4000bce - 399
400 - 1399
1400 - 1499
1500 - 1599
1600 - 1699
1700 - 1799
1800 - 1899
1900 - 1999
1st. End of March 1939:
The Fuehrer decides to make military preparations for the gradual, seemingly unavoidable conflict with Poland, in such manner that these can be executed in late summer 1939. Thereby the Fuehrer hopes only to have to wage war on one front ("Fall Weiss").
2nd. The following months: Minutes under the Fuehrer's influence:
a. Attack by the forces from East Prussia;-OKH will first of all deploy the forces from South West Part of East Prussia in order to eliminate the Corridor as soon as possible. The Fuehrer considers attack further East more suitable in order to reach a decisive solution at the very beginning (causing the Vistula line to fall, thereby preventing the Poles from making a new stand behind the Vistula).
b. Forming of 14 divisions. Fourth wave (Welle) to consist of E units.
c. All preparations to be camouflaged as defensive measures.
Basis for 1st and 2nd:
a. Directive for "Fall Weiss" OKW/L of April 1939.
b. "Chronological table" for Weiss OKW/L of July 1939.
c. Correspondence OKW/L with sections of the Armed Forces
d. Beginning of the War diary L
3rd. August 1939:
In spite of the English guarantee to Poland, and thereby a war on 2 fronts becoming almost unaviodable, the Fuehrer decides to settle the account with Poland after having prevented encirclement by means of an agreement with Russia.
4th. September 1939: Polish Campaign mainly under the Influence of the Fuehrer:
a. "Great Pincers" (strongly motorized forces to attack the Eastern part of East Prussia towards South behind Vistula, moreover motorized forces to push forward in plenty of time across lower Vistula towards East Prussia).
b. Capture of Warsaw. Must be carried out before the Russians reach the Vistula.
c. Reinforcement of the Western Front. Extension northwards to the Belgian/Dutch border, in order to incite the French/British Army to march into Holland and Belgium; in addition to this also hasten the construction of the Northern part of the West Wall.
5th. End of September 1939:
Decision of the Fuehrer, to attack in the West and this as soon as possible since the French/British Army is not yet ready. Intention of attacking through Belgium and Holland (at least southern part) is cartain from the start. From the very beginning it is the Fuehrer's idea not to repeat the Schlieffen-plan but to attack in approximately a west-north western direction through Belgium and Luxembourg under strong protection of the Southern flank, and to gain the Channel coast.
After conclusion of the Eastern Campaign the restrictions hitherto existing in regard to warfare in the West are progressively being lifted. They served the purpose, while the Eastern campaign was in Progress, of not inciting the enemy in the West to greater action, by German measures.
6th. October 1939:
Attack to begin at the earliest about 10 Nov. OKH is of the opinion that the preparations of the Army will not be absolutely complete by this time. Frequently the opinion is advocated-by no means shared by the Fuehrer-that an attack in the West is unnecessary, the war could perhaps be won for us satisfactorily if we were to wait a little.
Fuehrer is determined to attack in November only if the weather will permit operations by the mass of the Luftwaffe since only then can one of our most important trumps become effective.
How situation would turn out if France/England march into Belgium/Holland, is constantly the concern of the Fuehrer. Immediate attack of the German Western Army [Sofortfall] must be prepared for this event.
7th. End of October 1939: Influence of the Fuehrer:
a. Employment of motorized forces in direction Sedan is suggested by the Fuehrer. Preparations are under way for moving Army group B and concentrating them at A after, in accordance with previous deployment of troops, main concentration had been at Army Group B.
b. Re-occupation of Holland, it has been decided that Holland is not to be occupied for the time being, rapid occupation in case of English landing should however be possible at any time.
c. Question of using parachute and air-borne troops is being taken up by the Fuehrer.
8th. Beginning of November 1939: Mainly under Influence of the Fuehrer:
a. Permanent reinforcement of the southern mot. group, which is to advance against Sedan.
b. Reinforcement of the Western Army to the utmost capacity.
The weather conditions prevent the execution of the attack in the West.
9th. 23 November 1939: Speech by the Fuehrer to the Generals and Admirals.
10th. End of November 1939: Influence of the Fuehrer above all
a. Holland is to be occupied immediately.
b. Shifting of the main concentration of Army Group B to A appears to have even better prospects.
c. Deployment of 7th FL. Div. (Deliberation of further possibilities).
d. Important to maintain element of surprise, therefore motorized units which are still all located at home will be moved up to the Rhine in order not to betray to the enemy the imminent beginning of the attack, by the moving up to the front.
e. Capture of the bridges at Maastricht and of the Fort Eben Emael, since destruction of the bridges would render impossible the fast advance of the sixth Army.
First directive for warfare against England (no. 9) is issued. Purpose: concentration of all combat weapons for important targets.
At a conference in the map-room of the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) in the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer expresses anew his opinion that the attack planned in the West will lead to the greatest victory in world history.
11th. December 1939:
In spite of the severe winter the Fuehrer as always still continues to consider it desirable to carry out the attack in the West as soon as possible and not to delay it until spring. Reasons:
a. England/France must not be allowed under any circumstances to steal a march on us by occupying Belgium and Holland since then-on account of the danger to the Ruhrbasin-the war could hardly be won.
b. Time is not on our side but on the enemy's (see notes of Major Deyhle).
The Fuehrer is carefully watching the Russo-Finnish war (on account of the possibility of the Western powers joining in to the advantage of Finland).
12th. Beginning of January 1940:
The introductory movements in preparation for the big attack are ordered anew by the Fuehrer, soon however checked again on account of the weather condition, although most important operational basis fall into Belgian hands and thereby there is a possibility of our intentions becoming known.
For the deployment of the 7th FL. Division a new possibility becomes more and more probable: Capture of the "Fortress Holland".
13th. Middle of January 1940:
During the past weeks probable dates for our attack in the West have become known in Belgium and Holland. The reason can not be determined, the main fault lies possibly in the long waiting time just before the attack (issue of order 7 days beforehand).
In order better to maintain the surprise element beyond the time of attack, the Fuehrer orders therefore a change in the alert procedure.
The idea that the decisive point of the attack will have to be reached by breaking through Southern Belgium (thus the total attack to be concentrated on the left) is being worked out by the Fuehrer in even greater detail.
The occupation of the whole of Holland is ordered. For this also the 7th FL. Division is to be employed. Extensive deceptive measures are ordered. The "Sofortfall" remains in effect.
The Fuehrer makes up his mind to utilize the Danish and Norwegian space for the German warfare.
The Fuehrer considers what possibilities exist for forming new units. The setting up of the division's 7th and 8th wave is then ordered.
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946