4000bce - 399
400 - 1399
1400 - 1499
1500 - 1599
1600 - 1699
1700 - 1799
1800 - 1899
1900 - 1999
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the counsel for the United States. Mr. Alderman, before you begin, I think it would be better, for the purpose of the Tribunal, when citing documents, if you would refer to them not only by the United States exhibit number and the PS document number, but also by the document book identification. Each document book, as I understand it, has either a letter or a number. They are numbered alphabetically, I think. If that is not done, when we have got a great number of document books before us, it is very difficult to find where the particular exhibit is.
MR. ALDERMAN: I can see that, yes.
May it please the Tribunal, the handful of selected documents which I presented yesterday constitute a cross section of the aggressive war case, as a whole. They do not purport to cover the details of any of the phases of the aggressive war case. In effect they do amount to a running account of the entire matter.
Before moving ahead with more detailed evidence, I think it might be helpful to pause at this point, to present to the Tribunal a chart. This chart presents visually some of the key points in the development of the Nazi aggression. The Tribunal may find it helpful as a kind of visual summary of some of the evidence received yesterday and also as a background for some of the evidence which remains to be introduced. I am quite certain that, as your minds go back to those days, you remember the maps that appeared from time to time in the public press, as these tremendous movements developed in Europe. I am quite certain that you must have formed the concept, as I did in those days, of the gradually developing head of a wolf.
In that first chart you only have an incipient wolf. He lacks a lower jaw, the part shown in red, but when that wolf moved forward and took over Austria-the Anschluss-that red portion became solid black. It became the jaw of the wolf, and when that lower jaw was acquired, Czechoslovakia was already, with its head and the main part of its body, in the mouth of the wolf.
Then on chart two you see the mountainous portions, the fortified portions of Czechoslovakia. In red, you see the Sudetenland
27 Nov. 45
territories which were first taken over by the Pact of Munich, whereupon Czechoslovakia's head became diminutive in the mouth of the wolf.
And in chart three you see the diminishing head in red, with its neck practically broken, and all that was necessary was the taking over of Bohemia and Moravia and the wolf's head became a solid, black blot on the map of Europe, with arrows indicating incipient further aggressions, which, of course, occurred.
That is the visual picture that I have never been able to wipe out of my mind, because it seems to demonstrate the inevitability of everything that went along after the taking over of Austria.
The detailed more or less chronological presentation of the aggressive war case will be divided into seven distinct sections. The first section is that concerning preparation for aggression during the period of 1933 to 1936, roughly. The second section deals with aggression against Austria. The third section deals with aggression against Czechoslovakia. The fourth section deals with aggression against Poland and the initiation of actual war. For reasons of convenience, the details of the Polish section will be presented after the British Chief Prosecutor presents his opening statement to the Tribunal. The fifth section deals with the expansion of the war into a general war of aggression, by invasions into Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and the Balkans. The details on this section of the case will be presented by the British Chief Prosecutor. The sixth section deals with aggression against the Soviet Union, which I shall expect to present. For reasons of convenience again, the details on this section, like the details on aggression against Poland, will be presented after the British Prosecutor has made his opening statement to the Tribunal. The seventh section will deal with collaboration with Italy and Japan and the aggression against the United States.
I turn now to the first of these sections, the part of the case concerning preparation for aggression during the period 1933 to 1936. The particular section of the Indictment to which this discussion addresses itself is paragraph IV (F) and sub-paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), which I need not read at a glance, as the Tribunal will recall the allegation. It will be necessary, as I proceed, to make reference to certain provisions of the Charter, and to certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaty between the United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, 25 August 1921, which incorporates certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and certain provisions of the Rhine Treaty of Locarno of 16 October 1925.
27 Nov. 45
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, is it not intended that this document book should have some identifying letter or number?
MR. ALDERMAN: "M", I am informed. I do not offer those treaties in evidence at this time, because the British will offer all the pertinent treaties in their aspect of the case.
The Nazi plans for aggressive war started very soon after World War I. Their modest origin and rather fantastic nature, and the fact that they could have been interrupted at numerous points, do not detract from the continuity of the planning. The focus of this part of the Indictment on the period from 1933 to 1945, does not disassociate these events from what occurred in the entire preceding period. Thus, the ascendancy of Hitler and the Nazis to political power in 1933, was already a well-advanced milestone on the German road to progress.
By 1933 the Nazi Party, the NSDAP, had reached very substantial proportions. At that time, their plans called for the acquisition of political control of Germany. This was indispensable for the consolidation within the country of all the internal resources and potentialities.
As soon as there was sufficient indication of successful progress along this line of internal consolidation, the next step was to become disengaged from some of the external disadvantages of existing international limitations and obligations. The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were a bar to the development of strength in all the fields necessary, if one were to make war. Although there had been an increasing amount of circumvention and violation from the very time that Versailles came into effect, such operations under disguise and subterfuge could not attain proportions adequate for the objectives of the Nazis. To get the Treaty of Versailles out of the way was indispensable to the development of the extensive military power which they had to have for their purposes. Similarly, as part of the same plan and for the same reasons, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. It was impossible to carry out their plans on the basis of existing international obligations or of the orthodox kind of future commitments.
The points mentioned in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are now historical facts of which we expect the Tribunal to take judicial notice.
It goes without saying that every military and diplomatic operation was preceded by a plan of action and a careful coordination of all participating forces. At the same time each point was part of a long-prepared plan of aggression. Each represents a necessary
27 Nov. 45
step in the direction of the specific aggression which was subsequently committed.
To develop an extensive argument would, perhaps, be the unnecessary laboring of the obvious. What I intend to say is largely the bringing to light of information disclosed in illustrative documents which were hitherto unavailable.
The three things of immediate international significance referred to in this Paragraph IV (F) 2 of the Indictment are:
First, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; second, the institution of compulsory military service; and, third, the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Each of these steps was progressively more serious than the matter of international relations. In each of these steps Germany anticipated the possibility of sanction being applied by other countries and, in particular, a strong military action from France, with the possible assistance of England. However, the conspirators were determined that nothing less than a preventive war would stop them, and they also estimated correctly, that no one or combination of Big Powers would undertake the responsibility of such a war. The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations was, of course, action that did not violate any international obligation. The League Covenant provided the procedure for withdrawal. However, in this case and as part of the bigger plan, the significance of these actions cannot be disassociated from the general conspiracy and the plans for aggression. The announcement of the institution of universal military service was a more daring action with a more overt significance. It was a violation of Versailles, but they got away with it. Then, came the outright military defiance, the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
Still on the Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2, which alleges the determination of the Nazi conspirators to remove the restrictions of Versailles, the fact that the Nazi plans in this respect started very early is not only confirmed by their own statements, but they boasted about their long planning and careful execution.
I read to you yesterday at length from our Exhibit 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, Hitler's speech to all Supreme Commanders, 23 November 1939. I need not read it again. He stated there that his primary goal was to wipe out Versailles. After 4 years of actual war, the Defendant Jodl, as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, delivered an address to the Reich and to the Gauleiter in which he traced the development of German strength. The seizure of power to him meant the restoration of fighting sovereignty, in-
27 Nov. 45
cluding conscription, occupation of the Rhineland, and rearmament, with special emphasis on modern armor and air forces.
I have, if the Tribunal please, our Document Number L-172. It is a photostat of a microfilm of a speech by General Jodl, and I offer that photostat as Exhibit USA-34. I shall read, if the Tribunal please, only a part of that, but starting at the beginning.
