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MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the application for documents of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, 87 documents altogether have been submitted to the Prosecution, and we have gone over them in the German. After numerous conferences with counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, we find we are unable to agree now on 17 of these documents. As of yesterday the number was 20, as I so stated, but we have now reduced it to 17.
Document Number 5 in the defendant's list is a copy of a resolution of the German National Assembly on the 21st of February 1919, advocating Anschluss between Austria and Germany. We have told counsel we object to it as being really irrelevant here and immaterial. It is a resolution of a German parliamentary body, and it doesn't seem to us to make any difference what they were thinking of Anschluss in 1919.
Document Number 10 is an extract from a newspaper article published in October 1945 and written by a man named Walford Selby. It is a critical article criticizing the Treaty of St. Germain for not avoiding the obliteration of the Austro-Hungarian economic entity, and it discusses what it describes as the mistakes of 1919, and so on. We understand that it is intended to explain, with other documents, the economic background of the Anschluss movement. Whatever may be said for that type of proof, there are at least five other documents on the same basis and we made no objection to them. But we did feel that somewhere this sort of thing, even if relevant, certainly became cumulative. Documents 7, 12, 26, and 33 are all on the same subject, the economic background of Anschluss, and this is a long one. Therefore, we feel that it certainly is not necessary, doesn't add very much, merely creates a lot of paper work, and is cumulative.
Document Number 11 is a speech delivered by a Dr. Schober, giving the area and population of the Republic of Austria. We haven't any very serious objection to this type of thing excepting that there probably are better sources if the defendant wishes to establish the area and population of Austria in 1921. Further, it
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seems to us that the Tribunal could very well take judicial knowledge of the area and population of Austria as of that date from reliable publications.
Document Number 14 is a statement by the former Chancellor of Austria in 1922 to the effect that Austria belongs to Germany. Our objection is again based on the cumulative feature of this document, because there are at least three other documents with almost identical statements by Dr. Renner to which we have made no objection.
Document 19 is an extract from a book written by a man called Kleinschmied, and the extract purports to show that a number of politicians lived or prospered on the Anschluss movement in Austria. That doesn't seem to us to be very important here or likely to help the Tribunal very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, what exactly does "lived from the propaganda" mean? That they made their living by reason of propaganda, or what?
MR. DODD: Yes. It purports to show that they made it a vehicle for carrying on political activities, and made an issue of it and sustained themselves politically.
Number 21 is an extract from Kunschak's book Austria 1918-1934, and it gives the increase in the National Socialist votes in Austria between 1930 and 1932. That didn't seem to us to be very material or very helpful or likely to be helpful to the Tribunal. We objected to it on the grounds that it was irrelevant and immaterial.
Document Number 22 is an extract from an article in the New Free Press of August 1932, opposing the League of Nations loan. This again is submitted to prove the flow or the continuity of the Anschluss movement. There is at least one other document, Number 23, which purports to establish the same principle on the same kind of proof.
Number 27 is an extract from an article written by Martin Fuchs, "Un Pacte avec Hitler," and it discusses the Yugoslav policy with respect to Anschluss between Germany and Austria. Again that doesn't seem to the Prosecution to have any direct bearing or any helpful bearing upon the issues here, whatever the Yugoslavs thought about it.
Number 31 is an extract from the Neue Zeitung of the 11th of January of this year wherein Gordon Walker states that the celebration in Austria after the Anschluss was genuine. -Well, that is Mr. Walker's opinion, and there is some other substantial opinion on the other side. We doubt very much that his opinion is material here or competent.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is he?
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MR. DODD: I understand he is a member of the Labor Party in Great Britain, and a writer.
Number 39 is an extract from the Archiv of 1938. This sets forth a statement made by Senator Borah, of the United States, that the Anschluss was a natural and inevitable affair and had nothing to do with the United States. This was not a speech made by the late Senator Borah in the Senate; it was his own opinion, and it does not seem to us that it would be very helpful. Some later opinions of Senator Borah were not so helpful, and this doesn't seem to be very likely to be helpful to the Tribunal with respect to this issue.
Number 47 is an extract from Zernatto's book The Truth about Austria. Zernatto was one of the State Under Secretaries of Austria, as the Tribunal knows. He left the country after the Anschluss and went to the United States and wrote this book. He makes a number of statements, I might say, about the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. The Tribunal would be interested in knowing that this Document 47, and Documents 48, 50, 54, 55, 60, and 61 are all extracts from the same book. Now, we felt that wherever he reports a conversation with Seyss-Inquart, that would have bearing and relevancy before the Court; but where he expresses his opinion, we have more doubt about its relevancy. This one statement, Number 47, seems to be his opinion. He doesn't cite any conversation or anything other than what appears to be his impression that Seyss-Inquart disassociated himself from Leopold's efforts.
Now, we do not object to 48, and to 50, or to 54, because although we originally thought we would object, on reviewing them they appeared to set out actual conversations between Zernatto and SeyssInquart, and it might be helpful to the Tribunal. Therefore, we do not object to the next three.
But 55, again, is a statement in Zernatto's book that, in Zernatto's opinion, Seyss-Inquart was a figure on the chess board and was double-crossed by the Nazi or new Party leadership. We object to that for the reason that I have stated; it is the author's opinion. He is deceased, by the way, and is certainly not available. In any event, we do not think his opinion can be very helpful.
Number 60 is also a statement from Zernatto's book and it sets out a conversation with an unnamed Austrian Nazi. We felt that was altogether too vague and would not be of value or helpful. In Number 61, again, the author Zernatto expresses his opinion that Seyss-Inquart was afraid of shouldering responsibility. I don't want to stress our objections too heavily to these extracts. I don't think they are very harmful, certainly, but I rather object because we would like to cut down some of this printing, and I do not think they will be very helpful to Seyss-Inquart.
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Number 68 is the first document on anti-Semitism, and it is an excerpt from the publication entitled The Elements of National Socialism by Bishop Alois Hudal. It explains anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria; and it goes on to discuss matters that the Tribunal has heard very much about through other defendants, the disproportionate position of the Jewish population in Germany, and so on. We object to it as not being helpful and not material.
Again 69 is another extract from Zernatto's book on the causes, as some of these people see it, of anti-Semitism. It is his opinion and does not to us seem to be helpful or material here. Number 71 is on the Slovak question. I doubt that there has been any serious claim made anywhere in this case that at various times the Slovaks have not claimed autonomy. This extract from the Archiv of 1938, insofar as we can discover, seeks to establish that they did want autonomy. Well, we don't think that is very important here, and it will not be helpful to the Tribunal or to Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a document of state?
MR. DODD: Well, it is a document from the Archiv, and in that sense it is a public document.
THE PRESIDENT: After Slovakia had been taken over by the Reich?
MR. DODD: No, not afterwards, it's in 1938, and it preceded the taking over.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.
MR. DODD: These are our objections, Mr. President. I do think we have tried to be rather...
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Mr. Dodd, we are only considering now the question of objections to translation. We are not considering the question of admissibility, nor are we binding you not to object to them after they have been translated.
MR. DODD: Yes, I am aware of that, Mr. President. We. tried to be, I think, fairly generous about this list. The excerpts, or most of them, are not too long. We did think we would have to call a halt somewhere, and I do not think our 17 objections out of the 87 listed are very strict or are pinching, really, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I know that you value my small country, Austria, not only because of its ancient culture and its scenic beauty, but also because it was the first country which lost its freedom through Hitler. However, with all respect which you have for this country, I cannot expect of you that, as representative of great powers, you know the history of my country to
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the last detail. I do believe that it is of the utmost importance for the defense of Seyss-Inquart that you understand fully on the basis of what background and what motives this man acted the way he did.
I myself can see three reasons which led to the Anschluss.
First of all, the desperate economic situation which runs like a red thread from 1918 right up to-I am sorry to say-and through the year 1946.
