[The witness Hoeppner resumed the stand.]

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I request that you explain some of the testimony which you gave yesterday. Please give me very brief answers. First, you said yesterday that the SD had nothing to do with the working out of the plans of aggression and was not even aware of such plans.

HOEPPNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You further stated that the SD since 1934 and up to 1939, in other words during the period of the organization of the RSHA, was engaged in activities which were very far removed from carrying out any police functions and actually had the nature of a scientific research character; is that correct?

HOEPPNER: I did not talk of scientific problems.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I said of a scientific research character. That is how you expressed it yesterday. Is that correct?

HOEPPNER: I explained that the SD had two tasks, one was the work of ascertaining living conditions in Germany and the other was more of a statistical and research nature directed against other philosophies of life.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is clear. Thank you. You further stated that the SD had no relations whatsoever to Crimes against Peace and Crimes against Humanity, is that correct?

HOEPPNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I would like the permission of the Tribunal to submit the original of a German docu-ment from the archives of the main office of the SD, which is a document captured by the Red Army in the Berlin SD office and refers to plans concerning the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Kindly follow me, Witness, while I quote from the document in the Russian translation:

"Communication; Berlin; June 1938; top secret. Subject: Em-ployment of SD in Czechoslovakia."

The text follows:

"The SD should prepare to start its activity in case of com-plications between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia...-. The manifold planning and the preparation of the operational staff for mobilization should be effected on the basis of approv-al..." (USSR-509)

THE PRESIDENT: Stop. You read out a date of June 1938. I can't see that at the head of the document.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: June 1938, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It doesn't appear in the copy -at the head of the document. Does it appear somewhere else?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Your translation probably does not have it, Mr. President. The original has it. We submitted copies of two different documents and I am afraid the mistake might have been caused by the fact that your translation is not the translation of the document which I am submitting right now. We submitted copies of two different documents-two different translations.

THE PRESIDENT: Either it is an entirely different document or else some parts are omitted. The date is not on the document. Go on. Go on.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: "The SD follows, wherever possible, directly behind the advancing troops and fulfills duties similar to those in the Reich, which are the security of political life and at the same time the security as far as possible of all enterprises necessary to the national economy and so, also, of the war economy. "In order to achieve this purpose, we suggest the division of the country into larger territorial units, Oberabschnitte and smaller territorial units, Unterabschnitte ... the latter to be subdivided into Aussenstellen so that the members of the SD" -I draw your attention to the words "members of the SD"- - "intended for employment in Czechoslovakia, can be imme-diately assigned to their tasks."

This document shows, therefore, that the SD was not only well -informed of the plans, but had also actively taken part in the elab-oration of these plans of aggression. I am asking you, Witness, if this excerpt shows that the SD was not only aware of the plans of invasion and aggression but also that it took an active part in working out the plans?

HOEPPNER: May I first say something about the document?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer briefly, first. Answer "yes" or "no." Explain later, please.

HOEPPNER: From the document, it is obvious that it is only a draft ...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We will talk about that a little later. You will see, then, that this deals with something else. I refer to the excerpt which I read. Do you not see evidence there that the SD was both informed and took an active part in the, plans of aggression?

HOEPPNER: I said yesterday that the Domestic and Foreign Information Services are two different organizations. The domestic ...

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, we do not care what you said yesterday. We want to get your answer today. You were asked a question which can be answered by "'yes" or "no." You can explain afterwards.

HOEPPNER: The document has nothing to do with the Domestic Information Service.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, I would like you to look on Page 3 of the document. You testified yesterday that the SD had nothing to do with the staffing of the Einsatzkommandos. I am going to read an excerpt here. Perhaps you will find an answer there. It is Item II:

"The staffing of the offices of the SD"-I draw your attention to the "offices of the SD"-"should be effected with the following considerations: 1., According to the point of view of the SD..."

Does that not prove..

THE PRESIDENT: It is being read too fast. You know the trans-lators do not have time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you, Mr. President; I shall speak more slowly.

[Turning to the witness.] Does not the excerpt that was just read show that the Einsatzkommandos were staffed according to the demands of the SD? It is said here that the staffing is effected according to the point of view of the SD.

HOEPPNER: Excuse me. It was apparently translated incor-rectly. Your question does not make sense to me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It seems to me the question is quite clear. It is said here: "The staffing of the offices of the SD should be effected with the following considerations..." Please look at the text of the document.

HOEPPNER: In my text there is absolutely nothing concerning

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 202(a), Page 3?

HOEPPNER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: To which words are you referring now?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am referring to Section II Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: You must go slowly. You simply say Page 3. It happens not to be on Page 3-on our Page 3. It is on Page 2. How do you expect us to find it when you refer to it that way? It is Paragraph II then, at the start.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Section II, Mr. President; there is Roman numeral II in front of the section.

What answer will you give then, Witness? What answer will you give me with regard to manning the staffs? Were they not to be staffed according to the demands of the SD?

HOEPPNER: From the paragraph, it is evident only that it was requested that the SD should keep men in readiness, should be ready itself, but not that the SD asked to have men kept in readiness.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, I should like to ask you to turn to Section III. Mr. President, please turn to Section III. It is Page 4 of the Russian text. I quote from III:

"The groups detailed for Einsatz from the Reich"-pay atten-tion to the words 'Einsatz' and 'groups' which appear for the first time in this document-"will be collected in a subsector corresponding to their intended sphere of activity, as starting or distribution centers, where they will receive the material on hand."

Then I omit the next paragraph and pass to the next page of the Russian text which follows right after the list of cities. It is Page 4 of the English text:

"As soon as any district is free from the enemy, that is, when it is occupied, the allocated groups are immediately sent to the district center following the advancing troops. At the same time, the groups which are intended for the next district still in enemy hands will follow along in order to feel their way."

Will you deny after this that it was precisely the SD which staffed the first Einsatz groups?

HOEPPNER: From this document it can be seen only that the SD main office at that time had prepared this group.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If this does not convince you, then I would like you to turn ...

THE PRESIDENT: You must go more slowly. We will not hear what the witness says if you interrupt him during the time it takes for the translation to come through. It is impossible for us to understand it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg your pardon, Mr. Pres-ident. I shall go more slowly. I stated that if this does not convince the witness, that it was precisely the SD that helped to staff these operational groups, then I would be obliged ...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Then the witness said something about Einsatz groups. What did you say about Einsatz groups?

HOEPPNER: The question was whether I am now convinced that the Einsatz groups were being prepared beforehand, and I answered that...

THE PRESIDENT: No, you were not asked about Einsatz groups at all. You were asked about the SD.

HOEPPNER: I was asked whether the SD had prepared the Einsatz groups beforehand, and I said that from the document it is evident that the SD main office had prepared these groups.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please look at Paragraph V -Section V-entitled "Preparatory Measures," Page 5 of the English text.

HOEPPNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I want to quote Section V, "Preparatory Measures."

"Preparatory Measures; demarcation of the spheres of activity of the SD and the Gestapo: (a) in the Reich; (b) in occupied territory.

"Suggestion: Measures in Germany are carried out under the guidance of the Gestapo and with the assistance of the SD. Measures-in the occupied regions are carried ' out under the leadership of the senior officer of the SD. Gestapo officials are assigned to certain operations staffs. It is important that, as far as possible, similar preparations, training, and the use of materials should be conducted in the Gestapo as in the SD."

Would you not say that this shows that it was precisely the SD that took the leading part in the Einsatzkommandos and that the Einsatz groups carried on their criminal activity under the guidance of SD officials?

HOEPPNER: I read nothing here about criminal activity. And as

far as the SD is concerned I would like to refer to the first answer, that it had nothing to do with the Domestic Information Service.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says SD there...

THE PRESIDENT: The man had not yet finished his answer. We do not know what his answer is. Now repeat your answer.

HOEPPNER: I said that I read nothing about criminal measures in the document, and I said previously that the document had nothing to do with Domestic Information Services.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says there SD. Can you deny the term used by the document?

HOEPPNER: The word "SD" means many things.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But it seems to me that in this connection the term is used in precisely the sense in which the authorities in- Germany had used the term. The German officials understood the terms they used, did they not?

HOEPPNER: Yes, but it is about the Foreign Information Service.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to look at the continuation of the same quotation, Number 2, entitled, "Establish-ment of Files in Section 111/225 of the Main Office."

"(a) Collecting and utilization of all available materials of the SD Oberabschnitt is concentrated in Section 111/225.

"(b) In establishing duplicate local files for each region, one copy remains with the central department while the second is sent to the operations staff appointed to the region..."

I am stopping right there, and would like you to pay special attention to Item (c):

"Files must have notations such as these: 'To arrest,' 'to liquidate,' 'to remove from office,' 'to place under observation,' 'to confiscate,' 'police surveillance,' 'deprivation of passport,' et cetera."

Do you not think that when the filing department of the SD made a note like these on the cards of specific persons, such as to liquidate, to arrest, that the SD was participating in crimes against humanity?

HOEPPNER: I can only repeat that the document has nothing to do with the Domestic Information Service of the SD.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did I understand you correctly yesterday to say that you deny that there was any liaison or relationship between the SD and the SS units?

HOEPPNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to look at the end of this plan, the last paragraph, Number VII:

"It is necessary that an SS unit or Totenkopf unit be ready for disposal for special purposes."

After seeing that, do you still deny that there was any direct relation between the SD and the SS units and the organization of the activity of the Einsatz groups?

HOEPPNER: From this paragraph, in any case, it is not evident.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, how should we interpret the sentence which I just read?

HOEPPNER: From this paragraph one can only deduce that if such an Einsatz group was put to use, a special SS troop was to be present. If a unit of some other civilian agency marches into this territory and a military unit is put at its disposal, then from that one cannot conclude that --there was some sort of connection between this military unit and the civilian agency. But I should like to repeat once more that this document shows only that it is a draft project of an official-of an assistant official-of an assistant official who did not even-I stress that this is a draft of an assistant official which was not even countersigned by the expert, not to speak of the

department head, the central department head, office head, or main office head.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, it appears that you claim that the document just shown you is merely a draft?

HOEPPNER: It is only the draft of the assistant official of 111/225, which he initialled 29 June 1938, and the head of Depart-ment 111/22 did not sign it, nor did the Central Department chief of

111/2 do so, nor did the chief of Amt III sign it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, to show that the witness' testimony is not correct, I would like you to turn to a document signed by Schellenberg, Chief of the Central Depart-ment I/I, and to the chart which you will, find in the original. It shows that even the chiefs of the Einsatz commands were appointed ...

HOEPPNER: May I say something?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Just a minute. Let me read...

THE PRESIDENT: Just wait a minute. Just wait a minute.

Colonel Smirnov, the Tribunal would like you to read on from the place you had got to in Paragraph V, so that the document may be translated, and translated now, at once. You had got just to the place where it speaks of files, and at the end of "files," Para-graph 2...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is right, Mr. President. Do you want me to start reading from point (b) or from point (c)?

THE PRESIDENT: Point 3.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. "In establishing duplicate local files for each region..."

THE PRESIDENT: That is not what I meant. You had read

Paragraph V, Roman V, down to the end of 2, the last words of which are "deprived of passports, et cetera." The next paragraph is 3, small 3, Arabic 3-"It is imperative to speed up..."

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is right, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: We want the whole of the document from there.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.

"It is imperative to speed up the obtaining of necessary economic and political materials, such as maps, dictionaries, stationery, and office supplies....

"5. Allocated members and agents of SD have to undergo a training course in order to get acquainted with the language and with the general conditions of life in Czechoslovakia. However, it might be advisable to train only persons appointed for the subsections as heads of foreign branches and managers of enterprises in order not to allow the number of persons becoming acquainted with the preparations

to be too great.

"6. Release from military conscription of the appointed per-sons.

"7. Elaboration of plans, (a) for carrying out the task men-tioned in Paragraph 111 5; (b) for notification in due time, of the persons mentioned in Paragraph 1115, 11 1 (d), and 112 (c)

before invasion in order to give them the possibility of hiding to avoid arrest and deportation and to enable them to fulfill their missions.

"8. Providing necessary passes in due time for entering zones

of operation in order to ' secure a free passage and first-class living and working accommodations."

Shall I read Paragraph VI, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: "VI. Miscellaneous. It is sug-gested that wherever possible only trained military people be employed as:

"I. In the initial stages guerilla and partisan warfare will probably have to be reckoned with.

"2. For that reason arms will be necessary: carbines, pistols, hand grenades, gas masks, and if possible light machine guns.

"3. Relations in the zone of military operation demand appro-priate conduct.

11VII ... 11

THE PRESIDENT: You have read VII already. But you better go back now to III, Paragraph 5, which I think you have not read and which just has been referred to.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.

"Training of special agents (beforehand) from persons of German extraction living in Czechoslovakia (mentioned in Item 11 1 (d) who are to take over the internal protection of the most important enterprises for the purpose of preventing sabotage on the part of Czech organizations and offices."

THE PRESIDENT: Now I think you better go back to 11, Para-graph 2 (a), "Training of suitable persons."

The interpreting division had better have the original documents in German and read the passages which I will indicate to them..

I think you can go on, Colonel Smirnov, because this would be checked over in the translating division. The transcripts will be checked over against the original document.

Now, you were reading II, Paragraph 2 (a), beginning with the words, "Training of suitable persons," were you not?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is right, Mr. President. May I continue?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: "Besides"-interpreting ver-batim from the Russian text-"besides staff members of the SD we should also try to employ honorary workers, because German offices should not be deprived of proper personnel, and it may be necessary that other frontier regions should take similar measures to provide for the necessary personnel.

