Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 21

Two Hundreth Day Volume 21 Menu Two Hundreth and Second Day
Nuremberg Trials Page

Two Hundred
and First Day
Monday; 12 August 1946

Morning Session

[The witness Von Manstein resumed the stand.]

DR.FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): Mr. Pres-ident, I beg to be granted permission to submit to the Tribunal an urgent application on behalf of the Defendant Funk.

On Monday, 5 August 1946, that is to say a week ago today, the Prosecution submitted an affidavit of the former SS Obergruppenfuehrer Oswald Pohl, Document Number'4045-PS, alleging certain connections between the Defendant Funk and the SS, particularly with reference to the so-called "gold deposits" of the SS in the Reichsbank; I was unable immediately to object to the use of this affidavit during the session of last Monday since I was absent on that day because of illness. I had reported my absence in the appropriate manner to the General Secretary. On the same day, 5 August, Dr. Nelte, in an application to the Tribunal on my behalf, asked for permission to interrogate the witness Oswald Pohl in prison in order to obtain an affidavit from him. On 7 August 1946 1 myself repeated that application, asking at the same time for permission to call the witness Oswald Pohl for cross-examination, and also to recall the Defendant Funk himself to the witness stand to VON RUNDSTEDT: In our opinion, or in the opinion of the memorandum, the German Army was in no position. whatever to wage give testimony with reference to these new accusations.

Since the submission of these applications of mine the SS judges Dr. Reinecke and Dr. Morgen were heard as witnesses for the SS here in Court. Both of these witnesses have raised the gravest accusations against Oswald Pohl, although he was their SS comrade. The testimonies of these two witnesses, Dr. Reinecke and Dr. Morgen, have furnished proof that the former Obergruppenfuehrer Oswald Pohl, a witness of the Prosecution, first ...

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Are you applying to cross-examine Pohl or what?

DR. SAUTER: No. If you will permit me, Mr. President, I shall in a moment give you the reason why I do not wish to do so. I have just said that the examination of the witnesses Dr. Reinecke and Dr. Morgen has furnished proof, first, that this witness of the Prosecution is a millionfold murderer; secondly, that he was the head of that clique of criminals which carried out the atrocities in concentration camps; thirdly, that Pohl, by every means at his disposal, attempted to prevent the discovery of these atrocities and even committed new murders for this purpose.

All that has been ascertained from the testimony given under oath by the witnesses Dr. Morgen and Dr. Reinecke. Under these circumstances, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the defense of the Defendant Funk refuses to employ such a monster as a means of evidence. Therefore, as counsel for the Defendant Funk, I desist from calling this witness of the Prosecution, Oswald Pohl, to the witness stand, because testimony coming from a man who murdered millions of innocent people ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, I understand that you are not making an application of any sort now; you are making what is in the nature of a ...

DR. SAUTER: No, on the contrary, I refrain from doing so.


DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I beg to have your permission to make another application. I said that the testimony of a man who murdered millions of innocent people, who made a dirty business

out of murdering them, is in our conception completely without value for establishing the truth.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that this is an inappropriate time at which to make a protest of this sort, which is in the nature of an argument. If you are making an application,

you can make an application. If you want to make a protest, you must make it later when the case for the organizations is at an end.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I say the ~ following: We are now near the end of the submission of evidence, and I do not think that I can wait with this application until after the end of the Trial; the application which I was going to make must be made now, so that the Tribunal will receive it in good time.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, if you would only come to your application we should be glad to hear it.

DR. SAUTER: Very well, Mr. President, I will do so at once.

I herewith apply that the Tribunal decide, first, that the affi-davit of Oswald Pohl, dated 15 July 1946, namely, Document

Number 4045-PS, should not be admitted in evidence against the Defendant Walter Funk, and, secondly, that that part of the con-tents of the affidavit of Oswald Pohl, Document 4045-PS, which has reference to the Defendant Funk, should be stricken from the record of the session of 5 August 1946.

Furthermore, as an additional application and as a precautionary measure, I beg permission to apply for the Defendant Walter Funk to be recalled to the witness stand in order to give him an oppor-tunity to express himself on these completely new, assertions of Oswald Pohl.

Mr. President, I submitted this application to the General Sec-retary in writing this morning, but I do not know when the Language Division will pass it on to you. I' have therefore con-sidered it necessary to ask your permission to make this application orally during the proceedings in order to avoid being told that I should have done so in good time here during the session, but had failed to do it. That is the application, Mr. President, which I beg to make.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear the Prose-cution on this application.

DR. ROBERT M. W. KEMPNER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): May I reserve our answer until I have an occasion to talk to the chief prosecutor, Mr. Dodd?


DR. KEMPNER: I would like to state that even murderers some-times tell the truth.

DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine the witness any further?

MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Witness, I have two additional questions to ask you, both connected with the activities of the Einsatzgruppe D, You stated here that you exclude the possibility of your army group having participated in the shooting which was carried out by this group. Did you not know that the watches taken from those who were shot were sent to the Army, according to the order of the High Command?

VON MANSTEIN: No, I knew nothing about that. As far as the watches are concerned, the army administration officer on one occasion reported to me, as far as I remember, that he had procured a large consignment of watches from Germany. He showed me one of these watches; it was a completely new watch made in Germany. He wanted to issue these watches to the troops. I do not remember that confiscated watches were ever issued, and in no event have I heard of watches belonging to Jews who had been shot.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And these watches were used for the supply of the German army, is that right?

VON MANSTEIN: This consignment of watches from Germany, yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But you also spoke about watches which belonged to the Jews who were shot. That is the way I understood you. Is that correct?

VON MANSTEIN: No, I did not say that. The subject was not mentioned at all. I only said that the army administration officer reported to me about a consignment of German watches. That is the only thing I can remember with regard to watches. That he could have spoken of watches belonging to Jews who had been shot is completely out of the question.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Very well. Did you know that in Niko-laiev and Simferopol the executions were attended by represent-atives of the army command?


GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know that these facts were brought out here in Court by the witness Ohlendorf? Do you think that Ohlendorf testified falsely here when relating these facts?

VON MANSTEIN: I know Ohlendorf's testimony and I remem-ber that he said that soldiers had participated in executions near Simferopol. But he also said that he did not know for certain what soldiers they were. He thought they were probably mostly sub-sidiary, technical units, that is, not regular troops of my army. In any event, while I was in the Crimea I never heard that any soldier participated in the execution of Jews.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to answer my question. Do you call Ohlendorf's testimony false or do you consider it correct?

VON MANSTEIN: I assume that he made a mistake. At any rate, I am quite certain that regular units of my army did not participate in these executions of Jews. What he means by sub-sidiary technical units, I do not know.

GEMALEXANDROV: He had in mind the troops of the 11th Army, which you were commanding. Now I am asking you this. Did you know that over 195,000 persons, inhabitants of Kiev, were exterminated by the German Army and the German Police, including over 100,000 people who were put to death in Babye Yar alone?

VON MANSTEIN: I heard of this for the first time from the document submitted by the Russian Prosecution.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But you were aware of this type of mass extermination of the civilian population?

VON MANSTEIN: No, I did not know that, and at the time when these executions apparently took place Kiev did not belong to my sector.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Had you knowledge of the OKW decree transmitted in August 1941 by Quartermaster General Wagner, forbidding the feeding of Soviet prisoners of war from Army supplies? Did not this decree result in mass starvation among Soviet prisoners of war?

VON MANSTEIN: I do not recall that order. In August 1941, I was the commanding general of an armored corps far ahead of the front, and I could not even have received that order. What is more, I cannot imagine that the order was given in that form, because at least in my area we always supplied food to the prisoners, and I do not believe therefore that in my area any prisoners died of starvation.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But you yourself admit that there was a tremendous mortality rate from starvation among the prisoners of war. You admitted so yourself here yesterday, did you not?

VON MANSTEIN: I did not say that that was so in my army, but that I could see from the documents of , the Prosecution that after the large battles of encirclement in the area of Army Group Center, in which hundreds of thousands of prisoners were taken, many apparently died from starvation, first, because they were half-starved when they emerged from the pockets, and secondly, because no army was in a position to take over the feeding and care of, let us say, half a million prisoners arriving quite suddenly. This naturally resulted in difficulties which in view of the physical con-dition of the Russian soldiers when they arrived very probably led to a large number of deaths. But when I said this before, I was referring to the prisoners taken in the battles of encirclement and not those in my area.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not necessary to give such detailed replies to my questions. Would you kindly be more brief? Did you know of the operation called "Krimhild"?

VON MANSTEIN: The code name "Krimhild" for an operation is at the moment meaningless to me, nor do I know whether I ever heard it. Perhaps you can tell me when and what this is supposed to have been; then possibly I can recall it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will help you. This operation provided for the transfer of German troops from the Kuban district to the Crimea in connection with the advance and the pressure of the Red Army. A special decree from Hitler was therefore issued and sent to all headquarters.

VON MANSTEIN: I did not quite understand that. Do you mean the transfer of the army from the Crimea to the Kuban district or the retreat from the Kuban district to the Crimea?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The transfer, the retreat of German forces from the Kuban district to the Crimea.

VON MANSTEIN: I cannot say anything about that; I do not know details about it, because that was the area of Army Group Kleist and not my area.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And where was your army at the time?

VON MANSTEIN: My army group was in the Southern Ukraine at the time. The southern border was evidently near Rostov.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The retreat from the Kuban district was effected in connection with the army group in the southern sector of the front. You were handed this decree from Hitler; maybe you will be able to recall something in this connection. I would like to draw your attention to only one particular point in this decree.

[A document was handed to the witness.]

Do you remember this decree?

VON MANSTEIN: I must look at it more closely for a moment.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: If you please.

VON MANSTEIN: I can no longer tell you today whether or not I received a copy of this order; actually, it only concerns Army Group A. It is possible that I did receive a copy, but I can no longer remember. At any rate, I had nothing to do with it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: This decree was sent to all headquarters, but that is not the point. I would like you to find the second paragraph of that decree which is entitled "Destructive Measures During Evacuations"; and please look at point "g" of that section; quoting: "The enemy must take over completely useless and un-inhabitable waste territory where mine detonations will continue to,occur for months." Have you read that passage?


GEN.ALEXANDROV: Now I am asking you: Was this decree, too, motivated in your opinion entirely by military considerations?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, in my opinion, it was issued for purely military reasons; namely, because Hitler-as I know-wanted to free as many of the forces in the Kuban as possible in order to use them in other parts of the Eastern Front. He wanted to leave only a minimum of forces for the defense of the Crimea, and that of course was only feasible if the danger of a Russian attack coming from the Kuban could, if possible, be excluded for a lengthy period or at least made very difficult; and probably for that reason, these orders for destruction were issued, and in points a, b, c, d, e, and f, they do in fact only deal with objects which are of military im-portance; in other words roads, bridges, railroads, narrow-gauge railroads, corduroy roads, oil installations ...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know this decree, Witness, and you do not have to repeat it; I have it before me. I merely asked you to look at point "g" which does not mention roads and bridges and oil wells but deals generally with reducing the territory of the enemy to complete waste so that it would not be usable for months to come. That is the subject here. I *am asking you as a soldier-since you call yourself one-do you approve of such a decree? Was it prompted entirely by military considerations? Please answer my question.

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, I am convinced that the order was given only for military reasons; and I am equally convinced that letter IV' means territory completely useless for the military purposes of war. I do not believe, therefore, that the purpose here was to lay

waste the land and to, let us say, exterminate the population, but that the reason was a military reason in that the land was to be rendered useless for the continuation of military operations; that is what I believe.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It states here clearly enough what was meant. The interpretation is a matter of opinion. I shall pass to the next question. Were you aware that in May 1944 a special conference was held at Sonthofen?

THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am passing to another question, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: I asked you if you were passing from the document.


THE PRESIDENT: I think you should put to him Paragraph 3 C.


Please, Witness, look at Section 3 of the decree, Point c. I shall read it into the record:

"For this task ruthless conscription of the civilian population uninfluenced by any false leniency, the speedy commence-ment of work, and the establishment of construction bat-talions, including female construction battalions

, must be secured."

Do you consider this method of utilizing the civilian population, including the female population, as a method necessitated by military considerations?

VON MANSTEIN: As I see it, I do not doubt at all that it was necessary from a military standpoint; whether or not it was nice from a humane point of view, is another question. But I must point out that the use of the civilian population, including the women, was something we learned from the Soviet Union, which did just that to a large extent; otherwise the provision of Russian anti-tank ditches many kilometers long would not have been possible in a few days.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, is it your contention that it is in accordance with the laws of war to turn the females of a country into a construction battalion for the purpose of your army?

VON MANSTEIN: I am not absolutely certain at the moment whether that is in accordance with the laws of war of 1939. That in this war international law was widely trespassed against in many cases is an established fact. That the use of labor, including female labor, is one of the rights of an occupying power, is, I should think, a fact.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have just stated that the Red Army widely used the civilian population for constructing anti-tank ditches, et cetera. I want to explain that to you. That was really so, because the whole Soviet people, including of course, the Soviet women, participated in all possible actions against the Fascist in-vaders; but give me an illustration, just one illustration, of the Red Army utilizing German women for purposes of this kind.

VON MANSTEIN: I cannot give you an instance from the war.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Because there were none; but this decree of Hitler talks of utilizing Soviet women for erecting defense con-structions for German forces. That is what I am speaking about. Now we will go on to another question. Did you know that in May 1944 a special conference of generals was held in Sonthofen on the subject of National Socialist education of the army units?

VON MANSTEIN: In May 1944 1 was no longer in service, and therefore did not hear anything about this conference.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You never heard anything about the conference?

VON MANSTEIN: I did not hear anything about that confer-ence, no.

.GEN. ALEXANDROV: I should like to mention one fact in con-nection with that conference. You probably know that at that conference the Defendant Keitel, among others, stated as follows: "Any officers who express doubts about victory or who criticize the Fuehrer I shall have shot."

THE PRESIDENT: The witness says he knows nothing about it. Is this a new document you've got or not? Is it some new document?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. We do have a document on which I think it is necessary to ask the witness some questions, but we are not submitting this document immediately, because we have only just received it and it has not yet been translated. It is an affidavit by Lieutenant General Vincent Mueller of the German Army, in which he mentions Keitel's remark at this conference. If the Tribunal considers it necessary, this document will be put in at the end of this afternoon's session, or at the latest tomorrow morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, all I mean is this: If you aren't putting in the document and the witness says he wasn't at the conference and never heard of the conference, I don't think you can put to him what was stated at the conference in order to get that in evidence.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand, Mr. President. In that case I will ask another question.

