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[The Defendant Seyss-Inquart resumed the stand.]
MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): May it please the Tribunal, the report is made Defendants Hess and Jodl are absent.
M. DEBENEST: Defendant, you agree that very important stocks were sent to Germany?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is quite true.
M. DEBENEST: Concerning another system, for pillage, used in the Netherlands, I would like to submit to you a document which indicates moreover that you were not the only one to participate in this, pillage; but Goering and the OKW are involved too. This is Document F-868, which becomes Exhibit RF-1530. It concerns a teletype message which is addressed to you by the OKW and which is signed Reinecke. This teletype message is dated 5 December 1940 and begins as follows:
"Meeting at the office of the Reich Marshal on 7 October 1940. Regulation concerning the dispatch and the taking of merchandise from Holland by members of the Armed Forces or of the units attached to it.
"In agreement with the Reich Marshal and the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands territories, the regulations in force up to now concerning the dispatch and the taking of merchandise out of Holland are rescinded. Members of the Armed Forces and of the units, organizations and affiliations attached to it"-then follow the designations of these organizations-"as well as the officials of the services employed in Holland, can, within the means at their disposal, send home by military post packages of a maximum weight of 1,000 grams, without any limit on their number. If the parcels weigh more than 250 grams...."
I won't read what follows; it deals with a question of postal rates.
"The taking along of merchandise on the occasion of furlough or other crossing of the frontier is not subject to any restriction."
This regulation was drawn up with your agreement, was it not?
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SEYSS-INQUART: "Agreement" is putting it a little strongly in this case. An authority for confiscation is not involved here, but rather only instructions for transport. These things had to be bought in some manner. They could not be confiscated. The Reich Marshal decreed this and I put it into force. That was the so-called "Schlepp-Erlass," meaning that any soldier who returned from the Netherlands could bring with him as much as he could carry of any of the things he had bought. And I then gave this order for civilians in accordance with the military decree. I believe this decree was rescinded after 2 years, for the fact was constantly brought up that it, in particular, promoted the black market.
M. DEBENEST: I did not say that it concerned requisitions. Yesterday I said to you that there had been mass requisitions and you answered that this was correct. Today I tell you, and I submit this document in order to demonstrate to you, that there was also another way of pillaging the produce of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: But previously you did mention confiscation. I only wanted to correct that point.
M. DEBENEST: I merely spoke yesterday of it. Let us go on. Will you tell me what the task was of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall the wording of this decree. I believe it has been read here. At all events it dealt with the organizing of the entire economic wealth within the German sphere of interests in favor of the policy carried on by Germany and during the war, in favor of the war economy, of course.
M. DEBENEST: Who ordered the liquidation of the property of the Freemasons?
SEYSS-INQUART: I must admit that I really do not know that. My attention was called to the case after the property had been confiscated. I assume that this emanated from Himmler by way of Heydrich.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will refresh your memory, I will have handed to you Document F-865, which becomes Exhibit RF-1531. It concerns a letter which comes from you, doesn't it? It is dated 11 March 1944. It is signed by you, isn't it?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is absolutely correct.
M. DEBENEST: Good. You express yourself as follows in this letter:
"Dear Dr. Lammers:
"I have had the property of the Freemasons in the Netherlands liquidated. As the liquidation took place through me,
12 June 46
that is to say, through a government office, unlike the liquidation in other areas, it is for the Reich Finance Minister to decide on the further utilization thereof.
"I have written a letter today to the Reich Finance Minister, and I enclose a copy of it for you. I beg you to support my suggestion."
You, therefore, did not hear of this liquidation until after it had been undertaken, since you yourself had undertaken it, isn't that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: I still entirely uphold my first assertion. The question was who decreed this; I understood you to ask me who was the person in the Reich who demanded this. It is a fact that I did not hear about this whole matter until a few months had passed. Then I took over this liquidation and had it carried through to the end through my offices, and then I wrote this letter. Thus the execution rested with me.
M. DEBENEST: You said just now-and I understood the translation very clearly-that you heard of it only after it had been done. You contradicted your own declaration, as I was able to note yesterday on several occasions, when the documents were submitted to you.
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand that. Is that a question to me?
M. DEBENEST: I am simply making a remark.
Was this liquidation of the property of the Freemasons a big undertaking?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, certainly. I should like to say that it was started by another office. The property was confiscated, then I took over this task and had it carried through by my competent of fives.
M. DEBENEST: Did you make arrangements for the utilization of the funds which this liquidation produced?
SEYSS-INQUART: I made the proposal that this money be given to the Party.
M. DEBENEST: You discussed this beforehand?
SEYSS-INQUART: I wrote a letter as well. I believe the enclosure to my letter to the Finance Minister, which was mentioned just now, contains the proposal that this property be given to the Party.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not threaten to let the people of the Netherlands starve as a result of the railroad strike in September 1944?
~ June 46
SEYSS-INQUART: You can look upon it as a threat, but in any event I described it as very probable.
M. DEBENEST: You asked the secretary general to stop this strike?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the Tribunal would like to have further investigation as to who ordered the confiscation of the Freemasons' property.
Defendant, do you know who ordered the confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I do. The confiscation was ordered by Heydrich and was set in motion by the Police. Then a trustee of the Party started the actual liquidation and at that stage I took it over and transmitted it to my offices.
M. DEBENEST: At what date was this liquidation ordered?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the first few months. The whole thing went very rapidly. It was only a matter of weeks.
THE PRESIDENT: Was any reason given for it?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Freemasons were declared to be enemies of the Reich according to the decree about the taking over of the property of those who were inimical to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the order of Heydrich in writing?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I can't say. It went to the Security Police, and the commander of the Security Police insured its execution. I assume that it was a teletype message, although this entire action might have been planned in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean that you carried it out without having any order in writing about it at all?
SEYSS-INQUART: I received a report from the Security Police- it may have been in writing, or it may have been oral-that this confiscation was being carried through by the RSHA, and I took over this matter at this stage.
Am; PRESIDENT: What was the amount involved by the confiscation?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe the final amount of the liquidation was more than 8 or 9 million builders.
THE PRESIDENT: And then I think you said that you proposed that it should be handed over to the Party.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I proposed that these 9 million Builders be turned over to the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: And were they?
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SEYSS-INQUART: No, I received no decision. This property must have remained in the Netherlands in some form of securities, probably in treasury bonds.
THE PRESIDENT: You were the Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, weren't you? What happened to the money?
SEYSS-INQUART: The money was deposited in a bank account, and perhaps Dutch treasury bonds were bought. It was treated as a separate fund, and it was not used.
THE PRESIDENT: But this was all in 1940, wasn't it?
SEYSS-INQUART: I estimate that the liquidation continued until the year 1942, and from that period on the money remained in a bank account.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the bank?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I cannot tell you, Mr. President. But there is no doubt that the Dutch have ascertained this.
THE PRESIDENT: And when you said it was confiscated in the first few months, you meant in 1940, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, immediately after the invasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Debenest.
M. DEBENEST: Were the funds from this liquidation utilized in the same way as the money from the liquidation of Jewish property?
SEYSS-INQUART: For the most part the proceeds from the liquidation of Jewish property were transferred to the Administrative Of lice for Property and Pensions. The funds were not absorbed, but certain expenditures were met from them. For instance, the erection of Vught Camp was paid for from these proceeds. The funds derived from the liquidation of Jewish property amounted to perhaps 400 million guilders or slightly more. However, they were not taken over.
M. DEBENEST: How were the funds actually used? Were they used for the purpose of the German Government or for other purposes?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Jewish property, first of all, was confiscated. Then, as far as possible, it was liquidated, and we called that "Aryanization." The proceeds of the Aryanization were pooled in the Administrative Office for Property and Pensions, but as a whole were not...
M. DEBENEST: Pardon me, but will you answer more directly without recounting to us how this liquidation was effected. I asked you about the utilization of the funds.
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SEYSS-INQUART: The funds were not used at all. The 400 million guilders must have been placed on deposit in the Administrative Office for Property and Pensions of the Netherlands, partly in Dutch treasury bonds and partly in the original securities. Only relatively small amounts were used for certain purposes. I believe the largest amount was 14 million guilders which was used for the erection of Vught Camp.
I called the attention of the Reich Finance Minister...
M. DEBENEST: Excuse me. I asked you a question. Were the funds from this liquidation used for the benefit of the Reich? Yes or no?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, unless you call the erection of the Vught Camp using the proceeds for the Reich; but the funds were used because Vught Camp was to be a Jewish assembly camp.
M. DEBENEST: So you consider that the building of the Vught Camp was in the interest of the Dutch?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most certainly it was. The cost of Vught Camp, as far as I was informed, was covered out of this property-I believe 14 million guilders were spent-because this camp was to be a Jewish assembly camp. It was only later that Himmler transformed this into a concentration camp.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion, and the Tribunal will decide about it. But regarding the property of the Freemasons, what was done with the sums produced by this liquidation, exactly how were they utilized-for the Reich, or also for the construction of concentration camps in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither the one nor the other.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, he has said already, hasn't he-I thought he said quite clearly on deposit in some unknown bank, and that there were about 400 million which came from the Jews.
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, I know the bank. The property of the Jews is deposited in the "Vermogens-Verwaltungs und Rentenanstalt."
M. DEBENEST: Well, I am now going to submit to you a document, which is a letter, Number F-864, which becomes RF-1532. This document states exactly the destination of the property which was thus liquidated. First, you indicate at the beginning of the letter that the total resulting from the liquidation amounted, as you say, to 6,134,662 guilders up to that date, and you indicate that this sum is located in the Reich Foundation (Reichsstiftung) of the Netherlands. This is a German organization, and not a Dutch organization, as far as I understand. You indicate further on how the various sums were to be allocated.
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THE PRESIDENT: I think you don't need trouble about the details of where it is. He says it is there in the bank.
M. DEBENEST: Exactly, Mr. President, I would merely like to read the few lines at the end where he states exactly the purpose of the allocation of the various sums.
"I believe I am complying with your intentions if I assume, with reference to this liquidated Freemasons' property, that it too, as we discussed with reference to Jewish property,
should be used for specific purposes within the Netherlands, according to an agreement to be reached between us."
Consequently, your intention was to use the sums in the same manner as the Jewish fortunes, wasn't it?
SEYSS-INQUART: It doesn't say that at all.
M. DEBENEST: We have it in writing. That's still better.
SEYSS-INQUART: The purpose of utilization is perfectly plain. The Reich Minister of Finance wanted to exercise control over Jewish capital; and I called his attention to the fact that it had not been called in, suggesting to him not to call this money into the Reich but to wait and see what the course of events would be.
M. DEBENEST: Were you not proposing to him here that it should be utilized for the same purpose?
SEYSS-INQUART: I suggested to him to use it for certain purposes in the Netherlands, that is, not to send this money into the Reich, but to leave it in the Netherlands; but the use to which it was to be put was left entirely open. He wanted to bring it to the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, I think you can pass on.
M. DEBENEST: I was just thinking that we could leave that to the judgment of the Tribunal.
Let us come back to the matter of these railroad strikes. Did you not ask the secretaries general to stop these strikes?
M. DEBENEST: Did you not put an embargo on the means of transport and on the food in transit?
M. DEBENEST: That was you, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I said that yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Consequently, you knew very well at that time what the food situation was in Holland and the grave consequences which would inevitably result from the decision which you made-a very serious decision.
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SEYSS-INQUART: No, not really. The fact was that traffic had already been disrupted because of requisitioning by the Armed Forces, and it was only a question of finding a modes vivendi and after insuring the needs of the Armed Forces, which appeared urgent to me, of resuming the transport of foodstuffs into Holland. If the railroad strike had not taken place, I would have succeeded in persuading the Armed Forces to refrain from requisitioning, and navigation would have been left undisturbed.
M. DEBENEST: But we are not discussing the Armed Forces. You knew very well that the moment you placed this embargo on ships, on the fleet, that it was the time when they were transporting foodstuffs for the winter to Holland.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, at the moment when I declared the embargo, there was actually no more traffic; and the few ships carrying food were requisitioned by the Armed Forces together with the foodstuffs.
M. DEBENEST: Then your decision was useless?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, because in making this decision I prevailed upon the Armed Forces to make the requisitioning as short as possible and they promised me that the ships which I earmarked would not be interfered with by them.
M. DEBENEST: How long did this embargo last?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that between 15 and 20 October I instructed the chief of my traffic department to lift the embargo. Actually, it lasted some weeks longer because the Dutch traffic organization didn't function.
M. DEBENEST: Until what date, approximately?
SEYSS-INQUART: It may have lasted until the middle of November.
M. DEBENEST: Was not that the period when the traffic was heaviest?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite correct. In November and December we could only bring enough foodstuffs to Holland to tide us over these 6 weeks of frost, at the most; and in September I was of the firm conviction that in November and December the shipping facilities would be at my disposal.
M. DEBENEST: And actually, did you obtain. them?
SEYSS-INQUART: Unfortunately, no. For due to the failure of the Dutch traffic authorities, coupled with the other war conditions, these facilities were not at my disposal.
M. DEBENEST: But you knew very well that the decision which you were making was fraught with grave consequences?
12 June 46
SEYSS-INQUART: In September this decision was not as serious as the fact that the Armed Forces, in view of the railroad strike, was in sore need of this transport and these facilities; and as it was up to me to safeguard the Reich's interests, there could be no graver accusation against me than for the German people to say that I did not do everything humanly possible to help to win the struggle.
M. DEBENEST: The Tribunal will take note of your answer.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, you dealt with the subject yesterday, didn't you?
M. DEBENEST: I do not think I did, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the embargo on shipping surely was gone into yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I think I spoke yesterday only of the requisitions which were carried out and I only asked one or two questions of an economic nature. I do not think I touched upon this subject. If I did, I apologize to the Tribunal. In any case, I am finished with it.
[Turning to the defendant.] What was the position of the Netherlands Bank on your arrival in 1940?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Netherlands Bank as an issuing bank was, I believe, set up primarily on the basis of a private bank. The president was Mr. Trip. The State probably had a certain influence, since it served as the issuing bank.
M. DEBENEST: Give us a briefer explanation.
SEYSS-INQUART: Then it would not be stating the whole truth.
M. DEBENEST: Did the gold reserves cover the amount of notes issued?
SEYSS-INQUART: I assume so on the basis of the gold cover or the reserves of gold currency. In fact the gold cover was higher than the amount of notes issued. The Netherlands Bank had more gold and more gold currency, than it had notes issued.
M. DEBENEST: And what was the position at the time of the German capitulation?
SEYSS-INQUART: There were several thousand million Builders in paper money in circulation, and perhaps another 23 million in gold Builders.
M. DEBENEST: But, above alp Reichsmarks?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I said 23 million guilders in gold. The rest of the coverage might have been bills from the Reich.
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M. DEBENEST: Was it not you who ordered the abolition of the "Currency Frontier"? Will you answer?
M. DEBENEST: Were you absolutely in agreement with the necessity for abolishing these frontiers?
SEYSS-INQUART: The proposal originated in my office. I took it over. Mr. Trip protested. I sent it to Berlin. In Berlin the Reich Marshal decided in its favor. The Reich Minister Funk was against it; I carried out the proposal which I had made and which had been approved by the Reich Marshal.
M. DEBENEST: But personally you agreed with it?
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean exactly by the Currency Frontier that you are dealing with now? We merely want to understand what you are talking about.
M. DEBENEST: I mean the free circulation of German currency in Holland.
[Turning to the defendant.] Did not Holland also have to pay large sums in the form of so-called voluntary contributions, among other things, for the war against Bolshevism?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe I have explained this matter quite clearly. The Reich demanded during a certain period of time, as direct occupation costs, 50 million marks for the defenses of Holland. In Holland we called this a "voluntary contribution" for obvious political reasons. In reality it was a demand of the Reich which would have had to be paid one way or another, and I would not lay it to the charge of any Dutchman that he paid this contribution voluntarily.
M. DEBENEST: You agreed to these measures, did you not?
M. DEBENEST: What were the economic and financial consequences of all these measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: The financial consequences were a greatly increased circulation of bank notes, and extremely large banking accounts which remained the same in the Reich as in all occupied countries. We applied one system in Holland, another in France, and in view of the collapse of the Reich, the financial consequences were the same. If Germany had not lost the war, Holland would have had a claim of more than 4,500 million guilders against a sovereign Germany.
M. DEBENEST: Good. Will you then look at Document 997-PS, which you had in your hands yesterday. I will read to you what you thought of these measures. It is Page 14 of the French text
12 June 41;
and Page 12 of the German text. It is the big Seyss-Inquart report,
You write there-and I am reading from the sixth line:
"This regulation goes far beyond all similar regulations which have been introduced so far with the national economics of neighboring countries, including the Protectorate."
