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THE PRESIDENT: One moment, Dr. Pelckmann; although perhaps you can help me.
In view of a letter which has been addressed to the Tribunal, signed by most of counsel for the organizations but not, I think, by Dr. Servatius, dated 15 August 1946, the Tribunal would be glad to know from a counsel for the organizations how long they anticipate those who remain to present their documents and affidavits think they will take in doing so, and in what order they propose to make their speeches; also whether they are ready or will be ready when the time comes to make these speeches, because the Tribunal is very anxious and is not prepared to postpone the presentation of these speeches.
Therefore, the Tribunal thinks it is proper at this time to ascertain, as far as possible, whether the speeches will be ready in due time.
I see that Dr. Kubuschok is not here. Dr. Pelckmann is here and perhaps he can tell us as far as he is concerned, and Dr. Servatius.
HERR PELCKMANN: Perhaps I will need 2 more hours today.
I believe my colleague, Dr. Laternser, will need one day for his speech, as he has already said. How long the SA will take, I do not know. As to how long we shall take with, the pleas, I can only repeat what was said in the letter, because we were, of course, very busy with the taking of testimony, the interrogation of witnesses, and the presentation of documents and affidavits until just a few days ago. But I believe that on Monday we could all begin with our pleas. As far as I know, my colleague, Dr. Servatius-I do not know whether he is here-might be able to begin his plea now.
We announced in the letter that we could hand in our pleas at the end of the week as desired; if we allow 3 days for the translation and mimeographing, possibly one or the other of us could hand in the manuscript on Friday and we could begin on Monday; or Dr. Servatius might even begin at the end of the week. I personally, if I may say so, would not be ready before Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: You will be ready by Monday?
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HERR PELCKMANN: Not before Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: I think I ought to point out to the counsel for the organizations that the letter was addressed to the Tribunal on 15 August, which is 6 days ago, so that they have had 6 days since then in which to get their speeches ready. I have also pointed out to each one in turn of the counsel for the organizations that it is quite unnecessary, and it is wasting the time of the Tribunal, to take so much time in commenting upon their affidavits and other documents; and the time would have been very much better spent in preparing their speeches. But I gather from what you say and perhaps Dr. Servatius will be able to tell the Tribunal whether he agrees with it, and Dr. Laternser, too-that the counsel for the organizations will in all probability be ready to go on with their speeches on Monday and not to request any delay after that. Dr. Servatius, I understand, is ready to go on at once.
HERR PELCKMANN: Your Lordship, perhaps I may say one more thing. That the documents and affidavits are being commented on at somewhat greater length than seems necessary to- the Court is due-if I recall correctly-to the following specification of the Court. When the time of the speeches was set at 3 hours, it was said at the same time that the attorneys would have an opportunity to make comments during their presentation of affidavits and the documents, so that they would have the full time of 3 hours for their speeches and so forth at their disposal. We concluded, from that that we would have an opportunity to comment on the evidence now during the presentation of documents and affidavits.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but counsel for the organizations must realize that all these affidavits are summarized in writing before us; and therefore simply to repeat the summary which we have in writing, of course, does not really help us at all.
You have mentioned in the absence of Dr. Laternser, who I see is now present, that Dr. Laternser, you think, would be likely to take one day on these documents.
HERR PELCKMANN: Yes, he told me last night that he would probably need a day.
THE PRESIDENT: Let me hear what he is going to say. Dr. Laternser, in your absence, what I was saying was that the Tribunal had had this letter of 15 August, which was written 6 days ago, and that the Tribunal would like to know how long counsel for the organizations anticipate they will take over their documents and whether they would be ready to go on with their speeches immediately thereafter. In answer to that, Dr. Pelckmann told me that he would take two more hours and that he heard from you that you would be likely to take one day.
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I think the Tribunal would ' be very disinclined, very much disinclined, to listen to one whole day upon the documents.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe that I will certainly need a day. Please consider the following: The American Prosecution used 2 days to present their evidence. The Russian Prosecution used many days for their evidence against the General Staff. Now, having faced considerable difficulties in procuring evidence within the framework assigned to me, I do not believe I am asking for too much when I say I need a day, which is a fraction of the time which the Prosecution used to present the evidence against the General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you are leaving out of consideration altogether the fact that we have set up these Commissions and the fact that you have been before these Commissions not only for one day but for many days
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I presented the affidavits to the Commission, but this was more a matter of form. The purpose of my presentation of evidence is to bring it into a certain order, so that the Court may see to what points of the Indictment the individual affidavits are to apply.
MR.DODD: Mr. President, I'd like to point out to the Tribunal that Dr. Laternser spent between 9 and 10 days before the Commission on the General Staff; and, of course, he called witnesses here in the courtroom as well; two, I believe, or three-I've forgotten the number.
DR.LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was not quite correct. I used several days to examine witnesses, but not to present documents; and I must be in a position to present this written evidence to the Court in a certain order. Otherwise it cannot be effective.
THE PRESIDENT: You say you are not in a position to present it in a certain order. Well, nobody wishes you to present the affidavits in the order in which they are numbered on the document; but you can group them, presumably, unless they all deal with different subjects. I rather gather that you have a very great number of affidavits; and I feel quite certain that a great many of them deal with the same topic; and, therefore, in a very short time-probably in the course of an hour-anybody could go through that list of affidavits and could see which affidavits -relate to the same subject and could, therefore, group them. It is perfectly simple; and the Tribunal will not under any circumstances be prepared to have their time taken up for longer than half a day in the presentation of documents by your organization or by any other organization.
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DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I say something else on this point?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: I ask the Court to consider that the Russian Prosecution used several days to bring the most serious charges against the military leadership; and I ask that I may have approximately the same opportunity to answer these charges ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, Mr. Dodd has just pointed out that you have been before the Commission for 9 or 10 days; and you have already spent 2 days here. We have the very able and laborious work which has been performed by these Commissioners all before us in writing. I have before me at this moment a document. I don't know whether it -is in consecutive numbers-not quite consecutive numbers-but at any rate it goes up to the number of 3,172 affidavits which have been summarized. I say not consecutive numbers, but at any rate a bundle this thick of affidavits, which have been summarized in writing by these Commissioners.
You counsel for the organizations have had the opportunity of reading the report which has been made by the principal Commissioner on these affidavits, and have, as I understand, not commented adversely upon any remark in that report. All these matters are before the Tribunal; and in my opinion the Tribunal have granted to the organizations the fullest possible and most adequate opportunity of being heard before the Tribunal; and the Tribunal think that they have heard enough on this subject; and they adhere to the decision which I have announced
All right, Dr. Pelckmann.
HERR PELCKMANN: May it please the Tribunal, I shall now give a short presentation of the last group of individual affidavits.
First I present Affidavit Number 108.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am sorry to interrupt, but we are a little bit confused. Sir David and I both feel that there may be some misunderstanding about the position of Dr. Pelckmann. We are rather of the opinion, from listening to him, that he means that he will be ready only to submit his speech for translation on Monday, and we wondered if the Tribunal did not understand him to say that he would be ready to make his speech on Monday, and there would be a spread there of 3 days.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, the way I understood you, Dr. Pelckmann, was that you would be prepared to make your speech on Monday; not that it would necessarily come on Monday because, of course, Dr. Servatius' speech will come before yours.
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Presumably, unless you make other arrangements amongst yourselves, the speeches will be made in the order in which the documents and the witnesses have been presented. Doubtless you can make arrangements among yourselves-which the Tribunal will only be too glad to assent to-if one is ready and the other is not, but they will expect that there will be no delay.
HERR PELCKMANN: I believe, Your Lordship, that that will be all right. As stated in the letter, we will present the manuscripts for translation and mimeographing by the end of the week. If, for example, I turn it in on Friday afternoon, I believe I can speak on Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. That is all very well, but the Translating Division are human, and I don't see any reason why they should work on Sundays. I may be wrong, but I think I remember that you have assistants who are helping you and who presumably have been helping you ever since the 15th of August, on which day this document was presented. As I pointed out already, that is 6 days ago. Some parts of the speech ought to be ready now and ought to be in the hands of the Translating Division.
I see by the list that has just been handed to me that you have four assistants, or that Dr. Babel has four assistants and four secretaries, and that you have one associate counsel and a secretary. I don't understand why the speech, or some parts of it, should not have been handed to the Translating Division already, and the same with the other counsel appearing on behalf of the organizations.
HERR PELCKMANN: But we are still in the presentation of evidence, Mr. President. So far it has not been possible for me to prepare a complete plea before the end of the presentation of evidence, even after all my practical experience. But may I make a suggestion, Mr. President? I can turn in the manuscript of my plea for the Translating Division on Friday afternoon, and I can probably hand in a considerable part of it before that time.
THE PRESIDENT: All I am prepared to say is this, that I will not, on behalf of the Tribunal, order the Translating Division to work any more than the officer in command of that division thinks proper; and the Tribunal expects that the speeches will go on without any delay. Is that clear?
HERR PELCKMANN: I was just dealing with SS Affidavit Number 108. From this it can be seen that the SS had nothing to do with the drive for the seizure of manpower.
Affidavits Numbers 102 and 103 prove that the so-called "Voluntary Self-Protection," 'abbreviated "FS"-which the Prosecution considers a Fifth Column-in Slovakia and the Sudetenland had no connection with the SS and was never armed.
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Affidavits Numbers 106 and 111 deal with the nature of the organizational book of the NSDAP and with that of the NS Year-Book. The Prosecution quotes from these books to prove official opinions of the Party. These affidavits, however, state that the organizational book and the NS Year-Book were not official publications and that they are therefore no proof for organizational questions.
SS Affidavit Number 109 deals with the charge of the Prosecution that SS men were protected by the regime when they committed crimes. It proves that when SS members committed punishable actions, before the establishment of the SS courts in 1939, that the SS officers saw to it that no difficulties were put in the way of the regular course of justice inasmuch as these actions became known.
Finally, there is a last group, Affidavits Numbers 90, 30, 91, and 92.
Affidavit Number 30 is available only in the French translation. It is an answer to the assertion of the Prosecution that the -whole SS organization and its members knew, or must have known, that the SS was a criminal organization.
The affidavits state, to mention an example, that there were particularly good relations between the Foreign Diplomatic Corps and the SS, so that the SS members who heard about that could not assume that this organization was criminal.
Now I wish to deal briefly with the affidavits which I mentioned at the beginning, and of which no digest is available
THE PRESIDENT: What did you mean by saying that there was a group, which I took down as being 90, 31 or 30, or possibly both of them, and 92? By the document which is before me, Affidavits Numbers 90, 91, and 92 have been withdrawn. Is that a mistake?
HERR PELCKMANN: I had made application in the Commission to have them admitted, and the Prosecution did not want to have them admitted. As far as I can recall, no decision was reached by the Commission and it was postponed. However, I heard 2 days ago that Colonel Neave, who was presiding in the Commission at that time, said that they had definitely not been admitted. That is new to me. If this should be the case, then I would ask for a decision of the Tribunal whether these affidavits can be admitted. This decision need not be given at once.
THE PRESIDENT: You just cited them as a group. Have they got any relations to Number. 30? Number 30, you say, relates to the relationship between the SS and the Foreign Diplomatic Corps. Do' 90 and 92 relate to that?
HERR PELCKMANN: Yes, 30 was approved and is available in the French translation. The English translation ...
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THE PRESIDENT: We can take it then, and we will consider the application. We can take it that 90 and 92 deal with the same subject, is that right?
HERR PELCKMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That's quite sufficient. I don't want any more.
HERR PELCKMANN: Now I shall deal again with Affidavits 68, 64, and 69. 1 must refute the assertion of the Prosecution that illtreatment, individual killings, and mass exterminations in the concentration' camps can be charged against the SS as a whole because, as the Prosecution asserts, they were known to most of the SS men. The very important and elucidating records of the trials of the Allied Military Courts against members of the concentration camp administrations and against guards-for example, the trials at Belsen, Mauthausen, Dachau, Neuengamme, Celle, and Rastatt-I was not able to obtain. A systematic examination of the witnesses and a part of the affidavits from the camps made it possible for me to ascertain facts sufficient to refute the assertion of the Prosecution.
On 29 January, the President said that witnesses and evidence from the Defense were especially expected to be forthcoming on the point concerning concentration camps. The President said on the same day, in answer to a question by the French Prosecutor Dubost as to whether the Court was convinced that the same terrible conditions prevailed in all camps which two witnesses had testified to: "If you want to prove that, Mr. Dubost, it is necessary to call a witness from each of the hundreds of camps." I refer to the transcript. Therefore, for purposes of defense, I have a number of affidavits from guards, members of the administrations, and inmates of camps, and also from visitors to the concentration camps. I have submitted them as counter-evidence. Now, I refer only to an affidavit which seems very important to me, Number 68.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, why do you not tell us which the affidavits are, that is what we want you to do. You are telling us no and referring to some statement I made in January, that you have got affidavits made from each camp. Well, what are the affidavits? It is quite easy to tell us what the groups are, is it not?
HERR PELCKMANN: These groups, Mr. President, I mentioned yesterday. I only wanted..
THE PRESIDENT: If You mentioned it yesterday, why do you go back to them today?