[Turning to the witness.] Witness, are you aware that the High Command of the German Navy suggested a plan for the invasion of Norway already in October 1939? Were you aware of that?

VON MANSTEIN: No. I knew nothing about that. I heard of the entire Norwegian affair only when it had become an ac-complished fact. I learned the details only from the Indictment, before that I did not hear a word about it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about the plan for an operation under the code name "Jolka"?

VON MANSTEIN: I did not understand the code name.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Under the code name "Jolka" -- that means "Christmas Tree" in English or "Tannenbaum" in German.

VON MANSTEIN: Tannenbaum? No, it does not convey any-thing to me; I do not know.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall point out to you a few details relating to the plan. In the middle of July 1940, after the armistice with France, the chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, visited Von Leeb's Army Group Headquarters in Dijon. General Halder told Von Leeb to prepare a plan for the occupation of Switzerland, taking into consideration the fact that the Swiss would resist. This plan was worked out under a code name and submitted to the OKH. Do you know anything about it?

VON MANSTEIN: No, I was commanding general at the time, and in the summer I was transferred to the Channel Coast. I heard nothing about this plan.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You frequently emphasized here in your answers that the war against the Soviet Union was a "special war," and that you, as other German generals, acted only as soldiers, and that the so-called "ideological war" was conducted by 11itler and his colleagues. Did I understand that correctly?


GEN. ALEXANDROV: My American colleague reminded you yesterday about your own decree in which you spoke about the an-nihilation of the Soviet political system and other measures to be taken in the occupied territories. You also stated that you were aware of the decree of Field Marshal Von Reichenau about the conduct of the troops in the East. Witness, was such a decree, in your opinion, prompted by a military sense of duty, or by any other consideration?

VON MANSTEIN: No, it was certainly issued only out of a military sense of duty. In connection with this, I should like to add that these ideas were appearing in every newspaper and were, of course, promoted by higher authorities. They certainly did not originate with us. We, together with our soldiers, conducted the war in a military manner.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you not think that such decrees can only be explained by the fact that their authors were not generals brought up in the military tradition, but in the Hitlerite tradition?

VON MANSTEIN: I did not quite understand that. May I ask you to explain the meaning of the question again.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will repeat it. Do you not think that such decrees, political decrees really -- I mean the order issued by Reichenau --do you not think that such decrees can only be ex-plained by the fact that their authors were not generals brought up in the military tradition, but generals brought up in the Hitlerite tradition?

VON MANSTEIN: I can only speak for myself, for my own order. That I personally was nothing more than a soldier, to that I think every one of my subordinates and my superiors can testify. I was not a political general, nor was 1, shall we say, a National Socialist general in the sense in which you mean it. This order was a consequence of the growing danger of the partisans, and of the necessity to make it clear to our soldiers that they could not afford to be so careless, and that they must be aware that the fight on both sides was an ideological fight. The order itself is composed of two entirely different parts. Part One, which deals with the necessity of safeguarding the rear against attack, et cetera, and with the alertness of the soldiers, contains some ideas about the meaning of this struggle. When the order speaks of the extermination of the system, then it means the political system, and not human beings, it means exactly what is today meant when the other side speaks of the extermination of National Socialism. Part Two I would say contains my own ideas, it states what has to be done positively, and it also states quite clearly that the soldiers must avoid all arbitrary action, and that any violation of soldierly honor will be punished. I believe that this order is evidence of the fact that I 6onducted the light as a soldier, and not as a politician.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What you were during the war is best shown by your own decree, and the Tribunal will be able to judge it.

My last question. Did you know what measures the High Com-mand of the Armed Forces initiated for the purpose of conducting biological warfare?

VON MANSTEIN: Biological warfare? I do not know at the moment what you mean by the expression "biological warfare." Would you explain that, please?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The use of various types of dangerous bacteria in warfare. That is what I mean by "biological warfare."

VON MANSTEIN: No. I knew nothing about it. I have never heard of a bacteriological war or of poison warfare.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will now be shown several details of this plan for biological warfare, and you may then be able to recall it. I am submitting to the Tribunal Document USSR-510, which consists of the affidavit of the former Major General and Professor of the Military Medical Academy in Berlin, Walter Schreiber. I am reading it into the record.

"In connection with the Trial of the Major War Criminals in Nuremberg, 1, as Professor of Hygiene and Bacteriology of the Military Medical Academy in Berlin and former Major General of the Medical Corps of the German Army, consider it my duty to our people who have undergone such severe trials and to the whole world, to disclose one more page of Germany's preparation for war which has not been touched upon in Nuremberg. Aside from the former political and military leadership of Germany a large part of the guilt is borne by German scientists and particularly by German doctors. Had that type of weapon which was being prepared been used, it would have meant putting to a shameful and evil use the great discoveries of Robert Koch, whose native

country was Germany and who was a great teacher..."

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, counsel for the Defense, would like to say something.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): I should like to raise an objection. On looking through the document, I have discovered that the author of this affidavit is raising particularly grave accusations. -I do not know against whom these accusations are directed, but I should like to ask that the author of this document appear as a. witness, so that I may cross-examine him.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is he?

GEN.ALEXANDROV: I can answer that, Mr. President. The former Major General Walter Schreiber is now in the Soviet Union_ as a prisoner of war. If the Tribunal think it necessary to have Walter Schreiber testify here as a witness, the Prosecution will not object.

DR. LATERNSER: I think that if he is making such a serious allegation he should appear here in person.

THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, could you inform the Tribunal how long it would take to get this witness Schreiber brought here for the purpose of cross-examination?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: We shall take all steps to get the witness here in the shortest possible time, but I cannot guarantee that or state a number of days, since the distance is rather great. I would like the Tribunal to take this into consideration. However, regard-less of whether the witness is going to be brought here or not, I request the permission of the Tribunal to have this document pre-sented in this cross-examination.

DR. LATERNSER: May I be allowed to reply to that?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you can make your objections, if you wish to do so now, and then the Tribunal will consider the matter when they adjourn. We don't propose to allow the document to be presented now at the moment. We will consider the matter when we adjourn.

DR. LATERNSER: I request that the Tribunal decide that the document must not be read until Walter Schreiber can appear here as a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Your application is that the document should -not be admitted unless the witness is brought here for further examination?

DR. LATERNSER: I should like to go even further, Mr. President, and apply that the document should not be admitted at all, since the witness is now going to be produced by the Prosecution, and- can then state these facts under oath.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, may I oppose the ap-plication of the defense. It seems to me that the affidavit of Walter Schreiber could and should be read during the cross-examination of the witness Von Manstein, regardless of whether Walter Schreiber will or will not appear here as a witness. A photostat of his affi-davit is before the Tribunal; it is certified by the Extraordinary State Commission, which is the plenipotentiary of the Soviet Gov-ernment. Therefore, regardless of what the Tribunal may decide about calling Walter Schreiber as a witness, I insist that the docu-ment, which I put in as USSR-510, be accepted by the Tribunal and that I be given an opportunity of reading it into the record during the present cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: No, General Alexandrov; the Tribunal has said that they will not admit the document at this stage. We propose to adjourn at 11:30 and will then consider the application. I observe that the affidavit was made in April 1946 and there was plenty of time to bring the witness here.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The question of bringing the witness here has never had to be considered up to now. If the Tribunal commands me not to use the document, I shall not be able to ask the witness the questions which arise out of the affidavit of Walter Schreiber. Moreover, I shall thereby be prevented from putting questions on Walter Schreiber's affidavit at another stage of this Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, you will be able to ask him the question after the Tribunal has decided upon the admissi-bility of the document; that is to say, if it is decided as to its admis-sibility, can you not ask him then? But he has already said he knows nothing of biological warfare.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: He does not know what is in the affidavit of Dr. Schreiber. I have no further questions at the moment, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?

DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, you were questioned about the order, or alleged order, by Quartermaster General Wagner, which prohibited the feeding of prisoners of war from supplies of the Armed Forces. I would like to ask you, do you know that Generaloberst Halder, during a visit to the front on the occasion of a conference at Orsha, actually ordered that the food supplies to the troops should be cut so that prisoners of war could be better fed?

VON MANSTEIN: That is not known to me, because it did not take place in my area. I do know that in the winter of 1941-42 1 had to reduce the rations for my army in the Crimea since supplies from home did not arrive in sufficient quantity on account of the shortage of railroad transportation, and also since we could not completely strip the country of all food reserves to feed the popu-lation and the prisoners. As far as I can recollect, we reduced the meat ration at that time, and I know that I expressly prohibited that the one cow which would have remained the farmer's own property even under the Soviet Government should be taken away from him, even though the army needed the meat. I also remember that when the food situation became critical at times during that winter, we sent flour down to the South coast, although hundreds, in fact thousands, of horses belonging to our army on the South coast perished at that time because the lack of transport space prevented us from bringing hay and straw for them.

DR. IATERNSER: The order USSR-155 was submitted to you. Who signed that order?

VON MANSTEIN: I do not know which one you mean, USSR...

DR. LATERNSER: I mean Document Number USSR-115.

VON MANSTEIN: I do not have the number.

THE PRESIDENT: We can see for ourselves by whom it is signed.

DR. LATERNSER: I merely want to know by whom it is signed.

VON MANSTEIN: Oh, yes, I see; it is signed by Adolf Hitler.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is the order. You were questioned with regard to Figure 2 g. It says

there that "the land should be made useless and uninhabitable." Do you know, Field Marshal, if that was actually carried out?

VON MANSTEIN: I cannot give information about the Kuban district, because I was not there, and it did not belong to my area.

DR. LATERNSER: Were explosives, mines, and troops available in large numbers at that time, that is, in 1943?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, of course we had mines and explosives, but they were certainly not sufficient for such purposes.

DR. LATERNSER: Were not these supplies very short at that time, in 1943?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, at any rate we never had enough mines to lay mine fields in sufficient numbers ahead of our positions.

DR. LATERNSER: The Russian Prosecutor went on to ask you about Number 3 c, about the ruthless conscription of the civilian population, particularly the women. You did not answer the ques-tion of the Russian Prosecutor, whether you had ever heard that similar or other measures of force were applied to German women?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes. I know that that happened during the war, but even now women are conscripted for all sorts of work. My wife, for example, has been put to work collecting potato beetles.

DR.LATERNSER: I mean, what happened in East Prussia in 1944?

VON MANSTEIN: I cannot say that from my own observation, as I was not there, but I am sure that the civilian population had nothing to laugh about.

DR. LATERNSER: The American Prosecution submitted to you Document Number C-52, Exhibit Number GB-485. Will you please once more look at Figure 6. Is this a directive or an order?

VON MANSTEIN: That is a directive, but not an order.

DR. LATERNSER: So that, if "draconian measures," as this directive says, were to be enforced, orders to that effect from the commanding generals were necessary?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, of course, it was said that they were not to ask for security forces but to find a means themselves by taking draconian measures; and so further orders from the commanders were necessary.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of any orders which were issued on the basis of this Figure 6?

VON MANSTEIN: No, I do not recall any order issued on the basis of that paragraph.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have one question regarding Docu-ment Number 447-PS. Please look at Page 2, 2b. Does not Figure 2b show, first, that the Reichsfuehrer SS was given special tasks in the operational zone, and secondly, that in discharging -these tasks he acted independently and on his own responsibility?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, the order says so quite clearly:

DR. LATERNSER: Then it follows that the special action groups, the Einsatzgruppen, were not 'tactically under the commanding generals?

VON MANSTEIN: No, tactically they were, at most, under the local commanders, for instance in the fight against the partisans or in the battle zone at the front, but in any case as far as their police tasks were concerned they certainly were not under them.

DR. LATERNSER: Document Number R-102 was also submitted to you-that is a Top Secret matter. What does that mean?

VON AL4-NSTEIN: A Top Secret matter is, I think, an order or a directive or an announcement which is issued only to the highest authorities in the Reich or to certain specified persons, and which is not allowed to be generally known.

DR. IATERNSER: Is the distribution indicated on this document?

VON MANSTEIN: No, it should be noted at the end, but it is not.

DR. LATERNSER: So you cannot determine if this document also went to offices of the Army?

VON MANSTEIN: No, that cannot be determined, but quite cer-tainly it did not go to offices of the Army, because we never received such reports.

DR.LATERNSER: During your examination last Saturday, you said that you were convinced that the other commanding generals would also have taken steps against mass executions, had they been reported to them?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, naturally.

DR. LATERNSER: Is it known to you that when Field Marshal Von Kuechler, during the Polish campaign, heard of the execution of Jews, he used every means at his disposal to prevent it?

VON MANSTEIN: Yes, I heard of that here in Nuremberg. I did not know of it at the time.

DR. LATERNSER: It is known to you that the mayor of Marinka, who was a racial German, was sentenced to death by court-martial for a crime against a Jewish woman? '

VON MANSTEIN: I cannot recollect that. I do not know either whether it happened in my area; if it had, been in my area, it would have been reported to me, but I cannot remember it.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know that General Von Knobelsdorff, an officer also affected by the Indictment, had an SS leader arrested because he wanted to carry out executions?

VON MANSTEIN: Of that I also heard here. I did not know anything about the executions at that time.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know of any other cases in which the commanding generals took steps against particularly outrageous arbitrary actions?

VON MANSTEIN: I know, for example, that Generaloberst Blaskowitz, who succeeded Field Marshal Von Rundstedt as com-mander in the East, that is, in occupied Poland, protested and raised objections against the conduct of the Police in the Government General, and that there was some sort of a row about it, whereupon he was relieved.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I come to the last point. Regarding the subordination of the Einsatzgruppen, the American Prosecution referred to Affidavit Number 12 of Schellenberg, Exhibit USA-557. You do not consider that affidavit correct, I believe, because in practice the facts did not correspond to what is said in the affidavit, is not that so?

VON MANSTEIN: Do you mean the one in which Schellenberg speaks about the agreement with the Quartermaster General?


VON MANSTEIN: The subordination mentioned in that affi-davit does not by any means give a picture of the situation in practice, nor can I imagine that that was the agreement made by Wagner. As I said, there were two types of subordination, the tactical subordination for fighting, and the economic subordination for supplies, accommodations, et cetera. There were those two types of subordination, but the tactical subordination, as I said, only applied in battle conditions. Then there was a third possibility, subordination for military service, troop training, and so forth, but that certainly never applied in practice.

