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[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at ~ o'clock to sit in closed session. The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in open session from 1000 to 1300.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): You have testified that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. That was the chief department of the OKW, was it not?
JODL: I did not quite understand the last part of your question.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the Armed Forces Operations Staff the chief department of the OKW?
JODL: Because of the significance of the activity, one can certainly say that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was one of the most important departments of the OKW.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that the reason why you deputized for Keitel in his absence?
JODL: In the majority of cases I was the deputy only in operational matters. As for war ministerial questions, it was the senior chief, as a rule, Admiral Canaris, who deputized.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you deny that you were Keitel's deputy?
JODL: When Keitel was not at headquarters, then, as a matter of course, whenever the Fuehrer had anything to say to the OKW, he talked first with me, as I was the next officer by seniority.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember the testimony of the witness Wagner to the effect that either you or Keitel usually represented the OKW at all important staff meetings at which this witness, Admiral Wagner, was also present? Do you remember that testimony?
JODL: I did not quite understand that question on account of translation difficulties.
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COL. POKROVSKY: That is possible. I shall repeat it. On the 13th of May, appeared the witness Wagner here before the Tribunal. Do you remember, or not?
JODL: I remember the witness Wagner. He testified that Field Marshal Keitel and I were present at every situation report, and I do not dispute it.
COL. POKROVSKY: He said either Field Marshal Keitel or Generaloberst Jodl was present. Is that correct? Do you catch the difference in the way this question is phrased?
JODL: In 99 percent of all cases, both of us were present at the situation conferences.
COL. POKROVSKY: So that if we forget for one minute such formal considerations, such formal circumstances, would it be right to conclude that it was precisely you, Jodl, who actually was Keitel's acting deputy in the eyes of Hitler, of the whole cadre of officers, and of the entire military machinery of the German Reich? Would that be correct, or not?
JODL: In individual cases, when the Field Marshal was not there, and in unimportant things, yes; but when it came to important things I could reach him by telephone, at any time, and so it hardly ever happened that I deputized. He was never ill, and was never away on leave. When he was away he was in Berlin at headquarters.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case I would like to remind you of one such fact, which you yourself confirmed here on the 6th of June, while testifying to the Tribunal about the motives which caused you to sign Document UK-56, Exhibit RF-1438. You said that the document had had no connection with your sphere of activity. It concerned the deportation of Jews from Denmark and, you signed the document even though it actually had no connection with the operations staff work. You signed it because Keitel was away at the time. Was it not so? Is it true?
JODL: That is absolutely correct. It was an urgent matter and had to be signed immediately.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We can find a great many documents of that type; but I do not consider it necessary to waste any more time on the further elucidation of this point. Tell me, would it be correct to say that you were well aware of the entire work carried out by the OKW-that you well knew what important problems were occupying the OKW at that time?
JODL: Only to a limited extent-in individual matters. I was not at all aware of everything that took place in the numerous offices in Berlin. That was quite impossible. It did not concern me. I have testified already that my time was so fully taken up that I had much more to do than I had time for.
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COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, you force me to revert to a question which I really wanted to have done with. Will you please now look at our new Document USSR-476. This document consists of excerpts from Keitel's testimony of 9 November 1945. It is stated there:
"Question: 'Would it have been possible for General Jodl, without your knowledge to call such a meeting?"'
We are talking, My Lord, of the conference in Reichenhall.
Reply of Field Marshal Keitel:
"Yes, it was quite possible, as I was frequently on official journeys; and General Jodl had authority to call a meeting because he represented me in my absence."
Have you found the passage? Have you read it?
JODL: Colonel Pokrovsky, of course, it is very difficult for you to follow these military matters. It is ridiculous. Surely I may question my staff officers. I do not need to call a meeting for that. These were my General Staff officers with whom I worked in Reichenhall. Surely I could go to them. That was my office and my duty.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary for you to raise your voice in that way.
COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me that you have still not answered two of my questions. First, have you read this document?
Please tell me: Have you, or have you not, read the passage which I have just read into the record on Page 1?
JODL: Yes. Here, Field Marshal Keitel says, " . . . since I was very often away on official journeys . . . "
COL. POKROVSKY: You do not have to read it a second time. I have read it already. I merely want you to tell me whether you have read that passage?
JODL: Yes, I read that, and it says here, " ... to ask Generaloberst Jodl."
COL. POKROVSKY: No, you are reading beyond the passage which interests me at this moment. As for the words " . . . to ask Generaloberst Jodl."-rest assured, we shall get to that passage. But is it true that Keitel was often away, and that you deputized for him? I do not hear any answer.
[There was no response.]
I still hear no answer.
JODL: I have already said that, now and then, he went to the front for a day or so and that he was several times in Berlin for a few days; but he was at those offices which were subordinate to
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him. I was alone with my operations staff, and I could do whatever I pleased with my staff. During the entire war I never called a conference of other offices as a deputy of Field Marshal Keitel. I did not understand anything about those matters.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have uttered a great many words, but have not given me a clear answer to my very short and simple question-namely, do you confirm, or do you not confirm, the truth of Keitel's statement? "Yes" or "no." That is very easy to answer, is it not?
JODL: That is what it amounts to, but the thing as written down is ridiculous.
COL. POKROVSKY: We shall gauge the truth of your statement later. It is important to me to establish the fact.
I am submitting our Document USSR-263 to the Tribunal. You will now have the pleasure of reading it yourself. It is an excerpt from the evidence of another officer who worked with you, General Warlimont. Please acquaint yourself with that passage which is marked on your copy while I read it aloud. That will be quicker.
The question put to Warlimont:
"When did the OKW first receive the order for preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union?"
Have you found this passage?
JODL: That which I have before me-the passage which is marked in red-contains a statement by Warlimont as to the organization of the offices of the OKW. On the next page something follows about the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union.
COL. POKROVSKY: "When did the OKW first receive the order for preparing for the attack on the Soviet Union?"
"I personally first heard about the plan on 29 July 1940... On that day Generaloberst Jodl arrived by special train in Bad Reichenhall, where also Section 'L' of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was quartered."
Have you found the passage?
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, I do not consider it necessary to read a greater part of Warlimont's testimony, because we are dealing with a well-known fact, that is, the convocation of the conference during which Jodl gave his colleagues the order to prepare the plan for the attack on the Soviet Union. This document has already been accepted in evidence by the Tribunal.
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Warlimont then states, "Jodl stunned us by his announcement of the coming attack, for which we were not at all prepared." -Have you found the passage? Please look at the document.
[There was no response.]
Jodl, will you please take the document in your hand and see whether it has been read into the record correctly.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it not coming through properly? Wait a minute.
DR. EXNER: I just wanted to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the translation and the transmission is coming through to us so very badly that I have scarcely understood anything. I hear only half a question at a time, and I am surprised that the defendant could answer at all.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it coming through better now? Is the translation coming through better now?
DR. EXNER: I am of the opinion that the translation itself is poor, not only the technical transmission. It is often very difficult to understand the question-it makes no sense at all. And my colleague, Dr. Stahmer, confirms this. Therefore it is difficult for us.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better go on and see, perhaps, if it will improve.
COL. POKROVSKY: I would like you to read one other sentence to yourself. It is the passage in which Warlimont states to whom the responsibility for elaborating the plans was entrusted and how the officers present had reacted. He testifies, "Jodl stunned us by this announcement..." It is on the first page at about the middle of the page. Have you found it?
JODL: I could not find the sentence which you have just read, "Jodl stunned us." I cannot find that sentence.
COL. POKROVSKY: In that case, I shall begin with the preceding sentence. Perhaps it will be easier for you.
"Besides myself, he also ordered three other senior officers... Colonel Von Lossberg, Lieutenant Colonel Freiherr van Falkenstein of the Luftwaffe, and Captain Junge of the Navy to attend."
Have you found it?
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
"Jodl stunned us by this announcement... for which we were not at all prepared."
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And then a little further down:
"Jodl announced that the Fuehrer had decided to prepare for war against Russia. The Fuehrer based his decision on the fact that war with Russia must come sooner or later and that it would be better to carry this campaign through in the course of this war..."
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes, I have it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now, I would like you to read one more paragraph from Document USSR-476, which has just been handed to you, on Page 1. It is, Jodl, the one which you began to read the first time, and I told you then that we should get back to it eventually. Keitel is asked whether he knows anything about that conference, and he answers:
"I know nothing whatever about a conference with regard to an attack on the Soviet Union. I heard about it for the first time after I was imprisoned here."
Have you found the place?
JODL: No. I have not found it, but I do recall it. I read it just a short while ago.
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like you to have it. We do not want any misunderstandings. A little lower down Keitel states that you did not inform him of this conference even later. Is that so? Do you confirm this statement, or do you not? Would you say that Keitel had testified correctly? '
JODL: Actually there is no such thing as a conference in these military matters. You have conferences in civil and parliamentary life, but we do not have conferences. I talked to my General Staff officers as often as I pleased. Therefore, it is...
COL. POKROVSKY: Excuse me, I am going to interrupt you here. Later on you may add all you wish to say, but I merely want a direct answer to the question: Is Keitel's testimony correct, that you never reported this conference to him? Is that true or not?
JODL: I certainly did not report to him on this very discussion; but that is not in the least important. I am certain that I reported to him what the Fuehrer told me, because that was an important matter; and later, because of this, he wrote a memorandum. Therefore, he must have heard about it-but that is only a supposition, a very likely supposition, which I am voicing here.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, I am perfectly satisfied with your reply. And to conclude my first group of questions, I want to ask just one more on this particular matter: Do you not agree
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with me that only the Deputy Chief of the OKW, and not just any other responsible official, could quite independently-without Keitel's knowledge, without any instructions, and without even a post-factum report to him-decide questions, such as the preparation of a plan for attacking another country? Have you understood my question?
