Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 15

Previous Day Volume 15 Menu Next Day
Nuremberg Trials Page

Tuesday, 4 June 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]

DR. EXNER: General, yesterday afternoon we started dealing with war crimes, but today I should like first of all to put a few preliminary questions to you. What position and what tasks were yours during the period of the war?

JODL: I had to deal with the entire general staff work concerning the strategic operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me was the military propaganda department, whose duty it was to co-operate with the press; and thirdly, I was head of an office which, speaking broadly, had to distribute means of communication to the various branches of the Wehrmacht. The whole of this sphere of work took up my time to such an extent that as a rule I worked night after night, until 3 o'clock in the morning. I had no time at all to concern myself with other things. I already had to delegate to my personal adjutant almost all my work with the press, which had to receive daily information.

DR. EXNER: These tasks, which you have just named, were all tasks connected with your office, and that was the Armed Forces Operations Staff, of which you were chief, is that not so?

JODL: Yes, of which I was chief.

DR. EXNER: And one department of the Operations Staff, the main and most important one, was the operations department?

JODL: Yes, operations.

DR. EXNER: And most of your tasks were concerned with this department. The Prosecution say you were Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Keitel. Do you agree?

JODL: That is not correct as has already been shown by the organization which was explained here during Field Marshal Keitel's case. There is a great difference. As Chief of Staff, I would have been Field Marshal Keitel's assistant, concerned with all of his duties. I was, however, only the chief of one of the many departments subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel.


4 June 46

Beginning with the year 1941 it became the practice for me and my operational branch to report to the Fuehrer direct on all matters concerned with strategies, while Field Marshal Keitel, using my quartermaster department as a sort of personal working staff, took over all other tasks.

DR. EXNER: Did you, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, have authority to issue orders?

JODL: No-or rather only through my working staff. I was subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel, and even Keitel himself was not a commander but only the chief of a staff. But in the course of this war I naturally decided many operational details myself and signed them myself. There was no disagreement of any sort in these matters with the commanders-in-chief for I had their confidence, and I worked on the best possible terms with them.

DR. EXNER: For someone on the outside it is not quite easy to understand that even though you had no authority to issue orders, SO many orders have been submitted here which were, in fact, signed by you, and signed in different ways-sometimes with your full name, sometimes with a "J." the first letter of your name. Please explain these differences.

JODL: One must differentiate as follows: The decrees which the Fuehrer himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, bear my initial at the end, on the lower right; and that means that I at least assisted in the formulation of that order. Then there were orders which also came from the Fuehrer, though they were not signed by him personally, but were signed "by order, Jodl"; but they always had at the beginning the sentence, "The Fuehrer has decreed," or that sentence was found somewhere in the course of the order. There would be a preamble, usually giving reasons for the order, and then, it would read: "The Fuehrer has therefore decreed."

DR. EXNER: And what was the difference between these two groups of orders? Why was one group of orders signed by the Fuehrer, and the other only by you?

JODL: The difference was merely that the orders signed by me were of less importance.

DR. EXNER: Now, there were other orders which did not begin with "The Fuehrer has decreed," but were signed by you nevertheless. What about these?

JODL: These orders were as a rule signed: "The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl" These were orders which emanated from me, that is, I or my staff formulated them. The Fuehrer himself and Field Marshal Keitel had perhaps been informed of these orders, but not in every case.


4 June 46

Then there were other orders, which bear my initial on the first page, in the upper right-hand corner. Those were orders issued by other departments. My initial "J" on the first page was merely an office notation to show that the order had been submitted to me. But it did not mean that I had read it for if, on perusing the first page, I saw that the decree dealt with a matter not connected with my sphere of work, then I initialed it and put it aside, because I had to save time.

DR. EXNER: Now, there is another large volume of -documents, of which some are being used as very incriminating evidence against you; they are not orders but summarized notes. Can you comment on these?

JODL: These summarized notes were an arrangement used on higher staff levels for the convenience of people who had not time to study enormous files. The summarized notes contained, in a short condensed form, a description of some matter or other, frequently the views taken by other departments and sometimes even a proposal. The important point, however, is that it was not an order; it was not a draft of an- order, but it formed the basis for an order.

DR. EXNER: Perhaps the situation will best be clarified if you can explain this to the Tribunal in connection with the draft notes concerning the commissars, which were touched on yesterday. It is 884-PS, Exhibit USSR-351; Volume II of my document book, Page 152.

Before you start I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to an error in the translation. On Page 152, under Figure I, it says:

"The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding political officials et cetera...regarding commissary..."

The English translation says: "The Army High Command presents a statement . . ."; but it is a draft. And I cannot quite follow the French; it says: Confirmation des instructions. It should obviously be projet.

In any case the German original says:

"The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding treatment of political officials et cetera, for the uniform application of the order issued on 31 March 1941."

And these are the commissary. The whole of this is a condensed draft. Will you please explain what it means?

JODL: This document is a typical example. First of all it contains the draft by another department of the Army High Command, not verbatim, but in a brief, condensed form. Then, secondly, under Figure II, on Page 153, the views of another department-that of


4 June 46

Reichsleiter Rosenberg's-are set forth. Then, under Figure III, it Contains a proposal of my own staff.

The whole matter, therefore, is far from being an order; it is to become one. And on a summarized draft like that, I naturally made very many, I might say, cursory marginal notes to serve as a guide for the further treatment and discussion or disposal of the whole question. Therefore one cannot apply to this the same criteria as would be applied to the well-considered words contained in an actual order.

DR. EXNER: All right. So much for the summarized draft and your notes.

Now we turn to the very delicate topic of the Commando Order. This matter has been dealt with here on various occasions; and indeed, it goes beyond this Court in its importance and its repercussions, as we know from the newspapers.

I should like to hear from you something about the factors that led to this order. This order is Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501. I do not have it in my document book, but I asked the General Secretary to have it put at the disposal of the Tribunal in the various languages. I hope this has been done.

Then there is an explanatory decree in addition to the main order; both are signed by the Fuehrer. That is Document 503-PS, Exhibit Number USA-542.

MR. ROBERTS: It is 498-PS. It is in the Keitel and Jodl Document Book, Number 7, Page 64.

DR. EXNER: The first order is addressed to the troops; the second is an explanatory order addressed to the commanders-in-chief. The first order threatens enemy soldiers with death if they engage in bandit-like warfare; and it refers to the Wehrmacht communiqué in this connection.

Can you first explain the connection between the Commando Order and the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October '42?

JODL: May I ask the Tribunal to permit me, as an exception, to go into greater detail. Very much depends on this order; not my person, my own person does not matter in this Trial, but the honor of German soldiers and German officers whom I represent here is in question.

The Commando Order is inseparably linked with the announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942, for this announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué heralded the actual Commando Order.

DR. EXNER: And who was responsible for this announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué? Who wrote it?


4 June 46

JODL: This Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942-it was really a supplement to the communiqué-emanated in the main from me. It deals with the denial of a report by the British Ministry of War, a matter which I will not discuss further, for it is a very delicate point. The Prosecution especially does not wish it to be brought up.

DR. EXNER: But this supplement . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, we do not know-at least I have not seen the document of 7 October 1942, and the Prosecution has made no objection to any answer to any English documents as far as we know.

DR. EXNER: I wished to submit this document but objections were raised.

THE PRESIDENT What does the defendant mean by saying that the Prosecution does not wish him to present it or to answer it?

DR. EXNER: He probably refers to the fact that we were not allowed to present this Wehrmacht communiqué; but he can give us the contents of it briefly.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it may be a question of translation, but if he means simply that no evidence has been given by the Prosecution on the subject, of course, there is no objection to his saying that; but when he says that the Prosecution does not want him to put forward or does not want him to answer the document, that is a most improper statement to make.

DR. EXNER: Yes, I understand.

[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us briefly the contents of this Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942. I believe you have it in your own document book.

THE PRESIDENT: No, but, Dr. Exner, that is not quite what I mean. What the defendant has said was that the Prosecution does not want him to deal with this subject.


THE PRESIDENT: Now, if that is the remark that is- made, that is an improper remark to make. The Prosecution have no communication with the Defense upon this subject, presumably, except that they have put it forward in the evidence in this case.

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Did you understand? You must not say that you are not allowed to touch upon this subject. Perhaps you will give us an explanation of what you meant?


4 June 46

JODL: This communiqué is in direct connection with the Commando Order. Only the last paragraph of this Wehrmacht communiqué is important. It was written by the Fuehrer himself, as Field Marshal Keitel has already stated, and Professor Jahrreiss read it here before the Tribunal. It is the sentence which reads:

"..in future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices who do not act like soldiers but like bandits will be treated as such by the German troops and will be ruthlessly eliminated in bathe wherever they appear."

This sentence was written, word for word, by the Fuehrer himself.

DR. EXNER: And then you were instructed to issue a detailed order to that effect...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute.

Defendant, what the Tribunal wants to know is this: You said that the Commando Order appeared originally in a Wehrmacht report of the 7th of October 1942 which, in the main, emanated from you, and that that report refuted an English statement by the Ministry of War which the Prosecution did not want you to deal with. What do you mean by that?