DR. LATERNSER: I shall now read to you the affidavit, which I propose to introduce as evidence shortly, from Generalrichter Mantel, who, fortunately, had discussed just that point with General Wagner, and after reading it, I should like to ask you whether the contents of the affidavit correspond with the facts in practice. He states:

"Shortly before the beginning of the Russian campaign, I temporarily participated at the headquarters of the OKH -in a conference which Quartermaster General Wagner was having with the chief quartermasters of the armies in the East. Among other things, Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos of the Security Service in the operational zones of the Army were discussed on that occasion, and it was clearly stated that they would receive instructions for their activities exclusively from the Reichsfuehrer SS, and that the command auth6rities -of the Army had no jurisdiction over them from the point of view of discipline and service, although economically speaking they might be attached to the Army."

I now want to ask you: Do the contents of this affidavit in regard to the Einsatzgruppen and their subordination correspond to the facts in practice?

VON MANSTEIN: In the statement of Ohlendorf it is pointed out that Himmler gave his orders to the Einsatzgruppen, for in-stance at Nikolaiev, orally and only directly to them; and that Army agencies did not hear anything about them becomes apparent from the following, which I heard afterwards here in Nuremberg: Even though Himmler was at that time in Nikolaiev where the army command, then under General Von Schobert, was situated, he did not visit the army command, although he was well acquainted with Schobert. That shows that he intentionally refrained from mention-ing his plan.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you.

I have no further questions to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to hear the submission of the Prosecution with reference to Dr. Sauter's application.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): My Lord, I have the following statement to make to the Tribunal. I understand that the application asks for the striking of the Pohl affidavit and the permission that Funk again take the stand. I should like to oppose the application to strike the Pohl affidavit. It seems to us that it is highly material in this case, and if anything-although I doubt very much even the necessity for recalling or calling Pohl for cross-examination-but if anything is necessary, that might be it. The Defendant Funk, it seems to. us, has had a rather full opportunity when he was on the stand. I asked him when he started to do business with the SS, if the Tri-bunal will recall, and I think I went rather fully into all possible phases at that time of relationships between the Defendant Funk and the SS, and there was a denial on the part of the Defendant Funk. Furthermore, he will have an opportunity, I assume, in the last statement to say something, if the Tribunal saw fit to permit it, with respect to anything new that might have arisen out of the Pohl affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the Pohl affidavit is entirely new, is it not?

IVIR. DODD: Well, Sir, it is new, but it really covers only one new matter and that is the matter of the textile business that we alleged went on between the SS and the Reichsbank and the Defend-ant Funk. The matter of the jewelry and all the other things I think were gone into.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not mean that it dealt with entirely new subject matter, but it is the evidence -of a new witness upon that subject matter.

MR.DODD: Yes, yes, it is.

THE PRESIDENT: And as to that the Defendant Funk has not had an opportunity to deny it upon oath; it may be that the Tribunal will think it right to grant him that opportunity. There are two quite distinct questions, first of all, as to whether Pohl's affidavit should be struck out, and secondly, whether Funk should be called.

MR. DODD: Well, I certainly do not feel that the Pohl affidavit should be struck out, because it seems to us to be material, highly materiaL As the Tribunal will recall, there was considerable con-tr.oversy about this relationship which we claimed between Funk and the SS. We called another witness, Pohl, and still another witness who was his subordinate, and I would assume that counsel would prefer to cross-examine Pohl. We are perfectly happy to have him do that; and then at a later date, if Funk has an opportu-nity, as I am sure he will, to make his statement, he could make his denial. I don't know what more he could say except that it isn't so and I thought he had said that rather fully when he was on the stand and rather fully denied that he had really any relationship with Himmler or with the SS. I am also fearful, Mr. President, that if the Court permits this procedure in this case, there may have been some other instances where other defendants will want to be heard fully and the thing will go on with surrebuttal and I am afraid it will take much of the Tribunal's time.

[Dr.Sauter indicated a desire to be heard.]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr.Sauter, we have heard you fully upon the subject already.

DR.SAUTER: Mr. President, may I point out one fact? This witness Pohl arrived at the Nuremberg prison on 1 June, that is, the first day of the sixth month; he was questioned in preparation for the affidavit on 15 July, that is ...

TBE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, you have expressed yourself that you do not want to cross-examine him. What is the relevance of the fact that he arrived here at a certain time if you don't want to cross-examine him?

DR.SAUTER: Mr. President, my point of view is that on principle the Prosecution cannot be permitted to present further evidence against a defendant whose case is completely closed. The witness Pohl arrived here on I June; on 15 July, that is 6 weeks later, he was examined for the affidavit. That was the same day on which I made my final plea for the Defendant Funk. Again several weeks later, the affidavit was finally submitted. I do not believe that it is compatible with justice if after a defendant's case is completely closed, the Prosecution submit further evidence against the defendant, who at that stage no longer has an oppor-tunity of commenting on it from the witness stand. The Pohl affi-davit contains completely new allegations. For example, Pohl alleges that at a luncheon in the presence of 10 or 12 persons this gold teeth affair was discussed. That is something entirely new and, of course, completely improbable and that is why I ask, Mr. President, that you permit us to have the Defendant Funk examined on this point in the witness stand.

THE PRESIDENT: You must understand that it is a matter for the discretion of the Tribunal at what time they will end the evidence and it is necessary that the evidence should be ended at some time. The Tribunal has heard fully what you have had to say and they will now consider the matter.

DR. SAUTER: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the application by Dr. Sauter, the affidavit by Pohl will not be struck out. It will remain upon the record. But in view of the particular circum-stances of this case, the Defendant Funk may be recalled to give evidence upon the subject and he will be recalled after the evidence has been given on behalf of the organizations.

With reference to the objection of Dr. Laternser to the use of the statement made by Major General Walter Schreiber, the Tri-bunal is not inclined to admit any evidence so late as this, or to reopen questions which have been gone into fully before the Tri-bunal; but on the other hand, in view of the importance of the statement of Major General Schreiber and its particular relevance not only to the case of certain of the individual defendants but also to the case of the High Command, the Tribunal will allow General Schreiber to be heard as a witness if he is produced before the end of the hearing of the case. Otherwise no use can be made of this statement.

'With reference to the time within which General Schreiber must be brought here if he is to be heard as a witness, the Tribunal thinks that it will be proper to order that he might be heard as a witness, if he is brought here at any time before the final speeches with reference to the organizations are concluded. And, of course, counsel for the organization would have an opportunity of com-menting upon any evidence which General Schreiber might give. That is all.

The witness may retire.

Dr. Laternser, will you call your other witness?

DR. LATERNSER: With the -approval of the Tribunal, I call as my last witness Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.

[The witness Von Rundstedt took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

GERT VON RUNDSTEDT (Witness): Gert von Rundstedt.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, you are the senior officer of the former German Army. What was your last position?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I am the senior officer of the German Army and have been a soldier for over 54 years. My last position was Commander-in-Chief West, until 9 March 1945.

DR. LATERNSER: During what period were you commander--in-chief in Berlin?

VON RUNDSTEDT: From I October 1932 until 31 October 1938.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the military leaders towards domestic and foreign politics?

VON RUNDSTEDT: We generals did not concern ourselves with politics. We did not take par

t in any political discussions, and we did not hold any political discussions among ourselves.

I should like in this connection to quote the famous British Field Marshal Montgomery, who said: "As a servant of the nation, the Army is above politics, and that must remain so."

DR. LATERNSER: Did the Reichswehr in 1933 help Hitler to assume power?


DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the generals toward the Party and its methods?

VON RUNDSTEDT: The generals either rejected the Party or were indifferent. As for the methods regarding the Jewish question, they absolutely rejected them, particularly because many comrades were severely affected by the Aryan laws. The so-called master race is an absurdity. There is a mixture of Slav, Romanic, and Dinaric races in Germany. We also rejected the attitude in the Church question, and we succeeded in retaining chaplains in the Army up to the end.

DR. LATERNSER: Was this attitude also true of the younger generals who, in the course of the war, came into positions subject to the Indictment?

VON RUNDSTEDT: As far as my own close acquaintances are concerned, absolutely.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you, in 1934, as the senior officer, have an opportunity of doing anything to demand from Hitler punish-ment of the murderers of Schleicher?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No. In the first place, Reich President Von Hindenburg was still at the head of the State. In the second place, I was not the senior officer. We had a Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a Minister of War for things of that sort.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the troop maneuvers or the trips of the General Staff after 1935 indicate any intention or plan for wars of aggression?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, in no way. The large-scale maneuvers and the General Staff or Fuehrer trips were always concerned with war in our own country.

DR. LATERNSER: Were you, as resident commander-in-chief in Berlin, consulted before the declaration of military sovereignty?'


DR. LATERNSER: Did you know Generaloberst Von Fritsch well?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Very well; he was my subordinate for a time-

DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you, as his official representative after 1937, of Hitler's intention to wage wars of aggression?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, he could not do that, because there is such a thing as an official secret.

DR. LATERNSER: You deputized for him, did you not, when he went on prolonged leave to Egypt in the winter of 1937-1938? Did he on that occasion tell you of Hitler's intentions as contained in the minutes of the meeting of 5 November 1937?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I only deputized for Generaloberst. Von Fritsch; his official representative was the Chief of the General Staff, Beck. Generaloberst Von Fritsch did not give me any information at that time, nor did Generaloberst Beck.

DR. LATERNSER: What were the results of the measures which Hitler took on 4 February 1938, in the military field?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Hitler eliminated the Minister of War as. intermediary between himself and the Wehrmacht; thus he himself

now had command over all three branches of the Wehrmacht. In addition, he took the opportunity of dismissing high military leaders who were unwelcome to him.

DR. LATERNSER: In February of 1938 you had a private con-ference with Hitler alone. What did he tell you about the attitude of the German generals?

VON RUNDSTEDT: He complained very bitterly about the supreme military leaders. He said that he alone had been the one who had forced rearmament through. The supreme leaders had always resisted and said it was going too fast. In the occupation of the Rhineland, he charged the leaders with a certain cowardice when they asked for withdrawal of the troops behind the Rhine, since France was not adopting a threatening attitude.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you in this talk discuss the question of a successor to Fritsch?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. Hitler first suggested to me General Von Reichenau. That suggestion I turned down in the name of the Army. He then suggested General Von Brauchitsch, whose appoint-ment I entirely approved in the name of the Army.

DR. LATERNSER: When did you, as commander-in-chief in Berlin, learn of the planned march into Austria?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I was suddenly assigned to represent General Von Brauchitsch in Breslau, at a commemoration celebra-tion of the Iron Cross, and it was only there that I officially learned that the occupation of Austria had actually taken place.

DR. LATERNSER: How were the commanders-in-chief informed of existing intentions?

VON RUNDSTEDT: We were told of the intentions of the Supreme Command by our Commander-in-Chief, Von Brauchitsch, but he was only allowed to tell us what concerned us.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should now like to question the witness on Affidavits 3 and 5 of Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Blaskowitz. They are USA-536 and 537 (Docu-ments Numbers 3704-PS and 3706-PS), in the first volume of the docu-ment book of the Prosecution. In this connection I should like to call the attention of the Court to the fact that these affidavits, in the paragraphs in question, agree word for word, although they were made on different days by different persons.

[Turning to the witness.] Field Marshal, the two affidavits of Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Blaskowitz say that the groups of German staff officers-that is the way in which it is put-considered the solution of the Polish question by war to be indispensable and that that was the reason for secret armament. Is that true?

VON RUNDSTEDT: In the first place, a group of German staff officers never existed ...

DR. LATERNSER: What is meant by staff officers?

VON RUNDSTEDT: A staff officer is an officer holding the rank of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, or Colonel, then come the Generals.

DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.

VON RUNDSTEDT: Even if the statement of Blomberg is in-tended to mean that a German war of aggression against Poland

was indispensable, that is not true. On the other hand, if he means that we had to expect an attack from Poland at any time, I can say that in the first years after the World War, I also counted on this possibility. Hence the border protection and fortifications on the Eastern border of the Reich against Poland. But as I said, no sensible person thought of a war of aggression. We were in no, position to wage such a war.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst Blaskowitz, at the end of this Affidavit Number 5, USA Exhibit-537, says that the front com-manders-in-chief were the actual advisers in the OKW, and as an example he gives the battle of Kutno. Is this correct?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That is not correct. The commanders-in- chief never had an advisory role. Our Commander-in-Chief of the

Army was the only one who had to hold council with the supreme authorities. As for the battle of Kutno, any advice to Hitler is absolute nonsense. The orders for the battle of Kutno were given by me as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South, according to the instructions which I had from Herr Von Brauchitsch, and Herr Blaskowitz had only to obey and could not, have given any sort of advice to Hitler. No, no, that must be a mistake.

DR. LATERNSER: What impression did the discussion on 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg make on you, Field Marshal?

VON RUNDSTEDT: When we left the conference, we thought that this undertaking would end just like the so-called Sudeten war in 1938, primarily because Russia was on our side. When on 26 August the movement for the beginning of operations, which had been ordered, was suddenly stopped, and was to begin again on I September, we said, "Ali, that is the same kind of bluff which we had in 1938." We did not take the decision for war seriously.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you, after the conference of 22 August, talk to other commanders-in-chief and exchange ideas on the im-pressions gathered at this discussion?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I remember with certainty that I talked to Field Marshal Von Bock about it. I left Obersalzberg very quickly. With Manstein and later with my staff I exchanged the same views which I have just mentioned.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you have knowledge of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station?


DR. LATERNSER: In 'what way did you learn of the intention of occupying Denmark and Norway?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I learned of the accomplished fact through official channels.

DR. LATERNSER: How about the entry into Yugoslavia and Greece?

VON RUNDSTEDT: It was the same.

DR. LATERNSER: You participated in the conference in March 1941, when Hitler spoke of the necessity of attacking the Soviet Union?


DR. LATERNSER: What were you told about Soviet prep-arations?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Until a short time before that I had been in France, and I had no knowledge whatever of the ostensible prep-arations of the Russians. At the conference, to our surprise, we were told that the Russians were-very strongly armed, were con-centrating troops and preparing to attack us. If I am not mistaken, information from the Japanese Military Attach6 was referred to, and a map of the Russian distribution of forces on the borders of Poland was shown to us, so that we had to assume that these facts were actually true.

DR. LATERNSER: Was this impression confirmed after the entry into Russia?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. The resistance at the border was not too great, but it grew continually as we advanced into the interior of the country. Very strong tank forces, tanks of a better type, far superior to ours, appeared; and an enormous number of airfields, troop camps, munitions dumps, and newly built roads through im-passable territory were encountered. Maps were also found, showing German territory as far as Silesia, so that we had the impression that Hitler must have been right.