The second reason, and I shall be very brief with regard to the documents . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, will you come to the actual documents as soon as possible, because you will remember we are only discussing the question of whether they should be translated or not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. The second reason was the disunity of the democratic parties. The third reason was the attitude of the surrounding powers. From these points of view I have assembled my documents.
The first document is a resolution of the Weimar National Assembly, and I am of the point of view that it is important in respect to a final judgment that the Anschluss was not only a wish of the Austrian population, but an all-German postulate. It is very short and I request that it be admitted.
The second document is by Selby, who for many years was the British Ambassador in Vienna, a genuine friend of our country. In this article he refers to the economic background and conditions in Austria, which led to the Anschluss. That was the reason for my including this document.
The next document is a speech delivered by Federal Chancellor Schober who was held in great esteem by the world. In this speech he refers to the fact that the burdens imposed on Austria are too great for her to carry. He described the situation as a whole as a case of bankruptcy.
The next document is a statement by the present Federal Minister, Dr. Karl Renner, in 1922. At that time Dr. Seipel went to Geneva and with great difficulty put through a loan at the League of Nations which was of great importance to us because at the same time it was demanded of Austria that we should forego independence for 10 years' duration. That meant that we were not to take any steps to change the conditions for an Anschluss. Renner opposed Seipel in Parliament at that time. This document is in no way cumulative to Document 33, since in Document 33 I want merely to describe the economic situation as it obtained in the year 1938.
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The next document is Point 2 of my evidence, namely, the strong political propaganda for the Anschluss. In any event, I must dispute most strongly the assertion that Document Number 21, which is very short, is irrelevant. I consider it extremely important to prove that this new, very young party, which grew in the fertile soil of a desperate economic situation, increased tenfold, as far as the number of votes was concerned, in the years 1930 to 1932; thus all the time there existed a recognized political opposition to the government.
The next Document, Number 22, is an article which again illustrates the economic situation in Austria at a very essential period of history, namely, the moment when Federal Chancellor Dollfuss went to Lausanne in order to negotiate another loan from the League of Nations, and we again were forced to suppress thoughts of an Anschluss for another 10 years. This Document, Number 22, as well as the next one, Number 23, is not cumulative, since the one shows the political and the other the economic position of the members of Parliament with respect to the League of Nations' loan of the year 1932.
The next document is only an extract from the views taken by the various surrounding states to the Anschluss question. I selected only Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia was the country which most strongly supported the idea of Anschluss in her foreign policy.
As far as Document 31 is concerned, I should like to remark, supplementing the remarks made by the Prosecution, that Gordon Walker is not only a member of the Labor Party, but-and this point is much more important-during the entire war years he was head of the British Radio Division Austria, and he was himself in Austria in the year 1938 and he witnessed the Anschluss. His judgment therefore is of extraordinary importance since it is the judgment of a prominent foreigner.
The same remark also applies to the following document, the statement by Senator Borah who for 25 years was the Chairman of the American Committee on Foreign Affairs. His opinion is surely deserving of notice.
The next documents concern statements made by Dr. Zernatto. I should like to add that Dr. Zernatto was Federal Minister, General Secretary of the Fatherland Front and Schuschnigg's right-hand man during the period of the Anschluss. He was one of the spiritual fathers of the Schuschnigg plebiscite. I am sorry to say that the died an emigrant in 1940, and I cannot produce him as a witness here; but his book is a document and actually tells what this man experienced in those critical days.
I urgently request that the remaining three documents, which are very brief, be left in the book.
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The next two documents, which concern anti-Semitism, I included very unwillingly in order to avoid any accusation of anti-Semitic propaganda. I included them because in the trial brief my client is accused of being a member of an anti-Semitic organization. This accusation is unjustifiable insofar as more importance is attached to this organization than it actually deserves. If this matter is not further emphasized by the Prosecution, I shall not attach any particular importance to these two documents myself.
The last document which is being objected to, Number 71, contains the Agreement of Pittsburgh which was concluded between Masaryk and Hlinka, the Slovak leader, at which occasion Masaryk solemnly promised autonomy to the Slovaks, a promise which was not kept according to the letter of the agreement and which gave rise to a strong demand for autonomy in Slovakia, which was supported by Hitler. For these reasons I ask that this document also be approved.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the Tribunal will consider the question of these documents.
Now, Dr. Siemers.
[The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.]
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday in connection with Norway I submitted on one occasion Documents 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, and 86. I beg the Tribunal's pardon, but I forgot to submit one document pertinent to this matter, and I should like to remedy this omission.
The document, which has already been granted me, is Exhibit Number Raeder-88, which likewise is an extract from the White Book and is printed in my Document Book Number 5, on Pages 392 and following. This document shows the British order of 6 April 1940, regarding the plans for the occupation of northern Swedish ore fields, proceeding from Narvik.
Since the Tribunal is familiar with this document, it will not be necessary for me to read from it.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, yesterday we had arrived at the topic of Russia. You had answered my question regarding Directive Number 21, Document 446-PS, of 18 December 1940, to the effect that the Navy had not worked on this directive. You further stated that the Navy undertook preparations in January in accordance with the command.
RAEDER: May I make a brief remark on this directive to the effect that yesterday I believe you made a mistake when you said that this directive was signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. This was the copy of the operational staff which Hitler had signed; but Keitel and Jodl only countersigned. Thus there is no question of
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a signature of these two; when such directives were issued they were signed only by Hitler, and the others could merely countersign.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, and I thank you for the correction.
In this connection, I should like to ask the Tribunal to consider Document C-35, USA-132. This document is found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, on Page 16. It is an extract from the War Diary with the date of 30 January 1941. It describes the preparations by the Navy, in accordance with Hitler's command of 18 December, where Hitler under Number IV of the directive commanded that precautionary measures be taken in case Russia should alter her previous attitude toward Germany, that is, only in case of this possibility.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, in connection with your representation of the Russian situation, the Prosecution has submitted Document C-66, which corresponds to GB-81. This is your report of 10 January 1944 to Admiral Assmann for the historical archives of the Navy. The document will be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 13. There you will find the basic position taken by Raeder with respect to "Fall Barbarossa." This is set forth under "a" of the document under Number 1...
I have just heard that this document is also to be found in the Document Book 10a, on Page 35. There you wrote:
"At this time the Fuehrer had made known his 'unalterable decision' to conduct the eastern campaign in spite of all remonstrances. Accordingly, further warnings, as long as completely new situations had not arisen, were completely without purpose, as one knew from experience. As Chief of the Naval Operations Staff I was never convinced of the 'compelling necessity' for Barbarossa."
Do you have anything to add to these statements which you made at that time?
RAEDER: I should like to say in this connection that despite the fact that the directive had been issued on 18 December, I made a comprehensive report at the end of December, as can be seen from Document C-170, which I mentioned yesterday on several occasions, in order to convince the Fuehrer of the wrongness of this decision. This shows that I have gone very far, for when the Fuehrer had issued a directive, even if it applied only to a hypothetical case, it was generally impossible to approach him with basic considerations against this directive. Everything else I mentioned already yesterday.
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DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, yesterday, in connection with your counterproposals made to Hitler with respect to Russia, you mentioned that in the autumn the plan was still to carry through the action "Seeloewe," that is, to land in England.
DR. SIEMERS: When, according to your strategic opinion, or the opinion of the Navy, did this possibility cease to exist? When did you have to dispense with this plan?
