Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 15

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Wednesday, 5 June 1946

Morning Session

[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]

THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent.

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, in agreement with the Prosecution I ask permission to submit a memorandum by Hitler, concerning the Four Year Plan of 1936. It is a certified copy, certified by a British officer in Dustbin Camp. I have numbered it Exhibit Schacht-48. In the afternoon session of 1 May my friend Dr. Dix referred to this memorandum, which could not at that time be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht then quoted a few passages from this memorandum. The President stated that we could submit the memorandum at a later date on condition, of course, that the Prosecution agreed. The Prosecution has acquiesced and I therefore trust that I may now be permitted to submit it.

Furthermore I am handing in a number of English translations. I regret I have not yet been able to have translations made in the other languages, and I ask permission to supply those translations later on.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually made, the documents will not become part of the record.

DR. KRAUS: No. The English translations are available, and the others are not yet ready. May I submit them later?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. And they will then become part of the record.

DR. KRAUS: Yes, as a supplement to the document book.

DR. EXNER: Generaloberst, you told us yesterday that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war and that your main task consisted in the preparation of military operational plans. That is correct, is it not?

JODL: That is correct.

DR. EXNER: Then, where did you get the plans? Who decided what plans you had to make?


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JODL: It was the same as in any other military staff. The Commander-in-Chief-in this case the Fuehrer personally-received data for the decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of both our own and enemy forces, and information about the enemy. He then made his own decisions, and thereupon I would set my general staff to work, giving these decisions the military form necessary for the entire machinery of the Wehrmacht.

DR. EXNER: Now, in the course of these tasks and studies you also had to work on operations which were never actually carried out?

JODL: I have prepared a great number of such operations. Of the total number of operations for which I prepared orders and instructions there was only one which I definitely knew would be carried out; that was the operation against Yugoslavia. In the case of all the other operational plans, the decision as to whether it would be carried out or not remained undecided for a long time.

As an example of operational plans which had been drafted in every detail but which were never carried out, I mention the invasion of England, the march into Spain, the seizure of Gibraltar, the seizure of Malta, the capture of the Fischer Peninsula near Petsamo, and a winter attack on Kandalakscha on the Murmansk Railway.

DR. EXNER: Then, did these tasks of yours cover all the theaters of the war?

JODL: At the beginning of the war the work of my general staff did not apply to theaters of war at all, but the Fuehrer's instructions went only to the branches of the Wehrmacht-that is to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; and it was only in the Norwegian campaign that circumstances developed for the first time so that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was made responsible for a theater of war. And this condition changed completely when in the beginning of 1942 the Fuehrer himself assumed supreme command in the Army. Kesselring has already been asked about this, but did not answer. However, it stands to reason that the Fuehrer, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, could not issue orders through Jodl to himself in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and then have them carried out through Generaloberst Zeitzler. Consequently a separation came about. From that moment on he, with the General Staff of the Army, directed the entire Eastern Front, while the Armed Forces Operations Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all the other theaters of war.

DR. EXNER: Now, the witness Field Marshal Paulus stated before the Tribunal that the OKW was responsible for the order


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to hold Stalingrad; and, as a matter of fact, both Keitel and Jodl have been repeatedly accused by the foreign press of having given that disastrous order. Is that true?

JODL: No, that is not true. The witness, for whom I feel the deepest sympathy and with whom I have worked in the most comradely fashion possible, could not have known anything at all about it. The facts are as follows: The moment danger threatened, the decision that Stalingrad must be held was made by the Fuehrer during a private conversation with Generaloberst Zeitzler and contrary to the latter's advice. Zeitzler told me so himself on his return from this interview. At a later stage, when blizzards were already raging across the steppes of the Don, the question of a break-through by the Stalingrad garrison was discussed again. Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Zeitzler, and I were present on this occasion.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I do not quite see how that is relevant, although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean, he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he undoubtedly did; but I do not see how it bears upon the case before us, or how it bears upon the case for Jodl.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, this has already settled the matter. It was necessary to clear up Field Marshal Paulus' error. But this has already settled the matter.

[Turning to the defendant] We now come to the time when you were recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you find in Berlin on your arrival?

JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in Berlin-at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was really true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared except the operations for the attack on Poland.

There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of Dahlerus all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought in the first World


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War. And I heard in confidence from General Stapf-today the matter is no longer confidential-that the Reich Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.

DR. EXNER: Do you know when Poland mobilized?

JODL: That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived in Berlin and was being informed by General Von Stulpnagel for the very first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one.

DR. EXNER: That in itself already answers the accusation brought against you in the trial brief, namely "planning against Poland."

Had you prepared a plan against Poland?

JODL: No. Not by a single stroke of the pen did I participate in the preparations for the Polish war.

DR. EXNER: Then I am right in saying, to sum up, that when you left Berlin there was not yet a plan of operations against Poland?


DR. EXNER: And when you returned to Berlin the plan was ready?

JODL: Yes. The plan of attack was completely worked out.

DR. EXNER: Did you hear the Fuehrer's speech of 22 August 1939 which has been so often quoted here?

JODL: No; on that day I was still in Vienna.

DR. EXNER: When did you hear of that speech?

JODL: For the first time here in Nuremberg.

DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Fuehrer's special train on 9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember that?

JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly.

DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting while you were on the Fuehrer's train?

JODL: I met the Fuehrer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom, where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrucken sector was imminent. The Fuehrer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that nothing else was discussed.


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DR. EXNER: Then Lahousen's statement is correct that you were only present during that particular part of the discussion?

JODL: As far as I am concerned I have not a word of objection to raise against Lahousen's statement. Absolutely correct.

DR. EXNER: Frequent mention has been made during this Trial of the artillery and air bombardment of Warsaw. Did you participate in the giving of the orders for this?

JODL: Yes, I participated insofar as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had applied to the Fuehrer for permission for the artillery to bombard Warsaw as soon as the deployment of artillery units had been completed. The Fuehrer refused this. He said, "What is happening here because of the Poles is madness." He ordered me to draft new leaflets-which I did personally and immediately- and have them dropped again over the city of Warsaw. It was only when this renewed demand to cease the hopeless resistance had proved absolutely unsuccessful that he sanctioned artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress of Warsaw-and I emphasize the word "fortress."

DR. EXNER: When issuing orders, did you have anything to do with the co-ordination of German and Soviet Russian operations?

JODL: Yes. When we were still 3 days' march away from the Vistula, I was informed to my great surprise-by, I believe, the representative of the Foreign Office-while I was entering the Fuehrer's headquarters, that Soviet Russia would occupy the Polish territories . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might speak a little faster.

JODL: ...that the Polish territories east of an agreed demarcation line would be occupied by Soviet Russian troops at the appointed time. When we were approaching this agreed demarcation line, which was shown to me on a map-the line was the East Prussian Lithuanian border, Narew, Vistula, San-I telephoned to our military attaché in Moscow and informed him that we could probably reach individual points of this demarcation line in the course of the following day. Shortly afterwards I was informed over the telephone that the Russian divisions were not yet ready.

When, the day after the next, we reached the demarcation line and had to cross it in pursuit of the Poles, I once again received news from Moscow, at 0200 hours, that the Soviet Russian divisions would take up their position along the entire front at 0400 hours. This maneuver was punctually carried out, and I then drafted an order to our German troops that wherever they had contacted the troops of the Soviet Union, and in agreement with them, they were to withdraw behind the demarcation line.


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DR. EXNER: Do you know on what day all this happened?

JODL: I cannot tell you exactly when the troops reached the line, but I would say it was about 14 or 15 September.

DR. EXNER: We shall now deal with aggressive wars against the neutral countries...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, now all that the defendant has just been telling us seems to be to me a simple waste of our time, with absolutely no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I do not know.

DR. EXNER: You have been accused of having used your personal influence and your close relations with the Fuehrer to attack a whole series of neutral countries. Tell me, is that true?

JODL: No, it is untrue. I remember that a witness here spoke of a sinister influence, of a key position of a sinister kind-at any rate, something sinister. But my influence on the Fuehrer was unfortunately not in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought to have been in view of the position I held. The reason lay in the powerful personality of this despot who never suffered advisers gladly.

DR. EXNER: When did you first hear of a plan for a possible occupation of Norway?


JODL: The Fuehrer first spoke to me-I think it was in mid November 1939-at any rate, a fairly long time after Grossadmiral Raeder had first spoken to him. At that first conference, which I believe took place on 10 October, I had not yet heard of anything nor did the Fuehrer give me any information. But in the middle of November he spoke to me about it. I first learned the details during the oral report made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which took place on 12 November and at which I was present.

DR. EXNER: In this connection I would draw your attention to Document C-64, Exhibit GB-86, Page 46 of the document book. But I do not need to read it aloud. Volume I, Page 46.

What was the Fuehrer's point of view?

JODL: The general attitude of the Fuehrer at that time was-it is also established in writing: "I am not at all interested in extending the theaters of war, but if the danger of an occupation of Norway by England really exists and if that is true, then the situation would be quite different."

DR. EXNER: Was anything ordered at that time?

JODL: Nothing was ordered at that time, but he merely instructed me to think this problem over generally. The preliminary work, as has been proved by documents, began on 27 January 1940.


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DR. EXNER: That may be seen from Document C-63, Exhibit GB-87.

Were you at that time of the opinion that the assurance given by Hitler in December and October 1939 that Norwegian neutrality

would be respected-were you of the opinion that this assurance was given for the purpose of lulling Norway into a state of security, as has been alleged by the Prosecution?

JODL: That allegation can be definitely refuted, and by means of a few dates which I shall now enumerate. These assurances, these political assurances, were given by the Fuehrer-or by the Reich Government, I do not know which-on 2 September and 6 October. On 9 October the Fuehrer read and signed the famous memorandum known as Document L-52. I do not know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that it is a personal memorandum by the Fuehrer.

DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page 48, Volume I, of my document book.

In this memorandum-for whom was the memorandum prepared?

JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Fuehrer himself and was completed in 2 nights.

DR. EXNER: I shall read Paragraph 2, printed on Page 48 of my document book:

"The Nordic States.

"Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible, even if the war is of long duration."

JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Fuehrer, in this

extremely secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Fuehrer.

DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the leadership?

JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly-it meant gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was

that we had to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual danger. That is the reason why no definite


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date was fixed for this operation "Weserubung," and the reason why I at a later date suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate from each other.

DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared in every detail?

JODL: The reasons are quite openly and definitely stated in the order of 1 March 1940 which is Document C-174...

DR. EXNER: That is Exhibit GB-89.

JODL: Yes; we had to be prepared in any case.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that Document 174-PS, or what?

DR. EXNER: It is not printed in my document book. It refers to a document which the British Prosecution has submitted under Exhibit GB-89.

THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, must it not? The document said Document 174.

DR. EXNER: Document C-174.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is C-174.

THE PRESIDENT: C-174. Very well.

MR. ROBERTS: And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, In Document Book 3.


DR. EXNER: Now, you say in your diary that the Fuehrer was searching for a justification. The meaning has already been explained here; but you yourself should know best what the meaning is, since you wrote it yourself. What does it mean?

JODL: The Fuehrer said in those days, when I wrote it-not in a diary, but in my notebook, my memorandum book-he said: "To carry out a decision of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with which I can really justify this decision before the world and prove that it was necessary. I cannot tell, I only heard the following from Herr Quisling..." And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Service in particular very busy at this time, in order to get even more precise information for the Fuehrer about these many reports which we received...

DR. EXNER: Now, Grossadmiral Raeder has explained the facts from which England's plans could be deduced. Have you anything to add to that, or is the question settled?

JODL: On the whole, Grossadmiral Raeder has already submitted all the information. There is one thing which remains in my memory and which is also written in my notebook. That is the


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special insistence, quite openly advocated in the French press, that under all circumstances Germany must be cut off from the Swedish ore supplies. Then came the mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters; and then came the Altmark case which, according to my study of international law, was a flagrant breach of the agreement ruling the rights and duties of neutral states in naval warfare, and Articles 1 and 2...

DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has mentioned, I should like to draw attention to Document 1809-PS-that is, his diary, Exhibit GB-88, Page 53 of Volume I of my collection. There is an entry on 10 March:

"The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very gratifying from a political point of view. The French press is furious about it, because it considers it necessary to cut Germany off from Swedish ore."