DR.LATERNSER: At the conference in March 1941, Hitler an-nounced the Commissar Order. What was your attitude toward this order?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Our attitude was unanimously and abso-lutely against it. Immediately after the conference we approached Brauchitsch and told him that this was impossible. Our com-manders-in-chief of the armies were of the same opinion. The order was simply not carried out, and as I learned afterwards, it was later rescinded. General Von Brauchitsch, to make this order more or less ineffective, issued a very strict order to the troops on the correct conduct of German soldiers in the coming war. I know of no case in which this order was used in any way.

DR. LATERNSER: Was the intention to remove the Jewish popu-lation in the East announced at this conference?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, Hitler would never have expressed_ such intentions to officers.

DR. LATERNSER: According to the Russian Prosecution 33,000 Jews were shot in November 1941 in Kiev. Where were the armies of Army Group South in November 1941?

VON RUNDSTEDT: My armies were on the line Rostov-Stalino, along the Donets, to the district east of Kharkov. The rear border between the army area and the Ukraine district under civil admin-istration followed a line east of Kiev along the Dnieper.

DR. LATERNSER: Then Kiev was not at that time in any opera-tional area of an army under your command?


DR. LATERNSER: Did the commanders-in-chief of the army groups of the armies in the East have any powers outside this area of operations?


DR. LATERNSER: Was the operational area kept as small or as large as possible?

VON RUNDSTEDT: The operational area of the army was kept as small as possible, first, in order to trouble the army as little as possible with affairs in the rear, and secondly, to make the Ukraine district, et cetera, which was under the civil administration, as large as possible and thus remove it from the influence of the Army.

DR. LATERNSER: And now for the Commando Order. What was your attitude toward the Commando Order?

VON RUNDSTEDT: We military commanders were absolutely opposed to, the Commando Order and in oral discussions among our staffs we agreed to make it ineffective.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you, as Commander-in-Chief West, receive a report of any case in which the order was applied?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Not a single case was reported to me, and my chief of staff, whom I asked about it here in Nuremberg, knew of no case either. I must assume that this Commando Order had an intimidating effect on the enemy, for I know of no Commando operation undertaken afterwards, aside from that on the island of Sark, where illegal acts did take place, but no prisoners were taken by us.

DR. LATERNSER: Illegal acts on whose part?

VON RUNDSTEDT: On the- part of those who had undertaken the Commando operation.

DR. LATERNSER: Now the invasion came, or was expected. Document Number 531-PS shows that you asked to have the Com-mando Order rescinded. For what reason?

VON RUNDSTEDT: During the invasion, strong air landings far behind the front, perhaps as far as Paris, had to be expected, and a distinction between Commando troops and fighting troops would no longer have been possible. Moreover, it was at least a good opportunity to do away with this order altogether, and the more since the majority of the new divisions did not even know it.

DR. LATERNSER: But you said in your request to have it rescinded that the order had been obeyed up to that time. How do you explain that?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I had to express it in that way. I had evaded the order, but I could not very well say: "Paragraph 1. 1 have not carried out the Commando Order." Some sort of pretence had to be kept up.

DR. LATERNSER: Now a few questions about the struggle against the Resistance movement in France. What agencies were responsible for peace and order in the occupied area in France?

VON RUNDSTEDT: The Military Commander was responsible for peace and order in occupied France. In Pétain's France -- shall I say -- that is, in the South of France, the Military Commander had a special general i1i Lyons who was to work in close co-operation with the Pétain Government. As the Resistance movement in southern France became ever stronger and developed into a tre-mendous threat to the troops fighting in the Mediterranean area -that was in the winter of 1943 and 1944-the Commander-in-Chief West was made responsible for the southern part of France. Thereupon I placed this general in Lyons under the Army Group "Gustav" which was at Toulon and was responsible for establishing order in the South of France.

DR. LATERNSER: Were the French Government and the French population warned?

VON RUNDSTEDT: The French Government was repeatedly warned and asked to oppose this movement with an its strength, for the sake of the inhabitants. We issued proclamations to the population which in a fair manner were always first submitted to the French Government for scrutiny. When the invasion threatened, i personally asked the old gentleman to warn his people on the radio and ask that in their own interests they should not do such -things. He promised to do so. Whether he did it, I do not know.

DR. LATERNSER: Were these warnings observed?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Unfortunately, no. Finally even the French Police, whom we had armed better to combat the movement, went over to the rebels.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the Germans nevertheless fight against them with forbearance?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, as far as we possibly could. For example, never were entire towns destroyed from the air, but single planes were always sent out against particular places of resistance. Mass use of artillery or tanks did not take place. The fact that excesses such as those at Oradour took place, we all greatly regret-ted. At that time I immediately demanded a report, since I could not order a judicial investigation, and I also reported this un-fortunate occurrence to the OKW.

DR.LATERNSER: Why could you not order a judicial in-vestigation?

VON RUNDSTEDT: All the troop units of the SS were sub-ordinate only to Himmler. I had neither disciplinary power nor judicial power over them, I could not give them leave, or bestow awards. I was limited only to the tactical emp

loyment of these divisions, much as if I were having an Italian, or Hungarian, or Slovakian division under my command.

DR. LATERNSER: Was the legality of the Resistance movement recognized?

VON RUNDSTEDT: General Eisenhower and De Gaulle declared via radio that it was legal. We inquired of the High Command of the Wehrmacht what should be done in the matter, and the decision received was negative. Later, after the Allied troops had landed on the Mediterranean coast, the legality of the new French Army is said to have been recognized and observed without argument.

DR. LATERNSER: What is your attitude toward illegal warfare?

VON RUNDSTEDT: My point of view is the following, based on quite understandable patriotic feeling: Disorderly, irregular warfare behind the front of the enemy army must bring very great misery to the population of the country affected. No army in the world can tolerate such conditions for any length of time, and in the interests of the security and protection of its own troops, it must take sharp, energetic measures. But this should, of course, be done in a correct and soldierly manner. Excesses such as those in Oradour were strongly condemned by myself and by all army leaders. We very much disliked seeing the attempt made on the German side to set up this Werewolf movement at the last mo-ment. If it had been put into practice, it would have brought untold misery to our fatherland, and justly so. I would consider it fortunate for humanity if through international agreements such illegal wars could in future be made impossible. That is my point of view.

DR. LATERNSER: What measures did you introduce to relieve the position of the French population during the occupation?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I would not like to give all the details here. I can only say that I did everything to help Marshal Pétain, with whom I was on terms of great confidence. I asked Hitler to define at last what position France was to have in the future Europe. I assisted Marshal Pétain to raise his Guards and tried to create a new French Army for him, though it did not grow into more than a regiment. I succeeded in obtaining more rations for the fine French railroad men who managed all our transports, and I tried to have their relatives who were prisoners of war returned to them, in the same' way in which Hitler had approved after the Dieppe raid that the relatives of those in Dieppe, could return.

We did what we could to supply the great city of Paris with coal and food, though the transport situation for the German Army was almost unbearably poor. Those are the main points.

DR. LATERNSER: One intermediate question: on one of the last few days, a witness said that from 1944 on the concentration camps were guarded by soldiers of all branches of the Wehrmacht. How do you explain that?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I know nothing about that. Since Himmler was Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army after the attempted assassination of the Fuehrer, he could probably issue such an order. If he did issue it, my feeling is that he wanted to charge the Army also with all these occurrences in connection with the con-centration camps.

DR. LATERNSER: Now a few questions about the Ardennes offensive. Was- an order to shoot prisoners ever issued before or during this offensive?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Such an order was not issued by Hitler. On the contrary, he considered it most important to take as many prisoners as possible in the offensive. I consider it impossible that a subordinate military command issued such an order, which would contradict our training and our ideas.

DR.LATERNSER: Did you not oppose this offensive?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I opposed the offensive for the following reasons: The operational idea as such can almost be called a stroke of genius, but all, absolutely all conditions for a possible success of such an offensive were lacking. Therefore, Field Marshal Model and I suggested that we should be satisfied with less and should attack the Allied troops east of Aix-la-Chapelle from several sides. These suggestions remained unheeded. The offensive had to start with completely inadequate forces on the ground and in the air and, as predicted, could only fail.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you oppose Hitler on other occasions also?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Not personally, because I had no oppor-tunity of doing so; but to his staff I frequently objected to meas-ures ordered from above; especially in the case of the Normandy invasion, the Ardennes offensive, after it had failed, and the con-duct of operations in Holland. But it was all in vain.

DR. LATERNSER: When did you consider the war lost?

VON RUNDSTEDT: In my opinion the war could not be won after the fall of Stalingrad. I considered the war lost when the Allies had succeeded in establishing a strong bridgehead on French soil. That meant the end.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you or other commanders-in-chief attempt to stop the continuation of the war when you regarded it as lost?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Both Field Marshal Rommel and I twice attempted to persuade Hitler to change the conduct of the war and especially to withdraw the front to the German borders. But as was to be expected, these suggestions were not heeded.

DR. LATERNSER: Since Hitler refused to listen to such advice, did you not consider causing a violent overthrow?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I would never have thought of such a thing; that would have been base, barefaced treachery, and could not have changed the situation. The Army and the people still believed in Hitler at that time, and such an overthrow would have been quite unsuccessful. Even if I, perhaps with the aid of the Allies, had brought about an overthrow, the fate of the German people, according to the famous statement of the Big Three, would have been exactly what it is now, and I would have emerged and been considered for all time as the greatest traitor, to my fatherland.

DR. LATERNSER: You lost your position three times during the war. What were the reasons?

VON RUNDSTEDT: In 1941 a quite impossible order of a tech-nical nature was issued from above, and would have led to the destruction of the entire Kleist Panzer Army near Rostov. I ob-jected to it, I demanded that the order be withdrawn, and said that otherwise I would be compelled to consider it a lack of confidence in my leadership, and I would ask that another commander-in--chief be selected. Thereupon, I was removed from my post that same night, on 1 December, at my own request, as it was put. That was the first case.

The second case was on 2 July 1944, when by a very cordial letter, I was replaced by another commander-in-chief because of the impaired state of my health.

The third case was on 9 March 1945. Then I could no longer be expected as an old gentleman to continue performing the exact-ing duties of Commander-in-Chief West.

Those were the three cases.

DR.LATERNSER: And in none of these cases did you resign against the will of Hitler?

VON RUNDSTEDT: In the first case one might say so. But he did not hold it against me in any way, for already in the following March I was made Commander-in-Chief in France.

DR. LATERNSER: Now I come to the last question. You know, Field Marshal, that the Prosecution have asked that the body of military leaders be declared criminal. As the senior officer of the German Army, you know the attitude of these leaders toward military and international law. Would you please tell the Court about it briefly?

VON RUNDSTEDT: The rules of warfare and of international law as set down in the Geneva Convention and the Hague Rules on Land Warfare were always binding for us older leaders. Their strict observance by the troops was demanded, and very severe measures were taken in case of excesses, which in war can probably take place in all armies. The court-martial records of the various divisions can give information on this point. Property of the in-habitants was ordered to be respected. Severe punishment for plundering had to be meted out, if only in the interests of main-taining discipline amongst our own troops. Raping of women and other inhuman acts were also subject to severe punishment. What we could do to support the inhabitants of enemy countries affected by the war was done as far as was possible. The wounded or con-qu6red enemy was no longer considered as such, but had a claim to decent treatment. We ordered that the battle itself was to be fought chivalrously. We old officers who lived through the time of cavalry battles and of infantry bayonet attacks, witnessed the increasing mechanization of warfare with regret. Today the bravest men and the best troops are helpless against the force of sheer material. All the more did we leaders believe that where there was fighting on land, the old soldierly decent forms of battle should be maintained, and that they should be impressed on the troops again and again.

As senior soldier of the German Army, I will say this: We accused leaders were trained in the old soldierly traditions of decency and chivalry. We lived and acted according to them, and we endeavored to hand them down to the younger officers.

DR.LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

COMMANDER PETER CALVACORESSI (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Field Marshal, in time of war, the military commander must keep in close touch, must he not, and know the opinions of his immediate subordinates, is that right?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That is not necessary to that extent. My subordinates only had to know my operational and tactical views. For the rest, they were free as army leaders within their sphere.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I want to quote to you one sentence from the evidence which has been given by your former commander-in-chief. The translators already have it. It is on Page 2 of Affidavit Number 4:

"During operations, the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons by means of personal visits to them."

Is that, generally speaking, correct?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That is absolutely correct as far as the conduct of the war, operations, and tactical actions are concerned. Such an exchange did take place from the army groups up to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I shall read you one more sentence from the evidence that has been given by Generaloberst Blaskowitz. He has said-and I want you to tell me whether you agree with this-that it was common practice for the commanders of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of a situation, and for their recommendations, by tele-phone, teletype, or wireless, as well as by personal records.

VON RUNDSTEDT: It is not correct that they had to give such estimates. They could do so.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now I have some questions on the Russian campaign. You yourself at a conference with Hitler and your Army colleagues raised a question of a gap which existed between your army group and that of Field Marshal Von Bock. Is that right?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That is correct.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you knew from your former experience that although on the map that gap was shown as swamp land, it could be used by troops; and you therefore advised about the steps that should be taken to prevent its exploita-tion by the enemy?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I pointed out that according to my ex-periences in the last war against Russia, the Russians could operate freely'1n this swamp area, and that it would therefore be practical if German troops also could be moved through this area. This suggestion was not accepted. As the operations later showed, the Russians had strong forces in the area, and from there they con-stantly threatened the left Rank of my army group.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Yes. I am not concerned with whether the advice was listened to or not. But you agree that you offered it?

VON RUNDSTEDT: It was not advice; it was a question which occurred to me as I described the plan of the operation to the Fuehrer. It was not advice.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I am not going to quarrel with you on that. I want to mention one other conference about which we have already heard a certain amount, and that was the meeting which took place-I think it was in the office of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch-May 1938, when there was a question of seizing the Sudetenland. Is it not a fact that at that conference Von Brauchitsch asked for the opinion of you and your fellow- officers on the proposals which Hitler had laid before you?

VON RUNDSTEDT: At that time, a memorandum was read which the Chief of the General Staff, Beck, had drawn up, and which warned against a war over the question of the Sudetenland. It was to be submitted to Hitler by Von Brauchitsch. We were asked for our opinion on this memorandum, and we unanimously agreed that war should not be waged.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You were unanimously agreed with General Beck that the sort of war that was likely to happen at that time, if Hitler had his way, should not be waged at that time in that way?

this war if France, England, and America were likely to join the enemy side. That was the fundamental idea of the memo-randum. We could probably have dealt with Czechoslovakia alone, although certainly not if the countries just mentioned had come to her aid. And against that Hitler was to be warned.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Then it is fair to say, is it not, that in order to support himself in the objections which he proposed to make to Hitler, Brauchitsch assembled a circle of leading generals who were of the same opinion as himself? That strengthened his hand, did it not?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes; one might say that.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You all agreed in giving similar advice to the advice which had been given by General-oberst Beck?