RAEDER: In the course of the month of September we still believed that the landing could be carried through. As a necessary condition the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and I, too, always insisted-and he realized this fully-that for a landing air superiority would have to be on our side; and therefore we were waiting to see whether we could actually produce this air superiority in time for the landing, which due to weather conditions could not be carried out later than the beginning of October. If it were not possible by then, it would have to be postponed until May of the following year. It developed that air superiority could not be produced to the necessary extent; consequently it was said that the landing was to be postponed until the spring of the following year. Further preparations were to be taken and they actually were taken. But in the course of the winter the idea of a landing was completely abandoned, and Hitler decreed that preparations in the harbors along the Channel should be carried on only to such an extent as would give the British the impression that this landing actually was to take place. In September I had the impression that Hitler no longer had any great interest in this landing and that in his own mind he was completely committed to the Russian campaign in conjunction with which he, of course, could not carry out the landing in England.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, I turn to the accusation raised against you by the Prosecution that you demanded that war be waged against America. The Prosecution has submitted in this connection Document C-152, or GB-122, which is to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 23. This is an extract from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff dealing with a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy-that is, you-to the Fuehrer on 18 March 1941. Under Figure 11 of this document, it is stated, and I quote:
"Japan must proceed to take Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (preoccupation of the entire British fleet elsewhere; the unreadiness of the United States to carry on a war against Japan; the inferiority of the United States fleet to the Japanese
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fleet). Japan is, indeed, preparing for this action but will carry it out, according to statements of Japanese officers, only at the moment when Germany proceeds with the landing in England. All efforts on Germany's part must therefore aim to incite Japan to immediate action. If Japan captures Singapore, then all other Eastern Asiatic problems relating to the United States and England will be solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, and Dutch East Indies).
"Japan wants to avoid a war against the United States of America, if at all possible, and can do so if she takes Singapore promptly."
The Prosecution has construed this statement of yours to mean that you wanted to lead Japan into a war against America. Is that correct?
RAEDER: It is one of the most incorrect assertions contained in the Indictment against me. It is entirely clear that, since I was involved in a naval war with England with my small German Navy, I did not want, under any circumstances, to have America on my neck as well; and it has been discussed here repeatedly that my most urgent effort during the entire first few years of the war was to avoid, under all circumstances, being involved with the United States. Admiral Wagner described here in detail the limitations which I had imposed on the German Navy in order to prevent any clashes with the United States. I imposed limitations which actually I could hardly justify when I carried on U-boat warfare with such relatively small means. On the other hand, the United States from the end of 1940 on, at the latest, and during the entire year of 1941, exerted pressure on us in our naval warfare wherever possible and committed actions which could be interpreted as definitely not neutral. I remind you merely of the repairing of British warships in the United States, something which up until that time was completely impossible and unheard of; and Roosevelt's orders to shoot given in July and in September 1941; attacks by the American destroyers Greer and Kearney in the Atlantic on our U-boats. In two cases U-boats were pursued with depth charges for 2 hours until finally they surfaced and fired, in one case damaging one destroyer. Despite all this, in June 1941 I reported to Hitler that we were continuing not to disturb the merchantmen of the United States in any way-with the result that United States merchantmen were crossing the Atlantic completely unmolested on sea lanes of their own choosing, were in a position to give reports about our U-boats and our sea warfare without our preventing them from doing so; because of this the British were in a position to camouflage their ships as American ships. That they did. The first time our pocket battleship Admiral Scheer, while crossing the Atlantic, searched a
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ship flying the American flag it turned out to be the British ship Canadian Cruiser. Despite all this I recommended to the Fuehrer, and he fully approved my suggestion, that we should take no measures against American ships. That we did not go to Halifax to lay mines Admiral Wagner has already mentioned. I need not mention that any further.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this proposal that Japan capture Singapore only for the purpose of having assistance and an ally against England, with whom we were already at war?
RAEDER: That is actually the case, and I should like to picture very briefly the development which led to this proposal. This was not anything that I did on my own initiative, but rather at the beginning of the year 1941 political negotiations were carried on with Japan partly by the Fuehrer and partly by the Foreign Minister. I was not even called into these negotiations, and I must say regrettably so, for at these negotiations many things were discussed which were not correct. However on the other hand this shows again that there can be no talk about a conspiracy. Contact was made, and then the visit of the Foreign Minister Matsuoka took place, I believe, in March.
On the basis of this entire development the Fuehrer, on 5 March 1941, issued Directive Number 24. That is Document C-75, USA-151, of 5 March.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to Document C-75, which is the same as USA-151, to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10a, Page 58. In this Directive, Number 24, it says under Figure 3a:
"As the joint object in the war it is important to defeat England quickly and in that way keep the United States out of the war."
And three paragraphs farther down, under "d," it says:
"The capture of Singapore..."
THE PRESIDENT: That on Page 58 is Instruction Number 54, concerning collaboration with Japan.
DR. SIEMERS: I have just been advised-to my surprise-that only a part of this directive is to be found in the English translation. I ask that the Tribunal grant me permission, under these circumstances, to submit the complete directive later as a Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got it in your Raeder book, Dr. Siemers?
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DR. SIEMERS: No, not up until now; for I did not know that only a part had been translated. I am asking for permission to submit this whole document later as a Raeder document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you. This may be found under Figure 3a, and the next quotation will be found under Figure 3d, and it says:
"The capture of Singapore, which is the key position of England in the Far East, would be a decisive achievement in the war effort of the three powers. Beyond that, attacks on other bases of British and American sea power, if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented, will serve to shatter the might of the enemy in that zone...."
I ask the Tribunal to note the fact that already on 5 March, which is the date of this directive, Hitler decreed the capture of Singapore. Consequently, the suggestion made by Admiral Raeder in Document C-152, dated 18 March, cannot be considered decisive, since a Hitler decree was already in existence.
RAEDER: May I make a brief remark about that? The same thing seems to apply to all the cases which are being mentioned here: First of all, the political decision by Hitler, the head of the State; then the directive of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to the Armed Forces; then the conclusions drawn by the commanders-in-chief of the separate branches of the Wehrmacht. So, after I received the directive of 5 March, I had to contemplate how Japan, after entering the war, could strategically be used with the best results. And that depended on how we could most effectively wound our main opponent, England, on the sea. In this connection I had to insist most urgently that Japan move against Singapore since there were also circles who were of the opinion that Japan should attack Vladivostok, which would have been a grave mistake.
England's power center in East Asia had to be attacked. But the very fact that I believed that the capture of Singapore would cause the United States of America to shy away from the war occasioned this proposal of mine, and not the opposite.
DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection, I refer to Document 1877-PS which was submitted in the special Indictment against you. It is USA-152 and may be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, Page 320. It is a conversation between the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka-I am just told now that 320 is incorrect. It should be 319.
THE PRESIDENT: And it should be 10a, I think.
DR. SIEMERS: 10a, I beg your pardon.
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It is a conversation between Matsuoka and Von Ribbentrop on 29 March 1941. We have already discussed this matter. On Page 8 of this document, the following is said:
"The Reich Foreign Minister again referred to the problem of Singapore. Because of the fear expressed by Japan that there might be U-boat attacks from the Philippines and that the British Mediterranean Fleet and Home Fleet would join the attack he had discussed the situation once more with Admiral Raeder. The latter told him that the British fleet would be so completely occupied in the home waters and in the Mediterranean this year that she would not be able to dispatch even a single ship to the Far East.
"The American U-boats were described by Admiral Raeder as being so inferior that Japan would not have to concern herself about them at all."
[Turning to the defendant.] Herr Von Ribbentrop, in reply to my question on 1 April 1946, declared that he had been mistaken, that the statement was probably made by Hitler. Will you please clarify this statement once and for all?
RAEDER: I can only confirm that I never discussed such questions with Herr Von Ribbentrop, for unfortunately there was no connection between the Foreign Office and the High Command of the Navy especially since the Fuehrer had forbidden that any information be given by the Foreign Office to the military authorities. I would never have made such statements since they were in direct opposition to my own opinion, and especially since in this case I had no basis for any such statements.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, were not, on the other hand, questions frequently dealt with in the Naval Operations Staff as to the industrial and military strength of the United States, and that for these reasons any entrance of the United States was to be feared?
RAEDER: This was fully clear to us, even to the last detail.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you at any time during the war see this Document 1877-PS, which is before you?
RAEDER: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you advised about these discussions between Herr Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Minister Matsuoka or the discussion with Oshima?