"(b) Measures concerning Item II I (a) are necessary, for it may be found inexpedient to take people from the frontier regions for these new organizations, as an increase of work in these regions is expected anyhow."

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need read that. The Tribu-nal directs that the original documents as read into the transcripts, the shorthand notes, shall be checked over by the translating divi-sion against the original German text.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President, we shall do it today.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal direct that the original German document shall be retranslated into the other languages, namely, into English, into French, into Russian.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Now will you turn to the document which follows the document you have been reading and which appears to be some sort of letter from an Oberfuehrer of the SS? It is addressed to Dr. Best.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. Shall I read the whole document or just the first paragraph?

THE PRESIDENT: You better read the first paragraph, anyhow.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes.

It is Page 9, Witness, "111/225; to SS Oberfuehrer, Dr. Best, Berlin."

HOEPPNER: Yes, I am reading it. I have it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The contents follow:

"Introduction of the Einsatz of the Gestapo and of the SD, Reichsfuehrer SS in the territory of Czechoslovakia.

"The suggestion to introduce the Gestapo and SD, of which 12 detachments - were provided for along the Czechoslovakian

frontier, will be subject to some modification as a result of the new situation arising from the fact that the Czechs may cede the Sudeten territory. Since some of the detachments

will not be employed in the districts which will be ceded, we offer the following changes."

Shall I continue the quotation, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: You don't need to read the rest. But is that document dated?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: There is no date here, but there is a date on another document, which I consider very important and which I would like the Tribunal's permission to submit. The docu-ment which is addressed to Dr. Best has no date, but the next document has a date, and it is the following document that I consider extremely important. I would like the Tribunal's permission to submit it. It is a very short document, signed by Schellenberg:

"Berlin, 13 September 1938, State Chancellery 1 113, to the Chief of Amt III, SS Oberfuehrer Jost or deputy.

"Contents: Organizational Chart of the Einsatzkommandos."

Omitting the next sentence, the text reads:

"According to the regulations of the above-mentioned letter, I enclose herewith a photostatic copy of the Einsatzkom-mandos organizational chart. The chart in its present form has been prepared by Department C.

"(Signed) The Chief of Central Department 11 a B, SS Haupt-sturmfuehrer Schellenberg."

Mr. President, at this point I should like you to look at the chart which is attached, and which at that time already reproduced very

correctly the organization of the Einsatzkommandos. You have all the details of the organization there, Einsatzstab K, Einsatzstab L, and showing 11 different units, and among them the leading collab-orators of Einsatzstab K. In the second column, you can find that already at that time the chief of the gas cars to be put into effect later was included: Rauff, the man to whom later all the reports about the activity of the gas chambers and the special death wagons were directed. They have been read here earlier.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not see that on the chart.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is in the second column. Rauff, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But can't you show me where it is?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. There it is.

[Indicating.]

[The document was handed to the President.]

THE PRESIDENT: But Colonel Smirnov, there must be some words on the document which indicate what you are saying.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I think, Mr. President, that what happened is to be explained by the inaccuracies of the trans-lation. You see, I just drew your attention to the name Rauff, the man who was mentioned there, to whom later the reports about gas cars were directed. And there he is. The post had been prepared and foreseen in that chart.

THE PRESIDENT: What is his name?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Rauff, Mr. President. As early as 1939 we see his name and the post which he was to occupy. This is why I want to draw your attention to that.

May I continue the interrogation?

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, the Tribunal would like to have photostatic copies of this document.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President; we have 10 copies.

THE PRESIDENT: We anticipate that you are going to give the document to the witness and examine him upon it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. The witness has it before him already.

HOEPPNER: Yes; I have a photostatic copy here.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I should like to ask the witness the following question.

Witness, tell me this. Did not the confidential agents of the SD make and keep a list of persons who were to be annihilated or exhausted by hard labor?

HOEPPNER: Is the question being asked with reference to this document?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In connection both with the document and with your knowledge of the situation.

HOEPPNER: I do not know whether lists were compiled.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I am asking your permission to submit...

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has not answered.

Will you answer the question?

HOEPPNER: I said that I did not know whether such lists were made.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I request your permission to submit the second German document, which does not concern the leading man of the SD.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, we wanted you to ask the witness some questions so as to explain the chart. We have only just seen the chart. Have you no questions to ask on the chart?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President, I will ask these questions.

Do you have the chart before you, Witness?

HOEPPNER: I have the photostatic copy of the manuscript chart.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, I am talking about the photostatic copy of the document. They are going to hand you the original.

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

Do you recognize the names of the collaborators mentioned in the chart?

HOEPPNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Who was Jost?

HOEPPNER: Jost was the chief of Amt III, the Foreign Infor-mation Service in the then SD main office, and he had been the first chief of Amt VI of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Anyway, in 1938 he was a member of the SD?

HOEPPNER: Yes, he belonged to the SS special formation, SD, and was chief of the Central Department III of the SD main office.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, I thought you told us the SS had no connection with the SD. You are now telling us that this man was head of the SS department, SD, are you not?

HOEPPNER: There must have been a false translation. Mr. Pres-ident, may I repeat my answer?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, repeat your answer.

HOEPPNER: Jost was the head of Central Department III, Foreign Intelligence Service, in the former SD main office. He was later the first chief of Amt VI, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the predecessor of Gruppenfuehrer Schellenberg, who has been heard already by this Tribunal.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Are you acquainted with the name of Ehrlinger?

HOEPPNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Who was Ehrlinger?

HOEPPNER: I know Ehrlinger only from a later period. He was the last chief of Amt I of the Reich Security Main Office.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He was also a member of the SD, was he not?

HOEPPNER: He also belonged to the SS special formation SD.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know the name of Rauff? Do you recognize that?

THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through then to us that he was a member of the SS-SD.

HOEPPNER: He belonged to the SS special SD formation about which we spoke in detail yesterday; that is to say, the merger of SS members who were in the Security Service, in the Gestapo, and in the Criminal Police; that is to say, not all members of these, but only those who belonged to the SS, and also those who were honorary co-workers belonging to the SS, and also some other officers who worked with the Security Police-for instance, the border Police and customs investigations officials, and later a large number of Landrdte, too.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I continue, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you.

[Turning to the witness.] Do you know the name of Rauff?

HOEPPNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What was he at that time?

HOEPPNER: Rauff at that time was in charge of the motor cars belonging to the Security Service, as far as I remember today. I should like to say that at that time I had no direct connection with the control office in Berlin, as the main office of the SD was so organized at that time, that between the lower divisions and the main office there was an organizational set-up, Oberabschnitt, which was abolished in September 1939.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, the American Prosecution kindly gave me the documents already submitted to the Tribunal which show that subsequently orders concerning death vans were addressed specifically to Herr Rauff. These are the docu-ments which I am now passing on to the Tribunal. These documents have been submitted already. I am merely ren-dnding you of them.

And now, Witness, I should also like you to look at the circles showing Einsatzkommandos in the chart. Do you recognize the names mentioned there?

HOEPPNER: I do not know yet which names you mean.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am talking about the circles at the bottom, Einsatzkommando 2, 3, 8, 9, and others. Have you found the place?

HOEPPNER: Is that another document?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No; that is precisely the same document.

HOEPPNER: On the manuscript document which I have, I can see no such circles. It must be another document attached to another letter.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please look at the circles around "Einsatzkommando." Do you. recognize any of the names within those circles?

HOEPPNER: No. On the document which is appended to the letter signed by Obersturmfuehrer Scheidler?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you recognize the names there? Particularly, did you know Gottschalk?

HOEPPNER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Dr. Lehmann?

HOEPPNER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Schulze?

HOEPPNER: I gather that there must be a confusion of names there, and it I should be "Schulz."

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is right, "Schulz."

HOEPPNER: Yes, I know. Here we have "Schulze."

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is a mistake. I have it as "Schulz."

HOEPPNER: I know Schulz.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was he a member of the SD?

HOEPPNER: No. I think that he was at that time a State Police chief somewhere in northern Germany.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know Biermann?

HOEPPNER: Not personally, but I have heard his name.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Who was he?

HOEPPNER: I beg your pardon. I think that he was then a chief of the State Police. Later he became an inspector of the Security Police and the SD.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you know Höhnscheid?

HOEPPNER: I do not know Dr. Heinrich.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No-Höhnscheid?

HOEPPNER: EK 10, Einsatzkommando 10.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Einsatzkommando 4, Höhn-scheid.

HOEPPNER: I do not know him.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Hoffmann?

HOEPPNER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do suppose that you know Stahlecker, though.

HOEPPNER: I knew him by name but not personally.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You are acquainted with the post he held?

HOEPPNER: I think that he was then inspector of the Security Police or Staatspolizeileiter or Oberabschnittfuehrer, but I can not quite remember what he was.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And do you know Guenther?

HOEPPMER: Guenther, if I remember right, was at that time inspector in Berlin.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Inspector of the SD, was he not?

HOEPPNER: There were no SD inspectors at that time; there were only inspectors of the Security Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no more questions about the chart, Mr. President. May I ask some question about the next document?

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. These words "EK" in the circle at the bottom mean Einsatzkommando I suppose, do they? And will you tell the Tribunal what the purpose of the chart is? What is the organization which it is supposed to define?

HOEPPNER: I suppose that it is the preparation of some plan' of Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich to employ the offices of the Security Police and the SD, which were under his jurisdiction, in case of possible complications with Czechoslovakia. The abbreviation "EK" means Einsatzkommando. Actually, later, when the German troops marched into Czechoslovakia, there went along units of the Security Police and of the SD which, just like the Einsatzkommandos and the Einsatzgruppen in the East, were mobile units of a very special nature, which had been newly set up and had entirely new tasks, and which were dissolved later when the State Police office in Pragueand t

he SD Department Prague were organized.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I am not concerned with whether they were later dissolved. Heydrich, I suppose, was in command of the whole of the SD, was he not?

HOEPPNER: Yes, Heydrich was head of the SD main office and at the same time head of the Security Police, both offices personally united in him.

TXIE PRESIDENT: Was Stahlecker a member of the information branch of the SD that you are speaking of?

HOEPPNER: I cannot state that for certain. If I remember cor-rectly, Stahlecker had at that time some function in East Prussia.

THE PRESIDENT: You said just now, I thought, that Stahlecker was in Berlin.

HOEPPNER: In East Prussia at that time. In my opinion, Guenther was in Berlin. His name was also mentioned previously.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, was he a member of the SD In-formation Service?

HOEPPNER: Yes, I think that he was then head of the SD, Berlin Oberabschnitt. I cannot say it with certainty.

THE PRESIDENT: Ehrlinger, was Ehrlinger also a member of the SD Information Service?

HOEPPNER: I do not know in what office Ehrlinger was then employed. I heard his name only later when he became head of Amt I.

THE PRESIDENT: What about Rauff?

HOEPPNER: Rauff was then in charge of the motor transportation corps of the SD head office, but here, too, I cannot state for certain whether ...

THE PRESIDENT: What about the Information Service of the SD? Was he a member? Was Rauff a member of the SD Information Services?

HOEPPNER: He was head of a technical department in the SD main office. In the SD main office at that time, which handled foreign information and domestic information, there were several technical offices in the Central Department I which were at the disposal of the entire Amt.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what about his functions? One of his functions was to work in the Information Service of the SD-in the Domestic Information Service of the SD?

HOEPPNER: He was also in charge of the motor cars for the Domestic Information Service.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you can answer the question "yes" or "no." Was it part of his function to work in the Domestic Infor-mation Service of the SD?

HOEPPNER: Not in the Information Service as such, as far as I know. No, he only ...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he had no competence, as you call it, in the Domestic Information Service of the SD?

HOEPPNER: As far as I can remember, he was only in charge of the motor transportation of the SD main office-also for the Domestic Information Service.

THE PRESIDENT: Doesn7t that chart show that the SD was working in transport co-ordination with the Gestapo?

HOEPPNER: In my opinion the chart shows only that the head of both organizations was prepared, in case of a march into Czecho-slovakia, to employ men of both organizations there.

THE PRESIDENT: And don't these documents show that your comment about the first document was inaccurate and that that docu-ment was being used by Schellenberg in September 1938, for the purpose of organizing the SD in Czechoslovakia?

HOEPPNER: I think it is impossible that this document should have been used, because otherwise the date would have been filled in; and the Roman figures at the end of the document would have been indicated. Whether another draft was made later and sub-mitted to Schellenberg, that I do not know.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see that the first document is headed Roman III, Arabic 225. The letter to Dr. Best is also headed Roman 111/225, and it refers to the suggestion which is no doubt contained in that document; and the chart itself is also headed 111/225.

HOEPPNER: Yes; I suppose that some other draft was made, for this is months later. This draft was almost certainly not used because then the Roman figures would most certainly have been indicated. In any case, the Roman figure III of that time had nothing to do with the later Amt III, because the department from which the accused Amt III originated, was Central Department 11/2.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: -Mr. President, in connection

with the witness' replies on the fact that he does not know whether the confidential agents of the SD made up lists of persons who were to be annihilated or mobilized forcibly or else arrested and placed in concentration camps, I would like your permission to submit another short document pertaining to another country, to Poland, and which contains the instructions of the Blockstellenleiter of the SD in Poland to his confidential agents. I ask your permission to read this document into the record.

HOEPPNER: May I say one more word? There is nothing in my document about annihilation or concentration camps.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will now have the docu-ment before you.

May I quote the document? It is USSR-522. I quote:

"Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Blockstelle Mogilno, 24 August 1943."-Translating verbatim-"To confidential agents. Subject: The Preparation -of the Lists of Poles."