JODL: I understood your words, but not their meaning. First of all, you put a wrong assertion in your question. You asserted that I did not report the preparation for an attack on a neutral country to Field Marshal Keitel. That is an assertion on your part which I refuted yesterday under oath. We were not concerned with an attack on the Soviet Union at this meeting. We were concerned with the defense against a Soviet attack on the Romanian oil fields. That is established in Document C-170, the War Diary of the Navy.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wanted to say on that question?
JODL: I believe that suffices.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend to argue with you. I merely wish to say that we have two proofs of this conference. First, your testimony, in which you deny the fact of the preparation of a plan for attacking the Soviet Union; and second, the testimony of another participant at this conference, Warlimont, who says straight out that the meeting was specifically concerned with elaborating the plan of attack on the Soviet Union and that this directive greatly astonished all of them. I do not intend to deal with this question any further, but I should like to ask...
JODL: If you are interested, I could explain that divergence to you.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, at the present moment it does not interest me.
Would it be correct to state that you were either the leading, or one of the leading, staff officers in Hitlerite Germany who were engaged in preparing measures for attacking the Soviet Union, as far back as the summer of 1940? It is precisely on this matter that I want to hear your reply. Is the question clear to you?
JODL: The question is clear, and my answer to it is that I was probably the first who learned of the Fuehrer's concern about Russia's political attitude. However, I was not the first who made preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. To my surprise I discovered here, through the witness Paulus, that long before we concerned ourselves with any orders of this kind, plans of attack were already worked out in the General Staff of the Army. I cannot tell you with absolute certainty why it was done. Perhaps
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Generaloberst Halder can tell us about that. I can only express that as a supposition on my part.
COL. POKROVSKY: Suppositions are of no interest to us; we are only concerned with facts here. On the day before yesterday, the 5th of June, you stated that the attack on the Soviet Union, whereby Germany broke her non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, was in the nature of a preventive war. That is what you then stated, is it not?
JODL: Yes, that is what I said, it was a preventive war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. That is your opinion. Do you remember that from the testimonies of Milch and Raeder, from the testimony of Goering, from the testimonies of Paulus and Keitel, it seems that they were all opposed to the attack on the Soviet Union? I shall read into the record one sentence from Keitel's testimony here in court just to help you to remember.
While General Rudenko, Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. was cross-examining Keitel, he put this question:
"You stated that you especially went to Hitler with the request that he, Hitler, change his intentions with regard to the Soviet Union?" Answer (Keitel): "Yes, I asked him not only to change this plan, but to do away with these plans altogether, that is, not to wage war against the Soviet Union."
Do you remember that testimony of Keitel?
JODL: Yes, I remember, and I know the memorandum as well.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Do you not find it rather strange that a man-in this case yourself-who has in every way endeavored to disclaim the fact that he was Keitel's deputy, should emphasize before Hitler am here before the Tribunal, that he was better informed on current events than Keitel and could, therefore, find the courage to make a statement in direct opposition to the attitude of Keitel, Paulus, Raeder, Goering, and Milch?
JODL: I did not understand that.
COL. POKROVSKY: I shall be very pleased to make my meaning more explicit. Keitel did not appear to see any necessity for what you call a "preventive" war, and all the persons whose testimony I have just mentioned also saw no reason for waging a so-called "preventive" war. They did not believe that the Soviet Union intended to attack Germany, whereas you declared that the war was of a "preventive" nature. Now, do you understand my question?
JODL: Yes, now I understand you.
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COL. POKROVSKY: Very well, would you like to answer the question?
JODL: Yes, I can give an explanation. First of all, it is not certain what stand Field Marshal Keitel took in the spring of 1941 with regard to this question. Secondly, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force-with due respect to both of these gentlemen-saw the problem as a whole only from the point of view of naval or air strategy, and they saw no danger whatsoever in the Russian Navy or the Russian Air Force. What was taking place on land, of course, was of less interest to them. That explains why the strongest opposition came from the Luftwaffe and the Navy; and only the Army, in this case, was much more inclined to see the tremendous danger with which it was confronted. But in spite of this, every one of us, I myself included, warned the Fuehrer most urgently against this experiment, which should have been undertaken only if there really was no other way out. I will not take it upon myself to judge whether there might perhaps have been a political possibility which was not exhausted; I cannot judge that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I am satisfied with your reply, and particularly with the fact that you have condescended to define the breaking of this treaty and the attack on the Soviet Union by the word "experiment." I want you to look at the document. . .
THE PRESIDENT: I think you should not make comments of that sort. You must ask questions and not make comments.
COL. POKROVSKY: My remark, My Lord, is connected with my next question.
[Turning to the defendant.] Witness, please look at Document 865-PS. Have you got this document?
JODL: Yes, I have the document before me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In reply to the questions of your counsel, you stated that Lammers had, quite by accident, designated you as a collaborator of Rosenberg. There in your hands is a very brief document, which I shall now read aloud-a document signed by Keitel. It is a top-secret letter of 25 April 1941, addressed to Rosenberg personally. This letter states:
"The Chief of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's directive appointing you his plenipotentiary for dealing with questions relating to eastern European territories. I, on the part of the High Command of the Armed Forces, entrust the handling of these questions to the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, General of Artillery Jodl,
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with Major General Warlimont as his deputy. I request that your department contact these two persons only.
"Hell Hitler! Yours truly"-signed-"Keitel."
With this document in mind what do you say now in reply to the question as to whether or not you remember, that you, with Warlimont as your deputy, were charged by the High Command of the Armed Forces, as far back as April 1941, to deal with the practical problems of the Hitlerite expansion to the east in accordance with the directives of the Staff Rosenberg.
Do you understand my question?
JODL: I already told the Court yesterday everything that can be said in connection with this formality. Minister Lammers sent the very same letter to all Reich Ministries. He asked every Ministry to designate a plenipotentiary and a deputy; and accordingly, Field Marshal Keitel naturally designated the two officers who were at headquarters. I never worked with Rosenberg, and it was not necessary to do so-except for one single talk with him, which I mentioned yesterday. Only my propaganda section conferred with the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories about leaflets-quite simple matters which every soldier can understand.
COL. POKROVSKY: By the way, concerning the question of soldiers. You stubbornly affirm that you were only concerned with military questions of an operational nature and had nothing to do at all with political questions. Have I understood you correctly?
JODL: I gave that explanation yesterday as well, insofar as politics were not an integral part of the strategy. To a certain extent politics did come into it, for without politics there could be no strategy. It is an essential part of strategy. But since I was not a strategist, but only dealt with this matter as a General Staff officer, I was not concerned with this subject directly.
COL. POKROVSKY: You were not concerned with these matters? You will now look at Document C-26, Exhibit USSR-477, and I must ask you if you have found your own signature on the last page.
JODL: Yes, I see my signature.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have found it? It is a directive on the organization of propaganda in connection with "Case Barbarossa." Is that correct?
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you going to deny that in that directive, issued by you, the question is clearly put that the U.S.S.R, as a sovereign state, should be destroyed and that you consider that a
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purely military problem-you, an officer of the General Staff, did not deal with politics?
JODL: I cannot find the place where it says that Russia is to be destroyed.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right if you want to draw attention to the wording. It is not stated there in just these words. I am thinking of the general sense of the directive, particularly of Subparagraph "d."
JODL: Yes, but-I know the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: I want to read out one sentence:
"Propaganda aiming at the dismemberment of the Soviet Union into separate states shall not be used for the time being."
Further on there are a couple of technical remarks, and then it says in the same paragraph:
"Nevertheless, we should avoid such terms as 'Russia,' 'Russians,' 'Russian Armed Forces,' et cetera, and substitute 'Soviet Union,' 'Peoples of the Soviet Union,' 'Red Army,' et cetera."
Have you found the place, Jodl?
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. What would you like to say if you want to say anything at all on the subject?
JODL: Why, certainly. I wish to answer the question.
COL. POKROVSKY: If you please.
JODL: As may be seen from the heading of this directive, it deals with the handling of propaganda. Compared with the British and the Soviet Union, we were mere schoolboys in propaganda. You are perhaps aware that propaganda is something quite justifiable and is not limited by any regulations of international law. At one time, in Geneva, there was a long debate about this; and the idea that propaganda should be restricted by international law was rejected. I have already stated that in my preliminary interrogation. In the field of propaganda, I can do whatever I wish. There is nor law, either criminal or international, in regard to that. But perhaps you do not know that this propaganda had to be in line with the political directives of the Fuehrer and this was being done here. I am very well acquainted with propaganda, for I studied it for 5 years-yours, too. That is still quite another type of propaganda.
COL. POKROVSKY: You preferred not to give a direct answer to the question you were asked. I am perfectly satisfied with that, too, since I have understood your attitude toward this subject.
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Now, I should be interested in receiving a reply to the following question: What connection did the Ministry of Propaganda have with the issue of this directive? Did this Ministry participate in the drafting of the directive, or were you and the OKW solely responsible? Did you understand me?
JODL: Yes, I understood you.- My propaganda division worked in Berlin. I cannot tell you in detail how it worked with Minister Rosenberg or with the Ministry of Propaganda on such a document. But General Von Wedel, the chief of this division could tell you. I only knew it was drawn up in agreement with the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, for I was always eager that we should not take separate lines but rather work in line with the competent civilian authorities. But it is only propaganda; it is not a directive to destroy Russia. Propaganda is a spiritual weapon.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not propose to enter into a discussion with you on what constitutes propaganda and whether you were only responsible for propaganda. We shall have quite a number of other questions to ask.
Do you suggest that this directive was issued after a certain pattern decided upon with other departments? That is how I understood you. Is this correct? Partly by agreement with "Stab Rosenberg"?