HERR PELCKMANN: In order to stress the importance of the Affidavit Number 68 which I am about to explain. It is an affidavit of a commandant of a concentration camp. I can understand that in view of the prevailing attitude the general feeling of the Court
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will be one of distrust toward this commandant. But nevertheless, I ask that this very detailed affidavit be read. It deals with organizational questions which are significant in respect to the question: Who was responsible for crimes and ill-treatment of inmates in concentration camps, and who could have had knowledge of them.
For example, this affidavit explains the position of the Economic and Administrative Main Office, Amtsgruppe D. I ask you to pay attention to the fact that this office must not be confused with the Reich Security Main Office. Confusion has already occurred in summing up the testimony of witnesses before the Court. I should like to explain how important it is to re-examine the question of organization of the concentration camp system with the aid of this Document Number 68. But the other parts of this affidavit are also very important.
The other important affidavits are Numbers 64 and 69. They are also testimonies of SS judges, who just like the witness Morgen had participated in the investigations against concentration camp criminals. From the witness Morgen himself there are the Affidavits Numbers 65, 66, and 67.
THE PRESIDENT: Why does he make two affidavits on one day?
HERR PELCKMANN: I did not understand Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, why does he make two affidavits on one day? Why not make one affidavit?
HERR PELCKMANN: During these days work piled up with examinations before the Commission and interrogations of witnesses. The witness Morgen arrived quite at the end. I had to see to it that the affidavits were presented as quickly as possible. For that reason...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on.
HERR PELCKMANN: It is purely a technical reason, Your Lordship. These concentration camp investigations were, in my opinion, of great importance and very elucidating for the Court in judging the concentration camp system in general and determining the responsibility of the rest of the SS. Therefore, I ask that the affidavits of these two judges be added and closely examined. I will deal with them in my speech.
Finally, I ask the Tribunal to note the whole of Affidavit Number 70, which has been translated completely and which comprises many pages. There is neither a French nor an English translation here at hand. This affidavit gives a cross-section from a camp with 2,800 SS inmates, and these inmates include members of the various offices, members of most of the Standarten of the General SS from all parts of Germany, and members of about 30 divisions, Oberkommandos, and replacement units of the Waffen-SS. In addition,
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this affidavit is a good cross-section of the members at various times which, according to the Court's decision of 14 January, should be a decisive factor. The highest ranks are not represented there; it is the so-called "little man" who is represented.
From a similar point of view, and because this evidence of affidavits affects the great mass of the SS, I ask the Tribunal for a proper consideration and evaluation of the 136,000 affidavits of which I have made a digest. For the evaluation of the credibility of these affidavits, the fact is important that they were taken down at a very early date without juridical or any other explanations. The SS members commented only on one or several points which interested them I most. The fact that certain points are not mentioned in these affidavits is understandable because the ordinary SS man naturally had only a limited view and was not able to judge on many subjects. As a result they could not write anything on these points.
Justice Jackson stated that the numerous affidavits of SS members were only evidence of their interest in their personal fate. But this digest is to refute that. The individual's range of view is generally limited, and since he cannot testify to more than he knows, these affidavits -through the sum of the individual viewpoints assume a great value which is important for me as counsel for the mass of the SS, not for their highest leaders. They give a clear picture of the impressions made on the masses by the teachings, the statements, and the speeches of the leaders, and what actions resulted therefrom.
Only this picture, only this cross-section can show to what extent one can speak of collective criminality in the SS, if it is at all possible to say so juridically. These statements are also important for the question of conspiracy.
I may point out that this digest has not yet been translated This digest consists of various groups. First, may I briefly touch upon Group I. It deals with the motives of volunteering for the SS distinction being made between joining the General SS and volunteering for the Waffen-SS before 1933 and after 1933. Of 12,749 affidavits, 12,671 say that the motives were idealism and patriotism alone for joining before 1933. 78 affidavits give various other motives such as transfer from other units, for example sometimes rural riding clubs were transferred into the SS cavalry, and so forth The fact that the motive for joining after the seizure of power is commented on only by 804 men proves that people did not join out of pure idealism and on a really voluntary basis to the same extent as before 30 January 1933.
As for joining the Waffen-SS there are only a few affidavits. 0 488 men, 406 say that the Waffen-SS was a select and young troop
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Others say that they had to fulfil their military duties in any case and that they preferred the Waffen-SS. Many indicate that the Waffen-SS considered itself a fourth branch of the Wehrmacht. Many others indicate that they were racial Germans, and as I proved yesterday with the aid of documents, racial Germans could perform their military service only in the Waffen-SS. Some enlisted in the Waffen-SS because they wanted to be in the police service after the war.
I have made a digest of Group II as to the question of legal compulsion for joining the General SS and drafting into the Waffen SS. 67 affidavits say that the assimilation into the Police brought them to a service rank in the General SS.
The rest of the other affidavits are made by students and university teachers, or members of the postal guard, the Reich Food Estate, civil servants, Reich War Victims Care, and teachers. Also honorary 'leaders are in this group.
Concerning the drafting into the Waffen-SS, there are 4,042 statements. 1,806 racial Germans and 1,826 transferred from other parts of the Wehrmacht or from the Police, that is, compulsorily ordered to join the Waffen-SS.
The question of membership in the General SS among Waffen-SS members is of interest. According to these statistics there were 246 Waffen-SS members who were drafted into the Waffen-SS by the Wehrbezirkskommando, the district command of the normal Wehrmacht. Only one-fifth of them belonged to the General SS
Of further significance is the following: As early as 1939 Wehrbezirkskommandos were drafting men for the Waffen-SS. The witness Brill has also spoken on this subject. And Wehrbezirkskommandos drafted men to guard concentration camps by drafting them into the Waffen-SS.
Further, members of the Reich Labor Service were taken over compulsorily into the Waffen-SS. The concentration camp guards were supplied by the Labor Office; through so-called emergency drafting the Labor Office obtained the men for concentration camp guards, and there they were taken over forcibly into the Waffen-SS. Some minor points are the compulsory transfer of postal officials for the aid of the German Reich Post service at the front and for the SS Army Post.
Group III includes in its first subsection all the affidavits dealing with the knowledge which the SS members had of the intentions of their leaders.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, are you still dealing with Group I?
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HERR PELCKMANN: No, Your Lordship, I am on Group III. Group II...
THE PRESIDENT: Where did Group II begin?
HERR PELCKMANN: Group II began with the legal compulsion to 'join the General SS ...
THE PRESIDENT: You did not say so. As far as the translation came through to me, I have taken down all the numbers you have given, and I thought they were all in Group I.
HERR PELCKMANN: I beg your pardon. I thought I said it. Perhaps it did not get through.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you have got to Group III, have you?
HERR PELCKMANN: Yes. It deals with the training which the SS members received. 55,303 SS members state that in this training they had no indication of criminal aims. It was training for character, for decency, for comradeship, and exemplary conduct of life. It is noteworthy that none of the SS men in connection with the training mentions Hitler's book Mein Kampf. Statistics will prove that the mass of SS men did not read this book at all.
289 affidavits deal with the evaluation of the racial doctrine. 233 do not consider it conducive to racial hatred, to the desire to destroy other races, or to create a master race. They see therein only a demand for a separation of the races from one another. 57 affidavits see in the doctrine the purpose of selecting the best among the people. Various affidavits say that the racial doctrine included respect for other peoples. The problem of colonization and G6rmanization is not mentioned in any affidavit as a so-called training problem
Many affidavits deal with the question of whether the General SS were trained as political soldiers. 20,010 affidavits are available on this subject. 15,461 ascribe no military character to the General SS. They give, for example, the following reasons:
They never had any military training in the General SS. The ranks of the General SS were not recognized in the Wehrmacht. There were no arms or so-called tactical exercises; tactical discussions were f6rbidden. Shooting was done only with small-bore rifles. There were not enough rifles.
1,053 affidavits confirm the testimony of various witnesses here that during, the war service in the General SS no longer occurred
at all, or only in exceptional cases; at the end, of the war there was none whatsoever.
On the question of psychological preparation for war, 3,304 affidavits say that their authors did not think of war and did not
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believe in war. At the Junker schools, various affidavits say, rejection of war was taught, since it created a so-called negative counterselection. And in the Verigungstruppe, the so-called field service, a more military service, was taken up only when general military service was introduced.
127 affidavits confirm that the General SS did not demand any special obedience-that is, no oath which according to its form would obligate the individual to more than in the Wehrmacht or-in the civil service.
2,674 affidavits report on the training of SS men. In 3,138 affidavits it is asserted that orders against humanity were not known to them and were certainly not given.
The second subsection of Group III is intended to provide an answer to the question of what the members recognized as the actual aim of the organization. It is a problem of ascertaining whether there was a contradiction between the theoretical training and the real actions of the leaders. 688 affidavits deal with the question of whether the power in Germany was to be achieved through suppression of political opponents. On the question of whether the SS members recognized the destruction- of Jewry as an aim of the leaders, 1,593 out of 1,637 affidavits which mention this problem state that the Jewish problem was not to be solved by killing or the so-called "final solution," and that they had no knowledge of these intentions of the leaders. They point out that the SS members were forbidden to undertake individual acts against Jews. As evidence, numerous members refer to the fact that many death or other severe sentences were passed because of crimes against Jewish persons or Jewish property. Another question was whether the SS members believed that the actual aim of the leaders was to dominate Europe through war. 12,596 affidavits say that neither statements of the SS leaders nor statements of Hitler made plain that the conquest of Europe was an aim of the SS.
Group IV, the next, seems to me quite important. It includes affidavits on the question of the participation of the SS members in the crimes asserted in the Indictment.
The first question deals with participation in the concentration camp system. 2,866 affidavits have been made out on this subject. They are mostly from guards, a few from former concentration camp inmates and a few from kitchen and workshop personnel. They deal with the treatment of the inmates and with the conduct of the guards. They only show, of course, how the guards saw the concentration camp conditions and the life of the inmates from their point of view. They give a cross-section through almost all concentration camps and labor camps. They give a unified picture of the impossibility of obtaining insight into the true conditions, even for
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people working near the camps. They also give a unified picture of the degree of ignorance of conditions in the camps and the reason for this, namely, the order for extreme secrecy. 2,385 say that instructions were constantly given about the conduct of the guards; examples of punishment are given for disobedience of these rules, especially for ill-treatment. Significant is the statement in many affidavits that relations between the guards and the command personnel were not only indifferent but even tense.
Prisoners themselves, whose affidavits are presented, state that a great part of the responsibility for the conditions belongs to the internee Kapos, who were often criminals. The question of the participation of SS members in so-called mass exterminations in extermination camps, which must be distinguished from the concentration camps, is not mentioned at all in the affidavits. We have heard from various witnesses that these camps had a routine of their own and only a few SS men or men in SS uniforms were stationed there.
Now I come to another point. A cross-section through all the well-known divisions of the Waffen-SS is given by 8,242 affidavits and on the question of illegal treatment of prisoners of war, 4,306 testify to constant instruction on correct conduct before each action. Numerous affidavits give examples of particularly good treatment of prisoners of war.
13,613 affidavits deal with the question of treatment of the civilian population in the occupied territories contrary to international law. There were no orders to this effect; constant instruction about correct conduct was given. The majority of SS members can report only good relations with the civilian population in the occupied territories. There is no mention in any affidavit of the participation of the SS in resettlement or in deportation. for slave labor. A few statements say that labor commitment was no concern of the SS. Only a very few affidavits touch. biological experiments. They come from men who had something to do with concentration camps. These few say that they had heard that the prisoners volunteered for experiments. 1,271 affidavits deal with the so-called Rohm Putsch. The General SS did not participate in these events; parts of them had been told to stand by, but they were not armed and not employed. For 9 November 1938 4,407 affidavits give a cross-section of various units, Oberabschnitte, Abschnitte, and Standarten of the SS, in almost all cities of Germany and all districts. It is said with special emphasis that the SS did not participate in these excesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, I suppose what you are doing is reading out your summary of these 136,000 affidavits; is that right?
HERR PELCKMANN: Yes.
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THE PRESIDENT: Verbatim?
HERR PELCKMANN: Your Lordship?
THE PRESIDENT: I asked you whether you were reading it out verbatim.
HERR PELCKMANN: As soon as the translation...
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to my question. I asked you whether you were reading it out verbatim.
HERR PELCKMANN: No, I am only giving a resume, Your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we had better adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
HERR PELCKMANN: Your Lordship, I regret very much that the translation of the summary is not at hand. It would, of course, greatly facilitate the understanding and the grouping of this material.
Group V deals with statements concerning the general ignorance of the bulk of SS members. 96,257 affidavits are at our disposal. They tell us that the majority of the members of the SS knew nothing about the crimes attributed to them before the capitulation. They say that in general, but they make particular reference as well, when they deal with the various forms of crimes concerned. One fact is especially significant in this connection and is particularly emphasized. At the time when these crimes assumed a larger scale, that is, during the war, the main body of the SS was fighting at the front; for that reason alone it could not receive any knowledge of incidents of that sort, for the horizon of the man at the front is extremely limited, as experience teaches.