The text follows:

"I have repeatedly pointed out to you the necessity of paying special attention to the Poles. For that reason, I am giving below the speech of the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, delivered on 15 March 1940 at the meeting of the concentration camp commanders in former Poland, and according to the directives given in that speech, I ask you to submit to me the list of names of all the concerned Poles."

Extract from speech:

"'For that reason, all our collaborators, both men and women, should consider as their most important and urgent task the preventing of all unscrupulous leaders of the Polish people from exercising their activity. You, as camp commanders, will know best how to fulfill this task.

"'All skilled workers of Polish origin are to be utilized in our war industry; then all Poles will disappear from the face of the earth.

"'In fulfilling this very responsible task, you must, within the

prescribed limits of time, exterminate the Poles. I give this

directive to all the camp commanders.

"'The hour is drawing closer when every German will have to stand the test. For that reason, the great German nation should understand that its most important task right now is to exterminate all the Poles

"'I expect all my agents to report to me immediately all Polish grumblers and defeatists. For such a task we must also utilize children and aged persons, who can help us con-siderably, because of their so-called friendly attitude toward the Poles.'

"Extract from Himmler's speech on 15 March 1940. Heil Hitler. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, (signature illegible)."

I would like to ask you now, after seeing this document, whether you still deny that the workers of the SD in the occupied territories trained and oriented all, persons they could use to make up lists of such persons who were to be annihilated?

HOEPPNER: Yes, I deny that, especially as I cannot state whether this document is a genuine one or not.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document was captured by the Polish Army in Mogilno in the building of the SD.

HOEPPNER: I take, for example, the words "camp commander meeting" as being absolutely impossible. I don't see what it could refer to; and it seems to me impossible to ascertain what "Polish grumblers and defeatists" might mean. It seems to me absolutely self-evident that the Poles hoped that Germany would lose the war.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not asking you to make propagandistic speeches on the subject of Poland, I am asking you something quite different. I am asking you this question: Are you still denying the fact that the SD compelled those collaborating with it to make lists of persons to be annihilated?

HOEPPNER: Yes, I deny that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: What evidence is there that this document was found in the SD headquarters?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It was not found in the SD headquarters. That was not properly translated.

THE PRESIDENT: Your answer didn't come through.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This was not found at the central headquarters Mr. President. It was not translated to you correctly if that is what was said. The document was found by the Polish Army...

THE PRESIDENT: What was translated to me was that it was captured by the Polish Army at the SD headquarters. Is that right?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is right, but not at the central headquarters of the SD for Poland, at the headquarters in the block station of Mogilno.

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't say anything about the central head-quarters. All I want to know is what evidence there is that it was found at the headquarters of the SD.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. May I now

read the document of the Polish delegation on the subject, which

says:

"It is hereby certified that the submitted document in the German language, dated 24 August 1943, consists of the in-structions of the Security Police of the ReichsFuehrer SS, in the City of Mogilno, containing an extract from Himmler's' speech and that it is the exact photostatic copy of the original submitted by the Chief Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Poland."

The original was found in an envelope. In the left-hand corner at the top there was stated, "Landrat of the Area of Mogilno of the Governmental District Hohensalza." Besides, there is a receipt for a registered letter which says, "Registered Mogilno, Wartheland 272," with a postal stamp "24 August 1943," addressed to ...

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel, I am sorry, I didn't hear the begin-ning of what you said. What are you reading from now?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am reading, Mr. President, from the certificate which the Polish Delegation submitted on the subject of this document. This was a document which was submitted to us by the Polish Delegation.

THE PRESIDENT: How did you identify this particular docu-ment? You see, we have a document produced before us which appears to have nothing on it which connects it with that certificate. I mean, how do you connect it with this certificate?

MR. COUNSELLOR - SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I was just handed a note here from our documentary section which says that since the Tribunal has the original, the original does not have the certificate of the Polish Delegation attached to it, whereas, I have the certif-icate attached to my document. I am very sorry about the mistake. You will receive the certificate.

THE PRESIDENT: I see-and the certificate you have identifies the translation in Russian? Is that right?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, yesterday I myself verified the translation which I have with the original, and I have found it to be accurate and correct, -and the certificate also, states that the Russian translation is correct.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, you must offer in evidence that certificate in order to make it clear that this is the document which was found at this SD headquarters at Mogilno. That should be attached to this exhibit. Has this got a number, this exhibit? 522,, is that it?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, the number is USSR-522, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will have to have the certificate attached to it; then we shall be able to look at it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President. I have no more questions to ask this witness, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, in connection with one of the points to which my esteemed American colleague has drawn my attention, I request your permission to put another question here to the witness concerning the first document which I submitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Which was the first?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This is USSR-509, the chart.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you.

Witness, will you kindly tell us-do you deny that Gengenbach, who is to be found in this chart as belonging to the Einsatzstab-you will be shown the chart in a minute-was a member of the SD?

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

HOEPPNER: He was on the staff of the SD.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: He was a member of the SD.

HOEPPNER: Yes, he was. He was Gruppenleiter of III A. He was my immediate predecessor.

MR. COUNSELLOR- SMIRNOV: Tell us then, was it not you who became his deputy later on?

HOEPPNER: I was the successor of Gengenbach, but not his deputy. When I came to Berlin with the Reich Security Main Office he was already dead. Besides Gengenbach was not yet in Berlin then, for as far as I can recall today, he was at Munich. I met him only during the war.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But, at any rate, you did after-ward hold the post which had been held before by Gengenbach?

HOEPPNER: The position which Gengenbach held later in Berlin I took over from him. He was Gruppenleiter III A just as I was.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thank you very much. The American Prosecution, Mr. President, has a copy of the documents which have already been submitted under Exhibits Number USA-175 and USA-174, and it is stated here in the places underlined that the head of the Department III A was Gengenbach-that is the same man who is to be found in the chart.

I have no further questions to put to the witness, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the speech of Himmler, dated 15 March 1940, already been put in evidence?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: As far as I know, Mr. President, no. At any rate, I do not know this speech.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Now, Dr. Gawlik.

DR. GAVILIK: Witness, do you still have Document USSR-509?

HOEPPNER: I have no documents at all.

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

DR. GAWLIK: Witness, please look at Page 1. What was the task of these Einsatzgruppen which were to be employed in Czecho-slovakia?

HOEPPNER: I do not know; I had nothing to do with the prep-aration of these tasks.

DR. GAWLIK: I said please look at Page 1.

HOEPPNER: "To secure political life and to secure national economy," it says on Page 1.

DR. GAWLIK: Was this a completely different task from that which later in 1941 was given to Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D in the East?

HOEPPNER: I do not know the tasks in the East very well either, because I had nothing to do with them; but as far as I am informed, the Einsatzgruppen in the East certainly had nothing to do with safeguarding the national economy. The Einsatzgruppen 'in the East had to secure the rear army area.

DR. GAWLIK: Please look at the chart, the organization of these Einsatzgruppen.

HOEPPNER: The handwritten one or the printed one?

DR. GAWLIK: The second one. With the aid of this chart, can you answer the question whether these Einsatzgruppen belonged to the organization of the SD?

HOEPPNER: You mean the chart that says "Staff SS Gruppen-Fuehrer Heydrich" at the top?

DR. GAWLIK: Yes, that is the chart I mean.

HOEPPNER: No, that was not an organization of the Security Service but was something completely new.

DR. GAWLIK: Regarding the tasks these Einsatzgruppen or these Einsatz staffs had, were they a part of the duties of the Security Service?

HOEPPNER: I do not know the tasks which were assigned to these Einsatz staffs. In any event, the task mentioned on Page 1, "securing the national economy," is not a- task of the Security

Service; it is not a task related to the Information Service nor does the "safeguarding of political life" have anything to do with the Information Service.

DR. GAWLIK: Were parts of the organization of the SD used by these Einsatz staffs? Can you answer the question with the aid of this chart?

HOEPPNER: As far as the chart shows, parts of the organi-zation were not used but only individual members of the Security Service, just as in the case of the State Police too. The same will probably have applied as later in connection with the Einsatz-gruppen in the East, that is, it can be compared with being drafted into the Armed, Forces.

DR. GAWLIK: Were the individual members of the Security Service, by being assigned to the Einsatz staffs, no longer active in the Security Service?

HOEPPN

ER: No, of course not. For they received completely different tasks. Again, I can only make this comparison: If a judge is drafted into the army, then he no longer carries on his activity as a judge.

DR. GAVY'LIK: Were the activities and tasks of the Einsatz staffs generally known to the members of the Security Service, partic-ularly the members of the subordinate agencies of the branch offices of the regional offices?

HOEPPNER: Not in the least.

DR. GAWLIK: Now, I come to the second document that deals with the letter of the Blockstelle Mogilno. (USSR-522)

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

DR. GAWLIK: What was a Blockstelle?

HOEPPNER: In the structure of the Security Service, the term "Blockstelle" did not exist but, nevertheless, it is possible that regional offices (Aussenstellen) organized subbranches and then used this term; in general, what was subordinate to a regional office was called an "observer" (Beobachter).

DR. GAWLIK: What was the staff of an Aussenstelle in general?

HOEPPNER: According to the period of time and according to the importance of the Aussenstelle, it differed considerably. On the average, say in 1943 or 1944, there were one or two regular officials in a branch and a large number of honorary workers, whereby the head of the branch was sometimes an honorary official and some-times a regular one.

DR. GAWLIK: Was the Blockstelle above an Aussenstelle or was it subordinate to it?

HOEPPNER: Above the Aussenstelle was the Abschnitt, not the Blockstelle, and, as I'said before, the different Aussenstelle some-times selected terms for subordinate offices which were not really officially recognized. Observers were, however, recognized.

DR. GAWLIK: Did Amt III issue any orders as established in this document?

HOEPPNER: No; under no circumstances.

DR. GAWLIK: Then is this a case of the head of the Aussen-stelle in Mogilno acting on his own initiative? I mean the head of the Blockstelle.

HOEPPNER: If Himmler did make this speech then it would certainly constitute an arbitrary act. The only thing that I cannot imagine is Himmler's saying, when making a speech to the camp commanders, that he expected something of all his informers.

HOEPPNER: I am not speaking of Himmler. I am speaking of the orders of the head of the Blockstelle.

DR. GAWLIK: But the instructions are in the speech by Himmler-or do you mean the instructions in the first sentence "to give especial attention to Poland"? The head of the Blockstelle in Mogilno will, of course, have cared for the Poles in the same way as he cared for the Germans. He was naturally interested in the general attitude and frame of mind of the Poles, and he reported to the Reich main office, to Group III D.

DR. GAWLIK: Then I show you Document 3876-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: How does this arise from the cross-examination?

DR. GAWLIK: Mr. President, I have a few more questions in connection with the questions which Your Honor asked yesterday at the end of the session relating to distribution.

THE PRESIDENT: You are putting in some document which has not been referred to before?

DR. GAWLIK: The document was submitted yesterday by the American Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well it was. I beg your pardon.

HOEPPNER: I have here the English text of the document.

DR. GAWLIK: Please look at Page 45 now, the distribution. Did commanders of the Security Police and the SD belong to the Ein-satzgruppen A, B, C, and D?

HOEPPMER: No, that is something different. The Einsatzgruppen were mobile units, which advanced together with the Armed Forces in the rear army area. The offices of the commanders were offices in the civilian administration. When an area was taken into civil administration, the office of the commander was set up.

DR. GAWLIK: How were -the Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D organized?

HOEPPNER: They were divided into the Einsatzkommandos.

DR. GAWLIK: What names did these Einsatzkommandos have?

HOEPPN-ER: These Einsatzkommandos had no names at all. As I said yesterday, they were numbered from 1 to 10, as far as I can recall, possibly even to 11 or 12.

DR. GAWLIK: Please look at the distribution. There it says that .the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D received copies for the commanders of the Security Police and the SD.

HOEPPNER: No, that is wrongly translated. It should be for the Kommandeure of the Security Police and the SD, not for the com-manders; that is the Kommandeure of the Security Police who were subordinate to the commanders of the Security Police and the SD. To make it more clear, the Einsatzkommandos were not led by a Kommandeure of the Security Police and the SD, but by the Kommandeute of Einsatzkommandos 1, 2, 3, et cetera. In the territory which was under civil administration, the situation was the same as in occupied France. There were offices of the Kommandeure of the Security Police and of the SD. That was something quite different from the Einsatzkommandos.

DR. GAWLIK: Who were the officers superior to the Komman-deure?

HOEPPNER: Of which Kommandeure?

DR. GAWLIK: Of the Security Police and of the SD.

HOEPPNER: The commanders of the Security Police and the SD.

DR. GAWLIK: Who were their superiors?

HOEPPNER: The Chief of the Security Police and the SD in Berlin.

DR. GAWLIK: Who was the superior of Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D?

HOEPPMER: That cannot be answered in one word. In reality the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen had two superiors. In the first place, they were assigned to the army group in question, and had to take instructions from the chief of the army group. On the other hand, they received specialized instructions from the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. That is the very reason why I said yesterday that they were unique and different.

DR. GAWLIK: Now I ask you again. If the Kommandeure of the Security Police and the SD did not belong to the Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, hasn't all this been thoroughly gone into already? I mean, we have got the document. We have asked the witness a number of questions and he has given his answers. You are now asking him the same questions over again.

DR. GAWLIK: Mr. President, I only have one more question with regard to the copies.

THE PRESIDENT: Ask your question then.

DR. GAWLIK: Why did the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen A, B, C, and D receive copies for the commanders of the Security Police and the SD, if they were completely separate organizations?