RAEDER: No; I was merely told by the Fuehrer, and that is shown in the Document C-170, dealing with the results of this discussion with Matsuoka. But I had no discussions with Herr Von Ribbentrop.
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DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I have just been asked to correct a word which I have just used; in order to be fair, I should like to do so. I said that Hitler, in his directive of 5 March 1941, "decreed" that Singapore be taken. The expression is not correct. He naturally could not give any orders to Japan. The mistake arises because the directive starts with the words: "The Fuehrer has commanded the following for our co-operation." And under Figure 3 it says: "The following directives apply in this case." And among these directives the taking of Singapore is mentioned.
Admiral, in any conversation did you suggest to anyone at any time that Japan attack Pearl Harbor?
RAEDER: No, we never talked about that at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you hear anything about this plan before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor?
RAEDER: Never. It was a complete surprise for me and the Naval Operations Staff that this attack took place; and it is a complete mistake in judging the mentality of the Japanese to assume that they would have spoken of such a plan to anyone, even inside Japan, who was not directly connected with it. In 1904 they likewise attacked Russian ships "out of the blue" without anyone suspecting anything at all.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should like to submit three documents which have been granted me, first Exhibit Number Raeder-19, to be found in Document Book 2, Page 108. This document deals with the report by the American General Marshall which has been placed at my disposal through the help of the Court.
In this report, dated 1 September 1945, General Marshall stated the following; and I refer to Page 116:
"In order to establish for the historical record where and how Germany and Japan failed I asked General Eisenhower to have his Intelligence officers promptly interrogate the ranking members of the German High Command who are now our prisoners of war. The results of these interviews are of remarkable interest. They give a picture of dissension among the enemy nations and lack of long-range planning that may well have been decisive factors of this world struggle at its most critical moments."
And two paragraphs further:
"No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan. Although the High Command approved Hitler's policies in principle, his impetuous strategy outran German military capabilities and ultimately led to Germany's defeat. The history of the German
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High Command from 1938 on is one of constant conflict of personalities in which military judgment was increasingly . subordinated to Hitler's personal dictates. The first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective conservative influence on German foreign policy.
"The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, and the Low Countries developed serious diversions between Hitler and the General Staff as to the details of execution of strategic plans. In each case the General Staff favored the orthodox offensive, Hitler an unorthodox attack with objectives deep in enemy territory. In each case Hitler's views prevailed and the astounding success of each succeeding campaign raised Hitler's military prestige to the point where his opinions were no longer challenged. His military self-confidence became unassailable after the victory in France, and he began to disparage substantially the ideas of his generals, even in the presence of junior officers. Thus no General Staff objection was expressed when Hitler made the fatal decision to invade Soviet Russia."
And on Page 118, there is an extract dealing with Germany and Japan. I quote:
"Nor is there evidence of close strategic co-ordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea, and air forces in the Far East.
"In the absence of any evidence so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan."
And further, in the documents which were also granted me, Exhibit Raeder-113 and 114, in the Document Book 6, Page 491 and Page 497. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think you should ask the witness whether he agrees with General Marshall's appreciation.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you agree with the opinions of the American General Marshall?
RAEDER: I have not completely absorbed these statements. In general they are the lines of thought which we also had pursued, but I cannot vouch for each single point. In order to speak with certainty I would have to look at them or they would have to be read to me again.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe the general confirmation is sufficient. In Document Raeder-113 I should like to refer to the heading:
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"Army Foresaw Japan's Move, Marshall Says:
"Washington, December 11 (AP)-General George C. Marshall, formerly Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged last night that the Army knew more than 10 days before December 7, 1941, that a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor might take them past the deadline where the American chiefs believed the U.S. should fight."
In order to save time I shall not read the particulars; but it can be gathered from the report by Marshall that the American Army knew about it and later the date of November 25 and 26 is mentioned. In addition Marshall testifies that preparations had been worked out in the United States before the war for the construction of landing strips for American bombers in Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Singapore.
In Exhibit Number Raeder-114, which I am also submitting, Henry L. Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War, made a statement under date of 21 March.
"Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Secretary of War, disclosed that the late President Roosevelt's War Cabinet had discussed and rejected-9 days before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor- an American attack on the Japanese forces without further warning . . .
"Stimson related that he had received on November 28, 1941 information of Japanese movements along the Asiatic coast. On the same day, he said, the Cabinet met and discussed the possible meaning of the Japanese move."
He further said that:
". . . if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight, and that if the British fought we would have to fight."
According to this, Admiral, did the United States know about these Japanese plans before you did?
RAEDER: Apparently, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I shall turn to the last accusation by the Prosecution, and that concerns Brazil. In this connection, the Prosecution has submitted Document 1807-PS, GB-227, to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 288. This is Jodl's diary, the entry of 16 June 1942. I have to beg your pardon, I am told it is Page 287, not 288. This entry reads:
"The Naval Operations Staff applied on 29 May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. It considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this moment when defensive measures are still incomplete and there is the possibility of surprise,
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since Brazil is to all intents and purposes waging naval warfare against Germany."
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution is accusing you of violating neutrality and violating international law because you made that proposal at a time when Brazil was neutral I call your attention to the fact that the war with Brazil broke out 2 months later on 22 August 1942. Please tell me briefly from memory just how you came to make this proposal.
RAEDER: The relations between Brazil and Germany at this time could not have been worse. The Germans were very much persecuted and treated very badly. Germany's economic interests were heavily impaired. The Brazilians were already completely on the side of the United States. They had allowed United States air bases to be established along the Brazilian coast, and also intelligence stations. They themselves confirmed that they had destroyed a German U-boat; and, on the other side, the German U-boats had also attacked Brazilian ships, for the Brazilian ships were not illuminated according to regulations and consequently could not be recognized as Brazilian ships. Germany had previously asked all of the South American countries to illuminate their ships in such a way that their nationality could be distinguished at night. Then there were air attacks on U-boats of the Axis Powers, and they could have been carried out only from Brazilian bases. At this request of the Naval Operations Staff to the Fuehrer, the Fuehrer decreed that once again we should ask the Italians what intelligence reports they had received; and Italy in turn confirmed that some weeks before Italian U-boats, which had been operating together with ours, had been attacked near the Brazilian coast. Likewise the Brazilian Air Ministry had made known the fact that Brazilian aircraft or United States aircraft coming from Brazilian air bases had attacked Axis U-boats.
On the basis of that confirmation the Fuehrer permitted the use of weapons against Brazilian ships along the Brazilian coast. A plan was worked out, according to which a certain wave of U-boats, which left the French coast in June to proceed into the Atlantic, was to go to the Brazilian coast. The Fuehrer had ordered in particular that this was not to be mere pin-pricks but rather a serious enterprise. This operation was later stopped and not carried through. I am sorry that I am not able to say for what reason. But it can be seen from our document which gives the statements made in the War Diary.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the Tribunal, I believe that the entire accusation of the Prosecution regarding this planning would not have been raised if Document 1807-PS, Jodl's diary entry of
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16 June, had been submitted in toto. Only the first part was submitted. Therefore, I submit this entry as Exhibit Number Raeder-115, to be found in Document Book 6, Page 500. From the further statements made by General Jodl in his diary we may conclude that the situation was correctly investigated.