JODL: Yes, I believe that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Now let us pass on to a second complex of questions. Do you dispute the fact that the document regarding the conference at Hitler's headquarters on 27 March 1941 dealt with the subject of Yugoslavia? You, of course, remember that conference?
JODL: Yes, I remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Would you argue the fact that the documents describing this conference and the directive for operations against Yugoslavia-both documents are dated 28 March 1941, in other words, they were issued on the following day-would you still argue that these documents did not emanate from the Armed Forces Operations Staff, that is, from you personally? You can, if you like, take a look at Document 1746-PS. It might help you to remember events.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you are not losing sight of the fact that this subject was fully gone into by Mr. Roberts in cross-examination of the defendant?
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, if you consider that the question has already been completely clarified, I shall refrain from asking it. But it seems to me that insofar as I understood him, he analyzed
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this question in another sense. But if you think the matter is clear, I shall withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know yet. But I was only pointing out to you that it had been fully gone into by Mr. Roberts. I do not know what this document you are suggesting is.
COL. POKROVSKY: I offered for the attention of the defendant two documents, My Lord: the directive for operations against Yugoslavia, dated 28 March, and the minutes of the conference. Both documents were submitted to the Tribunal. If you think that the matter has been fully covered already, I will not ask the questions. However, it appears to me that there is some reason for asking the question.
THE PRESIDENT: All the Tribunal want to know is whether there is some really fresh point which is being brought out. You must have heard Mr. Roberts' cross-examination of the defendant upon the Yugoslavian attack. And I do not know what these documents of the 22d of March and the 28th of March are, or what you are asking to get out of them. If there is anything that is really fresh or new, of course, you may put it; but if it is not, then it is covered by what the Tribunal have already said, that crossexamination ought not to go over the same ground again.
COL. POKROVSKY: If you will permit me to say so, My Lord, I understood Jodl to mean that for him . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you, too.
COL. POKROVSKY: I understood in Jodl's testimony, in reply to Mr. Roberts' question, that it is still not quite clear as to who was in charge of the operations against Yugoslavia; and I only want to have this point elucidated. Now, if the Tribunal consider that this question has already-been replied to, I shall, of course, withdraw it.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are not able to see what there is fresh in this method of questioning that you are now raising; and unless you insist upon it yourself because you think it is of great importance, I think you should pass on to the next matter in your cross-examination.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I shall continue, My Lord.
[Turning to the defendant.] Your counsel has submitted Document L-172, containing the following sentence made by you in your speech to the Gauleiter of 7 November 1943. I shall read out this sentence: "This dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to the idea of utilizing more fully the reserves of manpower in the occupied territories."
Do you remember this document?
JODL: I did not understand the question.
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COL. POKROVSKY: I can repeat it. Your counsel submitted to the Tribunal Document L-172, which is a speech made by you before the Gauleiter.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the matter now? You cannot hear without your earphones on.
[Turning to Dr. Exner.] Do you wish to say something?
DR. EXNER: If you please, Mr. President, the translation is such that we simply cannot understand anything. We receive half a sentence which makes no sense at all-at least, that is our opinion- and I believe the other gentlemen, including the defendant, have the same difficulty...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has not shown any sign that he was unable to understand the translation; he has never protested, and he has answered the questions.
DR. EXNER: Do you understand, Defendant?
JODL: I would say that I can guess what most of the questions mean. Since I am fully acquainted with the problem, it is easy for me; but I am not sure. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, will you go a little slower. You heard, did you not, what Dr. Exner said?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, I heard him. I fear, however, My Lord, that the tempo of my speech may impede the interrogation, but I shall try to speak more slowly.
[Turning to the defendant.] In the speech with which you addressed the Gauleiter on the 7th of November 1943, you expressed, inter alia, the following idea: "The dilemma of the shortage of men has brought us to the idea of utilizing more fully..."
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, can you possibly indicate to us what page this is on. In our book we have not any single document in English, as yet. This document we have not had in English.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document L-172, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, this very passage that you have just read, or part of which you just read, was put by Mr. Roberts yesterday to the defendant. Surely that is contrary to our rules; we cannot have the same subject gone over twice. We already have it marked.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am quoting this sentence, My Lord, not as a question to the witness, but only as an introductory remark to the question which is to follow this sentence. I am reminding him of this sentence in order to receive an answer. The sentence as such is not to be considered as a question.
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THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat what you said?
COL. POKROVSKY: My Lord, he will now receive the document in order to save time, and I shall then ask him the question. I want...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, we want to know what the question is, so we may see if it is not a question which has been gone into by Mr. Roberts. Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal have indicated to you that they do not want you to go over the same ground which was gone over yesterday. If you have some new question, by all means put it.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not intend, Mr. President, to repeat in my questions any question previously asked by Mr. Roberts. Therefore, with your permission, I shall now continue, and I should like you, Witness, to look at Document J-6, Exhibit Number USSR-130. It is stated in these documents that they were issued with the consent of the OKW. They deal with the introduction of general conscription in the occupied territories of Carinthia and Krain. Have you found it? Have you found the passage that I have just read, that is, the decree dealing with the introduction of conscription in the occupied territories of Carinthia and Krain?
JODL: Yes, that document begins with the following sentence.. .
COL. POKROVSKY: It begins with the following sentence, "In agreement with the OKW..." Is that correct?
COL. POKROVSKY: As Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, you could not but know of such facts as the conscription for service in the German Army of the population of the occupied Yugoslav territories. What do you have to say about this decree, which is a gross violation of international law? Do you understand my question?
JODL: Yes. I can only say that I see it here for the first time. This is the first I have heard of it. After Al, I am not the OKW. I am Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I never read this document during the war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Will you read it, then, immediately. Do you not consider it a gross violation of international law?
JODL: In order to give my opinion, I would have to go into it more fully from a legal point of view, and I am not in a position to do that, and I believe it is not of interest to the Tribunal
COL. POKROVSKY: Welt, on 4 June you testified before the Tribunal that the decisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions were your reference book. You will now be shown Document
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638-PS, submitted to the Tribunal on 20 March as Exhibit USA-788. The authenticity of this document..
THE PRESIDENT: Well, 638 is the document which has been handed up.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is Document 638-PS, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, is the document that you just handed up to us J-6? Are you offering that in evidence? Are you offering that?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not submitting a new document. It was already submitted as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Are you referring to the Document 638-PS, or are you referring to Document J-6?
COL. POKROVSKY: I am referring to Document 638-PS, accepted by the Tribunal as U.S.A. evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I was not. I was referring to the Document J-6. The document which is here before me, which is 638, is the Yugoslav document.
COL. POKROVSKY: The document to which you refer, My Lord, bears a double number, USSR-130 and J-6; and the second document also bears a double number, USSR-447.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to know about the second document. I only want to know whether you are offering the first document in evidence, or has it already been offered in evidence?
COL. POKROVSKY: It has already been submitted, My Lord, by the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
[Turning the defendant.] You, Joel, have probably had sufficient time to read the document. Is that right? Have you read it?
JODL: I know about this document from these proceedings.
COL. POKROVSKY: Quite correct. I only wish to remind you that Goering has twice confirmed the authenticity of this document and merely questioned the accuracy of certain entries in individual sentences. I should now like to ask you how you reconcile your concepts of international law with the formation of bands under German command, attired in German military uniforms, bands recruited from the dregs of the criminal classes, who were officially authorized to plunder, murder, burn, and violate-they could also do all this during military operations. Have you understood my question?
You, of course, well remember that these bands were actually created and entered the ranks of the Armed Forces of the German
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Reich. You remember the testimony of the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 7 January 1946, concerning the special commands acting on these principles?
JODL: I do not know just how you come to know that the High Command gave its approval and that this actually took place; I do not know. These are merely the notes of alleged statements by the Reich Marshal, but I do not know how they concern me.
COL. POKROVSKY: I shall try to help you to understand this fact. Do you remember that at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 a special command was formed to operate against the partisans? The first commanding officer of that unit was Dirlewanger, and Von dem Bach-Zelewski testified about him here on 7 January 1946. Do you remember that?
JODL: No, I do not remember that.
COL. POKROVSKY: You cannot remember? Very well. Then we shall prove it without your testimony. Do you remember the fact that units of the Yugoslav Army wore regulation uniforms, complete with insignia, numbers of regiments and divisions? Do you remember that? Do you understand my question, or do you not?
JODL: I understood. Do you mean the Brandenburg Regiment? I have some idea of that.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I have something else in mind. I wish to remind you that despite the fact that parts of the Yugoslav Army did not come under these descriptions which you have enumerated here before the Tribunal in speaking of bands-that these parts of the Yugoslav Army were referred to in every official document of the German High Command as bands, in order to justify any atrocity perpetrated against them, and Only in the top secret correspondence between German officers and staffs was the correct, factual nomenclature of these divisions, regiments, and brigades indicated. Perhaps this fact, in your opinion, also testifies to the adherence of the German High Command to the standards of international law? Have you understood me?
JODL: I understand you very well, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you wish to say anything on the matter?
JODL: Yes. I can only say this assertion of yours is untrue. We . . .
COL. POKROVSKY: I would ask you to reply as briefly as possible.
JODL: Yes, I was going to answer very briefly. We always called these Yugoslav bandits "bands" for propaganda reasons, but in practice uniformed fighters always were treated as prisoners of war; and there is no order which would have prevented them from
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receiving such treatment as prisoners of war. Otherwise, we would not have had SD many prisoners.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am very much obliged to you for having raised the question of the prisoners of war. You have testified on oath before the Tribunal that there was no decree which forbade taking prisoners of war. You have not yet forgotten that testimony
JODL: No, there are no international law regulations which apply to a rebellion. There is no such thing.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I asked you to confirm only if I have rendered your testimony correctly to the Tribunal. You stated, before the Tribunal, that there was no decree against taking prisoners of war. Did you give such testimony before the Tribunal, or did you not?