The speech is entitled "The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the Fifth Year of War." It is a kind of retrospective summary by the Defendant General Jodl. "A lecture by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces to the Reich- and Gauleiter, delivered in Munich on 7 November 1943." I am reading from the English translation:
"Introduction: Reichsleiter Bormann has requested me to give you a review today of the strategic position at the beginning of the fifth year of war.
"I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none-too-easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to talk about what will come but one must say frankly what the situation is. No one, the Fuehrer has ordered, may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, gentlemen, but that you need a great deal, in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your Gaue, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the widespread enemy propaganda, defeatism, and malicious rumors are concentrated. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or-as they call it-a political solution. They say we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural feeling of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the nation; the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation, and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and unvarnished account of the present state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you. to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms, but by the will to resist of the entire people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but moral defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but-through the cowardice of these criminal traitors
27 Nov. 45
-a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal, without restriction, for application in your activities as leaders of the people.
"The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and, by attacking, parried the danger which menaced us . . . both from Poland and from the Western Powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and into Russia-these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war, so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask themselves whether, perhaps, we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own work of enlightenment, is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:
"I. A review of the most important questions of past developments;
"II. Consideration of the present situation;
"III. The foundations of our confidence in victory.
"In view of my position as Military Advisor to the Fuehrer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time, that in view of the Protean nature of this war, I shall in this way, be giving expression to only one aspect of the events.
"I. The review:
"1. The fact that the National Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the dictate of Versailles, is not one on which I need expatiate, in this circle. I should like, however, to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful professional soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National Socialist movement in reawakening the military spirit (the Wehrwille), in nurturing fighting strength (the Wehrkraft), and in rearming
27 Nov. 45
the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small Reichswehr would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Fuehrer aimed at-and has so happily been successful in bringing about- was the fusion of these two forces.
"2. The seizure of power . . ."-I invite the Tribunal's attention to the frequency with which that expression occurs in an of these documents.- "The seizure of power by the Nazi Party in its turn had meant, in the first place, the restoration of military sovereignty."
That is the German word "Wehrhoheit"-a kind of euphemism there-"the highness of defense." I think it really means "fighting sovereignty." Wehrhoheit also meant conscription, occupation of the Rhineland and rearmament, with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armored and air arm.
"3. The Austrian Anschluss . . ."-Anschluss means "locking on to," I think. They latched on to Austria and-"The
Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas, up until then, the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers."
I wish the Tribunal would contemplate the chart a moment and see that worm-like form of Czechoslovakia, which General Jodl calls a "wasp waist in the direction of France," and then he very accurately described what happened when Austria was taken by the Anschluss, that the "wasp waist" was "enclosed in the pincers."
I resume reading:
"Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive.
"This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the West Wall, which, in contradistinction to the Maginot Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear coverage for an active policy in the East.
27 Nov. 45
"4. bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939"-that is-the two phases in Czechoslovakia- "and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises."-I think it needs nothing more than a glance at the progressive chart to see what those favorable strategic premises were.-
"5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland, in itself unavoidable, was favorably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt, because the relatively strong opponent collapsed more quickly than expected, and the Western Powers who were Poland's friends, although they did declare war on us and form a second front, nevertheless made no use of the possibilities open to them of wresting the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said but that it proved to an extent which surprised the whole world a fact which until then had not been certain by any means, namely, the high state of efficiency of the young armed forces of Greater Germany."
If the Court please, there is a long review by General Jodl in this document. I could read on with interest and some enthusiasm, but I believe I have read enough to show that General Jodl by this document identifies himself fully with the Nazi movement. This document shows that he was not a mere soldier. Insofar as he is concerned, it identifies the military with the political, and the immediate point on which I had offered the document was to show the deliberation with whim the Treaty of Versailles was abrogated by Germany and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was militarized and fortified.
In one of Adolf Hitler's reviews of the 6-year period between his ascendancy to power and the outbreak of hostilities, he not only admitted but boasted about the orderly and coordinated long-range planning. I bring up again, if the Tribunal please, the Document L-79, which was offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-27. That is the minutes of a conference of the Fuehrer by Schmundt, his adjutant. In as large a staff as ours we inevitably fall into a kind of patois or lingo, as Americans say. We also refer to this as "Little Schmundt." The large file that I offered yesterday, we call "Big Schmundt."
At this point, I merely wish to read two sentences from Page 1 of that document which we call "Little Schmundt."
27 Nov. 45
"In the period 1933 to 1939 progress was made in all fields. Our military system improved enormously."
And then, just above the middle of the second page of the English translation:
"The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims."
One of the most significant direct preparations for aggressive war is found in the secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, which I offered in evidence yesterday as Exhibit USA-24 and commented on then. I need not repeat that comment. The law went into effect upon its passage. It stated at the outset that it was to be made public instantly, but at the end of it Adolf Hitler signed the decree ordering that it be kept secret. I commented on that sufficiently yesterday.
General Thomas, Thomas, as we call him, who was in charge of War and Armament Economy and for some time a high ranking member of The German High Council, refers to this law as "the cornerstone of war preparations." He points out that, although the law was not made public until the outbreak of war, it was put into immediate execution as a program of preparation.
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of General Thomas' work, A History of the German War- and Armament-Economy, 1923-1944, Page 25. We have the volume here, in German, so that anyone who wishes may examine it. I don't care to offer the entire volume in evidence unless the Court think I should. We do give it an exhibit number, Exhibit USA-35, but I simply should like to place it in the files as a reference work implementing judicial notice, if that is practicable.
THE PRESIDENT: You want it simply for the purpose of showing that General Thomas said that that law was the cornerstone of war? That has already been passed into the record.
MR. ALDERMAN: I want to say to counsel for the defendants that it is here if they care to consult it at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: I should have identified it by our number, 2353-PS.
This secret law remained in effect until 4 September 1938, at which time it was replaced by another secret Defense Law, revising the system of defense organization and directing more detailed preparations for the approaching status of mobilization, which I think was the euphemism for war.
27 Nov. 45
These laws will be discussed more extensively in connection with other sections of our presentation. They have been discussed by Mr. Dodd in connection with the economic preparations for the war.
The second secret Defense Law I offer in evidence as our serial number 2194-PS. I offer it as Exhibit USA-36.
As to that document I only intend to read the two covering letters:
"Reich Defense Law; the Ministry for Economy and Labor, Saxony; Dresden 6; 4 September 1939; Telephone: 52.151, long distance; Top Secret.
"Transportation Section, attention of Construction Chief Counsellor Hirche or representative in the office; stamp of receipt of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; received Prague, 5 September 1939, No. 274.
"Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938 and a copy each of the decrees of the Reich Minister of Transportation, dated 7 October 1938, RL/W/ 10.2212/38, Top Secret, and 17 July 1939, RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top Secret, for your information and observance.
"By order, signed Kretschmar. 3 inclosures. Stamp: complete to Dresden, 4 September 1939, signed Schneider.
"Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, with 3 inclosures, signed 5 September 1939, and returned to Construction Counsellor Kretschmar."
The whole point being that it was enclosing a second secret Reich Defense Law under top-secret cover.
Now, next I refer to Indictment, Paragraph IV (F) 2 (a). That paragraph of the Indictment refers to four points:
(1) Secret rearmament from 1933 to March 1935; (2) the training of military personnel (that includes secret or camouflage training); (3) production of munitions of war; and, (4) the building of an air force.