Next comes Group VI. It deals with the assertion made by the Prosecution that the SS was a unity. The first question reads whether the branch organizations formed an actual unit. 5,700 affidavits deal with this question. One half shows that a conscious effort toward unification for purposes of carrying through a conspiracy was totally lacking. The other half refers to the fact that the Waffen-SS was not basically recruited from the General SS. Therefore, it emphasizes the separation between the General SS and the Waffen-SS. The second question inquires whether the members of the various branch organizations knew of the activities carried out by the other branches. The significance of the question could not be recognized by the members of the SS without a previous explanation, and therefore few of the affidavits deal with this question. Those few affidavits that we have concerning that activity of the
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various main offices of the SS ' confirm that they were set up separately and that a union was formed only in the person of Himmler himself.
Several affidavits refer to the fact that, for instance, the personnel of the concentration camps were made up of the most varied groups and components. Many affidavits emphasize that the state of secrecy which had been ordered through the Fi1hrer Decree Number One, which has been quoted frequently, and also certain special directives, prohibited close co-operation among the various branches of the SS. In some other affidavits it is said that the General SS, on one hand, and the Police and the SD on the other hand, were not a unit.
Very informative are the affidavits which deal with the components of the Leibstandarte 1934. Less than 10 percent of the members of this Leibstandarte were at the same time members of the General SS. A large number of these affidavits state that during the war, practically speaking, the General SS did not exist. 342 affidavits deal with numerous affiliated groups or branches of the SS. These, in truth, only engaged in activities of a definite specialized character; they were not concerned with carrying through the alleged SS activities and had only a loose connection with the General SS. Among these groups we find the SS mounted units, the Reitersturme, which devoted themselves to sporting activities, and the motor units; also the SS female helpers, who like the Wehrmacht female helpers were only used during the war in intelligence and information service. Others were the SS sport organizations, the Lebensborn, the medical units for first aid, front units of the German Reichspost, signals units, and so forth.
Affidavits in Group VII deal with the question of the SS attitude toward the Church. 3,174 affidavits are on hand in this respect which, on the basis of their positive statements, conclude that according to their conviction, a persecution of the Church was not intended by the SS leadership.
Under VIII there are 127 affidavits grouped together which testify to the fact that many offices under Himmler had no connection with the SS and, further, that between Himmler and the SS an estrangement had arisen, especially in the course of the war.
Under IX, 435 affidavits are summarized. They deal with the behavior of our enemies during the war and after the capitulation. These affidavits, based on the experiences of the SS men, contain statements about actions contrary to international law which the enemy Perpetrated in combat. Names of places are given, as are theaters of war, nationality of the enemy, and the kind of excesses that occurred. The enumeration is intended to show that excesses of this kind can hardly be prevented during war and that for that
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reason one cannot conclude that an underlying system existed. They serve the purpose of showing that the German troops, especially the Waffen-SS, when confronted with isolated cases of violations of international law, which some of the affidavits say were punished, cannot be charged with having acted according to a system.
The last group is X. It contains 57 affidavits which reproduce the actual personal impressions of foreigners about the SS. From the recognition accorded by these foreigners, which was known within the SS, the individual SS man concluded that the general behavior -of the SS could not be criminal and that the activity was not objected to by the world as a whole. Various personalities are mentioned on the grounds of certain incidents; the opinions of prominent Americans, Englishmen, and Russians are given, such as Daladier, Chamberlain, Lord Rothermere, Chaim Weizmann, and others.
Finally, I should like to submit, though without going into a detailed explanation of it, a statistical record drawn up on the basis of a circular.
With that, My Lord, I have concluded the submission of affidavits and documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you next, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: First of all, I should like to submit the list of these 14 witnesses whose testimony I expect to use, as well as the transcripts dealing with their interrogations.
Moreover, I have a complete list of the affidavits submitted to the Commissions, and I have submitted this list. It is contained in one volume, which has been placed before the High Tribunal in an English translation. It is the list which has been referred to this morning by the President. I made a systematic compilation of the subject matter and have supplied this list with an index. The numbers of the affidavits are given, as are the names of the deponents and a brief description of the contents of the affidavits. In this way, the rather comprehensive and, in my opinion', especially valuable evidence is easily understandable.
The basis for the judgment of the circle of persons accused is the organization and structure of the highest Wehrmacht leadership. For this purpose I should like to submit Document General Staff Number 2, which you will find on Pages 12 and 13 of the first volume of the document book. From the diagram on Page 13 we can see the actual method of subordination as it appertained to the highest Wehrmacht leadership. I need this document as counter-evidence because the draft of the Wehrmacht leadership submitted by the Prosecution-Exhibits USA-531 and 532-is not correct~ in various points and has again and again led to misunderstandings.
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Concerning those mainly responsible for the conduct of the war, I should like to submit Document General Staff Number 3. This contains a rather large diagram.
The diagram on Page 13 shows the structure, and by this I should like to show in what manner the responsibility for the conduct of the war was shared between the military leaders and the other organs. From this diagram we see, first of all, that a clear distinction must be made between the military leadership of this war and the ideological political conduct of the war which was undertaken by Hitler and his various agencies. You will find the markings in blue for the military leaders, and in red for the sphere of the ideological and political leadership.
I The diagram shows also the chains of command and, thus, of responsibility between military and political leaders. The tasks which the military leaders had are marked in blue, and those which were entrusted to others are marked in red. This diagram shows further what tasks, even though they were in the spheres of the military leaders, were carried out within the responsibility of other agencies and offices in the operational territories which were under military jurisdiction. Thus we see an undermining of the authority of the military leaders even in the operational zones. A distribution of authority according to areas, and therewith a sharing of responsibility, is also shown in this diagram. Only the clearly defined operational areas were under the jurisdiction of the military leaders, and only for the time the operations were in progress. In all other fields the executive power was purely and solely in the hands of the political leadership, and these functions ate indicated in red.
Just one more remark in connection with this diagram: the areas outlined in black and dealing with the responsibility of the Wehrmacht commanders do not involve the circle of people accused, for these military commanders do not come within the scope of the Indictment.
The authenticity of the diagram is affirmed and sworn to by General Winter of the Wehrmachtsf-Uhrungsstab-the Armed Forces Operation Staff.
Having given the structure of the Wehrmacht leadership as a foundation, I shall turn to the circle of accused persons and its composition. The Prosecution has ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal would like to know whether there are three colors indicated in this diagram; namely, blue for the armed forces, red for the political forces, and an indiscriminate color, a mixture of red and blue and black, for an indeterminate body which is half political and half military.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President, that is quite true. The third color is supposed to be black, and these areas indicated in black
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show the areas of the Wehrmacht and military commanders-in-chief. They are not men who had their commands at the front, but rather commanders-in-chief who had a certain territorial power, and I added that this kind of commander-in-chief, such as is indicated in black, does not fall under the circle of persons accused.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that in what you call black are included the static military commands, non-operational? You don't mean there is anything political in the black?
DR. LATERNSER: No. But, Mr. President, those who had this power of command cannot be included among the people who are accused under the Indictment.
The Prosecution has set up a list of the circle of persons accused in Exhibit Number USA-778. This may be found on Pages 15-22 of my document book. This list comprises 129 persons. I should like to submit Document General Staff Number 4, in which three tables are shown. These tables are set up in accordance with Exhibit USA-778.
First of all, turn to Chart 1, please. It is on Page 24 of the document book. From this chart we can see, first of all, that on 1 March 1933 only one of the leaders indicted was in a high position.
Point 2. On 1 March 1938, there were only seven.
Point 3. On I September 1939, that is, at the outbreak of the war, there were 22.
Point 4. This is an important point, as may be seen from Column 8. In November of 1944, the top figure of 52 was reached.
Point 5. Only 9 generals and admirals were in one of the indicted positions throughout the entire war.
Chart 2 is found on Page 25. It is a graphic presentation dealing with the duration of membership of the accused generals in the alleged group. You can see from Columns 2 to 5 that a long membership was something exceptional. You can see from Column 9 that the top figure of 21 held a position falling under the Indictment for only 2-21/-, years; whereas a total of 61 people belonged to the alleged group only for a period of less than one year. This figure of 61 results from the additions of Columns 12 to 18.
Chart 3, found on Page 26 of the document book, shows, especially through Columns 4 and 5, that out of 129 generals and admirals, 100 served for less than 2 years in high positions, that is to say, the large majority of the military leaders involved.
I now submit Document General Staff Number 6. It is found on Pages 27 to 33 of my Document Book 1. This document comprises a list of names of the various leaders involved. From this list we can see just how many of the military leaders, at the time when important events took place, held positions which fall under the Indictment.
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Then, from Pages 27 and 29, you will see:
(1) On 1 March 1933, that is at the time of the assumption of power, one general.
(2) On 5 February 1938, which is the key date in the Indictment against the military personnel, only six generals, and (3), on I September 1939, 23 generals in the list (USA-778) drawn up by the Prosecution were in positions falling under this Indictment. Above all it is remarkable that on I November 1944, when we were mainly concerned with the defense of our boundaries, the highest membership in this group was reached-49 generals in all.
With Document General Staff Number 7, a copy of which is found on Pages 34 to 40 of Document Book 1, 1 should like to give you a different perspective of the people involved. Last 2 on Pages 36 to 40 shows the membership in the alleged "group" during certain periods. From the first column we can see that before June 1941 33 generals had been in positions which the Indictment covers. Only 21 of that group are still alive. Up to the events of Stalingrad in February 1943, that is, in the period where offensive operations were still being carried out, 27 other generals were in such positions as are covered by the Indictment. From February 1943, until the end of the war, which was the period of strategic defense.
THE PRESIDENT: You said something about only a certain number of them being alive. That is not shown by the chart, is it?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that will be seen from another chart to which I will refer later. I was just saying that in the last period, from February 1943 until the end of the war, an additional 69 military leaders were in positions coming under the Indictment. With this document I should like to prove, first of all, that out of the 129 officers indicted, only 33, that is 25 percent, participated in the preparation of war, and were the only ones who could have done so.
Point 2, 69 generals, which is more than 50 percent of the group involved, cannot have participated in plans of aggression.
Point 3, 40 generals, which is 30 percent, found themselves in positions which are now under indictment only when it was a question of defending the fatherland's boundaries.
From Number 5 on Page 35 you will be able to see that out of 129 generals 80 had formerly been members of the General Staff, whereas 49 of them had not belonged to it.
I shall now turn to Document General Staff Number 8, which may be found on Pages 41 to 48 of my Document Book Number 1. By this document I should like to bring proofs of a varied nature:
(1) From the first three columns of List 3, which are found on Pages 43 to 48, you will be able to see the number of dead, the
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number of those who are indicted individually or have been indicted, and the number of those officers who were only charged with the command of an army, and therefore did not definitely hold a position which falls under the Indictment. The sum total of these three columns is 56, as can be seen from Page 41, and in this way the number of 129 officers involved is reduced, and thereby also the practical consequences of a sentence, which could only affect, 73 people at the most.
(2) The last two columns of my list give the number of those officers who before the end of the war had lost their positions either through an order, or death, or because they were captured. Seventy admirals and generals make up this number out of the total figure of 129. And in this connection...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it very much matters but the last column which contains the reason does not seem to accord with the evidence which has been given to us up to date. Perhaps it is a mistranslation. I do not know. General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch and the reason given in the last column. It seems that the reason has been given to us ...
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I propose to go on to explain these two columns and to tell the High Tribunal who in this list fell into disgrace. My intention was to give this explanation to the High Tribunal. I wanted to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the fact that it can be seen from the last two columns that 36 generals, because of serious differences of opinion with Hitler, or because of active resistance against Hitler, were removed from their positions. As can be seen from the explanatory affidavit attached to the list, those who fell into disgrace did so because of serious differences of opinion between themselves and Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: All I wish to say is that no such suggestion was made to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch when he was in the witness box.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do believe that I can remember that he talked about serious differences of opinion between himself and Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: It is an English word and it seems to be highly inappropriate. Go on.
DR. LATERNSER: In this figure of 36 generals who, were removed from their positions because of differences of opinion is included, as may be seen from the list, General Hoeppner, who was sentenced to death for having participated in the affair of 20 Ju15 1944; he was the same general who, according to the view of the editor of Document L-180, had collaborated closely ...
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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I see that the same word is applied to the Defendant Raeder, and my observation equally applies to him.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please deal with this matter briefly once more after the recess?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, Dr. Laternser. You can go on now.
DR. LATERNSER: I have just referred to the fact that this list mentions General Hoeppner who, because of his participation on 20 July, had been sentenced to death. That may be seen from the last two columns, and I wanted to call the attention of the High Tribunal in this connection to the fact that this is the same general who, in the opinion of the author of Document L-180, allegedly had very close collaboration with Einsatzgruppe A.
Now I should like to submit Document General Staff Number 9, which will be found on Pages 49 to 54 of Document Book Number 1. I shall merely point out that this list contains the names of those 31 officers who served less than 6 months in positions which are included in the Indictment. Most of these officers, as will also be seen from this list, had not been appointed commanders-in-chief (Oberbefehlshaber) but had been entrusted with matters of administration.
Now I shall turn to Document General Staff Number 10 to which I particularly wish to call the attention of the High Tribunal. It will be found on Pages 55 to 61 of Document Book Number 1. From this document the High Tribunal will be in a position to see which ranks were held by the officers indicted at the times that exceptional events took place, for instance, at the outbreak of the war. This compilation, therefore, permits drawing certain definite conclusions as to how far these officers had a decisive influence on the events.