Page 12 of the German text, 14 of the French:
"It actually represents the first step toward a currency union. In consideration of the significance of the agreement, which almost affects the independence of the Dutch State..."
And then you add:
"...it is of decisive importance that the president of the bank, Trip, who is very well known in western banking and financial circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above sense."
That was your impression of these measures, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is true, but I must admit today that the opinion I held at that time was wrong. Otherwise I would incriminate the bank president, Herr Trip, too deeply. What is written down here is not yet the situation as it existed later when the Currency Frontier was abolished. This was only the agreement between the two issuing banks concerning the unlimited acceptance of bank notes. I should also like to refer to the statements which I made about the qualities of Herr Trip. The fact that he gave his approval does, in my eyes, establish the admissibility under international law.
M. DEBENEST: Did you not state that it affected the independence of the occupied country?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was an exaggerated optimism in my presentation of the facts.
M. DEBENEST: Very well, the Tribunal will judge as to that. On the other hand, you contemplated the suppression of customs barriers?
SEYSS-INQUART: I did not understand your question.
M. DEBENEST: You do not wait until you have had the translation. How can you expect to understand? I said: Did you not contemplate the suppression of the customs barriers?
M. DEBENEST: Were there not in the Netherlands certain agencies which were charged with the looting of art objects?
SEYSS-INQUART: I cannot call it looting, but at any rate the administration and care of them, and so forth.
12 June 46
M. DEBENEST: That is your opinion. At any rate there were several agencies?
M. DEBENEST: You are particularly well acquainted with the agency of Dr. Muhlmann?
M. DEBENEST: Who called him to the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I sent Muhlmann to the Netherlands ahead of me so that he could arrange for premises for my offices.
M. DEBENEST: But it was only to set up your of fines?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time, only to set up the offices.
M. DEBENEST: But later?
SEYSS-INQUART: Muhlmann then left and some time after he returned as an agent of the Four Year Plan, for the safeguarding of works of art. It was similar to what took place in Poland.
M. DEBENEST: What do you understand by "safeguarding"?
SEYSS-INQUART: In point of fact-I do not want to talk a lot about it-but actually he had to determine whether there were any works of art in the confiscated fortunes and then he had the task of reporting these works of art to the various Reich offices.
M. DEBENEST: Only to report them?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, because the purchasing was taken care of by these various offices themselves. I assume-that is, I know- that he also dealt privately in works of art, as an intermediary.
M. DEBENEST: Did you also obtain some pictures for yourself through his mediation?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Not for myself, but for the purposes that I described yesterday.
M. DEBENEST: Yes. You also stated yesterday that you had placed in safekeeping a large number of works of art, particularly pictures. What was your purpose in doing this?
SEYSS-INQUART: Many works of art I secured only in the sense that when the decree about confiscation of enemy and Jewish property came out, they were secured and liquidated. I bought perhaps three or four pictures which, as I mentioned, were to be presented as gifts to the Museum of Art History in Vienna.
M. DEBENEST: No, no, I asked you for what purpose you placed these works of art in safety.
SEYSS-INQUART: The confiscation of Jewish and enemy property had, as its primary purpose, sequestration; but in time it
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became clear that these art treasures were being bought by the Reich. These three or four pictures I purchased with the immediate purpose of giving them to certain Reich institutions, the Museum of Art History in Vienna, for instance.
M. DEBENEST: But there was not only Jewish property there. SEYSS-INQUART: I said enemy property as well, but that was not enemy property in general, but only in cases where a specially hostile attitude towards the Reich was proved. Such property was confiscated also.
M. DEBENEST: Very welt That is what you wrote in a document which has already been submitted to the Tribunal, and which you certainly know. It is Document F-824, submitted under Number RF-1344. You know that document. It is a letter which came from you and is addressed to Dr. Lammers. This letter concerns the acquisition of pictures, which was done for the Fuehrer. In Paragraph 3 of this document, in the French text, you write as follows:
"From the list which had been submitted to me I deduce that
in this manner a comparatively large number of valuable
pictures has been secured which the Fuehrer was able to
acquire at prices which, according to investigations which
I have made in the country, must be described as extraordinarily low."
Then you add that Rembrandt's self-portrait had been found again, thanks to Muhlmann.
Consequently, the placing in security of works of art was clearly a means of allowing the Reich authorities to take them into Germany; isn't that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: There is no doubt about that. Regarding the Rembrandt picture, I should only like to say that it had come into Holland illegally; and therefore it was confiscated.
M. DEBENEST: And it was taken to Germany by legal means? SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that in the case of the Rembrandt picture there was no question at all, because in this case a German regulation had been violated.
M. DEBENEST: In addition to paintings, you also procured for yourself a large number of works of art and diamonds, precious stones, and so on?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: You know nothing about that, but do you know that you have a house in Vienna at Untergasse, Number 3?
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SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is Iglauer Strasse 15. However, that may be true, yes.
M. DEBENEST: Had you not deposited a certain number of works of art which had come from the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will pass on to something else.
Who ordered the confiscation of the property of the Royal House?
SEYSS-INQUART: I personally.
M. DEBENEST: Therefore you took the initiative in this matter?
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, not only was I the instigator, but I decided to do that and I carried the decision through.
M. DEBENEST: So you only carried it through?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I also carried it through.
M. DEBENEST: I did not ask if you also carried it through. I asked quite clearly if you only executed this order?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I stated very clearly yesterday the reasons why I decided to confiscate the royal property. I also carried out the confiscation.
M. DEBENEST: You maintained that it was the result of a speech made by the Queen. Isn't that what you stated yesterday?
M. DEBENEST: I will show you Document F-828, which I submit under Number RF-1533. This document is a letter from Reichsleiter Martin Bormann to Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of 3 July 1941. At the beginning of the letter Bormann discusses the speech of the Queen of Holland; and in the last paragraph, which is the one which is important to me, he writes:
"The Fuehrer has therefore given permission to confiscate the
property of the Netherlands Royal House, for which the
Reich Commissioner had already applied at an earlier date."
Do you still maintain that it was because of the speech made by the Queen?
SEYSS-INQUART: I beg your pardon. There was a hitch in the sound apparatus.
M. DEBENEST: Yes, there was, but in any case you have the document in your hands.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I know what the question is here.
M. DEBENEST: Of course you know it.
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SEYSS-INQUART: It had escaped my memory entirely, that I might have asked for that permission at an earlier date. I really cannot remember. Perhaps I discussed the question as to whether this property was to be confiscated or not, but the only thing I do remember is my suggestion at the time this speech was made. After all, that was not the first speech made by the Queen of the Netherlands. She had spoken in the same manner previously.
M. DEBENEST: That is an explanation, and the Tribunal will take note of it.
Now, in regard to the looting of the Netherlands and the attempt to nazify and germanize that country-were these not the actions of the civil government of which you were the head?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes and no. It is quite obvious to me that from the economic point of view the Dutch people considered our conduct as looting. Seen from the legal point of view I do not think it was. I did not germanize the Netherlands in any way.
M. DEBENEST: Will you take Document 997-PS, Page 26 of the French text and Page 22 of the German text? I refer to the section of your report entitled "Remarks." Have you got it? I will read the remarks which you made concerning your own activities. That vitas on 18 July 1940:
"2) The administration is at present sufficiently under the direction and control of the German authorities and will be increasingly so in the future.
"3) The national economy and communications have been set in motion again and adapted to a state of war. Plans are on foot for large-scale reconversion geared to the continental economy, and practically everything is ripe for this changeover. Stocks in the country have been placed at the disposal of the Reich war economy. Nearly all the financial resources"- that is in 1940-"have been made available and placed under the control of the Reich, all this on the basis of extensive co-operation by the Netherlanders."
Isn't that exactly what you wrote? Isn't that exactly what you thought?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and I believe that any occupation power would fully understand Point 2, and Point 3 was a constructive conception of a new Europe.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion which the Tribunal will judge.
I would like to return briefly to the Jewish question. You stated yesterday that you protested against the deportation of 1,000 Jews to Mauthausen or Buchenwald and that there had been no more deportations to these camps. But why did you not protest against
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the transports to Auschwitz? Did you think that this camp was Vera different from the other two?
SEYSS-INQUART: Naturally, because Mauthausen and Buchenwald were concentration camps, whereas I was informed the Auschwitz was an assembly camp in which the Jews were to remail until such time as the war would be decided or some other decision would be made.
M. DEBENEST: Before coming to the Netherlands you had beer adjutant to the Governor General of Poland?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not adjutant, but the deputy.
M. DEBENEST: All the better. Consequently you had heart about this camp, had you not?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time Auschwitz did not even exist
M. DEBENEST: But did you not know that the ashes of thou 1,000 Jews who had been sent to Buchenwald or Mauthausen were sent back to their families against payment of 75 Builders? This happened in 1941. That did not prevent you later on from taking other measures against the Jews, measures which necessarily led to their being deported?
SEYSS-INQUART: Because to my thinking this measure, which was first of all called an evacuation, is something completely different from a deportation or removal to a concentration camp.
M. DEBENEST: But after all you knew the fate of these Jew who were transported to a camp in this manner?
SEYSS-INQUART: Most people, the great majority, did not know of this fate as it is known to us today; and I testified yesterday as to my misgivings.
M. DEBENEST: That is an opinion. You spoke yesterday of reprisals taken against the newspaper in The Hague...
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] Is this something you cross examined about yesterday?
M. DEBENEST: These are questions which were handed to me this morning as a result of statements made yesterday by the defendant. Otherwise I have finished.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you should not go over this matter again.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, since all of the questions concern either hostages or-
There is still one question which I would like to ask, if the Tribunal permit; it is a question about the flooding. All the other questions I had in mind concern hostages; and if the Tribunal so wishes,
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I will not ask them. However, may I be permitted to ask a question concerning the flooding?
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you went over the flooding yesterday. I don't know.
M. DEBENEST: Then I have finished, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4:45 in order to sit in closed session.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have noticed that counsel for the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is here this morning. I understood there was to be some cross-examination of this defendant by counsel for Kaltenbrunner, and I thought we might save time if he preceded us and finished his cross-examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I beg to apologize for having incurred the Tribunal's displeasure yesterday by not being here. But I had a very special reason, for circumstances are sometimes stronger than the will. If I may say this, I have been through a serious illness in the last few years and I did not feel well, although I firmly intended to be present at the session yesterday and had prepared everything. I respectfully beg to be excused.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Kauffmann, the Tribunal accepts your explanation.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much.
Witness, since when have you known the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was either 1935 or at the beginning of 1936 that I met Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in connection with the "Langot" relief work for National Socialist families who were in need. This was a form of support tolerated by the police.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What part did Kaltenbrunner play in Austria before the Anschluss in March of 1938? Did he belong to the radical elements or was he a moderate?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the time I was told that Kaltenbrunner was closely connected with the SS, but he was not the leader of the illegal SS. That was an engineer from Styria.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it the engineer named Leopold?
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SEYSS-INQUART: No. I spoke several times to Zernatto about Kaltenbrunner. We called him the "policeman of the 11th of July" in the Party; that is to say, it was due to his influence that radical elements were dissuaded from excesses, such as those of July 1934.
DR. KAUFFMANN: And then Kaltenbrunner became an under state secretary in Austria?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the suggestion for his appointment as an under state secretary made by Austrian circles, or did it come from Himmler and Hitler or the Defendant Goering?
SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I know, it was only made by Austrians. I myself did not receive or accept any suggestions from the Reich regarding my own Ministry. The Party in Austria drew my attention to Kaltenbrunner because we wanted also to have a man in the police organization.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What were his actual tasks as an under state secretary?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think that as an under state secretary he did nothing at all. After Skubl retired, the President nominated him state secretary. In that capacity he had administrative and economic functions. He could not intervene in the actual executive. For instance, if I wished a man to be released from custody, then Kaltenbrunner would have had to get in touch with the commander of the Security Police; and if he said "no," then we would have had to go to Heydrich.
. DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, it has been established that in 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed head of the Reich Security Main Office. He has testified here that he repeatedly tried not to accept that post. Can you say anything about that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I only know that I was at headquarters at the end of November or the beginning of December, 1942. On that occasion I also visited the field headquarters of Himmler; and one of the adjutants, I think it was Wolff, told me that the Reichsfuehrer wanted to have Kaltenbrunner for the Reich Security Main Of lice and that Kaltenbrunner was reluctant to accept. He was now to be ordered to appear at field headquarters and remain there for 4 weeks, where he would be handled in such a way that he would take over the post.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you any proof that the actual reason for the appointment of Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office was that he was to organize and direct a political and military intelligence service?
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SEYSS-INQUART: I know certain things which go to prove that he did not have control of Security Police matters to the same extent as Heydrich, and I had definite facts regarding his intelligence work. In Heydrich's time the commander of my Security Police, when he wished to get a decision from Berlin, only talked about Heydrich. When Kaltenbrunner came into office, I do not remember his mentioning Kaltenbrunner; but he talked about the Reich Security Main Office, and sometimes mentioned Muller. I myself, as far as I can remember, only discussed Security Police matters with Kaltenbrunner on two occasions. One was about Dr. Schuschnigg's further fate, and Dr. Kaltenbrunner has already told you about that. The second time was when a relative of mine was to be taken to a concentration camp. I went to Kaltenbrunner because he was the only man I knew in the RSHA and I assumed he had some say there. I knew nothing about the line drawn between the various functions. On that occasion Kaltenbrunner telephoned to Muter in a manner such as a superior would never adopt when talking to a subordinate official. I have positive proof of his activities, because since 1944 I worked closely with Kaltenbrunner in that respect. I placed at his disposal foreign currency for his foreign intelligence service, that is, I obtained it for him from the departments concerned; everything was done in conjunction with the appropriate department in the Reich.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Just now you mentioned Muller. Do you mean Gestapo Chief Muller?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have the impression that this man really held the reins as far as Security Police matters were concerned ?
SEYSS-INQUART: I can only say that I know that in the course of that telephone conversation Kaltenbrunner said to Muller: "What will you decide in this case?"
DR. KAUFFMANN: Then you received military and political reports directly from Kaltenbrunner? Is that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, quite often. Those were the very secret reports of which only four copies were made, I believe.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Was this the case before Kaltenbrunner's nomination?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Kaltenbrunner only introduced these reports at the end of 1943 or 1944, if I remember rightly.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the difference between those reports and the reports formerly prepared by Canaris?
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SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about the Canaris reports, or very little. I know them from the former Reich Security Main Of lice.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that the reports made by Kaltenbrunner were noted for their particularly sharp and open criticism of all public measures?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that too. Kaltenbrunner's reports were, above all, really objective; and not prepared reports serving certain ends.
DR. KAUFFMANN: How big were these reports?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think these reports generally ran into 40 to 60 pages, sometimes more; and they probably were issued every three or four weeks, as far as I know; but there must have been special reports as welt
DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know whether these special reports were addressed to military offices or did they-the ones you have just mentioned-sum up the situation from the military point of view?
SEYSS-INQUART: The reports of which I am speaking were predominantly political and they were addressed directly to the Fuehrer. In connection with these reports I remember they contained particularly severe criticism of the attitude of the Reich toward the Poles and toward the Catholic Church and that they were written on stationery with the Reich Security Main Office heading, which appeared to me then to be an impossible state of affairs.
DR. KAUFFMANN: You have just mentioned two criticisms. Can you perhaps tell me what was the gist of that criticism of the two phases of public life which you have just mentioned?
SEYSS-INQUART: With regard to the Poles, it demanded quite tersely that the Poles should once again be given an autonomous and independent existence as a state, or at least they should be promised it; and speaking of the Catholic Church, it demanded that all administrative and other measures should be rescinded and that the Catholic and Protestant Churches should in no way be molested.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that you became a Party member in 1938 and that your Party membership number was somewhere in the millions?
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SEYSS-INQUART: Seven million. The membership came into effect from 13 March 1938. That is when I formally became a member of the Party.
MR. DODD: Well, when you say "formally," you are trying to distinguish then, as I understand it, and point out that you were in fact, although maybe not formally, a Party member for some time. You paid dues and you supported the Party, didn't you?
SEYSS-INQUART: The first two points are incorrect. I only paid subscriptions from the autumn of 1937-I beg your pardon, from the autumn of 1932 until 1933; inwardly I felt myself to be a National Socialist and a Party member, without however having made any formal declaration of loyalty.
MR. DODD: Were you a member of the Styrian Home Protective Organization (Steierischer Heimatschutz)?
SEYSS-INQUART: The Styrian Home Protective Organization, yes, from the autumn of 1932.
MR. DODD: And that organization was taken over, practically in its entirety, by the National Socialists at a time when you were a member, wasn't it?
SEYSS-INQUART: That had been the intention, but it was not carried out. There had been an agreement that the Styrian Home Protective Organization was to be taken into the Party, but Munich did not carry this out. Individual members of the Styrian Home Protective Organization had to join the Party individually.