HOEPPNER: Probably there were different organizations but in certain cases the people were the same; or, as I assume, this was not a clear way of expressing it. I had a German copy yesterday. Various words were used for "Commander." Sometimes it was "Kommandeur" and in the next line it was "Befehlshaber." Those are completely different functions. I had a German copy yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. Dr. Gawlik, your next witness.

DR. GAWLIK: With the permission of the Court, I call as the next witness, Dr. Rössner.

[The witness Rössner took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?

DR. HANS RÖSSNER (Witness): Hans Rössner.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. GAWLIK: When were you born?

RÖSSNER: 1910, in Dresden.

DR. GAWLIK: Describe briefly your professional career.

RÖSSNER: After the customary schooling I graduated in 1930, then studied the German language and literature, German history, and Protestant theology. From 1936 on I was assistant at the Uni-versity of Bonn; from 1939 to 1940, military service; in 1940 deferred for the University of Bonn and emergency service in the Reich Security Main Office, Amt III.

DR. GAWLIK: Since when have you been a Party member?

RÖSSNER: Since 1937.

DR. GAVVTLIK: What office did you have in the Reich Security Main Office?

RÖSSNER: I was an expert, later section chief, in Group III C, Amt III.

DR. GAWLIK: Are you well acquainted with the tasks, methods, and aims of Group III C?

RÖSSNER: Yes, I am.

DR. GAWLIK: Please wait a little before you answer. In addition, do you also know of the tasks, methods, and aims of Amt III?

RÖSSNER: Yes, I also know these because they were fundamen-tally the same as those of Group III C.

DR. GAWLIK: What were the tasks and -aims of Amt III since 1939?

RÖSSNER: Amt III was a domestic German information service. It had set its aims and tasks to a great extent itself and worked independently in the domestic German sphere of life, that is to say it took up important questions of domestic German life in various fields, such as economics, culture, administration, law, and others as far as information service was concerned, and in particular attempt-ed to collect and sum up criticism on the part of the population regarding mistakes, faulty developments, measures, etcetera, and to report on them.

DR. GAWLIK: Please give a few examples by way of explanation.

RÖSSNER: For example, every week and sometimes daily, Amt III reported on the opinion of the population on German propaganda_ to the agencies concerned. Beyond that, in 1943 for example, Amt III, through its reports, prevented the closing of Ger-man universities in spite of Germany's total war effort.

DR. GAWLIK: The Prosecution has submitted, on Page 11 of the English trial brief, that Amt III had to carry out police investiga-tions in all phases of German life. Did Amt III have to carry out police investigations?

RÖSSNER: Never did Amt III as long as it existed have any police tasks.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD, Amt III, have the practical task and the fundamental aim of giving information through its information center on actual and possible opponents of the Nazi movement? This refers to Page 17 of the trial brief.

RÖSSNER: No. Amt III was basically not an information service on opponents, but on German domestic life.

DR. GAWLIK: What was the purpose of the information service reports of Amt III? In particular, was the main task to support the leaders of the Party and State as partners of a conspiracy and to keep them in power?

RÖSSNER: No. Amt III never had such a task and did not set up such a task for itself. The task of the information service of Amt III was to furnish an extensive and objective picture of the domestic problems of German internal life and to present them in an open and direct manner.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the members of Amt III know that the leaders of the Party and the State were participating in a secret plan for the purpose of committing Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity?

RÖSSNER: To my knowledge, the members of the Amt III did not know anything about this. All the material collected by the SD, Amt III was evidence to the contrary.

DR. GAVMIK: Can you answer this question for the members and honorary members of the subordinate agencies?

RÖSSNER: Yes.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the close collaborators of the chief of Amt III know of such a conspiracy?

RÖSSNER: No. Not even the closest collaborators knew anything about this.

DR. GAWLIK: On what is your knowledge based for your answer to the last few questions?

RÖSSNER: I often participated in internal Gruppenleiter con-ferences with the chief of Amt III.

DR. GAWLIK: Were the tasks and aims of the Domestic Informa-tion Service known to all workers even in the subordinate agencies?

RÖSSNER: Yes, the tasks and aims were known to the workers and honorary workers of the -subordinate agencies. They were con-tinually announced in the individual conferences, meetings, lectures, et cetera.

DR. GAWLIK: On what is your knowledge based by reason of which you have answered my last question?

RÖSSNER: On numerous individual conferences and meetings where I myself announced the aims and tasks of Amt III.

DR. GAWLIK: In the reports made on a situation, were the names of the persons mentioned?

RÖSSNER: No, not usually, since the SD was not interested in the names of individual persons, but in typical examples of questions regarding the different spheres of life.

DR. GAWLIK: In giving personnel data, was the aim being pursued to bring persons into influential State positions who would not oppose the execution of a plan for committing War Crimes, Crimes against Peace, and Crimes against Humanity?

RÖSSNER: No, Amt III did not have any such aims. Such data and reports of the SD were kept separate on principle from the reports on the general' situations. The SD, Amt III, gave personnel data, but did not have permission to pass judgment on people. That was the sole task of the HoheitstrAger of the Party.

DR. GAWLIK: What was the purpose of giving out information on personnel data by the SD?

RÖSSNER: This was to supplement the political judgment and purely specialized judgment of the individual Party offices and departments and present if possible a total picture of the per-sonality, character, professional ability, political attitude, and, personal way of living independent of any departmental point of view or of any power or political interests.

DR. GAWLIK: The Prosecution describes the tasks of the SD as follows: The task consisted in taking necessary steps to destroy the opposition or to make it harmless. Does this correspond with the actual facts and ideological aims of Amt III since 1939?

RÖSSNER: No, by no means. I have already emphasized the fact that Amt III was not an intelligence service for gathering news about opponents.

DR. GAWLIK: When did Amt III give up this task?

RÖSSNER: Amt III never had this task.

DR. GAWLIK: The Prosecution further submitted that the SD had an extensive spy net that would spy on the German people in their daily work, on the streets, and even in the sanctified halls of the church. This is on Page 66 of the English trial brief. Did the SD conduct such an extensive spy network as described?

RÖSSNER: During the whole period of its existence, Amt III never worked with spies or a spy network in the domestic German sphere of life. The spy network would have contradicted all the basic aims of this internal German information service.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD for its -tasks use only regular officials?

RÖSSNER: No, they were by far in the minority. The work of the internal SD was dependent upon the big staff of honorary workers from all parts of the country and all professions.

DR. GAWLIK: Can you give any figures?

RÖSSNER: I cannot give accurate figures, but in the last few years we estimated the honorary workers at some 10,000. They worked on a completely voluntary basis and a large part worked on their own initiative for the internal SD.

DR. GAWLIK: From what point of view were the confidential agents chosen for the information service for German domestic spheres of life?

RÖSSNER: Such a confidential agent had to offer proof that, free fr9m selfish interests, he would give clear and objective information on questions relating to his professional sphere, or to the population among whom he lived and on other concerns and worries and state-ments of criticism of the population with whom he came in contact. In addition, he had to be a person of decent character.

DR. GAWLIK: Did these agents have to be members of the Party?

RÖSSNER: No, by no means. It was even desired to have as

-large as possible a percentage of non-Party members among these agents of the SD so as to get a complete and independent picture of the total situation within Germany through these agents.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the agents have to be members of the SS?

RÖSSNER: No, the percentage of members of the SS among these agents was, according to my estimate, still less than that of Party members.

DR. GAWLIK: What were the tasks of these confidential agents?

RÖS

SNER: The task varied. In Amt III we had agents who were to give general information on the frame of mind, attitude, and opinions of the population on urgent questions during the course of the war years. Then we had another type of agent who gave information on their professional cares and worries and on questions relating to the specialist fields into which they hail insight.

DR. GAWLIK: What was the task of the SD Arbeitskreise?

RÖSSNER: In the so-called SD Arbeitskreise the agents of the subordinate agencies were called together in an informal way. In these Arbeitskreise questions and problems concerning technical matters and measures of the Party and State agencies were dis-cussed with absolute sincerity and frankness. The results of these discussions and criticism were summarized and then sent to Amt III in Berlin. The main prerequisite was absolute objectivity and absolute frankness and criticism.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the agents or the Arbeitskreise work under any special cloak of secrecy? This question refers to the trial brief, Page 16.

RÖSSNER: I do not know what you mean by the expression, "cloak of secrecy." I can answer that these agents never acted under any special personal secrecy and these Arbeitskreise which I just mentioned had no special obligation for secrecy. Usually taking place in some university, they were publicly known as Arbeitskreise.

DR. GAWLIK: Were there, aside from those employed, other agents of the SD?

RÖSSNER: Yes. In the last few years of our work there were more and more representatives of the most various professions and walks of life who on their own initiative came with some worry, criticism, or some positive suggestion to the SD) in order, on the basis of a personal confidence in the SD, to be able to turn over their worries to it.

DR. GAWLIK: Now, I show you Prosecution Documents 1650-PS, D-569, and 1514-PS. They deal with the Kugel Decree concerning the treatment of Russian prisoners of war and the turning over of prisoners of war to the Gestapo. It is the first point of the charge, VI (c), against the SD.

Was the SD Amt III competent for executing this decree?

RÖSSNER: No, the SD was not competent because Amt III, from the beginning, had no executive power.

DR. GAWLIK: Can you give any further explanation of the individual documents?

RÖSSNER: The documents all refer to the Secret State Police, the Gestapo. One document merely mentions the chief of Amt III. The document of the Armed Forces also refers to the Gestapo.

DR. GAWLIK: Was the SD, the Domestic Information Service, used to carry out these decrees?

RÖSSNER: No, this would have been in contradiction to its tasks.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD, the Domestic Information Service, participate in the deportation of citizens of the occupied territories for forced labor?

RÖSSNER: No, this was an executive task for which the SD, Amt III, was not competent.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD have the power to inflict punishment on forced laborers? This question refers to Page 1941 of the English transcript (Volume IV, Page 268).

RÖSSNER: No, this also would have been an executive task.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD, through its reports, contribute to deportations?

RÖSSNER: No, quite on the contrary. Amt III repeatedly showed

up the negative effects of such measures.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD have any control over the forced laborers brought into the Reich?

RÖSSNER: No, this control would also have been an executive task which Amt III did not have.

DR. GAWLIK: Now, I show you Document 205-PS. This is a memorandum on the general principles for the treatment of for-eigners employed in the Reich. Did the SD have any part in the drafting of this memorandum?

RÖSSNER: Yes, to my knowledge the SD, Amt III, had a part in the drawing up of this memorandum. It made its material available in setting up directives for a positive treatment of foreign workers. This material, which was used in this memorandum, corresponded, moreover, to the basic principles of the domestic SD in the treat-ment of national questions in the European area.

DR. GAWLIK: What is your knowledge based on as to the drawing up of this memorandum?

RÖSSNER: Part of the material comes from Group III C, in

which I myself was section chief.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD, Amt III, have the right to make confiscations? This question refers to the part of the charge VI (K) of the trial brief.

RÖSSNER: No, the SD had no right to confiscate. This also would have been an executive task.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD Domestic Information Service partic-ipate in the confiscation and distribution of public and private property?

RÖSSNER: No.

DR. GAWLIK: On Page 51 of the trial brief, it says, referring to Document 071-PS:

"In connection with the planned confiscation of scientific, religious, and art archives, an agreement was reached between Rosenberg and Heydrich on the basis of which the SD and Rosenberg were to co-operate closely in the confiscation of public and private collections."

Was there any such close co-operation between the SD and the staff of the Defendant Rosenberg, his agencies, or any of his deputies?

RÖSSNER: No. In this document we are again confronted by the customary mistake concerning the Security Police and the SD. Such co-operation, if it existed, would have had to be known to me, since Group III C would have been competent for it.

DR. GAWLIK: Mr. President, I now come to my last point. Shall I begin it?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions to ask upon it? It looks as if you had, so perhaps we had better adjourn.

DR. GAWLIK: There are 34 questions.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

DR. GAWLIK: I come now to my last point, the persecution of the Church, trial brief Section VII B. I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the SD is charged with being active in this regard only until 12 May 1941-Page 60 of the English text of the trial brief. My taking of testimony limits itself to the time from the establishment of the RSHA in 1939 up to 12 May 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Which does that mean, May 1940 or May 1941?

DR. GAVY'LIK: The 12 May 1941-Page 64, the last section but one of the trial brief, where it states that the political treatment of the Church was divided between the Gestapo and the SD and from that point on was taken over entirely by the Gestapo.

Did Department III C handle Church questions?

RÖSSNER: No.

DR. GAWLIK: Did. any other department in Amt III handle Church questions?

RÖSSNER: No. Since the establishment of Amt III, no Church matters were handled in that office at all.

DR. GAWLIK: What was handled in Amt III?

RÖSSNER: In Amt III, Group III C, only general religious mat-ters in various realms of life were handled.

DR. GAWLIK: In what manner were the matters regarding religious life handled?

RÖSSNER: The principles of the handling were the same as for any other sphere of life. It was the task of Amt III to observe all the religious wishes, cares, proposals, and tendencies of the Ger-man population and the influence of the German religious move-ments and the Christian creeds on the opinion, spirit, and attitude of the German people in the Reich, and to report on them.

DR: GAWLIK: The Prosecution has stated that the persecution of the churches was one of the fundamental purposes of the SD and the Security Police. Did the SD have this basic purpose in common with the Security Police?

RÖSSNER: To my knowledge as responsible head of a depart-ment, no such common purpose existed.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD on its own initiative have and realize any such program?

RÖSSNER: No. That would have been against all the principles of our work.