All four of these points are included in the general plan for the breach of the Treaty of Versailles and for the ensuing aggressions. The facts of rearmament and of its secrecy are self-evident from the events that followed. The significant phase of this activity insofar as the Indictment is concerned, dies in the fact that all this was necessary in order to break the barriers of the Versailles Treaty and of the Locarno Pact, and necessary to the aggressive wars which were to follow. The extent and nature of those activities could only have been for aggressive purposes, and the highest importance which the Government attached to the secrecy of the
27 Nov. 45
program is emphasized by the disguised financing, both before and after the announcement of conscription and the rebuilding of the Army, 16 March 1935.
I have, if the Court please, an unsigned memorandum by the Defendant Schacht dated 3 May 1935 entitled "The Financing of the Armament Program" (Finanzierung der Ruestung). As I say, it is not signed by the Defendant Schacht, but he identified it as being his memorandum in an interrogation on the 16th of October 1945. I would assume that he would still admit that it is his memorandum. That memorandum has been referred to but I believe not introduced or accepted in evidence. I identify it by our Number 1168-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-37.
I think it is quite significant, and with the permission of the Court I shall read the entire memorandum, reminding you that the German interpreter has the original German before him to read into the transcript. "Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler" identified by Schacht as Exhibit A, interrogation 16 October 1945, Page 40. May 3, 1935 is the date of the memorandum.
"Financing of Armament. The following explanations are based upon the thought that the accomplishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics; that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose as long as the main purpose is not imperiled by neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935 the difficulty remains that one cannot undertake the open propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of armament without endangering our position internationally (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult.
"Another supposition must also be emphasized. The printing press can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the domestic prices and is therefore like a snake biting its own tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged completely till 16 March 1935, and since this date the camouflage had to be continued to an even larger extent, made it necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have been natural to start it (i. e., the printing press) at the final point of finance. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are segregated bills of exchange for this purpose (that is, armament) of 3,775 mil-
27 Nov. 45
lions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of which bills of exchange for armament amount to 2,374 million Reichsmark, that is of April 30, 1935. The Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners, in bank notes of armament.
"Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our political opponents. Furthermore, 500 million Reichsmark were used for financing of armaments which originated out of the federal loans which were invested in the saving banks in the year 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided for the Armed Forces:
"For the budget period 1933 to 1934-750 million Reichsmark; for the budget period 1934 to 1935-1,100 million Reichsmark; and for the budget period 1935 to 1936-2,500 million Reichsmark.
"The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after the budget 1935 to 1936 to 5 to 6 billion Reichsmark. This total deficit is already financed at the present time by short-term credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the possibilities of utilization of the public market for the armament. The Reichsfinanzminister"-Minister of Finance-"correctly points out at the defense of the budget: " As a permanent yearly deficit is an impossibility, as we cannot figure with security increased tax revenues in an amount balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the impending great task of military policy,"-I interpolate that evidently the Defendant Schacht knew about the impending great military task to be faced by Germany.- "for all these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget policy, which solves the problem of armament financing by organic and planned reduction of other expenditures, not only from the point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, that is, by saving.' "How urgent this question is, can be deduced from the following, that very many tasks have been undertaken by the State and Party"-it isn't ever just the State; it is the State and the Party-"and are now in process, all of which are not covered by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. The existence of various budgets side by side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a clear view of the possibilities of financing the armaments. A large number of ministries and
27 Nov. 45
various branches of the Party have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of finance of the State, but not subject to the control of the Finanzminister"-Minister of Finance-"and therefore also not subject to the control of the Cabinet. Just as in the sphere of politics the much too far-reaching delegation of legislative powers to individuals brought about various states within the State, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of State and Party, working side by side and against each other, has a devastating effect on the possibility of finance. If, in this territory, concentration and unified control is not introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible task of armament finance is endangered.
"We have the following tasks:
"(1) A deputy is entrusted with, I suppose, finding all sources and revenues, which have origin in contributions to the Federal Government, to the State and Party, and in profits of public and Party enterprises.
"(2) Furthermore experts entrusted by the Fuehrer have to examine how these amounts were used and which of these amounts in the future can be withdrawn from their previous purpose.
"(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all public and Party organizations, to what extent this property can be used for the purpose of armament financing.
"(4) The federal Ministry of Finances is to be entrusted to examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new taxes or the increasing of existing taxes.
"The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank, under existing political conditions, was a necessity, and the political success proved the correctness of this action. The other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under any circumstance. For this purpose all absolutely nonessential expenditures for other purposes must not take place, and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether the problem of financing as outlined in this program succeeds remains to be seen, but without such concentration it will fail with absolute certainty."
Being sort of a hand in finance myself, I can feel some sympathy with the Defendant Schacht as he was wrestling with these problems.
27 Nov. 45
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn for 10 minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
[A recess was taken.]
MR. ALDERMAN: 21 May 1935 was a very important date in the Nazi calendar. As I have already indicated, it was on that date that they passed the secret Reich Defense Law, which is our Document 2261-PS. The secrecy of their armament operations had already reached the point beyond which they could no longer maintain successful camouflage and, since their program called for still further expansion, they made a Unilateral renunciation of the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty on the same date, 21 May 1935.
I refer to Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935; our Document Number 2288-PS. We have here the original volume of the Völkischer Beobachter (the "Popular Observer", I suppose, is the correct translation), Volume 48, 1935, 122-151, May, and the date 22 May 1935, which gave his speech under the heading (if I may translate, perhaps): "The Fuehrer Notifies the World of the Way to Real Peace."
I offer that part of that volume identified as our Number 2288-PS, as Exhibit USA-38, and from that I shall read, beginning with the fifth paragraph in the English translation. I am sorry, I said the fifth paragraph-this indicates on Page 3. It is after he discusses some general conclusions and then there is a paragraph numbered 1, that says:
"1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolution of 17 March....
"The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the Dictate of Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated by those powers who could not make up their minds to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as agreed upon by the Treaty.
"2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, which are nothing but a discrimination of the German nation"-I suppose "against the German nation"-"for an unlimited period of time, since through them, Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral manner, contrary to the spirit of the agreement."
27 Nov. 45
If the Tribunal please, needless to say, when I cite Adolf Hitler, I don't necessarily vouch for the absolute truth of everything that he presents. This is a public speech he made before the world, and it is for the Tribunal to judge whether he is presenting a pretext or whether he is presenting the truth.
In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect training of a military nature. This included not only the training of military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other para-military organizations, such as the police force, which could be, and were absorbed by, the Army.
These are shown in other parts of the case presented by the Prosecution. However, the extent of this program for military training is indicated by Hitler's boast of the expenditure of 90 billion Reichsmark during the period of 1933 to 1939 in the building up of the Armed Forces.
I have another volume of the Völkischer Beobachter, Volume 52, 1939-I think the issue of 2 and 3 September 1939-which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-39; and there appears a speech by Adolf Hitler, with his picture, under the heading which, if I may be permitted to try to translate, reads: "The Fuehrer Announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich."
That is a speech, if the Court please, by Adolf Hitler, on 1 September 1939, the date of the attack on Poland, identified by our number 2322-PS, and I read from the bottom of Page 3, the last paragraph starting on the page:
"For more than 6 years now, I have been engaged in building up the German Armed Forces. During this period more than 90 billion Reichsmark were spent building up the Wehrmacht. Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken."
The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early development is illustrated by a reference to the secret training of flying personnel, back in 1932, as well as the early plans to build a military air force. A report was sent to the Defendant Hess in a letter from one Schickedantz to the Defendant Rosenberg for delivery to Hess. I suppose that Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery.