MR. DODD: Do you know a man with the name of Dr. Andreas Morsey, M-o-r-s-e-y?
SEYSS-INQUART: Do you mean Andreas M-o-s-e-r? I think he was a solicitor, but I did not know him personally.
MR. DODD: Well, do you know that he was also a member of the Styrian Home Protective Organization?
MR. DODD: Do you remember having a conversation with him on 7 March 1938, just a few days before the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: I have no recollection of it.
MR. DODD: Well, let me see if I can help you. Do you remember telling him that you entered the Styrian Home Protective Organization in 1932 and that that was shortly before that organization was forbidden?
[The Interpreter translated: ". . . telling him that you were Chief of the Styrian Home Protective Organization..."7
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SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite out of the question. The Chief of the Styrian Home Protective Organization was Konstantin Kammerhofer. The whole of Austria knew that.
MR. DODD: You don't remember, then, having any conversation in which you said such as I have just stated to you? Is your statement that you never said it or that you don't remember the conversation? That is what I am trying to get at.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do remember that conversation; but I am stating that it is out of the question that I could have said that I
was the Chief of the Styrian Home Protective Organization, because the whole of Austria knew that it was Konstantin Kammerhofer. At most I may have told him that I was very friendly with Kammerhofer, as indeed I was.
MR. DODD: Well, I want to show you then his statement, or his testimony rather, in the Case of the People versus Dr. Guido Schmidt. It is Document Number 3992. This testimony was given before the Supreme Penal Court in- Vienna on 19 March 1946 before Judge Sucher.
We offer this as USA-882.
I ask you to look at the second page and you will find a sentence which begins:
"On 7 March 1938 Seyss-Inquart personally informed me that he had entered this organization in 1932, that is, before it was made impossible; shortly before the Styrian Home Protective Organization was forbidden."
Then he goes on and makes reference to the man Kammerhofer, whom you just made reference to, and further down, in the next sentence, he says:
"He (Seyss-Inquart) had entered this organization and had been admitted by the leader, Engineer Pichler (Franz), in Waltz and he had never left the organization."
Therefore your statement that you had not been a member of the NSDAP can be considered formally correct; but the statement that you had not worked illegally, he says, is not true.
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Moser could not possibly know whether I worked illegally. He is basing his statement on the assumption that the Home Protective Organization was actually amalgamated with the NSDAP, and that is incorrect. The witness Uiberreither can confirm this. I still hold entirely to my testimony.
MR. DODD: Do you know a man named Gainer?
SEYSS-INQUART: Very well, indeed. Dr. Friedrich Rainer.
MR. DODD: Yes. You have asked for him and he is coming here as a witness on your behalf, isn't he?
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MR. DODD: But what do you say if he says that you became a member of the NSDAP when that Styrian Home Protective Organization went over?
SEYSS-INQUART: To that I wish to say for all...
MR. DODD: By the way, before you answer let me tell you something that will help you. This document is already in evidence, so I assume you may have seen it. It is Number 812-PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. It is a letter, a report from Dr. Rainer.
MR. DODD: So you know what he has said, I assume. You have seen the document, have you?
MR. DODD: You agree that he does say in this document that you were a member through your membership in the Styrian Home Protective Organization and that you joined the Party, so to speak, when that organization was taken over?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I should like to say that until 1938 that was also my opinion, and I never doubted whether I was or was not. But in 1938 the Party stated clearly that it did not recognize that fusion and that the members of the Styrian Home Protective Organization were not members of the Party but that every one of them had to join the Party individually to be a Party member. Rainer will surely confirm that.
MR. DODD: Well, tell me this, whether or not you were formally a member, didn't you during all this time acknowledge the leadership of Klausner, who was the leader of the National Socialist Party in Austria; and didn't you follow his wishes and obey his directions?
SEYSS-INQUART: The leadership in Austria or in Germany?
MR. DODD: In Austria. I am talking about Klausner, who was in Austria.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. It was clear to me and I recognized the fact that Klausner was the leader of the Austrian National Socialists. I did not recognize Klausner as my political leader, a fact which is made clear by the same report which you, Mr. Prosecutor, have just mentioned. There Rainer says, "Seyss-Inquart recognized Klausner in political matters which were actually not binding."
MR. DODD: Well, he says precisely the opposite, if you will take a look at it.
SEYSS-INQUART: Oh, no.
MR. DODD: Well, now, wait a minute and look on Page 9, I think, of the German text, line 7 from the bottom; in the English text it is Page 7:
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'`Relations between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner were as follows: Seyss acknowledged unconditionally the Party leadership with respect to the whole program and thereby also Klausner's leadership. As a Party member, he therefore subordinated himself specifically and literally to Klausner's leadership."
Do you find that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I have only a draft before me, but it goes on to say:
"Over and above that, he declared himself, on the basis of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and particularly on the basis of the declarations made to him by the Fuehrer on the occasion of his staff: visit to Berlin, as being a trustee of the illegal NSDAP in Austria directly responsible to the Fuehrer within his political and state functions."
Then there must be another passage where I say that in regard to political matters I would not subordinate myself to Klausner.
MR. DODD: Well, anyway, to move along, it is a fact, isn't it, that very early in this period you acknowledged your unqualified allegiance to Hitler, and long before the Anschluss, too? You acknowledged your political allegiance, didn't you?
SEYSS-INQUART: One can almost say that. As far as "unqualified allegiance" was concerned, that was not clear to me at the time, because it was my opinion that Hitler, too, wanted a revolutionary course.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Didn't you have something to do with the Dollfuss matter other than what you have told the Tribunal? You know, of course, that Rainer says that you did, in this same Document 812-PS.
MR. DODD: And I think it is important that you make some answer to it. You haven't done it on your direct testimony, and the document is in evidence, and in it he says that you supported...
SEYSS-INQUART: The reason, Mr. Prosecutor, why I did not do it was because Rainer is coming here as a witness. Rainer will have to tell us here under oath on which facts he bases his statements. I can only say "no."
MR. DODD: Well, I know. I understand that, and that is another reason for asking you now. You see, you will be off the witness stand when he is on it; and I would like to know what you say now to what Rainer has said in this document, which is in evidence, to the effect that you were involved in the Dollfuss plot on 25 July 1934.
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SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is quite wrong.
MR. DODD: All right. In connection with this there is one other matter I think we should clear up now if we can. You didn't mean to convey to the Tribunal, did you, that the ceremonies-if I may use that expression-commemorating the assassination of Dollfuss had nothing to do with Dollfuss at the time that they were held?
SEYSS-INQUART: I certainly do wish to create that impression, because that ceremony was for the seven National Socialists who had been hanged at that time. On that occasion, as far as I remember, there was no thought of Dollfuss' death; but only of the fact that several men of the Standarte, I think Number 107 or 108, had made an attempt to do away with a system which in National Socialist opinion was hostile to the Reich, and as a result seven were hanged. The fact that Dollfuss was shot on that same occasion was not mentioned during the ceremony..
MR. DODD: Well, I don't say that it was, but the ceremony certainly commemorated the attack on Dollfuss; and I think it is quibbling, is it not, to say that it had no reference to it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, if Dollfuss had not been shot, then the ceremony would have been carried out just the same.
MR. DODD: Are you sure of that; you think that all would have been hanged if he hadn't been shot?
SEYSS-INQUART: At any rate, I know they were hanged.
MR. DODD: Well, you were appointed a State Councillor in 1937-and of course again we are going to talk a good deal about this in this short time, about Rainer and this document. You know Rainer also says that you were appointed through the influence of Keppler and other Nazis in Austria and Reich officials. Is that so? Did they influence your appointment in 1937? Rainer is wrong about that as well, is he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not at all-Keppler had no influence at all on the nomination as State Councillor.
MR. DODD: And Rainer, in your judgment, is in error when he says that they did have? You disagree with his statement, as I understand it. I want to make that clear.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is absolutely incorrect.
MR. DODD: All right.
SEYSS-INQUART: I was appointed State Councillor because Zernatto had discussed the matter with a friend of mine and then suggested it to Schuschnigg. A proposal from Keppler would probably have been a reason for Schuschnigg's not nominating me.
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MR. DODD: It was just a casual thing, and Schuschnigg appointed you because somebody spoke to him; and the Nazis with whom you were familiar in those days had nothing to do with it, had they?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I would not say. I discussed with Rainer the possibility of an appointment as State Councillor, because our mutual acquaintance had previously discussed the question with Zernatto. I then discussed it with Gainer, but he exercised no influence with regard to the appointment.
MR. DODD: You have seen the document known as the Hossbach Minutes, USA-25, 386-PS, introduced before this Tribunal many months ago. Do you recall then that Hitler, in the course of this discourse, as is reported by Hossbach, stated some of the plans that he had for Austria as well as for Czechoslovakia? Do you remember that? It is in the document, I can assure you.
MR. DODD: That was the 11th of November 1937-no, I'm sorry- it was on the 5th of November 1937. When did you first hear about that meeting? For the first time in your life, when did you hear about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: Here, in this room.
MR. DODD: Now, do you remember the letter you wrote on 11 November to Dr. Jury?
MR. DODD: Do you remember it very well, or would you like to see a copy of it? I will show it to you. We have a copy here. You haven't seen this; this is a new document.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have also got a copy.
MR. DODD: It is 3396 PS.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is right.
MR. DODD: What did you mean when you wrote to Jury on 11 November 1937, when you wrote:
". . . I personally believe that there will be no visible results until early next year. In the meantime, I have received an authentic report from Linz..."
and you go on to talk about a newspaper article.
What I wanted to know was, what did you mean by the events in the early part of 1938?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the situation prevailing in Austria at that time, it was clear that the internal political position would not remain static. The optimistic National Socialists thought that during the coming weeks either Schuschnigg would retire or
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something else would happen. I viewed the situation more correctly, and it was my opinion that the new internal political development in Austria would not take place until the spring, that is to say, developments in the direction of further permissible activities on the part of the National Socialists. The newspaper article is something quite different.
MR. DODD: I am really not concerned about that unless you feel that it is important to your answer. I wanted to go back a little bit. You see, you open your letter by referring to a conversation with Mr. Keppler. Now, he is the man who was Hitler's emissary on 11 and 12 March when Austria was handed over to the Nazis, isn't he?
MR. DODD: And you say:
"The conversations with Mr. Keppler today were carried on in an atmosphere of complete calm, and they were also extremely revealing. I do not believe that things are so ripe for discussion as they appear to be from the national side and in the Reich."
Then you go on:
"I should be pleasantly surprised if an initial solution were to be found before the end of this year."
What you were really talking about was the handing over of Austria to the Nazis. Isn't that what you had in mind when you wrote this letter? Isn't that the "initial solution"?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. First of all, it does not say that my conversations with Keppler were secret, but only that they were informative.
MR. DODD: It says "in complete calm." I don't know whether that is secret. I don't know what that means.
SEYSS-INQUART: It means that we talked very realistically. The Reich was very insistent. We might have discussed the possibility of applying some diplomatic pressure, but the aim was to promote the activities of the National Socialists in Austria, with the intention, however, of achieving the ultimate goal of the Anschluss.
The contents of the Hossbach Document were not mentioned at all, and I am convinced that Keppler had no knowledge of it. Keppler did not have a very strong position with the Fuehrer at all.
MR. DODD: Yes. You recall you wrote Keppler a letter a little later, in January of 1938. Do you remember that?
MR. DODD: That you wanted to give up your mandate or your trust or your responsibility or whatever the proper expression is.
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MR. DODD: What kind of mandate did you have from Keppler or from Goering, to which Keppler refers in his letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the mandate was the Austrian State Councillorship. I wanted to give it up, as well as the task of investigating the understanding necessary for obtaining the co-operation of the National Opposition. I did not receive any mandate at all from Keppler, and I could hardly have accepted one.
MR. DODD: You know the document that is in evidence, 3397-PS. It is USA-702. And Keppler says that he informed Goering of the situation and that Goering told him to keep you at your task, or that is the sense of it.
Now, my question is, why should Goering be interested in this mandate if it only had to do with your position as State Councillor in Austria? He wasn't an official of the Austrian Government, and you were.
SEYSS-INQUART: In that case may I have the document?
MR. DODD: Yes, indeed. You will also find reference in here to Dr. Jury, the very man concerning whom we talked a few minutes back and to whom you wrote that letter on 11 November.
SEYSS-INQUART: Which passage do you mean, Mr. Prosecutor?
MR. DODD: Well, my question about it is this, I am wondering why Keppler would go to Goering with your desire to withdraw from whatever position it was that you occupied with respect to the Nazis or, as you put it, with respect to your place as State Councillor; and it is even more of a problem to us with respect to your explanation. What did Goering have to do with that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday I stated that Dr. Schuschnigg had given me the task of investigating conditions for co-operating with the National Opposition. I always told Schuschnigg that the Austrian National Socialists would not accept any offers without Hitler's agreement. With the knowledge of Zernatto and Dr. Schuschnigg I visited Goering and Hess. Both these gentlemen knew that I not only had contact with the Austrian National Socialists, but also with the gentlemen in the Reich, through Keppler. This was also known to these gentlemen in the Reich, and they were interested. If now I were suddenly to say, "I'm through, I'm not going on with it," then I considered it my duty to inform these gentlemen in the Reich that they could no longer count on my co-operation. That, I believe, is a matter of course. One could not do otherwise.
MR. DODD: Yes, and the letter that you wrote to Jury on 11 November was after your meeting with Hess and Goering, too, wasn't it? Of course it was; you saw Hess and Goering in July 1937.
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SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, the Reich Marshal testified to that already.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Now I will ask you a little bit about this meeting with Von Papen in Garmisch. That just happened casually and was not planned, as I understood you. You talked about the possibility of the place of the Minister of Security being filled by a member of the Nazi Party. What I want to know is, did you also talk about the possible trip of Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden, which didn't come so long after this meeting, did it? Was it mentioned?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, we did not talk about the technical means, whether a meeting between Dr. Schuschnigg and Hitler would take place and so forth or whether this should be accomplished through diplomatic channels-that was not discussed by us.
MR. DODD: Wasn't it discussed at all, that's all I want to know? Wasn't there any discussion about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: A meeting between these two state leaders was not discussed, but only the material content of our plan.
MR. DODD: When, for the first time, did you learn about the proposed meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and from whom?
SEYSS-INQUART: I think 2 days-it must have been on 10 February that I received information from Rainer or Globocznik telling me that this meeting was expected to take place. At about the same tone Zernatto asked me to come to Vienna, but he still did not tell me what it was about.
MR. DODD: Actually, isn't it a fact that you prepared notes or, if you prefer to call it, a memorandum for Hitler which he used as the basis of his discussions with Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden?
SEYSS-INQUART: I made a written proposal for clearing up the matter; and I gave it to Zernatto, on the one hand, and to Dr. Rainer on the other. It is perfectly possible that Rainer passed it on to the Reich. I would also have seen nothing wrong with that.
MR. DODD: You know very well, don't you, that Muhlmann was sent up there that night by you and your associates; and he got to Berchtesgaden ahead of Schuschnigg and Von Papen with that memorandum, isn't that a fact?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Muhlmann is . . .
MR. DODD: Yes, the same gentlemen you referred to as having been in Holland with you, and in Berchtesgaden.
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Muhlmann went to Berchtesgaden at that time and was informed about my last conversation with Dr. Schuschnigg. He will probably have noted that down.
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MR. DODD: Don't you know that he did, and Schuschnigg didn't know-and that's the important thing-what Muhlmann was doing up there ahead of him with the notes or the conditions that you had presented to Schuschnigg the night before. Schuschnigg didn't know that, did he, when he went there like a lamb to Berchtesgaden?
SEYSS-INQUART: I am convinced Schuschnigg did not know that Muhlmann was in Berchtesgaden and had quite probably informed Keppler who in turn informed the Fuehrer. Schuschnigg certainly did not know that. When I talked to Dr. Schuschnigg, I did not know Muhlmann would go along.
MR. DODD: When did you find out that Muhlmann would go?
SEYSS-INQUART: After the discussion with Dr. Schuschnigg I returned to my office, and there I found Dr. Rainer and perhaps someone else; and I told Dr. Rainer about our conversation. Possibly Muhlmann was present, and then we-I say we, because I do not want to except myself from this-we decided to inform Keppler of the nature of our conversation. In the meantime, Dr. Schuschnigg had probably gone to the station. I really did not see any reason for informing him directly at this time.
MR. DODD: And so you did want to inform Hitler then-did I hear you correctly-of the nature of your conversation with your Chancellor Schuschnigg that night?
SEYSS-INQUART: At that time I had no opportunity or cause to inform Dr. Schuschnigg of the fact that Muhlmann was going there.