DR. GAWIAK: Did the SD, Amt III, actually engage in the perse-cution of the churches?

RÖSSNER: No.

DR. GAWLIK: Was the SD, Amt III, in any way involved by the Gestapo in an alleged persecution of the Church?

RÖSSNER: No. Between the Gestapo and Amt III there was a complete separation of materia~ personnel, and organization.

DR. GAWLIK: Was the SD involved in the persecution of the Church by any other office of the Party and State?

RÖSSNER: No. The SD worked quite independently in this sphere. No offices of the Party or of the State were entitled to give direct assignments to the SD.

DR. GAWLIK: Were the regular and honorary members of the SD under any supervision as regards their attitude toward the Church and induced to leave the Church by threats or other means?

RÖSSNER: No. I know nothing about that, and it would also have been contrary to our fundamental conceptions. Until the end, a large number of regular and honorary officials were and remained members of the Christian churches. I might mention that the Chief of Amt III himself left the Protestant Church as late as 1942.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the SD, Amt III, have veiled aims and did there exist any secret proceedings in the fight against the Church? This question is relevant to Page 58 of the trial brief.

ROSSMER: Neither in this sphere nor in any other sphere, of activity of Amt III were there any concealed aims or secret proceed-ings. As head of a department I would have had to know of them.

DR. GAWLIK: I submit to you Prosecution Document 1815-PS. Will you look at Page 59, please?

RÖSSNER: May I ask-the document does not go up to Page 59-is it Page 29 or 39?

DR. GAWLIK: 29, either 29 or 39.

RÖSSNER: I have both pages here.

DR. GAWLIK: Will you look at Page 1?

ROSSMER: I have Page 1 here.

DR. GAWLIK: There it says that the former officials should be detailed to the Gestapo for the time being.

Was this order given on the ground that the organization, the tasks, aims, and activities in the sphere of church affairs were the same in Amt III of SD and Amt IV of the Gestapo?

RÖSSNER: This order was given for an entirely different reason. Since Amt III and Amt IV were entirely different offices, the trans-fer of the former SD employees to Amt IV would have taken too long, and for that reason this planned transfer was undertaken in the form of an order so as to save time for the work.

DR. GAWLIK: Will you now comment on Page 29 of the Prose-cution document? That is record Number 18. Will you look at the first two sentences. Can it not be seen from that that the SD handled Church matters in collaboration with the State Police and the Criminal Police?

RÖSSNER: The document before me shows that the SD, Amt III, did not participate at all in this connection. At the time of this conversation in 1942, Amt III, according to the order of separation which was previously mentioned, was not allowed, on principle, to, handle Church matters.

DR. GAWLIK: Will you now look at Page I and Page 2. On the basis of these two pages, the Prosecution has suggested-I refer to Page 58 of the trial brief-that the handling of Church matters had until then been divided between the Gestapo and the SD, and that the SD files on Church opposition 'were then to be -transferred to the Gestapo but the SD was to retain material concerning Church influence on public life. Will you make a statement on this?

RÖSSNER: I said already at the beginning, that the SD, Amt III, had never handled Church matters since its foundation. The former material that was to be given by reason of this order to Amt IV was general informational material which was not suitable for the executive police tasks assigned to Amt IV. By the way, the order submitted to me was formulated by Amt IV and therefore pays ,particular attention to the,point of view of Amt IV.

DR. GAWLIK: Now will you look again at Page 19, please, where it says, in summarizing, that in Church matters the struggle against opposition and the work in everyday life must go hand in hand. Does this not indicate a collaboration of SD and State Police with the common aim of a struggle against the Church?

RÖSSNER: No, because Amt IV, to my knowledge, never had the fundamental task of a struggle against the Church. What is formulated here on this page is the personal desire of an inspector who had no actual right to give orders either to the Gestapo or to the SD.

DR. GAWLIK: Now look at Page 24, especially Paragraphs I and 4, where it says, "For the reasons stated, I request the 'In-formation Service on opponents' immediately to extend and inten-sify work in the field of Church policy." Also note immediately afterward: "As soon as channels of information have been established in this way..." Does it not seem from that that the SD had an intelligence service on opponents in the sphere of the Church?

RÖSSNER: No; it indicates exactly the opposite. The decree in front of me is dated August 1941, that is to say, after the order separating the two services. If the SD, on the basis of this order of separation, had transferred to Amt IV its information service apparatus to be used as "Information Service on opponents," then this decree of August 1941 need not have given the order finally to begin the establishment of an Information Service in Amt IV. By the way, the order was given to a large number of State Police offices and, therefore, it cannot deal with an individual local case.

DR. GAWLIK: I refer you now to Page 27, which discusses the transfer of agents to the Gestapo, and a common leadership for these agents. What have you to say to this order of the inspector in Dilsseldorf?

RÖSSNER: I must first again point out that this can be only a personal desire of the inspector, since he had no actual power to give orders. Practically, such a desire could never have been realized because, owing to the variety of the tasks, it was completely im-possible to provide common confidential agents of Amt III and Amt IV with practical assignments on specific questions. Each agent of the SD would have refused to undertake police tasks in addition to his regular duties.

DR. GAWLIK: On the basis of your activity, what can you say about the volume of the files which, as a result of the separation order of 12 May 1941, were handed over to the Gestapo by the SD.

RÖSSNER: That must have varied considerably according to the -way in which cases were handled by the various offices. Sections with good information services would have had correspondingly more material which would then have been given to the State Police.

DR. GAWLIK: On the basis of your knowledge, were the files -which were handed over by the SD of any use for the police tasks of the State Police against individuals?

ROSSNBR: No, they certainly were not, as the method of inter-rogation for gaining intelligence on ecclesiastical problems on the part of the SD was entirely different. Particularly, it was never drafted to suit individual cases.

DR. GAWLIK: According to your knowledge, were the files that -were then handed over actually worked on by the State, Police?

RÖSSNER: I cannot make any statement in detail, but for the reasons I have just given a large part of the material was never utilized any further, as it was completely useless for police tasks.

DR. GAWLIK: Did Amt III of the SD have the fundamental task and aim of persecuting the churches, or preparing a general persecution of the Church, and did it work at all for the perse-cution of the Church-that is to say, in the period between 1939 until the order of separation of 12 May 1941?

RÖSSNER: No, Amt III never did at any time receive such a practical assignment, nor did it ever set itself such a goal.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, you remember that you told us before the adjournment that you had come to your last point.

DR. GAWLIK: Yes. I have only about six questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you can compress them into a short time.

DR. GAWLIK: Did Amt III regularly inform leading offices of the Party and the State on the questions pertaining to religious matters, with a view to a common persecution of the Church?

RÖSSNER: No, the reports about

religious matters in everyday life came in very slowly and incompletely in the last period because the department in Amt III had for years only one man to work on these matters.

DR. GAWLIK: What was the aim of the SD in informing other offices about these matters?

RÖSSNER: Amt III, in addition to its ordinary reports, also pointed out in public reports that according to its opinion it was not a matter of a struggle for political power with the Church but, for the vital questions of religion affecting the German people, in conjunction with other cultural questions.

DR. GAWLIK: Did the reports of the SD lead to the prepara-tion or institution of measures inimical to the Church?

RÖSSNER: No. On the basis of the reports of Amt III, on several occasions, strong criticism was voiced on individual measures against the Church, on the part of individuals or by various offices.

DR. GAWLIK: I have no further questions to ask.

M. MONNERAY: Witness, you said that you were drafted into the, SD in 1940?

RÖSSNER: I did not say that I was called up but that I was detailed to the Reich Security Main Office on emergency duty.

M.MONNERAY: You forgot to state that you we're already a member of the SD before that.

RÖSSNER: I was asked by defendant's counsel, as far as I know, since when I had been in the SD.

M. MONNERAY: Were you a member of the SD before 1940?

RÖSSNER: I did not understand the question exactly.

M. MONNERAY: Were you a member of the SD before 1940?

RÖSSNER: Yes. From 1934.

M. MONNERAY: You forgot that, did you not?

RÖSSNER: Not as far as I know. Besides, I said it all in detail before the Commission.

M. MONNERAY: Is it a fact, Witness, that before the seizure of power by the Nazi Party, the SD was a secret and illegal organ-ization?

RÖSSNER: May I ask again-did you say before the seizure of power?

M. MONNERAY: Yes, before the -seizure of power.

RÖSSNER: I cannot say anything about that, as I was not a member of the SD.

M.MONNERAY: After the seizure of power, was the SD em-ployed by the Party and on the other hand by the State, along with the Gestapo, in order to fight opposition groups?

RÖSSNER: As far as I know, the SD always had an entirely different information service task from that of the Gestapo.

M. MONNERAY: During the war, in the occupied territories, did the SD appear at the same time as the Sipo within the Einsatzkommandos?

RÖSSNER: I can unfortunately give no testimony about the organization and activity of the Einsatzkommandos, as I was never in occupied territory as a member of the SD.

M.MONNERAY: Do you know Streckenbach?

RÖSSNER: Yes.

M. MONNERAY: What were his functions?

RÖSSNER: As far as I know, he was for some years Chief of Amt I.

M. MONNERAY: And Office Number I was in charge of organ-izational questions as much for the Sipo as for the SD, is that right?

RÖSSNER: Yes.

M.MONNERAY: Therefore, he should know sufficiently the respective functions of the Sipo and the SD?

RÖSSNER: May I ask again "who" knew the functions exactly?

M.MONNERAY: Witness, the question was quite clear. I was referring to Streckenbach.

RÖSSNER: No, one cannot assume that, since under him the duties and organizational problems were worked on entirely sepa-rately, even in his Amt I. I cannot judge to what extent Strecken-bach knew and supervised the tasks of the SD.

M. MONNERAY: I should like to read to you Document F-984. It is an appeal by Streckenbach, published in the bulletin of the Chief of the SD and Sipo.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this already been offered in evidence or not?

M. MONNERAY: This document will be Exhibit RF-1540. It has not yet been offered in evidence, Mr. President. It is an appeal by Streckenbach to all the members of the Sipo and the SD, dated 7 September 1942. Extracts from this appeal read as follows:

"Even before the seizure of power, the SD had done its share in contributing to the success of the National Socialist revo-lution. After the seizure of power the Sipo. and SD assumed the responsibility for the internal security of our Reich and opened up the way for the forceful realization of National Socialism in the face of all opposition. Since the beginning of the war our Einsatzkommandos are met wherever the German Army goes and are carrying on, each in its own sector, the fight against the enemies of the Reich and of the people."

Further on, this appeal requests material and information about the activities of the Sipo and the SD:

"For instance, in particular, articles, reports, or pictures are to be sent in on the following subjects: The history of the SD, its inception, its struggle to be acknowledged as the sole information agency of the SS and later on of the Party; difficulties and experiences when first setting up offices, records of the illegal activities during the struggle for power and reports about the development of the organization of the SD from its beginning until its full expansion after the seizure of power. Further, particularly important instances of intel-ligence activity before and after the seizure of power (illegal missions, et cetera)'~-and further on---"... common actions of the Gestapo and of the SD for the destruction of antago-nistic groups."

Witness, this appeal by Streckenbach is contrary to your declara-tions, is it not?

RÖSSNER: No, because there is not a word in this appeal about the actual tasks of Amt III-of domestic SD. Besides, the excerpt submitted to me does not indicate who actually drafted this appeal and formulated it. The name Streckenbach only means that he has signed it.

Amt III can hardly have participated in it, because otherwise the tasks of this Amt III would have had to be described more or less accurately in this appeal.

M. MONNERAY: What other offices had the SD apart from Amt III?

RÖSSNER: For the domestic SD there was only Amt III.

M. MONNERAY: Witness, I would be grateful to you if you would answer my questions.

RÖSSNER: I thought I had just answered your questions, Mr. Prosecutor.

M. MONNERAY: I asked you what the offices of the SD were, and not what the offices of the domestic SD were.

RÖSSNER: Under the general concept of SD, which had nothing to do with the concept of the domestic SD, there were also Amt VI and Amt VIL

M. MONNERAY: What were the functions of Amt VI?

RÖSSNER: That was the Foreign Information Service.

M. MONNERAY: When one speaks of the struggle against opposition groups, in conjunction with the Gestapo, you no doubt think it means a struggle in foreign countries, do you not?

RÖSSNER: That cannot be deduced in detail from the document which I have before me.

M.MONN'ERAY: Again you are not answering my question, Witness. Can you imagine the Gestapo fighting against antagonistic groups outside the Reich?

RÖSSNER: No. To my knowledge the Gestapo had a police task within the frontiers of the Reich.

M.MONNERAY: Very well. So when this appeal mentions a fight carried out by the SD on the one hand and the Gestapo oil the other hand and jointly, too, against hostile groups, reference is really being made to a fight which is going on inside the country, is that right?

RÖSSNER: Yes, although nothing is said thereby about the task of the domestic SD.

M. MONNERAY: You told us several times, Witness, that the duties of the domestic SD, and no doubt all the more those of the SD outside the Reich, were very different from the task of the Gestapo and that of the Police in general, is that not so?

RÖSSNER: I have said absolutely nothing today about the foreign division of the SD except in mentioning the existence of Amt VI.

M.MONN'ERAY: Please, Witness, can you answer for the domestic SD?

RÖSSNER: Yes.

M. MONNERAY: According to you, the Police was imbued with a police psychology?

RÖSSNER: May I ask the prosecutor what he means by this statement?

M. MONNERAY: As opposed to the ideas of the SD, which were objective; is that right?

RÖSSNER: I cannot say with what psychology the Police was imbued, because I was never a member of the Police.