This document points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization.
27 Nov. 45
This letter is our Document 1143-PS, dated 20 October 1932, and I now offer it in evidence as U. S. Exhibit 40. It starts: "Lieber Alfred" (referring to Alfred Rosenberg), and is signed: "Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo." Amo, I think, was the first name of Schickedantz.
"Dear Alfred: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential mail" -Vertrauensmann-"which indeed is very interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our long friend."
I suppose that means "our tall friend." I may interpolate that the Defendant Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified this "big friend" or "tall friend" as being one Von Alvensleben.
"I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere. Mit bestem Gruss, Dein Amo."
Then enclosed with that is "Air Force Organization":
"Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnel to provide for the case of the armament of the Air Force. "Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Colonel Von Willberg, at present Commander of Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichswehr, is going on leave of absence.
"(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air-lines in such a way as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.
"(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm"-I believe that means the "steel helmet"- "which is being turned over to Colonel Hänel, retired.
"All existing organizations for sport-flying are to be used for military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, proprietor, and crew, in the proportion of 10-20-20... Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors
27 Nov. 45
of planes or flying associations will over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization."
The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German Navy in this rearmament program, secret at first.
When they deemed it safe to say so, they openly acknowledged that it had always been their objective to break Versailles.
In 1937 the Navy High Command published a secret book entitled The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935. The preface refers to the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of Navy activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the Government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament and camouflage rearmament from 1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935.
This document points out the significant effect of the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy, which was only hampered in so far as concealment of rearmament had to be considered in compliance with the Versailles Treaty.
With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935 and the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated.
We have, if the Court please, a photostat of the German printed book to which I have referred, entitled Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles (The Fight of the Navy against Versailles) 1919 to 1935, written by Sea Captain Schussler. It has the symbol of the Nazi Party with the swastika in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed "Secret", underscored. It is our Document C-156. It is a book of 76 pages of text, followed by index lists and charts. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-41. I may say that the Defendant Raeder identified this book in a recent interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval development. I should like to read from this book, if the Court please, the preface and one or two other portions of the book:
27 Nov. 45
"The object and aim of this memorandum, under the heading 'Preface', is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich Navy, after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow, did not rest but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man Navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so create, by the work of soldiers and technicians, the primary condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal and responsibility in the service of the fight against the Peace Treaty. Thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their positions unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained tasks. This compilation makes it clearer, however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial, and spiritual power, could the work of the soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this Peace Treaty, the most shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will.
"Signed, the Compiler."
Now I wish to invite the Court's attention merely to the summary of contents because the chapter titles are sufficiently significant for my present purpose.
"I. Defensive actions against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the Ruhr, 1923).
"1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction.
"2. Removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons.
"3. Limitation of destruction in Helgoland.
"II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lohmann case in 1927).
27 Nov. 45
"1. Attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy.
"2. Contribution to the strengthening of patriotism among the people.
"3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.
I am ashamed to say, if the Court please, that I am not familiar with the story about Captain Lohmann.
"4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.
"5. Building up of the Air Force.
"6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm.
"7. Economic rearmament.
"8. Miscellaneous measures: a. The N. V. Aerogeodetic; b. Secret reconnaissance.
"III. Planned armament works countenanced by the Reich Government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1928 to the seizure of power in 1933.
"IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflaged form (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935)."
Now if the interpreter who has the original German volume will turn to Chapter IV, Page 75-"Aufruestung"-Concealed rearmament under the leadership of the Government of the Reich (from 1933 until military freedom in 1935):
"The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of decisive influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.
"While the Reichsrat approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, the Reichstag assumed a composition which could only take a decisive attitude toward the rearmament of the Armed Forces. The Government took over the management of the rearmament program upon this foundation ...."
Then a heading-"Development of the Armed Forces":
"This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the Armed Forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General Von Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the Armed Forces, received far-reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the Armed Forces. The whole organization of the Reich was included in this work. In view of these powers, the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management
27 Nov. 45
of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duties of the accounting office of the German Reich."
Another heading-"Independence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy":
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary doctor, had received thereby a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered in so far as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the ordinary budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the Navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schuessler, afterwards Commodore Foerste. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget."
Another heading-"Declaration of Military Freedom":
"When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strengthening of the Armed Forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned limitation on rearmament works, namely, the external camouflage, was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land, and in the air, for one and a half decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the Armed Forces, and as a part of it, the Navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion, the rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world."
If the Tribunal please, at this moment I have a new problem about proof which I believe we have not discussed. I have in my hand an English translation of an interrogation of the Defendant Erich Raeder. Of course he knows he was interrogated; he knows what he said. I don't believe we have furnished copies of this interrogation to defendants' counsel. I don't know whether under the circumstances I am at liberty to read from it or not. If I do read from it I suggest that the defendants' counsel will all get the complete text of it-I mean of what I read into the transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the counsel for the Defendant Raeder any objection to this interrogation being read?
27 Nov. 45
DR. SIEMERS: As far as I have understood the proceedings to date, I believe that it is a question of a procedure in which either proof by way of documents or proof by way of witnesses will be furnished. I am surprised that the Prosecution wishes to furnish proof by way of records of interrogations, taken at a time when the Defense was not present. I should be obliged to the Court if I could be told whether, in principle, I, as a defense counsel, may resort to producing evidence in this form, i. e. present documents of the interrogation of witnesses; that is to say, documents in which I myself interrogated witnesses the same as the Prosecution without putting witnesses on the stand.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if interrogations of defendants are to be used, copies of such interrogations should be furnished to defendant's counsel beforehand. The question which the Tribunal wished to ask you was whether on this occasion you objected to this interrogation being used without such a copy having been furnished to you. With regard to your observation as to your own rights with reference to interrogating your defendants, the Tribunal considers that you must call them as witnesses upon the witness stand and cannot interrogate them and put in the interrogations. The question for you now is whether you object to this interrogation being laid before the Tribunal at this stage.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like first of all to have an opportunity of seeing every record before it is submitted in Court. Only then shall I be able to decide whether interrogations can be read, the contents of which I as a defense counsel am not familiar with.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn now and it anticipates that the interrogation can be handed to you during the adjournment and then can be used afterwards.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
27 Nov. 45
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal. I should like to ask the Tribunal to note the presence and appearance, on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of Mr. A.I. Vishinsky of the Foreign Office, and General K.P. Gorshenin, Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Republic who has been able to join us in the Prosecution only now.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal notes what Mr. Justice Jackson has said, and observes that Mr. Vishinsky has taken his seat with the Soviet Delegation of Chief Prosecutors.
DR. SIEMERS: In the meanwhile during the lunch hour I have seen the minutes. I should like to observe that I don't think it is very agreeable that the Prosecution should not depart from their point that the Defense should only receive the documents during the proceedings, or just before the proceedings, or at times, even after the proceedings. I should be grateful if the Prosecution could see to it in the future that we are informed in good time.
Yesterday a list of the documents which were to be presented today was made in our room, number 54. I find that the documents presented today are not included in yesterday's list. You will understand that the task of the Defense is thereby rendered comparatively difficult. On principle, I cannot in my statement of today, give my agreement to the reading of minutes of interrogations. In order to facilitate matters, I should like to follow the Court's suggestion, and declare that I am agreeable to the minutes presented here being read. I request, however-and I believe I have already been assured by the Prosecution to that effect-that only the part be read which refers to Document C-156, as I had no time to discuss the remaining points with the defendants.