MR. DODD: I know you may not have seen any cause, but what I am trying to make clear is that you did want to let Hitler know that you had had this conversation with Schuschnigg and what you had said to Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: Why in the world were you notifying the head of another State about your conversation with the head of your own State, to which you owed allegiance?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not see that this is a breach of faith. It was giving information to heads of two parties to an agreement, for whom I was negotiating.
MR. DODD: Would you say that you could negotiate between your country and Germany at that time without notifying your own Chancellor? Schuschnigg didn't know that you'd sent that note on to Hitler, did he? Now be frank about it.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is certain that Dr. Schuschnigg did not know this. But Dr. Schuschnigg did know very well that I was in
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constant contact with the Reich through Keppler and that the outcome of our conversations was always passed on to the Reich, for the Reich also had to express an opinion. I always said there can be no internal political understanding unless Hitler agrees with it. That is a fact, and nothing can be done about it; whether it is morally right or not, that was the position. Otherwise there should have been no attempt at carrying through a policy of understanding.
MR. DODD: That was not the only time that you did not play completely fairly with Schuschnigg, was it? Do you remember when you gave him your word of honor that you would not make known his plans to announce the plebiscite? Remember when he first told you and asked you on your word to keep quiet and you told him that you would?
MR. DODD: You went right from that meeting to the Regina Hotel, and do you remember what your associates asked you and what answers you made?
SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot help you; I think you are confusing two events. At that time I did not go to the Regina Hotel. It was on the evening of 10 March, and it was an entirely different matter. First of all, it was wrong for Dr. Schuschnigg to ask me for my word of honor, for he himself employed me as liaison man in connection with the agreement of 12 February. Had I known in advance what he wanted of me, I would have turned it down, for on the basis of the agreement of 12 February it was my duty immediately to inform the Reich of this. But I kept my word. On the same evening Jury came to me. He had heard about this from other sources, and I did not mention a single word to Jury hat I knew about it. During the forenoon of the following day, Rainer came. I did not take part in these negotiations until it was nearly midday. Rainer says that it was in the forenoon, but it was really towards noon.
MR. DODD: Well, I will accept the correction as to the time, but I don't think it is very important. The point is...
SEYSS-INQUART: It is very important in my opinion.
MR. DODD: Very well, if you think it is, we will settle for that. I want you to read what Rainer says about your keeping of your word.
"Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the conversation he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth and that in view
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of the new situation, he had been co-operating with the regional leaders (Landesleiter) from the very first moment."
Now, certainly, that is not keeping silent or keeping your word as both you and Schuschnigg understood it, is it?
SEYSS-INQUART: In this case, it was absolutely impossible to do otherwise. It was getting on towards noon on the day on which my pledge of silence expired. The gentlemen sat in front of me and told me all the details. I could not now suddenly say that this was all a bunch of lies, for I did not promise Schuschnigg to lie either. Instead, I kept silent about it, and from that the others deduced that that was probably so.
MR. DODD: You knew when to keep silent and you knew when to make observations in order to give information to your associates what Schuschnigg had asked you to keep confidential.
Now, when did you learn the true nature of what happened at Berchtesgaden, about the threats and about the terrible way that Schuschnigg was treated up there?
SEYSS-INQUART: That I heard from Zernatto. I think that was already on 13 February. Then I heard it from Foreign Minister Schmidt, and Dr. Schuschnigg told me more or less the same thing. It was therefore probably on 13 or 14 February.
MR. DODD: Well then, you had a rather complete picture of the way that Schuschnigg was threatened; and I suppose you knew about Keitel being called in to frighten him, and all the threats of marching in by sundown You had a rather full knowledge of what happened up there, didn't you?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember the story of Keitel, but Schuschnigg told me that the generals were up there, and obviously military pressure was to be exercised.
MR. DODD: And you knew, too, that Hitler had demanded your inclusion in the Government as Minister of Security. Schuschnigg told you that, didn't he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I believe that Hitler had demanded that the National Socialists should be given the Ministry of the Interior and Security. Schuschnigg agreed and to Hitler's question as to whom he proposed Schuschnigg was supposed to have mentioned my name. But that is nothing but rumors and stories and I do not know any details. At any rate, that happened in the course of these very dramatic conversations.
MR. DODD: I think this is rather important, because you have a witness coming here who was there at that meeting, Dr. Schmidt. Are you now telling this Tribunal that it was Schuschnigg who suggested your name, and not Hitler who demanded that you be appointed?
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SEYSS-INQUART: I do not want to tell the Tribunal any stories; I merely want to make my contribution to clear up the background of events as far as the Charter allows. I say explicitly, I have heard that it was so. If Schmidt was there and says that it was otherwise, then of course I will believe him.
MR. DODD: Can you tell us who told you that, because we have the sworn testimony of President Miklas, who says Hitler demanded it. We know that Schuschnigg says Hitler demanded it and Dr. Guido Schmidt is going to tell you that Hitler demanded it. Now, who told you that it was Schuschnigg?
SEYSS-INQUART: Dr. Muhlmann told me that. But I wish to say that the facts are as you state them, Mr. Prosecutor, for this is just a tactical detail. If the Fuehrer forced Schuschnigg to cede the Ministry of the Interior, and then there was an exchange of words and he stated my name first, then I do not want to draw the slightest conclusion from that for my defense.
MR. DODD: Well, I think that is very brave. The fact of the matter is that it was all arranged; you knew it, and so did Hitler, that you were to be included in their government and that anything that went on there was unimportant as to who actually mentioned your name first.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct. But I did not know for sure that on that day Hitler would demand the Ministry of the Interior and would nominate me, because Herr Von Papen did not inform me about the outcome of his conversation with Hitler. I only supposed that things would take that course. I was by no means such a persona grate in Berlin that Berlin would certainly decide on me.
MR. DODD: Now, not many days after that so-called agreement, which was reached in Berchtesgaden, Hitler broke it, did he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: On 17 February, yes.
MR. DODD: He broke it before the 17th, didn't he? Do you remember when he appointed Klausner as the head of the Party, despite the fact that he had agreed with Schuschnigg that no such thing would be done and that there would be no such political organization? You knew about that, didn't you, when it was done?
SEYSS-INQUART: I beg your pardon, but I think perhaps I misunderstood your first question...
MA DODD: Maybe it is a little involved. The point is that a few days after this meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler appointed Klausner as the head of the illegal Nazi Party in Austria; isn't that so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that only happened after 17 February, because I myself suggested to Hitler that he ought to agree
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to Klausner's being the leader of the Nazis in Austria. It was perfectly clear to me that no National Socialist in Austria would follow anybody unless Hitler was agreeable.
MR. DODD: Would you accept the recorded history of Guido Zernatto, whose book you have offered to the Tribunal? Would you accept his record of when it happened?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I would.
MR. DODD: He says it was a few days after the Berchtesgaden meeting. I suppose that could be the 17th, but it is not likely. Wasn't it before you went to Berlin?
SEYSS-INQUART: Who said that-I?
MR. DODD: Zernatto.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, the first time in my life that I saw Hitler was on 17 February; and at that time I think Klausner had not yet been nominated, because I myself mentioned to Hitler that he ought to agree to Klausner's becoming the leader of the Austrian National Socialists.
MR. DODD: Now I see that you recognize that. That is a very crucial matter in your whole dealing between Austria and Germany, because if, as Zernatto indicates, this agreement was broken a few days after the meeting, then when you went to Berlin and talked about a Trojan Horse you knew that Hitler had already started his illegal activity in Austria, didn't you, if, indeed, it was before you went there.
SEYSS-INQUART: I would like to say that the illegal activities- not necessarily Hitler's but several people's-never ceased, and it was my intention to shape this illegal activity in such a way that we could control it from the Austrian side. I also told Schuschnigg repeatedly that the Austrian Nazis would do nothing without Hitler.
MR. DODD: Well, that is not the point. I am not going to labor it further. I am going to ask you one other question about your meeting with Hitler. You surely knew by the 17th how badly Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt had been treated at Berchtesgaden. Did you say anything to Hitler about that in the course of your 21/2 hours' conversation with him?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, for I am not responsible for the policy of the Fatherland Front against the National Socialists in 1934. It was only the reaction to the suppression of the National Socialists in Austria.
MR. DODD: Well, all right. Now we come down to ~ March. That is the day that Schuschnigg told you about the plebiscite that he intended to hold in a few days.
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MA It was on 9 March that you wrote the letter to Schuschnigg and sent the copy of it to Hitler, was it not?
MA DODD: Did you tell Schuschnigg that you were sending a copy by courier to Hitler?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know; but I would have had no qualms about it, because after 12 February 1938, I had to inform' the Reich.
MR. DODD: You certainly also had to inform Schuschnigg, didn't you, as his State Councillor, that you were sending a copy of this very important letter to Hitler? You did not tell Schuschnigg anything about that, isn't that true?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is possible, but I believe that I may have told Zernatto. I certainly told Zernatto that I was informing the Reich. Of that there is no doubt.
MR. DODD: We will see about that. The next night you had a meeting with Schuschnigg and with Schmidt and with Skubl,- I guess in the Chancellery office. You never mentioned the fact to any one of them there, did you, that you had already communicated with Hitler by special courier; do you remember that meeting?
SEYSS-INQUART: Actually I have no clear idea of it. I only remember the meeting on the evening of 10 March, but I think it is quite possible that it...
MR. DODD: That is the night that you did go to the Regina Hotel and saw Klausner; immediately after that meeting you went right down to the street and saw your associates. Did you tell them what Schuschnigg had said to you and what you had said to Schuschnigg in the conversation a little earlier?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but I found a most amazing lack of interest.
MR. DODD: But your courier was back from Berlin, wasn't he; Globocznik had returned from Berlin?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Globocznik came back and informed us that Berlin refused to agree to this plebiscite, and that the following day I would receive a letter indicating Hitler's attitude..
MR. DODD: Now, during that same meeting at the Regina Hotel you heard Rainer give instructions for the mobilization of the Party in Austria to be ready to put on demonstrations or to seize power the next day. You were there when he laid out his plans. Do you remember that?
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SEYSS-INQUART: I think that is a considerable exaggeration on Rainer's part. I only remember that Klausner said, "Well, then everybody is to keep in touch with him tomorrow." That demonstrations might of course take place was so obvious that everybody was aware of it. If the matters were not cleared up now, there would be serious demonstrations. But the Government also knew that.
MR. DODD: I think we can get over it pretty quickly if you will agree with me that these demonstrations were not spontaneous at all, as I thought you were trying to convey to the Tribunal, but they were well planned out by your associates.
SEYSS-INQUART: That the actions were not spontaneous? Certainly they were not spontaneous.
MR. DODD: They were not?
SEYSS-INQUART: The entire situation after 8 March became more and more heated.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, when Glaise-Horstenau came back from Berlin on the next morning, 11 March, he told you about the planned military events or the talk of military events in Berlin, didn't he?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, and we told Dr. Schuschnigg the same thing.
MR. DODD: You went to see Schuschnigg and you wrote him another letter that same morning.
SEYSS-INQUART: Before that, during a conversation which lasted for nearly 2 hours, I reported all details. The letter was merely a confirmation.
MR. DODD: Well, the letter was an ultimatum to Schuschnigg, wasn't it; and it was written by you at the direction of your political superior, Klausner?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Rainer has asserted that-that again is one of his assertions. If you can call it an ultimatum, then I had already given that orally, because when I left Dr. Schuschnigg I asked him to reply to me by 2 o'clock in the afternoon; and I said that in the event of his refusal Glaise-Horstenau and I would have to resign, but at that time I had not even spoken to Klausner yet.
MR. DODD: Well, as I take it, everything that Rainer has said in this report, in this Document 812-PS, you say is untrue. He also says there...
SEYSS-INQUART: Not untrue, but slightly exaggerated.
MR. DODD: All right. I just want to get your views, I repeat, because you will not be available after he comes on the stand. You
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know he also says that he talked with you about the seizure of power in the event that Schuschnigg refused your ultimatum. Do you say that is so or not so?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember. I do not think so.
MR. DODD: What do you say about his statement that you discussed three definite possible steps for the taking over of Austria and handing it over to Germany? Is that true or not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that that is a construction placed on it afterwards by Rainer.
MR. DODD: Now, I have to ask you about these things because we must get your view, I think.
SEYSS-INQUART: Please do.
MR. DODD: Rainer also says that the telegram, the now well-known telegram to Hitler saying that there was a bad situation in Austria-that that telegram was actually brought back from Berlin by Glaise-Horstenau. He says that in the same document. What do you say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: It is not quite correct. Hitler's letter. . .
MR. DODD: Well, how is it correct, if it isn't quite correct? You indicate that there is some truth in it.
SEYSS-INQUART: I received Hitler's letter through a courier, not through Glaise-Horstenau. And in that letter there was a draft for a telegram.
MR. DODD: And that is the same telegram that Goering referred to when he talked to you on the telephone, and the same one that Keppler referred to when he talked to Dietrich on the telephone, isn't it?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that telegram was at least twice as long and I very decidedly rejected this telegram.
MR. DODD: Well, finally, let me ask you this about that particular day. This radio speech that you made was really made at the direction of Goering, was it not? He told you. . .
MR. DODD: . . . to make a statement, didn't he?
SEYSS-INQUART: There is no question of it. That would have been of no interest to me.
MR. DODD: You had better look at the transcript of his telephone conversation with you. It was 1957 hours that night, when he told you to make a statement to the people, and about 3 minutes later you went on the radio and made it. What do you mean that Goering did not tell you to do it?
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SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but Goering asked me to do something quite different. He asked me to declare myself head of a provisional government and to take over power. At least that is what I believe. I introduced myself as Minister of Interior and Security and I demanded that the people should keep calm and should not put up any resistance to the German troops who were marching in, which was exactly what Schuschnigg had said half an hour before me.
MR. DODD: Well, anyway it only took you 2 or 3 minutes to get to the microphone after you talked to Goering?
SEYSS-INQUART: I talked to Field Marshal Goering such a lot- I do not want to involve him or myself in all that we did on the basis of the telephone calls. I believe that I did hardly any of these
MR. DODD: You are not indicating, are you, that Goering was not interested in your selling out Austria to Germany? He certainly had a great interest in what happened there that day, had he not?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but I do not think the expression "selling out" is very suitable. Obviously Goering was extremely interested in bringing this thing to a final conclusion, perhaps in some drastic way.
MR. DODD: You told the Tribunal yesterday that there were about 40 SS men in the building and that you thought they were there because Miklas and Schuschnigg did nothing to remove them, that they could very easily have removed them. Now, the truth of
the matter is that you were the Minister for Security; and it was your responsibility to remove them, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not the master of the Federal Chancellery. Apart from that, there was Dr. Skubl; and one word from Dr. Miklas or Dr Schuschnigg would have sufficed to bring in 300 men from the Guard Battalion to restore order. One could not expect me, at that moment, to proceed against National Socialists.
MR. DODD: Well, if one word from them would have sufficed, just the wave of your finger would have sufficed, would it not, to get them out of there? They were your National Socialist SS men; beside the fact that you were the head of the police.
SEYSS-INQUART: Whether they would have obeyed me or not I do not know. I did not have command over the Guard Battalion because it was part of the Armed Forces. Undoubtedly I could have exercised my influence and it might have been successful, but the fact that these 40 men were there seemed to me to be quite insignificant.
MR. DODD: The place was surrounded with them, was it not? They were not only in the building, but they were outside of it and on the roofs of neighboring buildings. You remember all that?
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SEYSS-INQUART: There were a few thousand National Socialists in front of the Federal Chancellery at the time.
MR. DODD: Well, we had, better refer to your friend Rainer, who is coming here on your behalf, and see what he says about it.
Have you seen the article-yes, I guess it is fair to call it an article-that he wrote about that historical night? Are you familiar with that?
SEYSS-INQUART: Oh yes; one can really call it more than an article.
MR. DODD: Yes. He called it "The Hours of Historical Decision." This is 4004-PS, Mr. President, USA-883.
[Turning to the defendant.] You will agree, then, that it is quite a different picture that Rainer gives from what you have given this Tribunal, is it not? If you know the article, and you say you do. He says, you know, that Kaltenbrunner commanded 700 SS men there that night and that Lukesch had 6,000 SA men within half an hour, and they received the order to advance and occupy the Federal Chancellery and to hold the Ring and the building until the National Socialist Government was proclaimed; and that 40 SS men under Kaltenbrunner's adjutant, Rinner, received the order to force their way into and occupy the Federal Chancellery, and so on. And you ordered-he says that you are the man who ordered-that Rinner be let in. That is very important, and I would like to know what you say about that. Rinner was in command of the 40 SS men that you say somebody else should have removed. You will find that he says:
"It was getting on towards 10 o'clock when the commanding officer of the guards reported to the Minister of Security, Dr. Seyss, who happened to be in our room, that a man accompanied by 40 others was demanding to be let in through the gate on the strength of higher orders. I quickly informed Dr. Seyss that these were Rinner and his 40 men who had been detailed to occupy the Federal Chancellery. Dr. Seyss ordered that Rinner be brought upstairs. I shall never forget this moment. Escorted by a lanky guardsman, Felix Rinner, the famous Austrian champion runner.. ." and so on. He was the first National Socialist Sturmfuehrer who entered the headquarters that night; and you are the man, actually, who let him in.