And then the entry of 25 March:

"The English have begun to molest or to fire on our merchantmen in Danish and Norwegian territorial waters."

Now, please tell us what gave rise to the decision to attack?

JODL: The Fuehrer's final decision was made on 2 April and was made on the basis of two pieces of information. First, the reports from the Navy regarding repeated firing on German merchant ships both in Norwegian and Danish territorial waters. Second, a report from Canaris that British troops and transports were lying in a state of readiness in the northern part of the English east coast.

DR. EXNER: What would have been the consequences for us if England had got there first?

JODL: As to that I can refer to Grossadmiral Raeder's testimony, and can only say that once Norway was in British hands the war would have been half lost for us. We would have been strategically encircled on the northern flank and because of the weakness of our fleet we would have been incapable of ever rectifying this again.

DR. EXNER: Was indisputable proof found later that the British plan really existed?

JODL: We captured the entire records of the British brigade which landed in Namsos and in other places. We surprised and captured the British war correspondent Romilly in Narvik, where he expected anything rather than the arrival of German ships, otherwise he could have escaped capture. To the question what he wanted to report about the war in peaceful Narvik he could not give us any information at all.


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Later on we captured all the records of the French General Staff, a part of which have already been presented by Admiral Raeder's counsel. Particularly instructive, and of great interest to me, were the diaries carried by the English officers and some of the noncommissioned officers whom we captured in Norway. At least they proved one thing, namely, that all these troops had already been embarked and had been put ashore again the moment our German fleet advanced towards Norway.

DR. EXNER: I should like to refer again to two entries in the diary, Page 54, Volume I of my document book, the entry of 24 April and the entry of 26 April. There it says:

"Major Soltmann reports on the interrogation of the Englishmen and submits additional important documents, among them the secret Army list. At noon the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All the material is being handed over to the Foreign Of lice."

In conclusion, I also draw your attention again to Soltmann's interrogatory It is Document AJ, Number 4, Exhibit Jodl-57, which I now present; Page 173 of Volume II. I need not read it aloud; I merely draw your attention to Soltmann's answers to questions 4 and 5.

Now, one last question about this Norwegian affair. The English representative of the Prosecution has said that this shows how honorable the soldiers were who attacked Norway and then made use of lies and excuses. What do you say about this?

JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the custom in this world. -I can only say that I neither attacked Norwegians, nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason be changed in any way.

DR. EXNER: We will now talk about the war in the West. After the end of the Polish campaign, was there already an operational plan for attacks in the West?

JODL: No. To begin with, there was no plan of attack in the West; but, on the contrary, there was, particularly in the Army, a widespread opinion that the war would die a natural death


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if only we kept quiet in the West. That went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army transformed even mobile infantry divisions into fortress divisions, and took away all their mobile equipment from them.

DR. EXNER: Did you already know during the Polish campaign what the Fuehrer's intentions were concerning the West?

JODL: The Fuehrer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign. He too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of the French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of a sham war with the help of their war communiqués. In reality not a single shot was fired at the front. But by the end of September, if I remember rightly, the Fuehrer did realize that once England enters a war she fights it out to the bitter end.

DR. EXNER: As an officer of the General Staff you should be able to answer the following questions better than anybody else. Could we, from a purely strategical viewpoint, have remained purely on the defensive as far as the West was concerned?

JODL: I shall be very brief since such problems are not directly connected with the Trial. I will only say that it would have been the greatest possible error of strategy, because the superiority we possessed at that time would necessarily have diminished in proportion to our delay in making aggressive use of it; for England was continually bringing further divisions over to France, just as the French were from their colonial empire.

I believe I need say no more about that.

DR. EXNER: I draw your attention to Document C-62, Exhibit GB-106, Volume I of my document book, Page 56. I need not, however, read it aloud. It is a directive for the conduct of the war, and contains the basic ideas which we have already heard expressed.

JODL: One thing more is perhaps important. The Fuehrer took such a serious view of this danger, that we might not maintain our superiority in the long run, that he actually wanted to attack in the winter, although all soldiers without exception advised him against it.

DR. EXNER: Here attention might be drawn to our document, Volume I, Pages 48 and 49. It is a memorandum of the Fuehrer on the conduct of the war in the West, from which Jodl has already quoted Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. A detailed justification of this is on Page 49 of my document book.

Why then was France not attacked without violating the neutrality of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium?


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JODL: It was no trifle for the Fuehrer to create new enemies possessing a strength of 500,000 men, which the Dutch and Belgian forces represented. It resulted in our having to make the attack in the West with actually inferior forces, namely, with 110 divisions against approximately 135 of the enemy. No military commander would do that except in an emergency.

DR. EXNER: Now, what were the reasons?

JODL: We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its strongest points, which would then have remained uncaptured-namely, between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where the Vosges mountains were an additional obstacle in breaking through this West Wall at these points, this Maginot Line. For this purpose heavy artillery was lacking. But that was not a moral reason; it was, in fact, rather an unmoral one.

The great danger lay in the fact that so protracted an attack on the fortifications exposed us to an attack in the rear by the combined English and French mobile forces thrusting through Belgium and Holland; and they were north of Lille with their engines already running, one might say, for this very task. And the decisive factor was that owing to the many reports which reached us, the Fuehrer and we ourselves, the soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive.

DR. EXNER: How did you arrive at that conclusion?

JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was, however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even if the two countries wished to-and perhaps in the beginning they did so wish --they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run.

DR. EXNER: What. danger would the occupation of Belgium and Holland by the English and French have meant to us?

JODL: Those dangers were quite clearly indicated by the Fuehrer, first, in his memorandum, Document L-52, which has been repeatedly quoted. There, on Page 48 of the document book, in the last paragraph of the page, is a reference to the enormous importance of the Ruhr-of which, incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today.


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In his address of 23 November 1939 to the Commanders-in-Chief-Document 789-PS, or Exhibit USA-23-he describes once more, on Page 59, Volume I of the document book, precisely how that danger would be for the Ruhr district if one day British and French forces were to appear by surprise in that region. He referred to it there as the "Achilles' heel," and that is just what it was for German war strategy.

DR. EXNER: And he said there, on Page 59 of our document book:

"We have an Achilles' heel: the Ruhr district. The strategy of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr district. If England and France thrust through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the very greatest danger."

JODL: I cannot, of course, or could not at the time, swear to the absolute accuracy of the numerous reports from Canaris, but the material we captured afterwards-and in this connection I would draw your attention to the conference of the Supreme War Council in London of 17 November 1939-confirmed on the whole the accuracy of the intelligence reports.

DR. EXNER: Presumably you had no reason at that time to doubt Canaris' honesty, had you?

JODL: No. At that time there was not the slightest reason for doubt.

DR. EXNER: Yes. But now some doubt has arisen as to his honesty.

Now, the German attack was originally planned for November 1939. Why did the Fuehrer postpone it over and over again? We have before us no less than 17 orders postponing the attack time and again.

JODL: It is not quite correct to say that the Fuehrer had ordered the attack for mid-November, but rather he wanted to order the attack for a time when the meteorologists could predict about 6 or 7 days of clear, frosty weather. But the meteorologists failed completely in this. At times they thought they could predict such a state of the weather, and then all preparations would be made for the attack. Then they would cancel their weather forecasts again, and the final preparations for attack would be discontinued once more. That is why we so often prepared for the attack and then refrained from carrying it out.

On such an occasion I received a report from Canaris to the effect that one unit of the French Army had already crossed one part of the Belgian frontier. I do not know if that is true.


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DR. EXNER: You have been accused by the Prosecution of first deceiving these countries and then invading them. Please tell us what you have to say on that subject.

JODL: The same applies here as I said before. I was neither a politician, nor was I the military Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. I was under the impression-and, indeed, an impression which could be proved-that in actual fact the neutrality of these two countries was no longer being respected. And as for the ethical code of my action, I must say that it was obedience-for obedience is really the ethical basis of the military profession. That I was far from extending this code of obedience to the blind code of obedience imposed on the slave has, I consider, been proved beyond all manner of doubt by my previous testimony. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that, especially in operational matters of this particular kind, there can be no other course for the soldier but obedience.

And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of its own brave soldiers.

DR. EXNER: We now come to the Balkans. In your diary, Document 1809-PS, on 19 March you made the following entry: "The Balkans should and must remain quiet." That is on Page 61 of Volume I of my book, Exhibit GB-88, Document 1809-PS, the entry of 19 March. It says first:

"The Fuehrer has returned beaming with joy and highly satisfied from the conference with the Duce. Complete agreement.... The Balkans should and must remain quiet."

What does that mean?

JODL: Herr Professor, I must correct you. This is not my diary.

DR. EXNER: Yes. Well then I must put in another question here. Your diary and your diaries are always being talked about. Explain just what this is-what we are dealing with here. Is one a real diary and the other not?

JODL: There is only one diary, and that is Document 1780-PS, which is from the year 1937 to 1938, and I used to make entries in it every evening.

DR. EXNER: And now this diary, Document 1809-PS, what was that?

JODL: I kept no diary at all during the war, but, of course, I filled up dozens of small notebooks. When one of these notebooks was full I marked important passages in red on the margin, and my secretary copied them out later, as they might be important for writing the history of the war and for the official diary of the


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Armed Forces Operations Staff. An example would be Document 1809-PS.

DR. EXNER: Did you check what your secretary had compiled?

JODL: No, I did not check it, and never saw it again. It fell then into the hands of the Prosecution.

DR. EXNER: Now, there is still a third one which is always quoted here as a diary. That is the Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the Prosecution?

JODL: No. I did not know at all where those extracts from my notebook had gone. The Prosecution captured it somewhere or other. The remainder are extracts, and partial extracts, from the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

DR. EXNER: And who kept this, the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff? Not you?

JODL: No. It was always kept by a highly qualified expert of my own selection.

DR. EXNER: Did you check it?

JODL: The final check was made by Dr. Schramm, a professor at the Gottingen University.

DR. EXNER: We shall hear him as a witness.

Did you check the entries made in that official diary, or did you not?

JODL: I usually did not have the time; but if General Scherff read through it and discovered anything in particular he would draw my attention to it.

DR. EXNER: Well, so much for clearing that up.

We now come back to the Balkan question again. It says in your so-called diary, "The Balkans should and must remain quiet." What was meant by that?

JODL: That was a brief note on the statement by the Fuehrer- namely, that he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini that the Balkans must be kept quiet.

DR. EXNER: And did we not actually try to keep the Balkan states as quiet as possible?

JODL: Yes. We made unremitting endeavors for that. Our attitude toward Yugoslavia was as considerate as if we were dealing with a prima donna. Matters went so far that when we had to prepare the Greek campaign the Fuehrer even refused a proposal


5 June 46

from the Quartermaster General of the Army that sealed trains -the supply trains-should be sent through Yugoslavia, which would have been permissible according to international law. Moreover, we brought pressure to bear on Bulgaria so that she should not participate in the impending campaign against Greece, above all so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Greco-Italian campaign, the Fuehrer still hoped that a conflict, an actual war, between Germany and Greece could be avoided.

DR. EXNER: I refer here to Directive Number 18, printed on Page 66 of Volume I of our document book, which contains an extract from Document 444-PS, Exhibit GB-116, and here we find the following statement in the paragraph before the last:

"The preparatory measures of the High Command for the conduct of the war in the near future are to be made in accordance with the following guiding principles..."

And it is then stated in the last but one paragraph of that page:

"The utilization of the railway through Yugoslavia may not be counted on for the deployment of these forces..."

Well, what forced us to give up this program?

JODL: That program was completely wrecked by Italy's arbitrary act, about which the Reich Marshal and the Grossadmiral have already made statements. I have only a brief addition to make. Italy was beaten, as usual, and sent the Chief of the Operational Staff of the Supreme Command to me crying for help. But in spite of this calamity the Fuehrer did not intervene in the war in Albania. He did not send a single German soldier there, although the matter had been under consideration. He ordered only an operation against Greece, starting from Bulgaria, to be prepared for the following spring. Even that was for the primary purpose of occupying the Salonika Basin, thereby giving direct relief to the Italians and only in the event, which to be sure was feared, of English divisions now landing in the Balkans as the result of Italy's madness. In that case it was decided to consider the whole of Greece as an operational area, since we could not possibly tolerate a Royal Air Force base in the immediate vicinity of the Romanian oil fields. And this contingency is shown very clearly in the order which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-117, Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I should like to quote two passages, two very brief passages from it. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph b of Page 63, it says:

" 'Operation Marital' My plan therefore is"-I am quoting- ". . . to send these forces straight through Bulgaria, for the occupation of the north Aegean coast and, if necessary, the entire mainland of Greece."