As to the remaining points, five other documents are cited. Moreover I request that the part which refers to the book by Kapitän zur See Schuessler, should be read in full, and I believe that the prosecutor agrees with this.
THE PRESIDENT: I understood from the counsel for Raeder that you were substantially in agreement as to what parts of this interrogation you should read. Is that right, Mr. Alderman?
MR. ALDERMAN: If I understood the counsel correctly, he asked that I read the entire part of the interrogation which deals with Document C-156, but I understood that he did not agree for me to read other parts that referred to other documents. I handed counsel the original of my copy of the interrogation before the lunch hour, and when he returned it to me after the lunch hour,
27 Nov. 45
I substituted in his hands a carbon copy. I didn't quite understand his statement about documents being introduced which hadn't been furnished to the defendant. We did file the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in the document book?
MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is that the document book contains all the documents except these interrogations. They did not contain the interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: Then he is right in saying that.
MR. ALDERMAN: He is right as to the interrogation, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you in agreement with him then, that you can read what you want to read now, and that it is not necessary for you to read the parts to which he objects.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. I understand he objects to my reading anything other than the part concerned with C-156. I would anticipate that he might be willing for me to read the other parts tomorrow.
This deals with the book which I offered in evidence this morning, Document C-156, Exhibit USA-41. The Defendant Raeder identified that book, and explained that the Navy tried to Elfin the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time make progress in naval development. I refer to the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder at the part we had under discussion:
"Q. I have here a Document C-156, which is a photostatic copy of a work prepared by the High Command of the Navy and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the work.
"A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.
"Q. Was that an official publication of the German Navy?
"A. This Captain Schuessler (indicating the author) was a commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OHM, it was an idea of this officer to put all these things together.
"Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?
"A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he tells here in the foreword.
"Q. And in the preparation of this work he had access to the official Navy files and based his work on the items contained therein?
"A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files which were necessary.
27 Nov. 45
"Q. Do you know whether, before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?
"A. No, I don't think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.
"Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?
"A. It was a secret object. I think all upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.
"Q. It was not circulated outside of Navy circles?
"Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work, regarding the circumventing of the provisions of Versailles?
"A. I don't remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but in order to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised 1 year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They did not belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed, but not in Germany and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an industrialist; in Finland, too, and they were built only much later, when we began to act with the English Government about the Treaty of 35 to 100, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so, in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but we tried to have advantages.
"Q. Would a fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limiting provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding personnel and the limits of armaments, but would attempt to fulfill the letter of the Treaty, although actually avoiding it?
"A. That was our endeavor."
MR. ALDERMAN: Now the rest of this is the portion that counsel for the defendant asked me to read:
"Q. Why was such a policy adopted?
"A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by the danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia, and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way; and so all our efforts were directed to
27 Nov. 45
the aim of having a little more strength against the Poles should they attack us. It was nonsense to think of attacking Poland in this stage by the Navy. A second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee (East Sea), because we knew that the French had the intention to sustain the Poles. Their ships came into the Ostsee, Gdynia, and so the Navy was a defense against an attack of Poland and against the entrance of French ships into the East Sea; quite defensive aims.
"Q. When did this fear of an attack from Poland first show itself in official circles in Germany, would you say?
"A. In all the first years. They took Vilna; in the same minute we thought they would come to East Prussia. I don't know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German Government Ministers, the Army and Navy Ministers-Gröner and Noske.
"Q. Then those views, in your opinion, were generally held and existed perhaps as early as 1919-1920, after the end of the first World War?
"A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning I cannot give you a very exact picture, because I was then 2 years in the Navy Archives to write a book about the War and the fighting capacity of cruisers. For 2 years I was not with those things."
MR. ALDERMAN: Likewise the same kind of planning and purposes are reflected in the table of contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy. Although a copy of the book has not been found by us, the project was to have been written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler's personal military historian. We have found the table of contents; it refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes of documents, which evidently were intended as the working materials for the basis of chapters, to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The titles in this table of contents clearly establish the Navy planning and preparation to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way and to rebuild the naval strength necessary for aggressive war.
We have here the original captured document which is, as I say, the German typewritten table of contents of this projected work, with a German cover, typewritten, entitled Geschichtie der Deutschen Marine,1919-1939 (History of the German Navy, 1919-1939). We identify it as our series C-17 and I offer it in evidence as Ex-
27 Nov. 45
hibit USA-42. This table of contents includes such general headings-perhaps I had better read some of the actual headings:
"Part A, 1919-The Year of Transition. Chapter VII: First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects.
"(a) Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval offices in Civil Ministries et cetera. (For example: Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Helgoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade Canal et cetera into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934: Noske's proposal of 11. 8. 1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin; formation of the Naval Arsenal Kiel.)" -With a reference to a group of documents numbered 75.-
"(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.
"(1) North Sea (strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission-information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts."-referring to the group of documents numbered 85.-
"(2) Baltic (taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pillau and Swinemuende; salvage for the Army of 185 movable guns and mortars there.)"-I may interpolate that when the British offer in evidence the Treaty of Versailles, you will see the detailed limitations which this document indicates an effort to avoid.
"(3) The beginnings of coastal air defense.
"Part B, 1920-1924-The Organizational New Order. Chapter V: The Navy. Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty. Foreign countries.
"(a) The Interallied Control Commissions.
"(b) Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the bay of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies.
"(1) Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons.
"(2) Limitation of demolition work in Helgoland.
"(3) Attempt to strengthen personnel of the Navy, from 1923.
"(I) The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, for-
27 Nov. 45
mation of 'sports' unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment).
"(5) Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920 (projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentina, and Finland; torpedo testing).
"(6) Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of airdromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid defense, training of pilots).
"(7) Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.
"Part C (1925-1932-Replacement of tonnage). Chapter IV: The Navy, the Versailles Treaty, foreign countries.
"(a) The activities of the Interallied Control Commission (up to 31. 1. 27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission).
"(b) Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case.
"(1) The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation) their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935.
"(2) Preparation for the restrengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to Spain, Argentina, Turkey; the first post-war U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927... 250-ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti-U-boat school.
"(3) Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparation for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Several, later Luftdienst" -or Air Service-"GMBH; Naval Flying School Warnemuende; air station list, training of sea cadet candidates, military tactical questions 'Air Defense Journeys,' technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development Do X et cetera, catapult aircraft, arming, engines, ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland flight 1925, and the seaplane race 1926.
"(4) Economic rearmament ('The Tebeg'-Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised naval office abroad for
27 Nov. 45
investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other war economic questions).
"(5) Various measures (the NV Aerogeodetic Company-secret investigations).
"(c) Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich Government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies (1928 to the taking over of power).
"(1) The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work.
"(2) Finance question ('Black Funds' and the 'Special Budget'). "
(3) The Labor Committee and its objectives.
"(d) The question of Marine attachés (the continuation under disguise; open reappointment 1932-1933).
"(e) The question of disarmament of the fleet abroad and in Germany (the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931; the League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).
"Part D (1933-1939-The German Navy during the military freedom period)."
-which goes beyond the period with which I am at the moment dealing. A glance at the chapter headings following that will indicate the scope of this proposed work. Whether the history was ever actually written by Scherff, I do not know.
I would like to call attention just to the first two or three headings, under this "Part D-The German Navy during the military freedom period":
"I. National Socialism and the question of the fleet and of prestige at sea.