SEYSS-INQUART: That is a victory article, written in the flush of victory. All I can say is that I saw these National Socialists, in black trousers and white shirts, in the corridors; and I asked, "What is going on?" But this dramatic account about my opening the gate-well, let's wait and see whether Rainer confirms that.
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MR. DODD: Well, I understand that; we look forward to it as well as you do.
You will notice that a little further on he says that you, on your own responsibility, gave the order to open the gate and let these men in. But you say that isn't so. That is all I want to know.
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that is quite new to me.
MR. DODD: Well, I think we can pass on. There isn't any truth at all, I expect, is there, in this whole article by Rainer? Or is there something in it that you might admit is true? You know he is going to be your witness.
SEYSS-INQUART: I am also extremely interested in hearing what he has to say here. This is a somewhat poetical account of these events. The basis is certainly correct, but there is a lot of victorious exultation attached to it.
MR. DODD: I think I should also tell you, by way of a preliminary to a question, that Guido Schmidt, in testimony which we have here and which I will be glad to present to you, says that the place was surrounded by these SS men and that they were in there with your knowledge. What do you say to that? He is also going to be your witness.
SEYSS-INQUART: I have said that a few thousand National Socialists had collected around the Federal Chancellery. Whether they were SS or SA men, that I do not know. There were quite a lot of women among them. This so-called mobilization order of the Party was unknown to me; but I told Dr. Schuschnigg that very morning that if we could not agree, then he would have to expect large-scale demonstrations by the Party.
MR. DODD: Now, one other matter. Did you tell the Tribunal- did I understand you correctly when I heard you testify that Miklas resigned without any request from you? That is, President Miklas, who was then the Bundesprasident of Austria. Is it your testimony that he resigned without any request from you?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was my request that he should sign the Anschluss Law, and he said he would not do that. According to the Constitution his powers would then pass to me. He did not want to stand in the way of developments. I do not think I told him to resign; I merely demanded that he sign the law.
MR. DODD: Well, he has testified before a court in Vienna, in which testimony he says that you demanded it. Now do you remember or have you forgotten or do you say that is untrue?
SEYSS-INQUART: No; I consider that is out of the question because I clearly remember that he said:
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'I cannot sign the law, but I shall not stand in the way of developments. If you confirm to me that it is necessary that the Anschluss should be carried out, then I shall resign and you will have my powers."
If he understood that as a demand to resign, then I do not want to contradict him. I do not want to make his position any more difficult, because I confess that I was in favor of the Anschluss.
MR. DODD: Well, I want to offer this in evidence, and you may look at it if you like. In any event, it is his testimony before a court in Vienna on 30 January 1946. It is Document 3697-PS, and it becomes USA-884. If you would like to see it, you may. He says just about what I put to you, that you talked around it a good deal, said it was very distasteful for you, but nevertheless you were bound to comply with the order from Germany and therefore he had to resign. That is on Page 17 of the English text of the testimony of President Miklas.
Did you once write a letter to Himmler, or did you twice write letters to Himmler, about Burckel? One of them is in evidence, and I want to ask you if you remember the other one. Do you remember the letter that you wrote to Himmler in which you said that it was not true that you were interfering with the deportation of the Jews; that you. had only insisted that they be turned over to Kaltenbrunner's men, the SD?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know it. It was submitted here. I know I have seen it in this Court.
MR. DODD: I think you have seen it, but it has not been submitted in evidence; however, I wish to do so.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the letter is certainly correct.
MR. DODD: It is Number 3398-PS, which is USA-885.
In the letter you said that you gave instructions that the deportation of the Jews should be carried out only in agreement with the SD and through the SD and that you could not permit wild actions.
SEYSS-INQUART: Right. Do you want me to state my views with regard to it, Mr. Prosecutor?
MR. DODD: Well, I want to ask you this. Then you knew all about it, and I understood you to say that you did anyway, on your direct examination. You knew about the deportation of the Jews, and you were doing your part to see that the SD carried it out. That is the only point I am trying to make with your and I assume that you agree.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course I knew that a few trains had been loaded with Jews in Vienna. They were then taken to Poland and unloaded. No preparations whatsoever had been made, and the
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Jews were in serious difficulties. I opposed this state of affairs; and when Burckel complained, I told Himmler, "If such actions take place, then they ought to be carried out by the SD," because I was under the impression that then better preparations would be made. When I say that today it sounds very tragic and bitter, but I thought that at least emergency quarters and so on would be provided somewhere. Apart from that I knew from 9 November 1938 how these things were carried out. The Party forged ahead, and then the State had to take over these matters and carry them out.
MR. DODD: Yes. At any event, you knew that Kaltenbrunner at that time was deporting, or had charge of the transporting of the Jews out of Austria.
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not recall Kaltenbrunner in this connection. I think that was done by the Party alone. I believe Kaltenbrunner had no part in it.
MR. DODD: Didn't you say the SD, and wasn't that under Kaltenbrunner in Austria, at that time?
SEYSS-INQUART: I said that it ought to do it, but these transports were not run by Kaltenbrunner, Globocznik ran them.
MR. DODD: Welt they were under Kaltenbrunner, were they not? He was the head of the whole police system in Austria at that time.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, he was rather the commander of the Security Police; and how much influence he had there I could not say, but I think it was very little.
MR. DODD: You found out since you have been sitting here that he had quite a lot, didn't you? You now know that he had a lot to do with it.
MR. DODD: You mean to say you haven't heard here that Kaltenbrunner had something to do with the removal of the Jews?
SEYSS-INQUART Yes, I shall leave that to Kaltenbrunner. From my own observations I do not know it.
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to labor it, but that isn't what I asked you. I asked you if you haven't heard in this courtroom that Kaltenbrunner had much to do with the removal of the Jews.
MR. DODD: Certainly. You relate that back to your letter, don't you? And don't you now know that he had something to do with the removal of Jews at the time you wrote the letter?
SEYSS-INQUART: In my opinion, Kaltenbrunner had nothing at all to do with the evacuation of Jews as mentioned here, because
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that was a wild action carried out by the Party or Gauleiter Globocznik.
MR. DODD: Do you remember when you got the authority, through Lammers, for the confiscation of property that you asked for in Austria?
MR. DODD: Have you seen these documents? They are new; your letter to Lammers, his reply back to you, and the order which was issued at your request. Those are three documents.
MR. DODD: Your letter to Lammers is dated 23 October 1938, and it is 3448-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-886. And Lammers' reply to you is dated 24 October 1938 and it is 3447-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-887. The order itself is 3450-PS, which becomes Exhibit USA-888.
That was a confiscation of the property of the Jews in Austria, was it not, which you requested?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I testified yesterday, or the day before, that I co-operated in this matter by issuing decrees.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
MR. DODD: I can finish in 5 minutes, MR. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.
MR. DODD' I would like to finish up, and I think I can do it.
Defendant, when did you first learn about the many Austrians who were dying in the concentration camps after the Anschluss?
SEYSS-INQUART: About the many Austrians who died in concentration camps? I really learned about that in this courtroom, but about the numerous Austrians who were in concentration camps, perhaps in the course of 1943-44. In 1938-39 I knew that some political opponents were in concentration camps, but they were gradually being released again, or at least some of them.
MR. DODD: Didn't you know that they were being killed in Buchenwald as early as 1939? Didn't you know some of the people, and know about their deaths? Now think a minute before you answer this. Didn't you know about the death in Buchenwald of people who had been your political opponents?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not remember, Mr. Prosecutor.
MR. DODD: You never heard a word about it?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not mean to say that at all. If you give me a name, then I shall tell you at once what the situation is.
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MR. DODD: I know if I tell you the name you will tell me you heard it, I suppose. However, I am asking you first if you didn't in fact know that some of them were dying in these camps. That is all I want to know. It was pretty common knowledge in Austria, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I shall most certainly admit that it is possible that I was told that one or another died in the camp even as early as 1938 or 1939.
MR. DODD: Well, you still continued to go on with the Nazis, although at least you knew that vast numbers of your fellow countrymen were being thrown into concentration camps. Didn't that make any difference to you? Whatever you thought before the Anschluss, you certainly knew what they were doing after it.
SEYSS-INQUART: That I knew that large numbers were dying is out of the question. That there were a few, one or another, who died would not have affected me particularly because, between 1934 and 1938, at least as many National Socialists had died in the concentration camps of Dr. Dollfuss and the Fatherland Front, that is to say, of the Austrian State.
MR. DODD: Well now, wouldn't you agree with me that conditions were very bad in Austria after the Nazis took over and they went from bad to worse and you knew it and everybody else in Austria knew it? Or do you want to take the position that they improved? I would just like to know what your opinion is.
SEYSS-INQUART: I will tell you quite frankly. Of course, if you listen today to the leaders of the political opposition, then it was terrible. However, if you saw the people up to 1939, then you could see that they had a new lease on life, because unemployment disappeared and there was quite a different spirit. But then the war altered all that.
MR. DODD: One last question, if you can answer it for me briefly.
Do I understand you to accept responsibility for whatever went on in Poland, whatever is established as having gone on in Poland? That is, joint responsibility with Frank? Do you accept that as his deputy?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, that can only apply to the time when I was there and acted as deputy.
MR. DODD: Of course. I certainly don't mean after you left there. I am only talking about the time that you were there.
SEYSS-INQUART: Well, then, as deputy, only where I acted as deputy, or where crimes came to my knowledge without my taking measures against them.
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MR. DODD: I just want to read into the record one sentence from a document that has already been offered in evidence, MR. President. It is Document 2233-PS; and from that document, Page 1, Paragraph 4, I would like to read this, because part of it was read by the Defense, but this part was left out. It is under the small Arabic Figure 3:
"The necessary police and other measures arising therefrom
will be under the immediate direction of the Chief of the
Security Police; every arbitrary action is to be strictly
This had to do, by the way, with the "AB Action," concerning which this witness has testified.
The records show that you, indeed, Mr. Defendant, were present at the time that the Defendant Frank discussed this AB Action and made this statement which I have just read into the record. Certainly you don't deny responsibility for whatever was done under the AB Action, do you? Because you did know about that.
SEYSS-INQUART: Neither in connection with the AB case nor in any other case did I deny anything. I spoke especially about the AB Action.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, Document 2233-PS, which is USSR-223, is now available in the French. It is already in evidence and has been accepted by the Tribunal, but a French copy was not available at the time it was offered. It has now been completely translated into the French, and I offer it to the Tribunal for assistance in the French.
I have concluded my examination.
Am; PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you said that the document of 11 November 1937, 3369-PS, was a new document. Did you give it a number?
MR. DODD: Just a moment, MR. President. I will check that. I meant to offer it, and I fear that I did omit to do so. That would become USA-889. It was a new document, and I did intend to offer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, and we will reconvene at 10 minutes past 2.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1410 hours.]
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DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, the French prosecutor asked you whether you were the deputy of Governor General Frank, and for that reason knew Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz is located?
SEYSS-INQUART: Auschwitz was not in the region of the Government General, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau Upper Silesia.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Then the same prosecutor confronted you with the testimony of a girl of 20 years old, by the name of Kunze, in 3594-PS. According to this testimony you allegedly repeatedly sent reports to Himmler.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yesterday evening, when I was confronted with this matter, I was rather tired, and made a statement somewhat in contradiction to the fact contained in the document, and said that under Paragraph 3 certain reports were mentioned which had no connection with me. Now this witness asserts that reports from me went to Himmler by way of the Security Police, dealing with the condition of the Jews. That is utter nonsense, which the results contradict. The Reich Commissioners were in no way subordinate to Himmler as far as the Jewish question was concerned. I sent perhaps two or three letters concerning individual cases. They went from my staff to the staff of Himmler; but never by way of the Security Police.
DR. STEINBAUER' That is sufficient. You were, in addition, confronted with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schongarth in connection with the question of the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Schongarth was the successor, or more accurately, the deputy of Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after he had inspected the scene of the assassination. He told me that Himmler demanded the shooting of 500 real hostages, prominent Dutchmen. I was aghast; and Schongarth said immediately that that was completely out of the question. Thereupon I most certainly said to Schongarth: "But we must do something, we must react in some way to this." He then told me that a number of cases of death sentences were on hand which were to be carried out by shooting within the next few days and weeks. He suggested that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to the effect that this was in retaliation for the assassination.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and the Armed Forces commander in the Netherlands, in connection with the question of hostages, issue warnings to the population, as is customary under international law?
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SEYSS-INQUART: I believe there is a document available which contains a warning by me against sabotage, et cetera, in which I threatened, in the case of violation of the laws, to confiscate property and to draft the population for guard duty.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS.
[Turning to the defendant.] Further, I have to confront you with a document which is an interrogatory of the Defendant General Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the order for the shooting of hostages.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that Christiansen does not say that. He admits that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak, was urging the matter behind the scenes. I made my statement, but perhaps the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, since he was present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yesterday evening I once more studied this question, since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the effect that this statement by the witness, which is really the interrogation of an accused person, was admitted by the Court. In my opinion, Paragraph 21 of the Charter means something else here. I believe that a partial matter like that has no probative value, for it is theoretically possible that Christiansen could now be sentenced by the British on the grounds that his statement is not correct. Now, I do not want to delay this Tribunal, but I wish to call attention to the equivalent statement of Criminal Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted in Document Number 77, Page 199.
Then I call your attention to another matter. The French prosecutor asserted that the Dutch secretaries general were left behind by the Dutch Government to serve as a government, and that you were not justified in interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. What have you to say to that?
SEYSS-INQUART: I know nothing about that and I also believe it is of no consequence. The Netherlands capitulated, and they did so for the entire region except Zeeland.
The terms of capitulation consisted only of military details. From the civilian point of view it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking the government into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the Tribunal, in this connection I should like to submit a document which takes issue with this question. This is a verdict by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands of 12 January 1942. In my final speech I shall refer to this
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from the legal standpoint. It will be submitted to the Tribunal in certified form in four languages through the Prosecution who have agreed to this. The Exhibit Number is 96.
Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out mass shootings and, particularly, deportations of civilian workers and the displacement of Jews, in order to weaken the biological power of the Netherlands.
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe that I can cite concrete examples which show that I had the opposite intentions. It is certain that during a war losses do arise among the population, and perhaps if I had given more attention or put up greater resistance, I might have prevented something. That this did not take place, I truly regret. But two figures are decisive: the figures for mortality and those showing the increase in the population.
Until the year 1944, the mortality rate in Holland, on the basis of the statistical data of the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, rose from 9.5 to 10 per thousand, whereas in the years 1914-18, the original rate of 12 per thousand increased to 17 per thousand, in other words by almost 50 percent even though the Dutch people were under their own Government, were not in the war, and were not under a blockade. According to the statistics which I received from the Netherlands Statistics Bureau, from 1914 to 1918 there was a decrease of about one-half. In the year of my administration, up until 1944, the population increased from 20 per thousand to 25 per thousand. That is a good one-fourth increase. Of course it is primarily the will to live of the Dutch people. But it is surely also a consequence of the measures of my civil administration.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my client, I should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central Statistics Bureau. I received this by way of the General Secretary in a German and English version, but it is not certified. The original should be in the office of the General Secretary.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to remark that in these statistics . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Because in the Indictment and in the proceedings here, it was claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of germanizing the Dutch people and of breaking resistance, and because he is also held responsible for the poor state of health of the population, the decrease in births, and the mortality rate. These were all assertions made in the Dutch Government report and in part also produced here. Yesterday, with the permission of the Tribunal, I submitted this query to the Dutch Government and I
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received this answer. In fact it answered more than I requested, particularly taking war victims into account. But we will pay homage to the truth and submit it as we got it.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering that in evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I submit it the way I received it from the General Secretary. It is Number 106.
SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that the reduction of the birth rate in the years 1914-18 is shown at a lower figure than the report which I received in January of 1945.
DR. STEINBAUER: I still have two brief questions regarding Austria. The first question is this: The American prosecutor has charged that you gave Muhlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say what the notes contained?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that was the outcome of the discussion which I had just had with Dr. Schuschnigg and it included, above all, the agreement to call upon Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaller, and Dr. Fischbock, and the institution of national political sections within the Fatherland Front-in short, things that we had agreed on, things which Adolf Hitler, at Berchtesgaden, did not in any way have to put through for the Austrian National Socialists.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then the American prosecutor asked you whether you knew that Austrians died in concentration camps after the Anschluss. You answered, no, that you did not know this. But people did die in Austrian concentration camps. Here in this room, in the course of months, you have become familiar with concentration camps. Do you mean to say that they were identical with those which you meant?
