lieu of calling Kaufmann, who has already been allowed as a witness. There is no objection to that.
My Lord, the next matter is an application by Dr. Seidl on behalf of the Defendant Hess, and it is a request for five documents relating to the German-Soviet agreements in August and September 1939. And it is also a request for the calling of Ambassador Gaus as a witness in connection with the above. But the position with regard to previous applications is somewhat lengthy, and without going into details, I tell the Tribunal that this matter has already been before them on six occasions. I have the details if the Tribunal would like them.
THE PRESIDENT: No, because the Tribunal made an order, did they not, that these documents were to be translated?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: And that they would then be considered by the Tribunal?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. The Tribunal made an order for them to be translated on 25 March and, My Lord, if I may just remind Your Lordship of the bare facts, on 28 March Fraulein Blank, the private secretary of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, was asked about the agreement. Your Lordship may remember that my friend General Rudenko objected, but the Tribunal ruled that the questions were admissible, and the witness said she knew of the existence of the secret pact, but gave no details.
Then, on 1 April, in the course of Dr. Seidl's cross-examination of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Gaus affidavit was read, and
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on 3 April, Dr. Seidl applied for Hilger and Weizsacker to be called as witnesses on this point, and on 15 April Dr. Seidl applied for Ambassador Gaus to be called.
Now, My Lord, it was discussed before the Tribunal on 17 April, when I said that in view of the Tribunal's previous ruling I could not contest the question of the agreement, but I objected to the witnesses. General Rudenko, I think, stated that he had submitted written objections, and the Tribunal said they would consider the matter. The position today appears to be, taking the five documents, that the affidavit of Dr. Gaus is already in evidence. My Lord, that is the first affidavit. But the second affidavit of Dr. Gaus is not in evidence. With regard to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, that is already in evidence. As to the Secret Supplementary Protocol appended to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, the substance is already in evidence. It was given in the Gaus affidavit.
Then, My Lord, we have the German-Soviet Frontier and Friendship Pact of 28 September 1939, and the Secret Supplementary Protocol to that pact. The Prosecution submit that these documents have no relevance to the defense of the Defendant Hess, and they cannot see any reason for them being wanted. If necessary, my Soviet colleague can deal further with the matter, but that is the general position. And we also submit that the second affidavit of Ambassador Gaus is unnecessary in view of his previous affidavit, and without stating them again, I refer to and repeat my objections to witnesses to the discussions preceding the conclusion of the agreement. It is submitted that this is really an irrelevant matter, and unnecessary to occupy the time of the Tribunal regarding it. My Lord, I do not know whether it is convenient...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal, as I have said, is going to consider this matter. They have not yet had an opportunity to consider these documents, but I should like to ask you whether there is any reason why Ambassador Gaus should be called as a witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: None at all, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: He has already stated the substance of these documents, as has the Defendant Ribbentrop, and if the documents are now produced and supposing that the Tribunal took the view that they ought to be admitted, it would be entirely irrelevant to call Gaus as a witness.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In my submission that is so, My Lord.
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THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal had better consider these documents, as they had stated in their order they were going to do when the documents had been produced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
Now, My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Funk, and he requests permission to read the affidavit of the witness Kallus. The permission was previously granted to the Defendant Funk to submit an interrogatory to Kallus, which has been done, and the interrogatory has already been introduced in evidence. The affidavit now in question has been received and supplements the interrogatory, and the Prosecution have no objection.
The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Streicher, and he desires to call the witness Gassner as a witness, and he is desired to speak as to the Sturmer and the size of the circulation and the profits. The Prosecution submit that it is unnecessary to call a witness as to the form of the Sturmer after 1933. A representative number of copies of the newspaper are before the Tribunal and the form of the newspaper can be seen from them.
On the second point, both the. Defendant Streicher and the witness Hiemer have given evidence as to the Sturmer's circulation, and it is respectfully submitted that the takings of the Sturmer and the use to which they were put are irrelevant.