As can be computed from the first column of List 5 on Pages 58 to 61 (the total will be found on Page 55 under Figure 1), on I September 1939-that is, at the beginning of the war-of a total of 107 generals and admirals now living, 47 still ranked as staff officers.
They were majors, or lieutenant colonels, or colonels. 48 were generals of a lower rank. And of the entire 107 involved in the Indictment, only seven held top ranks. Five were full generals, and there were two Field Marshals. For five of those still alive we do not have any definite information.
I shall merely call your attention to the other summaries dealing with earlier events, as 'Computed on-Pages 56 and 57. The following should be remarked 'concerning the composition of these alleged groups. Holders of the position of permanent deputy of the Armed Forces Operation Staff, on the basis of Affidavit Number 6 of
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General Halder, Exhibit USA-533, are also accused by the Prosecution. With reference to the tasks and the significance of the position, I should like to call your attention to the cross-examination of Halder before the Commission. According to this, the holders of this position did not concern themselves decisively with strategic questions. Their position did not in any way correspond with the positions which are included in the Indictment.
Thus, I conclude my evidence dealing with the group as indicted. The Prosecution is of the opinion that the circle of people as indicted consisted of an organized group. The affidavits submitted by the Prosecution to prove this point, Number 1, by General Halder, Exhibit USA-531, and Number 2, by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Exhibit USA-532, do not have the meaning indicated to us by the Prosecution. In this connection, I should like to refer first of all to the cross-examination of General Halder, which I conducted before the Commission, and I should like to ask the High Tribunal to permit me to read one passage from this transcript so that this point will be complete in the record.
"By Dr. Laternser:
"Question: 'In your Affidavit Number I you have used the word "group" four times. Did this expression "group" emanate from you'
"Answer: 'No; it was contained in the text, which has been changed several times, in which I left this word as it was.' "Question: 'Had you previously used this expression "group)) in a similar connection, for instance, in characterizing the military as a "group"'
"Question: 'What sense did you give this word "group" at the moment when you signed the statement
"Answer: 'I did not hesitate to use this word. "Group" is used in the sense of "number".'
"Question: 'You therefore mean several generals? Or did you mean a certain circle of people who had been grouped for a certain purpose'
"Answer: 'A number of generals who perhaps might be characterized as leading generals.'
"Question: 'Subsequently the Prosecution is now interpreting this expression "group" as if an organization of military leaders existed. Was there an organization, or an organized group of that sort?'
Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch was examined by me before this High Tribunal with regard to Affidavit Number 2. Concerning the
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allegation that the front commanders-in-chief were actually the consulting body for the High Command, the Prosecution has quoted Exhibit USA-537, Affidavit Number 5, by General Blaskowitz. I should like to refer to Affidavit General Staff Number 55 which has been translated, in which General Blaskowitz, on my request, gives an interpretation of the affidavit. According to this affidavit, the Oberbefehlshaber, the commanders-in-chief, were not a consultant body, but they were individual consultants in their own sphere, as is true in every army. The interpretation which the Prosecution gives to Affidavit Number 5 is, accordingly, not correct.
Further I should like to refer to Affidavits Numbers 1-55, which also prove that the highest military authorities did not form an organization-like "group." I should like you to turn your special attention to Affidavits 1-4 which have been translated, but which I do not wish to quote
That the Navy and the Air Force did not form a "group" with the Army generals may be seen from Affidavits Numbers 3145, 12 and 3097 of Admiral Schniewind and of the Generals Stumpf and Keller. Particularly from Affidavit Number 3145 by Admiral Schniewind can the High Tribunal infer all that which is important with reference to the commanders-in-chief of the Navy and their judgment.
I should also like to refer to the testimony of all the generals who were heard before the Commission, who all denied the existence of a "group."
Of special importance seems to me the testimony of General Von Buttlar, who testified as to how nominations to these positions covered by the Indictment were effected.
Mr. President, thus I conclude my evidence on the question of whether a "group" actually existed or not.
Now I shall turn briefly to my proof dealing with the common attitude of the generals involved.
Their general attitude as described in the opening speech by Mr. Justice Jackson is based on rather doubtful premises. Document Number 1947 was referred to by Mr. Justice Jackson in this connection. This Document Number 1947-PS, which is of basic significance to his statement, is a letter allegedly written by General Von Fritsch on 11 December 1938 to a Baroness von Schutzbar-Milehling, in which he is said to have declared that three battles would have to be won: The first, against the workers; the second, against the Catholic Church; and the third, against the Jews.
Despite several demands I received neither the original nor a photostat copy of this document. I was told that I would have access to it if and when it could be found.
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I should like to refer in my refutation to the affidavit deposed by Baroness von Schutzbar-Milchling, who in her affidavit states that the alleged letter by General Von Fritsch was never received by her.
If this key document, 1947-PS, cannot be submitted until the end of this proceeding-I should like to emphasize it has not been submitted until now but used all the same-then-and I make a special application for this-that part of the opening speech by Mr. Justice Jackson which refers to this document, which after all has not been submitted, should be struck from the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If the document has not been proved the Tribunal will pay no attention to it. If it is not in evidence then it is quite unnecessary to produce the document denying its existence. We will take no notice of it.
What I understand you to be saying is that Mr. Justice Jackson referred to a letter. That letter has not been offered in evidence. If it has not been offered in evidence then the Tribunal takes no notice of anything Mr. Justice Jackson said about it in his speech and it is unnecessary for you to produce an affidavit -denying the existence of the letter. Is that clear?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but, Mr. President, it has been used. Mr. Justice Jackson ...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you have pointed out to us now that it ought not to have been used because it is not in evidence. We
wish to be strict in these matters and only to allow factual documents to be referred to which had been offered in evidence.
DR. LATERNSER: Concerning the mistrust which Hitler brought to the military leadership, that is a matter which has been stated and proven several times in this proceeding.
I should like to refer the Tribunal to Affidavit Number 200, deposed by General Engel, an officer who for quite some time was in the closest proximity to Hitler and could observe the latter's growing mistrust. I will not read from that affidavit.
In this connection I should also like to refer to Affidavit Number 3182, deposed by General Warlimont, who reproduced significant statements made by Hitler, and in order to be brief I shall merely refer to the same.
Regarding the attitude taken by the military leaders toward the Party and its methods, I should like to refer as an example only to Affidavit Number 175, which has been translated.. The officer who at that time was competent, Major General Seegers, describes the battle waged by the military against the removal of Jewish officers. I should further like to refer to the contents of Affidavits
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Number 160 to 177, from which many particulars dealing with the unpolitical attitude taken by the military leadership may be gleaned.
Dealing with the question of rearmament, I should like to, refer to Affidavit Number 126, in which General Berlin testifies that the General Staff eliminated from its armament program for 1933/34 the construction of ultra-heavy artillery with the explicit statement that Germany did not propose to wage aggressive wars.
I should like to refer further to Affidavit Number 127 deposed by Major General Hesselbarth, from which it may be seen that at the beginning of the war the equipment and weapons for the units called up in case of mobilization were insufficient. As far as the rest of the interesting contents of this document is concerned', I .shall merely refer your attention to it.
Dealing with rearmament in the Luftwaffe, the Prosecution submitted Document Number L-43, Exhibit Number GB-29, from which, allegedly, the rearmament intentions of the Luftwaffe are to be seen.
I should like to refer to the contents of Affidavit Number 101 of the then Chief of the General Staff, General Stumpf, who expressly testifies that this was a private organizational study undertaken by General Kammhuber.
Continuing, I refer to the contents of Affidavits Numbers 102 to 152. Through details of the most varied kinds we can see that the military leadership, at any event, did not seriously take into consideration aggressive wars when carrying through the rearmament program.
I should further like to refer to the contents of Affidavits Numbers 181 to 205, from which we can see, as is corroborated by many details, that foreign officers participated in certain training courses and exercises; that maneuvers were only of a defensive nature, and that the Military Academy which existed for the training of General Staff officers mainly had courses in defense tactics.
As far as the deliberate participation of the military leaders in wars of aggression is concerned, the Prosecution has been trying to prove that the military leaders at an early date had been advised and informed of Hitler's plans, and in this connection they produced the Hossbach Minutes of 5 November 1937, (Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25).
I should like to refer to the affidavit of the author of this record, General Hossbach, dealing with the background and the origin of this document. General Hossbach in his Affidavit Number 210, which he sent to me, expressly states that he did not take notes at the conference and that he only wrote down these minutes several days later. This document has been translated.
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THE PRESIDENT: Does he say in this affidavit whether he was shown a copy of the notes or whether he had any comments to make on them?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I must state quite frankly that in view of the great bulk of material I cannot give you this information at the moment. In any event I would have asked for a recess now. I shall check on these matters and I shall be able to tell the Tribunal afterward. In addition, I should like to condense the material a bit, which I am sure will have beneficial effects later on.
I THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]
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DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I say something briefly about the order in which the final speeches for the organizations will be delivered? I am- submitting a list drawn up after brief consultation with my colleagues. According to this, counsel for the Political Leaders and the Gestapo could speak beginning Thursday or Friday. Beginning Monday, the SS and SD; Tuesday, the General Staff and the Reich Cabinet; and Wednesday, the SA. In the second column I have indicated by what date these documents can be turned in for translation; and in the last column I have given the time when the speeches could presumably be delivered. If there is no session on Saturday, Friday could be filled with the Political Leaders and the Gestapo. That is what I wanted to say.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean Friday this week could be taken up with the Political Leaders?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, and then the Gestapo. If there is no session on Saturday, the SS could begin on Monday so that there would be no interruption. The difficulty lies in whether the Translation Division can keep up with this pace.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that the difficulty in the Translation Division is partly due to their having nothing to translate.
DR.LATEANSER: Mr. President, the Court desired information on whether the Hossbach document was made available for information. As is shown in the document itself, Hossbach told Hitler of the existence of this document and gave it to him twice to read; but Hitler refused to initial it. General Hossbach does not recall whether he presented the record to Generaloberst Von Fritsch; but he certainly did show it to Generaloberst Beck. He also says that this record was not signed by the participants in the conference.
THE PRESIDENT: It was initialed by Blomberg, I see he says.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, initialed but not signed. May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, certainly.
DR.LATERNSER: Affidavits 213 A, B, and C show that the most important agencies were not informed of this conference of 5 November 1937. Numerous officers offered evidence that the equipment and training of the Wehrmacht made the idea of a war of aggression impossible; that is shown in Affidavits 223 to 225, 220 and 277. Generaloberst Adam, in Affidavit 211, discusses the entirely opposite views on the situation as held by the Wehrmacht on the one hand, and Hitler on the other. Field Marshal
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Von Weichs, in Affidavit 215, rebuts the opinions of Field Marshal Von Blomberg in his affidavit Number 3, Exhibit USA-536. Field Marshal Sperrle reports in Affidavits 237 and 237-a that he and Reichenau did not know the purpose of their visit to the Berghof during the Schuschnigg conference in February 1938. Only later did Hitler comment on this event, then rather drastically, however.
The surprise orders to march into Austria caused the troops to improvise measures, as is shown by Affidavits 238 to 244. The same is true of the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia; on this subject I refer to Affidavits 246, 252, and 254.
General Warlimont, in Affidavit 217, describes how, up to the day of the attack on Poland, a peaceful outcome of the tension had been expected. The same is shown by Affidavits 227, 246, and 255 to 257. Hitler's statements confirming this view of the generals are discussed in Affidavits 219, 211, 212, and particularly 277. The surprise which the final order to march against Poland caused is shown in Affidavits 228 to 231, as well as 255, 256, and 257.
In July 1939, Admiral Raeder had told the Navy that the Political Leaders had definitely assured him that during the next few years there would be no hostilities. That is shown in Affidavit 3115 by Rear Admiral Kratzenberg. At the beginning of the war the German battleship Gneisenau had written orders that no hostilities were to be expected; at that time it was on a training cruise near the Canary Islands, without ammunition supplies. That is shown from the statement of Admiral F6rste, Number 3114.
According to Admiral Backenk6hler, in Affidavit 3116, preparations for production had been so inadequate that in August of 1940 there was still a lack of torpedoes for the small number of U-boats available at that time.
Only a few officers learned of the preparations for the Norwegian campaign. That is shown by Affidavit 259. Affidavits Number 263, 264, 266, 267, and 269 quote statements by Hitler that he did not want to risk facing a war on two fronts. Unfortunately, owing to lack of time I cannot quote the detailed material exhaustively.
In regard to the Russian campaign too, I must limit myself to brief references. According to the reports available, which were given to the generals at the time, it was represented as a preventive war. This is shown from Affidavits 270-a to 270-n, as well as 271, 272, 274, and 275.
I refer further to Document General Staff Number 14, Pages 83 to 96 in my Document Book 1. The reference is sufficient.
I now turn to the evidence on individual points, which I shall present in the following order.
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1. Connections with Einsatzgruppen.
2. Commissar Order.
3. Partisan warfare.
4. Treatment of prisoners.
6. Treatment of civilian population.
7. Jurisdiction in the East.
8. Commando Order.
9., Deportation of laborers.
10. Crimes against rules of warfare and against humanity.
First the Einsatzgruppen.