JODL: By that I meant that my defense counsel intended to submit the entire Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942 as a document in evidence. But he refrained from doing so when the Prosecution objected to the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have certainly never objected to this document. I have asked Mr. Roberts and he tells me that he has never objected to it; and, as far as we know, no one on behalf of the Prosecution has ever objected to it. I certainly have no objection to it at all myself; as a member of the English Government at the time when this matter was issued, I have never heard anything about it before; but I have no objection to it at all.

DR. EXNER: May I say something?


DR. EXNER: If there has been a misunderstanding here, we shall be all the more pleased, and we shall submit this Wehrmacht communiqué either this afternoon or tomorrow.

I should like to clarify one point regarding the question which Mr. President put to the defendant. The defendant said that the Wehrmacht communiqué, in the main, emanated from him, but that the Fuehrer wrote the supplementary sentence...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, if you want to correct anything that I have said you must do it through the witness and not through yourself. You are not entitled to give evidence. You only give evidence through the witness.


4 June 46


[Turning to the defendant.] Please, state once more which part of the Wehrmacht communiqué you wrote and which part was added by the Fuehrer.

JODL: The entire first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué has nothing whatever to do with Commando troops, but is concerned with the well-known affair of the shackling of German prisoners of war on the beach of Dieppe. I shall refer to that again later.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that I was correct in saying that in the main it emanated from you?

JODL: Yes, absolutely. The first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué was formulated by me and contains an authentic refutation of a statement of the British Ministry of War broadcast by the British radio.

This statement of the British Ministry of War was false, and I established the reasons why it was false on the basis of records, photographs, and affidavits which we possessed. initially this affair had nothing to do with Commandos and reprisals. That was only introduced into the Wehrmacht communiqué through the supplement by the Fuehrer, which begins t with the sentence: "The High Command of the Wehrmacht is therefore compelled to decree the following."

DR. EXNER: And it was considered necessary to make this announcement known in the Wehrmacht communiqué in an executive order. Did the Fuehrer demand from you drafts for an executive order?

JODL: When the Fuehrer had written this last supplementary sentence, he turned to Field Marshal Keitel and to me and demanded an executive order to follow this general announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué. And he added: "But I do not want any military courts."

DR. EXNER: Did you make a draft?

JODL: I had very many doubts which a careful study of the Hague rules of warfare could not dispel Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor I prepared such a draft; but members of my staff, on their own initiative, asked for drafts and for the views of various departments. Thus Document 1263-PS came into being, to which I shall return later.

THE PRESIDENT: That is Document 1263-PS?

DR. EXNER: 1263. It is Page 104, Volume II of my document book, 1263-PS, RF-365; but we shall deal with that later.


4 June 46

HE PRESIDENT: Did you say Page 204?

DR. EXNER: No, Page 104, Volume II. [Turning to the defendants] Please continue.

JODL: My wish was an entirely different one. It was my intention to avoid an order altogether, and I rather expected that as a result of the announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué- an announcement which was certainly not kept secret but which was broadcast over the air to the entire world-the British Ministry of War would approach us again, either directly or via Geneva, as it had done on several previous occasions. And I hoped that in this way the whole matter would be shifted to the sphere of the Foreign Office. However, that did not happen. The British War Ministry remained silent.

In the meantime 10 days had passed and nothing had been done. Then on 17 October General Schmundt, the Chief Adjutant of the Fuehrer, came to me and said that the Fuehrer was demanding an executive order. I gave him the following answer, word for word:

"Please give him my best regards, but I will not issue an order like that." Schmundt laughed and said, "Well, I cannot tell him that," and my reply was, "Very well, then, tell the Fuehrer that I do not see how a decree like that could be justified under international law."

And with that he left. I hoped now that I would be asked to come to the Fuehrer, so that at last, after many months, I should again be able to speak to him personally.

DR. EXNER: And this coincided with the Vinnitza crisis?

JODL: Yes. I wanted an opportunity either of telling him my misgivings or else being thrown out altogether. Either eventuality would have helped me but neither occurred. A few minutes later Schmundt called me on the telephone and informed me that the Fuehrer was going to draw up the orders himself. On 18 October Schmundt again came in person and brought with him these two orders of the Fuehrer-the order to the troops, and an explanation for the commanders.

TH PRESIDENT: Are you referring to two documents which are before us?

JODL: These are the two documents, 498-PS and 503-PS. The papers submitted to the Tribunal as documents are not the originals of the Fuehrer; I personally handed over the originals at Flensburg. The documents which are in the hands of the Tribunal are copies of the originals, or mimeographed copies of my staff.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: Now, I should like to interpolate a question. You mentioned that your staff worked out something in detail, and you referred to 1263-PS, which has been submitted to the Tribunal- Page 104 of Volume II. In this document you wrote two remarks on Page 106. The first remark on that page is "No." In the French translation this non is missing, and should be added. On the same page a little further down, it says in your own handwriting, "That win not do either," and your initial "J" for Jodl.

Can you explain in general what this means?

JODL: As I have already said, the members of my staff-as may be seen under the first figure on Page 104-on their own initiative asked for proposals, firstly, from the foreign intelligence department, Canaris, because he had a group of experts on international law and, secondly, from the Wehrmacht legal department, since, after all, we were concerned with a legal problem.

On Page 106, under paragraph "a," there is the proposal which the foreign division of the intelligence department made:

"Members of terrorist and sabotage troops who are found.. . without uniform, or in German uniform, will be treated as bandits. . . or if they fall into German hands outside battle operations, they are to be taken at once to an officer for interrogation. Thereafter they are to be dealt with by summary court martial."

That was quite impossible, for if one came across a soldier in civilian clothing, without uniform, no one could know just who he was. He might be a spy or an escaped prisoner of war or an enemy airman who had saved his life by jumping from his plane and now hoped to escape in civilian clothing. That had to be determined by an experienced interrogating officer and not by a summary court martial consisting of a lieutenant, two noncommissioned officers, and two soldiers. In paragraph "b"...

DR. EXNER: And for that reason you wrote "No"?

JODL: For that reason I wrote "No."

In paragraph "b" it was suggested that if such sabotage groups were captured wearing uniforms, a report should be made to the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which should then decide what should be done. But in that case the Armed Forces Operations Staff would have assumed the function of a military court, and that it could never be.

I really must claim for myself that, thanks to my wider experience, I saw these problems a little more clearly than some of my subordinates.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: And so you rejected this proposal. You said that you also had grave misgivings about the Fuehrer Order. Will you tell the Court now what misgivings you had?

JODL: First of all I had a number of doubts as to its legality. Secondly, the order was ambiguous, and also it was not sufficiently clear for practical application. Particularly in this case I considered military courts absolutely necessary. I know well that even judges may on occasion, consciously or not, be under coercion and may pass judgment not strictly in accordance with the law; but at least they provide some safeguard against a miscarriage of justice.

DR. EXNER: Therefore, if I understand you rightly, you wanted to install some legal procedure. What did you mean by unclear and ambiguous?

JODL: The theory was that soldiers, who by, their actions put themselves outside the laws of war, cannot claim to be treated in accordance with the laws of war. This is a basic principle definitely recognized in international law, for instance in the case of a spy or a franc-tireur.

The aim of this order was to intimidate British Commando troops who were using such methods of warfare. But the order of the Fuehrer went further and said that all Commando troops were to be massacred. This was the point on which I had grave misgivings.

DR. EXNER: What legal doubts did you have?

JODL: Just this doubt-that on the basis of this order, soldiers also would be massacred...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, it is not necessary to speak so slowly, if you can speak a little bit more fast.

JODL: I was afraid that not only enemy soldiers who, to use the Fuehrer's expression, really behaved like bandits, but also decent enemy soldiers, would be wiped out. In addition-and this was especially repugnant to me-at the very end of Document 503-PS it was ordered that soldiers were to be shot after they had been captured and had been interrogated. What was totally unclear to me was the general legal position, namely, whether a soldier who had acted like a bandit would upon capture enjoy the legal status of a prisoner of war, or whether on account of his earlier behavior he had already placed himself outside this legal status.

DR. EXNER; By that you mean the Geneva Convention?

JODL: Yes, I mean the Geneva Convention.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: Could you understand the idea that enemy soldiers who had acted in an unsoldierly manner should not be treated as soldiers?

JODL: Yes, I could quite understand that, and so could others, for the Fuehrer had received very bitter reports. We had captured all the orders of the Canadian brigade which had landed at Dieppe, and these orders were put before me in the original. These orders said that, wherever possible, German prisoners were to have their hands shackled. But after some time, through the Commander, West, I received authentic reports and testimony of witnesses, with photographs, which definitely convinced me that numerous men of the Todt Organization, fathers of families, unarmed, old people, who were wearing an arm band with a swastika-that was their badge-had been shackled with a loop around their necks and the end of the rope fastened around their bent-back legs in such a way that they had strangled themselves.

I may add that I kept these photographs from the Fuehrer, and I did not tell him of these aggravating incidents which to me had been proved. I concealed them from the German people and from the Propaganda Ministry. Then came the English radio report denying emphatically that any German soldier had been shackled at Dieppe.

Some time later, a Commando troop made an attack on the island of Saercq. Again we received official reports that German prisoners had been shackled.

Finally we captured the so-called British order for close. combat. That was the last straw for the Fuehrer; I also studied it very carefully. These close combat instructions showed by pictures how men could be shackled in such a way that they would strangle themselves through the shackling, and it was stated exactly within what time death would occur.