JODL: What you have stated here is not my verbatim testimony.
COL. POKROVSKY: Just a minute, just a minute. We shall discuss in detail the matter I have mentioned. First, I want you to tell me the following: You stated, before the Tribunal, on oath, that there was no decree in the German Armed Forces to the effect that prisoners of war were not to be taken. Did you give this testimony or not? Have you understood me?
JODL: I think I remember. I do not know of any such order that no prisoners of war were to be taken.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. One moment more. I now want you to help me to elucidate another matter. A sentence of yours appears in this typed script to the effect that you considered it improper to question a prisoner of war if a decision had already been made that the prisoner of war was to be shot. Is that so? Is it correct?
JODL: Yes, I testified to the effect that I rejected that sentence from the moral and from the humane point of view.
COL. POKROVSKY: Excellent. Now I want you to tell me the following: Do you remember that there was a 4th Mountain Division in the German Army? It seems that you, at one time, were directly connected with it? Was there such a division or not?
JODL: That there were four mountain divisions, that I do not remember, there were many more.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not talking about four divisions. You have been given an inaccurate translation. I am asking you whether you remember that there was a 4th Mountain Division?
JODL: I certainly knew about that. I wanted to be the commander of that division.
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COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In that case, you may also remember another responsible officer of the German Army, whose name was Kubler? He operated in Yugoslavia.
JODL: There were two men of the name of Kubler, an older man and a younger man.
COL. POKROVSKY: Major General Kubler is the one who interests me. I am not asking you who Keitel was. You know that better than I do.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for a few minutes?
[A recess was taken.]
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, you and I, Defendant Jodl, will attend to these two documents. Please take Document J-67, Exhibit Number USSR-132. It is a directive to the 118th Infantry Division.
JODL: 118th Infantry Division.
COL. POKROVSKY: I will read to you the "Instructions for Conduct of Troops during Operations," Paragraph 2. "Prisoners: Any man who has obviously fought against the German Armed Forces, and has been captured, is to be shot after interrogation." Is that correct? It says so precisely in those words? Do you hear me?
JODL: That is approximately what it says in that one sentence, but I should like to have the whole document. Nothing can be gathered from one sentence. What is decisive is what comes before it, and that is not stated in the document.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is written above: "Instructions for the Conduct of Troops during Operations."
Now for the second document. It bears the stamp of the IV Mountain Regiment. It was issued on 6 October 1943 and contains Keitel's personal instructions, written in his own hand, on how to deal with prisoners of war. I will ask you to revert to Subparagraph 3. It says, in the second part of this subparagraph, ';. . . commanders having at least the rank of divisional commanders are authorized to issue orders to take no prisoners, and the civilian population in the combat area may be shot."
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Apparently the translation was not coming through correctly. Perhaps you are going too fast. It was coming through correctly to me, but it apparently was not coming through correctly to the defendants. Would you put your question again?
COL. POKROVSKY: In Subparagraph 3 of the document issued by the IV Mountain Regiment it says...
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THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number of it?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, My Lord. It is Exhibit USSR-470; and it bears a double number, Document J-127.
[Turning to the defendant.] Have you found Subparagraph 3, Defendant Jodl?
JODL: Yes, but this cannot possibly be described as a document. That is not a document.
COL. POKROVSKY: This document says how prisoners of war are to be treated.
I do not know how you feel about it, but it is quite clear to me.
JODL: But it is not an original. It is a fantastic translation. Any soldier would have thrown it straight into the wastepaper basket. It is a falsification. But I admit that it may be due to the foolish translation. In my opinion, all it contains is nonsense. The heading says "IV Mountain Regiment," and it is a Roman four. It should be an Arabic number. It is never called Mountain Regiment. It then, goes on to say, the commander of the IV Mountain Division, Section Ic, delivers under number such and such the following-all that is nonsense, pure unadulterated nonsense! This is not a document. It is a scrap of paper.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am not responsible for the translation.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to see the original of these documents. They were put in, apparently, as USSR-132 and USSR-470. Is USSR-470 a new document?
COL. POKROVSKY: No, My Lord, this document has already been submitted, and the original is in the records of the Tribunal. Now I am only submitting a copy of this document which is at our disposal. Both documents were previously submitted in the original. If it is necessary, we can obtain these original documents and submit them a second time.
THE PRESIDENT: One of the secretaries of the Tribunal says that it was not submitted before-not offered in evidence before- USSR-470. Are you sure?
COL. POKROVSKY: There may have been some technical error. I was informed that it had already been submitted. We shall now go into this matter thoroughly. I believe, My Lord, that the original of the second document is in your possession.
JODL: I can say something to clarify this.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal are uncertain about the admission of this Document 470. Could you tell us exactly what the document is, and in what circumstances it is now being offered in evidence? What the document is, and where it came from?
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COL. POKROVSKY: I can give quite a definite answer to the last question, My Lord, but perhaps I shall have to answer the first part of your question a few minutes later. The matter is being investigated.
On the second page of Exhibit USSR-470, at the bottom of the page, there is an affidavit:
"This is to certify that this is a correct and certified copy of the original document which was captured during military operations in June 1944, at Pakracu, by the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation. The original document is kept in the archives of the State Commission for the Investigation of Atrocities perpetrated by the occupants and their collaborators in Belgrade, dated 4 January 1946, Belgrade,"
signed by the President of the State Commission, University Professor Dr. D. Nedelkovitsch.
I am just having investigations made as to whether this document has already been submitted, by what member of the Soviet Delegation it was submitted, and on what date. If the document has not yet been submitted, then we can demand the original from the Belgrade archives-the German, the captured copy-or else a certified photostat, whichever is most acceptable to the Tribunal and have it presented in evidence.
My Lord, I have just been informed that this document was not presented. Therefore, it will be submitted for the first time, and we Shall immediately ask for the original as additional evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, with reference, for the moment, to Document USSR-132, which I understand has already been put in evidence-offered in evidence-the Tribunal would like to see the original of that document because there are only two paragraphs put out in the copy that we have before us, and that was the point that was taken by the Defendant Jodl, that he wanted to see the whole document.
Colonel Pokrovsky, first of all, with reference to Document 132, which the Tribunal understand has already been offered in evidence, the Tribunal think that that document in full should be put before the defendant for him to make any comments. With reference to Document 470, which you are now offering in evidence, the Tribunal are of the opinion that you should go on cross-examining with reference to that document, subject to the production, as soon as possible, of the original or a photostatic copy of the original, and subject to the right of the defendant's counsel to apply to have that cross-examination struck out if there is any substantial difference between the translation in the Yugoslav language-which is now
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being put to the defendant, or used for the purpose of crossexamination of the defendant-and the original document.
Is that clear to you and to Dr. Exner?
COL. POKROVSKY: It shall be done, My Lord.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I think that a discussion of this document ought not to be permitted at the moment. There are too many discrepancies in it. As it stands, it cannot be correct. Roman numeral IV, for instance, "the IV Mountain Regiment," is referred to. That Roman numeral IV is quite wrong. Then it says "the commander delivers. . ." which is not German. Then, on Line 4 there is mention...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal want to know what you are talking about. Are you talking about 470?
DR. EXNER: Yes. I am merely trying to show that this cannot be a genuine document because it is not proper German at all.
For instance, in Line 4 it says, "Armed Forces Operations Staff, Ob.H." The Armed Forces Operations Staff is attached to the OKW, not to the Ob.H.
Then, there is no signature. It is signed "Keitel" on the first page; but he signs as a Generaloberst, whereas I am told he was already a Field Marshal at that time.
Furthermore, this signature is part of the quotation and it says, "The OKW supplies the following..." Then there is the quotation-and Keitel's signature is a part of that-whereas the document itself is supposed to originate from the 4th Mountain Regiment, and there is no signature of the 4th Mountain Regiment. I really do not think there would be any sense in talking about the document until the original has been supplied. For instance, on Page 2 of the document there is the statement that this goes to the commanders of 6, 7, et cetera. They are not commanders, these company commanders. No German military person could have written this document.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal adhere to the decision that this document may be used now. All the points which you are now raising and any other points which you may wish to raise upon the document will be open to you if you wish to move to have the cross-examination struck out at a later stage when the original had been produced.
DR. EXNER: I understand.
THE PRESIDENT: For the purposes of not wasting time, it is, the Tribunal think, more convenient to have the cross-examination now upon this document. We will leave it to you to move hereafter to strike the whole cross-examination out.
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DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Colonel Pokrovsky, here is the original Document USSR-132 which the defendant ought to have for the purpose of making any comments that he wishes to make.
COL. POKROVSKY: The instructions of the Tribunal will be carried out, My Lord. We shall submit the original document.
[Turning to the defendant.] Have you acquainted yourself with the contents of the document?
JODL: It is an order of the 118th Infantry Division.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have no doubts at all about the authenticity of the document?
JODL: No, there is no doubt that it is an order of the 118th Infantry Division, but the connection between the 118th Infantry Division and myself is puzzling. But the order is genuine.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you would like to admit now that this is not a question of stupidity but of villainy. Perhaps you would like to amplify your testimony in this sense?
JODL: I did not understand you.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, when you were asked about Paragraph 2 of Document USSR-132, you said that the whole document was not before you. Now you have the whole document.
JODL: I have it, yes. I have the entire document. me entire order from Kubler is perfectly in order in my opinion. Apparently the doubts which the Prosecutor has refer to Point 2, where it says, "Any man who has obviously fought against the German Armed Forces and has been captured is to be shot after interrogation."
That, of course, does not refer to normal troops. mat refers to the population. At least, that is how I see it. Paragraph 8 says, "Attitude towards the Population."
That is also in order from the point of view of international law. It draws a distinction between the attitude towards a hostile population and the attitude towards a peaceful population.
COL. POKROVSKY: Is that all you wish to say?