The Prosecution contends that the Einsatzgruppen were in every respect subordinate to the commander-in-chief, and has referred to:
1. The testimony of Ohlendorf.
2. The testimony of Schellenberg.
3. Document L-180.
4. Affidavit 16, by General Rottiger, and finally,
5. Affidavit 18, by SS Fuefrer Rode. -
I shall now show to the Court that these proofs of the Prosecution are not conclusive. Above and beyond that I shall offer counter-proof that the alleged connections did not exist, so that the crimes committed by the Einsatzgruppen cannot be charged against the persons whom I represent.
First, concerning the testimony of Ohlendorf, I refer to Affidavits Number 703 and 703-a by General W61iler, which have been translated, and, which refute the testimony of Ohlendorf on the points of the charge. I should like to call the attention of the Court particularly to the fact that General W61iler at that time was Chief of Staff of the 1lth Army, with whom the witness Ohlendorf alleges that he negotiated in the implicating manner which he describes. The affidavits of General Wohler completely refute the testimony of Ohlendorf.
Secondly, Affidavit Number 12 of the witness Schellenberg, submitted by the Prosecution as Exhibit USA-557, is based-I should like to call the attention of the Court to this fact-mainly on assumptions. I cross-examined the witness Schellenberg at some length before the Commission; the record of this cross-examination appears in the Commission transcript, and I should like to ask expressly that the Tribunal refer to it, because it shows that the witness was not in a position to give facts as a basis for his assumptions.
Schellenberg asserts that an agreement between General Wagner and SS Fuehrer Heydrich existed, whereby the Einsatzgruppen in the operational area were completely subordinated to the commanders-in-chief.
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As evidence to the contrary, I submit Affidavit 704 by Judge General Mantel, who spoke with General Wagner, who lost his life in connection with the 20th of July 1944, about this point specifically, and received the clear reply that the Einsatzgruppen were not under any military command but only under that of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
In this connection I refer to Document 447-PS, submitted by the Prosecution, on Pages 99 and 100 of my Document Book 1. In Figure 2 to 2-b thereof it is shown clearly that the Reichsfuehrer SS that is, Himmler-received special assignments in the operational area of the Army, and that within these assignments he was acting independently and on his own responsibility. That is shown on Pages 99 and 100 of my Document Book 1, in a document which the Prosecution itself submitted.
The witness Schellenberg, in Affidavit Number 12,, mentions the close co-operation between Armored Group IV, under Generaloberst Hoeppner, and the Einsatzgruppen. I should like to call the special attention of the Tribunal to the way in which the testimony on this point came about. During his examination by the Prosecution, the report of Einsatzgruppe A was handed to the witness. From the report itself the witness Schellenberg obtained knowledge of this alleged close co-operation, and he then used this knowledge in his affidavit. I should, therefore, like to quote a part of the cross-examination before the Commission. "Question:..."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, what you are now doing is argument, is it not? We don't want to hear argument at this stage. I mean, you are referring us now to the case of the Prosecution, and you are arguing upon the affidavits which you are producing that they are satisfactory answers to the Prosecution. Well that is not necessary now.
DR. LATERNSER: I believe, Mr. President, I was misunderstood. I am contrasting assertions of the Prosecution and evidence of the Defense. To enable the Tribunal to see why I am presenting this evidence, I must show the evidence in its relationship to the charge of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT:. You have done that already, and you have done it, if I may say so, very satisfactorily. You have given us ten different categories of these individual points, and you are now drawing our attention to your evidence which deals with the Einsatzgruppen. Well, that is all we need; we don't need to have references, or argument, at any rate, upon the Prosecution's evidence with reference to Einsatzgruppen. If you would continue to give us the references to your affidavits which deal with the Einsatzgruppen, that will be sufficient for us.
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DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I regret to have to say one more thing. I can conduct my defense either by invalidating the Prosecution's evidence, or by producing evidence to the contrary. In this case I want to show the Tribunal that the affidavit of the witness Schellenberg-which was presented by the Prosecution, and in which the witness speaks of the particularly close co-operation between the Einsatzgruppe and Hoeppner-that this affidavit does not contain the knowledge of Schellenberg, but, that it ...
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that. I have got down here that Ohlendorf and Schellenberg are the witnesses for the Prosecution who say that the High Command was concerned with and actually commanded the Einsatzgruppen. That is a fact you are contesting, and you are referring us to the evidence which you say contests it. You don't want to give us the Prosecution's evidence. You have told us what it is: Ohlendorf and Schellenberg, and L-180.
Will you continue?
DR. LATERNSER: May I quote a brief passage from the testimony of Schellenberg?
THE PRESIDENT: No.
DR. LATERNSER: But that is evidence, Mr. President, which I brought out before the Commission, and from which I now want to read a short quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: But, you see, that comes as argument; it isn't a mere comment. We want to confine it to a mere comment so that you may explain your evidence. Once you begin to comment upon the evidence of the Prosecution, in the opinion of the Tribunal it becomes argument.
Well, if you are short you may refer to this passage; it is suggested that it is your evidence.
DR. LATERNSER: It is very brief.
"Question: 'Had you no misgivings in using immediately in your testimony, to which you have sworn, documents which
had only just been given to you'
"Answer: 'Dr. Laternser; what do you mean by 4tusing"'
"Question: 'You made this report the subject of your testimony.
"Answer: 'Since I was under oath, I of course had to comment =on it.1
With this quotation I merely want to prove that the knowledge of the witness Schellenberg on this point was not his own knowledge. The witness, in his Affidavit Number 1.2, then says that he became convinced that in the Wagner-Heydrich conference the
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future activity of the Einsatzgruppen, also the planned mass-exterminations, were presumably discussed and decided upon. With regard to this point I want to refer to the result of the cross-examination. It is quite clearly shown there that the witness Schellenberg's assumption that General Wagner and Heydrich in this discussion in 1941 had spoken of planned mass-exterminations was formed only in the year 1945.
The witness Schellenberg then says that in June 1941 he attended an intelligence (Ic) conference which lasted several days, but that he was present only at one of these conference sessions. He says in his affidavit that presumably in the following sessions the proposed mass-exterminations were made known to the intelligence officers, and he adds the further assumption that the commanders-in-chief were informed of the planned mass-exterminations through these presumably informed intelligence officers. I will now prove to the Court that both these assumptions which Schellenberg expressed in testifying for the Prosecution are contrary to the truth.
I present to the Court Affidavits Number 701 and 701-a, which are available in translation. In Affidavit 701 a participant at this intelligence conference, General Von Gersdorff, says that planned mass exterminations were not mentioned and the same fact is affirmed in General Kleikamp's statement, which is also given under oath. In cross-examination I showed one of these affidavits to Schellenberg and I questioned him as follows. This is one of the few quotations which I should like to make because of its importance.
THE PRESIDENT: What is that you wanted to refer to? Cross-examination before the Court?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Before the Tribunal or what?
DR. LATERNSER: Before the Commission,- Mr. President. Very well, I shall dispense with reading it, Mr. President. I only refer the Court to the evidence taken before the Commission, which has a special bearing on this point.
The affidavit of General R6ttiger, Exhibit USA-560, can no longer, in view of the cross-examination before the Commission, be used by the Prosecution in the sense in which it was desired to use it. I shall not quote from it, although I would very much like to do so.
In regard to the testimony of SS Fuehrer Rode, Affidavit Number 18, Exhibit USA-563, whom I unfortunately could not cross-examine, I point out that the witness himself begins- with the words "As far as I know, the Einsatzgruppen were completely subordinate
As counter-evidence I have 52 affidavits on this point, which I have numbered 701 to 752. Affidavits 704, 705, 707, and 710
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to 752 make it completely clear that there was never any subordination of the Einsatzgruppen.
Affidavit 706, in addition, shows that Field Marshal Von Kleist, as commander of an army group, on a mere rumor that Jews were being murdered, immediately intervened, summoned the Higher SS and Police Leader and told him that he would not permit excesses against the Jews. This SS Fuehrer assured him that no excesses against the Jews were taking place, and that he had no orders to that effect.
I refer, the Court also to Affidavit Number 709 which shows that General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg immediately expelled from the operational area the leader of an Einsatzkommando who came to him and said that he (the Einsatzkommando chief) had been entrusted with the settling of political matters.
I refer now to Affidavit 712-a by General Von Knobelsdorff. This general ordered the arrest 'of an SD Fi1hrer who wanted to have 50 to 60 persons shot because according to statements of confidential agents they were anti-German and intended to carry out acts of sabotage against the German troops. In this connection one piece of evidence seems of special importance, namely, Affidavit 1637, by General Kittel. According to this affidavit, the mayor of Marinka, a racial German, was condemned to death by a court-martial and shot for crimes committed against a Jewess. How could the sentence on this man be explained if on the other hand the military leaders had ordered or tolerated the murder of many thousands of Jews?
Finally, I refer to the testimony of all witnesses before' the Commission who testified that the Einsatzgruppen were not subordinate to the Wehrmacht.
Now, the Commissar Order. On this subject the Prosecution submitted Affidavit 24, Exhibit USA-565, by Colonel Von Bonin, according to which this order was valid for all units of the Eastern Army. But the same affidavit shows that the commanding general of the 47th Panzer Corps, General Lemelsen...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you are commenting upon evidence of the Prosecution. You are commenting upon Exhibit USA-565. At least, so I understand it.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I was misunderstood. I was only referring to a part of this document to which the Prosecution did not refer.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the affidavit is in evidence, I suppose, and it is evidence for the Prosecution, and you are commenting upon it and that is not what we want you to do. We want you to present your evidence. Go on, please.
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DR. LATERNSER: I have more affidavits refuting the charge of the Prosecution with regard to the Commissar Order. On this point I turned over a total of 82 affidavits to the Commission: they are numbered 301 to 376. 1 would actually prefer to go into this point in more detail, but in order to save time, I shall not do so, but shall merely refer to special points to which I have to draw the Tribunal's attention.
The testimony of General Warlimont in Affidavit 301-a shows the resistance against the order already at the time when it was being drawn up in the OKW and OKH, and the unsuccessful attempt to prevent its issue altogether. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Generaloberst Zeitzler, immediately protested to Hitler against this order, and it was thanks to his energetic protests that the order was rescinded. That is shown by Document 302-b. I ask that I may be allowed to quote one paragraph from this important document; it is 301-b.
THE PRESIDENT: 302-b, I thought. Whir-h is it?
DR. LATERNSER: I believe there is a mistake. In the list which you have, Mr. President, this document has been numbered 301-b.
THE PRESIDENT: I see
DR. LATERNSER: I quote:
"After I took up my duties as Chief of the Army General Staff, I had a very serious and outspoken private conversation with Adolf Hitler about this order, and we viewed it from all sides. At the time Adolf Hitler was, as I remember, very much impressed by this discussion; that struck me, because otherwise he never changed his opinion in such matters -once it had been formed, and cut short any person who referred to such matters. For that reason I returned to this question several times, and I believe I succeeded in altering his opinion."
Of the remaining affidavits I should like to refer particularly to Affidavit 315. This shows that General Hoeppner, the Commander-in-Chief of Panzer Group 4, acted in the same way in which the other commanders-in-chief acted, that is, he did not carry out the order.
Then I refer to Affidavit 324-a, b, and c. With these documents I refute the Russian accusation on Page 1 of Document USSR-62. General Nel~ring expressly confirms in this affidavit that the order was not carried out in the area under his command. This testimony is corroborated by Affidavit Number 336.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: The testimony of Major General Pape, in Affidavit 333, refutes with regard to the sphere of this division-it is
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the division which Field Marshal Model commanded at that time the Russian charge in USSR-62, which is based on the testimony of the soldier Trest. At the time when Field Marshal Model, who then of course held a lower rank, commanded this division the order was never carried out.
The testimony of Admiral Schmundt in Affidavit Number 349 shows that the order was also opposed in the Navy, where it actually had only secondary importance. That the troops of Germany's allies did not treat Russian commissars contrary to international law either, is proved by the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Fellmer with reference to the 13th Romanian Division and the sphere of the Italian expeditionary corps. He did not receive the order for transmittal, and he did not transmit it.
I ask that the Tribunal study with especial care the summary of the list of affidavits on the Commissar Order, because it shows that the order was not carried out. I would certainly have been in a position to present further evidence on this point if I had had more time at my disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: You have already referred to 75, 1 think that perhaps is sufficient. I say you have already referred to 75 affidavits.
DR. LATERNSER: On partisan warfare: The Prosecution contends that, in the East in particular, this~ warfare was conducted in violation of international law. As evidence for these assertions, the Prosecution has referred to Affidavit Number 15 by General R6ttiger, Exhibit USA-559, to Affidavit Number 20 by General Heussinger, Exhibit USA-564, to Affidavit Number 17, Exhibit USA-562, and to the testimony of the witness Von dem Bach Zelewski. I cross-examined the witnesses Heussinger and Ruttiger before the Commission, and I ask the Tribunal to take notice of these transcripts. General Ruttiger, in his Affidavit Number 15, Exhibit USA-559, had raised an especially severe charge.
I ask the Court's permission to quote a few passages of the examination before the Commission concerning this point. General R6ttiger had asserted that there existed orders of the High Command of the Army saying that the most severe measures were to be taken: 'furthermore, he asserted that the number of prisoners taken by the enemy ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we have got to consider, not these individual details, but we have got to consider the criminal character of the organization charged. First of all, whether it is an organization within the meaning*of the Charter, and secondly, whether it is a criminal organization. Here you wanted to draw our attention to individual details about partisan warfare in your cross-examination of the witness before the Commission. As I have
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pointed out, we have nearly 3,000 affidavits on your behalf to consider. If you would only give us the numbers of the affidavits which you say relate to a particular topic, then we shall know what relates to that topic and we shall be able to consider it.