THE PRESIDENT: Is this a convenient time to break off?


[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

[The witness Von Rundstedt resumed the stand.]

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You have given evidence, Field Marshal, to the effect that you had little or no knowledge of such moves as the occupation of the Rhineland or the seizure of the Sudetenland, is that correct?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I had no previous knowledge of the occupa-tion of the Rhineland, just as little as I knew anything of the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1939. 1 was inactive at the time, retired.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: What was the highest post you held when you were in service between 1933 and the outbreak of the war in 1939?

VON RUNDSTEDT: As I stated earlier, from 1 October 1932 until 31 October 1938 I was Commander-in-Chief of Group I, Berlin. Then I retired,

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Therefore, during the period up to the outbreak of the war, during such time as you held the post, and when you received little or no information about what was going on, you were not a member of the indicted group, as defined in this Indictment?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, I was not a member of that group.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And as far as the invasion of Norway is concerned, you were at that time active in a different theater of war, is that right?

VON RUNDSTEDT: At the time when the Norway enterprise began I was Commander-in-Chief of Army Group A, stationed at Coblenz, in the West.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And in any case, the Nor-wegian invasion was not the affair of the OKH, but of the OKW?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I cannot tell you whether it was an affair of the Navy or of the OKW.

COMMANDIRR CALVACORESSI: Now, in general, before the war, you would say your picUire is: the generals were left alone to occupy themselves with training exercises and the training of relatively small details and units. Is that a 1air summary of the evidence you gave before the Commission?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That probably is a misunderstanding. The smaller training exercises were a matter for the divisional com-manders and commanding generals, and only General Von Fritsch asked of

the commanders-in-chief that they too should concern themselves with smaller details occasionally.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Anyhow, during this period when the bouridaries of Germany were rapidly expanding, you say that the problem of defense came first in the minds of the military leadership of Germany?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I did not quite understand that. Did you say the borders of Germany were expanding? They did not do that. It was only in 1938 through the Sudeten affair and until...

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I mean from the beginning of the period of the Anschluss until the outbreak of the war with Poland?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, quite.

COMMANDER, CALVACORESSI: And you said this morning the exercises which were held at that time were defensive exercises, defensive maneuvers?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I did not hold any maneuvers any more. After the Sudeten war in 1938 1 was pensioned. Whether and to what extent maneuvers were carried out in 1939 is beyond my knowledge.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you referred this morn-ing to prewar maneuvers prior to 1939 ', and as I understand it, you spoke of these maneuvers as simply defensive exercises?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. Those were the maneuvers in 1936 and 1937. During the latter I myself, as an army commander, was leading a party in Pomerania against an enemy attack on Germany-

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Would you also describe as defensive exercises those which were held with stukas and other weapons at Guernica in Spain?

VON RUNDSTEDT: About that I cannot give you any infor-mation. When rearmament had been decided upon in 1935, or 1936, I think, the Air Force introduced stukas too. But I do not know that. At any rate, I considered that at that time any type of weapon was justified within the rearmed Army.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: We will pass on to another point. You told us that German officers were severely aloof from politics?


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Is it not the case that this policy is very closely associated with the name of General Von Seeckt?

VON RUNDSTEDT: General Von Seeckt took the greatest care in the Reichswehr to see that no officer concerned himself with political matters. What he himself did politically is another story, and about that I cannot give you any information.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Is it not true to say that the reason why General Von Seeckt, was determined to keep the Army out of politics is the fact that at the time when he took over there had just been the Kapp Putsch?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That I do not believe. It is a very ancient Prussian tradition that an officer does not concern himself with politics. And General Von Seeckt, was just as loyal to the Right-in the Kapp Putsch-as to the Left-the Communist revolt in the Ruhr, for example-always supporting the constitution of the Weimar Government. That was our general attitude.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I have no doubt that all that is perfectly true, but I suggest to you that this whole Prussian policy was revised and insisted upon by Von Seeckt because, as a result of the Kapp Putsch, he saw how important it was to keep the Army out of entanglements with incompetent politicians.

VON RUNDSTEDT: That is entirely my view too. All the more since the Hitler Putsch in 1923 placed the Army in a very difficult position because the Bavarian division was commencing to detach itself from Seeckt.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now, Kapp was a failure, wasn't he? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Republic?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No. Seeckt, never tried to overthrow the Republic.


VON RUNDSTEDT: I beg your pardon then; I misunderstood you.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I will repeat that Kapp was a failure, wasn't he? He tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Republic?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Kapp was a failure and a very stupid one at that, a Putsch which could never succeed.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: But after 1933 or 1934 Hitler was not a failure, was he?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I shall have to state that Hitler, under Hindenburg's Government, was called into the Government by legal means, namely, by the majority of the people, as the leader of the strongest party. That was a perfectly democratic way in keeping with the constitution, not by means of a Putsch.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I am not concerned with the forms of democracy or anything like that. I was only asking you whether, after 1933-1934, it was plain that Hitler was not a failure; he was doing very well, wasn't he?

VON RUNDSTEDT: He had the majority of the people behind him.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: That is an assent to success from which we will pass on. Generaloberst Reinhardt has said that there was not a single officer who did not back up Hitler in his extraordinary successes. Do you agree with that?


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Von Blomberg has said that you and your colleagues in the Army had at that time no reason to oppose Hitler, because he produced the results you desired. Do you disagree with that, too?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That is not quite correct. We did our duty because Hitler had legally been made Chancellor by Hindenburg, and because, after his death, he appeared as the Fuehrer on the basis of the testament.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, the answer is, no, you don't agree with the Field Marshal.

VON RUNDSTEDT: I have never agreed with Field Marshal Von Blomberg at any time.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Have you at any time agreed with Generaloberst Blaskowitz?

VON RUNDSTEDT: How am I to understand that? He was one

of my subordinates; but I cannot accept what he has said in the

affidavits in that form.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, I am only putting to you the fact that when Hitler's power was assured and there was no more danger of his being a failure, the nonpolitical opponents began to disappear.

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, we always remained nonpolitical. Of course there were active National Socialists, like Reichenau and Blomberg, in the Army, but the bulk were politically quite indifferent.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Surely it is common ground, isn't it, that there was a lot in common between Hitler's policy and the general aspirations of you and your colleagues immediately after 1933?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes; that is to say the equality aimed at by Hitler and achieved by him was welcomed by us, and that which was good in the National Socialist movement, as I have already emphasized, and which was mostly taken over from old Prussian traditions, we of course welcomed also; but we all disapproved of the excesses which I have mentioned earlier, the older generation at any rate.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: When you say that there was a certain amount that was good in National Socialist ideas and that that was taken over from the old Prussian times, are you not saying that Hitler revived the old Prussian policy of nationalistic expansion and that you were glad about it?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That had very little to do with politics as such. The principles are important: care for the worker, just as under Bismarck, social welfare, common good which takes pre-cedence over all personal interest-those are the things I am refer-ring to.

COMMANDER CALVACORBSSI: Now, before the war, did you and your colleagues at the head of the Army discuss the question of the neutrality of Belgium, for instance?

VON RUNDSTEDT: To my knowledge, no. We were not thinking of Belgium. We always believed, as I said earlier today, that Poland would some day attack Germany.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Didn't you say before the Commissioner that you used to have discussions about the neutrality of Belgium?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, that must be a mistake. Answering the question put by the American Prosecutor I only replied that a march through Belgium into the Ruhr was considered possible by us.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, I have here a copy of the transcript of what was said before the Commissioner. I only need to read one sentence, and it is at Page 1352 of the English version. According to what I have here you said that "the opinion concerning the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands was very much doubted within the higher military circles." Now, all I want to ask you about that: If you discussed that question, was that not a political discussion?

VON RUNDSTEDT: May I just put that right. This statement before the Commission was made concerning 1939, when we had drawn up our troops in the West, and when the question arose whether Holland and Belgium would remain neutral or not. My answer was given in that connection at the time.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Very well. You have also said that you opposed or you fought Nazi totalitarian ideas; is that right?

VON RUNDSTEDT: May I ask you to repeat that question to me, please?

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You have said, I believe, that you opposed Nazi totalitarian ideas?

VON RUNDSTEDT: We could not put up any resistance. I opposed it, as so many of my comrades did.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, wasn't that a political attitude, a political standpoint?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Everybody can have a political standpoint for himself, but a soldier cannot participate in political activities. That is what I understand by political standpoint.

.COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: A soldier then, in your view, has political views but may not express them; is that right?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, that could be applicable. Of course it was possible to talk to some friend about such questions and discuss them, but there was never a meeting or a body called together for the purpose of discussing political questions.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now I want to move on to the late thirties. When you say that all the generals-I forget your exact words this morning, but most of the generals, you said, did maintain the old nonpolitical attitude. I want to show you a docu-ment.

My Lord, this is Document Number 4060-PS and it will be Ex-hibit USA-928.

Now this is a sketch of a speech which General Reinecke proposed to give in the auturnn of 1938 to some of the up-and-coming military people. General Reinecke held a very high position in the German Army, didift he?

VON RUNDSTEDT: At the end he was the chief chairman of that National Socialist leadership training outfit; in 1938 he must still have been a junior staff officer, a low-grade staff officer.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: What do you mean by a junior staff officer? By the middle of the war he was one of the few people who were immediately s~bordinated to Keitel, wasn't he?

VON RUNDSTEDT: About that I cannot give you any in-formation.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: But, anyhow at this time, he was a Colonel. It is Page 2.


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: After all, he was a very high-ranking officer.

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. But still one of the younger officers. About this entire subject I cannot give any testimony. I have never at any time had anything to do with it. As I have mentioned, I was no longer active in November 1938, and so I cannot give you any information about these training courses which Reinecke held.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: All I am asking you to do is to look at certain passages in this document which I shall indicate to you and which, in my submission, show that the extreme non--political attitude of the generals was not maintained at this time.

VON RUNDSTEDT: That will be applicable insofar as Hitler tried everything to make the Armed Forces National-Socialist--minded ...

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Calvacoressi, the witness has said that he was retired at the time and has never seen the document. You can put it in if it is a new document.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Should I read from this point or would it be more convenient at the end of the cross-examination?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we can look at it ourselves.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: If Your Lordship pleases. My Lord, there is another document which bears on the same subject and which I will also put in at this point. That is Document Num-ber 4065-PS, and it will be Exhibit USA-929.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the PS?


[Turning to the witness.] Now, Field Marshal, I want to ask you a few questions about the rearmament of Germany. You have told us that that was purely defensive. Do you maintain that?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I had said before that the measures against Poland mentioned in Blomberg's affidavit were of a purely defen-sive nature. After rearmament was carried out up to 36 divisions, the German Army alone was still too weak to conduct an aggres-sive war against Poland, not to speak of aggression against a western or an eastern neighbor. I still maintain my opinion that we are here concerned with a defensive measure. If Hitler had planned a war of aggression, he would at least have been com-pelled to have 3 to 4 times as many divisions. This was utterly im-possible.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, if you are defending yourselves, you must be defending yourselves against somebody, and you said before the Commission that you were, among other things, taking defensive measure's against the Lithuanians.


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Are you still asking the Tri-bunal to believe that you were very much concerned with the defense of Germany against the Lithuanians?

VON RUNDSTEDT: May I answer? I called it, at the time, the basis for the various games of war. Lithuania was menacing the isolated province of East Prussia, where at that time there was only one, although later three divisions. The Poles and Czechs added together were fully in a position to attack and to occupy the whole of Eastern Germany, not to mention - that the French might have crossed the Rhine in the West. Those were the thoughts which I expressed, and which were the basis for our games of war: how were we going to defend ourselves against an invasion from the East and West,, or from the East or the West.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, now, we have already had that. You have never agreed with General Von Blomberg on any point, but I think I'll draw your attention to the fact that in June 1937 Marshal Von Blomberg, who was, after all, War Minister and Commander-in-Chief at that time, issued a directive in which he said that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. That is already in evidence, My Lord. It is a quotation from Docu-ment Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69.

Now, you said that you thought Germany was to act outside a war. Was it your opinion that Hitler was rearming too fast?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, on the contrary.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: He wasn't arming fast enough?

VON RUNDSTEDT: He was rearming too quickly. That was what he accused Generals Von Fritsch and Von Blomberg of, namely, that they had tried to slow down the speedy rearmament. Many divisional commanders adopted the same attitude. We could not keep pace with the rearmament program, since we did not have enough trained reservists.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Then it is fair to say that what you objected to about Hitler in this matter were his methods?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That I do not understand. I do not under-stand what you mean.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: What aims did you and your colleagues hope to gain through Hitler on the question of rearma-ment if not through the methods Hitler himself was using?

VON RUNDSTEDT: The aim itself to ' be achieved by rearma-ment was to protect ourselves from an aggressive war, particularly coming from the East. This had been attempted earlier by the Stresemann Government, by peaceful means through Geneva. What I said regarding the speed of the rearmament was in answer to a question by counsel as to whether Hitler ever criticized the generals. I myself have never discussed rearmament with Hitler, giving him my point of view.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now, you knew, from reading the newspapers, didn't you, that Hitler was adopting what I would call a diplomatic offensive?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I do not know what you mean by that. He effected a diplomatic offensive at Munich and at Godesberg. Is that what you mean by it?


t in a slightly different way. Was it not clear to any reasonably well-informed citizen that a strong military machine was an essential part of Hitler's general foreign policy; was it or was it not clear?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That was evident, for with Hitler's creation of this military machine, Germany could feel secure against any attack from abroad. What we had not succeeded in doing by peace-ful means, Hitler achieved with a stroke of his pen; that is, the rearmament program. But I stress this fact once more: for an attack even on Poland, these miserable 36 divisions were far too weak.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Now, is it your opinion that Schuschnigg would have turned down and given in to Hitler if he had not known that Hitler had a strong military machine?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That I do not believe ...

DR. LATERNSER: I object, Mr. President. This question is not permissible because the witness does not know what Schuschnigg thought at the moment and he cannot testify as to what was in the mind of Schuschnigg. I request that this question be ruled out.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: My Lord, I should have thought it was a question of common knowledge and that everyone was discussing this matter at the time. I am not asking him what was in Schuschnigg's mind, but I am asking whether in his mind he thought Hitler could have achieved what he did achieve without a strong arm. He can give an answer to that question.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the Tribunal can judge for them-selves about it.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: If My Lord pleases. I do not want to go over ground that has already been very well covered, but I only want to draw your attention to this matter which, of course, has not been gone over in connection with this particular part of the case. My Lord, if the Tribunal wish to refresh their minds on this point, I would ask them to, refer to that part of the transcript (Morning Session of I April 1946, Volume X, Page 328 et sequentes) where the Defendant Ribbentrop was cross-examined on matters concerning these.