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I then quote from Page 64, Paragraph 4, Subparagraph a:

"The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove necessary."

It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was not yet the case.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. EXNER: You said we had planned to leave Yugoslavia neutral. Now this plan was apparently changed by the Simovic Putsch. Why did this event alter our policy toward Yugoslavia?

JODL: This Putsch against a legal government, by officers meddling in politics, immediately after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact had necessarily an anti-German tendency. We stood directly on the verge of the campaign against Greece, against the whole of Greece, for in the meantime English divisions had landed there, and this campaign could only be waged with a safely neutral Yugoslavia behind us.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, various other members of the defendants Defendants Goering and Keitel-have dealt with the political aspects of the entry of Germany into Yugoslavia. Unless there is anything new for this defendant to give evidence about it seems to be entirely cumulative.

DR. EXNER: Then kindly just tell us, if you have anything new to add-some documents, et cetera.

JODL: I have something to add which concerns myself personally.

THE PRESIDENT: Nothing is coming through-the English was not coming through. Please, try it again. Repeat what you said.

JODL: I have something else to add which concerns me personally with regard to the Yugoslav problem...

THE PRESIDENT: No. There is nothing coming through to us. Go on then, Defendant. You were asked if there is anything new to say.

JODL: Yes, I have something personal to add.

DR. EXNER: Yes, do so.


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JODL: On this morning when the Fuehrer spontaneously ordered the immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, "That will not be of any use." Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.

DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March?

JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the evening of the 27th the order was issued...

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.

DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important.

JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on Page 70 of the document book.

DR. EXNER: Page 71.

JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69

of the document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order signed by the Fuehrer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall quote:

"The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore beaten as quickly as possible."

This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof

of the sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following aide-memoire, this operational aide-memoire, into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written-I quote:

"Should political developments call for armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention..." et cetera.

I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do it.

DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these directives-the order for deployment of troops for


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the operation. That is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of

Volume I, as I have already stated, and it says there:

"As a result of the change in the political situation..." et cetera-and then-"there will be concentrated..."-and then the last paragraph states-"The operation will be given the code name 'Project 25."'

I ask you, Generaloberst, can anything be gathered from this?

JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April...

DR. EXNER: No, 30 March.

JODL: . . .30 March.

DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name "Project 25"?

JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3 days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937 as was once stated here.

DR. EXNER: And now, just one last question on this Balkan matter. Was Greek neutrality still being maintained on 24 March 1941 when we gave permission for the Luftwaffe attack on her territory of Crete? In this connection I refer to Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13. It is an order of 24 March 1941 which, as I have just stated, sanctioned air attacks on Crete and also on Greek shipping. Now, what about Greek neutrality on 24 March 1941?

JODL: From the point of view of international law it no longer existed at that date. The English had in the meantime landed on Crete and at Piraeus, and we had already learned about this on 5 or 6 March. The order, therefore, was in accordance with all the principles of international law. But to conclude the Yugoslav

problem I may add that the allegation made by the Prosecution, that the plan to attack Yugoslavia emanated from Jodl's office, is a statement which has not been and cannot be substantiated by anything.

THE PRESIDENT: What was that document that you were referring to? 24 March 1941? You said 360, which did not indicate anything to us.

DR. EXNER: 24 March, which is Document C-60, Exhibit AJ-13.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. What page?

DR. EXNER: Page 76, Volume I.

[Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the question of the Soviet Union. Mow many troops did we have in the East during the Western campaign?

JODL: At first it was 10 divisions, which in the course of the Western campaign were reduced to 6 or 5 divisions.


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DR. EXNER: What prompted us to send troops to the East after the Western campaign?

JODL: The notification from the commander in the East that with such weak forces he could neither keep Poland quiet nor guard the demarcation line.

DR. EXNER: In your diary-the so-called diary-Document 1809-PS, Volume I of my document book, Page 83, you write on 24 May: "Situation in the East becomes precarious due to the Russian menace against Bessarabia." That is on 24 May 1940. That is what you wrote in your diary. How did you come to this conclusion?

JODL: The reason was a dispatch from Canaris reporting the concentration of 30 Russian divisions against Bessarabia. Whether the note expressing anxiety originated with me, or whether it was an idea of the Fuehrer's which I jotted down, I can no longer say today.

DR. EXNER: Well, on 6 September 1940 you signed an order stating that the regrouping should not give the impression of an offensive preparation. How should that be understood?

JODL: This order signed by me was interpreted as the first attempt to conceal the impending attack on Russia.

DR. EXNER: One moment. I want to point out the order in question to the Tribunal. It is Page 78, Volume I, Document 1229-PS, Exhibit USA-130. It is an order by Jodl, addressed to the Foreign Intelligence Service, and it says there:

"The Eastern area will be manned by stronger forces in the coming weeks. By the end of October, the status indicated on the enclosed map ought to have been reached."

And now, Your Honors, I am sorry to have to point out an omission in the English and French translations. The next paragraph is missing, and this is very important for the understanding of the entire document. It says, namely, "For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service..."

THE PRESIDENT: It does not appear to be in our document. What paragraph are you reading?

DR. EXNER: It is Paragraph 2 in my document book, Page 78.

THE PRESIDENT: It has not been translated.

DR. EXNER: That is just what I said. That is the error. Therefore I will dictate it now, or read it slowly.

THE PRESIDENT: You want it to be translated?



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THE PRESIDENT: You see, Paragraph 2 is not translated at all. There is nothing here.

DR. EXNER: These three lines were not translated at all, but they are very important.

THE PRESIDENT: Just read it through the earphones, then. Read the passage.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the full document is in the British Document Book 7, Page 102.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Go on.

DR. EXNER: "For the work of our own Intelligence Service, as well as for answering questions asked by the Russian Intelligence Service, the following guiding principles apply..."

And now explain the subject further.

JODL: Instructions such as these to Canaris' office were issued by me every 6 weeks. They formed the basis for the so-called counterespionage work, which I do not wish to discuss in detail here. In this case what matters to me was that the weak forces which we kept in the East at this time should be made to appear actually stronger. That, for instance, can be, clearly seen from Paragraph 3 which says, and I quote:

"In statements on the equipment situation of the forces, especially of the armored divisions, it is advisable to exaggerate if necessary."

I also pointed out in the next paragraph that antiaircraft defenses should be exaggerated. All this was done because at that time anxiety had already arisen that possibly a Russian operation against Romania might develop. The purpose of this order was to deter them from that, and it was intended for the intelligence only. If on 6 September, I had already known of any aggressive intention against Russia I would have said exactly the contrary; for with this order, as I had issued it, I would have been working in the interests of Gisevius and his friends-namely, I would have been informing the Russians that we were beginning to deploy our troops.

DR. EXNER: Now, when did you first hear of the Fuehrer's fears that Russia might prove hostile to us?

JODL: For the first time, on 29 July 1940, at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden.

DR. EXNER: In what connection?

JODL: The Fuehrer kept me back alone after a discussion on the situation and said to me, most unexpectedly, that he was worried that Russia might occupy still more territory in Romania before


5 June 46

the winter and that the Romanian oil region, which was the conditio sine qua non for our war strategy, would thus be taken from us. He asked me whether we could not deploy our troops immediately, so that we would be ready by autumn to oppose with strong forces any such Russian intention. These are almost the exact words which he used, and all other versions are false.

DR. EXNER: You have just mentioned Hitler's concern about the seizure of the Romanian oil fields. Did the Fuehrer do anything on account of this apprehension?

JODL: It was precisely on the basis of this conversation-when I protested that it was quite impossible to carry out a troop deployment at that time for it would take 4 months-that the Fuehrer ordered that these deployment arrangements were to be improved. Two orders were then issued immediately. One, I believe, is of 9 August. It was called "Reconstruction East" and included all measures to improve the deployment arrangements in the eastern area. The second order was issued on 27 August. We do not have it here, but it has been recorded in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.

DR. EXNER: Yes, that is Page 85, Volume I of my document book. There is an entry, right at the end of the page, in the Diary of the Naval Operations Staff:

"Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General, in case prompt intervention should prove necessary for the protection of the Romanian oil fields."

That is an excerpt from Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136.

The; PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you seem to be reading from Page 85. Were you?

DR. EXNER: Yes, from Page 85. It is Page 85 of the German version. Perhaps the numbering of the pages does not quite tally with the numbering of the English version. It is the entry: "Transfer of 10 divisions and 2 armored divisions to the Government General."


JODL: This entry is a proof of the Fuehrer's intentions at that time with regard to this reinforcement in the East.

DR. EXNER: Well, when was the Fuehrer's order issued to prepare for attack?

JODL: The first order for deliberation concerning an attack, or for the discussion of any aggressive operation at all, was issued in writing by the Armed Forces Operations Staff and submitted to the Fuehrer on 12 November. It is Document 444-PS...

DR. EXNER: It is on Page 66, Volume I of my document book.


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JODL: . . . and it is already known to the Tribunal. But this first order, which is known to me, had to be preceded by oral instructions from the Fuehrer to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

DR. EXNER: That can be gathered from the document itself, namely from Page 67 which reads:

"Irrespective of the result of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered are to be carried out."

This is proof, therefore, that oral orders and preparation had preceded.

JODL: I am not in a position to say, however, when these oral instructions had been given to the Army.

DR. EXNER: Tell me, in these statements, which Hitler made to you, was there ever any mention made of such things as the extension of the "Lebensraum," and of the food basis as a reason for a war of conquest, and so on?

JODL: In my presence the Fuehrer never even hinted at any other reason than a purely strategic and operational one. For months on end, one might say, he incessantly repeated:

"No further doubt is possible. England is hoping for this final sword-thrust against us on the continent, else she would have stopped the war after Dunkirk. Private or secret agreements have certainly already been made. The Russian deployment is unmistakable. One day we shall suddenly become the victim of cold-blooded political extortion, or we shall be attacked."

But otherwise, though one might talk about it for weeks on end, no word was mentioned to me of any other than purely strategical reasons of this kind.

DR. EXNER: According to the reports received, how did the military situation develop in the East after the Polish campaign?

JODL: When we first contacted the Russians in the Polish campaign, relations were rather cool. We were carefully prevented from gaining any information about their troops or equipment. There were constantly unpleasant incidents on the San. The Russians shot at everything, at fleeing Poles or at German soldiers, and there were wounded and dead; and the demarcation line was flown over in numerous cases. The unusually strong forces employed by Russia for the occupation of the Baltic states, of Poland and Bessarabia struck us from the very beginning.

DR. EXNER: Did the reports which you received contain indications of military reinforcements for the Red Army?


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JODL: From maps which were submitted every few days, which were based on intelligence reports and information from the radio interception section, the following picture was formed: In the summer of 1940 there were about 100 Russian divisions along the border. In January 1941, there were already 150 divisions; and these were indicated by number, consequently the reports were reliable. In comparison with this strength, I may add that the English-American-French forces operating from France against Germany never, to my knowledge, amounted to 100 divisions.

DR. EXNER: Did Hitler attempt to clear up the political situation by diplomatic means?

JODL: He attempted to do so by the well-known conference with Molotov; and I must say that I placed great hopes on this conference, for the military situation for us soldiers was as follows: With a definitely neutral Russia in our rear-a Russia which in addition sent us supplies-we could not lose the war. An invasion, such as took place on 6 June 1944, would have been entirely out of the question if we had had at our disposal all the forces we had used and lost in this immense struggle in Russia. And it never for a single moment entered my mind that a statesman, who after all was also a strategist, would needlessly let such an opportunity go. And it is a fact that he struggled for months with himself about this decision, being certainly influenced by the many contrary ideas suggested to him by the Reich Marshal, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

DR. EXNER: On the basis of the reports which you received, what did the further military situation on both sides look like?