Then, My Lord, the next application, on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel, is for one Biedermann as a witness, instead of a witness allowed previously who cannot be found. The Prosecution have no objection to that, and they have no objection to the documents that are asked for, so with the approval of the Tribunal I shall not go through them in detail.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we should like to know when you think the most appropriate time would be to hear the evidence on behalf of those defendants whose cases have already been presented, whether to hear it at the end of all the evidence or to hear it earlier?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I should have thought that it was better to hear it earlier if the Tribunal could put aside a Saturday morning for it, or something of that kind, before the cases of the various defendants have gone too far into the background.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that and let you know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. Now, My Lord, the next application is in behalf of the Defendant SeyssInquart, and he asks for an interrogatory to be submitted to Dr. Stuckart to complement the testimony of the witness Lammers. The Prosecution have no objection to such an interrogatory. They reserve the right, or they ask the Tribunal to let them reserve the
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right, to put in a cross-interrogatory. The Defendant Frick asks for Dr. Konrad as a witness on the question of Church persecution, and the Prosecution suggest that an interrogatory would be sufficient on this point. I think there is a little confusion here; I think that what is desired is an affidavit. The original application says:
"Contrary to the charge to the effect that the defendant participated in the persecution of the Churches, an affidavit by the witness is to establish that Frick strongly defended Church interests."
So the only question is between an affidavit and interrogatory, not between an oral witness and an interrogatory. Then, if I might leave the next one, the application on behalf of the Defendant Goering, to my friend Colonel Pokrovsky, who is going to deal with that. I pass to the applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank. That is Dr. Seidl's application; and if I might just read what is stated in the Secretary General's note, it is official information from the ministry of war of the United States of America, or another ministerial service official of the Office of Strategic Services. It is stated that such a report is desired to show that the witness Gisevius had perjured himself on the witness stand and that they desire to show this to attack his credibility. It is alleged that the perjuring consists of his denial under cross-examination that he acted on behalf of foreign powers and his denial of receiving any favors from any power at war with Germany, which is supposed to be at variance with his statement that he had friendly and political relations with the American Secret Service and with some subsequently published reports. Confirmation of these two factors, alleged to be at variance with his prior statements, is sought by requesting official statement; and they ask for United States Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, as a witness for the essential points, in case the Tribunal does not consider an official report admissible or sufficient or the United States ministry of war refuses the information.
Now, My Lord, I deal with this matter simply as a question of jurisprudence on which I submit that the English view is a sound one and should be followed by this Tribunal. The law of England, as I understand it, is that when you cross-examine a witness to credit, you are bound by his answers. There is only one exception to that which, in my recollection, is contained in a note in Roscoe's Criminal Evidence, that when you have cross-examined a witness to credit, you may call a witness to say that, knowing the general reputation of the witness who has been cross-examined to credit, on that general reputation, and only on that general reputation, the witness would not believe him on it. That is the only exception that I know in English Law.
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THE PRESIDENT: And, of course, if he is cross-examined as to a crime or a misdemeanor, he may be contradicted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; Your Lordship is quite right. I should have put that as an exception; that if he is cross-examined as to a specific conviction, then the conviction may be proved. I am very grateful to Your Lordship. But, My Lord, what is not permissible in English jurisprudence is that when a witness has been cross-examined to credit on particular facts other than a conviction by the State, evidence may be adduced as to these particular facts. I should submit that the principle which I am sure obtains in all systems of jurisprudence, interest ret publicae at sit finis litium must apply and support that condition. Now, I will put it in English-I am sorry. "It is in the interest of the community that there should be an end of the legal proceedings."