DR. EXNER: Therefore, the reasons which Hitler gave for his Order 498 were actually based on reliably reported facts. I remark that Hitler referred to prisoners who had been shackled, prisoners who had been killed, and that criminals, as Commandos...

THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphrasing the evidence in a way that is inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That is not what the witness said.

DR. EXNER: Then, I must ask you whether the facts upon which this order is based were reported to you.

JODL: I believe the Tribunal has Document 498-PS. In it the Fuehrer first makes the general statement that for some time our opponents in their conduct of the war have been using methods


4 June 46

which violate the international Geneva Convention. I must support this statement as true on the basis of reports which, regrettably, we had been receiving since the summer of 1941. I do not wish to go into individual cases. There was an outrageous incident with a British U-boat in the Aegean Sea. There was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war should not be given water before they were interrogated. There were a large number of such reports.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in respect of, namely the shackling; and you are now referring to other things which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which happened long before.

JODL: And I do not want to speak about these matters any longer. I only want to point out, as I think I must, that generally speaking the reasons given by the Fuehrer for this order did not spring from a diseased imagination but were based on actual proof in his and in our possession. For it is certainly very different whether I, in my own mind, had to admit there was some justification for this order or whether I considered the whole order an open scandal. That is a vital point for my own conduct. But I shall try to be very brief. The fact that many previously convicted persons and criminals were included in the Commandos, who were of course reckless people, was proved by the testimony of prisoners; and the fact that prisoners were shackled was obvious from captured orders and the testimony of witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that already. We have heard that more than once-that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled and that you had the Canadian orders before you.

DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can just say a few words on the subject of killing prisoners.

JODL: In conclusion, I want to say that I did not see any order, any captured order, which decreed death for German prisoners of war, though this was also contained as a reason in the Fuehrer Order. But I must explain that the British Ministry of War advised us-I cannot recall exactly whether it was via Geneva or through the radio-that situations might very well arise in which prisoners of war would have to be killed-no, rather, in which prisoners of war would have to be shackled because otherwise one would be forced to kill them. And so, if


4 June 46

at the end here the Fuehrer says orders have been found according to which the Commandos were on principle to kill prisoners, then I think he is referring to the British close-combat instructions which described a method of shackling which would cause death.

DR. EXNER: And that was your own part in this Commando Order?

JODL: My part consisted only in distributing this order, or having it distributed, in accordance with express instructions.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution said once that you also signed this order-one of these two orders, I do not know which one. That is not correct?

JODL: No,I signed only a general decree to have one of the orders kept secret.

DR. EXNER: Yes, we will deal with that in a moment. Could you have refused to transmit this order?

JODL: No, if I had refused to transmit an order of the Fuehrer, I would have been arrested immediately; and I must say, with justification. But as I said, I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its entirety or in part, actually violated the law; and I still do not know that today. I am convinced that if one were to convene here a conference of experts on international law, each one of them would probably have a different opinion on the subject.

DR. EXNER: General, you can speak a little faster.

Could you have made counterproposals?

JODL: At any other time, probably yes. At that time, however-a time of conflict with the Fuehrer-it was not possible for me to speak to him personally at all. To broach the subject during the general conference on the situation was quite out of the question. Therefore I intended in the execution of this order to adopt a very magnanimous attitude, and I was certain that the commanders-in-chief would do the same.

DR. EXNER: And what do you mean by magnanimous? Could this order have been interpreted in different ways?

JODL: Yes. The order offered two ways of avoiding the treatment of really decent soldiers like criminals. If a Commando troop, mostly encountered in fights at night, was not wiped out but captured, as was the rule in almost all cases, that was already certain proof that our troops did not consider these men as bandits. It was then the task of the commanders-in-chief to make an investigation. If it was purely a reconnaissance operation, the entire action did not fall within the sphere of the Commando Order at all and would not be reported as a Commando raid. However,


4 June 46

if the operation was really carried out by a sabotage and demolition unit, its equipment had to be examined. It had to be investigated whether the men were wearing civilian clothing under their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armpit guns, which go off automatically when the arms are lifted in the act of surrender; or whether they used other despicable methods during the fighting. The commanders-in-chief could then act in accordance with the outcome of such an investigation. I believe that in that way it was quite possible and in fact it happened many times, I might almost say in the bulk of cases-that the shooting of brave, decent soldiers was avoided.

DR. EXNER: Could you yourself exert any influence on the practices followed by the troops?

JODL: I tried to exert my influence on various occasions. When it was reported to me that a Commando unit had been captured- which according to the Fuehrer decree was not allowed-then I raised no questions or objections. I made no report at all to the Fuehrer on Commando operations which met with only minor success. And finally, I often dissuaded him from taking too drastic views, as in the Pescara case, which Field Marshal Kesselring has already described here, when I succeeded in convincing the Fuehrer that only a reconnaissance unit was involved.

DR. EXNER: Were many units actually wiped out?

JODL: Commando operations decreased considerably as a result of the public announcements in the Wehrmacht communiqué. I believe that not more than 8 or 10 cases occurred in all.

For a time, during the months of July and August 1944, increasingly large numbers of terrorists were reported killed in the Wehrmacht communiqué; these, however, were not Commando troops, but insurgents who were killed in the fighting in France. That may be proved if the Tribunal will read Document 551-PS, Figure 4. There the order is given-it is USA-551, on Page 117.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is Page 70 of Book 7.

JODL: Or Page 117 of our Volume II. There it is ordered...

DR. EXNER: What is ordered? I should like to deal now with another document, Document 532-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. EXNER: With reference to the Commando Order, I want to mention Document 532-PS, Exhibit Number RF-368, which is in our Document Book 2, Page 113.


4 June 46

This document was offered on a previous occasion, and I objected to it because it was not signed, or rather because it was crossed out.

Will you explain why you crossed out the draft order which is contained in this document?

JODL: Immediately before this draft order was written, the Commander, West requested that now, after the invasion, the Commando Order should be rescinded altogether. I approved that proposal. A draft was submitted to me here which rescinded the order only partially, namely in regard to the immediate area of the beachhead and that part of Brittany, a little further from the beachhead, where landings by parachutists were taking place daily at that time.

THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was this document not rejected? You told us that you objected to the document. What I am asking you is, what did the Tribunal do upon your objection? Did they maintain it, or did they deny it?

DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, and I think the document was struck off. I do not think that I am mistaken.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, why are you putting it in now?

DR. EXNER: I did not ask at the time to have the document struck off. I merely raised the objection that no mention was made of the facts that the draft order in the document was crossed out, and that it clearly bore a handwritten marginal note by Jodl rejecting it.

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Either the document was offered in evidence or it was not; and either it has got an exhibit number or it has not; and, as I understand, your objection was rejected.

MR. ROBERTS: It was in fact objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been given the French Exhibit Number RF-368; and after discussing it, it was then stricken from the record, the English shorthand note reference being Page 3631 (Volume VI, Page 360). My Lord, I think in fact both the Prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl's writing upon it; and, therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to its admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or the Defense. My Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to cross-examine him about it; and I have not the slightest objection to my friend Dr. Exner putting it in.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. It may, therefore, be left in as RF-368.

DR. EXNER: Will you continue?

JODL: At that tune it was my intention to get rid of the Commando Order entirely. For that reason I wrote, next to the sentence


4 June 46

under Figure 4: "That is just what they should not"-the entire first page. That was of no use, however, because on that very day the Fuehrer made a different decision with regard to the request of the Commander, West, and his decision is contained in Document 551-PS.

DR. EXNER: 551-PS, Exhibit Number USA-551. That is contained in the second volume on Page 115; it is an order on the treatment of men belonging to Commandos. This order contains the following handwritten remark of yours: "Similar action should be taken in the Italian theater of war." This is on Page 117.

Will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for your remark.

JODL: That can be quickly explained. In that order territorial limits were set restricting the use of the Commando Order, which henceforth was to apply only to enemy operations behind the corps

command posts but not to the battle area of the beachhead. These were territorial limitations which had not so far been fixed or ordered; and I immediately accepted this order for the Italian theater of war, because in Italy also there existed a fighting front on land. If this order were put into practice in Italy, it would mean that no Commando operation which began with a landing on the coast need be regarded as a Commando operation, because all these landings took place in front of the lines of the corps command posts. Therefore I was very anxious to have the same lighter conditions applied to the whole Italian theater of war.

DR. EXNER: I just want to read one paragraph on Page 116. It is the second paragraph under Number 1. In the first paragraph it says: "... the order remains in force...." But the second paragraph reads:

"Excepted are enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate battle area of the beachhead-that is in the area of the divisions fighting in the front line-as well as reserve troops up to and including corps commands, in accordance with Figure 5 of the basic order...."

The word "Generalkommando" means "corps command," and it has not been quite correctly translated into English and French. This limitation of the order to certain areas was, on the basis of Jodl's comment, also to apply to the Italian theater.

Now finally-but before that I have another important question . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation?


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: Yes; the word "Generalkommando" has been translated into the French, Region Militaire. Region Militaire is not quite clear.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English?

DR. EXNER: And in the English it says, "corps command." That is correct. The English is correct: "corps command." That is the same as "Generalkommando."