The first part, which was submitted by the Prosecution, that is, the first two sentences, I have already read. The rest of the entry is as follows:
"Ambassador Ritter of the Foreign Office declares that an aggravation of the conflict with Brazil is undesirable in view of the attitude of Argentina and Chile and that, previous to measures of war against Brazil, consultations must be held with Italy and Japan. Acting on the report of the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Fuehrer has ordered on 30 May, that the Naval Operations Staff is to ascertain, by inquiring in Rome, whether the Brazilian reports about warlike actions against Axis U-boats are correct. The inquiry by the Naval Operations Staff shows that Italian U-boats were attacked on 22 and 26 May at the northeast corner of Brazil by airplanes which beyond a doubt had started from a Brazilian air base. The Naval Operations Staff transmit, moreover, the text of the official communique of the Brazilian Air Ministry about the fighting and propose to put into action near the main Brazilian harbors during the period from 3-8 August 10 U-boats to sail from 22 June to 4 July from ports in western France, along with the tanker U-460. The order for execution must be given to the U-boats by 15 June at the latest. After the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had reported this to the Fuehrer at the Berghof on the afternoon of 15 June, the Fuehrer declared himself in agreement with the intentions of the Naval Operations Staff but ordered, however, that before any final decision is made, the political situation be examined once again by the Foreign Office."
I believe that this proves that we were careful enough; and I refer further to Exhibit Number Raeder-116 which I should like to submit herewith, in the same document book, Page 503, which is an extract from the War Diary. Under date 6 June there is an entry which states that the development has gone so far that:
"... a latent state of war is practically already in existence, (Brazil entirely on the side of USA; most severe damage to all German interests; individual Brazilian steamers not properly illuminated sunk by U-boats; increasing agitation in Brazil; Brazilians claim they have already sunk German U-boat while patrolling the coast)."
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And a further extract from the War Diary, Exhibit Raeder-117, which I should like to submit herewith, to be found in the same document book, Page 509. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document and its contents and I refer only to Figures 3 and 4 in detail. Under Figure 3 it reads:
"When Brazilian ships began to provide themselves with camouflage paint and to arm, the order was given on 15 May 1942 to use arms at once against recognizable armed South Americans."
And under Figure 4 it says:
"On the basis of the fact that Axis submarines were attacked by vessels along the Brazilian coast and that the Brazilian Air Ministry officially made known that attacks had been made by the Brazilian Air Force, the Naval Operations Staff on 29 May 1942, in Document 12938/42, Top Secret, asked the Armed Forces Operations Staff for permission to use arms against Brazilian military forces and merchant ships."
I submit also Exhibit Number Raeder-118, Document Book 6, Page 510. I ask the High Tribunal to take notice of this document. I do not wish to quote it, since it repeats the facts we have already heard. I believe that Figure 4 of Document 117 which I have just read clarifies the matter completely and refutes every accusation against the Navy.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, do you have anything to add to these extracts from the War Diary?
RAEDER: No, I have nothing to add. It is entirely clear.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I ask you now to describe to the High Tribunal-and with this I am coming to the conclusion of my examination-how it came about that you resigned in January 1943?
Your Honors, shall we have a recess first?
THE PRESIDENT: It depends on whether you hope to finish in a few minutes. If you hope to finish in a few minutes we will sit on so that you may finish your examination.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe it will take perhaps 10 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] Please describe how it came about that you resigned in January of 1943; but first I should like to ask you one more question: Did you, even before this, have the idea of resigning?
RAEDER: I should like to say briefly that on several occasions before the war I asked the Fuehrer to relieve me of my post, or I presented him with an ultimatum. I should like briefly to cite two cases as examples. In November 1938 in the presence of General
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Keitel I made a report to the Fuehrer about the type of ships and our plans as to how the ships should be developed further. On this occasion the Fuehrer, in a manner defying explanation, began to attack everything that we had built and were building, including the plans for the Bismarck, and to declare them wrong. Later I found out that things like that happened whenever some persons of his entourage, who knew very little about such things, gave him their opinion, that he always followed it up, probably wanting--as I told myself later-to check whether the things he had been told were actually correct.
This case, however, was so extreme that I could not do anything else but simply pick up my plans, put them in my brief case, and leave the room. General Keitel was present. The Fuehrer followed me to the door, asked me to come in again, softened his accusations, and asked me not to resign now under any circumstances.
The second case was a purely personal one, but it is rather typical. His naval adjutant, who had just been appointed, wanted to marry a young girl who had a very unsavory reputation at the University of Kiel. I told him I would never consent to the marriage. The Fuehrer had the girl introduced to him and decided he had nothing against the marriage; I left the Berghof and sent the Fuehrer a letter via a staff: officer in which I told him that I would refuse my consent, that the officer would not remain in the Navy should he marry, or else I would not remain. I asked the officer who acted as my courier to bring back the answer since I wanted to reach a decision at once. The Fuehrer had the officer wait 2 days at the Berghof and then sent him back to me with a letter saying:
"Very well, the officer cannot marry and remain in the Navy and he will not be used further as a naval adjutant; someone else will be put in his place. He will become some sort of leader in my National Socialist Motor Corps and will then serve as one of my Party adjutants."
It was also typical of the Fuehrer that, to a certain degree, he wanted to see his will carried through; but this man was out of the Navy, and I could make my conviction felt in this case. Under these circumstances I declared myself ready to continue in office. That was at the beginning of 1939; in the course of the spring, however, I asked again whether I could not be relieved of my position now, since I had served for many years in the Navy and I did not believe I would be able to maintain the dignity of the office much longer. I suggested to him that perhaps in October 1939 I should leave my post. The Fuehrer refused at the time, and on 1 October we were at war, and in time of war I did not believe that I could leave the Navy under any circumstances unless it was very urgent, especially since I considered myself totally responsible for
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all preparations and for the training of the Navy. In the course of the war our co-operating which up until then, aside from such incidents, had been quite congenial, since the Fuehrer had always made an effort to show me respect, our connection gradually became very strained during the war. The Fuehrer became more nervous when I made reports, flared up in rage when there were divergences of opinion or if there had been any incidents, as, for instance, a technical defect or poor performance by a ship. It happened again and again that his entourage influenced him before I could actually explain matters to him, and I was called in subsequently to set him straight on these matters. In that way unpleasant scenes ensued which wore me out.
One point about which the Fuehrer was especially sensitive was the large ships. He was always uneasy when our large ships were out on the high seas and were carrying on raids against shipping. The loss of a ship, such as the Gray Spee or later the Bismarck, he considered a tremendous loss of prestige; and matters like that, therefore, excited him tremendously. That went on until the end of 1942. Then there came-and this particularly impressed me-my defeat in the consultation with the Fuehrer on questions dealing with Norway, France, and above all, Russia. In the final analysis he always listened more to the Party people as, for example, Terboven, than to an old officer. That led to a situation which could not be tolerated for any length of time. One of the basic characteristics of the Fuehrer was a tremendous suspicion toward anyone and everyone, but especially directed against old officers who had come from the old Wehrmacht and of whom he always assumed-despite all well-intentioned treatment-that in their hearts they did not share these feelings which he had to demand of them. Especially the case of Russia had led me to so many conflicts with him that our relations were strongly influenced thereby. Indeed, the man who compiled all these war diaries and minutes, Admiral Assmann, summed it up on one occasion at the conclusion of such a discussion with the words; "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, therefore, is in complete opposition to the Fuehrer in this matter."
At the end of 1942, just after I had had to put an end to the entire Norwegian question, an incident occurred which led to the end. There was to have been an attack on a convoy which was going to Murmansk or Archangel from England. It was in December at a time when in those northern regions there are just 1 or 2 hours of light and hence no favorable weather for fighting by large ships when up against large numbers of destroyers. The ships, together with the destroyers, had started on their journey and had reached the convoy while it was still light. But since daylight soon disappeared and darkness fell and since the convoy was guarded by
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many destroyers, the admiral considered it expedient to withdraw the big ships from the battle. That was the only correct decision for he might have lost them ad by torpedo attack. This fact, and secondly the fact that unfortunately the radio connection between this admiral and the Naval Operations Staff was made difficult and at times completely broken off by static, caused the Fuehrer to become extremely excited in his headquarters where I reported to him everything I found out myself. The whole day was spent with questions back and forth, and even in the evening I could not give him a clear picture. This excited him extremely. Through Admiral Krancke he had all sorts of insults transmitted to me and demanded that I report to him immediately; and I could see that very strong friction would result. I arranged it so that I did not need to report to him until 6 days later on 6 January so that the atmosphere could first cool off a little. On 6 January I could go to him with a complete report; and in the evening, at a discussion at which Field Marshal Keitel was also present, he made a speech of about an hour's duration in which he made derogatory remarks about everything that the Navy had done so far, in direct contrast to every judgment passed on the Navy up until this time. From this I saw that he was anxious to bring about a break.