My Lord, if one did not apply the limit which English jurisprudence has applied, one would then call evidence to attack the credit of witnesses for the Prosecution. The Prosecution would then render a rebuttal and call evidence to attack the credit of each of these witnesses who had attacked the credit of the Prosecution's witnesses and there would never be an end to legal proceedings at all. My Lord, on that point which is a general point-and I do not mean to be academic; it is a point of practical importance for preserving some decent limit to legal proceedings-I would submit that this application should be refused. My Lord, I think that covers all the points except the question of the Defendant Goering's application with which my friend Colonel Pokrovsky will deal.
COL. POKROVSKY: The Defendant Goering is applying, My Lord, for the calling of supplementary witnesses in connection with the Katyn Forest shootings to clarify the matter from the point of view of the Wehrmacht. That is to say he intends to prove that German Armed Forces were not in any way concerned with this Hitler provocation. The Prosecution of the Soviet Union categorically protests.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky. we have this matter fully in our mind as we have already had to consider it; therefore, it is not necessary for you to deal with it in detail, for I understand that these are new witnesses who have not before been applied for.
COL. POKROVSKY: I had in mind the fact that the new witnesses have been called and I would like to inform the Tribunal of our exact point of view with regard to the calling of the new witnesses, without going into detail about the Katyn Forest incident. The Soviet Prosecution, from the very beginning, considered the Katyn Forest incident as common knowledge. The Tribunal can see, by the limited space allotted to this crime in the Indictment and by the fact that we found it possible to limit ourselves to reading into
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the record only a few short excerpts from the report of the Commission, that we consider this episode to be only an episode. If the question mentioned by Sir David should be raised, that is, the fact that the Tribunal may have doubts about the credibility of certain witnesses or certain documents accepted as evidence-then, once again, we would be forced to present new evidence in order to discredit the new material again presented by the Defense.
Thus, if the Tribunal considers it necessary to admit two new witnesses relative to the Katyn Forest shootings, the Soviet Prosecution will find itself obliged to call about ten more new witnesses who are experts and specialists, and to present to the Tribunal new evidence put at our disposal and which we have recently received -new documents.
Furthermore, we shall have to return to the question of reading into the record all of the documents of the Special Commission, excerpts from which were read before the Tribunal. We think that it will greatly delay the proceedings, and it will not be a matter of hours but of days. So far as we are concerned, there is no necessity for doing this, and I think that this request should be refused, since there is absolutely no basis or reason for it. That, My Lord, is what I wanted to say in regard to the Defendant Goering's application.
I would also like to add a few words to what Sir David said in regard to Dr. Seidl's application. I will not go into all our motives. We certainly support Sir David fully, and we consider that Dr. Seidl's applications should be refused. But I want to report to you that this morning I signed a document which is being sent to you, Your Honor, and which contains a full and detailed statement of our motives and considerations in regard to this question; and this document is presented to the Tribunal. Therefore, without taking up your time, I have found another way of informing the Tribunal about our position.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, it is not necessary, I think, to ask counsel for the Defendant Schirach to address the Tribunal, because there is no objection to those two applications with reference to the witness Marsalek and the interrogatory of Kaufmann.
With reference to the Hess matter, the Tribunal will consider that. They are going to consider it as they said they would in their previous order.
With reference to the Defendant Funk, there is no objection to the affidavit of Kallus, and so unless counsel for Funk wants to address us upon it, we need not bother about that.
With reference to Streicher, there is an objection to Gassner as a witness, so perhaps the counsel for Streicher had better say anything that he wishes to say.
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[There was no response.]
Well, the Tribunal will consider that, then.
As to Sauckel there has been no objection. As to Seyss-Inquart, an interrogatory-there is no objection there.
As to the Defendant Frick, Sir David suggested an interrogatory. It was not quite clear whether the application meant that. Is counsel for the Defendant Frick here or not?
[There was no response.]
Well, we will consider that. And with reference to Goering, the Tribunal will consider the applications for the Defendant Goering
And with reference to Hess and Frank, as to Gisevius' evidence- Dr. Seidl, do you wish to say anything about that?