JODL: Yes, but as I said, I do not understand the connection between Major General Kubler's order and myself. I do not understand it.
COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm that the question of the treatment of the civilian population has been isolated to form an independent paragraph, Number 8? Is that correct? You have just referred to that.
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JODL: Yes, Paragraph 8 mentions the treatment to be meted out to the civilian population.
COL. POKROVSKY: I am satisfied with your answer. Let us pass on to another group of questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
JODL: But I wished, with the permission of the Tribunal, to object . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Defendant, are you suggesting that there is anything in the order itself which indicated that the prisoners dealt with in Paragraph 2 are not, as you have put it, normal troops?
JODL: In that respect, the paragraph is not very clear; but the next document which the Prosecutor has submitted might give the proof regarding what other orders have been issued. However, I consider that it is out of the question that Kubler gave an order saying that Yugoslav troops captured in battle should be shot. mat is quite impossible. And had he done so, then he would have done so against the orders of the High Command of the German Armed Forces. But how can I give my views on an order from Major General Kubler? It would be best to ask him, he is alive.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, your answer to my question, then, is in the negative, that there is nothing in the order itself which shows or indicates that the prisoners referred to in Paragraph 2 are not normal troops.
JODL: That cannot be concluded from the wording of that order.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps I ought to draw your attention to the words under "General Directives for the Conduct of Troops in Action."
At any rate, that is your answer upon the whole document.
JODL: May I please have permission to look at the original again? I have only a copy here before me.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
THE PRESIDENT: You now have the original document before you. Do you want to add anything to what you have said?
JODL: I just wanted to add-if you are dealing with this order of Major General Kubler-that it is not certain whether this order refers to any particular action, for example, the mopping up of guerrillas in a given territory who were not regarded as regular
troops at that particular moment, but were regarded as a revolt of the population. That is feasible.
At any rate, I cannot answer these questions because I am not Major General Kubler.
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THE PRESIDENT: Now you can pass on to 470.
JODL: May I ask the Tribunal for permission to make a correction in my objection to this document?
THE PRESIDENT: Which document are you speaking of?
JODL: Document USSR-470.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you want to say about it?
JODL: I previously described that document as nonsensical because, at the first moment, I regarded it as a German order. In the meantime I have ascertained that it is obviously a Croatian order, because it is addressed to three Ustashi battalions. In this Croatian order the Croatian commander of this mountain regiment tells his troops something which he had apparently received in the way of orders from the 4th German Mountain Division, regarding the treatment of prisoners. He, in turn, traces it back to an order from Keitel which, however, is misrepresented and which, if it were correct, would best be handed in to the counsel for Field Marshal Keitel, because it is the best example of the attitude toward the guerrillas in Yugoslavia in keeping with international law-that is, if it is correct. Therefore, it is not a German order; it is apparently a draft or a translation of a Croatian order of the 4th Mountain Regiment. But what the 4th Croatian Regiment has to do with the General or the Defendant Jodl is a puzzle to me. I do not understand it.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Colonel Pokrovsky.
COL. POKROVSKY: I ask you, Defendant Jodl, whether you knew of such a directive by Keitel to the effect that division commanders or officers of higher rank were entitled to issue orders that no prisoners should be taken. Do you know of such a directive?
JODL: No, it is not known to me; and it is not certain that the order was issued in that way. However, in certain cases it is permissible under international law.
COL. POKROVSKY: I have no further questions to ask in connection with this document. The defense counsel will obviously ask some questions when the original document is submitted to the Tribunal.
I shall now proceed to another group of questions. If I am not mistaken, you confirmed the authenticity of your so-called notes for "Plan Grun" where it dealt with the creation of an incident on the borders of Czechoslovakia. It is stated quite clearly there that the organization of this incident was to be entrusted to the counterintelligence. Have I interpreted the idea of your notes correctly?
JODL: No. The translation as it came over to me is completely distorted. But there has been a full discussion about that, too.
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COL. POKROVSKY: To facilitate the task of the interpreters, I shall simplify the question. You, I believe, confirmed the authenticity of this document dealing with the incident and the organization of the incident. This is Defense Document Jodl-14.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it has come through properly.
JODL: No. It did not make any sense to me at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right. I shall repeat it. Do I clearly understand that you do not contest the authenticity of Document Jodl-14?
JODL: If that is the letter from me to Major Schmundt, then that is an absolutely genuine document, which I wrote myself.
COL. POKROVSKY: In this connection I should like to ask you one precise question: Do you confirm that the provocation which you call the "organization of an incident" had two objectives: First, to give a pretext for an attack against Czechoslovakia; and secondly-to use your own terminology, which we heard here on 4 June-to shift the blame for the war on to somebody else's shoulders? Had you these two objectives when you proposed to organize an incident? Do you understand my question?
JODL: I understood roughly what you said.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you give an answer?
JODL: Yes, I can repeat the answer I gave yesterday. I have...
COL. POKROVSKY: You confirm this?
JODL: My testimony of yesterday? Yes, of course. I still maintain today something which I said yesterday.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. I would like you to tell the Tribunal everything you know about the supplying of weapons to the Sudeten Germans organized into the Henlein Corps, which you mentioned to the Tribunal in passing. You stated that this corps contained a certain number of officers. Do you remember?
JODL: Yes, I remember.
COL. POKROVSKY: In order to help you, I will show you a document.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
It is the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank. He declares in this testimony that the Henlein Corps received a certain quantity of weapons. Do you know anything about this?
JODL: I only know of weapons supplied to the Henlein Free Corps at the time when it was being formed on German territory. Whether arms had been previously smuggled into Czechoslovakia for that Sudeten German group, or how they were brought in, is
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something which I know nothing about. The Armed Forces were never in any way concerned with that, just as later on they were not concerned with the Henlein Free Corps.
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you know what kind of weapons were sent there? Were they of German origin or not?
JODL: The fact that arms were taken into Czechoslovakia is
something I know absolutely nothing about. I was not a smuggler of arms; I was a General Staff officer.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is why I am asking you, since you have said that you received reports on the arming of the Henlein Free Corps when it arrived on German territory. That is why I asked you, an officer of the General Staff, were these weapons of German origin or not? You must know that.
JODL: Henlein's Free Corps-which was formed near Hof, and in the district to the North, on 17 September-received, in my opinion, former Austrian, or even German, arms. I think they were Austrian weapons, but I do not know that for certain.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then it is not necessary. We only need
definite information and definite facts. You will now be handed a photostatic copy of the Case Green folder.
[The folder was submitted to the defendant.]
You will look at the passage which has been marked. The marked passage says, "For the success of the operation, the penetration into Sudeten Germany with parachute troops will be of great value." The Defendant Keitel, on 6 April 1946, when questioned regarding this part of the document, said that it is precisely you who could give the requisite explanations with regard to this document.
JODL. With reference to this paragraph I have to say that, in the preparation for a possible war, the Army had a notation inserted to the effect that fortifications would have to be penetrated quickly or would have to be opened up from the rear and that for the success of this joint action the co-operation of airborne troops, together with the border population and the Sudeten Germans who
deserted to us, might be of value. For, of course, it was a fact that among the Germans who had been drawn into the ranks and who numbered about 100,000, not one would have turned his weapon upon us but would have deserted on the spot. They wrote that to me personally while in Czech uniform. These Germans would have deserted on the spot. That, of course, we expected and had taken into account in our military calculations.
COL. POKROVSKY: I fear that you have not understood me quite correctly or that you did not wish to understand the question which I put to you.
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Defendant Jodl, I am interested in something else. Do you confirm the fact that prior to the attack on Czechoslovakia you had planned diversionary activity on the territory of Czechoslovakia proper. That is what I am interested in. Yes or no?
JODL: First, there was no attack upon Czechoslovakia at all; that is a historical untruth. Second, this was General Staff work, which was prepared for a possible war; and there is nothing else to be said about that.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question was whether you planned before the war-or the possible war-diversionary activity in Czechoslovakia. Did you plan that? Can you answer that?
JODL: No, I did not. You will have to ask Admiral Canaris about that. Such matters were not in my jurisdiction.
COL. POKROVSKY: Keitel advised us to ask you, and you advise us to question Canaris. Very well; I have another question to ask you. Was the unification of all pro-Fascist forces and armed Fascist bands in Yugoslavia, which fought against the Allies, carried out with your knowledge? Or do you know nothing about that?
JODL: You mean the military organization under Marshal Tito. That is known to me, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am referring to the organization under the direction of the German High Command, of a united front of all pro-Fascist bands-of Nedish, Michailovic, and others- financed by Germany, helped by Germany, and under the leadership of the German High Command. Do you know anything about that, or do you not?
JODL: I do not know whether you have in mind the Chetniks. They were under Italian command. Because of this there was always a big row between us and the Italians. Then there was the Ustashi, they were Croatians. But the other pro-Fascist organizations are not known to me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will look at Document J-95, Exhibit USSR-288. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal. It is the testimony of Nedish. Two or three sentences from this document have a direct bearing on the questions that I have asked you. Nedish testified under oath, naming those who had helped him to form and to finance his bands. He named the representatives of the German High Command and the Gestapo who helped him to create his armed forces.
Have you found that?
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JODL: That is right. Nedish formed a Serbian unit. I forgot that before. Nedish had a-what shall I say-a Serbian. . .
COL. POKROVSKY: Do you remember it?
JODL: Yes. Nedish had a small unit. That is right. There were perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 men. They were Serbs.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you give financial support to this organization?
JODL: No. I had no money. I did not back these things.
COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not speaking of your personal means, but the means of the German Reich.
JODL: I cannot tell you that. I did not concern myself with money in this war.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was the German High Command at the head of the work of controlling the organization of these bands, or was it not?
JODL: No. I did not organize it. The Commander, Southeast, probably discussed that with Nedish. But it was Nedish's own private affair if he wished to call on the Serbs to fight.