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal would prefer that you should draw the attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a mistranslation, rather than stating that it is a mistranslation. I call it a question of opinion whether it is a mistranslation or not. It is not for you to tell us that it is a mistranslation. You may draw our attention to it and say that you submit it as a mistranslation. But now, will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551-PS, it appears to be signed by, or initialed by Warlimont. In the other, in your version of the translation, it appears to be signed by the Defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I make a suggestion? I think the Court should get the original from the Exhibit Room. 551-PS in fact consists of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil; and the second is a draft initialed "W"-that is Warlimont, with Jodl's penciled note at the end extending it to Italy; and the third is the final order in which the penciled note of Jodl and the alteration of distribution to Italy is incorporated. So, there are really three documents, and the last is a mimeographed document with the mimeographed signature of Keitel. That appears from the original draft.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner.

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution has been emphasizing that you gave strict instructions to have this order kept secret, and that you ordered its distribution only down to the level of commanding officers to avoid its falling into enemy hands at all costs. You gave these instructions for the second order, the explanatory order, 503-PS. Will you explain why you ordered such strict secrecy?

JODL: These instructions for secrecy refer actually only to Document 503-PS.

DR. EXNER: That, I may add, is in the second volume of my document book, on Page 102. That is the order for secrecy, signed by Jodl.

[Turning to the defendant.] Will you continue?


4 June 46

JODL: Particular secrecy for this order was quite inevitable. First of all, it was directed only to the commanders. Secondly, the order contained in great detail information on the considerable damage which the German Wehrmacht had already suffered through these Commando operations, and the damage which might still be caused under certain circumstances. If the order were to fall into enemy hands, it would certainly be an incentive for the enemy to continue that particular type of warfare in increased measure. Thirdly, the order, 498-PS, could be considered as a reprisal. But the last sentence in Document 503-PS, a sentence which can easily be recognized as a later addition-as the order seems to end before it-that sentence, I must say, made me indignant and was one of the reasons why I insisted on such particularly strict secrecy for this order.

THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to?

JODL: I refer to the last sentence of document 503-PS, which says:

"If it should serve some useful purpose to save one or two men temporarily to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately after interrogation."

I cannot prove it...

THE PRESIDENT: That is not in 503, is it?

DR. EXNER: 503-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: You have not printed the whole of 503 in your document book. Is that it?

DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, 503-PS is not in it, but only the secrecy order, Page 102. I expressly requested, however, that it should be submitted to the Tribunal.

JODL: May I add that this sentence became the source of all trouble, The troops made use of that sentence and on principle, or as a rule, did not kill Commandos but took them prisoner.

DR. EXNER: You said this last sentence made you indignant. Were you also convinced that it was against international law?

JODL: One might have doubts in that respect too. But I found it distasteful from a human point of view, for if one does shoot a man, I think it is base to extort all information out of him first.

DR. EXNER: I want to ask one more question concerning what you mentioned before the recess. You said that you did not report everything to the Fuehrer; you did not report all Commando raids to him. That is quite clear. But you said you also did not report information which you obtained from the enemy-killings, and so on. What did you mean by that?


4 June 46

JODL: I reported the results of Dieppe and, should we say, the violations of international law which we considered had been committed there-the shackling of German prisoners, and so on. There was only one thing which I did not report, namely, the shackling of some men belonging to the Todt Organization in such a manner that they strangled themselves. I did not report that, and it did not appear in any order or Wehrmacht communiqué.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you should ask him again I don't know.

DR. EXNER: I thought it was not quite clear.

[Turning to the defendant.] We now pass to another subject, the order regarding Leningrad and Moscow. How did Hitler's order about the fate of Leningrad and Moscow come into being? It is C-173, second volume, Page 145 of my document book; it was submitted under the number USSR-114. This is the order stating that surrender was not to be accepted. How did this order come into being?

JODL: At the beginning of the second paragraph appears the sentence: "The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world." I shall now explain that. The first reason was a report from Field Marshal Von Leeb, the Commander of Army Group North at Leningrad. He reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to flock out toward his lines in the south and west. He pointed out that it would be absolutely impossible for him to keep these millions of Leningrad people fed and supplied if they were to fall into his hands, because the supply situation of the army group was deplorable at that time. That was the first reason. But shortly beforehand Kiev had been abandoned by the Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when tremendous explosions occurred one after another. The major part of the inner city was destroyed by fire; 50,000 people were made homeless; German soldiers were used to fight the flames and suffered considerable losses, because further large masses of explosives went off during the fire. At first the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60 objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this demolition chart in my hands. That proved...

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the details of Kiev. This deals with Leningrad. The defendant might briefly


4 June 46

state in substance what he says happened at Kiev; but we cannot investigate details of it.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to show that it was feared these happenings in Kiev might repeat themselves in Leningrad.

THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that; but if he said that he had plans of the blowing up of Leningrad, it would be a different matter, and he could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go into the details about Kiev.

DR. EXNER: No. I only want to refer without quoting to my Exhibit AJ-15 (Document Jodl-50), on Page 149 of my second volume. That is a report on these explosions in Kiev. We will not delay over this matter any more now. I just wanted to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal.

Turning to the defendant.] Please continue.

JODL: Then I only need to say in conclusion that the Fuehrer always expected that what had happened in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Odessa would happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive reason why this order, which already had been put into writing, was given by him orally to the High Command of the Army. And the order was given added weight because the Russian radio reported that Leningrad had been undermined and would be defended to the last man.

The purpose of the order was exclusively that of protecting German troops against such catastrophes as had already occurred; for entire staffs had been blown into the air in Kharkov and Kiev. For this reason the Fuehrer issued this order, which I in turn, at his express request, put into writing. Therefore the order began with the words, "The Fuehrer has again decided"-that means "once more," "for the second time."

DR. EXNER: What was the reason for the order to leave openings to the east in the encirclement of Leningrad and Moscow?

JODL: We did not want these masses of the population. We had had our experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary to use the transport space of four divisions and the whole relief train "Bavaria," which could supply tens of thousands of people, to save the population from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible, because in the first place the railways had been destroyed; the raids had not yet been adjusted to our gauge, and the supply situation was very difficult. It would have been impossible to help these millions of people in any way; there would have been a real catastrophe. Hence the idea of pressing them back to the east, into the Russian areas; an idea, incidentally,


4 June 46

not in conformity with the assertion which has been made here that we wanted to exterminate the Slavs.

DR. EXNER: I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor has accused you of ordering in Document UK-56-which is Exhibit RF-335 in my document book, the second volume, Page 153-of ordering the deportation of Jews, thereby giving, as chief of a military staff, a political order.

Will you explain how this order came into being?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You said-at least, I took it down-Page 153.

DR. EXNER: Page 155. I beg your pardon, it is on Page 155 of the second volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please reply.

JODL: I must explain in connection with this document that the deportation of Jews from Denmark was discussed during a conference at which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Fuehrer; and the Fuehrer approved or ordered it. I was informed of it either through General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel.

Then on instructions conveyed to me by Schmundt, I transmitted to the military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The heading, or rather, the address of this teleprint message shows that it was directed to two offices, namely to the Foreign Office and to the commander of the German troops in Denmark. These are the two principal offices for which it was destined. The Reichsfuehrer SS received the letter only for information purposes, as is noted on it in accordance with our of lice practice. He did not have to act upon it; it was not an order for him, but it was merely for information. He already knew the Fuehrer's decision.

I did not in any way order the deportation of the Jews, but I wrote, "The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS..."

DR. EXNER: That is under Figure 2?

JODL: Figure 2. Had this been an order, it would have had to be addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS; and it would have had to be worded like this: "Reichsfuehrer SS is to deport Jews from Denmark." But it is exactly the other way about. This Figure 2 informs General Von Hanneckeh in Denmark that he has nothing to do with this affair, but that it is being handled by the Reichsfuehrer SS. But General Von Hannecken had to be told of this, because at that time a state of military emergency existed. He had executive power in Denmark, and if anything like that had been done without his


4 June 46

knowledge he might immediately have objected to it and forbidden it.

The matter appeared to me so urgent that, in order to avoid incidents, I informed the military commander in Denmark about it over the telephone, quite openly and without regard to its secrecy. The French Prosecution mentioned an indiscretion which enabled most Jews to escape from Denmark into Sweden; presumably it was this telephone call which made that possible.

Finally, therefore, I repeat that I was far from ordering the deportation of Jews; I merely informed the military commander in question that he was to have nothing to do with the matter. Besides, as I heard afterwards on making inquiries, these Jews were taken to Theresienstadt, where they were cared for and visited by the Red Cross; and even the Danish minister declared himself satisfied with their treatment.

DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to what I consider is an inadequate translation into English and French. Under Figure 1 on Page 156 of the second volume the word "volunteers,' does not appear in the translation. It says here, "The Reichsfuehrer SS has permission to recruit volunteers from the former members of the Danish forces who are to be released. . ." The word "volunteers" is missing in the English translation; the French merely says hommes-"men."

[Turning to the defendant.] You actually had no dealings with matters in occupied territories; they were outside your jurisdiction. How then did you come to sign this order?

JODL: Actually this affair did not concern me at all. I signed the order because Field Marshal Keitel was away on that day.

DR. EXNER: As we are just talking of the Jews, will you tell the Court what you knew about the extermination of Jews? I remind you that you are under oath.