DR. LATERNSER: But the Prosecution presented these details and they constitute a very grave charge; I want to prove the contrary . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, they did, and I have a reference to them. They were presented in the USA Affidavits 559 to 564, and I am perfectly well aware that you have cross-examined the witness. What I want to know is what affidavits you want to draw our attention to in reply to the case of the Prosecution on partisan warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: I draw the attention of the Court to the Commission transcript. The result of the cross-examination is that the affidavit of General Ruttiger presented by the Prosecution was completely refuted. As counter-evidence I refer to Affidavits 901 to 1043, and with regard to the suppression of the Warsaw uprising, to Affidavits 1501 to 1507. In detail, Statements 901 to 905 contain general statements on partisan warfare and on the suppression of partisan attacks in all theaters of war. Especially significant is Affidavit 903, by Field Marshal Von Weichs. Affidavits 906 to 931 give examples of the fighting methods of the partisans, while Affidavits 906 to 920 describe particularly dreadful atrocities committed by partisan bands. Affidavits 921 to 924 prove the partisans' actions in violation of international law, with regard to clothing, weapons, and other details. Affidavits 925 to 931 describe the extent of sabotage against railroads. That in spite of this the Germans fought according to the rules of international law, is proved by Affidavits 932 to 970. They show that the partisans were treated like prisoners of war.
Affidavits 972 to 1032 show that there was no talk at the front about orders or intentions of the Supreme Command to use partisan warfare for the purpose of exterminating Jews or Slavs.
Affidavits Number 1033 to 1040, and 1050, deal with the charge against the commander-in-chief of the 18th Army, that on 30 October 1942 he ordered that without discrimination all partisans were to be shot. In this connection I refer to the affidavit of Generaloberst Lindemann himself, who was the commander-in-chief of the 18th Army. This shows that such an order was never given. He describes the entry in the war diary of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, Document Number 1786-PS, as incorrect. This affidavit is available in translation.
Affidavit Number 1041 by General Von Mellenthin is a description of a large-scale operation against partisans. In spite of an application of Army Group North to the OKH that the Army should
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be entrusted with this operation, the undertaking was carried out under Himmler's direction by General of Police Von dem BachZelewski. This affidavit serves to refute the testimony of Von dem Bach-Zelewski, in which he describes himself as nothing more than an agency for the collection of reports. To prove that this assertion of the witness Von dem. Bach-Zelewski is incorrect, I further refer to the testimony of the witness Heussinger before the Commission.
Concerning the suppression of the Polish uprising in Warsaw, Affidavits 1501 to 1507, particularly the statement of General Guderian, 1501, state:
(1) that General of Police Von dem Bach-Zelewski was entrusted with the task of suppressing the uprising;
(2) that he was appointed to this task by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and was directly subordinate to him;
(3) that he received his orders from him, that is, neither from the OKH, nor from Army Group Center, nor from the 9th Army;
(4) that the majority of the troops employed in Warsaw consisted of SS and police troops, including the SS Brigade Kaminski;
(5) that the particular atrocities against the population in Warsaw were committed by the SS Brigade Kaminski which consisted of Eastern nationals, and that this brigade was withdrawn from the battlefield to prevent further harm, and that its leaders were punished;
(6) that the 9th Army took exemplary care of the population escaping from Warsaw.
I will not quote any more details of this Affidavit 1501.
As further proof that army agencies had nothing to do with the battle in Warsaw, I present the testimony of General Von Vormann, Affidavit 1504.
Document USSR-128, on Pages 161 and 162 of my Document Book 2, also shows that the Wehrmacht agencies had nothing to do with the destruction of Warsaw which was apparently intended in 1944.
I should like to -make one reference to partisan warfare in Italy. The Prosecution presented two orders of the commander there, Field Marshal Kesselring, and considers them to be violations of international law. I refer to the testimony of Field Marshal Kesselring before the Commission. In this examination the witness emphasized that he had to take these temporary measures to suppress the uprising and that through taking them ~e succeeded in becoming master of the situation. This testimony of Field Marshal Kesselring is confirmed by Affidavit 3004 by General R8ttiger.
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Treatment of prisoners: The Prosecution charges the military leaders with planning, tolerating, or committing crimes against prisoners of war in all theaters of war. , The Russian Prosecution, in particular, enumerates specific atrocities, which I do not wish to mention in detail. Insofar as they affect the circle of persons whom I represent, I shall refute these accusations by affidavits.
I refer first to Affidavit Number 1101 by Field Marshal Von Ktichler, which deals with the principles of the treatment of prisoners of war. Lieutenant Colonel Schaeder testifies in Affidavit 1102 that in November 1941 in Orsha he participated in a discussion between the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder, and the chiefs -of the three army groups on the Eastern Front, at which the feeding of prisoners was also discussed. The Army Groups Center and South, which had just taken many prisoners, asked for permission to use army supplies to supplement the food allowances of the prisoners, and if necessary, even to reduce the rations of the German troops for this purpose. In this connection, I further refer to the Affidavits 1103, 1104, 1104-a, 1105-a to c, and 1106 to 1109, inclusive. A particularly important affidavit is Affidavit Number 3146 by General Gereke. General Gercke was, from August 1939 to the end of the war, Chief of Transport in the OICH. He states that the transports of Soviet prisoners of war were treated exactly Eke the transports of other prisoners of war. The prisoners were transported together in closed freight cars, and orders deviating from this procedure were never issued. Open flat cars, as contended by the Prosecution, were used only very seldom and only on transports over short stretches, because there was a great scarcity of this type of car. In no case were transports in the winter sent intentionally in open cars in order to let the prisoners freeze to death. That is shown by Affidavit 3146.
Now I come to the refutation of individual points of the Russian charges concerning the treatment of prisoners. On 13 February 1946 it was stated that corpses of Red Army men were found on the island of Chortiza on the Dnieper (Volume VII, Page 347). ,
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal has already said that it intends only to listen to you for half a day, and unless you shorten or unless you have in mind the shortening of your address, it doesn't look as if you will be able to do it. If you can't do it, then we will have to take your documents as they are without any further reference. It seems to me that with reference to prisoners of war, all you have got to do is tell us what are the numbers of the affidavits which deal with it and say "I particularly refer to such and such an order or such and such an affidavit," and then we shall know that you attach particular importance to those affidavits, but to deal with it in detail like this is simply wasting
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our time. Anyhow, what I mean is that at the end of half a day your address on these topics will cease.
DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, I must have an opportunity of answering the accusations of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: You are having that opportunity at the present moment and you have had since twelve o'clock.
DR. LATERNSER: On 13 February 1946 it was asserted that on the island of Chortiza on the Dnieper, corpses of Red Army men were found who had been tortured, whose hands had been cut off, whose eyes had been put out, and whose stomachs had been cut open (Volume VII, Page 347). This is refuted by Affidavit Number 1115 of Field Marshal Von Kleist, who was commander-in-chief of the troops there. No German troops -were used on this island, but the Hungarian Light Corps was fighting there. That is shown by Affidavit 1115.
In the Northern sector of the Eastern Front, according to the transcript of 13 February 1946, prisoners are said to have been driven before the attacking German troops who used them as shields (Volume VII, Page 348). This is clearly refuted by the testimony of the former commander-in-chief of the 18th Army, Generaloberst Lindemann, Affidavit 1116-a. This testimony is reinforced on the same point by the affidavit of Colonel Nolte, Number 3159.
The Russian Document USSR-151 and the speech of the Prosecution of 13 February 1946 contain the examination of General Von 6stOrreich, who made especially serious charges with regard to the treatment of prisoners (Volume VII, Pages 363-365). As counterevidence I present Affidavit Number 1117 which proves that Von Osterreich reproduced the conference in May 1941 quite wrongly. In particular the affidavit refutes the assertion that orders were given to fire on fleeing prisoners or to poison prisoners incapable of working.
According to the transcript of 13 February 1946, numerous prisoners in the prison of Sevastopol are said to have been killed by intentionally bad treatment (Volume VII, Page 383). This assertion is clearly disproved by the testimony of the Army Medical Officer of the 11th Army at that time, Generalstabsarzt Grosse, in his Affidavit 1118. According to the transcript of 13 February 1946, three trainloads of prisoners of war are said to have been taken from Kertch to Sevastopol and burned or drowned at sea there on 4 September or December 1943 (Volume VII, Page 383). This assertion is disproved by the testimony of Generals Deichmann and Ruttiger in Affidavits 3140 and 3007; both generals were in the Crimea at that time. The Russian Prosecution tried ' on 13 February 1946, to portray the violent fighting in the quarries near Kertch as bestiality on the part of the Germans (Volume VII, Page 388). Gas is said to
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have been used, and according to the testimony of a woman who apparently made an exact count, 900 prisoners were maltreated or shot. The clear testimony of the commanding general in that area, General Mattenklott, contradicts this; the reference is Affidavit 1121.
Document USSR-62 and the Prosecution speech of 13 February 1946, according to which on the orders of Field Marshal Model and General Nehring no prisoners were to be taken, are refuted by Affidavits 1222-a to f, that is, by six affidavits on this particular point (Volume VII, Page 392). Maltreatment of prisoners in Norwegian camps is also alleged in the Prosecution speech of 14 February 1946 (Volume VII, Page 433). Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst, in Affidavit 1123, proves that these prisoners were not under the military but under the SS.
Affidavits 1150 to 1160 testify that wounded prisoners were everywhere treated like our own wounded. From the many theaters of war there is testimony that the enemy himself acknowledged that the treatment was good. On this point I submit Statements 1161 and 1162, the latter containing an acknowledgment by the American General Storm. Number 1165 testifies to a letter of thanks from the nephew of the King of England, and Number 1166 contains several letters from RAF officers to the commandant of the Air Force prisoner of war camp at Oberursel thanking him for his chivalrous attitude. Affidavit 1168 shows that in October 1942 the commander of the 14th Division, General Heim, in an order to the German troops at Stalingrad stated that Russian prisoners were to be provided with food and that for this purpose food supplies for the German troops were to be further reduced, although they were already very small. Further examples of the chivalrous treatment of captured enemy soldiers are given in Statement 1170, and in that of General Student, Number 1171. When infantile paralysis broke out among British prisoners on Crete, General Student sent a transport plane to Berlin for the necessary serum, in spite of the difficult position of the German troops, who were dependent on supplies from the air. Oberstabsarzt Dr. Schtifer, in Affidavit 1172, says that the Mountain Rescue Service in the Alps saved approximately 350 enemy flyers from death.
Document 1174 testifies to outstanding personal chivalry on the part of Colonel Count Klinkowstr6m, and I would like to refer to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, Dr. Laternser, you can give us the reference to the numbers of the affidavits which state that prisoners were treated properly. Why waste time about it by telling us what each affidavit says. You only have to tell us that these affidavits refer to good treatment by individuals.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I only give numbers and do not refer at least partially to the contents, none of this material
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will have any weight, because these affidavits have not been translated. Of all the affidavits approximately 40 have been translated. If I cannot go into at least some of the contents, then the Tribunal will not be able to take these affidavits into consideration at all.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got the summary before us in writing. What you are practically doing in every case is to repeat the summary which we have already before us in writing; for instance, 1174: Decent treatment of English prisoners. There is another one from some of the British officers showing who the British officer is and saying what he said about the treatment. Well, I have made it quite clear to you, I hope, that you will not be allowed to go on beyond a half day; and now the Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit on Saturday next.
DR. LATERNSER: The Russian Prosecution, on 13 February 1946 made charges concerning the robbing of corpses (Volume VII, Pages 347 and 354). Evidence to the contrary is provided by Affidavits 1176 to 1178.
The Russian Prosecution asserts that Soviet prisoners of war were forced to serve in the German Wehrmacht. In this connection I refer to Affidavits 1179 to 1203, which show that in one year alone the number of volunteers was 500,000 men.
On the subject of the treatment of prisoners in the home area, I refer to Affidavits 1208 to 1213.
On the subject of special measures for the prevention of excesses, I refer to Affidavits 1214 to 1216.
Destruction and plundering: I have subdivided my material into five sections:
1. Alleged destruction and desecration of churches,
2. Destructions during the advance in the East,
3. Alleged destruction and plundering of cultural monuments and cultural sites,
4. Destructions during the retreat,
Affidavits 1301 to 1353 refute the assertion of the Prosecution concerning the destruction and desecration of- numerous churches. Most of the churches had already been destroyed or had already been desecrated by being turned into warehouses, workshops, or in
certain instances into atheist museums. Affidavits 1301 to 1323 give evidence of this. During the retreat, churches were especially
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protected: Affidavit 1324. Affidavits 1325 to 1348 prove that in fact the churches were restored to their religious purpose.
Special protection of churches: in the French campaign, the prevention of a major fire in the Cathedral at Rouen by order of a high military commander is shown by Affidavits 1349 to 1353.