M. MONNERAY: But you told us the SD was animated by objective, impartial, and scientific ideas. That is right, is it not?

RÖSSNER: I never said scientific ideas, but always by an objective and critical spirit, and I would like to stress this for-mulation expressly.

M. MONNERAY: Was this also the spirit of the Police?

RÖSSNER: I cannot, judge that for, as I said, I never belonged to the Police.

THE PRESIDENT: Put the question again, would you, M. Mon-neray?

M. MONNERAY: These impartial and objective ideas were also the ideas of the Police?

RÖSSNER: I cannot state an opinion on this, as I was never a member of the Police, but only of the domestic SD, Amt III.

M. MONNERAY: Let us be clear about this, Witness. You gave us long explanations as to the differences between the SD and the Police, did you not? If you can give us evidence about this difference, you must at least know what the Police is.

RÖSSNER: I have explained for certain spheres the difference between the SD tasks and the Police tasks, but I am not in a position to define all the duties of the Police, because I am not familiar with them. I spoke only of the principles of the work of Amt III and of concrete examples that I know from the departments in which I worked.

M. MONNERAY: Is it correct to say, Witness, that the young candidates who had to, or wished to enter the SD received exactly the same training as the young candidates who wished to enter the Gestapo or the Kripo?

RÖSSNER: I am not acquainted with the training of candidates for the SD in detail. I know only that the head of Amt III repeatedly, from year to year, raised positive objections to a certain -planned uniformity of the training. How far his objections achieved a practical result, I cannot say from my own knowledge.

M. MONNERAY: Well, I shall put to you a paper for your infor-mation which seems rather incomplete on subjects with which you were always concerned. It is a circular published in the official bulletin of the Chief of the Sipo and the SD, dated 18 May 1940, which states that young candidates, young students of the Police and SD-in spite of the objective and impartial character of these -would have to be attached for a period of 4 months to the Criminal Police, for 3 months to the Gestapo, and 3 months to the SD. You y,7ere unaware of this, were you?

RÖSSNER: No.

M. MONNERAY: Now you have told us also that the SD had very little to do with the official policy of the personnel and the Nazi Party. Is that right, Witness? Perhaps you now recall the fact that the Political Leaders of the Party had to give the German Government their opinion of the political outlook of candidates for Government posts. You know that, do you not?

RÖSSNER: May I ask the Prosecutor to repeat his question? I did not quite follow it.

M. MONNERAY: When it was a question of promoting a civil servant of a certain grade, or of 'appointing a civil servant, the Political Leader-the Gauleiter or the Kreisleiter, for instance

would have to furnish to the Government a sort of political appreciation of the sound outlook of the candidate; is that right?

RÖSSNER: Yes, I said already this morning that this was the duty of the Hoheitstr5ger of the Party.

M. MONNERAY: And it was the, Chief of the SD who had to supply the political appraisal?

RÖSSNER: No.

M.MONNERAY: Very well. I shall read to the witness an extract of Document F-989, which becomes Exhibit RF-1541-Page 2 of the extract.

It is a circular of the Chancellery of the National Socialist Party concerning political reports supplied by Political Leaders. First of all, this political report is defined as follows:

"The political opinion is an estimate of the political and ideological attitude and of the character....

"The political opinion must be true and correct that is to say it must be evaluated on the aims of the Movement."

And afterward there is a short paragraph saying who will have to supply, this opinion:

"In procuring the data for that estimate the competent Hoheitstrdger, the technical office and the SD must be heard.

Political information can be given by all offices of the Party and particularly by the offices of the SD."

RÖSSNER: I said clearly this morning that the SD was allowed to give information but never political judgments and that the SD itself paid special attention to giving as complete a personal picture as possible in these opinions which were supplemented by other inquiries. In the extract which is before me, moreover, there is no mention, so far as I can see, of personal information but only of information on the general lines of which I spoke this morning.

M. MONNERAY: In this document there is no mention of the political appraisal as a useful judgment of the political and ideo-logical attitude?

RÖSSNER: Not in this document, no. It only mentions generally reports on prevailing conditions.

M.MONNERAY: Very well. I will ask that the witness be shown the original letter a little later.

I continue. There was close collaboration between the SD and the Party, was there not?

RÖSSNER: One cannot in any way speak of close collaboration. The relations between the SD and the Party, especiany between Amt III and the Party Chancellery, were to a great extent strained to the utmost in the last years. I would be very glad to illustrate this with concrete examples.

M. MONNERAY: I would like to read you another extract from the same circular, dated 21 August 1943. It says ...

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

ROSSMER: That is the same extract which I have already received.

M. MONNERAY: "The SD is directed by the RSHA to keep the competent leaders currently informed on the, political events which take place in their sector .... On the other hand, by this practice the SD constantly drew the attention of the Hoheitstrdger to particularly urgent matters which demanded the latter's intervention." (F-989) Is that right?

RÖSSNER: Here, unfortunately, theory and practice are com-pletely at variance. Amt III would, contrary to the usual practice, have been very glad in many cases to be heard by the Hoheitstrdger of the Party so that all the critical material could have been gathered. But in many cases this was not done for years, since the local representative of the SD was not received by the Hoheits-trdger.

M. MONNERAY: Very well, we will see by way of a few examples whether there was a difference or an inconsistency between practice and theory. Before the Commission you were shown Document R-142, Exhibit USA-481, concerning the control of the 1938 plebiscite by the SD. The collaborators of the SD, who were so honorable and so disinterested, had even falsified the ballot papers. And since this concerns an actual fact, you probably want to tell us that it is an isolated instance?

RÖSSNER: I would like again to repeat most emphatically before the High Tribunal that this document does not refer to the SD but to one single subsidiary office among many hundreds of branch offices of the SD. There is not a single word saying that the Reich Security Main Office, Amt III..

THE PRESIDENT: Don't raise your voice, please.

RÖSSNER: ... that Amt III in Berlin had ever given any order to make those reports.

M. MONNERAY: Well, I will show you another document which, no doubt, is another isolated case. This time reference is made to the city of Erfurt. It is Document D-897, already offered by the British Delegation when they were submitting evidence against the Political Leaders, Exhibit GB-541. This is a secret circular of 4 April 1938, coming from the Erfurt SD branch office and addressed to all subsections, requesting all outside agents to send in reports urgently on all those persons who they were sure were going to vote no.

This document makes you smile, Witness. However, if

you look a little further down you will see that the matter was a serious one, for the Chief of the SD, a conscientious man, as you call him, says as follows:

"The tremendous responsibility of the operational point leaders is stressed once more particularly with regard to this report, as they must be fully aware of the possible con-sequences for the persons named in their reports."

Witness, do you call this objective reporting?

RÖSSNER: I am sorry, Mr. Prosecutor. You spoke just now of the Chief of the SD-and the document is signed by a local ScharFuehrer, a rank which is approximately corresponding to that of a private, first class, in the army. I do not think you can speak of the Chief of the SD. I am also sorry to have to state that this is certainly an exaggerated, isolated case, since to my knowledge it was never one of the assignments of the domestic SD to supervise elections.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Monneray, I think a good many leaders have already been examined on this document.

M. MONNERAY: Yes, Mr. President.

I will also draw the attention of the Tribunal to Document D-902, already offered in evidence as Exhibit Number GB-542, on the same subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the witness know anything about this document? Because if it is already in evidence there is no use putting it to him unless he knows something about it.

M. MONNERAY: Yes. It has already been submitted in evidence and I understand, Mr. President, that you do not wish me to inter-rogate on that document.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if there is any particular reason for asking this witness questions upon this document, you may ask them; but there is no use putting a document to him if he has never seen it before, if it is already in evidence. I don't know what the document is.

M. MONNERAY: Mr. President, I wanted to ask this witness questions on both documents to show how little faith one can attach to his depositions since he declared before the Commission that it concerned an exceptional case; whereas, as a matter of fact, it

seems that it was a general measure of the SD which was in force in many different parts of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want to cross-examine the witness as to the document, you can put questions from the document to him but you can't-at least the Tribunal doesn't want you to put the document to him.

M. MONNERAY: Witness, you told us, concerning radio, that the SD furnished also very objective reports without any political intentions behind them; is that right?

RÖSSNER: Yes. Every week we sent in reports about the reception of the radio programs by the German population, a objectively as possible, including all critical opinion.

M. MONNERAY: I have submitted to the Tribunal a Document 3566-PS; already produced in evidence as Exhibit tJSA-658, which established that in this domain also the SD had a mission which was not merely objective reporting.

Witness, what was the work of Department III B 3?

RÖSSNER: I cannot say that from memory as I no longer remember the individual departments; in any case, it had nothing to do with radio as that was the task of III C 4.

M. MONNERAY: Is it right to say that they looked after questions concerning race and health?

RÖSSNER: I answered just now that I no longer remember the duties of that office.

M. MONNERAY: Did you have anything to do with or did you receive reports through your colleagues on the general situation of the foreign workers in Germany?

RÖSSNER: No. I personally had nothing to do with these matters. The question was quite beyond the scope of my duties.

M. MONNERAY: I should like to show to the Tribunal Docu-ment 1753-PS, which becomes Exhibit RF-1542, and which contains a report from one of the departments of the SD, concerning the possibility given by the RSHA to German doctors to practice abor-tion on female workers from the East, if they requested it.' This report establishes that the statements of the SD on this matter are in no way objective statements, but that they definitely take a favorable view of the official policy of the Nazi State.

I submit another document, Document Number 1298-PS, which becomes Exhibit RF-1545, concerning slave labor by workers in Germany. In this document the person who wrote the report, who was an agent of the SD, after having mentioned the numerous desertions of foreign workers, recommends practical measures, such as reprisals against relatives by withdrawal of ration cards, and so forth.

Witness, you call objective reports those which do not of them-selves support the policy of the Police, don't you?

RÖSSNER: Yes, for this is a report of one of the many sub-sidiary offices which existed under the Reich Security Main Office in order to obtain a cross-section of public opinion in which, of course, the opinions of members of the Party would also be registered.

Moreover, I would like definitely to refute the assertion of the prosecutor that it involved any agent of the SD. Amt III, as long as it existed, never had any agents in the field of domestic political intelligence, as I already stated this morning. I must again state 'that, concerning the technical questions which are dealt with in these documents, I can only take a subjective attitude because they did not concern my department. I still maintain my fundamental declaration concerning the duties of the SD, even in the face of these documents.

M. MONNERAY: But, Witness, this document was not addressed to the RSHA for general use; it was addressed to the Office for the Allocation of Labor. It is therefore a report dealing with the execu-tion of those measures which are suggested, is that not so?

RÖSSNER: From the document which I have before me, it is not evident from what SD office it came.

M. MONNERAY: I am going to show you a photostatic copy of this report.

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

RÖSSNER: This also does not indicate in any way from which SD office the document was sent.

M. MONNERAY: Do you admit that the report is addressed to the Office for the Allocation of Labor?

RÖSSNER: Yes, but at the same time I would like to point out that under the signature it says, "Secretary"; and the SD, as far as I know, never had any secretaries. There should be an SD or an SS rank shown there.

M. MONNERAY: And -the document says, "I am sending you herewith a copy of the report from the domestic SD."

RÖSSNER: Yes.

M.MONNERAY: In the occupied territories the SD was repre-sented by organizations under Amt III and Amt VI, is that not so?

RÖSSNER: No, Amt III-here, again I can speak only for Amt III-had no organizations which were directly subordinate to it, but only individual SD agents of Amt III who carried out the specific SD tasks in the occupied territories.

M. MONNERAY: Amt VI of the RSHA looked after the SD abroad, did it not?

RÖSSNER: Yes.

M. MONNERAY: And it had its representatives within the Ger-man police organizations operating abroad, did it not?

RÖSSNER: About this I can say nothing because I never worked in that office.

M. MONNBRAY: I offer to the Tribunal in evidence Documents F-973 and F-974. The two documents will become Exhibits RF-1544 and 1545. These are information sheets and agents' reports sent by the office.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on. Have they been translated? Have copies been given to the German counsel?

M. MONNERAY: It has not been given to the interpreters because I am not going to read the whole document. The original is in German.

It is a report made out on a printed information form sent out by the SD agents to the competent services of the Gestapo, con-cerning the Jewish question; and thereby the relations existing between the two offices can be established, contrary to the state-ments of the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Have these documents been translated into the various languages?

M. MONNERAY: Only into. French, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know the rule is that they must be translated into four languages. You must read it then, if that is so.

M. MONNERAY: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall read only one of the two documents, Section VI, Number 1.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Monneray, we have been a long time, and we have now apparently got to the stage that we have got to read this document, all these documents, which are of very remote importance. We have got to read them through because they have not been translated. It is taking up a long time; and it does not seem to be achieving any great result.

M.MONNERAY: Mr. President, I shall pass directly to the last point, concerning the resettlement of population.

Do you know, Witness, if the SD participated with the Gestapo in sending people into concentration camps?

RÖSSNER: I cannot say. From my personal knowledge, I can only say in general that Amt III had no executive duties at all and was, therefore, not empowered to send any people into a concentra-tion camp.

M. MONNERAY: Do you know that the SD collaborated with the Gestapo to ascertain which Poles were capable of being germanized and which of them, on the other hand, should be sent to concentra-tion camps?

RÖSSNER: No, I have no factual knowledge of any of these questions.

M. MONNERAY: I would ask permission merely to read an extract of Document R-112.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this new?

M. MONNERAY: It is a document which has already been offered in evidence, Exhibit USA-309.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you must not refer to it because the witness says he does not know anything about it.