VON RUNDSTEDT: I am very willing to answer the question.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I do not think, Witness, that the Tribunal is interested in having any more on this point. Now, the last point with which I want to deal is the question of the conduct of the war. You know, of course, about the Commando Order and it is not necessary for us to look at it again. You had said today that it was never carried out in your area when you were in the West?


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you told the OKW in 1944 that it had been carried out?


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Will you please state, cate-gorically,, which of those two statements is true, because they cannot both be true.

VON RUNDSTEDT: They do not conflict, because I told counsel that the Commando Order was not carried out by us, but passed up under silence. Since, however, it came to the Army from Hitler and had been announced in the Wehrmacht commumqué, one might have had to say at that time: "No, I will not carry out that order," whereupon one would have been dismissed or something. We simply did not carry out the order, and when I asked to have it rescinded, I wrote in Paragraph 1: "Action was taken accordingly." That was, I do not mind saying so openly, an insincerity. I told you. Why I said so, I cannot explain it in any other way. Anyhow, I ask you to believe me that it was not carried out.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Whether it was issued or not there is no doubt, is there? Whether it was carried out or not-and there is no doubt that it was issued through regular army channels -and whatever may be the true picture of the number of men who, may have lost their lives as a result of the issuance of this illegal order, it is clear, isn't it, that the mere issuing of this order through regular army channels shows that there was something wrong, something rotten with the military leadership of Germany?

VON RUNDSTEDT: There was not a single person in the West who lost his life on the strength of that Commando Order.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: The German soldier is well known for his discipline, is he not?


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you wouldnt suggest,j, suppose, that he is more liable to commit excesses than any other soldier?

VON RUNDSTEDT: That did not happen in this case wish to repeat that in the West not a single man was killed on account of that Commando Order.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, I want to leave the Commando Order now. In general, supposing for the sake of argument that we find that the German soldier is normally well-disciplined and well-behaved, if he would act and behave with unnecessary brutality, would you not feel compelled to look for some extraordinary outside motive?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Within my field of authority no brutalities occurred.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: If that did occur, you would have to look for some such motive, would you not?

VON RUNDSTEDT: If the Commando Order was carried out elsewhere in another theater of war then the commander or the unit in question acted in accordance with Hitler's order, which they had to assume was founded on international law.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I have already said that we are not talking about the Commando Order any more. I am going to suggest to you that if these German soldier, for the sake of argument, behaved badly in occupied territory, a logical reason for it would be the knowledge by them that their commanders had a ruthless disregard and indifference for the sufferings of the population.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that it is too hypothetical a question to put to him.

COMMANDER CALVACORE: Your Lordship, if you please.

You commanded the Army Group South in Russia in the autumn of 1941, didn't you?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, Army Group South.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And one of your subordinate commanders was Field Marshall Von Reichenau?


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And you no doubt heard many times about the order which Field Marshall Von Reichenau issued to the 6th Army about how to behave in Russia?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I never discussed that with him nor do I recollect that I had seen that order before I came to England and my chief of staff spoke about it. Von Reichenau had repeatedly given orders which the army group never received, and which did not concern them either. I do not recollect having seen the so--called "severity order" (Härtebefehl), but I do not deny on the other hand that through some channels it may have reached my army group and probably got into the office. At any rate, my former first General Staff officer, who is also interned here in Nuremberg, cannot recollect either that we received that order for our in-formation. It was a matter of course that one could not approve of that order, particularly since it was in contradiction to the clear order ...

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: Well, just a minute, please. I only asked you if you knew of its existence, and I take it from what you have been saying that you do know of its existence. Are you saying that Reichenau was exceptional in these matters?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, correct.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: That he was exceptional?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Considering Reichenau's entire attitude and his character, I assume that to be the case. General Von Manstein, General Von Kleist, General Von Schobert, General Von Stuelpnagel would never have issued such an order on their own, especially since -- may I go on? -- General Von Brauchitsch had given the strictest orders that the conduct of the war in the East was to be carried out in an absolutely soldierly manner and in accordance with the rules and regulations.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You see, yesterday we had put in evidence an order of Field Marshal Von Manstein which was strikingly similar to the "Rundstedt" order. In some passages ...

VON RUNDSTEDT: The "Reichenau" order, you mean.

THE PRESIDENT: You said the "Rundstedt" order.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: I beg your pardon, My Lord.

Now, you commanded three, or was it four, armies in Army Group South?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I had four armies under my command, besides the Romanians.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: And of these four armies which fought so far away so many years ago, we have recovered orders of this kind from two. I put it to you that any soldier of the 6th Army or the 11th Army who received this order would be justified in assuming that his commanders-in-chief were encourag-ing or at least tolerating excesses, and now, just to show you that these matters were not confined to one army group or even to one front, I want you to look at this signal, Document Number 4067-PS, and it will be Exhibit USA-930.

My Lord, it is convenient to put this in at this point: I am not suggesting that the witness is himself personally concerned with it. This is a signal that was made to the Panzer Army Africa in June 1942, and I will read it, as it is pretty short, in fun:

"For Panzer Army Africa via the German General with the Supreme Command of the Italian Armed Forces in Rome--OKH/Quartermaster General for information -- General for special duty with the OKH for information-Air Force/Quar-termaster General for information-OKW/WR for information. Top Secret, only to be transmitted via officers. According to information received, numerous German political refugees are supposed to be amongst the Free French units in Africa. The Fuehrer has ordered that they are to be treated with the greatest severity. They are therefore to be disposed of with-out mercy in battle. Where this has not happened, they are to be shot retroactively on the command of the nearest Ger-man officer immediately and without further ado, as long as they do not have to be kept back for the time being for pur-poses of intelligence. Handing over a written copy of this order is forbidden. Commanders are to be informed verbally."

It is unsigned.

You see, whoever sent this order was conscious of its criminality as appears quite clearly from the last two sentences. "The Fuehrer has ordered that they are to be treated with the greatest severity." The order which the Army puts on that in sending it out is to kill. Do you remember the death of Field Marshal Rommel?


COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: It was generally supposed at the time, was it not, that there was something suspicious about the death of Rommel; did you hear these rumors at that time?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, I did not hear these rumors; otherwise I would have refused to act as representative of the Fuehrer at the State funeral for Field Marshal Rommel; that would have been an infamy beyond words.

I only heard of those rumors from the American papers after I was taken prisoner. According to these, Rommel's young son was supposed to have said that his father took poison in order not to be hanged.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: You never heard during all these months that succeeded the death of Rommel up to the end of the war, that it was generally, said that Rommel had been

"bumped off "?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, it was merely said that he had been under suspicion.

COMMANDER CALVACORESSI: My Lord, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other cross-examination? Dr. Laternser.

DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, you have been questioned with reference to Affidavit Number 4, which comes from Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and is Exhibit USA-335. The Prosecution attached value to the assertion made in this affidavit that in this manner-referring to personal visits of the commanders-in-chief- the commander-in-chief was in a position to obtain the advice of the other commanders under him. What was the nature of such advice; on which subject could it have been given and in which way?

VON RUNDSTEDT: The matter was very simple. Let me go back a bit. Say I am the commander of a regiment and am giving a task to my battalion commander, saying: "You will attack that village with your battalion." When I go to see him and ask him, "How do you propose to do this?" he will reply, "I propose to do this and that, Sir, and if I may say so, I would like to go to the left where there is better terrain." It is the same on a higher level. If the Commander-in-Chief of the Army should come to see me, as the army group commander, he might say: "Herr Von Rundstedt, how are you going to tackle your task?" and I might say, "In such and such a way, and perhaps I will need one more division." That is the only way of doing it, a friendly discussion. But I would never say to my superior: "What you are doing is wrong, do it differently." Is this intelligible, the way I have put it?

DR.LATERNSER: I think so; then it amounted to a discussion as to how the special task assigned to some commander was to be carried out?

VON RUNDSTEDT: It was not a discussion with the com-mander-in-chief as to whether it was to be carried out, but a short discussion on how it was to be carried out and how it could best be achieved. You see, sometimes a subordinate has quite a clever idea which the superior will accept gratefully. That was out of the question as far as Hitler was concerned, though.

DR. LATERNSER: And on the other hand, there were always discussions and meetings concerning the solving of tasks in all the armies?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, I imagine so.

DR. LATERNSER: Now with reference to Affidavit Number 5, by General Blaskowitz. The Prosecution has emphasized that leaders of army groups and armies had been in contact by means of telephone, teletype, and radio and had thus been in a position to get situation reports from each other. Are we not concerned with the ordinary daily communiqués which every unit commander had to make so as to facilitate military leadership?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, definitely. These situation reports were made up in the morning on what happened during the pre-vious night, and in the evening on what happened during the day. If there was an action which was of particular importance to me as the superior commander, then I would ask for reports not only once or twice but possibly three times, by telephone or by teletype: "How are things going; how are you doing? Are you advancing or retreating?" That is the meaning of this.

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution still refers -to this Affidavit Number 5 by General Blaskowitz, and for the purpose of clearing up this statement, as the interpretation by the Prosecution might lead to misunderstandings, I have asked General Blaskowitz to make a statement on his affidavit. I shall read part of it to y6u now and subsequently I shall ask you whether the facts are correct as General Blaskowitz has given them. I quote:

"The purpose of the present declaration is to make clear a restrictive clause I mentioned in my affidavit of 10 November 1945: 'In their sphere!' This restriction was intended to convey what I am explaining in today's supplementary declaration. I did not mean a conference of commanders at the front forming a 'group' or an actual 'advisory circle.' Both ex-pressions might be misunderstood; they only designate a circle from which individual advisers could be heard by their superiors on matters affecting the latter's spheres."

Would this supplement to the previous explanation correspond to what a commander could actually do?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, that is so, and it removes the misunder-standing which I never believed had originated with General Blaskowitz in that sense.

DR. LATERNSER: You were furthermore asked regarding the misunderstanding which occurred before the opening of the Rus-sian campaign between you and Field Marshal Von Bock con-cerning a gap due to by-passing a large swamp area.

VON RUNDSTEDT: That is an error; it was not a misunder-standing between Von Bock and myself. This deployment plan had been laid down by the OKH, and 1, as commanding officer of Army Group South, did not like this gap. That was why I reported to Hitler, saying: "My army group has such and such a task and will do this or that. It would be a good plan if some troops were to pass through this gap." It was not a disagreement with Bock at all, it was a su

ggestion for improvement coming from me.

DR. LATERNSER: When you reported to Hitler concerning your intention of carrying out your military tasks, did you do so jointly with Field Marshal Von Bock, or were the reports made one after the other?

VON RUNDSTEDT: -They took place one after the other. First Bock and his army commanders had their turn. Then I had my turn with my commanders. I again refer to the order that officers were not supposed to know any more than what concerned them. That meant that I was not supposed to know how Bock was going to operate with his army group. According to Hitler's order, it was none of my business. I was only allowed to know where the tip of his Tight wing was.

DR. LATERNSER: And that reached a point where you actually reported separately?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes, and that is easy to understand since the more there were present at such a report the more uneasy one felt:

DR. LATERNSER: An order has been submitted to you, 4067-PS, according to which German citizens, when found fighting for the Free French units in Africa, were to be shot. Did you ever hear ...


DR. LATERNSER: . . . that this order was put into practice?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No, I do not know anything about the order.

DR. IATERNSER: You said that you had never agreed with Field Marshal Von Blomberg's ideas. In this affidavit, which is constantly being referred to by the Prosecution, Field Marshal Von Blomberg gives his opinion of what is called the "Group of German Staff Officers." Did Field Marshal Von Blomberg have particularly close connections with the generals under him?

VON RUNDSTEDT: He always remained somewhat aloof. He did not seem to live on the earth. He was a pupil of the Steiner school of theosophy, and no one really liked him. Once he was a subordinate of mine, before becoming Minister of War. His position was rather exceptional.

DR. LATERNSER: You have not answered the question. Did Blomberg have such close contact with the generals under him that he could state their opinions in such a decided manner as he did in this affidavit?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I cannot imagine that.

DR.LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further question,

THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in the event that Professor Dr. Schreiber is produced by the Russian Prosecution, and only in that case, I should like to make application for another witness to be questioned on this point, on which he can give the most exact information. But only in that case.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you would say what point you mean?

DR. IATERNSER: The Russian Prosecution today, during the cross-examination of Von Manstein, submitted a written statement by Professor Dr. Schreiber regarding a special type of warfare.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but there are three or four points in that statement. Which one are you referring to? There is not only one point in the statement. There are a number of points.

DR.IATERNSER: In the event the witness arrives I should like to ask that I be afforded an opportunity of producing a witness of mine to be questioned on this point. This is only an application made for an eventuality.

THE PRESIDENT: You must make the application now. What is the application; who is the witness?

DR.LATERNSER: If Professor Dr.Schreiber appears here as witness, I would like to call, to give evidence on this subject, General of the Medical Corps Dr. Handloser, as a witness for the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Is he in Nuremberg, or where?

DR. IATERNSER: I cannot tell you where he is, Mr. President, but I will make every effort to find out.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal thinks that the application should be made in writing, giving the reasons why you think this doctor knows anything about biological warfare, and where you can find him. That concludes with your witnesses, does it?


TBE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has now only the SA to con-sider. Will you call your witnesses for the SA?

HERR BÖHM: I should like to call as first witness for the SA the witness Bock.

[The witness Bock took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

FRANZ BOCK (Witness): Franz Bock.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will -withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, when did you join the SA?

BOCK: I joined the SA in 1922.

HERR BÖHM: What was your profession at the time?

BOCK: At the time I was a commercial employee.

HERR BÖHM: What offices did you hold in the SA?

BOCK: From 1922 to 1929 I was an SA private. From 1929 until 1932 1 had the following ranks: Truppfuehrer until about 1930; Sturmfuehrer until 1931, and Sturmbannfuehrer until 1932. When I became unemployed around this time, I professionally joined the SA Group Staff West as adjutant in 1932. In 1933 1 was transferred to the SA Group "Bayrische Ostmark" and became Stabsfuehrer. In 1934, as Standartenfuehrer, I was transferred to Traunstein. From 1935 to 1937 1 was Brigadefuehrer. In 1937 1 became section chief and later department chief with the Supreme Staff of the SA. In 1940, 1 performed my military service. After having completed my military service toward the end of 1942, 1 was sent to Duesseldorf as commander of the Group Lower Rhine. There I remained until the collapse in 1945.