With reference to Section 2, Affidavits 1354 to 1401 deal with destructions during the advance. Affidavits 1354 to 1362 prove the organized work of Soviet commandos who were charged with destructions before the German advance. Affidavits 1363 to 1398 show the tremendous destruction carried out by the Russians in the Donets Basin,, and in the industrial areas of Stalino, Maikop, Artenisk, Dniepropetrovsk, Krivoy-Rog, Orel, Orchom-Kisegrad, Zaporozhe, Smolensk, Vitebsk, Rovno, Riga, and Kharkov.
In Vitebsk, according to Affidavit 1319, actual firebrand commandos were set into action with gasoline cans. All this refutes the assertions of the Prosecution in the transcripts of 18 February 1946 (Volume VII, Page 534), 21 February 1946 (Volume VII, Page 90), and 22 February 1946 (Volume VII, Page 124).
The dam at Zaporozhe was destroyed by the Russians themselves. This is proved by Affidavits 1371 to 1384.
The chief reason for destruction in France is explained by Affidavit 1400.
Destructions in Greece were not carried out by the German troops but by the retreating enemy troops, and this is proved by Affidavit 1401.
Affidavits 14.02 to 1552 deal with Section 3, destruction and plundering, of cultural monuments, and clearly refute a number of assertions.
Affidavit 1402 was deposed by Field Marshal Von Kuchler and states that art treasures were taken from areas at the front to the rear and stored in a secure museum in Pleskov. In a ceremony there, they were handed over to the Metropolitan of the city.
Leningrad: Destruction was determined by military necessity. Affidavits 1403 to 1405 are proof thereof and refute the testimony of the witnesses Orbeli and Lomakin. Affidavits 1406 to 1411 refer to the places in the vicinity of Leningrad, most of which were destroyed by Russian fire.
The famous estate of Tolstoi in Yasnaya Polyana was spared by the Germans upon express orders of Generaloberst Guderian, as shown by Affidavits 1412 to 1418. One of these affidavits deposes that in the Russian victory film of the spring of 1942 the Tolstoi estate was shown undamaged after recapture. The Tschaikovsky Museum in Klin was not plundered by the Germans. Proof: Affidavits 1419 to 1422. Affidavits , 1423 to 1427 prove that the observatory in Bulkowo was never in German hands and therefore
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was not plundered by the German Wehrmacht. The observatory at Siemais in the Crimea was not plundered by German troops. According to Affidavit 1428 the instruments were removed by the Russians in their retreat before the German troops marched in.
Destructions in Novgorod (Affidavits 1429 to 1438) were never ordered. St. Peter's Church and the famous Schwarzhiiupter House in Riga were not destroyed by the Germans but by fire by the Russians themselves.
Riga, Reval, and Novgorod suffered heavily through Russian bombing attacks. The church treasures of Novgorod were not plundered by German troops. The Russians in 1941 loaded these treasures on a ship which sank in the Wolchow and remained lying there. Proof of this: Affidavits 1429 to 1438.
The monument "1000 Years of Russia" was treated by the Germans correctly and with great care. Proof of this: Affidavits 1439 and 1440.
An order to set 500 villages in the neighborhood of Pleskov on fire was never given. Proof: Affidavits 1441 to 1443.
Generaloberst Mackensen did not rob the museum in Rostov of valuable paintings. Proof: Affidavit 3021.
Destruction in Kiev: Kiev came into German hands relatively undamaged. Affidavits 1444 to 1451 prove that the destruction was caused primarily by time bombs. The German troops did everything to fight the fire and remove the mines, and in that way the Lenin Museum was saved. Hoses to fight the fire were brought in from Germany by airplane. Proof of this: Affidavits 1444 to 1451.
Plundering in Tula never took place. German troop~ were never in Tula, Lt only reached the edge of the city; see Affidavit 1452.
Affidavits 1453 to 1483 refer to plundering and destruction during the retreat., Affidavit 1483 by General W6hler gives proof of the fact that at the last minute the wish of a high Russian Church prelate in Poltava, that church valuables be safeguarded, was fulfilled.
Affidavits 1484 to 1500 and 1551 to 1591 prove that plundering of any kind was strictly prohibited and was severely punished, even if an object of small value was involved.
Affidavit 3024 by General Eberbach is especially important and proves that the order given by Hitler in the summer of 1944, that everything was to be destroyed in the retreat from France, was not carried out by the commander-in-chief of the 7th Army in agreement with Field Marshal Model.
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For the Italian theater of war, there is the testimony of witnesses Kesselring and Weizsdcker, and in addition, Affidavits 3008, 3025, and 3026, which show that:
(1) cities of cultural value were evacuated in good time;
(2) art treasures from Monte Cassino, Ravenna, Bologna, and Rimini were protected and removed to safety;
(3) the destruction of industrial installations, which had been ordered, was not carried out, and through the personal intervention of a German general the port of Genoa was saved from, being blown up. This is shown in Affidavits 3008, 3025, and 3026.
I should like to refer to Documents USSR-115, USSR-168, and General Staff Number 19 contained in my document book. The Wehrmacht communiqu6 of 18 May 1940 shows that Louvain was taken after hard fighting. This explains the damage to the university at Louvain, which the witness Van der Essen believed he could attribute to arbitrary acts.
Treatment of the civilian population: The Russian Prosecution has asserted, on 8 February 1946, that the directives for the "Barbarossa" order called for the physical destruction of people under suspicion (Volume VII, Page 172). In order to refute this, I refer to Affidavits 1601, 1601-a, and 1601-b, which show that frequently the death penalty was imposed for excesses, especially in cases of rape.
1601-c offers evidence of three death sentences for crimes committed against a Russian family.
It is asserted, on 14 February 1946, that the German Wehrmacht, on 1 July 1941, carried out a mass killing in Lvov (Volume VII, Page 454). 1 refer to Affidavits 1602, 1603, and 1604 which show that when the German troops marched in, many rows of partly mutilated corpses were found, and were viewed by several generals.
On 2 July the 49th Mountaineer Corps took steps against the maltreatment of Jews by the local Ukrainians. According to the Prosecution speech of 15 February 1946 135,000 corpses were said to be found in the area of Smolensk (Volume VII, Pages 465-466). Evidence to the contrary: Affidavits 3006 and 1607, showing that especially good relations existed with the population there. Among other things, the famed Cathedral at Smolensk was restored and reopened. During the retreat large masses of the population followed the German troops against the wish of the commanders. That is proved by Affidavit 1608.
According to the assertions made on 15 February 1946, 245 children were poisoned with coffee and cake at Kertch (Volume VII, Page 493). Evidence to the contrary: Number 1609, an affidavit
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by General Konrad, which also shows that relations with the population of the Crimea were especially good. I refer particularly to Affidavits 1611 and 1612 in this connection.
According to the assertion of the Prosecution on 15 February 1946, a cruel alarm order was issued by the commander of Feodosia and instructions published by the 260th Infantry Division (Volume VII, Page 499). Evidence: Affidavit 1612-a, which shows that a 260th Infantry Division was never stationed in the Crimea. Supplementary proof: 1614.
In the Prosecution's case of 15 February 1946 reprisals in Kiev in 1941 are mentioned (Volume VII, Page 503). 1 refer on this point to an affidavit by General Von Obstfelder, Number 1615.
According to Affidavit 1616, also deposed by General Von Obstfelder, German troops gave substantial aid to an insane asylum which presented a dreadful picture of negligence, as the inmates had been left to look after themselves.
With regard to the alleged murder of 33,000 Jews in Kiev, I refer to Affidavit Number 1665 deposed by General Heim. He knows of no order to that effect.
In the autumn of 1943, 195,000 persons are alleged to have been killed in mass executions and in gas vans in Kiev. For counterevidence I refer to Affidavits 1116-a, 1116-b, and 1116-c, which show that the Wehrmacht never possessed any gas vans.
According to the record of 15 February 1946, the military command in Stalingrad sowed death everywhere (Volume VII, Page 504). The state of affairs in Stalingrad - is described in Affidavit 1617.
The accusation is made on 18 February 1946 that the German Wehrmacht drowned 144,000 Russians in the sea (Volume VII, Pages
545-546). At another point, 144,000 citizens are again mentioned as having been taken out to sea on ferries and then drowned. I refer to Affidavits 1609, 3007, 3140, 1625, and 1625-a, which show, among other things, that the shipping space was so inadequate that not even the supplies of the German troops could be entirely handled by way of the water and that the air transport service had to help out.
It is asserted on 26 February 1946, quite generally, that the Wehrmacht participated in the persecution of the Jews (Volume VIII, Page 294). 1 refer to Affidavit 1629, deposed by Field Marshal Von Kuchler, who describes at great length the absolute refusal of the Wehrmacht to take part in such things, and its endeavors to take measures against excesses.
Affidavits 1630 and 1632 are of significance in this connection; they testify especially to the medical help provided, against the wish of certain quarters, during a typhus epidemic among the Jews. To show that no orders were issued for the killing of
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Jews or other members of the population of the occupied territories, and also that troops did not take part therein, I refer to Affidavits 3051, 3057, 3083, 3084, 3097, 3099, 3111, 3142, 3150, and 3172.
Some documents of the Soviet Prosecution, including USSR-291, Pages I to 3, allege that atrocities were committed in the area of Vyasma and Rizhevska, and also in the area of Rzhev.
Affidavit 1633 by General Praun deals with the accusation made against General Weiss that he ordered people in Rzhev to be hanged. Two women were sentenced to death at that time and were hanged publicly. Reason: The murder of 15 children and the sale of the flesh of these children on the market. For that reason two women were hanged publicly at Rzhev.
USSR-2, Page 7, speaks of slavery in Stalino. Evidence to the contrary: Affidavit 1637, by General Kittel. ,
USSR-91, Pages I and 8, mentions atrocities near Leningrad and Pskov; refutation by Affidavit 1640, deposed by Field Marshal Von Kilchler. The alleged shooting of 50,000 inhabitants of the city of Narva is refuted by the statements of the same officer, hi Affidavits 1646 and 1647.
Numerous measures to aid the city of Pleskov are described in Affidavit 1645.
USSR-39 deals with Estonia; refutation of this document by Meld Marshal Von Leeb, Affidavit 1641.
The attitude taken by the commanders-in-chief with respect to the Reichenau order is shown in Affidavits 1662, 1663, and 1665. Particularly the last affidavit, 1665, states the reasons for this decree of Field Marshal Von Reichenau. One of the reasons was the murder of two German officers.
With regard to Italy, the correct behavior of the troops is described in Affidavits 1666, and 1667 to 1670. Among these is an affidavit by the Prince of Hesse, who also mentions the view of the last Italian king.
The same correct behavior is described with regard to Yugoslavia in Affidavits 1671 and 1672.
Especially good co-operation was recognized as the rule in Norway and Denmark; evidence of this is contained in Affidavits Number 1673 and - 1674. Numerous examples of the endeavors of the Wehrmacht to win the co-operation of the Belgian and French populations, above all through the strictest control of troop discipline, are shown in Affidavits 1675 to 1679.
Generaloberst Blaskowitz testifies in Affidavit 1680, and two other generals in Affidavits 1681 and 1682, that the Wehrmacht took severe measures against excesses by the troops in Poland. Against
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plundering many drastic steps were taken. Proof: Affidavits 1683 and 1685.
It is known that a saying was common in all occupied countries: "German soldier with eagle on chest-very good." And the fact that. this was so is due to the military leadership.
With respect to the administration of military justice I should first of all like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the diagram contained in my document book as General Staff Number 12, on Pages 72 to 74. This diagram, Page 74, shows that the commander-in-chief of an army may at times be judicial administrator only for a small part of the army area under his command.
For the attitude of the military leaders toward the judicial system, I refer to Affidavits 501, 502-a, and 503. In addition, three of the highest judges of the former German Wehrmacht were examined, and their statements are contained in Affidavits 504, 505, and 506. It is the testimony of Judge General (Generaloberstabsrichter) Lehmann and Judge General Von Hammerstein. They describe what severe punishments were inflicted for crimes against the population of the East, and how Wehrmacht justice finally made its will prevail over Hitler's will.
The Commando Order: the Prosecution submitted Documents 498-PS, Exhibit USA-501, and 503-PS, Exhibit USA-542, and I should like to point out that both of these documents were signed by Hitler.
Affidavit Number 600 describes in detail that this Commando Order must be traced back to the sole initiative of Hitler, and that he did not consult his commanders-in-chief at the front before issuing it. Affidavit 600, therefore, refutes the assertion of the Prosecution that the military leaders had a part in the publication of this order. With regard to the execution of this Commando Order, the Prosecution has pointed out three cases which occurred in Norway. Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain any material on these cases.
In the Italian theater of war, according to the statement of the Prosecution, three British Commando units were 'captured on 2 November 1942 and turned over to the SD for special treatment: Document 509-PS, Exhibit USA-547. The Prosecution submitted this Document 509-PS as proof that these units were actually handed over, as is set down in this report to the OKW. This is an obvious conclusion but, as I shall prove, it is not correct. I refer to the testimony of General Westphal, given before the Commission, in which he expressly states under oath that these three British Commando units-the witness stated the exact place of their landing -were not turned over to the SD, but were sent to a prisoner-of-war camp, and that the report to the OKW to which the Prosecution
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refers, 509-PS, was a wrong report which did not correspond to the facts. In these three cases, therefore, the Commando Order was not applied. Thus General Westphal's statement made under oath before the Commission refutes Document 509-PS.