I personally was firmly prepared to seize this opportunity to resign, especially as it became ever clearer that the war was becoming a pure U-boat war, and I could therefore feel that I could leave at this moment with a clear conscience.
After the Fuehrer had concluded his speech I asked to be permitted to speak with him alone. Field Marshal Keitel and the stenographers left and I told him that I was asking for my resignation as I could see from his words that he was entirely dissatisfied with me and therefore this was the proper moment for me to leave. As always, he tried at first to dissuade me but I remained adamant and told him that a new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy who would have complete responsibility would definitely have to be appointed. He said that it would be a great burden for him if I were to leave now since for one thing the situation was very critical-Stalingrad was impending-and secondly, since he had already been accused of dismissing so many generals. In the eyes of the outside world it would incriminate him if I were to leave at this point. I told him that I would do everything I could to prevent that happening. If he wanted to give the appearance as far as the outside world was concerned that I had not resigned because of a clash, then he could make me a general inspector with some sort of nominal title, which would create the impression that I was still with the Navy and that my name was still connected with the Navy. This appealed to him at once and I told
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him on 6 January that I wanted to be dismissed on 30 January. At this point I had concluded 10 years of service as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy under him. He agreed to this proposal and asked me to suggest two successors so that he could make a choice.
On 30 January he then personally dismissed me by appointing me Admiral Inspector of the Navy. He said that he would still on occasion ask me for advice; but that never happened. I was merely sent out twice, once to Bulgaria when the King of Bulgaria was buried and once to Hungary, to the Hungarian Regent Horthy to bring him a gift from the Fuehrer.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you otherwise performed no tasks as Admiral Inspector?
RAEDER: I had no functions and received no orders.
DR. SIEMERS: Then my last question: Did you have the impression, on the occasion of your conversation of 6 January 1943 with Hitler, that he in a way was glad to get rid of you in view of the many differences of opinion and the fact that you contradicted him frequently on technical naval and political matters concerning Norway, France, Russia?
RAEDER: I do believe that he wanted to get rid of me at this time, for I was in a certain way an inconvenience for him. This one case which I described, where I had my way in the end, he had never forgotten.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much.
This concludes my examination of Admiral Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit today until half past one. It will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel want to ask questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): Admiral, you recall the memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff of 15 October concerning possibilities for an intensification of the economic war. That is in the Document Book of the British Delegation, Number 10, on Pages 96 and 97 of the English text. Admiral Wagner has already testified about it here. Can you add anything to that statement concerning the purpose and the meaning of that memorandum?
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RAEDER: Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed questions of submarine warfare. Among other things we had not yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine warfare which had played such a very important part in the previous war. And from that fact it developed that on 3 September that officer who was recently mentioned here was sent to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on the question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to just how far we could go. And that is the document which recently played a role here, D-851, GB-451, of 3 November.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: 3 September, you mean.
RAEDER: Yes, 3 September. This touches upon all these questions. Then discussions with the Foreign Office took place and this U-boat memorandum mentioned by you was worked out in the High Command of the Navy on the basis of these discussions and released on 15 October. I believe that on 15 October I presented it to the Fuehrer who in principle agreed to the contents. But the very fact that a memorandum about submarine warfare concerning possibilities for an intensification of submarine warfare was issued only on 15 October shows how little we were prepared for that eventuality.
That memorandum contains near the beginning that sentence which has been quoted by the Prosecution concerning our position with respect to international law, where reference is made to highest ethics of warfare, adherence to international law, and the desire to base all military measures on existing laws wherever possible. But if this is not possible or when by deviation it is possible to achieve decisive military results, and we could take the responsibility for this deviation, then in case of necessity we must depart from existing international law. That means that also a new international law may have to be developed.
However, this entire memorandum represents merely a constant search for possibilities for conducting submarine warfare with the least damage to neutrals and the greatest possible adherence to international law and in such a way that it would become a decisive factor in the outcome of the war.
Various cases are discussed as to how an intensification can be reached, but it always was a question of finding countermeasures against enemy measures. Such possibilities as blockade or the new concept to lay siege to England by submarine warfare are examined in all directions; but the draft always states the conclusion that in view of the number of submarines and other misgivings it is not yet possible to conduct such operations.
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And the final result of that entire memorandum, as set down in that document, can be found in the two last pages. Unfortunately I have only the German copy in front of me where under the last Paragraph D the final opinion, the following sentences which I should like to quote, are worthy of notice...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the extract?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: On Pages 99 and 100 in the Document Book 10, GB-224.
Mr. President, another excerpt from the same document has already been mentioned and that is in the Document Book Doenitz 3, on Pages 199 to 203; but I do not believe that it is necessary to refer to it because the witness will only read one or two sentences.
RAEDER: [Continuing.] Now, the last paragraph "Conclusions" reads:
"1.) The manner in which economic warfare has been conducted until now, in accordance with Prize Regulations, does not meet with military demands for ruthless severity.
"A large part of enemy mercantile trade including all exports in neutral ships is not covered.
"The requirements of naval law that neutral merchantmen be stopped and searched can no longer be fulfilled, in view of the strength of aerial reconnaissance and U-boat countermeasures in the enemy's coastal approaches. Economic warfare according to Prize Regulations has therefore to be limited and in the North Sea and the Baltic must be left to surface craft only. In the Atlantic the U-boats in enemy coastal waters will limit their activities to attacks without warning on convoys, troop transports, and once it has been approved, armed and all enemy merchantmen, and will conduct economic warfare according to the law governing prizes only in exceptional cases. The use of the Operational Air Force for economic warfare is not possible. Economic warfare is conducted within the framework of international law. A possibility of controversy with neutral states is ruled out."
Then one more sentence:
"If the Supreme War Command for political reasons should not be able at present to decide to wage the economic war in the most vigorous form possible by having recourse to a siege, it will be possible to increase the effectiveness of the policy of stopping enemy trade by a ruthless increase in the use of mines and by air attacks on enemy port installations. One cannot, however, expect a decisive result from the economic war in its present form." (Document C-157, Exhibit GB-224)
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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: The immediate result of that memorandum and of your report to the Fuehrer was the order of 17 October?
RAEDER: Yes, and that provided: Firstly, that all enemy merchantmen could be torpedoed; and secondly, as a severer measure, that passenger ships in convoys could be torpedoed a short time after an announcement to that effect had been made. That was all done in connection with the intensification, measure for measure, which we had brought about in answer to individual acts of the enemy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, that long passage that the defendant has just read, if it has not been put in evidence yet, must be offered in evidence by you. I understand it is not in evidence at present.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I can help. I shall be using this document and I shall put it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it been offered in evidence?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only part of it, not the part that the defendant has referred to. But, in view of that I shall refer to it later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Admiral, you mentioned that before 1935 certain preparations were made for the construction of a German submarine weapon. Did Admiral Doenitz participate in any way in these preparations?
RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. As was said before, he was abroad during the last year; but even before that he had nothing to do with it.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: You have reported about your dismissal as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Would you please tell me how it came about that Admiral Doenitz became your successor?
RAEDER: The Fuehrer had ordered that I propose two admirals as successors. I suggested in writing first, as the elder...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, how does this arise? I mean, what relevancy has it to anything we have to decide as to how Admiral Doenitz became head of the Navy?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: That has significance, Mr. President, in view of the Prosecution's assertion that Admiral Doenitz became the successor of Admiral Raeder on the basis of political relations or services rendered.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
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FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Please continue, Admiral.