JODL: The Intelligence Service was put to work as from January 1941. The divisions on our borders and also along the Romanian frontier grew rapidly. On 3 February 1941 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army informed the Fuehrer of the operations which he himself intended to carry out. At the same time he presented a map showing the Russian troop deployment. This map indicated-and this has been proved by documents-that there were 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, do we need all these strategic details of plans which were drawn up by the German General Staff?

DR. EXNER: It is of very great importance to establish the picture facing the General Staff at that time. If an overwhelming concentration of Russian troops had not...

THE PRESIDENT: But that is not what he tells about. He is telling us about February 1941. The OKW had produced plans to show the deployment of German troops.


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DR. EXNER: That is a plan which was developed by . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to go into such details as to tell us how many cavalry regiments they had there.

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us on general lines how Halder pictured the situation to you after the February 1941 reports. One figure only: how many divisions were deployed?

JODL: I have already said that 150 Russian divisions were deployed against us in February.

THE PRESIDENT: He said that already.

DR. EXNER: And how many were there on our side?

JODL: I should like to say in reply that at this same time our deployment, as reported by General Halder, had only just begun. And furthermore, I should like to point out that according to Document C-39, Exhibit USA-138, Page 92 of the first document book, it is clear from a study of this document book-it is the timetable for the deployment-that it was not until 1 June that the actual attack formations, consisting of 14 armored divisions and 12 motorized infantry divisions, were brought up. In fact they were not actually moved until 10 June. I mention this so that it cannot be said that the German intention to attack was already obvious in February 1941. Such was not the case.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has especially emphasized that this plan for the attack on Soviet Russia had been drawn up long before then. Can you perhaps say anything more about that?

JODL: I will explain the matter in a few words. We had to use 10,000 trains for this deployment. If one could have run 100 a day it would have taken 100 days; but we never reached that figure, So for purely technical reasons this deployment had already taken 4 months.

DR. EXNER: Did events in Yugoslavia have any influence on the Fuehrer's decision?

JODL: They gave it the final impetus. Until that time the Fuehrer still had doubts. On 1 April, not earlier, he decided to attack; and on 1 April he ordered the attack to be made ready for about 22 June. The order for the attack itself-that is, the real opening of the campaign-was issued only on 17 June, which is likewise proved by documents.

DR. EXNER: Then, in your opinion, the Fuehrer waged a preventive war. Did later experiences prove that this was a military necessity?

JODL: It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later on was the certainty of enormous Russian military


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preparations opposite our frontiers. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour, it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war.

DR. EXNER: As an example, could you perhaps tell the Tribunal the number of new airfields which were discovered in the Russian-Polish area?

JODL: I recall approximately that there had been about 20 airfields in eastern Poland, and that in the meantime these had been increased to more than a hundred.

DR. EXNER: Quite briefly, under these conditions what would have been the result of Russia's having forestalled us?

JODL: I do not want to go into the strategic principles, into the operations behind the front; but I can state briefly that we were never strong enough to defend ourselves in the East, as has been proved by the events since 1942. That may sound grotesque, but in order to occupy this front of over 2,000 kilometers we needed 300 divisions at least; and we never had them. If we had waited until the invasion, and a Russian attack had caught us in a pincer movement, simultaneously, we certainly would have been lost. If, therefore, the political premise was correct, namely that we were threatened by this attack, then from a military point of view also the preventive attack was justified. The political situation was presented to us soldiers in this light, consequently we based our military work accordingly.

DR. EXNER: Now, a few questions concerning Japan. What significance did Directive 24 of 5 March 1941 have for co-operation with Japan? It has already been mentioned, but the matter is not quite clear. That is Page 94, Volume I of our document book, which is Document C-75, Exhibit USA-151. Grossadmiral Raeder, in the witness stand, has already said something about this directive. Can you tell me anything new?

JODL: The document is very important. First, I must make a confession. So far I have been accused of merely having received this document. But it emanated from me; I authorized it. It was worked out by my staff in the Navy group. Consequently, I knew this document better than anybody else. It is not an operational order, it is a guide for German officers.

DR. EXNER: What does that mean?

JODL: All German officers who officially or unofficially came into contact with Japanese officers were to be told exactly what the aims of German policy were, namely, to attack England even in the Far East and precisely thereby to keep America out of the war.


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DR. EXNER: In Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a, of this directive we read: .

"It must be emphasized that the common aim in this war is to crush England as soon as possible and thereby keep the United States out of the war."

JODL: Such a directive was necessary in order that careless statements on the part of German officers should not be used by officers of the Japanese Army and Navy for their own political purposes. For this reason the Foreign Office also received a copy, as is shown in the distribution list on the bottom of Page 96. This would never have happened in the case of an operational order. Also that is why the Fuehrer did not sign it.

DR. EXNER: The objectives of the German Navy are also stated on the top of Page 96. They read as follows:

"Moreover, attacks on other British bases-on American naval forces only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented-are capable of shattering enemy forces in those places."

And so we again find the endeavor to prevent the entry of the United States into the war and to attack them only if nothing else should prove possible.

JODL: I should like to add that the purpose of this document was not to exert influence on Japan, as that would have been

a political action; it was merely a directive for all officers telling them what to say in such a case.

DR. EXNER: Grossadmiral Raeder has already told us by what naval orders he had endeavored to keep the United States out of the war. Have you anything to add to that?

JODL: Only one point, which the Grossadmiral did not mention. It comes from Document C-119 and Exhibit Jodl-37. It can be read on Page 98 of Document Book Number 1.

DR. EXNER: Page 98 of Volume I, Exhibit Jodl-37, which we submit. There we find: "Special regulations on deportment during the occupation of Denmark and Norway." And then...

JODL: Only the last sentence need be read.

DR. EXNER: Please read it.

JODL: "All warships and merchant vessels under the U.S.A. flag, as well as aircraft, are excepted from the prohibition to sail or take off."

DR. EXNER: And that is the last sentence at the bottom of Page 98. The paragraph speaks of prohibiting warships, merchant vessels, aircraft, et cetera, from leaving port, with the exception of the Americans.


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JODL: And so, in all the war measures of the Naval Operations Staff, America was granted an exceptional position for a long time.

DR. EXNER: Before Japan's attack on America, did you have any official dealings with Japanese officers?

JODL: No, not before.

DR. EXNER: None at all?


DR. EXNER: Did you expect the attack on Pearl Harbor?

JODL: The attack came as a complete surprise. It was a complete surprise to me, and I had the feeling it was also a surprise for the Fuehrer; for he came, in the middle of the night, to my map room in order to give the news to Field Marshal Keitel and myself. He was completely surprised.

DR. EXNER: Now, I should like you to clear up an erroneous interpretation of this letter of Falkenstein's. It is Page 81, Volume I, of our document book. A letter, Document 376-PS, Exhibit USA-161, can be found there. There is a letter from Falkenstein to yourself, I believe?

JODL: No, no.


JODL: No, to General Von Waldau, of the Air Force Operations Staff.

DR. EXNER: It states.

' With a view to a future war against America, the Fuehrer is considering the question of the occupation of the Atlantic islands."

That can be interpreted to mean that he intended to attack America: "With a view to a future war against America, the Fuehrer is considering. . ." What is meant by that, and how did you interpret it?

JODL: That is perfectly obvious. At that time consideration was actually being given to the occupation of the Atlantic islands, a thing the Fuehrer had always wanted to do.

DR. EXNER: For what purpose?

JODL: As a certain security base, thus an outpost in case of American intervention; and so we had to take this idea into consideration. Although the Navy as well as the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces definitely rejected it, we had to consider these matters in theory at least; and this is what he tells General Von Waldau in this letter.


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Furthermore, the same thing was then written in a document, later in an order, Document 444-PS, exactly as written here.

DR. EXNER: Did we have any interest at all in extending the war?

JODL: I, personally, none. I can only say that the expanse from the North Cape to Tobruk, and from Brest to Rostov-on-the-Don was too great for my liking.

DR. EXNER: And were we interested in having Japan at war with America?

JODL: No, we would have much preferred a new and powerful ally without a new and powerful enemy.

DR. EXNER: Did we drag Italy into the war?

JODL: I do not know what was done politically; but after the collapse of France, when Italy also wished to take an active part in the war, we tried to prevent this, we soldiers in the OKW. But we only succeeded in delaying her intervention by 4 to 6 days; the Fuehrer could not refuse altogether. But during the whole of the war Italy was of no help to us, rather only a burden; and this will be confirmed by subsequent histories of the war.

DR. EXNER: As to all the accusations concerning Crimes Against Peace, I should like to refer to the relevant documents which have been submitted by Goering, Ribbentrop, Raeder, and Doenitz. I do not know whether such a reference is at all necessary according to the rules of procedure.

Now one final question. The Prosecution has represented this whole series of campaigns as a long premeditated and concerted plan of conquest which you, as a conspirator, both instigated and carried out. What have you to say to this?

JODL: I believe I have already corrected this completely distorted picture by my testimony. The war against Poland broke out without my having taken any part in its preparation. It developed into a World War contrary to the hopes of all soldiers. Everything had to be improvised for this war. There was nothing ready except the plan of attack against Poland. There were neither enough bombs nor enough ammunition. At that time not a single soldier thought about Norway, Belgium, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, or even Russia. No military agreements had been reached with Italy or with Japan.

I acknowledge the statement of the American Chief of General Staff, General Marshall, to be absolutely correct in almost every point.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask.


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THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): General, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you were for many years the leading General Staff officer of the German Armed Forces?

JODL: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: In the course of your military activity you were also for a fairly long time a teacher at the War Academy?

JODL: Not exactly at the War Academy but at the General Staff courses which preceded the War Academy and which at that time were held at the individual district headquarters.

DR. LATERNSER: As all our higher military leaders came from the professional class of General Staff officers, I ask you to tell us briefly how these officers were trained at the War Academy. Please confine yourself exclusively to the following points:

How was, or rather how much time was allotted to instruction on attack; then for propaganda for wars of aggression; and the attitude toward international law and politics?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think this question is completely irrelevant.

DR. LATERNSER: If the Court considers these questions to be irrelevant, I will dispense with the answers to these questions.

Generaloberst, you know the standpoint of the Prosecution, that the military leaders are supposed to have formed a group with the aim of unleashing wars of aggression and, in the course of these wars, committing crimes against military law and the laws of humanity. Please explain to the Tribunal your attitude toward this point, particularly as to whether the higher military leaders ever actually formed such a group.

JODL: I never understood the idea of Such a group, and I never shall understand it. It is just as if the passengers of a passenger ship were to meet on an ocean liner and there form a unit-or be obliged to form a unit-under the authority of the captain. This so-called group of high-ranking officers might possibly have existed in imperial times as an absolute entity, but not entirely even then. But here, after the National Socialist revolution, these groups broke up completely in all spheres of life, politically, philosophically, and ideologically. The goal that united them was the military profession and the necessary obedience.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn at this time.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]


5 June 46

Afternoon Session

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, before the occupation of Czechoslovakia there was a meeting on 10 August 1938 at the Berghof between Hitler and the military leaders, at which you were also present. Up to now that conference has not yet been discussed here, and I want to ask you what was the subject of that conference.

JODL: During that conference, the Fuehrer spoke to General Staff officers only, and gave them a talk that lasted for about two and a half hours on the whole military and political situation. In particular, he dealt with the Sudeten-German problem, and said that it would have to be solved no matter what happened. He described the various possibilities and, in particular, made it clear that he intended to solve the question without interference from France and England and was confident he would succeed.

DR. LATERNSER: That was the subject of that conference?

JODL: Yes, that in the main was the subject.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know for what reason the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces and their chiefs were not there?

JODL: I know the reason because the Chief Adjutant, Major Schmundt, informed me of it before the conference. He told me that it was the Fuehrer's intention to speak directly to the senior General Staff officers at a time when they would not be under the influence of their too-critical Commanders-in-Chief and thus not inclined to balk or criticize.

DR. LATERNSER: But then, during that conference there was, nevertheless, considerable criticism on the part of those officers, was there not?

JODL: I could not say that there was criticism; but one of the generals believed that he could or should draw the Fuehrer's attention to the possibility that France and England might interfere after all, if he did something against Czechoslovakia. That was General Von Wietersheim.

DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler later on again follow the principle of excluding the highest military leaders from such conferences?

JODL: The Fuehrer did that quite often. I would say that he did it on principle. For instance, after our unsuccessful attack on the bridgehead at Nettuno, southwest of Rome, he ordered the junior officers, who were taking part in these battles, from the regimental commanders down to the company commanders, to come to the Fuehrer's headquarters. For days he personally interrogated each one of them alone without their superiors being present. He


5 June 46

did the same thing very, very often with Air Force officers, whom he interrogated without the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force present.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you were present during most of the Hitler conferences on the situation. Could the commanding generals present at the Fuehrer's headquarters at the time take part in such conferences without difficulties?

JODL: As long as during these orientation conferences on the situation only things which had already happened were discussed, the Fuehrer was very generous about who took part in them; but as soon as something was discussed which dealt with future operations-for instance, the attack on Russia in 1942-commanding generals of an army group from the Western Front could not take part; nor was it possible the other way round, so that so far as his intentions were concerned, he would only initiate such officers as had to be informed for official reasons.

DR. LATERNSER: In such cases then, the so-called "smallest circle" was summoned to a situation conference?

JODL: That is right. And so it was that the chief adjutant would announce, on behalf of the Fuehrer, that a discussion among the smallest circle would now take place in which only such and such officers could take part.

DR. LATERNSER: During such situation discussions, did you often hear energetic remonstrances on the part of the commanding generals of an army group? Who made these remonstrances, and on what occasion? Please limit yourself to the most important instances.

JODL: I can only give you a very short answer to that question; otherwise, I would have to speak about it for an hour. I can say that not a single conference took place without the old traditional conceptions, if I may call them so, regarding operations coming into conflict with the revolutionary conceptions of the Fuehrer. Therefore, apart perhaps from single operations during the first part of the war, I can state that whenever such a report was made by a commanding general of an army group, there was a clash of opinions. I could mention the names of all the commanding generals of army groups who ever held a post. I know of none to whom this would not apply.

DR. LATERNSER: Of course, you knew all the commanding generals of army groups, did you not?

. JODL: During the first half of the war I knew all the commanding generals down to, and including, commanding generals of army groups. During the second half of the war, there were commanding generals of army groups in the East whom I did not


5 June 46

know. For the most part they did not come from the General Staff, but were line officers, so that I did not know some of them.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, could, for instance, a commanding general of an army group report for a discussion with Hitler without difficulties?

JODL: The commanding general of an army group could not do that. The commanding general of an army group would, first of all, have to ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Army as long as there was one. When the Commander-in-Chief of the Army no longer existed, the commanding generals of army groups then applied to the military adjutant's office, or they applied to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army for permission to make a report, which the commanding generals could not do themselves.

DR. LATERNSER: So that, if a commanding general of an army group intended to protest against some measure which he did not consider right, then he had to go to the commander-in-chief of his army group, who in turn would have to go to the commander-in-chief of the particular branch of the Armed Forces; so that this was practically the only channel through which objections could be made to Hitler in the normal official way?

JODL: That is perfectly correct. All military departments did that, and it had been done for a number of years.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about Himmler's attempt to set Hitler against the generals? When I say "generals" I mean the ones who are of the "group."

JODL: I have perhaps already answered that in part when I complained that we were not in a position to prevent military reports and news of irresponsible sources from reaching the Fuehrer. It was a standing rule that police circles particularly continually used the opportunity through Himmler to criticize the traditional, or-as they called it-the reactionary, humanitarian, chivalrous attitude of the higher military leaders, so that the severe orders of the Fuehrer for brutal action-as he called it-might be stayed. This was a constant state of affairs. All of them were by no means involved and it was not directed against all the commanding generals, but it was against quite a few.

DRY LATERNSER: Generaloberst, you still have not quite answered my question. I asked you whether you knew anything about Himmler's attempt to make Hitler hostile, for reasons which I hope you will tell me.

JODL: Well, the outcome of what I have just described was that Himmler went to the Fuehrer and reported to him, privately of course. He complained about certain commanding generals, all


5 June 46

of them of the Army; and we knew about it, because the following day the Fuehrer suddenly began to raise some objections to some commanding general without our knowing why, and would cause bad feeling.

DR. LATERNSER: How were the relations between the OKW and the OKH?

JODL: Before the war and during the first part of the war the relationship between the High Command of the Armed Forces and the High Command of the Army was made difficult by considerable tension. The reason, however, was exclusively an internal military one. Because in the creation of the High Command of the Armed Forces a general staff group had come into being which was outside the jurisdiction of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, and which was, I should say, even above the General Staff of the Army and gave orders to them. This constellation was, of course, regarded with a great deal of distrust by the General Staff of the Army. I might add, however, that Field Marshal Keitel and I, and many reasonable officers, succeeded in completely overcoming this tension as the war went on.

DR. LATERNSER: I think, Generaloberst, that that is enough on that point.

The military leaders are accused of having delayed the end of a hopeless war unnecessarily. What do you know about the efforts of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and Rommel after the invasion had succeeded?

JODL: I remember a conference with these two commanding generals when the Fuehrer and I flew to the headquarters which had been prepared north of Reims. That was about July 1944. During that conference, both Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and particularly Rommel described in an unmistakable manner the seriousness of the entire situation in France, characterized by the tremendous superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Force, against which ground operations were powerless. I remember quite clearly that Field Marshal Rommel asked the Fuehrer at the end, "My Fuehrer, what do you really think about the further development of the war?" The Fuehrer was rather angry at this remark, and he answered curtly, "That is a question which is no part of your duty. You will have to leave that to me."

DR. LATERNSER: Did you read the letter which Field Marshal Von Kluge wrote to Hitler shortly before he died?

JODL: I stood next to the Fuehrer when he received this letter. He opened the envelope, read the letter, and then gave it to me to read. It said exactly the opposite of what I had expected. Field Marshal Von Kluge began his letter with fulsome praise for the


5 June 46

Fuehrer's personality and steadfastness in the conduct of the war. He said that he was much more in sympathy with his ideals than the Fuehrer assumed. He had begun his task in the West full of confidence. But as the promised support of our own Air Force had not been given he was now convinced that the situation was hopeless, and his dying counsel was to make peace now. That briefly, was what the letter contained.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, can you give further examples regarding the efforts of the commanding generals to end the hopeless war?

JODL: No commanding general could touch upon the political question, because the ending of a war is not a military but a political decision. But indirectly I must say that there was not one officer in a responsible position who did not tell the Fuehrer soberly, honestly, and openly what the military situation was and describe it as hopeless-as indeed it turned out to be at the end. I, myself, too, expressed this view in writing in a memorandum to the Fuehrer.

DR LATERNSER: I have a few questions regarding the various campaigns.

What was the attitude of the High Command of the Army, particularly Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, regarding the Austrian campaign?

JODL: The evening before the march into Austria, at about 2 o'clock in the morning, I was with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch. I found him in a dejected mood. I saw no reason for it; but apparently he was convinced that this march into Austria might possibly lead to a military conflict either with Italy or with Czechoslovakia. Or perhaps from a political point of view he was not quite pleased about this impending increase of the south German element in the Reich. I do not know. But at any rate he was most dejected.

DR. LATERNSER: What were the reasons for the tension which existed between Hitler on the one hand and the military leaders on the other after the Polish campaign?

JODL: The conflict was particularly serious at that time because the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and many of the higher generals held the view I described this morning-namely, that we should remain quiet in the West to end the war. As this again was a political argument, which they could not use, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army presented a military argument to the Fuehrer at that time. This argument was that considering the conditions in which our Army was at the time, it would not be in a position to defeat the French Army, strengthened by the British Army, in


5 June 46

an offensive. That made the Fuehrer extremely bitter, and this bitterness expressed itself repeatedly in every speech to the commanding generals. The entire speech of 23 November, the entire memorandum which he wrote on 10 October can only be explained in the light of that conflict.

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution, as a basis for the Indictment of the group, have presented a number of affidavits. I should like to ask you to state your views in connection with Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, which was made by Walter Schellenberg. There on Page 1 Schellenberg testifies that in the front zone the SD special task groups were entirely under the command of the armies-that is to say, tactically, technically, and from the point of view of troop service, as he says in his affidavit. Is that true, Generaloberst?

JODL: It is only true to a very limited extent. I must start my answer by saying I was not familiar with the idea of the Einsatzgruppe and Einsatzkommando until I came here to Nuremberg. I must say that quite openly, even at the risk of being called a "Parsifal," but it is a fact. I only knew about the Police. The operational territory of the Army was divided into three sectors. The front line was called the fighting zone, and that went back approximately as far as the enemy artillery could fire. In that sector everything, that was anything at all, was in all respects subordinate to the Army. But in that sector there was no Police-except the Secret Field Police, who were in any case completely under the jurisdiction of the Army.

DR. LATERNSER: The Secret Field Police were actually a part of the division, were they not?

JODL: Yes, they were divisional troops which carried out police work among the troops. Then came the rear area of the armies which was under the commanding generals of the armies, and behind that were the lines of communication of the Army which comprised all the supply units and services of the Quartermaster General of the Army. In this main sector-which was by far the largest sector as it comprised 97 percent of the entire operational area-the entire Police and everything which did not belong to the Army organically was not under the command of the Army, as far as tasks were concerned, but under the Police, under the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler. Only from the standpoint of servicing the troops-that is, with regard to their supplies or movements during advance or retreat-did the Army, of course, have the right to give orders to the troops regarding their movements and their accommodation.

DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg states that in the rear operational areas and in the rear areas of the Army these special task


5 June 46

groups came under the Army only as far as supplies were concerned; and as far as orders and tasks were concerned, under the Reich Security Main Office. Is that correct?

JODL: That is correct. The entire Police received orders about what they were to do from Himmler only.

DR. LATERNSER: Schellenberg also states further in his Affidavit Number 12, Document 3710-PS, Exhibit USA-557, that this subordination as regards troop servicing also included the question of discipline. Is that true?

JODL: That is wrong. An officer of the Army could never punish a member of the Police or the SS.

DR. LATERNSER: As has been established, the chief task of these special task groups was to carry out mass extermination of Jews and Communists. Schellenberg states in his Affidavit Number 12 that he was convinced that the commanding generals of the army groups and armies had been clearly informed of these tasks through official channels. Since Schellenberg has stated his conviction in this affidavit I ask you to give us yours, because I think I am right in assuming that you were with the best informed officers of the Armed Forces.

JODL: I cannot, of course, judge exactly what the commanding generals actually experienced while they were together at the front; but I can say with absolute certainty that I have never seen an order which revealed that these police units had been sent into the operational zone for any other purpose than that of maintaining quiet and order, from the police point of view, and uncovering revolts and partisan activities. I have never seen a report or an order which contained anything other than that.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you believe, Generaloberst, that the commanding generals of the armies or army groups would have tolerated those conditions without protest?

JODL: I consider that out of the question, because even in the case of much smaller incidents they raised the most violent protects. Hundreds of documents which have been offered by the Prosecution here show how the troops at the front had objected to measures which they considered inadmissible from a humane point of view or dangerous to peace and order in the occupied territories. I have only to remind you of Blaskowitz' memorandum, which was one of the first.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you read that memorandum?

JODL: No, I did not read it. I only heard about it.


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DR. LATERNSER: Furthermore, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit Number is from Rittmeister Wilhelm Scheidt. It is Document 3711-PS, Exhibit USA-558. Scheidt says in this affidavit, and I quote from Page 2: "It was a generally known fact that the partisan fights were conducted with cruelty on both sides."

I skip a sentence. He goes on to say:

"There is no question but that these facts must have been known to the leading officers in the Armed Forces Operations Staff and in the General Staff of the Army. It was also known that it was Hitler's view that in the fight against partisans only the use of cruel, intimidating punishment could be successful."

Is Rittmeister Scheidt's statement correct, namely, that the leading officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the General Staff of the Army knew of the cruelty employed by both sides in the partisan fighting?