COL. POKROVSKY: I do not know whether it was his private business or not. But it is most important to me that you confirm the fact that these bands actually existed. How Nedish organized them does not interest me.
JODL: I can confirm that. There were about 5,000 to 6,000 men of the Serbian auxiliary police.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will be shown another report from this group of questions. It is an official report of the Polish Government sent to the Military Tribunal. You will find that it contains some very valuable information about the activities of the Fifth Column. Please turn to the sentence which is marked "B." It is said there:
"In addition to the agents selected from among the young people and appointed to co-operate with the German civilian population, there also existed a group of leaders and instructors made up of officers who had come to Poland, supplied with valid passports, weeks before the outbreak of hostilities."
Do you, as the direct leader of the counterintelligence-this section was subordinate to you-know anything about this Fifth Column organization in Poland?
JODL: There are two small errors you have made, Colonel Pokrovsky: first of all, counterintelligence was not under me but under the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces; and secondly, I stated at length yesterday that I know nothing about
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any of the preparations for the Polish campaign, either from the point of view of operations or otherwise, because I was Artillery Commander in Vienna and Brunn. What Canaris did at that time with respect to Poland is something I know absolutely nothing about. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot be of any help.
COL. POKROVSKY: Well, let us proceed to the next group of questions. You were examined on 8 November by the Soviet Prosecution, and you were asked whether Germany was pursuing a predatory policy when attacking the Soviet Union? Do you remember being asked this question?
JODL: I remember very well, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed a copy of your answer. You replied:
"I admit that the question of the expansion of Germany's 'Lebensraum' and the utilization of Russian economy for Germany's needs did play a certain part, but it was not the basic reason for the attack on the Soviet Union."
Do you remember answering in this sense?
JODL: It is possible. I did not sign it. At any rate, I said it was not the chief cause.
COL. POKROVSKY: You also said in the same answer:
"It was never our intention to keep enlarging our 'Lebensraum' and thereby create new enemies."
It appears that you do remember that?
JODL: Yes, I do.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will now recall that the witness Ohlendorf testified before the Tribunal that prior to the outbreak of hostilities against the Soviet Union, Himmler, in his speech, had outlined a program for the annihilation, In the East, of 10,000,000 Slavs and Jews? Do you remember this statement?
JODL: I recollect having heard that testimony in this court
COL. POKROVSKY: In the light of this-in the light of Ohlendorf's testimony-would you not like to answer more precisely the question as to whether the war against the Soviet Union was waged with a predatory purpose, with the purpose of seizing territory, annihilating the population, and then of transforming the occupied territories, to quote Hitler's own words, "into a paradise for the Germans"? Do you not think that is exactly what did happen?
JODL: What the Fuehrer might have wanted to create later on I do not know; but the military and strategic reasons, which he gave us and which were definitely confirmed by the many reports
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received, I explained yesterday in great detail. The main reason was the feeling that we were under a dire threat of being attacked by Russia. That was the decisive point.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. You will now be handed Document C-57. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal, My Lord. On the evening of 5 April 1946 this document was put to Defendant Keitel as Exhibit USSR-336. I must ask you to turn to Subparagraph 4 of this document and to Subparagraph 7, for Defendant Keitel stated that you could give far more detailed explanations about these documents. Point 4 referred to the active participation of Spain in the seizure of Gibraltar as far back as 1941. Tell us, how visas this active participation of Spain to be expressed? Have you found this passage in the document?
JODL: Yes, I already know the document. But nobody signed it. First of all, I have to give an explanation of what this document is, so that it is not mistaken for an order.
COL. POKROVSKY: But I do not believe I ever said that it was an order.
JODL: That is all right, because it is not an order. I cannot say what the people who drew up this document had in mind at the time. It was obviously a draft which the General Staff officers, presumably from my department, together with the operations expert of the Navy, prepared in my of lice and which they submitted to the Naval Operations Staff for their perusal, according to the principle that General Staff officers must think and plan a long time ahead. They had these personal ideas and put them down on paper without my ever having seen them.
THE PRESIDENT: What was your question, Colonel Pokrovsky? It was whether the draft did not. . .
COL. POKROVSKY: I asked a question to which I received no answer. My Lord, I asked him what he could say about the actual part which Spain was to play in the seizure of Gibraltar in 1941.
JODL: I cannot make a statement on what other people thought. I can only talk about serious intentions in connection with Spain in 1940. That I can talk about. But as far as this paper is concerned, I can say nothing about it. For at the time I had long ago dismissed the thing as impossible. I know of it only since I have been in Nuremberg; I never saw it before.
COL. POKROVSKY: Whether that plan could not be fulfilled is quite another question. Defendant Keitel said that you could give an explanation. You declare that you cannot say anything.
JODL: As I have just said, it is some preliminary work carried out by the younger General Staff officers, which I saw here in the
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document room for the first time with great interest and some amusement. It was not shown to me at the time, because it could already be seen that in a week's time the situation would change.
COL. POKROVSKY: You know nothing about the proposed dispatch of an expeditionary corps to Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, through Trans-Caucasia in the direction of the Persian Gulf, if the Soviet Union had fallen, as is stated here; you did not know anything about that either?
JODL: It was never a really serious proposition. On the contrary, I had the biggest row of my life with the Fuehrer because I refused to attack beyond the Caucasus in the direction of Baku. But the General Staff officers did entertain such ideas in the first flush of optimism because of the big victories in the summer. That is what they are there for-to have ideas. But the decisions are made by the older and more level-headed men.
COL. POKROVSKY: So you confirm that the success of the Red Army upset what you call "the bold and far-reaching plans" of Hitler to send an expeditionary corps to Syria and Egypt? Is that right?
JODL: If the Soviet Union had collapsed, then one might have entertained such ideas for continuing the war. But never the idea, for instance, of attacking Turkey. She would have come over to our side anyway voluntarily. That was the opinion of the Fuehrer.
COL. POKROVSKY: How do you know that?
JODL: How do I know it? Even the document says so. And there are the entries in the Diaries of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which are here in Court. It says:
"After big German victories, Turkey will come over to our side, anyway. I order that she be given preferential treatment in the supply of munitions and arms and tanks." ,
In fact, Turkey had expressed such a wish, and she was very grateful to receive from us tanks equipped with arms. The Fuehrer would never have done that if he had expected Turkey to join our opponents.
COL. POKROVSKY: We shall proceed to another group of questions. On the eve of the campaign against Russia, a conference was held between the representatives of the OKW, the OKH, and the socalled RSHA. The participation of the sub-department SIPO was being considered. Do you know anything about this conference, at which the witness Ohlendorf was present?
JODL: I know nothing about that. I was working on quite different matters, and I have never had any conferences or connections with the Reich Security Main Office at all.
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COL. POKROVSKY Are you acquainted with Wilhelm Scheidt, a colleague in the Prisoners of War Organization of the OKW?
JODL: Yes, I know him. He was an assistant to General Scherff.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are you acquainted with his testimony which was given before the Tribunal? It is, My Lord, on Page 2207 of the English transcript (Volume IV, Page 467). He testifies that the
criminal practice of inflicting punitive measures on the peaceful civilian population was known to the leading officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and of the General Staff of the Army. Do you remember that?
JODL: I do not know the words that he used. Criminal actions were neither known to the Armed Forces Operations Staff nor to me. I rejected criminal actions and fought against them, and I made that abundantly clear here.
COL. POKROVSKY: Am I to understand that you deny all knowledge of the criminal punitive measures taken against the
civilian population? Do you mean to say you knew nothing about them?
JODL: Of course, I know of the fight against your partisans. That is quite clear. I have shown two instructions which were issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff in this connection.
COL. POKROVSKY: On 7 January 1946, the witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski testified that the real aim of this struggle against the partisans was the extermination of the Slavs and the Jews, and that the methods used in this struggle were known to the High Command. Do you wish to deny this, too?
JODL: It might have been the intention of Bach-Zelewski; it was not mine. My instructions were different. I already described the intention yesterday as completely senseless. The numbers of guerrillas made no difference at all in the gigantic struggle between the German and the Soviet Armies. It was a minute percentage.
COL. POKROVSKY: Could you perhaps recollect, Defendant
Jodl, when and in what circumstances you yourself said, at one of Hitler's conferences, that the German troops were entitled to treat the partisans as they wished and to subject them to any kind of death by torture, by quartering, hanging them head downward, et cetera. Do you remember having said something of the kind at that time?
JODL: About this matter-which is more comical than serious- we talked for quite some time during the preliminary interrogation.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps you can tell us about this matter at less length but with greater precision. Will you answer my question whether you spoke these words or anything like these words, and in what circumstances did you say them?
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JODL: I want to explain it briefly. It was on 1 December 1942. As the Tribunal will remember, a directive in regard to combating the guerrillas was issued on 11 November by the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which we declared to be outdated by the new issue on 6 May 1944. In that directive, which was issued on 11 November, I had written the sentence: ' The burning down of villages as a reprisal is forbidden, because it necessarily only creates new partisans."
The draft of that instruction remained in the Fuehrer's hands for weeks. He always objected that this instruction would hamper the troops in ruthlessly combating the guerrillas. As at that time I had already issued that instruction and he still had not given his approval, I became rather rude; and when he once more came with lengthy explanations of his fighting experience, his experience of fighting the Communists in Chemnitz, I said, in order to break the ice at last, "My Fuehrer, what people do in battle does not come into this instruction at all. As far as I am concerned, they can quarter them or they can hang them upside down."
If I had known that the Russian gentlemen have so little sense of irony, I would have added, "and roast them on the spit." That is what I said and I added, "But in this instruction we are concerned with reprisals after the battle, and they must be prohibited."