M. MONNERAY: I would like merely to read the passage from this document which establishes, contrary to the statements of the witness who does not know these facts, that the SD did in fact collaborate with the Gestapo in selecting Poles to be germanized.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is anything in the document which shows that the witness is not telling the truth you can put that part of the document to the witness.

M. MONNERAY: The document refers to Amt III B of the SD and does not indicate any element which directly affects the witness. Therefore, it bears only on the general question of the activity of the SD and does not affect the witness personally.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Monneray, the witness has just said that Amt III did not have anything to do with deportation of populations If this document shows that it did, then you can put that fact to him

M. MONNERAY: That is why, Mr. President, I was asking per. mission to read a passage of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: You can put the document to him.

M. MONNERAY: It is a letter of 1 July, signed by Streckenbach It emanates from Amt III B 1 and it is addressed to the Gestapo office of the SD, in the newly occupied territories of the East. TU document says, on Page 2, first point:

"The State Police (head) offices must immediately ask the branch offices of the DVL, the SD (head) Abschnitte and the Kripo (head) offices for all available material on persons belonging to Department 4."

Third point:

"The chiefs of the State Police (head) offices and the leaders of the SD (head) Abschnitte, or their permanent representa-tives (in SD-chiefs of Department III B) must participate in the racial examinations in order to see for themselves the people involved."

On Page 3, the fourth point:

"After the racial selection, the chiefs of the State Police (head) offices and the leaders of the SD (head) Abschnitte, or their permanent representatives (in SD-chiefs of Department III B) will verify in common-- this is underlined in the docu-ment-"the material available and will, if necessary, ask the Reich Security Main Office, Amt IV C 2, for arrest and con-signment to a concentration camp. In particularly difficult cases the documentary files will first of all have to be sent to the RSHA, Amt III, III B."

On Page 4, the last paragraph of this order, signed by Streckenbach:

"In execution of the current control of re-Germanization, the SD (head) Abschnitte in the old Reich territory..."

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As far as I understand the document it clearly applies to Amt III. Well, why do you not put it to him?

M. MONNERAY: I should like to ask the witness afterward if he still maintains that Amt III had nothing to do with the Gestapo and had no authority to carry out arrests and send people to con-centration camps.

First of all, I would like to finish reading the last paragraph.

THE PRESIDENT: All right, go on.

M. MONNERAY: 11... the SD (head) Abschnitte in Reich terri-tory proper will carry on in a similar manner with the super-vision of Poles capable of being germanized and reporting on them to the Reich Security Main Office and the Higher SS and Police Leader; they should afford all assistance to the advisers on Germanization."

The report is signed Streckenbach.

Witness, this order really emanates from Amt III of the Reich Security Main Office, does it not?

RÖSSNER: Apparently some mistake has occurred, Mr. Pros-ecutor, because according to the document before me the document does not come from the RSHA at all, but from the Reich Com-missioner for the Preservation of German Nationality. After the date of 1 July 1942 there is III B 1, it is true, but it has the letter-head "Reichskommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums," an office which is completely separated from the RSHA.

M. MONNERAY: Well then, Witness, is it correct to say that according to this order signed by Streckenbach, the services of the SD, in common with those of the Gestapo, were to check their files and to request, if necessary, the arrest of people concerned and have them sent to concentration camps? Will you please answer "yes" or "no"?

RÖSSNER: Unfortunately', from my own experience I can give no information about that. In any case it is clear that the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality could give no orders to the SD, Amt III. Therefore, this document does not reveal at all what the SD did in practice in this matter. On this subject the competent expert should be questioned.

M. MONNERAY: You did not answer the question. According to this text, is it correct to state that the SD actively collaborated with the Gestapo in these matters?

RÖSSNER: I believe ...

M.MONNERAY: "Yes" or "no"?

RÖSSNER: I cannot answer the question with "yes" or "no," but I think I have already answered it when I said that the Reich Com-missioner for the Preservation of German Nationality could give no orders to the SD. I cannot judge, therefore, what the SD actually did, as these are two entirely different offices. As far as I know, the competent Gruppenleiter has already been heard before the Commission.

M. MONNERAY: You are still not answering the question. Is it true, "yes" or "no," that according to this text the SD collaborated with the Gestapo in screening people and, if necessary, had them arrested and sent to concentration camps?

RÖSSNER: I am sorry I must again repeat my answer to your second question. Since the Reich Commissioner could give no direct orders to the SD I cannot answer by "yes" or "no" as to whether the SD, on the basis of this order by the Reich Commissioner, actually collaborated with the Gestapo-and this is surely what you are aiming at.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the document speaks for itself and now I think the Tribunal had better adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

M.MONNERAY: One last question, Witness, concerning this Document R-112. Who was the Reich Commissioner for the Preser-vation of German Nationality?

RÖSSNER: That was a supreme office.

M.MONNERAY: Which was under the authority of the Chief of the SD and the Chief of the German Police, is that not so?

RÖSSNER: Himmler.

M. MONNERAY: Do you maintain that this letter of I July, which came from Himmler's offices and was addressed at the same time to the Gestapo offices, the SD offices, and the Criminal Police offices, does not correspond with the real state of affairs?

RÖSSNER: From my own knowledge I can only point out once more that ther

e are two completely different agencies concerned. To what extent the formulation of the document coincides with the actual work of the SD, I cannot, I repeat, judge from my own knowledge.

M.MONNERAY: I have no more questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik-wait a minute.

LT. COMDR. HARRIS: May it please the Tribunal, we would like to offer, merely as a supplement to our last exhibit, a new docu-ment which has just come to our hands, which is Document 4054-PS and becomes Exhibit USA-921. The only significance of this docu-ment is that it shows that the SD was running agents in Los Angeles, California, shortly before the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: You have got a copy of this, Dr. Gawlik? Have you got a copy of it?

DR. GAWLIK: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to re-examine?

DR. GAWLIK: I have no questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. And I think that finishes your evidence, Dr. Gawlik-that is all of your evidence, isn't it? That is all of your evidence, isn't it? Wait a minute. You have no more witnesses, have you?

DR. GAWLIK: I have no more witnesses, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: In what order is it that the counsel for the organizations wish to proceed now?

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Reich Cabinet): It has been ruled that the witnesses for the Reich Government will be examined now.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR.KUBUSCHOK: I call the witness Dr. Franz Schlegelberger to the stand.

[The witness Schlegelberger took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name please?

FRANZ SCHLEGELBERGER (Witness): Franz Schlegelberger.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Onmiscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: Sit down.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, from what year on were you em-ployed in the Ministry of Justice?

SCHLEGELBERGER: To begin with, I was judge in a common court of pleas, then in a court of appeals, and from 1918 I was first an assistant and then a Geheimer Rat (Privy Counsellor) in the ministry.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: When did you become State Secretary?

SCHLEGELBERGER: In 1931.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: At what time, after the death of the Reich Minister of Justice Guertner, did you carry on the affairs of the Ministry of Justice?

SCHLEGELBERGER: From January 1941 until August 1942.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you a member of the Party?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Originally I was not a member of the Party and I never requested admission into the Party. To my great surprise I received a letter from the Chief of the Fuehrer's Chancel-lery on 30 January 1938, saying that the Fuehrer had decreed my admission into the Party. Of course I could not reject this letter, and I should like to call myself an involuntary member of the Party.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you in very close personal contact with Minister Guertner so that you were constantly kept informed by him of all questions, not only of the Ministry of Justice, but also of all general government questions?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR.KUBUSCHOK: Was Guertner already Minister of Justice in the Papen Cabinet?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was Guertner previously Minister of Justice in Bavaria?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the activity of the entire Government which met for cabinet sessions in the first period of the Hitler Cabinet-I mean the time up to the promulgation of the Enabling Act-differ from previous practice?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No, the bills were thoroughly discussed and divergent opinions were debated.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this change after the Enabling Act was issued?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes. The March elections and the adoption of the Enabling Act by the Reichstag had greatly strengthened Hitler's position. At first Hitler was quite reserved, modest, toward Von Hindenburg, or perhaps even embarrassed. Now he was filled with the thought that he was the executor of the popular will. Perhaps that can be explained by the facts that Hitler had directed all his activities to winning over the masses; that he now saw success; that he believed he had judged the will of the people correctly; that he considered himself the personification of the people's will; and that he wanted to realize the people's authority.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the combining of the position of the Reich Chancellor with that of the Reich President in August 1934-beyond the general state-legal effects-have any influence on the position and functions of the Cabinet?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes; I see in this law the last step in the concentration of all the power in the person of Hitler, and I judge this law as particularly important because it was generally ap-proved by the plebiscite.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was this development also expressed in the law of 16 October 1934 with regard to the oath of allegiance for the ministers-was the duty of obedience toward the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor now established for the ministers?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes; and this law meant that the minis-ters, like other officials, were now bound by directives.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did the ministers still have the possibility of resigning on their own wish?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No.

DR. KLTBUSCHOK: Did later laws further restrict the activity of the Cabinet?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes. I am thinking of the law on the Four Year Plan and on the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were considerable parts of the govern-mental activity decentralized and assigned to special offices? I am thinking' of the appointment of Gauleiter, Reich 'commissioners, chiefs of civil administration?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes; the Gauleiter were appointed Reichs-statthalter (Reich governors) and Reich defense commissioners. The Plenipotentiary for Administration was created, and the Pleni-potentiary for Economy and Plenipotentiary General for the Allo-cation of Labor.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Through the law on the unity of the Party and State, of I December 1933, did co-operation between agencies of the Party and State arise in practice or how did conditions develop in fact?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Whoever had believed in this co-operation was soon sorely disappointed. From the very beginning considerable dissension became apparent between the State offices and the Party offices and I can say from my own experience that an extraor-dinarily large part of the work became necessary because State agencies had to overcome the influence of the Party offices.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: For what purpose and under what conditions was the Enabling Act submitted to the Reichstag in March 1933?

SCHLEGELBERGER: The Enabling Act, which is called "the law to relieve the distress of People and Reich," was issued because the cumbersome machinery of the Reichstag worked too slowly and laws had to be created speedily. The Enabling Act was intended as a temporary solution only and for that reason it was limited to 4 years; later it was repeatedly extended.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: For what reasons were special courts estab-lished and what special circumstances prevailed in these procedures?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Special courts were already established temporarily during the Briming Cabinet in 1931, and now they ,7~ere created again because in this way it was planned to deal quickly with things which demanded urgent solution. This could be-achieved only by excluding recourse to the law; but in order to do away with unjust procedure and unjust sentences, a number of clauses were introduced; that is, first, the resumption of sus-pended proceedings in favor of the defendant was facilitated; secondly, the plea of nullity to the Reich Court was allowed, which meant that the Reich Court could quash a sentence and substitute another; thirdly, an appeal extraordinary to the Reich Court was instituted, by means of which a completely new trial could be started; finally, an ex officio defense was instituted.

I may emphasize that the special courts and the legal facilities which I have mentioned were as much for the defendants as they were against them, that these special courts were regular judicial courts and not exceptional courts, and that they were conducted by three professional judges.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What have you to say regarding the law of 3 July 1934, by which the measures of Hitler taken on 30 June 1934 were legalized?

SCHLEGELBERGER: According to Hitler's statement and cor-responding to the text of the law, this concerned exclusively the SA men who, according to Hitler's statement, which wag credible at the time, had intended a revolt. To that extent, the law was absolutely justifiable, because revolt meant a state of emergency in the sense of the term generally recognized in Germany. It was quite another thing with those victims of the incident who were not among the members of the revolt. Hitler stated that these cases should be prosecuted by the courts. A number of trials were started and ended in severe sentences. In a number of cases, how-ever, Hitler used his legal right of veto-for example, in the case of Klausner and Edgar Jung-and as a result of the veto these cases could no longer be legally tried.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you and the Reich Minister of Justice Guertner know of the Nuremberg Laws before the decision was made at the Reich Party Rally?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No. I had already left the Reich Party Rally and learned of these laws, on the way, through the newspapers or radio. The Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Guertner, as I know for certain from him himself, was not informed beforehand of the intention to issue these laws.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the purpose of the taking-over of the administration of Justice by the Reich?

SCHLEGELBERGER: This was primarily due to the general trend of centralization but beyond that, the Reich Ministry of Justice carried out this measure with the greatest energy. The Ministries of Justice of the Under were all directed by National Socialist ministers and probably state secretaries, and this caused a number of embarrassing situations. The taking-over of the administration of Justice by the Reich had the effect that now it came into the hands of a Minister of Justice and his state secretary who were not National Socialists.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the relationship between the Party agencies and the Ministry of Justice?

SCHLEGELBERGER: As a result of the transfer of the adminis-tration of Justice to the Reich, strong efforts were soon made by the Party to exert influence on the Ministry of Justice, first by way of personnel policy. The legal situation was such that according to an order of the Fuehrer the Party had to be heard before a judge or a high legal official was appointed. The Party did not limit itself to commenting on the Ministry of Justice's candidates, but vigorously advocated candidates of its own. As soon as the mini§ter, and later, I myself, became convinced that the Party wanted to have an unsuitable man in a position, we took recourse to obstruc-tion by keeping the position open. Later it was filled by another man who was more suitable, at least in our opinion.

Repeatedly, we observed that in civil trials Party agencies approached the judges and tried to persuade them that in the public interests this or that decision was necessary. In order to spare the judges these painful discussions, at the suggestion of the Minister of Justice, the law on the co-operation of the State Prose-cutor in civil cases was issued, according to which the judge to whom such a request was made could tell the Party agency, "Apply to the prosecuting authority, it is competent to assert the public interest."