JODL: What we knew about the conduct of partisan warfare has already been submitted to this Tribunal. I refer to the instructions which I signed regarding the combating of partisans in Document F-665, Exhibit RF-411. It begins with a lengthy discourse on how the partisans conducted this war. Of course, we did not invent this. This was extracted from hundreds of reports. That troops in such a fight, seeing the methods employed by the enemy, would on their-part not be exactly mild can readily be imagined. In spite of that the directives which we issued never contained a word to the effect that no prisoners were to be taken in these partisan fights. On the contrary, all reports showed that the number taken prisoner was larger by far than the number killed. That it was the Fuehrer's view that in their fight against the partisans the troops should in no way be restricted is authentically proved by the many arguments which I, as well as the General Staff of the Army, had with the Fuehrer on this subject.

DR. LATERNSER: What if the commanding generals received reports about cruelties committed by their own soldiers?

JODL: Then they would be court-martialed. That again is established in the documents. I remind you of an order, issued by the Fuehrer, which begins with the sentence, "It has been reported to me that individual soldiers of the Armed Forces have been dealt with by court martial because of their behavior when fighting partisans."

DR. LATERNSER: And that was the only thing the commanding general could do in a case like that?


5 June 46

JODL: There was no other way open. And even on these orders, he always acted in accordance with his own legal judgment. Who could stop him from doing that?

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have also submitted Affidavit Number 15, by General Rottiger, Document 5713-PS which is numbered Exhibit USA-559. In this affidavit General Rottiger states, in the middle of Page 1:

"Only now, on the strength of documents put before me, do I realize that in issuing the order to employ the severest measures to combat partisans, the highest levels might possibly have had in mind the final aim of using this combating of partisans by the Army to achieve the relentless extermination of Jewry and other undesirable elements."

Did the military leadership at the highest level hold any such

point of view, and was that their final aim?

JODL: No. Of course, one is wise after the event. I too have learned many things today which I did not know before. However, this knowledge does not apply at all here, because there were next to no Jews among the partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatical Russian fighters-mostly White Russians-and were as hard as steel. And, to a question put by my counsel, even the witness Bach-Zelewski had to admit that there were just about no Jews among these partisans.

As regards the extermination of Slavs, I can only say that the Slavs who were killed in the partisan fighting amounted to no more than one-twentieth or one-thirtieth of the numbers which in the normal, large-scale battles with the Soviet Russian armies the Russians lost in dead or wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carries no weight at all. Therefore that is a completely erroneous view.

DR. LATERNSER: A further Affidavit, Number 16, by the same General Rottiger, was submitted by the Prosecution under Document 5714-PS, Exhibit Number USA-560. In the last sentence General Rottiger states the following, and I quote:

"Although generally speaking one knew what the special tasks of the SD units were, and although this apparently happened with the knowledge of the highest leaders of the Armed Forces, we opposed these methods as far as possible since it meant endangering our own troops."

In other words, General Rottiger, in his affidavit, maintains that the special tasks of the SD units were apparently carried out with the knowledge of the highest military leaders. If that is correct, then, you, Generaloberst, must have known about the tasks and these questions you have already...


5 June 46

JODL: Yes, I have already answered. I have never spoken to a single officer who had knowledge of these matters and told me about them.

DR. LATERNSER: Also, in the case against the General Staff and the OKW, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit 17, Document 3715-PS, Exhibit Number USA-562. This affidavit comes from SS Leader Rode. Rode states, at the top of Page 2:

'As proof, one can quote the OKW and OKH order which stated that all members of partisan groups who had been captured, such as Jews, agents, and political commissars, were to be handed over by the troops to the SD for 'special treatment' without delay. Apart from that, this order contained instructions that in guerrilla fighting no prisoners, apart from the above-mentioned, were to be taken."

Generaloberst, was there such an order that in guerrilla fighting no prisoners were to be taken?

JODL: Such an order never existed. I have never seen such an order. It was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrilla fighting. Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue. There never was an order from the OKW-OKH-that is, an order which came from both departments. Jews among the guerrillas. I have already dealt with that. Agents among the guerrillas. Agents-that is a chapter by itself. Political commissars. That is quite another point. They were never handed over to the SD for special treatment-if they were handed over at all-because the task of the SD was an entirely different one. They may have been handed over to the Security Police. In other words, every word is untrue.

DR. LATERNSER: There is an Affidavit Number 18, by the same SS Leader Rode, which the Prosecution have submitted under

Document 3716-PS, Exhibit Number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this affidavit:

'.As far as is known to me, the SD special task groups, attached to the various army groups, were under the jurisdiction of the latter in every way-that is to say, tactically, as well as in every other way. For that reason, the tasks and methods of these units were fully known to the commanding generals. They approved of the tasks and methods, since apparently, they never raised any decisive objections to them."

Do you know SS Leader Rode?

JODL: No, I do not know him. I do not think it is necessary to say much about this, because the General of the Police Schellenberg, who led such a special task group himself, and who really


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must know, has stated quite clearly on this witness stand what jurisdiction he was under and from whom he received his orders.

DR. LATERNSER: That was not the witness Schellenberg; that was Ohlendorf.

JODL: Ohlendorf? Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have a few questions about the Commissar Order. Were you present at the conference when Hitler gave the Commissar Order orally to the commanding generals?

JODL: As far as I remember, right at the beginning he spoke only to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or the Chief of the General Staff and a few officers of the OKW, about this Commissar Order. As far as I recollect he referred to that order of his at a later date when addressing the commanding generals. I believe that it was during that second conference that he used the words, "I cannot expect that my generals understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them."

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know any commanding generals who resisted that order?

JODL: Later on someone told me-I do not know whether it is true-that Field Marshal Rommel had burned this order. But...

DR. LATERNSER: Does not that recollection of yours refer to the Commando Order? General Field Marshal Rommel was...

JODL: Oh, yes, that was the Commando Order. You are talking about the Commissar Order, are you not?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is right.

JODL: I remember that there were constant objections from the High Command of the Army which, unfortunately, had to carry out this order, and these went on for a long time. Officers of the General Staff told me confidentially that for the most part it was not being carried out. I know of one official application made to the Fuehrer to have this order officially withdrawn. That was done, although I cannot remember when.

DR. LATERNSER: Who made that application?

JODL: The High Command of the Army. Whether it was the Chief of the General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say.

DR. LATERNSER: When was this application made?

JODL: I believe it was in the spring of 1942.

DR. LATERNSER: The spring of 1942? And to that application. . .

JODL: I know for certain, the order was withdrawn.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you talk to any commanding general who approved of that order?


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JODL: No. All the officers to whom I spoke considered, first, that the order should be turned down from the humane point of view and, secondly, that it was wrong from the practical point of view.

DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler gave his reasons for this order orally-and you have already told us some of them-he is supposed to have mentioned additional reasons for making it. I should like you to tell us what they were so that we may get this matter quite clear.

JODL: He gave a lengthy explanation-as he always did when he felt it necessary to convince somebody.

DR. LATERNSER: Did he state . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Have not these reasons already been given?

DR. LATERNSER: As far as I am informed; Mr. President, they have not yet all been given.

[Turning to the defendant.] During that conference did Hitler state . . .

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Haven't you already given the reasons which, you say, Hitler gave for this order?

JODL: I have not given some very important reasons, which the Fuehrer also pointed out. They were...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.

Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on many occasions in which you have examined witnesses, and really you have spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every witness who comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the Tribunal think that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you. Now, this witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any argument about it. He can give his explanation now.

JODL: I have only to add that the Fuehrer said on that occasion: "If you do not believe what I am telling you, then read the reports from Counterintelligence which we have received regarding the behavior of the Russian commissars in the occupied Baltic states. Then you will get a picture of what can be expected from these commissary."

He also stated that.

DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put a question to you about the report in Document 884-PS, submitted under Exhibit USSR-351.

THE PRESIDENT: Repeat the number please.

DR. LATERNSER: Number 884-PS, it is a document submitted by the Russian Prosecution on 13 February, and it is on Page 151


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of the second document book for General Jodl. Under Number II of this report, Page 153, there is the following statement. I quote, "To this, Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Memorandum 3 suggests..." I do not want to read further. The next is a suggestion.

I would like to ask you for what reason this Number II was brought out in this report.

JODL: I can only guess because I did not write it. But I have no doubt...

THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his guesses, you know. If he can only guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not guesses.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will dispense with this question. I assumed that the witness would have personal knowledge about that.

Witness, you said yesterday that the Commando Order of 18 October 1942 had been changed-that is, partially revoked by application of the Commander, West. Who was that Commander, West who had applied for that change?

JODL: General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and he applied to have the entire order withdrawn.

DR. LATERNSER: You know the order by General Von Reichenau which the Russian Prosecution submitted on 13 February as Document USSR-12? It is dated 10 October 1941. Do you know the reasons this order was issued?

JODL: Yes. Reichenau, at that time, was commanding general of the 6th Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. This morning I already started to describe events that took place in Kiev at the end of September, and that was the reason for this order.

DR. LATERNSER: How did the commanding generals exercise their jurisdiction-strictly, or not so strictly?

JODL: I know this because Dr. Lehmann...

THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the charge against the High Command. There is no charge against the High Command for having arranged courts martial or administering their courts martial improperly.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I am of a different opinion on this point. If the commanding generals heard of any breaches of discipline or atrocities...

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know of anything in the Indictment, or anything in the evidence, which charges the High Command, or


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any member of the High Command, with improper behavior at a court martial, or in connection with a court martial?

DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical attitude of the High Command.

[Turning to the defendant.] What do you know about the reasons for the mass deaths which occurred among Russian prisoners of war during the winter of 1941?

JODL: I am informed on this subject because several adjutants of the Fuehrer were sent there personally, and they reported to the Fuehrer in my presence. We were mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the last great battle for the Viazma pocket. The reason for the mass deaths was described by the Fuehrer's adjutants as follows: The half-famished encircled Russian armies had put up fanatical resistance during the last 8 or 10 days. They literally lived on the bark of trees and roots because they had retreated to impenetrable wooded country, and when they fell into our hands they were in such a condition that they could hardly move. It was impossible to transport them. The situation as regards supplies was critical, because the railway system had been destroyed, so that it was impossible to take them all away. There were no accommodations nearby. Only immediate careful hospital treatment could have saved the majority of them. Soon afterwards the rain started, and then the cold set in, and that is the reason why such a large number of those prisoners-particularly these prisoners of Viazma- died.

That is the report of the Fuehrer's adjutants who had been sent there to investigate. Similar reports came from the Quartermaster General of the Army.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the shelling of Leningrad by German artillery? You remember that a witness has been examined here on that point?

JODL: I was present during two conferences which the Fuehrer himself had with the German artillery commander who was in charge of the artillery before Leningrad. He brought along the exact target chart, and it showed a very carefully worked-out system, according to which only key plants in Leningrad were marked as necessary targets, so as to cripple the power of resistance of the fortress. They were mostly factories which were still producing munitions. The ammunition for this heavy artillery, only a small portion of which could reach the center of Leningrad, was so scarce that one had to be extremely economical in its use. They were mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as much ammunition as we had captured.


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DR. LATERNSER: You know that the witness has asserted that in his opinion the artillery deliberately destroyed the castles in Leningrad. You have seen the target chart for this artillery?

JODL: Yes; I myself had the artillery target chart in my brief case for many weeks. Only the armament industry was marked on it. It would have been insane to shoot at anything else. OF course, every artilleryman knows that through dispersion the shots can fall elsewhere.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the order from Hitler and the OKH to destroy dwellings and fireplaces during the retreat in the winter of 1941? What was the reason for that order?

JODL: The reasons are that...

DR. LATERNSER: I refer to the Order USSR-130. Unfortunately, I have not been able to ascertain on what day the Prosecution presented this order. I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed.

JODL: During that frightful winter battle, with a temperature of 48 degrees of frost, the commanders at the front reported to the Fuehrer in his headquarters that this battle was exclusively a battle for warm shelter. Those who did not have some sort of heating arrangement-that is to say, a village with serviceable stoves- could not hold out and would not be able to fight the following day. One could say it was really a fight for stoves. And when, because of this, we were forced to retreat, the Fuehrer then ordered that those fireplaces must be destroyed-not only the houses but also the fireplaces were to be blown up-because in such a critical situation that alone would prevent the Russians from pursuing. Since, in accordance with the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare, every type of destruction is permissible which is absolutely necessary from the military point of view, I believe that for this type of winter warfare-and it happened only during the winter-that order can be justified.

DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the case of Katyn?

JODL: Regarding the finding of these mass graves, I received the first report through my propaganda department, which was informed through its propaganda company attached to the army group. I heard-that the Reich Police Criminal Department had been given the task of investigating the whole affair, and I then sent an officer from my propaganda department to the exhumation to check the findings of the foreign experts. I received a report which, in general, tallies with the report which is contained in the White Book issued, I think, by the Foreign Office. I have never heard anyone raise any doubts as to the facts as they were presented.


5 June 46

DR. LATERNSER: You have also seen the film which the Russian Prosecution have shown in this courtroom, and which showed atrocities committed in the Yugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the pictures which you perhaps still recollect?

JODL: I believe that every picture shown in this courtroom is, and was, perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photographs. But it has never been said what the photographs represented. It was not clear from the film whether the dog that was mauling a human being was not photographed in an army dog training center.

THE PRESIDENT: That is mere argument.

DR. LATERNSER: I was about to stop him.


DR. LATERNSER: I was thinking of certain photographs which you might be able to clarify with a statement as: "I remember one photograph of a police dog jumping at a human being or a dummy." Can you say...

THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he says that they were all true-in his opinion-true pictures; and he didn't take them. He doesn't know anything about them, and anything that he can say upon them appears to us to be argument.

DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question.

Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by the witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain was taken without fighting.

JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I think, 18 May contains the sentence, "Louvain taken after heavy fighting." But I do not believe...

THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?

DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured: whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then occupied, or whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has stated that there was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a particularly despicable act.

THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?

DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know who should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with any one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must strike out the whole event.


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THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the Indictment?

DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it.

THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it?

DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but in the evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there was no reason to fire on the town.

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't catch the place-but go on.

JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940 contained the sentence, "Louvain captured after heavy fighting." Even though the German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some things, it certainly never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because I edited it.

DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of Oradour. I merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt did about this event-when it was reported to him.

JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had been started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel, the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial proceedings?

JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS court in connection with this event.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings?

JODL: I cannot say.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many conferences were there before the Ardennes Offensive in December 944?

JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them?

JODL: I took part in all of them.

DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was an order ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during this offensive?

JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal


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with purely operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct of the troops.

DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such an order had been issued by-let us assume-Field Marshal Von Rundstedt?

JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could have been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued only through the Police-that is to say, Himmler or the SS.

DR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the units of the Armed Forces-that is, of the Army?

JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general of the Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no order of the Fuehrer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this way.

DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness Van der Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that question.

Do you know the case-the Commando case?

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You said that was your last question.

DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be through in about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact that Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is the officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an examination is not an excessive amount of time.

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know the Commando case in which the son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant?

JODL: Yes, I know the case.

DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it.

JODL: I heard about this affair through a report-I cannot quite remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel, and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these proceedings be discontinued.

DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued?

JODL: Yes, they were.


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DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group, two more questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff?

JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff- I would say-directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire staff, from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I was in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in Security Circle Number 2-that is to say, outside; and the whole of this general staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if necessary, he acted, of course, as my deputy.

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is that correct?

JODL: No. I was primarily responsible.

DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of the other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?

JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff chief.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant's counsel want to ask any questions.

DR. STAMMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the end of March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation conference, that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the camp, Stalag III, at Sagan?

JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not in the big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning. Hearing a very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what was going on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the English airmen from the Sagan Camp.

DR. STAMMER: Was Reich Marshal Goering present at this situation conference?


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JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation conference. I am absolutely certain about that.

DR. STAMMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find out what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers?

JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, I learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this shooting, and I knew that particularly in situations such as these the former officer in him who did not approve of such incredible acts came to the surface. One must give him his due. There were repeated arguments over this between him and the Fuehrer, which I witnessed personally.

DR. STAMMER: I have no more questions.

HERR GEORG BOHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of the Court, I will ask the witness a few questions.

Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and the units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit (Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando unit is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the Wehrmacht.

JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando unit for the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English Ranger battalions. We never used this term.

HERR BOHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used as a Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in the occupation of the Sudetenland?

JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated in the occupation of another country-with the exception of the Henlein Free Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA leaders who had formerly been officers.

HERR BOHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA unit or as a Wehrmacht regiment in the war?

JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA, and it was recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever to do with the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in every sense of the word.

HERR BOHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25 group schools, and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000


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to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that these 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in the Wehrmacht?

JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that the Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone else than by its own personnel.

HERR BOHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members were drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise from the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier?

JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any other German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their service in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as noncommissioned officers.

HERR BOHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the SA trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but that 25,000 of ricers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained by the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this?

JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even much greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in the military schools of the Army and nowhere else.

HERR BOHM: The Prosecution assert further-and I ask whether you know anything about this-that in the course of extending the war effort, 86 percent of the professional leadership corps were made available.

JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about that.

HERR BOHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent 70 percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may be that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the able-bodied male population?

JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when men were drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other German who was called up for military service. Whether or not a man had been in the SA previously, did not matter in the slightest.

HERR BOHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units (Sturme), engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them in action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht?


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JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in action outside Germany during the war.

HERR BOHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff have a liaison man with the SA?

JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the Supreme SA Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, or was composed mainly of members of the SA, and later, about a Panzer formation which also continued the tradition of the Feldherrnhalle of the SA.

HERR BOHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which shows that on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field Marshal Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you explain this photograph?

JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the latter inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Rohm Putsch we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent squares, at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly.

HERR BOHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, when he inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the Field Marshal?

JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy.

HERR BOHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which the SA is charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been the task of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by instilling, increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany, especially among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection from personal observations?

JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch of the Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks, to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing for wars of aggression, no one ever did that.

HERR BOHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of the opinion that it is not true?

JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true.

HERR BOHM: I have no more questions.


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DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Generaloberst, the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the attack on Poland. Is it true that on 25 August the order to attack was withdrawn upon the urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to the communication which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had ratified the Treaty of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939, and Ribbentrop told the Fuehrer that the advance of German troops would therefore mean war with Great Britain?

JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received the order, "The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place," I telephoned to the then Major Schmundt-Field Marshal Keitel was not there-and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly before the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Fuehrer that Britain had concluded a pact-a mutual assistance pact-with Poland, and for that reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland. For this reason the Fuehrer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is what I learned at that time.

DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the Fuehrer held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to this conference later. Is it true that at this conference .Von Ribbentrop represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion?

JODL: I recall this incident especially well because about 1 hour before I had said the same thing to the Fuehrer, that we should clear up the situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this, the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark, and he fared considerably worse than I did. The Fuehrer said:

"Is that how you size up the situation? The Yugoslavs would swear black is white. Of course, they say they have no warlike intentions, and when we march into Greece they will stab us in the back."

I recall that statement very exactly.

DR. HORN: Generaloberst, is it true that the Foreign Office from the very outbreak of the Russian war was completely eliminated from Eastern questions, that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison man, Ambassador Ritter, and that he had no success with his suggestions to the Fuehrer?


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JODL: I know that Ambassador Ritter, who came to see me very often, repeatedly complained in private talks about having such a large part of its field of activity taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter but also the opinion of the whole Foreign Office as well as of the Foreign Minister.

DR. HORN: In your testimony you have already mentioned the fact that the Wehrmacht was against Hitler's intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed Hitler's intention, and that after the objections of the Wehrmacht had been rejected at the beginning, Ribbentrop then succeeded in inducing Hitler to give up his intention?

JODL: Put that way, I cannot confirm it fully. One thing I know for certain: the Foreign Office informed me in writing of its unfavorable attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Fuehrer. For me that was conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of view. I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign Office-together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe-in a short memorandum, and submitted it to the Fuehrer. To what extent the Reich Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the Fuehrer about the matter, I cannot say with certainty.

DR. HORN: Is it true that Von Ribbentrop spoke against the chaining of English prisoners of war as reprisal for the chaining of German prisoners of war, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to discontinue this measure?

JODL: That is true. The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office, repeatedly remonstrated with the Fuehrer to withdraw the order concerning the chaining of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these many objections, which were also supported by the OKW, finally succeeded in having the order withdrawn.

HERR BOHM: In the Tuesday afternoon session you discussed the question of terror-fliers. In this connection you stated that by making inquiries and observations you wanted to prevent the cause for the decision regarding the intended treatment of this question. The Prosecution submitted two documents on this question. One was the record of an alleged talk between Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler at Klessheim, the other an opinion by Ambassador Ritter, who has already been mentioned. I would like to hear from you as to whether you know anything about Ribbentrop's attitude toward the handling of the question of terror-fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop advocated that this question be dealt with according to the Geneva Convention, and whether he thought that it was possible to deviate from this Convention only if decisive


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military necessities demanded it, and even in that case only by expressly indicating beforehand to the protective powers that it intended to depart from the Geneva Convention?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, can't you put that question more shortly; what does he know about it?

DR. HORN: Is it true, Generaloberst, with regard to the question of terror-fliers, that Von Ribbentrop, in the same way as the Wehrmacht, was against departing from the Geneva Convention, and he put this view to Hitler?

JODL: To this I can say-again from talks with Ambassador Ritter-that I knew that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain acts of terror as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of view of the Foreign Office. To this I said at the time that the Fuehrer would probably not be interested as I had concluded from his oral instructions. As it turned out, the suggestion, such as the Reich Foreign Minister intended to make, was never put forward, or at least I never saw it.

DR. HORN: Do you know anything of a peace feeler by English officers on behalf of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in 1943?

JODL: I know very well that at that time, in Athens, an Englishman-I believe it was an English captain-established contact with us. This captain said that he came from English headquarters in the southeastern area. I was present when the Reich Foreign Minister reported to the Fuehrer about this matter, and I know he suggested that this contact be tried to see what results it might bring. That was done; the Fuehrer agreed; but I heard nothing more about the matter, and apparently nothing came of it.

DR. HORN: Do you know anything about any further peace attempts of Ribbentrop, especially after the Polish campaign, after Dunkirk and 1943?

JODL: I only knew of the attempts and intentions after the Western campaign. At that time the Fuehrer spoke quite openly and frankly with everyone. I myself, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister, heard the Fuehrer agree that peace would be concluded with England at any time only if part of our former colonies were given back to us.

DR. HORN: Is it true that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop suggested to Hitler that Hungarian Jews, insofar as they wished to do so, be permitted to emigrate?

JODL: I recall that too. Shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our troops, at about the beginning of May 1944, there was a


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conference at the Berghof, at which a decision was to be reached. The Fuehrer wanted to hear our views as to whether the Hungarian Agony be dissolved, or whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion, which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said to the Fuehrer, "Can we not send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some neutral country?" The Fuehrer answered, "That is easier said than done. Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is technically impossible." That is my recollection of this talk.

DR. HORN: You spoke yesterday of the expulsion of the Danish Jews, and you said that this expulsion took place on Himmler's orders. An affidavit by a Colonel Mildner has been submitted to me, in which it is asserted that this expulsion took place on the orders of the Reich Foreign Minister. Is that statement true?

JODL: Before this Himmler-Fuehrer conference, which caused me to send my teletype message to the Wehrmacht-Commander in Denmark, I never heard a word about the Jews being deported from Denmark, and I never heard that the Foreign Office had any part in it.

DR. HORN: Did you ever get to know anything about the basic attitude of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop toward the Jewish question?

JODL: Apart from this suggestion about the Hungarian Jews, I do not recall any talk by the Reich Foreign Minister, at which I was present, in which there was any mention of Jews.

DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.

DR. KRAUS: Did I understand you correctly, Generaloberst, when you testified yesterday that in 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?

JODL: That is true, yes.

DR. KRAUS: I am interested to know how many divisions were ready by 1 April 1938? I am interested in this key date because on that day the financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many divisions were ready on 1 April 1938?

JODL: At that time there were about 27 or 28 divisions actually ready-that is, as regards personnel and materiel.

DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, Generaloberst, how they were made up?

JODL: I cannot say with certainty.

DR. KRAUS: Approximately?