II. Incorporation of the Navy in the National Socialist State." -The main heading III in the middle of the page-"The Rearmament of the Navy under the direction of the Reich Government in a disguised way."
The policy development of the Navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the Navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations.
I have here, if the Court please, a captured document, in German, headed "Der Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934," and marked in large blue printing "Geheime Kommandosache"
27 Nov. 45
(Secret Commando Matter), which is identified as our C-153. It has the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end. I assume it is the facsimile; it may have been written with a stylus on a stencil; I can't tell. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-43. It is headed with the title: "Armament Plan (R.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase." This document of 12 May 1934 speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armament targets, et cetera, and shows that it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. It shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period.
I quote from the third numbered paragraph:
"The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of this target; this again requires a co-ordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years, according to the military viewpoint, is found in the armament program and provides: (a) for the military leader a sound basis for his operational considerations, and (b) for the political leader a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time."
One other sentence from Paragraph 7 of that document:
"All theoretical and practical R-preparations"-I assume that means armament preparations-"are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period."-And "without any alert period" is underscored in the original.
The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-boat construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland and Spain.
The Nazi theory was rather clever on that. The Versailles Treaty forbade rearming by the Germans in Germany, but they said it didn't forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.
Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval negotiations with England. We have a captured document, which is a manuscript in German script, of a conversation between the Defendant Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. It is not signed by the Defendant Raeder. I might ask his counsel if he objects to my stating that the Defendant Raeder, in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, admitted that this was a record of this conversation and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end.
27 Nov. 45
That document is identified in our series as C-189, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA - 4.
It is headed: "Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of the 'Karlsruhe."'
"1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning increased displacement of D. and E. (defensive weapons).
"Fuehrer's instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton ships. Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may not be stated.
"2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on, the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35-centimeter guns (like the King George class.)
"3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-boats secret, in consideration of the Saar plebiscite."
In order to continue the vital increase of the Navy, as planned, the Navy needed more funds than it had available; so Hitler proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. We have another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder and Hitler on 2 November 1934. Of this I have a photostatic copy of the German typed memorandum, identified as our C-190. This one, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder's personal file and I think he will not deny that it is his memorandum. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-45.
It is headed: "Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2. 11. 34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the 'Emden'.
"1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the Armed Forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the Navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the Navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need he will get Dr. Ley to put 120 to 150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later, in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the Navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.
"2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have six U-boats assembled at the time of the critical polit-
27 Nov. 45
ical situation in the first quarter of 1935,"-that's the following year, foreseeing-"he stated that he would keep this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence."
Then, there is an apostrophe and a note at the bottom:
"The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June '35 according to plan."
The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets was a program encouraged by the Navy, so that this industry would be able to supply the requirements of the Navy in case of need.
We have an original German document, again headed "Geheime Kommandosache" (secret commando matter)-a directive of 31 January 1933 by the Defendant Raeder for the German industry to support the armament of the Navy.
It is identified in our series as C-29. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-46:
"General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German armament industry."
"The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German armament industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing 'self-sufficiency' would in any case make such participation superfluous.
"However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:
"a) The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent.
"b) The consequent estimation of the duties of the German armament industry lies mainly in the military-political sphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our Armed Forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements.
27 Nov. 45
"c) Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy, are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits, are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost, to expand their output from the point of view of military policy
"d) It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navy has an ever increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German armament industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the world.
"e) If, however, the German armament industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire the confidence of its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances, in the interest of the defense of the country, is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that at the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.
"f) To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the Navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something better is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need."
27 Nov. 45
This Navy program of surreptitious rearmament, in violation of the Treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazis came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of the Defendant Raeder, Chief of the Naval Command, addressed to the main Naval Command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo-tubes for S-boats. He ordered that torpedo-tubes be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal, but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the permitted number-that is, permitted under the Treaty-at a given time, and storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective S-boats was constantly increased.
We have this German order, with the facsimile signature of Raeder, with the heading: "Der Chef der Marine Leitung, Berlin. 10 February 1932." Our series number is C-141. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-47, the order for concealed armament of S-boats. That is C-141. I read from the first paragraph of the text:
"In view of our Treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first S-boat half-flotilla, which in a few months will Consist of exactly similar, newly built S-boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats"-the German word being "Torpedoträger"-"and it is not intended to count these S-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed to us.
"I therefore order:
"1. S2-S5 will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen, Vegesack, without armament and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheetmetal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I."-a translator's note at the bottom says with reference to T.M.I. (Inspectorate of Torpedos and Mining)-"In agreement with the Naval Arsenal, for the Boat S-1 which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat.
"2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-boats will be stored in the Naval Arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting, so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A."
-I suppose that is not the Tennessee Valley Authority; the translator's note calls it the Technical Research Establishment.-
27 Nov. 45
"It should not anchor together with the other unarmed boats of the half-flotilla because of the obvious similarity of the type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.
"3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all S-boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it."
Interestingly enough, that memorandum by the Defendant Raeder, written in 1932, was talking about "as soon as the situation of the political control allows it." The seizure of power was the following year.
Along similar lines the Navy was also carrying on the concealed preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of 'Transport Ships 0'. The preparations under this order were to be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion.
We have the original German document, again top secret, identified by our Number C-166, order from the Command Office of the Navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. It has the seal of the Reichswehrministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-48. I think the Defendant Raeder will admit, or at least will not deny, that this is an official document.
"Subject: Preparation of auxiliary cruisers.
"It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations in foreign waters.
"In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations, the ships will be referred to as 'Transport Ships 0'. It is requested that in future this designation only be used."
The short paragraph says: "The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1. 4. 35."
Among official Navy files, OKM files, which we have, there are notes kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy, and in these notes are numerous examples of the Navy's activities and policies of which I should like to point out some illustrations.
One of these documents discloses that the displacement of the battleships "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau" and "F/G" -whatever that is-was actually greater than the tonnages which had been notified to the British under the Treaty. This document, our
27 Nov. 45
C-23, I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA - 9. That is a set really of three separate documents joined together. I read from that document:
"The true displacement of the battleships 'Scharnhorst-Gneisenau' and the 'F/G' exceeds by 20 percent, in both cases, the displacement reported to the British."
And then there is a table with reference to different ships, and two columns headed "Displacement by Type": one column "Actual Displacement" and the other column "Notified Displacement."
On the "Scharnhorst" the actual was 31,300 tons; the notified was 26,000 tons. On the "F"-actual 41,700 tons, the notified 35,000. On the "III"-actual 56,200 tons, notified 46,850, and so down the list. I need not read them all.
On the second document in that group towards the end, Page 2 on the English version, is the statement:
"In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of carrying out the aims of his foreign policy."
The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament limitation and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared superficial explanations or pretexts to explain away these violations.
Following a conference with the chief of "A" section, an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction, and in many instances proposed together with a statement of the justification or defense that might be used in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded.
The list contained 30 items under "Material Measures" and 14 items under "Measures of Organization." The variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within the Navy, which must have realized their significance. As I understand it, the "A" section was the military department of the Navy.
We have this very interesting document among the captured documents identified by our Number C-32. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-50. It again is Geheime Kommandosache and it is headed "A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of 'A' Section", dated 9 September 1933, and captured among official German Navy files.
This is a long document, if the Tribunal please, but I should like to call attention to a few of the more interesting items.