DR.ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): Mr. President, the application regarding the obtaining of official information from the minister of war was made for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence as to the credibility of the witness Gisevius. Afterwards I made another application to examine Secretary of War Patterson by means of an interrogatory dealing with the same subject. On the following day I made an application to examine the Chief of the O.S.S., General Donovan, also by means of an interrogatory. I think that this new application is in the hands of the Tribunal.
I have made this further application only because the firstnamed witness, Patterson, was minister of war for only a comparatively short period, and because it seemed helpful to have the chief of that organization himself as an additional witness. As a reason for these applications, I refer to my written statement of 1 May this year, which I have also submitted as Appendix 1 of the form. I further refer to Appendix 2, a report by Associated Press on this incident. I should like to reply very briefly to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe's statement here.
The Tribunal does not appear to be bound by any particular rules in dealing with the question of additional witnesses in connection with the credibility of other witnesses. Neither the Charter of the International Military Tribunal nor the regulations governing its procedure contain any definite rules. In my opinion, it is rather left exclusively to the free judgment of the Tribunal whether such additional evidence referring to the credibility of a witness should be admitted or not, and in what circumstances. In German criminal procedure such evidence is admissible without question.
However, since the Tribunal in setting up this procedure is not bound by any rules of procedure, I see no reason why the decision should be based on any of the customary Anglo-American legal procedure, since the Charter is not based on either the
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Anglo-American legal procedure or the continental European legal procedure. This Tribunal and its rules of procedure are entirely independent and give complete freedom to the judgment of the court.
That is all I wanted to say in that connection.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Seidl. Do the questions which you wish to put with reference to the witness Gisevius relate solely to credit?
DR. SEIDL: In my written application I have already said that as far as I am concerned, it is not a question of whether in certain circumstances the witness Gisevius was guilty of an action which from the German legal standpoint might constitute the crime of treason. I only put that question in connection with the examination of the credibility of the witness before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: That is what I thought. Now, one other question I wanted to ask you. Are these pacts or agreements, which you say existed between the Soviet Republics and Germany-are they published in print? Have all the documents which you wish to use been typewritten or mimeographed and circulated to the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, on 13 November of last year, I gave six copies of those five documents to the Secretary General, and I also gave a corresponding number of documents to the Prosecution. All these documents are typewritten, or, rather, they are mimeographed.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: Perhaps I might add one point. On an earlier occasion the Tribunal admitted as evidence an affidavit made by Ambassador Gaus. This first affidavit is a statement of the contents of these secret agreements. It is my opinion...
THE PRESIDENT: I know that, yes.
DR. SEIDL: . . . that if we have the agreements, we should refer to the agreements themselves and not merely to a summary. If the Tribunal so desires, and considers it necessary, then I should be prepared, now or at some later date, to discuss the relevancy of these agreements.
I have noted down eight points from which only these agreements appear relevant as evidence, and perhaps I may point out that these additional agreements...
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ordered that these documents should be submitted, and they will then consider them and that is what they propose to do; so it is not necessary to go into them in detail. We will consider the matter.
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DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, during the examination of Defendant Funk, a film was shown here on the screen and an affidavit by a witness-Puhl-was read-Emil Puhl, the Vice President of the Reichsbank. At. that time, following an application of mine, the Tribunal decided that this witness, Emil Puhl, should be called here
for examination. Now I should like to ask you to amend your decision in one respect. I think it would be useful to show to the Witness Puhl the film which you saw on this screen a few days ago,
so that he may state whether in fact the steel vaults of the Reichsbank looked as they were shown in this film.
I should like to ask, therefore, Mr. President, that you order this short film which we were shown twice recently to be shown also to the witness Puhl before his examination. It is, of course, not necessary that this should be done during a session of the Tribunal; it can be done in the presence of the prosecutor and myself, outside
this courtroom. I have various questions to put to the witness Puhl, and for that it is necessary that he should first see this film. I wanted to make this application today so that there may be no delay when the witness Puhl is examined.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the witness Puhl know the vaults in Frankfurt which were photographed?