HERR BÖHM: So you are one of the oldest SA leaders. You can therefore tell us why the SA was created and how it was organized.

BOCK: Originally, the SA was created as a sports and athletic association in about 1920. Shortly thereafter they were organized into a guard or protective organization, as a security group for duties in assembly halls and for self-protection. At that time, the SA consisted of young idealists and front-line soldiers of the first World War and was not specifically organized until approximately 1923. It was created in accordance with the local needs and necessities as the Party happened to see fit.

HERR BÖHM: You have talked of a self-protection squad for duties in assembly halls. What was to be achieved by these means?

BOCK: The spreading of National Socialist ideas met with much resistance by political opponents, who tried to fight the Party with all means, even by terror. From that a so-called protective organ-ization arose and a so-called assembly security guard.

HERR BÖHM: Why did the SA declare their main task to, be the fight against the opponents of their movement and its great aims?

BOCK: Every urge for self-preservation demands a struggle. The realization of National Socialist ideas, with the aim of assuming power in the State, required political struggles and fighting. Our weapons, however, were spiritual ones-propaganda, the spoken word, and mass demonstrations.

HERR BÖHM: What was the development of the SA from 1925 -until its complete organization in 1931? ~

BOCK: The SA from 1925 on developed organically, generally speaking keeping pace with the development of the entire Party. It was closely connected with the Party, and merely had a very insignificant organizational construction of its own. At that time, the Party and the SA were recognized by the rulers of the State and were legalized by them, just as all other political parties, like, for instance, the Reichsbanner or the Red Front Fighters' Association, the combat units which formed part of the various organizations and parties of the time.

HERR BÖHM: What reasons existed in your opinion for a reorganization in 1931?

BOCK: The development of the Party and the spreading of the SA over the entire Reich necessitated at that time, in my opinion, a closer co-ordination and a corresponding organization of the leadership of the SA. Furthermore, it was urgently necessary, because of the Party rallies which took place every year and in which the SA was mainly responsible for the organization, that the SA should be closely organized and united for these propagandistic purposes.

BERR BÖHM: Why did the SA wear uniforms, and did this type of clothing correspond to military functions?

BOCK: In my opinion, it is not correct that the SA had military uniforms in the literal sense. First of all they had a grey windjacket and later on a brown shirt, but most of the other clothing was of a civilian nature. The SA had to have a certain uniform at that time to distinguish it from the other political organizations such as the Reichsbanner, et cetera. It would be fallacious to hold that the uniform was of a military character and we never considered that this type of clothing could or should be of a military nature.

HERR BÖHM: Did the members of the other organizations at the time wear any badges of distinction indicating they were units?

BOCK: Yes, of course the Reichsbanner, for instance, had uni-forms similar to ours; they wore our type of grey windjackets and special caps. As far as I remember, the Red Front Fighters' Associa-tion, too, wore a kind of uniform, a green-brown shirt, and so on. All organizations at the time were appearing in the uniform typical of their organization.

HERR BÖHM: Did the SA have arms and who was allowed to carry such arms?

BOCK: The SA was not allowed to carry arms in conformity with regulations. After 1933, that is, at the end of 1933 or in the beginning of 1934, the SA received the so-called "Dagger of Honor." Later on-after the seizure of power-leaders only were aRowed. to carry a pistol, and then only if they had an appropriate police permit or a valid SA pass. The carrying of arms, particularly during the period of struggle, was checked upon by the police and State authorities, and I remember from the time when I was a unit leader, that before and during every meeting or during our marches and demonstrations, the Police searched us for arms. We had the strictest orders at the time not to carry arms, even when we were in danger of being attacked.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

HERR BÖHM: Witness, you know that SA members were active in the service of the State and of the Police and were armed. By whom were they armed in these instances?

I BOCK: As far as I know, the SA units which were used for emergency State services or as auxiliary Police were armed by the competent authorities by whom they were employed, and were also generally led by the corresponding military or police offices.

HERR BÖHM: You know that special units were established in the SA. Please tell us what the tasks of these special units were.

BOCK: These special units were created in the SA, in the first place, to correspond to the peculiar characteristics of people of the different regions-for example, the people living near the sea coast or in the mountains-or, in the second place, to allow the technical abilities of the SA men to be utilized. Training in these units was, in general, the same as in other SA units. Only to the extent that these units had the necessary material at their disposal or could obtain it-such as signals equipment-was service in these specialized fields carried on.

In addition, particularly in the earlier days, we needed these special units, also called technical units, for our big parades, for the demonstrations and so forth, because thus we could be com-pletely independent. For example, in carrying out a big Party rally in Nuremberg it was absolutely essential for directing and encamping 100,000 men to have the necessary signals units and engineering units to make the arrangements ourselves for these rallies; and it was the same in the individual Gau territories. There also, signals units were set up for such purposes. -

Furthermore, later these signals units and special units were urgently needed for service during catastrophes and for protection against catastrophes, in which the SA specialized.

HERR BÖHM: For what purpose did the SA keep musicians' units?

BOCK: They were an essential component of the marching units whenever they appeared for propagandistic and recruiting purposes. In addition, we needed these musicians' units for the big rallies and demonstrations of the Party.

HERR BÖHM: What points of view governed service in the SA?

BOCK: I should say that that varied greatly everywhere. Partly it was determined according to purely Party viewpoints, such as I mentioned in regard to these special units for the Party rallies, parades, and so forth, for the meetings, the distribution of handbills and so forth.

Furthermore, SA service was necessary for arranging the columns for the parades in such a way that they would make a good impression and be a means of recruitment. It was the spiritual and physical development of the units which was effected through the training program of the Supreme SA Leadership. And finally, there was the service for emergencies, which had to be practiced before-hand in order to be effective.

HERR BÖHM: Did the SA members fulfill their obligations?

BOCK: As far as I could see in my units, the SA men performed their duty gladly, only there were great difficulties for the men, difficulties arising from the men's occupational duties and due to problems of distance and time. For example, a worker in the Ruhr district could, of course, not always be available to follow up his duties.

As I emphasized at the beginning, service varied greatly, and it was especially difficult in country districts in the summertime. As a rule efficient training, could only be carried on during the few fall and winter months.

HERR BÖHM: Did the SA men perform their duty according to their oath or in blind obedience?

BOCK: The SA man performed his duty voluntarily. He followed, according to an oath, the orders which were given to him. The oath was that he, the SA man, was bound to absolute obedience to his superior unless illegal things were demanded of him'. That is about how it read.

HERR BÖHM: Service in the SA was voluntary, you said. Do you know of no cases in which the principle of voluntary service was broken?

BOCK: It may be that units appeared with the SA which were not built up on a voluntary basis. I am referring, for example, to the Reich Finance Schools or the units which were recruited primarily from students later on, or possibly also such nationalist organizations as had been taken over by the SA.

HERR BÖHM: Was punishment inflicted in the SA? Was there a penal code and why was it necessary?

BOCK: There was a penal code in the SA and there were punishments. The SA had to have these in order to maintain dis-cipline and order in its ranks. One must consider that in the SA. We had people from all sections of the population, and that especially after the seizure of power we received an enormous num-ber of people into our ranks, whose characters we were not acquainted with, so disciplinary and penal codes had to be created in order to maintain order and discipline. There was no punishment involving imprisonment in the SA. So-called arrest sentences were provided for, which were intended primarily for the schools. In all my time I was never obliged to use them.

HERR BÖHM: From th6 fact of the existence of a penal code, can one not conclude a military character of the SA?

BOCK: Not according to my opinion. One must have punish-ments and penal codes in any organization.

HERR BÖHM: What other regulations were there in the SA?

BOCK: There was a general service regulation hi the SA; special orders were contained in the salute regulation, the uniform regula-tion, the medical regulation, and the drill order.

HERR BÖHM: Why was this drill regulation necessary? Must one not conclude a military character of the SA from it?

BOCK: The drill regulation was a regulation for exercise.- It was introduced in the SA in order that the marching units should make a good impression. These exercises were for the appearance

and bearing of the men, and were primarily to have an effect on the marching discipline. A comparison with the service regulations of the Army is not possible, for, as far as I am acquainted with these regulations of the Army, they include drill with arms and sham battles, while we had only physical exercises for the purpose of attaining good marching discipline.

HERR BÖHM: Was there not an SA Sport or Defense Insignia for special training? '

BOCK: There was an SA Sport Insignia. After 1939, after the decree of 19 January, it was called the Defense Insignia (SA-Wehrabzeichen). This SA Sport or Defense Insignia was an award for achievement, just like the German Sport and Athletic Insignia. It included Group 1, so-called physical exercises, that is, achieve-ments of a physical nature; Group 2, defense sport exercises for training willpower, and Group 3, occupational service, water sports, and special tasks-training of the mind. Those are the exercises that were taught and practiced. This Defense Insignia had the purpose of achieving moral and physical fitness among the SA.

HERR BÖHM: What do you mean by moral and physical fitness?

BOCK: By that I mean there was taught in the schools a mental attitude in the sense of strong patriotic conviction, the training of the men for defense and self-possession, and finally the maintaining of physical stamina through training in sports.

HERR BÖHM: Was the execution of the tasks connected with the Sport Insignia immediately possible on a large scale, or was special preparation necessary?

BOCK: The execution of these exercises for the SA Sport Insignia required an extensive preparation. It is obvious that to obtain this insignia the men had to be taught by competent instructors and leaders and that examiners had to be trained first before the exercises for the acquisition of -this insignia could be carried out on a broad basis. In addition, for carrying out the work connected with this insignia we often lacked the necessary means, above all in the country. Thus it happened that after the re-establishment of this Sport Insignia in 1935 it could only make headway with the bulk of the SA men very gradually and year by year. In addition, the work for this Sport or Defense Insignia was not the main task which we had in the SA, but taking this test was more or less voluntary and considered supplementary.

HERR BÖHM: Are training and the discipline of this Defense Sport Insignia to be judged from a military point of view?

BOCK: In my opinion, this insignia is not to be judged from a military point of view but, as I said, it was like the Reich Sport Insignia, an insignia of achievement. Essentially it included the disciplines which were required for the acquisition of the German Sport Insignia and which are at the basis of any other sport dis-cipline, such as the Olympic Games, for example, modem pentathlon, obstacle races, throwing the hammer and javelin, riding, swimming, et cetera.

HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserts that sudi activitie-st. played a great role in the defense of the country. What do you have to say to that?

BOCK: Possibly, but only to the extent that all functions of civil life play a certain role in the defense of a country.

HERR BÖHM: Did attendance at the SA schools entail any military qualifications? What schools were there in the SA?

BOCK: There were four possibilities of training in the SA. First, the so-called week-end training, covering free Saturdays and Sundays. At these week-end courses the lower ranks, the Schar-fuehrer and Truppfuehrer, were primarily trained. This was a so--called elementary training for the lower units and could be quite brief according to circumstances and necessity. The next training school was the so-called SA Group School, that is, a course within the district of a group. It was for the Sturmfuehrer and lasted about two weeks. At the SA Group Schools the purpose of the training was the strengthening of comradeship amongst the Sturmfuehrer, to introduce them to general SA service with their units, to instruct them briefly in sport activities and at the same time to make them acquainted with the disciplines of the Sport or Defense Insignia. Furthermore, questions of the day were discussed, a brief general intellectual education was given, and, finally, they were given an examination of their achievements, ability, and character. The next training school was the Reich School. These were primarily for the secondary leaders, the Sturmbannfuehrer and Standartenfuehrer. The training was more or less the same as at the Group Schools, only one step higher. Generally there was an examination of the ability and achievement of the individual and of his character, and an introduction to SA service at the equivalent rank. These schools were also ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Böhm, can't you condense this a little bit? We have got this all. You are going straight through the examinations as far as I can make out, when you know we don't want that.

HERR BÖHM: Yes, Mr. President, I will try to condense it a little.

[Turuing to the witness.] The Prosecution asserts that 25,000 officers were trained in these schools. What do you have to say to that? Officers for the Wehrmacht, of course.

BOCK: SA Fuehrer were never trained as officers of the Wehr-macht at these schools; only SA Fi1hrer were trained and no one else.

HERR BÖHM: Were drills with arms carried out at these schools?

BOCK: No, none at all.

HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution alleges further that 70 percent of the militarily trained men of the SA were sent to the Wehrmacht. What do you have to say to that?

BOCK: According to the German defense law, every German had to do his military service no matter to what organization he belonged. The SA did not train any soldiers. In 1940 1 myself served in the Wehrmacht as a simple private and worked my way up to be an officer, although I was active as inspector of the SA Group Schools.

HERR BÖHM: Did the Wehrmacht have an opportunity to influence these schools in any way?

BOCK: No, the Wehrmadht had no opportunity to influence these schools and no right to inspect the schools.

HERR BÖHM: Tell me, Witness, what do you understand by political soldiery and 9piritual arming in the SA?

BOCK: Political soldiery means the general attitude and bearing of the men connected with a clear political conception. Spiritual arming was training in the fundamentals of physical, mental, and spiritual bearing, nothing else.

HERR BÖHM: You are acquainted with the decree of the Fuehrer of 1939 on premilitary and postmilitary training of the SA. How about this order? Was it carried out or not?

BOCK: This order of 19 January was not carried out. Imme-diately after the outbreak of war, when the preparations for the execution of this order were far from being concluded, the Com-mander-in-Chief of the Army repealed it and postponed it until the end of the war. When this order was published on 19 January, the Chief of Staff, Lutze, intended to make an experimental beginning of this training on I October, but he did not get to do so. At the beginning of the war everything still remained in an experimental and preparatory state.

HERR BÖHM: Can the decree of the Fuehrer of 19 January 1939 be interpreted to mean that it pursued a logical development of the work of the SA before 1939?

BOCK: As I could see it, no. The state of training of the SA when the decree was issued was not such that one could speak of an analogous continuation. Our whole training from 1934 to 1939 was only a general sport training. Otherwise, in my opinion, there would have been no need for any agreement between the SA and the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht. In the second place, we could have begun immediately after 19 January, and in the third place, the training of the SA Fuehrer, as far as I know, had not sufficiently progressed, in about 80 percent of the cases, to enable them to fulfill even the slightest military demands. These leaders would no doubt first have had to learn in the Army what would have to be done for this training or postmilitary training.

HERR BÖHM: Can one say that in the field of premilitary and postmilitary training, as originally ordered, anything practical ever took place?

BOCK: In my opinion, no. For one thing, this order was given only on 19 January, and it was never carried out. For another it could not become applicable because it was to begin only on 1 October. No men could come back, since the war actually began on 1 September. Only preparations of a technical and financial nature were made-particulars are not known to me-and perhaps the general considerations of how and in what way this order could be carried out.