27 Nov. 45
There are three columns, one headed "Measure", one headed "Material, Measures, Details," and the most interesting one is headed "Remarks." The remarks contain the pretext or justification for explaining away the violations of the Treaty. They are numbered, so I can conveniently refer to the numbers:
"Number 1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines."- Then figures are given. Remarks-"Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered."
"Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries."In the remarks column- "Justification: Necessity for overhauling. Cheaper repairs."
"Number 6. Inlaying gun-platforms in the Kiel area." Remarks: "The offense over and above that in Serial Number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures."
"Number 7. Exceeding the caliber permitted for coastal batteries." The explanation: "Possible justification is that, though the caliber is larger, the number of guns is less."
"Number 8. Arming of minesweepers. The reply to any remonstrance against this breach: the guns are taken from the Fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine sweeping forces (equality of rights)."
-Here is one that is rather amusing-"Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns et cetera, permitted." Remarks: "Can be made light of."
"Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts." This remark is quite characteristic: "Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied."
"Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels." Remarks: "For warning shots. Make little of it."-And so on throughout the list.
I think quite obviously that must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference as to the position that they might take.
Now to Paragraph IV (F) 2 (b) of the Indictment: the allegation that "On 14 October 1933 they led Germany to leave the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations."
That is an historical fact of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would not be serious enough to provoke
27 Nov. 45
reprisal from other countries. At the same time Germany attached so much importance to this action, that they considered the possibility of the application of sanctions by other countries. Anticipating the probable nature of such sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans were made for military preparations for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the air, in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense Blomberg, to the Head of the Army High Command Fritsch, the Head of the Navy High Command Raeder, and the Reichsminister of Air Goering.
We have this captured document in our series C-140, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-151. It is a directive dated 25 October 1933, 11 days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.
"1) The enclosed directive gives the basis for preparations of the Armed Forces in the case of sanctions being applied against Germany.
"2) I request the Chiefs of the Army and Navy High Commands and the Reichsminister for Air to carry out the preparations in accordance with the following points:
"(a) Strictest secrecy. It is of the utmost importance that no facts become known to the outside world from which preparation for resistance against sanctions can be inferred or which is incompatible with Germany's existing obligations in the sphere of foreign policy regarding the demilitarized zone. If necessary, the preparations must take second place to this necessity."
I think that makes the point without further reading. One of the immediate consequences of the action was that following the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Germany's armament program was still further increased.
I introduced this morning document C-153, as Exhibit USA-43, so that is already in. From that, at this point, I wish to read Paragraph 5. That, as you recall, was a document dated 12 May 1934.
"5) Owing to the speed of military political development, since Germany quitted Geneva, and based on the progress of the Army, the new R-plan will only be drawn up for a period of 2 years. The third 'A' phase lasts accordingly from 1.4.34 to 31.3.36."
Then the next allegation of the Indictment, if the Tribunal please: "On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Goering announced that Germany was building a military air force."
That is an historical fact of which I ask the Court to take judicial notice, and I am quite certain that the Defendant Goering would not dispute it.
27 Nov. 45
We have a copy of the German publication known as Das Archiv-the number of March 1935; and it is Page 1830 to which I refer, and I would offer that in evidence, identifying it as our number 2292-PS; I offer it as Exhibit USA-52. It is an announcement concerning the German Air Force:
"The Reich Minister for Aviation, General of the Airmen, Goering, in his talk with the special correspondent of the Daily Mail, Ward Price, expressed himself on the subject of the German Air Force.
"General Goering said:
" 'In the extension of our national defenses' "-Sicherheit- " 'it was necessary, as we repeatedly told the world, to take care of defense in the air. As far as that is concerned, I restricted myself to those measures absolutely necessary. The guiding line of my actions was, not the creation of an aggressive force which would threaten other nations, but merely the completion of a military aviation which would be strong enough to repel, at any time, attacks on Germany.' "
Then, at the end of that section of the article in Das Archiv:
"In conclusion, the correspondent asks whether the German Air Force will be capable of repelling attacks on Germany.
General Goering replied to that exactly as follows:
" 'The German Air Force is just as passionately permeated with the will to defend the Fatherland to the last as it is convinced, on the other hand, that it will never be employed to threaten the peace of other nations."'
As I said, I believe, this morning, when we cite assurances of that kind from Nazi leaders, we take it that we are not foreclosed from showing that they had different intentions from those announced.
The next allegation of the Indictment is the promulgating of the law for compulsory military service, universal military service.
Having gone as far as they could on rearmament and the secret training of personnel, the next step necessary to the program for aggressive war was a large-scale increase in military strength. This could no longer be done under disguise and camouflage, and would have to be known to the world. Accordingly, on 16 March 1935, there was promulgated a law for universal military service, in violation of Article 173 of the Versailles Treaty.
I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that law as it appears in the Reichsgesetzblatt, which is the official compilation of laws, in the Title I of Volume I, yearly volume 1935, or Jahrgang, at
27 Nov. 45
Page 369 and I think I need not offer the book or the law in evidence.
The text of the law itself is very brief and I might read that. It is right at the end of the article. I should refer to that as our Document Number 1654-PS, so as to identify it:
"In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the following law:
"Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.
"The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is herewith promulgated:
"Paragraph 1. Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military duty.
"Paragraph 2. In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops transferred to it, is organized into 12 corps and 36 divisions."-There is a typographical error in the English version of that. It says "16 divisions", but the original German says 36 divisions.-
"Paragraph 3. The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of submitting immediately to the Reich Ministry detailed laws on compulsory military duty."
Signed: "Berlin, 16 March 1935."
It is signed first by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and then many other officials, including the following defendants in this case:
Von Neurath, Frick, Schacht, Goering, Hess, Frank.
Does the Court contemplate a short recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the Prosecution expects, on tomorrow, to offer in evidence some captured enemy moving pictures and in order to give Defense Counsel an opportunity to see them before they are offered in evidence-and in response to their request made to the Tribunal some time ago-the showing of these films for Defense Counsel will be held in this court room this evening at 8 o'clock, for the Defense Counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Colonel Storey.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I have reached now Paragraph IV, F, 2 (e) of the Indictment, which alleges:
27 Nov. 45
"On 21 May 1935 they falsely announced to the world, with intent to deceive and allay fears of aggressive intentions, that they would respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty and comply with the Locarno Pact."
As a part of their program to weaken resistance in possible enemy states, the Nazis followed a policy of making false assurances, thereby tending to create confusion and a false sense of security. Thus on the same date on which Germany renounced the armament provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler announced the intent of the German Government to respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno.
I offered in evidence this morning, as Exhibit USA-38,. our Document 2288-PS, the pertinent volume of the issue of the Völkischer Beobachter of 21 May 1935, containing Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on that date. In that speech he said:
"Therefore, the Government of the German Reich shall absolutely respect all other articles pertaining to the cooperation" -Zusammenleben, really meaning the living together in harmony-"of the various nations, including territorial agreements. Revisions which will be unavoidable as time goes by it will carry out by way of a friendly understanding only.
"The Government of the German Reich has the intention not to sign any treaty which it believes not to be able to fulfill. However, it will live up to every treaty signed voluntarily even if it was composed before this Government took over. Therefore, it will in particular adhere to all the obligations under the Locarno Pact, as long as the other partners of the Pact also adhere to it."
For convenient reference, the territorial limitations in the Locarno and Versailles Treaties include the following: The Rhine Pact of Locarno, 16 October 1925, Article 1:
"The High Contracting Parties, collectively and severally, guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles: the maintenance of the territorial status quo, resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium, and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers, as fixed by, or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said Treaty, concerning the demilitarized zone."