Then there were roars of laughter from all the officers present, and also from the Fuehrer; and he gave me permission to issue that directive; and the testimony of a witness, General Buhle, who was present, will confirm that to you. That quartering people has not been the custom in Germany since the sixteenth century, any more than hanging people upside down, everybody in the world certainly knows. Therefore that remark could only be an ironical one.
COL. POKROVSKY: I ask the Tribunal to grant me one minute for one last question, literally one minute only-;
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know that the German troops, evidently understanding irony better than we do-and in the literal sense of the word-quartered, hanged upside down, and roasted Soviet captives over the fire? Did you know of that?
JODL: Not only I did not know it, but I do not even believe it.
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal I shall proceed to the last group of questions left to me after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer will that take, Colonel Pokrovsky?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have only a very few questions to put, and I believe it will not take very long.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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COL. POKROVSKY: You have given very important testimony before the Tribunal. You have admitted that in 1941 the warriors of the Red Army at Vyazma were fanatically resisting the Fascist
invaders. Many of them were taken prisoner only because they were too exhausted to move. You thereby explained the abnormally high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war. Is that correct?
JODL: That is true with regard to the prisoners, particularly in the Vyazma pocket.
COL. POKROVSKY: Can you think of any other reasons you know which would account for this high mortality among the Soviet prisoners of war?
JODL: I did not hear of any other reasons.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then I will refresh your memory a little and draw your attention to a short excerpt from our Exhibit Number
USSR-353. It is a letter from Rosenberg to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, that is, it was sent directly to the OKW. The letter is dated 28 February 1942. I would draw your attention to a few short extracts from this document. On Page 1, I believe, the following sentences are underlined:
"The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is a large-scale tragedy.... A great part of them have died of hunger or from the inclement weather. Thousands have also died of typhus."
I will leave out a few sentences and proceed to the next page:
"Several intelligent camp commanders have taken this line with some success."
Before it had been a question of the population being willing to supply the prisoners of war with food of their own accord.
"In the majority of cases, however, the camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to give any food' to the
prisoners of war and have preferred to let them die of starvation....Moreover, in many cases, when prisoners of war on the march could no longer keep up from sheer hunger and exhaustion, they were shot in full view of the horrified civilian population; and the corpses were left by the roadside."
And further on:
"Remarks have been heard like these: 'The more of these prisoners that die, the better it will be for us.'"
And again on Page 3:
"It would be too naive to imagine that what went on in the prisoner-of-war camps could be concealed from the Soviet
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Government. It is obvious from Molotov's circular note that the Soviets are perfectly well aware of the conditions described above...."
Have you found the passages in question?
JODL: Yes, I have found them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Now, did you really know nothing of the reasons for this high mortality?
JODL: No. I heard of the letter here in court for the first time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Defendant Jodl, I am not asking you about the letter. I am asking you about the reasons for these mass deaths among the Soviet prisoners. So you did not know of the reasons which led to these mass deaths?
THE PRESIDENT: Is the document signed?
COL. POKROVSKY: The document bears no signature. It is a captured document, Number 081-PS. It belongs to the documents captured by the United States and was handed to us so that we could submit it to the Tribunal.
[Turning to the defendant.] I did not hear your reply, Defendant.
JODL: I knew nothing about these reasons for the mass deaths. In any case they are completely wrong; that I do know, because I can give rough figures from memory as regards the number of Soviet prisoners of war and their whereabouts.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. We will now deal with this question from a different angle. Are you familiar with the name of Von Graevenitz?
JODL: Von Graevenitz? Yes, the name is familiar to me.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did he not work in the OKW?
JODL: He was, if I am not mistaken, in the Armed Forces Department as a subordinate of General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: This time you are quite accurate; you are right. Do you know General Osterreich?
JODL: No, I do not know that general.
COL. POKROVSKY: You have never even heard the name?
JODL: I do not recall it.
COL. POKROVSKY: This general was chief of the department in charge of prisoners of war in one of your military districts. Do you perhaps remember this general's testimony about the directive he had received from Von Graevenitz in the OKW with respect to the Soviet prisoners of war? You will now be shown Document Number USSR-151, Page 5 of the German text. You will find there the passage to which I should like to draw your attention.
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"At the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 I was repeatedly called to Berlin to attend conferences held by the commanders in charge of prisoners of war in the military districts.
"The newly appointed commander of the Prisoners of War Organization in the headquarters of the OKW, Major General Von Graevenitz, presided over the conference.
"During the conference there was a discussion about the treatment of prisoners of war who, because of their wounds or from exhaustion and disease, were unfit to live and unfit to work. At the suggestion of General Von Graevenitz several of the officers present, among them several doctors, gave their opinions on it and declared that such prisoners of war should be concentrated in a camp or in a hospital and be poisoned. Following this discussion, Major General Von Graevenitz issued an order to the effect that all prisoners of war who were unfit to live and to work should be killed and that medical personnel should be employed for this purpose."
Did you know anything at all about that?
JODL: I knew nothing about that at all, and I cannot comment on this document. It has nothing to do with me and I do not know whether what has been said here is true, but General Von Graevenitz must certainly know about it. I had no connection whatsoever with prisoners of war. That was another office, General Reinecke.
COL. POKROVSKY: Von Graevenitz himself defends his statement. He was an executive; he put the directives of the OKW into effect and also issued the relevant instructions and yet you tell me you knew nothing about them?
JODL: I did not say that. General Von Graevenitz is no subordinate of mine. I had no interviews of any kind with him. I have seen him perhaps twice in all my life. I was not responsible for prisoners of war, and I was not competent to deal with them.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. We will now pass on to my last group of questions. There are very few of them.
When Defendant Keitel was cross-examined here before the Tribunal, as well as in the preliminary interrogations preceding the Trial-I believe these particular subjects arose during the preliminary interrogation-he said that you would give us more detailed information about directives for the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad. You stated here before the Tribunal that the directives were issued for two reasons: First, because General Von Leeb had reported on the gradual seeping through of the Leningrad populations to the west and south to the front lines; and secondly, they were issued as a reprisal for Kiev. Is that correct?
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JODL: Not reprisals, but the justifiable fear that whatever could happen to us in Kiev could also happen to us in Leningrad; and the third reason was the announcement by the Soviet Russian radio that this would actually take place.
COL. POKROVSKY: Good. The only important thing for me is to establish the fact that you connected the issuing of this directive with the report from the Leningrad front and with the affair in Kiev; is that correct?
JODL: I did not connect them; but events, as they actually happened, necessarily influenced the decision of the Fuehrer in this direction. These were the reasons which he gave himself.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you will remember when the High Command received this information from Leeb-in what month?
JODL: It was in the first days-as far as I remember in the first days of September.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Perhaps you can also remember the date on which the Germans captured Kiev. Was it not towards the end of September 1941?
JODL: As far as I remember, Kiev was occupied at the end of August. I believe it was on 25 August or about that date. But I cannot . . .
COL. POKROVSKY: Was that not on 22 September?
JODL: That is entirely out of the question. We have a document here, a report about the incidents in Kiev; I do not know the date of it from memory, but it is Document 053-PS. We must be able to see the date from that document.
COL. POKROVSKY: It is precisely in that document that 23 and 24 September are mentioned. Well, let us, however, suppose that it really did happen in August. Would you not remember the date when Hitler first declared that Leningrad should be razed to the ground?
JODL: I beg your pardon. I have made a mistake all the time about the date. This document is-Document C-323, the Fuehrer decree, is dated 7 October. So, your statement may be correct. I was a month off in my calculations, and the taking of Kiev was actually at the end of September. The reports which we received from Leeb came in the first days of October. I made a mistake. I am sorry.
COL. POKROVSKY: Please, do not mention it; it is of no importance. I only want you to remember when Hitler first stated categorically that he would raze Leningrad' to the ground. That is important for me.
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JODL: You are referring to the naval document, I assume, the document of the SKL, the Naval Operations Staff.
COL. POKROVSKY: You will now be handed Document L-221 and will be shown the passage where it is written that, on 16 July 1941, during a conference in the Fuehrer's headquarters, the following statement was made:
"The Finns are claiming the district of Leningrad. The Fuehrer wants to raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns."
Have you found the passage?
JODL: Yes, I have found the place.
COL. POKROVSKY: This took place on 16 July 1941, did it not?
JODL: The document was written on 16 July 1941, yes.
COL. POKROVSKY: That was considerably earlier than the date you received the report from the Leningrad front?
JODL: Yes, it was 3 months before then.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was also long before the day when explosions and fires first occurred in Kiev. Is that correct?
JODL: Quite correct.
COL. POKROVSKY: It was clearly not by accident that in the directive you drew up yourself and in the statements you made before the Tribunal, you declared that the Fuehrer had again decided to raze Leningrad to the ground. It was not the first time he had made this decision.
JODL: No, this decision, if it actually was a decision-and the statements made at this conference-I learned for the first time here in Court. I personally did not take part in the discussion, nor do I know whether the words were said in that way. My remark that the Fuehrer had again taken a decision refers to the verbal order he had given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shortly before, perhaps 1 or 2 days earlier. It is quite clear that there was already talk of this and that in the order I am referring to-a letter of the High Command of the Army of 18 September-and in that way the word "again" is to be explained. I was quite unaware of the fact, and I heard of it for the first time here in Court. It was only here in Court that I heard of the conference taking place at all.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. The Tribunal will probably be able to judge precisely when Hitler made this statement for the first time.
You have declared that you knew nothing about reprisals against the Jews?
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COL. POKROVSKY: And yet you have just referred to Document Number 053-PS.
[The document was submitted to the defendant.]
It is a report from Koch, personally signed by him. Maybe you will confirm that it states quite clearly that Koch held the civilian population of the city responsible for the Kiev fires and exterminated the entire Jewish population of Kiev, numbering some 35,000 souls, over half of whom were women. That is what the report says. Is it correct?