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a director in Berlin, was he not?
DR. SA-UTER: Yes; but I assume, Mr. President, that the witness Puhl, who was the managing Vice President, would also know the steel vaults in Frankfurt. Apart from that, I believe that these vaults in the various branches of the Reichsbank were all built on the same pattern, and were also treated in the same way in practice. He will be able, also, to state whether the method of safe-keeping shown in the film was the type actually used by the Reichsbank in looking after deposits.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution anything to say about this?
MR.RALPH G. ALBRECHT (Associate Trial Counsel for the United States): If Your Honor please, I think, as it is a document belonging to the case, we would be very glad to show them to the witness before he is cross-examined by Dr. Sauter.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And perhaps the most convenient way would be, as Dr. Sauter suggests, that he should be shown the film in some room in this court; not actually in this room, but in another room.
MR. ALBRECHT: Yes; we can do so in the presence of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you can arrange that between yourself and Dr. Sauter?
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MR. ALBRECHT: Very well, Sir.
DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, has any time been arranged for the calling of Puhl?
DR.SAUTER: No; nothing has been arranged yet. As far as I have heard, the witness is already here. I do not know when he is to be heard. I shall leave that entirely to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: What would be the most convenient time?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Mr. Dalton suggests to me, at the close of the case of the Defendant Doenitz.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be convenient? Would it not be better to put it after the Defendant Raeder-I do not know, they are rather connected cases?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If the Tribunal would prefer that, we could make it after Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether Dr. Kranzbuehler and Dr. Siemers would prefer that.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZB0HLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you could arrange that with them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: That is to say, we would take Puhl's evidence as soon as convenient, either after the evidence on behalf of the Defendant Domtz or after the evidence on behalf of the Defendant Raeder, whichever you prefer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship prefers, we will do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to inform the Tribunal that my colleague Dr. Stahmer's applications for the Defendant Goering, which were made with a view to clarifying the Katyn case, are also of interest to me with reference to my clients. I gathered from the application made by the Russian prosecutor that this complex, too, was submitted to implicate the General Staff and the OKW, although no evidence has been submitted to suggest that these events took place either by order or with the approval of the General Staff and the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Does this not, perhaps, interest all the defendants?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. But I only wish to inform the Tribunal that I am interested in my colleague Dr. Stahmer's applications, and that I also request you to allow them. We have agreed to share the task, and that is my colleague Dr. Stahmer's reason for making the
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application. I wanted first to inform the Tribunal of that arrangement.
I should also like to remind the Tribunal that some time ago, when my colleague Dr. Nelte, acting on behalf of the Defendant Keitel, forfeited the examination of the witness Halder, I pointed out to the Tribunal that this action encroached upon my privileges, and that the witness Halder must be allowed- for cross-examination by the Russian Prosecution. At that time, I was told that the witness Halder would probably appear for examination, and I have checked it in the record. When I referred to the point during that session. the Tribunal said that it would announce its decision in a few days. Although some considerable time has elapsed since then, no announcement has been made. I merely draw the attention of the Tribunal to this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Your witnesses have not been dealt with yet, have they? You have not applied for your witnesses yet? They have not been proffered? The matter has not been dealt with?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, this is a repetition of the misunderstanding which arose when I pointed out to you at that time that the forfeiture of the witness Halder constituted an infringement of my rights. The situation at the time was that the Russian Prosecution submitted an affidavit made by General Halder, and when the Defense objected, which at that time was done in my name too, the Tribunal decided that the witness Halder would have to appear for examination here. I have the right to cross-examine him, and therefore this is the proper time to call that to the attention of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the convenient time is the question. You will have the opportunity to cross-examine him. But the question is when. You want to cross-examine him yourself on behalf of the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that, Dr. Laternser.
The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 13 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
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