JODL: I do know that only one Panzer division was ready at that time, one cavalry division, one mountain division, and the rest


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were probably infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equipped, and they existed only as skeleton formations.

DR. KRAUS: I would like to know to what extent this armament was increased between that date and the outbreak of the war on 1 September 1939-that is, increased from 27 divisions?

JODL: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more favorable because the preparations in the armament industry were now producing results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the divisions; also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were beginning to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in a position to set up approximately 55 divisions-including reserve divisions-even though some of them may have been only poorly equipped. In 1939-as I said before, according to my recollection-there were between 73 and 75 divisions.

DR. KRAUS: Therefore, the number of divisions set up after March or April of 1938, after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by 200 percent in la or 16 months, whereas it took more than 3 years to set up 27 divisions?

JODL: That is true, except that these 55 divisions, or rather these 75, were still very short of equipment in the same way as the small number in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But the fact that from that time on armament went much faster was due-as I have said-to the very nature of things.

DR. KRAUS: Thank you, I have no further questions.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you testified yesterday that the Intelligence Service during Kaltenbrunner's time was better organized than before. Please tell me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in the OKW?

JODL: I met Kaltenbrunner when...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Kauffmann, you have asked a general question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner's positions given to us more than once. What is it you want to know?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner only testified quite generally to the fact that his intelligence service was connected with the military Intelligence Service. This witness can tell us what this connection of the military Intelligence Service with the other intelligence service amounted to, especially as regards its scope and its influence on policy as a whole.

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't understand you to ask him anything about the Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was connected with the OKW, in


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perfectly general terms. It might have involved an answer which would take about an hour.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I restate the question which apparently did not come through properly?

Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner's time the whole Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time-that is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have within the Intelligence Service?

JODL: Kaltenbrunner...

THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The Tribunal do not think that you ought to ask general questions of this nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about, you can ask it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What did Kaltenbrunner do during the situation discussions which took place daily?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner: What was his activity over a number of years?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I said, during the situation report, that is) the daily military conferences-how did Kaltenbrunner conduct himself? What did he do? What did he say? Did he report? What did his reports consist of? That, in my opinion, is a concrete question.

THE PRESIDENT: What time are you asking about?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on. That is the only time which is in question.

THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences, certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if you know any?

DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention.

Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell me?

JODL: As far as I recall, until the spring of 1945 when the headquarters were finally moved to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did not take part in any situation discussions. I cannot recall ever seeing him at a discussion in the Fuehrer's headquarters.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Excuse me, do you mean 1944 or 1945?

JODL: 1945. From the spring of 1945-that is, from the end of January, I frequently met Kaltenbrunner in the Reich Chancellery.


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Before that time he came to the Fuehrer's headquarters, from time to time, and talked to me there-especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence Service-but he was not present at the situation conferences of the Fuehrer.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did he submit written military situation reports?

JODL: Before he took over the Intelligence Service from Canaris- he took it over on 1 May 1944-before he took over the Intelligence Service, he sent me from time to time very good reports from the southeastern area, and these reports first called my attention to his experience in the Intelligence Service. He then took over the Intelligence Service, and although I was against it at first, after I had expressed my views to him I even supported him, for I had the impression that the man knew his business. After that, of course, I constantly received reports from Kaltenbrunner as I previously had received them from Canaris. Not only did I receive the daily reports from agents, but from time to time he sent what I should call a political survey on the basis of the individual agent's reports. These comprehensive situation reports about the political situation everywhere abroad attracted my special attention because they summed up our whole military situation with a frankness, soberness, and seriousness which had not been at all noticeable in Canaris' reports.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you also testified yesterday that after the daily military situation conference was ended, Hitler gathered around him his trusted confidants and his political men. I ask you now: Was Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidants?

JODL: I never heard of Kaltenbrunner being in this private circle of the Fuehrer, and I never saw him there. What I saw was a purely official attitude.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you, I have no more questions.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): Generaloberst, Grossadmiral Doenitz is accused of calling on the Navy to continue to fight in the spring of 1945. Did you yourself, as a responsible military adviser, advise the Fuehrer at that time to capitulate?

JODL: I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It would have been of no use.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive in February 1945?

JODL: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The Fuehrer realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did,


5 June 46

and probably much sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to him in this connection.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: What were the reasons for not doing this?

JODL: In the winter of 1944 there were many reasons for not doing this, apart from the fact that the question of capitulation or discontinuing resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional surrender, for tine' other countries left us in no doubt on that score; and even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely removed by the fact that we captured the English "Eclipse"-the gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in the winter of 1941 at Viazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly have to camp in the middle of winter in the open. Death would have taken an enormous toll.

Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about 31/~ million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them into the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts closer together. Those were the purely military opinions which we held in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there will be more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today.

DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, how long have you known Field Marshal Keitel?

JODL: I believe I met him in 1932 when he was chief of the organizational department of the Army.

DR. NELTE: And from that time, except for the time you were in Vienna, you always worked with him?

JODL: There was a time when Field Marshal Keitel was not in the War Ministry but in the field. I believe that was in 1934-35. I then lost sight of him. Otherwise I was with him all the time.

DR. NELTE: Was your work with him only official, or did you have personal relations with him?

JODL: In the course of the years, as a result of all we went through together, these relations became very personal.

DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have characterized Field Marshal Keitel as one of the most powerful officers of the Wehrmacht. They


5 June 46

charge him with using this position to influence Hitler. Other circles represented here called Keitel weak, and accused him of not being able to achieve his purpose in his position.

I do not want to ask any questions which have previously been asked and answered; but there are questions which have been previously answered in various ways-as you have heard-and only a person like you can answer them, a person who worked with the

Field Marshal for more than a decade. Therefore, please tell me briefly-making your sentences short-what the official relations were between Keitel and Hitler.

JODL: The official relations between the Fuehrer and Field Marshal Keitel were exactly the same as between the Fuehrer and me, but on a somewhat different level. They were purely official, especially in the beginning. They were interspersed, just as in the case of all other higher officers, by constant clashes between a revolutionary and a Prussian officer bound by tradition.

DR. NELTE: Then, these clashes, the result of differing opinions, were a daily occurrence?

JODL: They were a daily occurrence and in effect led to extremely unpleasant scenes, such scenes as made one ashamed, as a senior officer, to have to listen to such things in the presence of young adjutants. The entry in my diary proves that on 19 April 1940, for instance, Field Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the

table and left the room. That is a fact.

DR. NELTE: May I ask what the reason was?

THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte. If you want him to confirm

the evidence which the Defendant Keitel has given, why don't you ask him whether he confirms it?

DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not submitted to Field Marshal Keitel My line of questioning became necessary because between the questioning of the defendant . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The question you put to him was: What were his relations with the Fuehrer? You could not have put it any wider than that, and you certainly covered that with the Defendant Keitel.

DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.

THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered it at great length.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness appeared here who would discredit the statement of Field Marshal Keitel, if what he says is true. Therefore, in order to clarify, I must...


5 June 46

THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason why I asked you whether you wanted this witness to confirm what the Defendant Keitel said, and-if you did-why you didn't ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of Keitel

DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, you have heard that we can simplify the question on this matter. I submit to you that which the witness Gisevius said here, in this room, about Field Marshal Keitel. It was, for the main part, in contradiction to what Field Marshal Keitel, and the other witnesses questioned about Keitel, had said. I point out that Gisevius did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information from the OKW. If you want to consider that, please answer the question now: According to your knowledge of these things, is it true what Field Marshal Keitel said under oath-and which was confirmed by others, with the exception of Gisevius-or is it true what Gisevius said?

JODL: Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this connection are general figures of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was no powerful man; there was and could be no influential man next to him.

DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius mentioned an example to prove that Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since you had a part in this document, I should like to have this one document presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS. This document is not an actual set of minutes, but a note for the files, as you see. It is about the White Book which was prepared on the alleged Belgian and Dutch violations of neutrality. And in this connection, the witness Gisevius said:

"I believe that I should cite two more examples which I consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to incite Keitel to warn Hitler before the invasion of Belgium and Holland, and to tell him-that is, Hitler-that the information which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. Counterintelligence"-that is Canaris- "was to produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris, at that time, refused to sign these reports.... He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong.

"That is one instance when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler that which he should have."


5 June 46

Generaloberst, I ask you to confirm, after you have looked over this document, that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were expected to cover false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris report-contained in Part A-the OKW refused to cover this White Book. Is that true?

[There was no response.]

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it?

JODL: I understand the question, and I should like to establish the facts here briefly, and tell how it really was as far as I can without being choked with disgust.

I was present when Canaris came to the Reich Chancellery with this report to Field Marshal Keitel, and submitted to him the draft of the White Book of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked through this book and listened carefully to the essential remarks which Canaris made, at the wish of the Foreign Office, to the effect that the intelligence needed perhaps some improvement, that he was to confirm that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that, as it says here, a final really flagrant violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said another word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table, and said, "I will not stand for that. How could I assume responsibility for a political decision? In this White Book are, word for word, the reports which you yourself-Canaris- gave me."

Whereupon Canaris said, "I am of exactly the same opinion. In my opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are quite sufficient to substantiate the breaches of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and in Belgium." And he advised Field Marshal Keitel against signing it.

That is what took place. The Field Marshal took the book with him, and I do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the imaginary reports of this Herr Gisevius turn everything upside down. All these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people who now assert that we had signed them falsely. This is one of the most despicable incidents of world history.

DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, Admiral Canaris played a part in this case. Gisevius said, "It was not possible for Admiral Canaris to submit an urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative." He asserts that Canaris gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel who did not submit them. I ask you, is that true?


5 June 46

JODL: Of course, I did not follow up every document that came to Field Marshal Keitel; but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything which was considered necessary for the Fuehrer to know about. I have already said that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could have gone to the Fuehrer directly. He had only to go into the next office and inform the Fuehrer's chief adjutant, or he had only to tell me.

THE PRESIDENT: If you don't know, why don't you say so? If you don't know whether he gave it to the Fuehrer or not, say so.

DR. NELTE: I only asked whether the testimony is true, that Admiral Canaris could not go to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question.

JODL: In fact, he went to the Fuehrer dozens of times.

DR. NELTE: If he wanted it, he had access at any time?

JODL: Absolutely, at any time.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes this evidence is of Gisevius?

DR. NELTE: The evidence about Keitel is in the transcript of the session of 26 April 1946 (Volume XII, Pages 265 to 271).


DR. NELTE: I now want to show you two affidavits which you signed together with Field Marshal Keitel, which have also been submitted to the Tribunal. These are the Affidavit Number Keitel-9, High Command of the Wehrmacht and General Staff, and the Affidavit Number Keitel-13, Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military competencies.

You remember that you signed these affidavits?

JODL: I did so, yes.

DR. NELTE: And if you are sure of that, do you remember the contents?

JODL: Yes. '

DR. NELTE: You confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?

JODL: I confirm this statement.

DR. NELTE: I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the subject of rearmament-that is, regarding General Thomas, who was also given here as a source of information-I should like to ask you a few questions.

You know that the Prosecution submitted a voluminous book here, Document 2353-PS, which is a description of the rearmament, written by General Thomas. As General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as a source of information, I must


5 June 46

question you about Thomas. In his affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353-PS, he said that on 1 February 1943 he was released from the OKW. Do you know whether that is true or not?

JODL: As far as I can recall, he was assigned to the group of officers for special employment by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. He was therefore at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.

DR. NELTE: Did he not have a special assignment when he was made available for special employment?

JODL: He took over several assignments after that, I believe.

DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that also after 1 February 1943, General Thomas was still given assignments by the OKW, especially that of writing this book which has been submitted here, is that true?

JODL: That is true, that he was engaged in writing what might be called the "History of Rearmament."

DR. NELTE: What was his relation to Field Marshal Keitel?

JODL: I know of that from the time when the two men worked together-that was only before the war and at the very beginning of the war, and the relations were good.

DR. NELTE: Do you know the reports of General Thomas concerning rearmament?

JODL: I have no exact recollection of any reports about our own rearmament. I can only recall reports about the war potential of our enemies. I remember those.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is 10 minutes past 5, and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had better adjourn.

DR. NELTE: I will need a quarter of an hour yet.

THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]


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