SEYSS-INQUART: In no way at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you, that is sufficient.
SEYSS-INQUART: And apart from that, I said I heard that it might have been possible that Austrians died in German concentration camps. The Austrian concentration camps can in no way be compared with what we have heard here about German concentration camps. ~
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination-in-chief of the defendant, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call my first witness on the Austrian question, General Glaise-Horstenau.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Defendant, you said that you had considered that the laws of land warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
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THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did you consider that they were all obsolete?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Which ones did you consider were obsolete?
SEYSS-INQUART: I was of the opinion that the contractual stipulations for the protection of the civilian population were out
dated by technical developments in weapons, for obviously certain warlike measures like total blockade, demolition bombing attacks, et cetera, are directed primarily at the destruction of the civilian population and consequently are only justifiable if the civilian population is considered a war potential like the troops at the front. But if that is the case, then the civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in such a way also.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And when you say "considered in such a way," you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the civilian population to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; is that not the conclusion?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is my conclusion, yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that conclusion reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: I believe with the increase of the bombing attacks, approximately.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind the increase of the bombing attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
SEYSS-INQUART: At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; now there are two
short questions. You said that you told the Fuehrer that you would not act as a Trojan Horse; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, of course.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, had he suggested to you that you should act as a Trojan Horse?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, not that, but I was fully aware of my
difficult position. It was quite obvious to me that I could be misused for such purposes, that behind the back of my ministerial post a situation could be prepared so that Austria would be overrun.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you used that expression after you had been talking to the Fuehrer for some time, did you?
SEYSS-INQUART: In the course of the discussion, but the thought itself had come to me previously; I only brought it up during the discussion.
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THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, you had had this thought for some time?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Ever since you had gotten into this Austrian matter actively you had had the thought, I suppose?
SEYSS-INQUART: The possibility of dissension and of a difference of opinion about this situation was quite clear to me.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That your actions might be misconstrued?
SEYSS-INQUART: First of all; and secondly, that the fact of my activity could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of course, because you represented both sides at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: That is correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well now, let us take up this matter of declaring forfeited property of enemies of the State. You made those declarations, I presume, did you not, as Reich Commissioner?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And was that made under a decree of the Fuehrer's giving you authority to do that?
SEYSS-INQUART: That was a basic practice which was current in the Reich, and if I did not get the order I nevertheless had a sort of directive...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now wait a minute. I did not ask you about the practice. It was made under a decree, was it not? That practice was under a decree?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that decree applied to all occupied countries, did it not?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so. I first announced this decree in the Netherlands myself. The measures in the Netherlands came about on the basis of my directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I do not want to get you confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Fuehrer, was it not, giving you that authority; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Let us say on the basis of a directive.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of a directive of the Fuehrer; right?
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THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that directive in evidence? Has it been put in evidence?
SEYSS-INQUART: I do not think so.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now tell us what was in it. What was in that directive?
SEYSS-INQUART: It was the general directive that the property of persons who committed acts inimical to the Reich was to be confiscated. I had already issued a decree similar to this in Austria. The first one was issued in the Reich itself; that was the model.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, you were the person in the Netherlands who had complete discretion to make the determination of who was an enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision under the decree?
SEYSS-INQUART: No, that was actually a matter for the Police and the courts.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see.
SEYSS-INQUART: I only had influence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the Police did not have to go to the courts to get that determination surely, did they?
SEYSS-INQUART: No. Either the Police directly made a decision of this kind or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the court sentenced the people on the basis of certain offenses, and then on the basis of the judgment the property suffered the legal consequences.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, the property of the Freemasons was confiscated under that decree. What other property, of what other groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that direction of the Fuehrer? I do not mean individuals; I mean groups.
SEYSS-INQUART: At the moment I cannot think of any others, although there were a few other groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): But, in effect-see if I state the practice correctly-the Police would decide that an individual or group of individuals, on account of their words or their actions,, were enemies of the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. And the decisive office at the time was that of Heydrich.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The decisive factor was Heydrich?
SEYSS-INQUART: And the Netherlands agencies carried through his decisions.
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THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you carried through Heydrich's decisions; right?
SEYSS-INQUART: I carried through Heydrich's decisions when it came to property rights. The association of Jehovah's Witnesses belonged to those groups.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, Jehovah's Witnesses belonged to the group too?
SEYSS-INQUART: They were also among them.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the property of Jehovah's Witnesses was confiscated also, since they were enemies of the Reich?
SEYSS-INQUART: They probably did not have very much, but what they had was confiscated because of their attitude in refusing to serve in the war effort.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They refused-let me get this straight. This is interesting. Jehovah's Witnesses refused to fight or to serve in the German war effort and therefore their property was confiscated. Is that right?
SEYSS-INQUART: Not quite. Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany refused to serve in the German Army. So first of all they were prohibited there and then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the Netherlands?
SEYSS-INQUART: Yes; but Jehovah's Witnesses in the Netherlands were not prohibited because they refused to serve in the German Army, but rather because we were against this group on principle.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see, on general principles. As pacifists, you were against them, so you confiscated their property; right?
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[The witness Glaise-Horstenau took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
EDMUND GLAISE-HORSTENAU (Witness): Edmund Glaise-Horstenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
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DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what position did you have in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was born in 1882 in Braunau in Upper Austria. I came of an officer's family of French descent. In 1918 I was a major in the General Staff of the Austrian headquarters as adviser on politics and the press.
DR. STEINBAUER: What position did you have then in the Austrian Republic?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After the overthrow of 1918 I was in the civil service as director of archives at the university, a historian and author. Among other things, I was the author of a basic work about the collapse of old Austria, which...
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we want only your public positions; I am interested in knowing about them only.
What public positions did you have?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Director of archives; then, from 11 July 1936 on, I was Minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, as guarantor of the July Agreement; and then during the March days of 1938, I was in the Cabinet of Seyss-Inquart.
In November 1939 I voluntarily entered the German Army, first in the obscure fob of a graves registration inspector; and from 1941 on I had to do with military diplomatic tasks and was on duty at Zagreb without troop command. In September 1944 I was dismissed from my post in Zagreb because, being an Austrian of the old regime, I was against the official policy and was one of the basic opponents of the Ustashi terror. Another reason was that I was supposed to have called the head of the State, who was elected and appointed by us, Ante Pavelich, a "criminal subject," among other undiplomatic things.
DR. STEINBAUER: General, I shall put a few brief questions to you, and it is quite sufficient if you just answer them with a characterizing phrase. The Tribunal does not want to know very much about the Anschluss itself, but everything as to how it came about. Therefore I ask you very briefly: After the July Putsch of 1934, were you in any way connected with Chancellor Schuschnigg?
DR. STEINBAUER: What was the economic situation at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The economic situation at that time may be characterized through the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6 million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that
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means, counting their families, that more than a million were in the misery of unemployment.
DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities were there regarding the expansion of the economic area?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In this connection I can say openly and immediately that all the possibilities always received "no" as an answer. If Austria wanted the Anschluss, the answer was "no." If Austria wanted to call the Hapsburgs back, the answer was "no." If Austria wanted to enter a German customs union in order to expand her economic area, the answer was "no." And when great men like Briand and Tardieu spoke of a Danube federation, we received only cold shoulders from our autarchically minded neighbors. That is the Austrian tragedy.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now a party was formed which took up the Anschluss as the main point of its program. What were the combat methods of this party?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: In the year 1918 the standard bearer of this Anschluss was no less than the Social Democratic Party led by Otto Bauer who the year before had declared the Anschluss to be the only possibility for the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party crowded to the front, though it was not unified, to be sure, until the end of the twenties by unconditional subordination to the leadership of Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the leader of the NSDAP in Austria at that time?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The leaders themselves changed frequently. Hitler, however, sent a land inspector by the name of- what was his name; a Prussian-I cannot think of the name at the moment-who was evicted from the country by Dollfuss in 1933. Habicht-Dr. Habicht is his name.
DR. STEINBAUER: And after him, is it correct that it was Captain Leopold?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: After him, Captain Leopold rose to the leadership of the Party.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did the Austrian National Socialists stand with respect to Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: They considered themselves bound by absolute obedience and loyalty.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now the famous Agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached. After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he tell you about his political objectives?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I became well acquainted with SeyssInquart shortly before this agreement. I do not remember exactly
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what he told me then about his political objectives. In general, it coincides with what he later set up as his political objectives.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what was that, briefly?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Party, not as an organization, but only as a support for an ideology in the totalitarian instrument of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime, in the Fatherland Front-at the same time its members were to acknowledge the State and Constitution in Austria, and had Adolf Hitler's blessing in addition.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you yourself deal with the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, or did you talk with him?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Apart from the March days of 1938, I had three opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did Seyss-Inquart enter the Government?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart entered the Government after 12 February 1938.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: As far as I can remember, he visited Adolf Hitler on 17 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he make a report about his visit with Hitler to Schuschnigg and the other members of the Cabinet?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Certainly he told Schuschnigg, and he told me as well.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he collaborate in the planned plebiscite which was to take place on 13 March 1938?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: At that time, without knowing about the plebiscite, I left, on the 6th of the month, on 2 weeks' leave. Therefore, I cannot give you a reliable answer to this question.
DR. STEINBAUER: But do you know whether this plebiscite had been decided upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-Inquart or not? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: To my knowledge, the plebiscite was not handled by any Ministerial Council.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the National Socialists agree to the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: So far as I could judge on my return from my leave, certainly not.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it became known that Schuschnigg wanted to have a plebiscite. Where were you and what did you experience at that time?
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GLAISE-HORSTENAU: On 6 March, as I have already said, I went on leave, and in Stuttgart I gave a lecture, something I had planned for a long time. And the subject of my speech was "Central Europe in the Year 1000 A. D."
DR. STEINBAUER: We are not interested in details, only in the facts.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Then I undertook a private visit to Landau in the Pfalz to visit my French relatives, and there Burckel, whom I had told nothing about my arrival, came to see me, and in his home I heard over the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck. Immediately it was obvious to me that the scheduled plebiscite would, in view of Hitler's nature, certainly bring about some form of grave countermeasure, and I decided to fly to Vienna at once. Burckel was to have arranged this. However, he telephoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. I gave the reasons for complying with his request to the American interrogator, and subsequently, only here, I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin. I heard from the mouth of an absolutely authentic witness that he did not want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all solutions by force. During the night between 9 and 10 March I reached Hitler and entered upon a discussion which lasted for 21/s hours, a conference which assumed no concrete proportions and led to no concrete decision. Instead he told me that during the course of the day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, he would have me called in. In fact, he did not call me until 8 o'clock in the evening in order to give me the drafts for Seyss-Inquart: a) of an offer of resignation for Schuschnigg, and b) of a radio speech.
I declared that I could not bring these notes to Austria myself, and I asked that it be taken care of in the regular way by courier.
Later on I received a third draft from Goering, who was Field Marshal at the time. There was a telegram therein, containing a second request to Hitler asking for the marching-in of German troops. I should like to say from the beginning, all these drafts-as far as I know also the third draft-had no actual significance. These were my experiences on the 11th in Berlin.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you flew to Vienna and met SeyssInquart. What did you do with him on that critical morning of 11 March?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Seyss-Inquart met me at the airport. I advised him briefly about what had taken place in Berlin, and made entirely clear to him the grave misgivings which I had. Together, Seyss-Inquart and I, at 11 o'clock in the morning, shortly after my arrival, went to see Schuschnigg. While Seyss-Inquart placed before
12 June 46
Schuschnigg certain inner political problems which I did not know about because I had been absent, I pointed out to Schuschnigg, who was on the verge of tears, that there was great danger of new world complications, even of a new world war, and implored him to give in and to rescind the plebiscite which was scheduled for Sunday.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you and Seyss-Inquart offer to resign?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot recall whether we went so far orally. This discussion was comparatively brief, but afterwards, at about 1 o'clock, we offered to resign.
For this neither a decree by Hitler nor a decree by the National Socialist leader, Klausner, was necessary. Already on Thursday evening I had made my decision in the home of Burckel that, in connection with the plebiscite, I would also make use of this traditional method of ministerial resignation in order to prevent the worst, if possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: And how did Schuschnigg react to this proposal to postpone the plebiscite?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Schuschnigg at first was rather reserved, but at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Guido Schmidt and Guido Zernatto-I do not have to tell you who these gentlemen were- made efforts to establish a modus vivendi with Seyss-Inquart. I myself kept in the background since my mission had already been fully accomplished on 12 February.
DR. STEINBAUER: And what did Seyss-Inquart do in the afternoon?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Shortly after this discussion, which led to no result, Schuschnigg still hesitated. But finally, he declared that in accordance with the wishes expressed he would postpone the Sunday plebiscite. I believed that the worst had passed. A short time thereafter Seyss-Inquart was called to the telephone, and returned visibly agitated, saying that he had been advised from Berlin that Hitler could not work any longer with Schuschnigg, and that Seyss-Inquart was to demand succession to the post of Chancellor.
Seyss-Inquart invited me to go with him to Schuschnigg. I turned this down for reasons of delicacy. Seyss-Inquart went in alone and returned after a brief period, and we had a discussion which seems to me to be of importance to this Court. He was confident of receiving the Chancellorship, and said to me, almost with an undertone of regret: "Now we will have to take in the Nazis after all, and we shall work with the Catholics and others who are of similar trends to establish a political combine with which I shall
12 June 46
govern." However, he was going to demand of Hitler, as far as internal politics were concerned, an agreement of 5 years' tranquillity.
DR. STEINBAUER: And, of course, Hitler did not agree to that. Instead he marched into Austria and you were confronted with a law. You were named Vice Chancellor. Did you sign this law, and why?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a cosignatory of this law. I entered into the Government after Keppler requested me to and I countersigned this law, for three reasons:
First, under the impression that Austria was completely alone in the world, and that no one was lifting a finger on our behalf; secondly, and I must say something here which has been said in the southern German press, I entered under the impression of the overwhelming street demonstrations that were taking place. You can call this mass psychology, or what you will, but this mass psychology was present and it was an unequaled popular demonstration. Thirdly, on the Ballhausplatz, on the night that I received this law into my hands-I did not participate in the origination of this law- the German tanks were rolling past below me, and the occupation of the country by Adolf Hitler was accomplished. With him this meant "bend or break." If Austria had tried to assert a different will it would not have been possible.
Of course, one is easily inclined to say about my home country that it should have committed suicide from fear of death. ..
DR. STEINBAUER: That is sufficient, General, thank you. Mr. President, I have no further questions to address to this witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was the July Agreement concluded as a result of pressure from Germany or through mutual desire and mutual interest?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: It was concluded on the basis of mutual desire and mutual interest.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you then and later have complete confidence in Schuschnigg and he in you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Up until the winter of 1937-38, my relationship to Schuschnigg was one of complete confidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know anything about the intention of Herr Von Papen to effect the removal of Chancellor Schuschnigg?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Never did I have the slightest hint of that sort.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the so-called "Langot aid fund"?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The Langot aid fund was a fund which was established quietly by the Government in typical Austrian
if dune 40
fashion-this is not intended as criticism, my saying that it is a typical Austrian fashion-for the help of National Socialist family members of National Socialists who had been imprisoned.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Schuschnigg and the Government have knowledge of this fund?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Both of them knew about this and they both knew definitely of Langot.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of the NSDAP and particularly of Leopold to Herr Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The NSDAP and Leopold were completely opposed to Von Papen. They were inimical toward him to begin with because he was a Catholic, and they distrusted him additionally in every sort of way.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MR. DODD: Did you know a man named General Muff?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Yes, very well indeed.
MR. DODD: You were in the habit of telling him everything that went on in the Ministerial Consulate of Austria, were you not?
MR. DODD: Do you know Stephan Tauschitz, the Austrian Ambassador to Germany?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Not him either. We spoke to him about some topic but that I should let myself be used as an informer was contrary to my tradition as a soldier of the Empire.
MR. DODD: Then what did you think you were being brought to Berlin for by Burckel from Stuttgart?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I cannot follow you, I am sorry.
MR. DODD: What did you understand to be the purpose of your trip when you were being brought to Berlin from Stuttgart in March 193S, when Hitler wanted to see you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not go to Berlin from Stuttgart, but rather from the Pfalz. Hitler had had me advised to come at all costs. I considered this matter and finally accepted, a) because I wanted to know what was going on in Berlin...
MR. DODD: I wanted to know what you thought was the purpose of your trip when you left, from wherever it was, to go to Berlin. That is all. What did you understand was the purpose?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: My intention was to comply with Hitler's invitation and to see just what was tailing place in Berlin.