RAEDER: I'll be very brief. I suggested, first, Admiral Carls, who was the senior and has vast knowledge of the entire conduct of naval policy. In the event that the Fuehrer should want to manifest that he now was placing U-boat warfare in the foreground I suggested Admiral Doenitz, who was the greatest authority in that field. Political considerations of any kind were not mentioned at all; it was purely an official, technical appointment.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: I have no more questions.
DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, the Tribunal, through its letter of 26 March, has consented that an affidavit be submitted by the Codefendant Raeder for the Defendant Keitel, provided the Prosecution has an opportunity to question Admiral Raeder on his statements in cross-examination.
I have sent the affidavit to the Prosecution, and the Prosecution has raised no objection. I ask to be permitted to submit this affidavit which is concerned with the functions and position of the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, as Exhibit Number Keitel-l9, after Admiral Raeder has confirmed that he signed this affidavit and that he agrees to its being submitted.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, you are acquainted with the questions which I put to you and which, after a conference with your counsel, you answered and signed on 19 March?
RAEDER: That is about the position of Field Marshal Keitel in the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
RAEDER: I am quite familiar with that.
DR. NELTE: Then, may I submit this affidavit? The Prosecution has a copy of it.
I have a few more questions for Admiral Raeder, the answers to which can be greatly simplified with the permission of the Court. These are the same questions which on 9 May, a week ago, I put to Admiral Doenitz and which refer to the assertion made by the witness Dr. Gisevius about Keitel's tremendous influence and the circle of silence which Keitel is said to have drawn around Hitler. I merely want to ask the witness Admiral Raeder, with the permission of the Tribunal, whether he can confirm as correct for the period before 1943 as well-that is, for the period during which Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy-the answers to my questions given by Admiral Doenitz in Raeder's presence. I ask for the decision of the Tribunal whether I may put this general question in order to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
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DR. NELTE: You heard what I said, and I ask you, can you confirm the answers given by Admiral Doenitz to my questions on 9 May for the period before 1943 as well?
RAEDER: Yes, that I can do.
DR. NELTE: Now, I have one final question. During your testimony Document L-79, the "Little Schmundt" file, was treated. You objected to this document as inaccurate and not of probative value?
DR. NELTE: Dr. Siemers then quoted a part of that document which the Prosecution, at the time when it submitted the document, had not read. In that part of the document there is mention of a research staff in the OKW.
DR. NELTE: I ask you now to tell me whether such a research staff in the OKW was ever actually created.
RAEDER: Not to my knowledge. The work was done by the Armed Forces Operations Staff in which there were officers representing all three branches of the Armed Forces.
DR. NELTE: So there was no change in the scope of tasks and in the division of jurisdiction?
RAEDER: No, definitely not.
DR. NELTE: That also concerns the question of working out strategic and operational matters between the OKW and the Armed Forces Operations Staff on one hand and the general staffs of the Armed Forces branches, including the Naval Operations Staff, on the other?
RAEDER: As far as the Naval Operations Staff is concerned, yes, there was no change.
DR. NELTE: And as far as the other branches of the Armed Forces are concerned do you know of no change or...?
RAEDER: That I cannot say. I do not know about that.
DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and Halder have testified about that.
Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, is the affidavit that you referred to contained in your document book?
DR. NELTE: No, not yet. It will be Number Keitel-19.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you have translations supplied to the Tribunal?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
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DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Admiral, you are the senior member of the group of the General Staff of the OKW, and you belonged to this so-called group for the longest time?
DR. LATERNSER: In what manner did you become a member of this so-called group?
RAEDER: I was appointed Chief of the Naval Command Staff by Reich President Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. I did not join that group by doing so; rather I became Chief of the Navy. One was not aware of any group.
DR. LATERNSER: Joining and remaining in this group the Prosecution maintains was voluntary. Was there any possibility at all for military leaders to apply for any vacant posts?
RAEDER: No, there was nothing of the sort.
DR. LATERNSER: In other words, military accomplishments were the decisive factor?
RAEDER: It was a military order. There was no question of its being voluntary.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you know the various members of the group at the time when you belonged to it?
RAEDER: No, I certainly did not know all individuals from the other branches. Of course, I knew a large number.
DR. LATERNSER: Within the purely military leadership was there ever a conference about a plan which had as its purpose the launching of aggressive wars?
RAEDER: No, there was never such a conference. Frequently it has been mentioned here how the various enterprises came about-the political decision of the Fuehrer, a directive issued by him, and then the working out of the final order.
DR. LATERNSER: Admiral, I do not mean now by this question the meetings which took place under Hitler's leadership. I mean meetings of purely military officers.
RAEDER: Do you mean within the various branches of the Armed Forces?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, within the various branches.
RAEDER: Of course, within the Naval Operations Staff there were meetings about various questions, but not about aggressive wars.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, my questions referred only to that. The Prosecution asserts, furthermore, that this indicted group was first established by the National Socialist Regime. Is that correct?
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RAEDER: In no way whatsoever. There was no group at all, but the organization was such as has frequently been described.
DR. LATERNSER: And such as has always existed in all armies of the world?
RAEDER: Yes, as has always existed.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has furthermore asserted that, after the seizure of power by Hitler, the high military leaders had the choice either of co-operating or of accepting the consequence that the new regime would establish new armed forces, that is armed forces of their own, and that on the basis of this situation the generals decided to co-operate. Is that assertion by the Prosecution correct?
RAEDER: No. It is not true that thereupon any joining of forces took place. I know that such tendencies existed. For instance, once in 1934 I reported to the Fuehrer that I had been informed that SA GruppenFuehrer Killinger, who had formerly been in the Navy and had advanced to prominence (in the SA), had the intention of becoming the Chief of Naval Operations Staff. But I was not aware of any further efforts. But above all, there was no coalition of the generals for defensive action against such an intention.
DR. LATERNSER: So the assertion made by the Prosecution is not correct?
RAEDER: No, not correct. That was not in the least a method which would have been in accordance with the sentiments of the soldier-that such a coalition be formed to avert something.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution furthermore asserts that the group, above all, the generals, let themselves be won over by the regime because of the chance of conquest. Is that assertion correct?
RAEDER: That is an absolutely incorrect and farfetched assertion.
DR. LATERNSER: Was the effort of the Party to acquire for itself supreme authority ever supported or promoted by the military?
RAEDER: I do not know that that ever happened. Do you mean the seizure of power?
DR. LATERNSER: After the seizure of power was the Party supported by military leaders, as far as you know, in its efforts to attain sole domination in Germany?
DR. LATERNSER: Yesterday, in reply to the question of your counsel, you described how you came to swear your oath to Hitler.
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If such an intention had existed in the mind of one of the commanders-in-chief, would it have been possible for him to refuse the oath?
RAEDER: That I cannot say, but I believe that not one of us saw any necessity for refusing that oath.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution has further asserted that the high military chiefs agreed completely with the principles and aims of National Socialism. Is that correct?
RAEDER: I explained here yesterday how far one could agree with the principles of National Socialism and to what extent one trained one's soldiers according to these principles. Anything that went beyond that was rejected and found no acceptance in the Navy. Here I can speak only for the Navy.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the officers who were subordinate to you and who were in the group ever have an insight into the political situation and Hitler's intention so that one could speak about participation or membership in the plan?
RAEDER: No. There was an absolute prohibition on speaking to anyone about speeches in which Hitler mentioned intentions and possible developments. The officers below the rank of Armed Forces commander were informed only when things had gone so far that the directive was to be issued.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution further asserts . . .
RAEDER: I have to qualify that. That directive was first worked out by the High Command of the Army and the Navy. Thus they received information as soon as the directive of the individual branches of the Armed Forces was issued and that always happened sometime later.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution also asserts that the high military leaders were not military experts but that they knew Hitler's intentions of aggression and willingly co-operated. Can you name any military leaders who, before they had received orders, took a positive attitude toward any aggressive action?