I recall further a case in which the then Gauleiter Adolf Wagner announced at Munich that he was going to appear uninvited at a civil trial and make a speech in order to convince the court that this Party member enjoyed Party rights in a civil trial. On behalf of the Reich Minister of Justice, I then visited the Defendant Hess and asked him to prevent the appearance of Gauleiter Wagner and this wish was fulfilled.

Another means to influence justice was to criticize sentences of judges that they did not like. This criticism was made by the SS newspaper Schwarzes Korps.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. How does this evidence bear on the Reich Cabinet?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The witness is particularly familiar with conditions in the Ministry of Justice, from his own activities. I am limiting myself to a few very significant cases in which the situation in the ministry is explained. I have no more questions on this point and I believe the witness is almost finished with his answer.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

SCHLEGELBERGER: The Schwarzes Korps repeatedly promised to stop the criticism but did not keep its promises. The Ministry of Justice took every opportunity at conferences with the presidents of the provincial appellate courts and the chief prosecutors to tell them they should point out to the justices that they were inde-pendent and should reject every attempt at intimidation and report all difficult cases to the minister.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In cases of ill-treatment and excesses in concentration camps which- became known to you, did the Ministry of Justice take steps to intervene?

SCHLEGELBERGER: According to my information the Minister of Justice intervened in all cases of which he obtained knowledge. As early as 1933 he employed two lawyers in the Ministry of Justice for the express purpose of investigating on the spot an cases which were reported, and to follow them up with great energy. Prosecution ensued and in many cases sentence was passed. Since the introduction of the special jurisdiction of the SS in 1939 these matters were withdrawn from the competence of the Ministry of Justice.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What were the personal relations of the ministers to Hitler?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I believe one must make a distinction between Hitler's relations to the Party ministers and the non--Party ministers. Ministers who were not members of the Party, kept their distance; he likewise displayed distrust. Even with regard to the Party ministers I got the impression that the rela-tionship varied greatly. I believe, for example, that Ministers Rust and Darré were not nearly as close to him as Göring and Goebbels. But even Party ministers were viewed by Hitler with distrust. This is already indicated by the fact that, as far as I know, there were even Party ministers who for years were not admitted to report personally to the Fuehrer.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was Hitler's circle of close confidants from cabinet circles comparatively small?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes, very small. To my knowledge it was limited to a few persons.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler take measures to prevent co-operation of the members of the Cabinet or even personal contact between ministers?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Hitler's point of view was that frequent meetings of the Cabinet members were undesirable. From 1938 on he firmly prevented all attempts to return to the form of Cabinet meetings; he even expressly prohibited unofficial meetings such as "beer evenings."

DR.KUBUSCHOK: Did you and Minister of Justice Guertner, before the outbreak of the war or before the beginning of any of the later hostile actions, know anything about Hitler's plans?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No. I may remark that I had the inten-tion in the late summer of 1939 to take a cure in Marienbad. For that reason, as the situation was tense, I asked the Minister of Justice what he thought about it, and he said, "Go right ahead. I consider it out of the question that there will be any hostilities." Upon that I went to Marienbad, and returned only at the beginning of September when the war broke out.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have finished the examination.

DR. KEMPNER: Is it true, Dr. Schlegelberger, that the Reich ministers, which means the members of the Reich Cabinet, had the highest rank, had the highest responsibility, and the highest pay of all German officials?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR. KEMPNER: Is it correct to state that

the appointment as a member of the Reich Cabinet was a completely voluntary act?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR. KEMPNER: Is it correct to state that a member of Hitler's Cabinet had the right to resign if he did not agree with Hitler's policy?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I believe not.

DR. KEMPNER: Do you know any Cabinet members or state secretaries like yourself who resigned?

SCHLEGELBERGER: One minister resigned.

DR. KEMPNER: What was his name?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Von Eltz-Ruebenach.

DR. KEMPNER: Do you know a state secretary who resigned?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I do not remember.

DR. KEMPNER: What about yourself, Dr. Schlegelberger, did you not resign?

SCHLEGELBERGER: This question is not so easy to answer.

DR. KEMPNER: When did you leave your office?

SCHLEGELBERGER: In August 1942 I was dismissed by the Fuehrer.

DR. KEMPNER: Is it a correct statement if I say you were dismissed because you did not like the policy of the Fuehrer concerning the judges?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes, that is true.

DR. KEMPNER: Now, you remember that the Minister o Economics, Dr. Kurt Schmitt, resigned?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I do not know from my own knowledge whether Dr. Schmitt resigned or whether he was dismissed.

DR. KEMPNER: Then I should like to refresh your memory, and I show you an affidavit, a new document, a short one, which I give to the Court. And this document will become Exhibit 922.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to object to the admission o this affidavit. It deals with questions concerning the resignation of the witness which concern him personally and in which he is greatly interested personally. I believe that if this question, which in my opinion is not relevant, is to be discussed at all, we cannot avoid calling the witness who made the affidavit himself; he live near Munich. I also believe that this affidavit is not suitable to prove the credibility of the witness Schlegelberger in any way. The details of the resignation of a minister need not be known to the state secretary of another ministry. The witness stated he did no know anything further about it. I believe, therefore, that the examination to test the credibility of this witness is not fulfilled by this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kempner, the Tribunal thinks you should submit the facts of the resignation to the witness. Have you heard? That you should submit the facts of the resignation to the witness

DR. KEMPNER: You know that another minister, Minister Ku Schmitt, resigned? Do you remember now?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes, I remember that, of course, but I do not know whether he resigned or whether he was dismissed. That I do not know.

DR. KEMPNER: Do you know that Minister Schmitt resigned because he knew that Hitler's policy would lead to war?

SCHLEGELBERGER: That is unknown to me.

DR. KEMPNER: Now, another chapter. Is it true, that the Reich Cabinet became a legislative body of Nazi Germany through the Enabling Act?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes, through the Enabling Act.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kempner, the Tribunal thinks you could put the first part of the affidavit to the witness.

DR. KEMPNER: I come back to the question of the resignation of Minister Schmitt and ask you whether the following is true or not:

"As Minister of Economics I was a member of the Reich Cabinet from 30 June 1933 until the beginning of January 1935. I resigned from the Cabinet 28 June 1934, formally for reasons of ill-health but factually because of deep differences of opinion with the policy of the Hitler Cabinet."

Are you informed about this, Dr. Schlegelberger?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I can only repeat, I know only that Herr Schmitt was Reich Minister of Economics and that he left the Cabinet. In what way he left, whether he was dismissed, whether he wanted to be dismissed, or whether he was dismissed for sickness or differences of opinion, I do not know.

DR. KEMPNER: But now you agree with me that you knew two ministers who resigned and who were neither killed nor put in con-centration camps?

SCHLEGELBERGER: That is certainly true ...

DR. KEMPNER: That is enough, that answers my question.

Is it true that the Reich, Cabinet exercised its legislative powers continuously?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR. KEMPNER: Is it true that the Reich Cabinet had more than 100 meetings and passed numerous laws? Is that correct?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR. KEMPNER: Is it true that the Cabinet continued to pass and promulgate laws even without formal session, by circulating drafts of the laws among the Cabinet members? Is this correct?

SCHLEGELBERGER: It is true that when the Cabinet meetings stopped, laws and decrees were issued after being circulated.

DR. KEMPNER: Now, do you know. how many laws were passed by the Reich Cabinet by means of this circulation method in the year 1939 for instance?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No, I cannot answer that.

DR. KEMPNER: If I tell you that in the year 1939 alone the Reich Cabinet passed the following laws ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kempner, you can state what the fact is.

DR. KEMPNER: If I tell you that they passed 67 laws, would you say that is the correct statement?

SCHLEGELBERGER: If you say that it is true, Dr. Kempner, I accept it as such.

DR. KEMPNER: Do you know that the Reich Cabinet had also

the duty of approving the Reich budget?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR.KEMPN`ER: Would you say that the members of the Reich Cabinet were informed about the things which were going on in Germany because they had to approve the budgets of all ministries?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I believe that very much can be gathered from the Reich budget but not necessarily everything.

DR.KEMPNER: Do you know...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kempner, you are asking the next ques-tion a little too quickly. We did not hear the answer come through. I think the witness said that important matters were to be derived from the budget or something of -that sort.

DR. KEMPNER: Would you repeat the answer please?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I believe that very much can be gathered from the Reich budget but not everything.

DR.KEMPNER: You know that the Reich budget had special provisions about concentration camps?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No, I do not know that.

DR. KEMPNER: When you were a Minister of Justice and acting Minister of Justice, did you have anything to do with the anti--Jewish legislation?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I believe that during the period in 'which I was active, one law or decree was issued in the year 1941. As far as I can recall, it concerned leases that affected Jews.

DR. KEMPNER: Do you remember that you yourself made up proposals, a legislative proposal, together with the Defendant Dr. Frick, to sterilize all half-Jews in Germany and the occupied territories?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No, I do not recall that.

DR. KEMPNER: Now I should like to show you a letter from the official files which has your signature, and you might remem-ber-you might be able to refresh your memory by reading this letter. This will be my last question. And this will become Exhibit Number USA-923. Do you remember now that you put you

signature under this terrible document?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes, I remember; yes, I remember it.

DR. KEMPNER: You remember that the Party and that the Defendant Frick proposed to sterilize all Jews and all half-Jews?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR.KEMPNER: And you remember that the various Cabinet members, like the Defendant Göring, the Chief of the Four Year Plan, that the Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick (attention of his Secretary of State), that the Foreign Office. (attention of Under Secretary Luther) got copies of this legislative proposal?

SCHLEGEI.BERGER: Yes.

DR. KEMPNER: And you remember, on Page 1 of this document, that this legislative proposal to sterilize all Jews and all half-Jews should be submitted to Hitler?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I did not quite understand the question.

DR. KEMPNER: You remember that your and Minister Frick's proposal should be submitted to Hitler?

[There was no response.]

DR. KEMPNER: Yes or no.

SCHLEGELBERGER: Dr. Kempner, I beg your pardon; I still have not quite understood your question. I do not know what I am to try to remember.

DR. KEMPNER: Whether your proposal should be submitted to Hitler?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I believe so.

DR. KEMPNER: And you remember what Hitler said?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No, I do not remember that.

DR. KEMPNER: Is it a true statement that your Secretary of State, Freisler, told you, "Hitler does not like this sharp measure of the Reich Cabinet at the present time; he will postpone it until after the war"?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I do not remember that.

DR. KE4PNER: You regret deeply your signature under this law?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I can say "yes." I should like to add one thing only. At that time, there was already a serious struggle to obtain this limitation ...

DR. KEMPNER: And you regret deeply these crimes; is that correct?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I regret greatly that I signed this.

DR. KEATPNER: Thank you. That is all.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): I ask the Tribunal to permit me to ask three questions of the witness, because these questions arise from the cross-examination by Dr. Kempner, since the answers to these questions and the questions themselves concern the interests of the Defendant Schacht and his own testi-mony directly, and because the charge against the Reich Cabinet is now being discussed, and also because Schacht, in the period known to the Tribunal, was a member of the Reich Cabinet. For these reasons, I ask the Tribunal to make an exception and to permit me, after the cross-examination, although I am not a defendant's counsel for an organization, to ask questions of this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

DR. DIX: Dr. Schlegelberger, was Hitler's signature necessary for the dismissal of a minister?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR.DIX: Do you recall that not immediately after 1933, but later, perhaps during the war only, Hitler expressly prohibited Reich ministers from handing in their resignation?

SCHLEGELBERGER: I may say the following: Am order was issued changing the German civil servants law. According to this law, every official had the right to be released from his office. This right was abolished during the war. It was decreed that the release did not have to be granted, and as I recall, Hitler in following this decree actually did not accept resignations of ministers.

DR. DIX: Now, my third and last question: Herr State Secretary, in answer to Dr. Kempner's question about the departure of the former Minister, Von Eltz-Ruebenach, you said that he had resigned. To assist your memory, may I point out that we heard here from Göring on the witness stand a modified version of this event which agrees with the recollection of the Defendant Schacht. Of course, I do not have the transcript of the Göring case before me and there-fore I can only give Göring's testimony from memory. But I believe that in essence and effect I present it correctly. According to the testimony, this departure of Eltz, developed as a result of the presen-tation of the Golden Party Badge to various ministers, including Von Eltz-Ruebenach. When Hitler, with the idea of pleasing the ministers, had handed him this Golden Party Badge Eltz started and made some remark to the effect of whether he was thereby incurring any confessional obligations. Hitler was annoyed at this, and the upshot was that Von Eltz-Ruebenach left the Cabinet, which cannot exactly be termed a resignation on Von Ruebenach's own initiative.

I believe that I have at least reproduced the sense of Göring's testimony correctly.

SCHLEGELBERGER: I know these events only from reports which I received from others. I myself was not present at the incident. I have no reason to believe that the Defendant Göring, who was present, did not describe the facts as they actually happened.

DR.DIX: You say you know the story only from reports; that is, actual reports from Herr Guertner, for example?

SCHLEGELBERGER: Yes.

DR.DIX: Do you still recall these reports, more or less? Or is what I have just said the first reminder?

SCHLEGELBERGER: No; I recall vaguely that according to Herr Guertner's report, as Dr. Dix just stated, Von Eltz-Ruebenach had put forward certain wishes for the Catholic Church, and that the Fuehrer was annoyed at the wishes he had made and everything else had resulted from that incident. I can only repeat, if it is put to me, I have no reason to deny the correctness of an eye-and-ear witness.

DR. DIX: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 August 1946 at 1000 hours.]