HERR BÖHM: And then an order was given that this activity concerning premilitary and postmilitary training of SA members. should be stopped?

BOCK: As far as I know, both the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Party Chancellery ordered this measure to be put aside, and if I recall rightly, this letter of the Party Chancellery further included instructions that this whole decree of 19 January, due to, difficulties made by the youth organizations and the Party units concerning the carrying out of the decree by the SA alone, was to be reviewed and possibly abandoned altogether.

HERR BOMI: Did the SA have financial facilities for creating training opportunities, especially in the special units?

BOCK: The SA had very meager means. For example, an SA Sturm received 80 to 120 marks. A Standarte had about 800 to 1,200 marks. An SA Group had about 2,500 to 3,500 marks-I cannot say exactly. These means were just sufficient to cover the immediate needs of the offices. We had hardly any means for bigger purchases or the acquisition of depots for our special units. If from time to time we received any funds, then these were only smaller amounts which were meagerly distributed through the Supreme SA Leadership. Generally, however, and I believe I have mentioned that, our SA men, and above all those in the special units, manufactured about 90 percent of their equipment themselves or made use of materials they had procured from their working sites or had collected from friends or acquaintances.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, there was rifle practice in the SA, among other things. Will you tell us what kinds of weapons were used and how many of these weapons were at the disposal of the individual units?

BOCK: The SA carried out shooting exercises on ranges with small-bore weapons, partly also with air rifles. In addition, at various leader meetings, we had pistol shooting competition for sports training and just as a matter of entertainment. Some SA men and units on private rifle ranges belonging to rifle clubs carried out competitions from time to time with full-bore guns. The number of rifles they had was very small. I remember...

THE PRESIDENT: We surely don't want the details of these rifles. You have probably got it all in your hearings before the Commission, the details of the particular caliber of the rifles.

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, this witness was only named for two questions, the question of military training in the SA and several questions in connection with the newspaper Der SA Mann. I believe that I have only a few more questions to put to this witness altogether.

[Turning to the witness.] You have spoken about schools before -Group Schools and so forth. Were these schools continued during the war?

BOCK: Shortly after the beginning of the war -- no, I would rather say immediately with the beginning of the war, the majority of these SA schools were closed. Only a few were kept open. The reason for that was that in the course of time more and more SA men and leaders were inducted into the Armed Forces, while on the other hand those who remained at home at their occupation were kept so busy that they could no longer carry out their service in the SA to the fullest extent, especially in the schools.

BERR BÖHM: Now I should like to ask you about another subject, the last one which I would like to discuss with you, and that is the publication Der SA Mann. Can we consider Der SA Mann as an official publication of the Supreme SA Leadership?

BOCK: No, I did not consider it an official publication because I knew that Der SA Mann was not published by the Supreme SA Leadership. It was a newspaper just like any other.

HERR BÖHM: What was the attitude of the Supreme SA Leadership to that publication?

BOCK: The Supreme SA Leadership published official state-ments, such as promotions or announcements of a similar nature, in the newspaper. Apart from that, the contents were similar to those of other publications.

HERR BÖHM: Did you, as chief of office, Amtschef, with the Supreme SA Leadership, have any influence on the setup of that publication?

BOCK: No, I had no influence on that newspaper. I only know that my superior, the Hauptamtschef, had tried several times to get a special section in that publication for schooling and training. It was not possible, though. I do not know for what reason, but I have always assumed that purely business matters did not allow this.

HERR BÖHM: Now was that publication Der SA Mann used for training purposes within the SA?

BOCK: I did not notice that. That publication was distributed in schools and was read there just as other publications were, but as far as I know, it was not used for special training purposes.

HERR BÖHM: There appeared in that publication a series of articles about armament in other states. Is it not to be assumed that these articles were published in order to justify our own armament?

BOCK: In my opinion, that particular weekly was not so important or so widely distributed that it could have had any influence on important people or large numbers of people.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know of a publication within the SA which had an official character?

BOCK: The Verordnungsblatt, the publication containing regula-tions of the Supreme SA Leadership, or for instance Der SA Fuehrer, which was published by a special department in the Supreme SA Leadership.

HERR BÖHM: One question which is outside this complex of questions: could you tell me who guarded the concentration camp in Dachau from the very beginning?

BOCK: As far as I can recall, that was guarded by SS, I, myself, was never in that camp. Only later did I find out about the existence of that camp.

HERR BÖHM: What effect had the seizure of power on 30 January on the old SA men of the combat time after the serious political strife of the previous years?

BOCK: At the time of the seizure of power, I was adjutant in a Gruppenstab. And if I think back to that time today, I remember that I believed at first that, on the basis of the tremendous political tensions and conflicts of the 12 preceding years, precisely at that time a tremendous eruption of pent-up fury and hatred and reprisals was bound to come. I wish to state, however, since I lived through this period of time personally, that I could only see and notice that the seizure of power was effected on the whole quietly and reasonably, and that the old SA man, who still remembered the fighting days, remained calm and prudent.

HERR BÖHM: In what light, however, did you see the various excesses which have occurred later on from 1933 to 1934, according to the statement which you have now given?

BOCK: In my opinion, the excesses which occurred later in spite of the discipline and order which had been commanded, could only have been committed by a few individuals or small groups who did not understand the point of our Socialist revolution, its scope and its limitations; or on the other hand, by individuals who were thrown off their balance and could not regain. their inner equilib-rium.

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, I have no further questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?


l for the United Kingdom): Witness, you have told the Tribunal that the SA were trained only in "political soldierdom." Did not political soldier-dom mean that the SA men had special privileges in the State which the ordinary German citizen had not?

BOCK: I do not know what privileges the SA men were supposed to have had.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Was not the SA man one of the National Socialists' elite?

BOCK: The SA man was the political soldier within the Movement and nothing else.

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, our transmission apparatus does not work. We do not understand the questions. The witness under-stands them in part only because he knows some English.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Would it be possible for Dr. Böhm to come and sit here? The German switch appears to be working all right here.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so. If his earphones are not working properly he can get another pair.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Witness, was the SA man subject to the same restraints of behavior as an ordinary German citizen?

BOCK: To a much greater extent. The SA man performed his services voluntarily, and he was particularly subject to the law. I as chief of the Office for Social Welfare, have been concerned for years with gradual1y finding employment for thousands of SA men, and supported them in their work. I had to take care of many poor and needy SA men through that vast welfare organization for many years until close to the end.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I asked you -- perhaps the translation did not come through right -- were there the same restraints, or restrictions, on the behavior of the SA men as there were on ordinary German citizens?

BOCK: Mr. Prosecutor, I would ask you to tell me what, restraints you mean. I do not know of any essential restraints such as you mention.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Is your answer no? There were no restraints? Or is it yes?

BOCK: I asked a question of the prosecutor. What restraints did the-SA man not have in contrast to others? That is how I under-stood the question.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Was the SA man as free in his behavior, or was the SA man more free in his behavior than the ordinary German citizen?

If you cannot answer it, have a look for a moment at the general service regulations which you talked about just now.

My Lord, that is on Page 30-A of Document Book B. It is Docu-ment Number 2820-PS, and is Exhibit USA-427.

[Turning to the witness.] Look first at Article I. I think it is on Page 9. Have you got it?

BOCK: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: "The SA man is the political soldier of Adolf Hitler"; and a few lines further down: "He therefore enjoys special prestige and has definite rights in the State." Do you deny that those words mean what they say? Wasn't the SA man in a privileged position?

BOCK: I can only say that as far as I was an SA 'man, and as far as I came to know others, SA men were not in a privileged position. Besides, this is the SA service regulation of 1933, which, according to my knowledge, was rescinded essentially in 1934, and ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not care when it was rescinded. It was issued on the 12th of December 1933, was it not? And that was after the Nazis were in power?

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, you can see it says so on the top of it. Tell me what those definite rights in the State were that the SA man is said to have by Article I. What were the definite rights in the State? What did it mean? Every SA man read that book.

BOCK: If the SA man was in the service of the State or in the emergency police service, he, of course, had the privileges accorded that particular service.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You cannot tell me what they are, I suppose. Well, look at that Article 10 on Page 13. Have you got Article 10, Page 13?

BOCK: Ten? Yes.


"The exalted position of the SA man may not be degraded by insulting, slighting, or unjust treatment."

How was the SA man "exalted" above any other German ,citizens?

BOCK: In my opinion he only had particular responsibilities.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: What did it mean when it says he had "an exalted position," and he must not be insulted? He could insult other German citizens, could he not?

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Was the SA man e3falted above the Army? Yes or no?

BOCK: I have already said that, as far as I am concerned, I never had or assumed any special privilege, and therefore I cannot imagine that the SA man could have availed himself of any such privilege.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Very well then; that is your answer. Now, look at Article 18, on Page 17:

"The SA man may use weapons which are entrusted to him only in execution of his service or for legal self-protection."

Now I want you to tell me, what aspect of the SA man's service might require the use of weapons other than in self-defense?

BOCK: I have already said that the SA man could be used for emergency service. With regard to these service regulations, I would like to say that in my opinion they had been issued under Röhm at the time ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not want to go into that. R6hm was Chief of Staff of the SA, and what he issued presumably was

law to the SA. And he says that they may use weapons only in execution of their service or for legal self-protection.

Now I ask you again, apart from self-protection, what case could there be where the SA man's service should require the use of a weapon? If you cannot answer, say so.

BOCK: I can only say what I have already said in answering a question of counsel, that the SA was armed only to the extent that it was active in carrying out functions of the State.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Are you suggesting that the purpose to which they might use their arms might be a military purpose, then?

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Are you suggesting they might use them for a military purpose, if they were called for that purpose?

BOCK: I have said emergency service, especially auxiliary police service or police service, whenever the SA was called upon to do so.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You say you are not asserting they would use them in the Army, but you are asserting they might use them to assist the Police, are you?

BOCK: For police emergency service, or police auxiliary service.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Do you mean, then, that when they were under the police auxiliaries, this regulation in the general service regulations of the SA was the regulation that applied to them? Or did police regulations apply?

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Did they take the commands of the SA, or did they take the commands of the Police when they were auxiliary policemen? That is what I want to know.

BOCK: Mr. Prosecutor, I have only stated what I have seen myself. I do not know what has been decreed in detail according to the service regulations. The SA man, as I have seen it, was armed in as far as he was used in the State or police auxiliary service.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Can you tell me any other case besides police service where he would have to use his arms, except self-defense? Any other case?

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I put it to you, Witness, that what these arms which are mentioned in this Article 18 were meant for was nothing more nor less than for the carrying out of the so-called SA actions; isn't that right?

BOCK: I can, only repeat again and again that in my opinion ...

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, you can answer the question. It is either right or it is wrong. You can say, you were with the SA all this time.

BOCK: If the SA man used the weapons when not employed on emergency service, then he became liable to punishment. Apart from that, the SA man was used only for emergency service.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: The SA man, I put it to you, became liable for punishment if he used his weapons for a purpose that the SA did not approve of. But what I am saying now is that he was encouraged-indeed, ordered-to use his weapons for actions which the SA did approve of.

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, if you cannot answer that, I will leave it.

Look on in that little book to one more thing. Look on to Page 33, Number 6 of the punishment regulations; Page 33. Have you got Page 33?

BOCK: Yes, I have Page 33.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, you see the last sentence of the first paragraph, about punishment: "Right is what is advantageous to the Movement, and wrong is what harms it." Have you got that?


MAJOR BARRINGTON: "Right is what is advantageous to the Movement, and wrong is what harms it."

BOCK: Yes, I have found that.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, I suggest to you, Witness, that what is advantageous to the Movement, such as SA actions, is precisely the thing that the SA arms and weapons were meant to be used for; is that right or wrong? You can say yes or no.

BOCK: The SA leaders were employed under the command of their leaders, and they had to know for what purposes they were allowed to employ their SA men.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not think that has got much to do with my question. Look again at that sentence, "Right is what is advantageous to the Movement, and wrong is what harms it." Does not that show perfectly clearly that the Nazi Party regarded the SA as a privileged party who were entitled to commit crimes if they were advantageous to the Movement?

BOCK: The SA man was led, and could not on the basis of that regulation act as an individual, or as he wanted to.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I have only got one more document. There are only two or three questions on it, My Lord.


MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, the document is the first document in Book C. It is D-918. Oh, I beg Your Lordship's pardon. It is Book 16-B. The document is D-918 and it will become Exhibit GB-594.

Witness, I am not going to take you into any detail in this docu-ment. You can see what it is. It is Lutze's training directive for 1939, and you will see on Page 2 that the date on which it was issued was 4 November 1938, which was before Hitler's order about the pre- and postmilitary training. Now I have only one point to, put to you on this document. You have maintained just now, have you not, that the training of the SA was predominantly for sport; is that right?

BOCK: I have said that the training of the SA was primarily training and exercise towards the achievement of the Sport Insignia and ideological and physical training generally.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: But didn't you say that the emphasis was placed upon sport and not upon military tendencies? If you didn't say that, admit it.

BOCK: I cannot remember the details of what was said before. I can only say one thing, that the SA only had defense-sports training, including physical and ' intellectual training and training of the will power as described here in this book.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You don't deny then that that training had a military tendency behind it; do you deny that? The training for the Sport Insignia had a military tendency behind it?

BOCK: We received no directives for any kind of military train-ing nor did we actually engage in it. It was a case of moral education, comprising, as I should like to point out again and again, physical and intellectual training and training of the will-power, and nothing else.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, all I want you to do is to run your eye down certain passages of this document. Look at Page 7 of Lutze's training directive for 1939. You will see that Page 7 deals with the first training period, from November 1938 until the beginning of February 1939, and at the bottom part of the page you will see, set out in certain sequence, the items on which particular attention is laid: Marching, drill, shooting, field training, and last of all, sport. Can you see that?

BOCK: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now turn on to Page 9, which gives you a similar thing for the second training period, from February to April 1939. In the middle of the page you will see, underlined again: Drill, firing training, and last of al.1, sport. Do you see that?

BOCK: I do not know, Mr. Prosecutor, what you are referring to right now-I have it now.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, turn on to Page 10, where you see the same thing for the third and last training period, which is May to June 1939. On Page 10 you will see the same thing: drill, musketry, field training, and last of all, sport. Isn't it perfectly clear that sport was very much an excuse and a means to an end?

My Lord, I am not proposing to put any more questions to this witness, as the general topics will be dealt with in the cross-examination of the witness Juettner.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; we will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 13 August 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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