That has reference, of course, to the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
27 Nov. 45
Then from the Versailles Treaty, 28 June 1919, Article 42:
"Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications, either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank, to the West of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the East of the Rhine.
"Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden."
The next allegation of the Indictment (f):
"On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced to the world that 'we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.' "
The demilitarized zone of the Rhineland obviously was a sore wound with the Nazis ever since its establishment, after World War I. Not only was this a blow to their increasing pride, but it was a bar to any effective strong position which Germany might want to take on any vital issues. In the event of any sanctions against Germany, in the form of military action, the French and other powers would get well into Germany, east of the Rhine, before any German resistance could even be put up. Therefore, any German plans to threaten or breach international obligations or for any kind of aggression, required the preliminary reoccupation and refortification of this open Rhineland territory. Plans and preparations for the reoccupation of the Rhineland started very early.
We have a document, a German captured document, in German script, which we identify as C-139, and which appears to be signed by the handwriting of Blomberg. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-53.
The document deals with what is called "Operation Schulung", which means schooling, or training. It is dated 2 May 1935 and even refers to prior Staff discussions on the subject dealt with. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army Command, who at that time, I believe, was Fritsch, the Chief of the Navy High Command, Raeder, and the Reich Minister for Air, Goering.
It does not use the name "Rhineland" and does not, in terms, refer to it. It is our view that it was a military plan for the military reoccupation of the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine Pact of Locarno.
27 Nov. 45
I read from the first part of the document which is headed "top secret":
"For the operation suggested in the last Staff talks of the Armed Forces, I lay down the code name 'Schulung'"- training.-
"The supreme direction of Operation Schulung rests with the Reich Minister of Defense as this is a joint undertaking of the three services.
"Preparations for the operation will begin forthwith according to the following directives:
"(1) The operation must, on issue of the code words 'Carry out Schulung', be executed by a surprise blow at lightning speed. Strictest secrecy is necessary in the preparations and only the very smallest number of officers should be informed and employed in the drafting of reports, drawings, et cetera, and these officers only in person.
"(2) There is no time for mobilization of the forces taking part. These will be employed in their peacetime strength and with their peacetime equipment.
"(3) The preparation for the operation will be made without regard to the present inadequate state of our armaments. Every improvement of the state of our armaments will make possible a greater measure of preparedness and thus result in better prospects of success;"
The rest of the order deals with military details and I think it is unnecessary to read it.
There are certain points, in the face of this order, which are inconsistent with any theory that it was merely a training order, or that it might have been defensive in nature. The operation was to be carried out as a surprise blow at lightning speed (Schlagartig als Überfall).
The air forces were to provide support for the attack. There was to be reinforcement by the East Prussian division. Furthermore, this document is dated 2 May 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of the Conscription Law on 16 March 1935, and so it could hardly have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription Law.
Of course the actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7 March 1936, so that this early plan would necessarily have been totally revised to suit the existing conditions and specific objectives. As I say, although the plan does not mention
27 Nov. 45
the Rhineland, it has all of the indications of a Rhineland operation plan. That the details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not at all detract from the vital fact that as early as 2 May 1935 the Germans had already planned that operation, not merely as a Staff plan but as a definite operation. It was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so, if necessary, to resist French sanctions against their Conscription Law.
It is significant to note the date of this document is the same as the date of the signature of the Franco-Russian Pact, winch the Nazis later asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.
The military orders on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was actually carried into execution, on 7 March 1936, were issued on 2 March 1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Blomberg, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, and Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Goering. We have that order signed by Blomberg, headed, as usual, "top secret." identified by us as C-159. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-54.
The German copy of that document bears the Defendant Raeder's initial in green pencil, with a red pencil note: "To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy."
The first part of the order reads:
"Supreme Command of the Navy:
"1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following decision:
"By reason of the Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact, the obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply to Articles 42 and 43, of the Treaty of Versailles which referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as obsolete.
"2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the following orders...." There follow the detailed orders for the military operation.
We also have the orders for naval cooperation. The original German document, which we identify as C-194, was issued on 6 March 1936, in the form of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, Blomberg, signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Raeder, setting out detailed
27 Nov. 45
instructions for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and the admirals commanding the Baltic and North Sea. I offer the document in evidence as Exhibit USA-55.
The short covering letter is as follows: "To: C-in-C Navy.
"The Minister has decided the following after the meeting: "1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has been approved. C-in-C Air Force will instruct the Air Command VI from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance aircraft, to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet.
"2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-boat reconnaissance line until the evening of 7 March. The immediate transfer of U-boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshafen has been approved.
"3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as the first countermeasures to be taken against military preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous measures could not be omitted."
That is signed "Keitel".
The rest of the documents are detailed naval orders-operational orders-and I think I need not read further.
For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a momentous speech on 7 March 1936. I have the volume of the Völkischer Beobachter, Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936, our Document 2289-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-56.
This is a long speech which the world remembers and of which I shall only read a short portion:
"Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government is now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet treaty has been supplemented
27 Nov. 45
by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German Government has today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland."
The whole matter of the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland caused extensive international repercussions and study. As a result of the protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council of the League made an investigation and announced the following finding, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, as being carried in the League of Nations Monthly Summary, March 1936, Volume 16, Page 78; and it is also quoted in an article by Quincy Wright, in the American Journal of International Law, Page 487, 1936.
The finding is this:
"That the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, 1936, military forces to enter and establish themselves in the demilitarized zone referred to, in Article 42 and the following articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno."
At the same time, on 7 March 1936, as the Germans reoccupied the Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, they again tried to allay the fears of other European powers and lead them into a false sense of security by announcing to the world: "We have no territorial demands to make in Europe."
That appears in this same speech of Hitler's, which I have offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-56, which is Document 2289-PS. The language will be found on Page 6, Column 1:
"We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above all that all the tensions resulting either from false territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers of inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be solved by war."
Most of the acts set forth in the paragraph of the Indictment which I have been discussing, I think do not need judicial proof because they are historical facts. We have been able to bring you a number of interesting documents illuminating that history. The existence of prior plans and preparations is indisputable from the very nature of things. The method and sequence of these plans and their accomplishment are clearly indicative of the progressing and increasingly aggressive character of the Nazi objectives, inter
27 Nov. 45
national obligations and considerations of humanity notwithstanding.
The detailed presentation of the violations of treaties and international law will be presented by our British colleagues, in support of Count Two of the Indictment.
To clear relief, there is shown the determination of the Nazi conspirators to use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany. In this process, they conspired and engaged in secret rearmament and training, the secret production of munitions of war, and they built up an air force. They withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on October 14, 1933. They instituted universal military service on March 16, 1935. On May 21, 1935 they falsely announced that they would respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno. On March 7, 1936 they reoccupied and fortified the Rhineland and at the same time, falsely announced that they had no territorial demands in Europe.
The objectives of the conspirators were vast and mighty, requiring long and extensive preparations. The process involved the evasion, circumvention, and violation of international obligations and treaties. They stopped at nothing.
The accomplishment of all those things, together with getting Versailles out of the way, constituted an opening of the gates toward the specific aggressions which followed.
I pass next, if the Tribunal please, to the presentation of the story of the aggression against Austria. I do not know whether Your Honor desires me to start on that or not. I am perfectly willing to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to use this volume of documents marked "M" tomorrow?
MR. ALDERMAN: There will be a new one marked "N".
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 28 November 1946 at 1000 hours.]