I was not able to clarify the case of Dostler, because the records of the court martial were not put at my disposal, despite my request. Nevertheless, I should like to point out that a supplementary order by Field Marshal Kesselring was issued, and that he reserved the right to determine just what constituted a Commando operation. General Dostler does not belong to the group of persons accused.
On the basis of Document L-51, Exhibit USA-521, it is alleged that in accordance with the order directing the application of the Commando Order to foreign military commissions also, several persons were shot. I refer to the contents of Document L-51, USA-521, which clearly shows that the Wehrmacht had nothing to do with this matter.
I further refer to Document C-178, which shows that the General Staff of the Army and the General Staff of the Air Force protested against the Commando Order. I also refer to Affidavit 610 regarding the application or nonapplication of the Commando Order for the theater of war in the West, and Supplementary Affidavits 611 and 622. Affidavit 617 shows that this order was not applied in the Netherlands. Affidavit 601 shows that the order was not applied in Africa; this is confirmed by Affidavits 603-c and 603-d. Affidavits 614 and 621 show that the order was not applied in the Italian theater of war, and of particular importance ~in this connection is Affidavit 619, in which proof is given that Field Marshal Kesselring reserved the right to determine what constituted a Commando operation.
I further refer to Affidavits 3147 and 3148, which show that the Commander-in-Chief, Southeast, ordered that British Commando units landing on the Aegean islands were not to be considered as Commandos, but as German prisoners of war.
General Bohme affirms in Affidavit 3174 ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you have been over half a day now. The Tribunal would like to know what it is further that you have to refer to.
DR. LATERNSER: I am now near the end of my evidence on the Commando Order, and I shall then refer very briefly to the deportation of workers-that will take two minutes-and to crimes against humanity and war crimes. I estimate that I shall need another twenty minutes altogether.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal has already-at least I have already pointed out to you over and ever again that
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all you are doing in substance is to read out what is already before us in writing, with certain references in addition to the Prosecution's evidence. In nearly every case we have before us in writing exactly what you say about these affidavits.
There is no use nodding your head at me. I have checked it, and that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, is quite unnecessary. You can go on and you must refer us to the affidavits which you say relate to these topics, which you have properly announced as topics upon which you were going to produce documents. That is to say, deportation, rules of war and humanity, and you may refer to the numbers of the affidavits which deal with that and refer us also to the numbers, particularly of the documents which have been translated, and then we shall know where to find the documents which are important. Now will you go on please?
DR. LATERNSER: My last reference was to Affidavit 3174, which states that for the 20th Mountain Army the Commando, Order was changed by General B6hme with the approval of the OKW.
Affidavit 625 proves that the Commando Order was not carried out in the Italian naval theater of operations.
For the Eastern theater of war, Affidavits 608 and 616, as well as 624, show that the order was not carried through.
THE PRESIDENT: In order to show that I was entirely accurate in what I said to you, what we have before us is 608, General Wilke, "Rejection of the order by all commands in the East. No instance of shooting known." Go on.
DR. LATERNSER: With respect to the participation or the alleged participation of the military leaders in the deportation of workers, I refer to Affidavits Number 2001 to 2019. That is all with reference to this point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, have any of them been translated?
DR. LATERNSER: No. Mr. President, that is exactly the misgiving I have. If the affidavits had been translated ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, 2001, the substance of the affidavit is in the summary; the same in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2004-a, and right on down to 2019. The substance of the affidavit is in the summary before us. It doesn't help us in the least to have it repeated by you.
DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the attitude of the military leaders toward the rules of war and toward human laws, I refer to Affidavits Number 505 to 514. ^Furthermore, in this connection I refer to the following documents in 'my document book: 440-PS, Pages 105 and 106 of the document book; 2329-PS, Pages 105 to 112; C-119,
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Pages 116 to 119, and the announcements on Pages 120 to 141 which were valid in all theaters of war.
Affidavit 531 is submitted to refute the accusation that the German military leaders tried to bring about an incident between Hungary and Russia by having German air planes with Soviet insignia attack Hungarian territory. The High Tribunal will remember this assertion, which is refuted in Affidavit 531 by the intelligence officer serving with the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe at that time.
To refute the assertion that military orders were issued for the murder of enemy air crews who were shot down, I refer to Affidavits 652 to 659. 651 particularly shows that the Wehrmacht protected the airmen who were shot down-protected them against the excited population. The fact that lynching was condemned and rejected is evident from Affidavits 518, 519, and 520-a. Two of these affidavits refer to the Chiefs of the General Staff of the Air Force, General Koller and General Kreipe. In particular, Affidavit 520-a shows that General Kreipe officially took measures to punish civilians who used violence against aviators.
Number 521 is an affidavit deposed by Lieutenant General Galland, who testifies that German fighter squadrons never received orders to carry on the fight against crew members who had parachuted from their planes. Affidavit 522 ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, how do you think it helps the Tribunal for you to have made the statement which you have just made, when we have before us Affidavit Number 521, "General Galiand, 7 July 1946: no order was ever given for the combating of shot-down air crews." Now, do you really think that you have added anything to that?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I intended to go into more detail on this point, but in consideration of the Tribunal's wishes I curtailed my remarks. This is the only reason. I shall conclude in a moment.
I refer now to Affidavits Number 522 and 523, which also show rescue measures for enemy fliers.
In conclusion, I should like to refer to Affidavits Number 3103 and 3106. In both of them, it is proved that the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau rescued the survivors of the British auxiliary cruiser Rawalpindi, even though that ship had sent out a radio call for help and fast ' British naval forces could have arrived and would have been in a position to cut off the return route of the German ships to the Bight of Heligoland.
Affidavit 3106, deposed by Rear Admiral Peters, describes similar rescue measures of the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the
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spring of 1941, and also an incident in 1943 when a German U-boat was sent to Spitzbergen specially for the purpose of rescuing persons ,shipwrecked in that area.
That concludes the submission of my documentary evidence.
I should like to introduce the documents which have been translated, Numbers I to 4, 933, 935, 939, 1501, 508a, 508b, 513, and 514b. And finally, I should like to refer to my Document General Staff Number 1 dealing with the speech of Generaloberst Beek on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the foundation of the Military Academy, because this speech shows the attitude of the military leaders.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bohm.
HERR BOHM: Mr. President, may it please the Tribunal, I should like, first of all, to submit an index showing that Document Books SA 1A, 1B, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are being submitted; I shall do that as soon as the originals are here. Then the index includes the transcripts of the Commission sessions, which refer to evidence on this subject before the Commission, affidavits for the General SA, namely, 21 affidavits which have been translated, and an additional 68 affidavits which were also deposed and were dealt with by the Commission, and 17,089 affidavits which have been summarized. Then affidavits for the SA which refer to members of the SA who came from the Stahlhelm, and the corresponding transcripts of the Commission's sessions. Also documents dealing with the mounted SA units, namely 72 affidavits, of which Numbers 1, 13, 21, 24, 29, 30, 64, 68, 70, 72, and 75 have been translated. Then an index which lists the individual affidavits deposed for the General SA, for the Stahlhelm, and for the SA Mounted Corps. I should like to submit this index.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you submitted it?
HERR BOHM: I shall submit this material, Mr. President, as , soon as I receive it, and I shall then call the attention of the High Tribunal to it. It will not take more than a few minutes.
As the first part of my evidence I shall submit documents showing the legal measures taken by the National Socialist State to force the young generation to join the affiliated organizations of the Party. Document General SA-144 shows how members of the Evangelical youth organizations were individually forced into the Hitler Youth. A simple calculation shows that when these young people reached the age of 13, they were taken over by the Party and by the organizations affiliated with the Party, such as the SA.
In order to lay 4old on youth, the Reich Government issued at the same time a decree concerning the creation of student associations in the universities of the Reich; on the basis of this decree the
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student associations received certain powers. That may be seen in Document SA-147. This document refers to Bavaria, but it applied to the whole of Germany; that is proved by Document SA-148, the so-called Prussian Students Rights Decree, the purpose of which clearly was the training of the students for their place in the national community and their training for military fitness.
This decree was the basis for the directive concerning the creation of an SA Department for Universities-Document SA-156. This order, which in this, form applied to all universities in the Reich, compelled all students who were physically fit to serve in the SA. It is important to note that the students could not join up with the SA University Department, but had to join up with the local SA companies (Sturme). The SA University Department was later dissolved, but since the. students had to join the local SA companies, they remained in the SA.
The obligation to serve in the SA was emphasized in every newspaper, as is shown by Document 150. This is an excerpt from the monthly periodical of the C.V., the Catholic German Youth associations.
These obligations however were not sufficient in the National Socialist State, and in the year 1936, all students in their first, second, and third semesters were taken over by the NS Students League, and, as Document SA-151 shows, the National Socialist Students League was given the task of seeing to it that all students belonged in addition to one of the affiliated organizations of the Party; as a result of this, great numbers of German students were again incorporated into the SA.
In Document SA-159, we see the results of noncompliance with the directives of the SA University Department. It shows that study without membership in the SA or a similar formation was impossible.
Document SA-164 shows that the first step of legal coercion was taken in Prussia. The document clearly shows that the Prussian Ministry of Science, Art, and Education ordered that service in the SA and the Labor Service was a condition for being admitted to the second teachers' examination.
Document SA-165 gives evidence that in the year 1935 the Gazette of the7 Bavarian State Ministry of Education and Culture stated, on Page 56, that one of the conditions for study as a teacher was activity and service in an organization such as the SA.
It is obvious that legal coercion was most marked in its effect on those who were economically weak. I want to prove this by submitting Document SA-167, in which service in the Labor Service and in the affiliated organizations is demanded.
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Document SA-170 shows that not even schoolboys, of the sixth class and upward in the high schools, were exempt from this compulsion to be active in the NSDAP or its formations.
In the first part of my evidence I dealt with legal coercion in high schools and universities. I now come to the second part, the legal compulsion applied to recruits to the civil service.
Document SA-162 shows that the law for the restoration of the professional civil service had turned out to be a much-feared discriminating law directed against the civil service.
Document 173, a commentary dealing with the German Civil Service Law of 1937, says on Page 66:
"Of the young German official it must be required, if his physical condition permits, that he be a member of the SA or the SS."
The development which was started by the law for the restoration of the professional civil service ended with the regulation concerning preliminary training for the career of a German civil servant. In Paragraph 2 of this directive-Document SA-176-it is stated:
"Applicants must belong or have belonged to the Party or one of its formations."
In this connection I should like to refer to Document SA-175; and as an exception I should like to deal at greater length with this document and quote from it:
"At last each applicant for an official position can be required to belong to the Party or one of its formations. For the civil servant should not only belong to the SA or to the SS, but should have been in the Hitler Youth as well, since, through the law of 1 December 1936, the Fuehrer has set for all German youth the goal that, in addition to being trained in the home and at school, physical, spiritual, and moral training in the spirit of National Socialism should be given in the Hitler Youth for service to the nation and to the national community."
I should like to quote another passage briefly:
"Thus the material content of the decree had its origin in the individual particles and was built up organically. This kind of refashioning of the law is in accord with the basic principles of the National Socialist State. Its method is not that of the Weimar Constitution State which first issued pleasant sounding laws but was then unable to carry them out because the prerequisites were lacking, apart from the fact that the governmental agencies were too weak to carry them out; but the Government of the Third Reich first creates the actual
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conditions necessary for the carrying out of a governmental measure, and then issues the corresponding law."
The period from- 1933 to 1939 was an epoch in which one law after the other appeared and one directive after the other was issued. I have incorporated only a few of these directives in my document book. Document SA-178 shows that apprentices in the Prussian State administration were to be taken only from National Socialist formations such as the SA and SS.
As early as 1934, as Document SA-183 shows, a condition for being admitted to practical training in the advanced construction service was that the applicant be a member of a formation such as the SA.
The same applied, as is shown in Document 165, in the case of the Reich Railways.
One can say, to sum up, that the young generation, which was not old enough to vote in 1933, was forced into formations of the NSDAP through laws and directives. It cannot be regarded as an exception that the Reich Minister of Transport says in a letter, Document SA-186:
"A special case prompts me to point out once more to all civil servants entering training courses for higher posts, as well as assessors and construction assessors already belonging to the administration, that they should take an active part in the Party or in one of its formations."
This is not an exception involving the Reich Minister of Transport, but it is a typical case for all agencies of the Reich, of the states, communities, and other public institutions.
We will see later that large parts of industry and trade were also affected b this so-called political co-ordination of the younger y generation.
Document SA-188 shows that the Reich Post Office, in all its employment regulations, required membership in the Party or its formations.
The same can be seen in the Reich regulations for legal training, in Document SA-191.
Document SA-194 shows that the Reich Minister of Justice was not satisfied with a formal membership, but demanded active participation in the Party or its formations, such as the SA.
That the Police also did not make any exception, is shown in Document SA-196. Membership in the NSDA-P or one of its formations was a condition for entry into the police service.
Document SA-197 is a collective order, and it concludes this array of directives in 1944.
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Documents SA-200, 201, 203, 208,'and 213 show that service in the SA was required of young personnel in the financial administration. It is regrettable ...
THE PRESIDENT: What is regrettable?
HERR BOHM: I beg your pardon!
THE PRESIDENT: Finish your sentence.
HERR BOHM: Yes, I shall submit all the documents, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 22 August at 1000 hours.]