12 June 46
MR. DODD: All right. Now you have told the Tribunal that you were interested only in a peaceful solution of the question. Surely, when you got this false telegram and the draft of the radio speech for Seyss-Inquart, you certainly did not think you were proceeding in a peaceful and loyal manner insofar as Austria was concerned, did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: From all these three things I had gained the absolute impression that if Schuschnigg were to cancel the Sunday plebiscite, then a peaceful solution would still be possible.
MR. DODD: And what do you suppose you were going to do with that telegram, that false telegram that asked Hitler for help because of disorders? This was days before it actually took place. You knew that this was a complete fraud, an obvious fraud. Why did you even consent to carry that back to Austria?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I did not take it along. There was even a sharp difference of opinion between myself and Field Marshal Goering. I did not take it along. It was given to a courier.
MR. DODD: You told us; you know we have your notes here, in which you said that you did carry it along.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, never did I say that. That was contrary to the truth. I never put down or said that I took any of these three things along personally, but I emphasized that the courier did that. I should like to call your attention to the fact that, according to the agreement of 12 February, Seyss-Inquart had the right to deal with Reich and Party agencies in the Reich.
MR. DODD: Well, in any event, you knew that the telegram was a falsehood, did you not? Whether you carried it or Globocznik did, it was not true, was it?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I beg your pardon, I had nothing whatever to do with this telegram afterwards. Months later I asked Seyss-Inquart whether this telegram had ever been sent off and he said "no," it had never been sent. I have already said that all three documents were not used.
MR. DODD: Certainly they were not given to you by Hitler to be thrown away, and when you consented to carry them, you did not know that they were not going to be utilized, did you?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Anything further was the task of SeyssInquart who, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had contact with the Reich and Party offices...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you try to answer the question instead of answering something else?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: Very well...
12 June 46
MR. DODD: Well, I am not going to press it any further. You seem to think that you had some other reasons, but I do not want to press it any further.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: No, I would be very grateful if I could follow, but I do not understand this question.
MR. DODD: Well, if you do not understand it, I do not think there is any point in pressing it.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I should be very grateful if you would repeat it.
MR. DODD: What I suggested in my question was what you, at least, knew about this false telegram which was handed to you, a draft of it, I think you said either by Hitler or by Goering. You were then a Minister without Portfolio of the Austrian Government. You certainly knew it was a complete falsehood and yet you were willing to go back to Austria and deal with Seyss-Inquart, knowing that such a telegram had been arranged, and that it had been sent by courier.
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: The telegram had lost all significance through the fact that Schuschnigg canceled the plebiscite, and I told Schuschnigg explicitly-leaving it to Seyss-Inquart, who sat beside me, to say anything more specific-that Hitler would march in if we did not call off the plebiscite. That is exactly what I said to Schuschnigg.
MR. DODD: All right. That is not what I am talking about, but I am not going on with it.
Do you remember telling us that at the time that Goering was talking to Seyss-Inquart at the telephone, you found out that the Defendant Von Papen and Fritz Wiedemann were sitting beside Goering in Berlin?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I am sorry. I only heard about that after the collapse in 1945, from Wiedemann.
MR. DODD: What I want to know is, how did you find that out?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I found out from Captain Wiedemann, whom I just happened to be with.
MR. DODD: All right. Now, you know Defendant Von Papen once wrote a letter to Hitler and he said that you were a willing collaborator with him with respect to the possibility of union or Anschluss with Germany, and that was way back in 1936. Do you know about that? It is in evidence in this case, USA-67, Document 2246-PS. Were you a willing collaborator with Von Papen?
GLAISE-HORSTENAU: I was a willing collaborator for the normalization of the relations between the two countries; but I am not familiar with this document.
12 June 46
MR. DODD: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine, Dr. Steinbauer?
DR. STEINBAUER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
We will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
[The witness Rainer took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
FRIEDRICH RAINER (Witness): Friedrich Rainer.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STEINBAUER: What functions, and for how long, did you have in the NSDAP?
RAINER: I have been a member of the NSDAP since 10 October 1930. Until 1934 I had no functions. Afterwards Gauleiter Klausner of Carinthia called me to the Gauleiter's office. Beginning in 1936 I worked in the Landesleitung. Landesleiter Leopold, in the autumn of 1936, relieved me of my position because there were differences of opinion between us. In February of 1938 Klausner again appointed me his political adviser and co-worker in the Landesleitung. In May 1938 the Fuehrer appointed me Gauleiter of Salzburg. On 1 December 1941 I was transferred to Carinthia. Those were my political functions.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were therefore Gauleiter of Carinthia at the end?
DR. STEINBAUER: And through years of work in the NSDAP you had a chance to get to know it well?
RAINER: Yes, I know the conditions well since the Anschluss.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you get to know Seyss-Inquart?
RAINER: The first time that I met Seyss-Inquart was in August 1935. We had a conversation which lasted a few minutes. A few days later I was arrested, and for 6~/~' months I was in the custody of the Austrian police. After my release in approximately April or May 1936 I met Seyss-Inquart again in Vienna and remained in contact with him after that.
12 June 4G
DR. STEINBAUER: Was he a member of the Party?
RAINER: During the time that the Party was prohibited SeyssInquart was not a member of the NSDAP, but he was a member of the Styrian Home Guard. That organization was, I think in 1933 by agreement between its leaders and Habicht, taken over entirely as part of the Austrian NSDAP. After the Anschluss that transfer was not recognized by the Reich Treasurer, Schwarz, and the members of the Styrian Home Guard, among them, I believe, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, had to apply again for membership.
DR. STEINBAUER: So your statement in the famous "Rainer letter"-I shall call it the Rainer letter henceforth for short-is incorrect?
RAINER: At that time I did not know that the transfer in its original form had not been recognized by the Reich Treasurer.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that we can say you knew Seyss-Inquart, you had talked to him quite frequently, and surely he would have told you his ideas regarding the Anschluss?
DR. STEINBAUER: What were these ideas? Please be very brief.
RAINER: The Anschluss, at that time, was not the subject matter of our discussion. The idea of the Anschluss was a point in the program of all Austrian parties; it remained the ideal goal for all of us. In this case, however, what we were concerned with was that the Austrian State should once again steer a course toward Germany and that internal conditions should be peaceful. The difficulty in this connection was that the State founded by Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, by disregarding the democratic constitution, was going to permit only a one-party system. It was particularly difficult, therefore, to draw into participation and to legalize the great mass of the opposition of the National wing. That task, according to Seyss-Inquart's conception and my own, was to be carried out without further bloodshed by peaceful means. With good will on both sides and a postponement of radical means such a way seemed possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then came the Agreement of 11 July 1936?
DR. STEINBAUER: Then you, at that time, went to see Adolf Hitler to clarify his attitude toward the party. What did Adolf Hitler say to you at the time?
RAINER: A few days after 11 July 1936 I was called to Berchtesgaden, and on 16 or 17 July I visited Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can go a little quicker than you are going, Witness.
12 June 9B
RAINER: The Fuehrer made very serious and thorough observations, and he demanded in very severe words that the Austrian National Socialists should respect the Agreement of 11 July under all circumstances. He criticized the previous methods, and he used the expression that they had been heroic, but stupid. He pointed out that the continuation of such methods would lead to continuous difficulties in foreign politics.
He demanded that the National Socialists in Austria should use the existing political possibilities. Upon my specific question whether this included the Fatherland Front, he said "yes." He assured us that in the near future the general tension would be relieved by an improvement in the relationship between these two German states.
DR. STEINBAUER: In its essentials, therefore, he approved of Seyss-Inquart's policy?
RAINER: The Fuehrer's statement, to me, meant a confirmation of the correctness of the way in which we had decided to go.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was Seyss-Inquart also the leader of the Party?
RAINER: No, Seyss-Inquart was never the Party leader.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he subordinate himself to the leadership of the Austrian NSDAP as you state in your letter?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was a member of the National Opposition group, and in that capacity he recognized the existing leadership.
I want to draw your attention to the fact that he recognized Klausner in that letter because Klausner, according to the Berchtesgaden agreement, had replaced Leopold by request of the Fuehrer, since he promised to steer a quiet, clear, and open course. Cooperation with him appeared to assure adherence to the Berchtesgaden agreement.
Seyss-Inquart, however, had explicitly stated that in his capacity as trustee for the Berchtesgaden agreement and Minister in Schuschnigg's Government he was independent of Klausner.
DR. STEINBAUER: Tell me, Witness, after the understanding of 12 February 1938 did you, during a railway journey, meet SeyssInquart who was coming back from his visit to the Fuehrer?
DR. STEINBAUER: What did he tell you about his conference with the Fuehrer?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart returned in a sleeper, and we sat together in his compartment. He had a piece of paper-I think it was an envelope-and on that there were notes. I remember that
, , .
12 June 40
he described the formalities which had taken place at the beginning by saying that he had come in his capacity as an Austrian Minister, bound by oath to the Constitution, and responsible to the President and the Chancellor of Austria. He said that he was greeting, in Adolf Hitler, the leader of all Germans. Afterwards he told me in detail about points of that conference, not all of which I can remember now. My whole impression was that the discussion had passed satisfactorily, and I recognized that the conference had been conducted in a spirit of full loyalty to Chancellor Schuschnigg. As far as I can remember, the Anschluss as such had not been dealt with at all.
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you remember his telling you that he had stated to Hitler that he would be Schuschnigg's living guarantor, and not a Trojan Horse?
RAINER: I do not wish to confirm those exact words. The expression which Dr Seyss-Inquart repeatedly used was that he was not a Trojan Horse leader. Furthermore, I remember that he had used the expression frequently that he was the living guarantor for mutual adherence to the agreement of Berchtesgaden.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he also say that he refused to have a cultural fight?
RAINER: I do not believe that I can remember that. At any rate, that was his point of view, and I certainly assume that he spoke to the Fuehrer about that.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did the Fuehrer agree to these proposals?
RAINER: I had the impression that Adolf Hitler was in full agreement with the suggestions of Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart tell Schuschnigg that?
RAINER: That I must assume. At any rate, he did state that that was his intention.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he tell the Austrian National Socialists the same thing?
RAINER: Yes, because that was particularly necessary. SeyssInquart made a speech at a conference of leaders at the beginning of March and pointed out that an evolutionary course and measures which were to a certain extent disappointing to the radical followers-namely, the dissolution of the illegal organization-were specifically desired by Adolf Hitler.
I think I can also remember that during the large demonstration at Linz, and on the occasion of the demonstrations at Graz, he referred to that specifically; for the visit to Adolf Hitler in Berlin gave him the necessary legitimate foundation in the eyes of the National Socialists.
12 June 46
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter of yours you wrote that Seyss-Inquart had been informed of preparation for revolutionary steps.
RAINER: May I ask you, Dr. Steinbauer, which revolutionary steps you mean?
DR. STEINBAUER: Those of 10 March.
RAINER: May I have permission to go into some detail in this connection? The expression "revolutionary steps" is too far-reaching. The measures which were introduced were mainly these: After Chancellor Schuschnigg's speech at Innsbruck, Major Klausner was convinced that thereby every. basis for an inner political understanding had been destroyed and that this speech would be like a spark in a powder barrel.
Whereas previously we had had consultations under what circumstances the vote might be "yes," it had now, in view of the attitude of the broad masses, become impossible.
A clear-cut indication of attitude by the National Socialist leaders had to be brought about. During the night, the new Gauleiter were still being given their first piece of information about the Party not being agreeable to the proposed plebiscite, and that therefore the slogan would be, for the time being, to refrain from voting. The strictest discipline was demanded, because we feared that feeling would soon run very high. On 10 March the long-prepared propaganda of Zernatto began, and clashes occurred. We also had reports to the effect that large groups of the Protective Legion, forbidden in February 1934, were being armed. Strictest alert was ordered for the formations, therefore, and the formations received orders to provide protection for the Nationals.
Essentially, these were the steps ordered on the 10th; I think I informed Dry Seyss generally, in the afternoon, regarding the atmosphere in the provinces. I probably did not inform him about individual organizational measures. ~
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he promote that atmosphere?
DR. STEINBAUER: Did he demand demonstrations, or did he prevent them?
RAINER: He neither promoted them, nor did he urge them. Prevention at that stage was no longer possible.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened on the morning of the 11th?
RAINER: On 11 March in the forenoon I was working at the office of State Councillor Jury at 1 Seitzergasse. I no longer know at exactly what task. We met Dr. Seyss, Glaise-Horstenau, and
12 June 46
several others about noon in the office of Dr. Fischbock, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart told us of the outcome of the conferences with Dr. Schuschnigg.
The result of our consultation was the letter which the Ministers and State Councillors wrote to Dr. Schuschnigg, which set a time limit for 2 o'clock in the afternoon, demanded the cancellation of this unconstitutional plebiscite and the fixing of a new plebiscite a few weeks later in accordance with the regulation of the Constitution, or we would resign.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then what happened? Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite. How did you hear about that?
RAINER: Yes. Schuschnigg postponed the plebiscite, but he refused to give a date for a new plebiscite and gave orders to Dr. Seyss, the Security Minister, to adopt severe measures. That solution was reported to the Chancellery in Berlin by telephone in the afternoon, and it produced the statement from the Reich that this solution, as a half-solution, was not acceptable any more. As far as I know, that started the intervention by the German Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: But was not intervention already brought about through the fact that Glaise-Horstenau, as has been stated, or a courier, took a letter from Adolf Hitler to Henna?
RAINER: It was my view that certain drafts which Globocznik showed me at midday, and which had been addressed to the Landesleitung offices, had been brought along by Glaise-Horstenau who came back from Berlin that morning. As I heard later, that was reportedly done by a courier. In my opinion this was not an intervention on the part of the Reich.
DR. STEINBAUER: Was there collaboration between the Party and the- Reich on one hand, and Seyss-Inquart on the other?
RAINER: If you mean "conspiracy" by "collaboration," then I must say definitely, "no." But the collaboration which was agreed upon at Berchtesgaden was carried out.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Klausner give the order that the Party was free to act and that it was to seize power?
RAINER: Through a specific order from Adolf Hitler, the Party was bound not to undertake any revolutionary steps. That order had been retransmitted by Keppler during the early days of March, and Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had called Keppler, who was already in the plane, back in order to impress upon him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, surely, the question was what Klausner did, and the witness is now telling us what a lot of other people did.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
12 June 46
I asked you, when did Klausner give the order to the Gauleiter to seize power?
RAINER: That order was given by Klausner on the evening of 11 March.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart approve?
RAINER: Seyss-Inquart was not informed of that until some time later.
DR. STEINBAUER: NO I must put to you the fact that Gauleiter Eigruber, of Upper Austria, has stated in an affidavit that he received a telegram in which he was addressed as Landeshauptmann. Do you know anything about that?
RAINER: I know nothing whatever about telegrams, or a telegram. I know that Klausner's order was telephoned from 1 Seitzergasse. That evening Globocznik was also putting through calls from the Chancellery. I assume that Eigruber is referring to one of these telephone calls.
DR. STEINBAUER: Is it known to you that Globocznik, who was Gauleiter of Vienna before this illegal period, told you that he misused the name of Seyss-Inquart for the seizure of power?
RAINER: Globocznik told me that several inquiries had been directed to the Chancellor's office which were passed on to him over the telephone, and that he did not always state his name in that connection. One special case relative to Salzburg is known to me very well.
DR. STEINBAUER: In this Rainer letter you also made a statement which mentions some assistance rendered on 25 July 1934. The Prosecution considers that this has some connection with the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss.
RAINER: That remark goes back to a conversation during which Seyss-Inquart told me that after 25 July he had been afraid for a few days that his name might be connected with those events. But after a few days it turned out that there was no such connection. Subsequently he tried to exert his personal influence toward reconciliation and he took over some defense cases. That is what I meant.
DR. STEINBAUER: So that is your explanation for the expression "rendering assistance"?
DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that pressure was exercised on President Dr. Miklas by the Austrian National Socialists, so that he would appoint Seyss-Inquart?
12 June 46
RAINER: The negotiations, which occupied the entire late afternoon and evening, were under a certain amount of pressure; for practically in the whole of Austria the change had already been carried out. The overthrow of Schuschnigg's Cabinet loosed a tremendous avalanche. During the negotiations that fact made itself felt.
DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, you mean that clearly there was pressure, but not physical, directly upon the person of the President?
RAINER: There can be no question of that.
DR. STEINBAUER: But then, how do you explain that at that time 40 SS men marched into the Chancellery building and occupied it?