RAEDER: I cannot answer that. I explained yesterday how Admiral Carls pointed out to me the danger imminent in Norway; but he did not do anything more than give me the information, point out the danger, and elucidate the situation there.
DR. LATERNSER: The attitude of' the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Von Fritsch, and of the Chief of the General Staff Beck to the question of a war is known. I just wanted to ask you, did the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, have the same attitude concerning the war?
RAEDER: I believe so, yes.
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DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the conference on 5 November 1937, you have already made detailed statements yesterday. I would like . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been putting this class of question to every naval and military witness who has been called, and what the Tribunal desires me to point out to you is that there has been no cross-examination by any member of the Prosecution challenging any of these points, so this evidence is entirely repetitive and cumulative and is not bound to be put by you to every military and naval witness who comes into the witness box, and it is simply a waste of time to the Tribunal. When questions are answered by a witness and are not cross-examined to by the other side, it is the practice to assume that the answers are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for me this is an extremely important question which has just been touched upon, namely, the question of whether a question is inadmissible because in the opinion of the Court it is cumulative. I should like to make a few statements concerning whether or not a question is cumulative.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can understand what the Tribunal has said to you, that it is now desired, in view of the directives of the Charter, that this Trial should be as expeditious as it can reasonably be; and it does not desire to have the same evidence adduced to it over and over again. Is that not clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts as true these proofs which I want to bring by means of my question, then I can of course forego these questions. But I cannot determine whether that is the case unless I know that I have succeeded in bringing definite proof ...
THE PRESIDENT: What I wanted to point out to you was that you asked the same question of a great number of witnesses and that those questions have not been cross-examined, and in such circumstances you can assume that answers given by the witnesses are accepted.
DR. LATERNSER: If I am justified in drawing this conclusion, then of course I shall dispense with such questions in the future. I have only a few more questions, Mr. President.
[Turning to the defendant.] In support of the Indictment of the group of the General Staff and the OKW two affidavits have been presented by the Prosecution, one by Field Marshal Von Blomberg and one by Generaloberst Blaskowitz. In these two affidavits both generals state that as a whole, within the circle of generals before the war, the opinion existed that the question of the Corridor would have to be decided unconditionally and, if necessary, with
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force. Is that opinion stated by the two generals correct? Was that the general attitude at that time?
RAEDER: I never heard of such an opinion. In my presence General Von Blomberg never made any statement of that kind. The Polish question was discussed by us in the Navy only to the extent already mentioned here during the last few days, namely that an attack on Poland by Germany would have to be prevented under all circumstances. The political treatment of this question...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant says he has never heard of this suggestion.
DR. LATERNSER: That was the reason why I put the question to the witness.
RAEDER: After 1933 political questions were handled and decided by Hitler exclusively, and he said that he made all policies.
DR. LATERNSER: It is therefore correct that this opinion which Blomberg and Blaskowitz have mentioned does not apply for the circle of generals?
RAEDER: Well, at any rate, I have never heard it expressed by the generals. It did not exist in the Navy.
DR. LATERNSER: You were present at the conferences of 23 November 1939?
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put one supplementary question concerning those conferences. Admiral, do you remember that in the course of these conferences Hitler reproached the generals because they still had old-fashioned ideas of chivalry and that these ideas had to be rejected?
RAEDER: That I cannot say with certainty. I believe that I can recall having once heard it said that Hitler was of that opinion.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one last question concerning the document which your defense counsel already put to you in the course of your examination. It is Document C-66 submitted by the British Prosecution under GB-81. It is in Document Book 10, on Page 13, or 10a, Page 35. On Page 5, in the last paragraph of that page, you said the following and I quote:
"It can be seen from my statements and plans that the Fuehrer reckoned with a definite conclusion of the eastern campaign in the fall of 1941, whereas the High Command of the Army (General Staff) was very skeptical."
Admiral, I wanted to ask you of what this skepticism consisted?
RAEDER: As far as I know, the High Command of the Army was of the opinion that it was impossible to conclude such a
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tremendous campaign in so short a time; and many others shared that opinion, whereas the Fuehrer believed that because of the new weapons and his strategy he could conclude that campaign very quickly.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about whether the High Command of the Army had any fundamental objections before the beginning of the Russian campaign?
RAEDER: As far as I know, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was very much against it; but that too, I cannot say definitely.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no more questions.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Representing Dr. Von Luedinghausen, Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Admiral, in the course of the proceedings it has been testified, I believe by the Codefendant Goering, that Field Marshal Von Hindenburg had expressly desired that Herr Von Neurath become Foreign Minister. Do you know anything about that?
RAEDER: I learned at the time that Hindenburg had expressed that wish, and it caught my attention because Field Marshal Von Hindenburg until that time had always considered merely the appointment of the Minister of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy as his privilege in the Reich Government. This was the first time that he expressed such a wish in the case of a Foreign Minister.
DR. KRAUS: So it was not the practice of the Field Marshal to make any suggestions regarding the appointments of Ministers?
RAEDER: No. He had merely acted according to his own wish to appoint the Defense Minister, even in the previous Social Democratic, Democratic, and other cabinets.
DR. KRAUS: What may have been the reason for Field Marshal Von Hindenburg's making that exception in the case of Neurath?
RAEDER: He probably wanted to make sure under all circumstances that the peaceful policies which had prevailed in Germany up to that time would be continued. He was sure that Herr Von Neurath would continue these policies in the same direction.
DR. KRAUS: So he had particular confidence in Herr Von Neurath's attitude up to that time?
RAEDER: Yes, beyond a doubt.
DR. KRAUS: You knew Von Neurath very well, and you were informed about his political principles, weren't you? What were the main lines of his policies?
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RAEDER: Herr Von Neurath wanted to see the gradual recovery of the German people to normal conditions and he wanted to strive with peaceful means for equal rights for the German Reich. Above all, he wanted to have good relations with England, which was also in conformity with Hindenburg's intentions, and on this very point both of us agreed completely.
DR. KRAUS: So one can say that you considered Von Neurath an exponent of a policy of understanding with England and a peaceful policy of compromise.
DR. KRAUS: Then I have a second question for you, Admiral. A Fritz Wiedemann, who was Hitler's adjutant from 1935 to 1939, has submitted an affidavit. The Prosecution has submitted that affidavit under 3037-PS. In this affidavit Herr Wiedemann states that on 28 May 1938 a conference took place in the winter garden of the Reich Chancellery with all important people of the Foreign Office, the Army, and the Operational Staffs present, a meeting so large that one almost doubts whether all these people could get into the winter garden.
And here, he says, in addition to Goering, General Beck, General Keitel, and Von Brauchitsch, there were also present Von Neurath, Von Ribbentrop, and yourself.
In this meeting Hitler spoke among other things about Czechoslovakia and stated that it was his unshakeable intention that Czechoslovakia must disappear from the map. Do you know anything about that meeting?
RAEDER: Although I can otherwise recall every large or more important meeting, I do not have the slightest recollection of this meeting at that time. The list of those present also seems very unlikely. I have never seen Herr Von Neurath and Herr Von Ribbentrop together at the same meeting. I should also doubt whether Herr Von Neurath at that time was in Berlin at all. He was quite definitely not present at that meeting. But I also do not remember any meeting at which Von Ribbentrop was present as Foreign Minister when military matters were discussed. I think this Herr Wiedemann is mistaken because I believe also that I have never seen him at a meeting in which such matters are supposed to have been discussed. The Fuehrer always sent this personal adjutant of his out of the room beforehand. I believe there is some mistake.
DR. KRAUS: Such an important statement by the Fuehrer you would doubtless have remembered.
RAEDER: Yes. During that summer the Fuehrer's opinions fluctuated greatly. I believe that at the end of May a mobilization took
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place in Czechoslovakia, or something of the sort-I do not remember exactly what. But I attended no meeting, as far as I know, at which such a statement was made.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
Sir David, it seems scarcely worthwhile starting the crossexamination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I entirely agree.