JODL: I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very often the improbable is true and the probable untrue. I can only say, fully conscious of my responsibility, that I never heard, either by hint or by written or spoken word, of an extermination of Jews. On one single occasion I had doubts, and that was when Himmler spoke about the revolt in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight; but Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the concrete dugouts which had been built there, and he said, "Not only the Jews but also Polish Nationalists have taken refuge there and they are offering bitter resistance." And with that he removed my suspicions.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw?


4 June 46

JODL: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I heard through a personal report from Himmler given in our presence, in the- presence of soldiers at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Himmler spoke only of an uprising and of bitter fighting. As far as the activities of the Police are concerned, of the so-called action groups, Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos-a conception, incidentally, of which I first heard here in detail-there was never any explanation through the Fuehrer himself other than that these police units were necessary to quell uprisings, rebellions, and partisan actions before they grew into a menace. This was not a task for the Armed Forces, but for the Police, and for that reason the Police had to enter the operational areas of the Army. I have never had any private information on the extermination of the Jews; and on my word, as sure as I am sitting here, I heard all these things for the first time after the end of the war.

DR. EXNER: What did you know about concentration camps . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to point out to you that you cannot speak about there having been no explanation to the Fuehrer; you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself. The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had been no explanation to the Fuehrer.

All; INTERPRETER: From the Fuehrer.

THE PRESIDENT: From the Fuehrer?


JODL: I said that the Fuehrer had never given us any other reason for the presence of police forces than his statement that police measures were necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: I misheard the translation.

DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about concentration camps, or what did you know about them? Please be brief.

JODL: I can briefly say that I knew there were concentration camps at Dachau and Oranienburg. Some divisional officers visited Oranienburg once in 1937 and gave me very enthusiastic accounts of it. I heard the name of Buchenwald for the first time in the spring of 1945. When the name was mentioned, I thought it was a new troop training camp; and I made inquiries. The inmates were always described as German habitual criminals and certain inveterate political opponents, who however, like Schuschnigg or Niemoller, were held there in a kind of honorable detention. I never heard a single word about tortures, deported persons, or prisoners of war, crematoriums or gas vans, torments reminiscent of the Inquisition, and medical experiments. I can only say that, even if


4 June 46

I had heard of these things, I would not have believed them until I had seen them with my own eyes.

DR. EXNER: The French prosecutor read a statement by the German Police General Panke, according to which you were present at a conference with Hitler on 30 December 1942, when terror and counterterror and so on, and reprisal murders in Denmark were said to have been discussed. What do you say to that?

JODL: I think it was on 30 December 1943.

DR. EXNER: Was it?

JODL: In some points that statement is correct; in others it is incorrect. During that conference, at least as long as I was present, the word "murder" was never mentioned. The Fuehrer said:

"I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks, now beginning in Norway, with exactly the same weapons. That is to say, if a Danish factory working for Germany is blown up, which has happened, then a factory working solely for the Danes will be blown up also. If some of our strong points are attacked by terrorists, which has also happened, these terrorists will be hunted, surrounded, and wiped out in fighting; and I do not want courts martial, which only create martyrs."

He did not say or suggest, however, that innocent Danes should now be murdered as a reprisal. I can only say that, in my presence and in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel, that and nothing else was said. Again, it is a very debatable question from the point of view of international law whether an army is not entitled to adopt the fighting methods of its opponents in its countermeasures, particularly in such franc-tireur warfare and in rebellions like these. It seems to me a very moot point.

DR. EXNER: You just said, "as long as I was present." Were you not present during the entire conference? Can you remember?

JODL: I do not think that even in my absence any other statements were made. Once during the conference I went out to telephone and was away for a short time, perhaps 15 minutes.

DR. EXNER: We now come to the partisan fighting. Partisan fighting and partisans have been mentioned frequently here. Can you say briefly what these partisans were?

JODL: It is not easy to define that clearly, considering all the types of fighting adopted in this world war; but there are five characteristics:

1) A partisan group is a fighting unit formed behind one's own front; 2) it is not or is only partly in uniform; 3) it is not an organic part of the Armed Forces even though it receives its orders


4 June 48

from them; 4) it must be in a position, or it generally is in a position to...

THE PRESIDENT: We don't require a lecture about this matter.

DR. EXNER: Well, then we know approximately what partisans are. I now want to ask you about the fighting against partisan groups. First of all I must read what we have heard here about partisans, Document L-180, USA-276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book, Page 121. That is a complete report of an Einsatzgruppe in action against partisans; it is Appendix Number 9. What is found on Page 122 is, I think, of importance. First of all under Roman Numeral I, Figure 5, I quote:

"In the larger cities, especially those with industrial works, so-called istrebitelui battalions (i. e. destruction battalions) were formed by the Soviets before the entry of the German troops...."

Then, under Roman Numeral III:

". . . the tasks and fighting methods of the various partisan groups have become known . . . partly from the captured combat directives of the partisans themselves. This statement of a captured partisan . . . is significant: 'A partisan must destroy everything that he can reach....) ,,

And then, in one of the "Combat Directives for Partisan Groups" received by us from the commander of the army, rear area North, we find stated:

"Unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his allies in territories occupied by him. All the measures of the enemy are to be opposed."

And then instructions are given to blow up bridges, to destroy roads, et cetera. I shall not read it all. In the last paragraph, which I have on Page 123, it expressly states that partisans are to disguise themselves cleverly; that they will sometimes appear as farmers or will work in the fields as soon as German forces appear in the vicinity. The witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski stated here that the fight against partisans was carried out in a chaotic manner. He meant by that that it was not directed from higher quarters. You must be informed about that. Is that correct?

JODL: No, that is not correct. This expert on partisan fighting obviously has a bad memory. I draw attention to Document F-665, in Document Book 2, Page 126. Here the first page is given of a directive for partisan warfare. It is called "Instructions for Partisan Warfare," and was signed by me personally on 6 May 1944. The Tribunal will see that in the second sentence it says that...

DR. EXNER: Page 126.


4 June 46

JODL: . . . the instructional pamphlet number so-and-so, "Instructions for Partisan Warfare in the East," issued by the OKW, Armed Forces Operations Staff, dated 11 November 1942, is canceled. That proves that at least since 11 November 1942, the troops had in their possession instructions issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff as to how the battle against partisans should be conducted.

DR. EXNER: May I now draw attention to my Document AJ-1, Page 133. It is an affidavit of a Pastor Wettberg; I do not want to read it. Pastor Wettberg contacted me because he himself had been engaged in the warfare against partisans, and he confirmed that the fighting was perfectly well directed even before the new instructions were issued, that is, from 1942 onwards. In 1944 you issued this new directive without Hitler's permission; is that correct?

JODL: Yes.

DR. EXNER: What made you do that? Was it not an unusual step?

JODL: I want to state that I did not submit this directive either to Field Marshal Keitel or to the Fuehrer, because it was a contradiction of all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later that it gives instructions for all so-called partisans in France and Yugoslavia-partisan areas in Russia were now in front of our lines-to be treated immediately as regular fighting troops, and thus as prisoners of war.

I took this unusual step because I became convinced, after the shooting of the English Air Force officers at Sagan, that the Fuehrer no longer concerned himself with the idea of human rights; and also because after 1 May 1944 I myself felt responsible for questions of international law, as the "Canards" department had been dissolved on that day and the foreign section, together with the international law department, had come under my command. I was resolved not to tolerate and not to participate in any such violations of international law on our part, and I acted accordingly from that day up to the end of the war.

In this order I declared all partisans and those supporting them, and even those wearing civilian clothes, to be regular troops and prisoners of war, long before Eisenhower-on 7 July 1944 only-demanded that terrorists in France should be given that status.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that the fight against partisans was only a code name under which Jews and Slavs were killed; is that true?

JODL: The fight against partisans was a horrible reality. In July 1943. to quote some figures, 1,560 instances of railway


4 June 46

sabotage occurred in Russia. There were 2,600 in September; that is 90 per day. A book by Ponomarenko was published from which an American paper quoted 500,000 Germans as having been killed by the partisans. If a nought is crossed off from that figure, it is still quite a considerable achievement for a peaceful Soviet population. But the book is also said to have stated that the population became increasingly hostile; that murder and terror became more frequent; and that the peaceful Quisling mayors were being killed. At any rate it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in the East.

DR. EXNER: In this connection, I would like to draw the Tribunal's attention to an entry in Jodl's Diary, Document 1807-PS. It is on Page 119 of the second volume of my document book. Under 25 May it says, "Colonel General Halder draws the attention of the Fuehrer to increasing partisan activity..."

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The defendant stated, I think, that in this directive of his on the 6th of May 1944 there was an order that guerrillas should be treated as prisoners of war. Will you refer us to the passage?

DR. EXNER: Will you name the passage, Defendant?

JODL: It is under Figure 163, on Page 131.

DR. EXNER: Page 131 of the second volume.

JODL: May I read it?


JODL: "All partisans captured in enemy uniform or civilian clothing or surrendering during combat are to be treated in principle as prisoners of war. The same applies to all persons encountered in the immediate fighting area who may be considered as supporting the partisans, even when no combat action can be proved against them. Partisans in German uniform, or in the uniform of an allied army, are to be shot after careful interrogation if captured in combat. Deserters, no matter how they are dressed"-and, may I add, even if dressed in German uniform-"are, on principle, to be well treated. The partisans must hear of this."

The; PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Well, perhaps-it is 1 o'clock-we might break off now.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 Hours.]