RAINER: An occupation by the SS is hardly the right expression. When, toward 8 o'clock in the evening, Miklas had again refused to nominate a National Socialist as Chancellor, Doppler stated that at 8 o'clock-not as originally declared-they would march in and he stated his fear for the safety of the negotiators. In fact, as was said in Austria, things were generally in commotion and the situation appeared very unsafe. The Chancellery building was occupied by the police and by the guards and was put in a state of defense. I informed the Landesleitung of this situation and asked them to take protective measures so that willful acts would not cause unnecessary misfortune. In consequence of the measures which were then 'introduced, I estimate that no earlier than 10 o'clock in the evening an SS leader reported in civilian clothes, stating that he and his men had been assigned to protect the negotiators. Seyss-Inquart considered that step excessive but I asked him to take the measure into consideration, and he then allowed these men to pass through the police and guards, and they, were admitted to the courtyard of the Chancellery building. There was never any pressure nor were there acts of force; it was merely a precautionary measure.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were Gauleiter of Carinthia. Did you also have administrative powers during the war in the neighboring area of Italian sovereignty?
RAINER: Yes. In September 1943, I was appointed Supreme Commissioner in the operational zone "Adriatic Coastland," with my seat in Trieste, and I had six provinces under my authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you recruit foreign workers there for employment in Germany?
12 June 46
DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner was this done?
RAINER: It was done through recruiting, that is to say, without employing coercion, since for many decades these workers were accustomed to go north to work.
DR. SERVATIUS: These workers were put to work in your Gau, were they?
RAINER: The majority were put to work in my Gau, but also in other parts of the Alpine regions.
DR. SERVATIUS: What were the living conditions of these people in your Gau?
RAINER: Their living conditions were the general and normal ones.
DR. SERVATIUS: Where were they accommodated? In camps? Did you see any such camps?
RAINER: They were housed by their employers. Where larger numbers of them existed they lived in camps which were looked after by the Italian consulate and the German Labor Front.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Labor Front supervise matters in practice?
RAINER: Yes, it was bound by an agreement to that effect, of which I was informed, and it took great pains to carry out that task.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself inspect any camps?
RAINER: Yes. I inspected camps repeatedly and I found conditions to be in good order. In the case of certain industries, for instance the water works, I found that conditions were exceptionally good.
DR. SERVATIUS: Can you give us the names of these camps?
RAINER: A particularly good impression was made on me by one camp attached to some water works at Mund on the Drau River; the same applies to Schwabeck.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did these foreign workers behave at the end of the war? Were there riots?
RAINER: No. Due to the considerable number of workers in my small Gau I was worried about the food supply. Relations with the population were good because the Carinthian is a good-natured and agreeable type of person. I myself have experienced that French workers who had already been collected by the British in camps to be transported away, went back to their farmers, preferring to wait there rather than in the Camp.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the National Socialist Party strongly represented in Carinthia?
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RAINER: Yes. . There were so many National Socialists in Carinthia that Schuschnigg said on one occasion: "One ought to put barbed wire around that county and the concentration camp would be complete."
DR. SERVATIUS: But their relations with the foreign workers were good?
RAINER: Yes, naturally.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.
MR. DODD: Witness, when did you come to the conclusion that this Defendant, Seyss-Inquart, was not a member of the Party as you stated in your letter? When did you change your mind about that?
RAINER: I did not learn until fairly late after the Anschluss that he was not a member of the Party. I cannot tell you the exact year any more.
MR. DODD: But it was not long after you wrote this report, was it, that you found out that what you had said in here was not exactly so? You had misunderstood?
RAINER: In that report I made various attempts to describe matters in a manner favorable to Seyss-Inquart, because I refused to support the Prosecution against Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I asked you. I asked you if it was a fact that you found out soon after you wrote this letter that you were in error in stating that Seyss-Inquart had been a member of the Party. Now you can answer that very directly, I think, without any long statement.
RAINER: I do not believe that I noticed it shortly afterwards.
MR. DODD: Well, when was it? That is all we want to know. If at any time you actually did receive such information, when did you receive it?
RAINER: That I can no longer say and it did not appear important to me at the time.
MR. DODD: All right. Now when did you change your mind or find that you were in error in saying that Seyss-Inquart knew about and participated in the staged demonstrations or the arrangements for the demonstrations which were to take place in Vienna? When did you find that that was misinformation or a mistake?
RAINER: I am not aware that Dr. Seyss-Inquart participated in demonstrations in Vienna.
MR. DODD: Now that is not what I said. If you misunderstood me, I am sorry. Now turn around and maybe if you will look at me it will help a little. You told the Tribunal, in answer to a question
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from Dr. Steinbauer, that Seyss-Inquart did not provoke the demonstrations and he could not prevent them at that stage. But what Dr. Steinbauer asked you was if what you said in your letter about his participation in the plans was true. You know what you say in your letter or your report, do you not? Do you remember what you said in this report about Seyss-Inquart and his participation?
RAINER: The details of my report are no longer in my memory.
MR. DODD: Would you like to look at it?
RAINER: Yes, please.
MR. DODD: While you are waiting for it I can clear some other things up here. Now as a matter of fact, you gave us an affidavit in November, swearing that this was true, did you not?
RAINER: I specifically stated in this connection that I was partly relying on information received from authoritative individuals and that afterwards I had further information showing me that not everything had been correctly represented. I also stated specifically, and had it included in the record, that I had made these statements with a certain bias. A supplement to my affidavit was also made.
MR. DODD: Just a minute. On 15 November 1945, right here in Nuremberg, under oath, you executed this affidavit in which you said that you confirmed the facts of this report and that they were all true to the best of your knowledge and belief. Now what information have you received since 15 November and from whom, that warrants you in making statements contrary to this report today before this Tribunal?
RAINER: I wish to state in this connection that the point of view which I adopted on 15 November is maintained by me today.
MR. DODD: Well, is this report true or not in its entirety, as you told us it was on 15 November?
RAINER: The report must not be taken literally. Partly it is based on statements made by reliable people, and I made it to the best of my knowledge and belief according to the situation existing, I believe, in July 1939, with a certain bias.
MR. DODD: Well, you told us it was true in November, did you not?
RAINER: I did not say that. I said specifically...
MR. DODD: I will show you your affidavit. Your affidavit is attached to that document that you have, and that is your signature, is it not, and you have sworn to the truth of it?
RAINER: I made a specific statement in connection with it, and as a precaution I made a short note about it afterward. The formulation of the reservations was discussed at length.
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MR. DODD: Now you answer my question. Is that the affidavit that you executed under oath on 15 November here in Nuremberg? Yes or no?
MR. DODD: Now, in there you say that you testify and confirm that "The facts which form the basis of the above-mentioned letters and reports are true to the best of my knowledge and belief," and you also say further up that you have read the letters and the report.
Now, is that affidavit true? Were you telling the truth when you said that to us under oath in November?
RAINER: That affidavit is correct, but I demand that the explanations which I gave in connection with it and which were made apart from the record at that time-at least they were taken down in shorthand-be added to it.
MR. DODD: Why did you not ask that there be included in the affidavit anything that you wanted about this report if it was not altogether true? You were swearing to it. Did you ask that something be added to it or that it be changed?
RAINER: I considered this statement to be a statement of the genuine character of the documents which had been submitted to me. The record of my statements contained my opinion of the contents of these documents, and as a precaution I added a statement that in this case, too, I wished certain reservations to be taken down. They were subsequently formulated by one of the gentlemen interrogating me, stating ". . . to the best of my knowledge and belief..." and then he went on to say that all these reservations which I had stated had been expressed in accordance with the method customary with you.
MR. DODD: Now, are you really serious in telling this to this Tribunal today about this affidavit? Are you really serious about this last statement?
RAINER: I am absolutely serious about it. I have nothing to hide.
MR. DODD: Now maybe we can shed a little more light on the kind of reports that you make. I have another one here that you have not seen. You made a speech in 1942. This is Document 4005-PS. It becomes USA-890.
You had better have a copy of this in front of you, USA-890. Do you remember that speech that you made on 11 March 1942 in Klagenfurt before the Leader Corps and the bearers of honor insignia and blood orders of the Gau Carinthia, in which you told the whole story of the development of the events of March 1938? Do you remember the day you made that speech?
RAINER: I did make a speech of that kind.
.MR. DODD: All right. Now, let us look at it. Were you telling the truth the day you made that speech?
RAINER: I represented the events in a way in which my audience would understand.
MR. DODD: Were you telling the truth when you made that speech? I did not ask you if you made it interesting; I asked you if you told the truth.
RAINER: I believe I spoke the truth at the time, but I also believe that there were certain things on which I was not correctly informed.
MR. DODD: Now, let us take a look and see what you said in 1942 with reference to this report, 812-PS.
Now, if you will turn to-I think it is Page 8 of your text, I am trying to locate for you the sentence that begins:
"Only in co-operation with us, Jury and a number of coworkers of Leopold, and also with Leopold's consent, was it possible to achieve Seyss-Inquart's appointment to the post of State Councillor. More and more Seyss turned out to be the clever negotiator. We knew he was the one who would best represent the interests of the Movement in the political forefield. He also unconditionally subordinated himself to Klausner's leadership. He always conducted himself as Klausner's deputy and conscientiously followed Klausner's instructions.
"With Seyss' appointment to the post of Staatsrat, we found a new possibility to enter into further negotiations. At that time there were a number of grotesque situations. We were informed on events in the Schuschnigg camp by the political apparatus; our own connection to Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler we had via Keppler."
Did you say that in your speech as reported there in the text of it, and how do you reconcile that now with what you have told the Tribunal about the report to Burckel?
RAINER: It is not known to me where that record of the speech originates. I should have to have an opportunity. . .
MR. DODD: I will tell you. It is a captured document that was found down there in the files, so you need not worry about that. What I want to know is whether or not you now admit that you made this speech and you said these things at the time that you made it.
RAINER: I made the speech, but I declare emphatically that whatever I have said under oath today about that point is the true
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version. This is a broad statement designed for the audience of that time, which cannot be taken as literally as something which I say today, conscious of my responsibility.
MR. DODD: You are not speaking broadly for the benefit of an
audience here today, are you?
RAINER: That is correct.
MR. DODD: Let us turn a page and see what you said about Papen, and about the conference. You go on to say how you got information, how you met in the Ringstrasse, and so on. If you will follow right along now, we will not lose the places.
"Papen had been expressly told to handle preparations for the conference confidentially. In Austria, only Schuschnigg, Schmidt, and Zernatto knew about it. They believed that on our side only Papen was informed. Papen, too, thought that only he knew about it, but we too were informed and had had conversations with Seyss about the subject."
That is the Berchtesgaden conference. Now, were you telling the truth when you said this in 1942, or not? Or was that a broad statement for the benefit of the audience?
RAINER: I cannot today check this document against a correct reproduction of what I said then.
MR. DODD: Well, why not? It was in 1942. Do you not remember? Do you mean that you do not know whether you told the truth or not, or you do not know whether you said this or not?
RAINER: In those days I gave a description before the simple people of Carinthia and I...
MR. DODD: Did you lie to them or did you tell them the truth?
RAINER: No, but I speak to people like that differently than I would speak under oath before this Tribunal, having to make concrete statements about concrete points. It seems impossible to me that I should today be required to confirm individual points of a speech which was made 4 years ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you have an answer? He is not answering your question.
MR. DODD: No, Sir, he is not.
[Turning to the witness.] I asked you whether or not you made these statements on that day, and if you did so, were they true? Now, you can tell us that very simply and we do not need any long answer. You have read it over and you have heard me read it. Now, please give us an answer.
You do not need to read ally more. You have read it once and I have read it to you. Was that true and did you say it?
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RAINER: In details it is not correct.
MR. DODD: Well, is it true in any respect? Is it true that Papen was informed and that Seyss-Inquart knew about that conference long before it took place or sometime before it took place? That is what we want to know.
RAINER: When we met during the Olympic winter games in Garmisch, we encountered...
MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. You are not answering my question. That is the next paragraph or the next sentence which you have been reading. I know that is coming and I am going to ask you about the meeting in Garmisch. I am now asking you if what you said about Von Papen and Seyss-Inquart is the truth, and that is all I want to know.
RAINER: It is correct that at about this time we were informed about the intention of having a conference.
M. DODD: And that Seyss-Inquart knew about it.
Now, let us go on a little bit further and find out about this Garmisch meeting. You were invited down there to the Olympic games, you say, and you had a meeting with Papen and SeyssInquart and they went through some negotiations, and then you went on to Berlin.
Now, I want to move down a little bit. There is a lot of interesting material here. We do not have the time to go into it all just now. You go on down quite a bit, and I want to ask you about what you say you had already prepared.
"We had already prepared the following"-and you are talking about Schuschnigg and the impending conference. It is on the back of Page 9 of your text, Witness, and it is on Page 5 of the English text, the last paragraph. You say:
"We had already prepared the following:
"The last result of the conversation Seyss communicated to me in a shop in the Karntnerstrasse. I called the telephone number where Globus was to be reached in Berlin. . ."
By the way, for the benefit of the Tribunal, Globus is Globocznik, is he not? He is the same person, is he not?
MR. DODD: "...and told him about the negative result of the conversation. I could speak with Globus entirely freely.
We had a secret code for each name, and besides we both spoke a terrible dialect so that not a soul would have under
stood us. Globus immediately wrote down this report..." and so on.
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"In the meantime, Keppler had gone to Munich by sleeping car."
Then, a sentence or two further down:
"I then forwarded instructions by Party member Muhlmann, who proved to be an excellent liaison man to government offices in the Reich. He left for Salzburg on the same train as Schuschnigg. While Schuschnigg had his car taken off at Salzburg and spent the night there and went on by car to the Obersalzberg, Muhlmann continued on and got to Berchtesgaden. Keppler and he went to the Fuehrer before Schuschnigg and were able to tell him everything. Schuschnigg arrived in the morning, was received, and experienced boundless surprise that the Fuehrer took up the negotiations where they had been broken off without results the day before between Seyss and him. The Fuehrer did not conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg expected. He went the whole hog. Schuschnigg was finished off that time, in a manner one can hardly imagine. The Fuehrer got hold of him, assaulted him, and shouted at him and reproached him for all the dirty tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the past years. Schuschnigg had become a heavy smoker. There was connection even with his bedroom. We knew about his way of life. Now he was smoking 50, now 60 cigarettes. Now, in the presence of the Fuehrer, he was not allowed to smoke. Schuschnigg could not even smoke.
"Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg He only stood at attention before the Fuehrer, held his hands against the seams of his trousers and all he said was 'Yes, sir,' 'Jawohl."'
Now, what about that? You say all these things in your speech and were they true when you said them? Right up to that point, Witness, you have read it with me. Did you say this or not, and was it true when you said it?
RAINER: The events as I have described them here are, as a whole, correct. Individual expressions which I read here are not mine. In that point this document has been supplemented by somebody else. Whether the events described here are correct in detail, is something I cannot say for certain because much of it did not happen in my presence.
MR. DODD: I just wanted to know if you said it; that is all. Very well, we will go on.
You also told them that Schmidt finally went to Ribbentrop and asked him to give Schuschnigg one cigarette and so they gave him
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one. Let us go on quite a few pages to a more important matter. It is on Page 13.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, will you be able to finish tonight, because we were going to adjourn at a quarter to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I will. I shall need only 2 more minutes to finish. I do not think it takes much time. I just have one or two items in this speech.
[Turning to the witness.]You know in this speech you told your listeners about the day that Seyss-Inquart came to a meeting and told you that he had been bound by his word of honor not to talk about the plebiscite. You know what you told your listeners that day. You will find it on-well, you can find it, I can assure you it is in the text and it will save time if you believe me. It is on Page 13 of the English text. You say:
"We asked Seyss: Is it true? Seyss said: I am bound by my word of honor not to speak, but we want to act as if it is true." "Diplomat that he was..."-was your observation- ". . . the matter was clear to us."
He let you know, did he not, that Schuschnigg had told him about the plebiscite. He let you know, did he not? Please, can you not answer my question without-you will not find the answer to that on that page.
- RAINER: The description here coincides with my memory.
MR. DODD: [Turning to the Tribunal.] Just one last matter and I am not going to have many more questions for him.
You also told your listeners that in the night from Thursday, 10 March to Friday, 11 March, all Gauleiter were in Vienna waiting for information:
"On 10 March we issued orders to the SA and SS, Lukesch and Kaltenbrunner, to call out, beginning Friday, half of the formations, and that the best men were to remain armed in their barracks in the event of a civil war," and so on.
Did you say that?
RAINER: With arms and in barracks? That cannot be right. The instructions at that time were, and it is unlikely that I recounted them otherwise, that half the strength should remain assembled at home, that is, in assembly areas. There is no question of barracks, and weapons we had almost none.
MR. DODD: You know, in this whole speech almost everything, except in more detail, that you wrote in your report to Burckel, is contained. The truth of the matter is that you were telling, in both instances, what you believed to be the truth, is it not? That is the truth of the matter. When you made your report to Burckel and
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when you made the speech to the leaders and the members of the blood order, you were reporting what you thought were the facts, and what of course, you know now are still the facts.
RAINER: I cannot recognize this matter as being authentic.
MR. DODD: Well, I certainly do not have many more questions, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 13 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]