4 June 46

Afternoon Session

DR. EXNER: I have one further question concerning the partisan regulations. The Prosecution brings the charge that you, through Number 161 of the partisan regulations-that, Your Honors, is in the document we used last, F-665, Page 130 of Volume II- were responsible for the destruction of whole villages, and even of the total population of villages in France. Will you please comment on this?

JODL: I believe the opposite is true. Through Number 161, I reduced the collective measures and collective punishments that the Fuehrer had decreed without restraint, to what was permitted by Article 50 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. In this article collective punishment is prohibited unless the entire population is equally guilty in terror activities of any kind. Therefore, with this Number 161 I did not order the burning down of villages, not even in exceptional cases, but on the contrary I said that such collective measures might be used only in very exceptional cases, and then only with the approval of a divisional commander, for he would have a tribunal and could make a judicial investigation.

I do not wish to trouble the Tribunal with any other merits of mine, which may be read in this document. I discussed the good treatment of the population; the necessity of leaving them the necessaries of life, et cetera. I believe, at any rate, that this document actually serves as a model of how this sort of war may be brought within the scope of international law. I did this as I was convinced that at that time the French Maquis movement, and also the Tito revolt had gradually begun to develop into a regular war.

Now the case of the 2d SS Panzer Division is cited as an example of things that I caused through this Number 161. I can say only that the behavior of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its commander. I learned about it only months afterwards. I am grateful to the French Prosecution for having submitted this document, and I am grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement in the beginning was nothing else than franc-tireur warfare, the heroism of which I do not dispute.

DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different problem, the low-level fliers. From Document 731-PS, Page 139 of the second document book, and Page 144 of Volume II of my document book- from these documents it can be seen that from various sources proposals had been made as to the treatment of enemy airmen who had made emergency landings. Can you tell us, first of all, the reason for this, and what your attitude was toward these proposals?


4 June 46

JODL: I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was that numerous reports had been received of people being attacked by individual enemy aircraft contrary to international law. The Fuehrer demanded countermeasures, and that is the origin of the memorandum 731-PS, Exhibit RF-1407. It is not a draft for an order, still less an order. It is a note containing proposals made by the Luftwaffe in that connection. There was no talk as yet about lynching. The fact that I concerned myself with this problem at all may find its explanation in the responsibility which, as I have previously mentioned, I believed had rested with me since 1 May with regard to questions of international law. The note which I wrote on the document has already been read. I objected to one paragraph-a case which I nevertheless considered entirely admissible according to international law. This was later crossed out and replaced by a statement that it was to be considered murder if one of our soldiers landing by parachute was shot. I wrote this objection on Document 735-PS. The concept of lynching . . .

DR. EXNER: I should like to state, for the assistance of the Tribunal, where this passage is. The remark made by Jodl in his handwriting is found on Page 144 of the document book. Various proposals are made in this memorandum, and then Jodl adds "To Number 3..."; and then there is a notation.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please comment on this.

JODL: My notation was: "Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Number 3b?"-namely, that the shooting of our own airmen who have been shot down and are parachuting to earth is to be considered a mean terrorist act.

DR. EXNER: This Number 3b is on the same page, at the top.

JODL: I just wanted to add that lynching was suggested in an article by Goebbels, published in the Volkischer Beobachter. The more I concerned myself with this problem, the more it was obvious that nothing at all could be achieved with measures of this kind, for one could never capture a guilty low-flying airman, for he would either escape or he would be dashed to pieces on the ground. This would only lead to a general murder of airmen. Therefore, I decided-and I was in complete agreement with Field Marshal Keitel on this point-to cause this entire action to fail. The Court can see that between Document 731-PS, which was compiled on 21 May, and Document 735-PS, 16 days had elapsed wherein nothing had been done. When on 6 June I received a rather lengthy report, I noted on it, "This is not sufficient; we have to start all over again; how can we be certain that other enemy airmen will not be treated in the same way? Should some


4 June 46

legal procedure be arranged or not?" If I wrote that, then, Your Honors, it is absolute proof, if you consider my general method of work, that I had no other intention than to delay and drag things out until the matter had solved itself. And I succeeded in this case. No military authority issued an order. We did not even go so far as to make a draft of an order. The only thing we had were these scraps of paper. It has been proved, and it will be proved further, that many months afterwards the Fuehrer brought the gravest charges against us, and against the Luftwaffe in particular, of having torpedoed his order.

DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief of the OKW, in a letter written in 1941, called you and Warlimont his representatives for collaborating with Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. That is Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143. How did that work out in practice?

JODL: Not at all. Apart from one conference in 1943 dealing with an appeal to the peoples of the East, I had no connection with Rosenberg's Ministry whatsoever. The only collaboration which took place constantly was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it compiled and which were dropped over Russia were discussed first with the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories.

DR. EXNER: Then why were you appointed at all? Why was that necessary?

JODL: That was purely a matter of form, because Minister Dr. Lammers wrote to each of the higher Reich authorities in general asking that a deputy be designated; and so Field Marshal Keitel also designated a deputy.

DR. EXNER: We shall now turn to something new. You have been shown the rather strange Document C-2, Exhibit USA-90. It is not contained in my document book, but the Court will remember it at once. It is a compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance in international law are cited in the first column. In the second column there are examples; in the third and fourth...

MR. ROBERTS: It is Page 163 in the big document book.

DR. EXNER: This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side a certain incident, and on the other enumerates the consequences of this incident: its appraisal in the light of international law, its use for propaganda, and so forth

Will you explain how this came about? It is really a very strange document. Twelve infringements of international law by our side are set down, and, I believe, 13 infringements by the enemy.


4 June 46

JODL: I do not think this document is so remarkable after all. It was compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific instance. I consider it worthy of note that even then we concerned ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international law or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual practice.

DR. EXNER: Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions of international law?

JODL: Not at all, but as one Conversant with the history of warfare, I knew that there has never yet been in this world a war in which infractions of international law did not occur.

If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the paragraph there appears: "Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry," I should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of international law, and that Admiral Burckner, who gave the reply, himself referred to it-that propaganda could be put into practice only after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on the subject.

DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Burckner as a witness on this question, but it really seems to be too unimportant a matter, and I shall therefore forego the calling of this witness.

[Turning to the defendant.] I want to ask you the following question in this connection: What was your attitude in general as to the limitations placed on the conduct of war by international law?

JODL: I recognized and valued international law with which I was well acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane


4 June 46

conduct of war. Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention were always lying on my desk. I believe that by my attitude toward the Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate the Geneva Convention- bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office-I have proved that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international law.

Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations...

DR. EXNER: I submit Document AJ-14, Pages 99 and 100 in my document book, Volume I. These are special directives for conduct during the occupation of Norway and Denmark, directives which, therefore, were issued when those countries were occupied. There are some very characteristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I should like to read. You will find on Page 98, Figure I:

"The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries. The aim must be to carry this out in a peaceful way."

Then on Page 99, at the top it says:

"Directives for conduct in personal intercourse with the Norwegian population. '

"Every member of the Armed Forces must remember that he is not entering enemy country, but that the troops are moving into Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of its inhabitants.

"Therefore, the following is to be observed:

"I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves closely related to other Nordic peoples.

"Therefore avoid anything that might wound national honor." Figure 2 is also very characteristic. Then I shall turn to Figure 4:

"The home of the Norwegian is sacred according to the old Germanic conception. Hospitality is offered generously. Property is inviolable. The house remains..."

THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is enough to show the nature of the document, isn't it?


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: Then I will make mention of the remainder of the document which I shall not read, and ask that the Tribunal take official notice of this document.

Then there is a directive here, Document AJ-16...

THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, that last document does not appear to have been signed by the defendant, does it?

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] What had you to do with this document? Did you..

JODL: It is signed by Von Falkenhorst, but it is well known that we-the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the staff of Von Falkenhorst-comprised one unit for the Norwegian enterprise. I participated in the drawing up of this document, and I submitted it to the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer approved of it. There is even an entry to that effect in my diary.

DR. EXNER: Then comes Document AJ-16, which I submit herewith.

"Special directives for the administration and pacification of the occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg." This is Page 161, Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: "International law must be strictly observed in every case." But I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the other regulations.

In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164-Directive Number 8 regarding the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1439. It says in respect to the tasks of the Air Force-I will read the last paragraph:

"Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.-Signed Keitel."

Did you also draft that?

JODL: I drafted that order.

DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also.

JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmedy incident.

DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international law where your orders were concerned?

JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not


4 June 46

wish to detain the Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare, deplorable confusion in definition arose for instance between rebellion and legal war force; between franc tireur, bandit, and scout; between spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have had on international law.

DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit. I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr. Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can perhaps merely refer to it...

THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?

DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as we received permission for it only yesterday in Court.

MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I think there is no reason to object to it.

DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr; Lehmann. They seem to me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving information here.

THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number.

DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number I gave it, Your Honor.


DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl's attitude toward legal questions.

And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous entries in the war diary, orders, et cetera, are the subject of serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you were captured, of destroying all this material?


4 June 46

JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original Fuehrer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was captured.

DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace. First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933.

JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October 1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW.

DR. EXNER: That means the Wehrmachtsamt was actually the OKW?

JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brunn, in Moravia; and from 27 October 1939...

DR. EXNER: Just a moment please. 27 September?

JODL: No-August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and the tasks of Chief of the General Staff.

DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called Truppenamt?

JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz 0st (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of enemy occupation. That was all.

DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general conscription?

JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the day before.

DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National Defense from June 1935 to October 1938?

JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to work out drafts for laws in connection


4 June 46

with the general conscription order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the Reich Defense Committee came under me.

DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your military rank?

JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in 1936-I believe-I became a colonel.

DR. EXNER: Did you take any part in the Reich Defense Law?

JODL: No, that law originated before I entered my office in the Wehrmachtsamt.

DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this document it says, "Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935. . ." The signature is Blomberg's and it is dated 24 June. Then comes a supplementary paragraph: "Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl" What can you tell us about that?

JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that.

DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law itself?


DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Council?


DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Committee?

JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his deputy.

DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible.

JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension.

DR. EXNER: What were these various stages of tension?


4 June 46

JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages according to the degree of tension existing.

THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to say it was copied from France?

DR. EXNER: Very welt

[Turning to the defendant.! Perhaps you can tell us what this meant; why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason?

JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal-as was customary all over Europe at that time-that would achieve an intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization was issued.

DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with armament?

JODL: No. It did not concern itself with armament at all.

DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political plans or intentions?

JODL: It had nothing to do in any way with political problems.

DR. EXNER: But how about war?

JODL: It was concerned only with mobilization.

DR. EXNER: That means, a certain particular war . . .

JODL: Mobilization is a necessity for every possible war.

DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization books. Is that correct?

JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed according to degrees of tension.

DR. EXNER: What do you mean by chief Reich authorities?

JODL: I mean all the ministries.

DR. EXNER: You mean the civil authorities?

JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had to be brought into line with the preparations by the military.

DR. EXNER: What were the preparations in the demilitarized zone?

JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine in case of a French occupation.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy?

JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature-a very characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in connection with the "Freimachung" of the Rhine.

DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries would not be disquieted?

JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to avoid any and all tension with foreign countries.

DR. EXNER: What were the military plans of those days?

JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the Grenzschutz fist. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden attack by Poland.

DR. EXNER: Did you know of any German intentions of attack at that time?

JODL: There was no thought or talk of that whatsoever.

DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said-who was he, by the way?

JODL: He later became Quartermaster General.

DR. EXNER: Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said:

"The outcome of the war"-that is, the last war-"has resulted in a completely changed military and political situation in the case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in one's own country."


4 June 46

He said that on 14 May 1936. What would you gather from this sentence?

JODL: Of course, one can perhaps say...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness can interpret to us.

DR. EXNER: Very well.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, were you concerned with armament in the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense?

JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht-the Army, the Navy, the Air Force-and it was dealt with and handled by their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these matters with the Fuehrer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht.

DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament, and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of armament? Were you in favor of it?

JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36 divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to the Fuehrer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper.

DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me: What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935?

JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was 1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy's plan of construction ran on to 1944-45.

DR. EXNER: At that time what did you consider the objective of the armament?

JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the neighboring countries.

DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted-the 2-year report of General George Marshall. This has already been submitted as


4 June 46

Raeder-19. I have a part of it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3, (Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head.

In the second paragraph on Page 6, or rather the last sentence there, we see:

"The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power."

Then on the next page there is another sentence:

"Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy..."

Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that of foreign countries was at that time?

JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190 divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper definition for this conception could not be formed.

DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again, on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: "The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack..."

Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please?

JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of Course, in a position to destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939, actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: But tell us, when did intensive rearmament actually begin?

JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started. We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914. Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already testified, were ridiculously low.

DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS, USA-72. On 13 December you said:

"After completion of project for L"-that is the Landesverteidigung, National Defense-"Field Marshal reports on state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army-10 to 15 days of combat equals 6 weeks' supply."

JODL: That is right, we had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat.

DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the Rhineland.

THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the Rhineland?

JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because before that the Fuehrer had not yet made the decision himself.

DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that occupation?

JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose entire fortune is at stake.

DR. EXNER: Did you have legal objections?

JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician. Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which I accepted as a fact at the time.

DR. EXNER: How strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the occupation?


4 June 46

JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine; one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrucken.

DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation, is it not?

JODL: Yes, and they acted only symbolically.

DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of that occupation?

JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attaches in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men from their borders.

DR. EXNER: Was that suggestion ever made?

JODL: Yes, it was made to the Fuehrer, but he turned it down. He rejected very bluntly General Beck's suggestion that we should declare that we would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of General Beck's, which the Fuehrer turned down very bluntly.

DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with any aggressive intention?

JODL: No, there could not be any question of aggressive intentions.

DR. EXNER: Why not?

JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces.

DR. EXNER: Do you think that the leading men had aggressive intentions then?

JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible that in the brain of the Fuehrer there was already an idea that the occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East. That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the Fuehrer's brain.

DR. EXNER: But you did not see any outward signs of it?

JODL: No, none whatsoever.

DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5 November 1937 which has been presented here?

JODL: The first time I heard it read was here in Court.

DR. EXNER: What did you learn about it at the time?


4 June 46

JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me that there had been a discussion with the Fuehrer. When I asked for the minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary, Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.

DR. EXNER: Was there an operational plan against Austria?

JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most emphatically.

DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what this directive means.

JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a. plan of operations was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: "The following 'special cases' are to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by regional authorities..." and among such cases, on Page 22, is the special "Case Otto."

DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July 1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian case?

JODL: No, I did not participate in any discussions.

DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore,


4 June 46

based only on an account which you received through Keitel; is that right?

JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully.

DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: "General Keitel with Generals Von Reichenau and Spercle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military pressure." In the English and French translations it says that Schuschnigg and Schmidt are "again subjected to very great political and military pressure." This word "again" does not appear in my German original.

Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being held against you.

JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Fuehrer ordered them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards have always been played. But the Fuehrer ordered it and that is stated in the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich.

DR. EXNER: What did you think was the purpose of...

JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg.

DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of such intentions?

JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o'clock I heard of it for the first time.

DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when?

JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viebbahn, who was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention for the first time.

DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what?

JODL: The Fuehrer surprised them by stating that the question involved was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a General Staff plan called "Otto." They sent for me and for the directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist, but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only been a theoretical plan and


4 June 46

drafted solely in the event of an Austrian restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment, the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.

DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?

JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.

DR. EXNER: And what made you think that?

JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that country there had been a government against the will of the people for a long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example.

DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the suggestion, C-175?

JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be given this task.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn't you, that the Fuehrer told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn't you?

JODL: I said that the Fuehrer had informed General Keitel and General Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me, and until that day I had not talked to the Fuehrer either.

THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to know the date. You said it was 10 March?

JODL: Yes, on 10 March, in the morning.

DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the frontier districts, into Austrian territory?

JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.

DR. EXNER: Ammunition columns, for instance?

JODL: No, everything remained behind.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the last moment?

JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening, however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me, which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to find out the reason for that hesitation.

DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force?

JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded by the flowers thrown at them.

DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?

JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late.

DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?

JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army. They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Fuehrer, and I then put his decision down in writing, by his order.

DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off?

JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen-even though no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the German troops called that march just a battle of flowers.

DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which the Prosecution have described as conspirators' conferences?


4 June 46

JODL: I did not participate in any of these conferences.

DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for "Case Green"-which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation?

JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened hostilities-"Case Red" and an offensive deployment-Case Green-against Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way, even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a war on two front which was the problem we always faced-could never be conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case Green which began with the customary words: "I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation..."

DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS, Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. "I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation..." Now, please continue.

JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in Saxony. I can only state-and my diary entries prove it-that not a single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had happened.

DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a questionnaire-Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that time. Third volume, 199-Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there is the following question: "What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian mobilization in May 1938?"

And he answered:

"It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government wished to force her political allies to take up a definite position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he


4 June 46

had exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the responsibility of not taking countermeasures."

On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be mentioned:

"The Fuehrer's intention not to Touch on the Czech problem yet is altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Germany's silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for the Fuehrer, to which he is not willing to submit again., Hence the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green."

[Turning to the defendant.] That is from Jodl's diary, Page 26, first volume. Now continue, please.

JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the impression made on the Fuehrer. The result was that he personally changed my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words:

"It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action. To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment is a matter for the political leadership."

DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May 1939.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us briefly what the contents of these directives were.

JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the Fuehrer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without particular cause-politically impossible and out of the question; 2) after a prolonged period of tension-most undesirable, because of the lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene.

Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4 days such a situation would be created that the military position of Czechoslovakia would become untenable.

DR. EXNER: Why was the entire directive redrafted in June?

JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year


4 June 46

began, and because this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30 September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1 October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Fuehrer's intention-namely, that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October 1938-not on, but from 1 October 1938-every favorable opportunity was to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either.

I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion:

DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: "I have decided, from 1 October..."

JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military forces were concerned, nothing happened.

DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl's Diary Volume I, Page 32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the entry under 14 September 1938:

"At noon it was announced that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This, however, did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730 hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Fuehrer gives his authorization from Munich."

THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?

DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page 32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl's diary of 14 September, therefore an entry made in the midst of that critical period.

[Turning to the defendant.] Just what were these military measures which were being introduced?

JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over.

On 17 September the Fuehrer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the previous agreement and without telling us


4 June 46

beforehand. Previously it had been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the Reserve Army.

Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the Berghof had already taken place. Benes ordered mobilization in Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the political discussions, did the military deployment against Czechoslovakia commence.

I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the Western Powers; for the Fuehrer had clearly stated that he would negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or militarily.

DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26 September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made by Captain Burckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page 34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September:

"Captain Burckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague through Colonel Juppe.

"1050 hours: Burckner reports that the incident has not been confirmed The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy. "1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint. To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies, 'Thanks, excellently.' The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion that he should think over what measures would have to be taken if the Fuehrer should wish for an immediate bombardment of Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action." Then, on 26 September, it says: "It is important that false reports do not induce us to military actions before Prague replies."

The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green?

JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia. DR. EXNER: Did you believe that the conflict might be localized?


4 June 46

JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine that the Fuehrer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.

DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern about incidents?

JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to

a conversation with General Stulpnagel. According to that, Stulpnagel was at the moment very worried lest the Fuehrer should depart from his oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military action, in spite of the danger of France's intervention.

According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment I shared his worries to some extent.

1)R. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938.

[Turning to the defendant.] You have already said, have you not, what your worries were? Our weakness?

JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were

nothing but a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions. That was militarily impossible.

DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me what the significance of that statement is.

Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made at the time of the "X" Order and the preliminary measures.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please, will you state what you intended in this work of the General Staff?

JODL: The Fuehrer's order of 30 May which I have already explained, assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had passed.

The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no


4 June 46

longer be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore, nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for deployment.

The Fuehrer's demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was meant to explain that difficult situation to the Fuehrer.

At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order. They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany. All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in that manner.

From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express that if one resorted to military action at all-all this is, of course, purely theoretical-one might use just such an incident as a cases bell).

DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: ". . . unless the intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any case"?

That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract from 388-PS.

JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to know that the question of the first shot-the apparent cause of war, not the inner cause of war-has played an important part in each war and on each side.

The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need not describe the condition in which 3 1/2 million Germans found themselves who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of the war was firmly established, and Word Runciman, who came on that mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to the


4 June 46

Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and England and France did not interfere-as the Fuehrer believed-we might find a really obvious reason for taking action.

DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36. It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on Page 36 states: ". .. that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation (Amass) for military intervention." The translation in English of these last words is a "provocation"; "Amass" is translated as "provocation."

THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration?

DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal's attention to it. "Amass" means "pretexts" in French-which as far as we know is "pretext."

THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of the words, whether it is "provocation," or whether it is "cause."

DR. EXNER: "Provocation" sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is "cause" and not "provocation."

[Turning to the defendant.] Now the Prosecution calls these considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say to that?

JODL: This, of course, is grotesque. The example that the Fuehrer allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to protect the German Embassy in Prague and to protect the lives of the people in it, because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously threatened.

DR. EXNER: This is proved by Exhibit AJ-9, Document Jodl-62, third volume of the document book, Page 200. That again is the interrogatory of General Toussaint, who was a military attaché in Prague at that time. The third question is as follows:


4 June 46

"Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?"

And his answer is:

"Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by telephone probably in September 1938..."- and so on and so forth.

Then in Question 4...

"It is true that the German Embassy..."

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already said once it was so.

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Then I shall only refer to the testimony of Toussaint. In addition it has been said that the incident had been staged by us. We need not go into that in detail. Did the incident really happen?

JODL: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day,

and the solution was a political one and entirely different.

DR. EXNER: So that this note, which we have often read, remained purely theoretical, did it?

JODL: It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really necessary at all

But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political discussions started I made continuous efforts to prevent the provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading to any military measures on our part.

DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September know of Germany's military preparations? Did the statesmen there know that we were militarily prepared?

JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political correspondent of The Times wrote an article on 28 September against this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner . . .

DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject.

Is it true that in August 1938 you prepared a new operational plan of which you had already spoken on 7 July? A new plan based on the previous one?


4 June 45

JODL: Yes. Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact, I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the borders only were to be protected while the bulk of the Army was to be kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was available here during my interrogation. It is now no longer contained in Document 388-PS, but there is a reference made to it.

DR. EXNER: On Page 40, Volume I of our document book, I again read an extract from 388-PS. At the very end the following is stated:

"... after the conclusion of Green, it must be made possible to put a provisional deployment into action soon."

And then:

". . . first the Wehrmacht will guarantee the protection of the German frontiers, including those of the newly acquired lands, while the bulk of the Army and of the Air Force will remain at our disposal. Such a future 'frontier protection' deployment should be executed separately on the various fronts."

Why did you prepare this "frontier protection" deployment? what was the cause of it?

JODL: The reason was that once the necessity for an operation against Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And as no other intention of the Fuehrer was known to me, I on my own initiative drew up a plan for this operation which would be suitable for any eventuality.

DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about the intentions of the Fuehrer, after the Munich Agreement, to go even further and occupy Bohemia and Moravia?

JODL: No, I had no idea of that. I knew of his speech of 26 September where he said: "Now we are facing the last problem to be solved."

I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during those days-it was about 10 or 11 September-I suggested to Field Marshal Keitel, then General Keitel, that he should ask the British Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion which I would never have made if I had had any idea that the Fuehrer nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: These further intentions of the Fuehrer were recorded on 21 October 1938 in a directive. Did you know about that in the OKW, or what was the position?

JODL: No, I did not know about it. I did not see it. I only saw it here in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation.

DR. EXNER: Then were you transferred to . . .

JODL: I was transferred to Vienna as Artillery Commander of the 44th Division stationed there.

DR. EXNER: That was the end of October, was it not?

JODL: The end of October.

DR. EXNER: How did you imagine further military developments would be? But, of course, you have already answered that.

JODL: Actually, I expected an easing of the political tension and a period of peace. I can certainly say that.

DR. EXNER: And what happened to you then?

JODL: As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would never have entered my mind to make if I had any idea of what was going to come.

DR. EXNER: Did you as Artillery Commander in Vienna remain in contact with the OKW?

JODL: No, hardly at all. I had no connections with the OKW. I received no military documents from the OKW during all that period.

DR. EXNER: And who informed you then about the situation during that time?

JODL: Nobody. During that time I knew no more about what was going on or what was intended than any lieutenant in my artillery.

DR. EXNER: Did you have private correspondence with Keitel?

JODL: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that quite probably I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on 1 October.


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: Did you help to draw up the plan for the occupation of the remaining parts of Czechoslovakia?

JODL: No, I did not. During this occupation I remained in Vienna for the time being and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brunn in Czechoslovakia together with the entire 44th Division.

DR. EXNER: When did you hear about the whole thing?

JODL: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand.

DR. EXNER: Was this move into Czechoslovakia the carrying out of Case Green which you had originally drafted?

JODL: No; it had no longer anything to do with that. There were completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into Czechoslovakia in 1939.

DR. EXNER: Now, during that period when you were in Vienna there was a conference with the Fuehrer on 23 May 1939, which has often been mentioned here, concerning the disregarding of neutrality, et cetera. It has often been stated that Warlimont was present there as your representative. What was the position? Was he your representative?

JODL: With great persistence it has been said again and again that General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And even if it is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my successor.

DR. EXNER: You had left the OKW, had you not?

JODL: Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite accidentally Warlimont became my deputy later on has nothing whatsoever to do with the events of May 1939.

DR. EXNER: When did you hear for the first time of this meeting in May 1939? '

JODL: Here in Nuremberg in 1946.

DR. EXNER: Did you have any contact with Party leaders meanwhile, or with Austrian National Socialists?

JODL: No, not at all; with nobody.

DR. EXNER: Or with these defendants here?


4 June 46

JODL: No, not with them either.

DR. EXNER: Once during that time the Fuehrer went to Vienna with Keitel I think they were there 2 days or so. Did you have to report to him on that occasion?

JODL: Yes, coming from Prague he visited Vienna quite unobtrusively, and on that occasion I spoke a few words to General Keitel, but I did not talk to the Fuehrer.

DR. EXNER: You were not presented to him?


DR. EXNER: What was your war appointment to be?

JODL: As I have already said, in the event of a war I was to become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

DR. EXNER: What about your private personal plans for that summer?

JODL: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean on 23 September 1939.

DR. EXNER: On 23 September 1939 the voyage...

JODL: The voyage was to start at Hamburg; I had already paid for the tickets.

DR. EXNER: When did you buy the tickets? Do you remember?

JODL: I bought them about the second half of July.

DR. EXNER: When did you return to Berlin?

JODL: I am not absolutely certain about the exact date, but I imagine that it was on 23 or 24 August-according to a telegram which reached me unexpectedly in Brunn.

DR. EXNER: If you had not received that telegram, when would you have had to go to Berlin?

JODL: In case of a general mobilization I would have had to go to Berlin anyway.

DR. EXNER: And did you now have to report to the Fuehrer in Berlin?

JODL: No, I did not report to him, either. I only reported, of course, to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff! of the Army and the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject, and I thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us how long you are likely to be?


4 June 46

DR. EXNER: I very much hope-certainly it will be in the course of tomorrow morning; but shall we say until noon?

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to ask on behalf of my client that he may be permitted to be absent from the session for 2 days, to prepare his defense.


[The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]


Previous Day Volume 15 Menu Next Day
Nuremberg Trials Page

127 Wall Street, New Haven, CT 06511.