JODL: I know that very well indeed, but I only found this document here in the document room; and I used it as a good piece of evidence for the incidents in Kiev. The existence of the document
was unknown to me until I came to Nuremberg and it never went to the OKAY either. At all events, it never came into my hands. I do not know whether it was ever sent.
COL. POKROVSKY: You also did not know whether the Jews were exterminated or not? Is that true?
JODL: I certainly believe it today. There can be no more doubt about that; it has been proved.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In the document submitted by your defense counsel as Exhibit Number Jodl-3, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6 of your document book, in the last entry made on that page, you will read the following: "A large proportion of senior generals will leave the Army."
This refers to the entry in your diary of 3 February 1938. Do you remember?
JODL: Yes, that is from my diary.
COL. POKROVSKY: Are we to understand that resignations from the Army could take place at any time, in other words, that any general could retire or resign from the Army whenever he wanted to? That is what you say here.
JODL: At that time, I believe it was quite possible. In the year 1938 I knew of no decree which prohibited it.
COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. In Document Number Jodl-64, Exhibit Number AJ-ll, which was submitted by your defense counsel, we find a passage which, for some reason or other, was not read into the record; and I would like to quote it now. It is the
testimony of General Von Vormann, who states under oath that you, together with General Von Hammerstein, often used such expressions as "criminal" and "charlatan," when referring to Hitler?
Do you confirm the accuracy of that testimony, or has Vormann expressed himself incorrectly?
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JODL: To the best of my knowledge, and in all good conscience, I believe that he is confusing two things. In talking about the Fuehrer, I very often said that I looked on him as a charlatan; but I had no cause or reason to consider him a criminal I often used the expression "criminal"; but not in connection with Hitler, whom I did not even know at the time. I applied it to Rohm. I repeatedly spoke of him as a criminal, in my opinion; and I believe that Vormann is confusing these statements just a little. I often used the expression "charlatan"; that was my opinion at the time.
COL. POKROVSKY: That is to say, you considered Rohm a criminal and the Fuehrer a charlatan? Is that correct?
JODL: Yes, that is right, because at that time it was my opinion. I knew Rohm, but I did not know Adolf Hitler.
COL. POKROVSKY: Then how are we to explain that you accepted leading posts in the military machine of the German Reich, after the man whom you yourself described as a charlatan had come to power?
JODL: Because in the course of the years I became convinced- at least during the years from 1933 to 1938-that he was not a charlatan but a man of gigantic personality who, however, in the end assumed infernal power. But at that time he definitely was an outstanding personality.
COL. POKROVSKY: Did you receive the Golden Party Badge of the Hitler Party?
JODL: Yes, I have already testified to that and confirmed it.
COL. POKROVSKY: In what year did you receive the badge?
JODL: On 30 January 1943.
COL. POKROVSKY: Was it after that when you came to the conclusion that Hitler was not a "charlatan"? Did you hear my Question?
JODL: Yes. It became clear to me then that he was, as I said before, a gigantic personality, even if with certain reservations.
COL. POKROVSKY: And after you had reached that conclusion you promptly received the Golden Party Badge? I thank you.
I have no more questions, Your Honor.
DR. NELTE: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the Document Number USSR-151, which was submitted by Colonel Pokrovsky. I should like to ask for this document to be admitted only if General Osterreich can be produced as a witness for cross-examination. My reasons for this are the following:
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1. The document as submitted contains the heading "Aussagen" or "statements," but we cannot make out before whom these statements were made.
2. The document contains no mention of the place where it was drawn up.
3. The document is not an affidavit, although according to the last paragraph General Osterreich set it down in his own handwriting; and, therefore, it could have been certified as a statement under oath.
Because of the severity of the accusation which this document brings forward against the administration of the prisoner-of-war system, it is necessary in my opinion to order this general to appear here in person.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
DR. NELTE: Those are the reasons for my request. In conclusion I should just like to point out that General Von Graevenitz is no longer alive. At all events, he cannot be located. I tried to find him as a witness on behalf of Defendant Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a fact that this document was offered in evidence as long ago as February or March?
DR. NELTE: I do not remember that, nor-and I know this for certain-was it issued to us through the Document Division; I am seeing this document for the first time now. But perhaps Colonel Pokrovsky can give some information about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider your request.
DR. NELTE: May I also call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the document is dated 28 December 1945, and it is to be assumed that General Osterreich can also be produced by the people who took his testimony at that time.
COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I believe that I can give some information about this document. It was submitted by the Soviet Delegation on 12 February 1946, when it was accepted as evidence by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, just a moment. Was it translated into German then or was it read in Court?
COL. POKROVSKY: I have just received a memorandum from our document room. The document was submitted on 13 February, at the time when I was presenting documentary evidence with regard to the subject of prisoners of war. It is all I have on the matter.
I personally assume that the document was translated into German as a matter of course at that time. I have almost no doubt about it. However, we can easily make sure.
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THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants' counsel wish to reexamine the defendant?
DR. EXNER: First of all, I should like to put one question which came up again during the interrogation by the Defense Counsel. It was a point which seems to me in need of clarification.
One of the Defense Counsel reminded you of the photographs which were shown us here depicting atrocities in the occupied countries, and you said that the pictures were genuine.
What do you mean by that?
JODL: I meant to say that it was not trick photography, at which the Russian propagandists were past masters, according to my experience. I meant that they were pictures of actual events. But I also meant to say that the pictures offered no proof of whether it was a matter of atrocities at all, nor did they show who committed them. The fact that they were found in the possession of Germans would even lead us to assume that they were pictures of things which had been perpetrated by the enemy, by the forces of Tito or perhaps the Ustashi. Generally one does not take a picture of one's own acts of cruelty if any were ever committed.
DR. EXNER: Very well. The English Prosecutor has submitted a new document, 754-PS, dealing with the destructions during the retreat in Norway. Why in this purely military Fuehrer Decree did you write: "The Fuehrer had agreed to the proposals of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories, and has given his orders accordingly...." and so on? Why did you deliberately put in "to the proposals," and so forth?
JODL: In issuing orders I had a kind of secret code for the commanders-in-chief. If an order was the result of an agreement between the OKW and the Fuehrer, then I started with the words "The Fuehrer has decreed...."
If a decree originated from the Fuehrer himself, I started the decree with a preamble which gave the Fuehrer's reasons and the arguments in favor. Then, after the preamble, I wrote "The Fuehrer, therefore, has decreed...."
If the Fuehrer was prompted by the proposal of a nonmilitary agency to issue a decree, then, as a matter of basic principle, I added, "The Fuehrer, on the proposal of this or that civil authority, has decided...." In this way the commanders-in-chief knew what it was all about.
DR. EXNER: Did you draft this decree-Document Number 754-PS-without objection or resistance?
JODL: This decree originated in much the same manner as the Commando Order. One of the Fuehrer's civilian adjutants advised
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me that Terboven wished to speak to the Fuehrer. He had had trouble with the Wehrmacht in Norway because of the evacuation of the civilian population from northern Norway. The civilian adjutant said he wanted to advise me first before he established connections with Terboven by telephone. Thereupon I at once had inquiries made through my staff of the commander in Norway-Finland. I was told that the Wehrmacht-the commander of the Wehrmacht in Norway had rejected Terboven's proposals and did not consider them possible on such a large scale. In the meantime Terboven had spoken with the Fuehrer. I then remonstrated with the Fuehrer and told him that, in the first place, the decree and Terboven's intention were not practicable on such a scale, and secondly, that there was no necessity for it on such a large scale. I said that it would be better to leave it to the discretion of Generaloberst Rendulic to decide what he wanted or had to destroy for military reasons. The Fuehrer however, incited by Terboven, insisted on the decree's being issued on the grounds of these arguments which I had to set down. But it was certainly not carried out to this extent. This is also shown by the report of the Norwegian Government, and it can also be seen from personal discussions between me and my brother.
DR. EXNER: Now let us turn to something else. When there were drafts and proposals to be submitted to the Fuehrer, you often voiced objections and presented arguments. It seems remarkable that when matters contrary to international law were contemplated you raised no objections on the grounds of international law or on moral grounds, but you mostly voiced objections of a practical nature or from considerations of opportunity. Can you tell us briefly why you acted in this manner?
JODL: I already told you that when I gave my reasons for the formulation of the proposal not to renounce the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Namely?
JODL: This form had to be chosen to meet with any success with the Fuehrer.
DR. EXNER: Yes, that is sufficient. Now, you said yesterday . . .
MR. ROBERTS: Your Lordship, I object to this merely in the interest of time, because it is exactly the same evidence which was given yesterday; and, in my submission, it is pure repetition.
DR. EXNER: This discussion at Reichenhall was mentioned today. Please tell us briefly how it came about that you made such statements in Reichenhall or how such directives as you described today were decided upon in Reichenhall?
JODL: I have already testified about the conversation with the Fuehrer.
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DR. EXNER: Yes, it was only a question of provisions . . .
TILE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the defendant has just told us that he has given evidence about this already.
DR. EXNER: Yes, about the conversation which preceded it, but you did not testify about the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
JODL: No, I have not yet spoken of the actual conversation at Reichenhall.
DR. EXNER: Please be brief.
JODL: In regard to this conversation at Reichenhall-that is, the orientation of the three officers of my staff-Warlimont's description is somewhat different from mine. He is confusing here the earlier events with the later ones, which is not surprising, because from 20 July until the time he was arrested, he was ill at home with severe concussion of the brain and complete loss of memory. Up to the time he was captured he was no longer fit for service. That my description is the right one may be readily seen from the notes in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. It is stated there that these divisions would be transferred to the East only to prevent Russia from taking the Romanian oil fields.
DR. EXNER: I should like to correct one point which, it seems to me, was presented erroneously by the Russian prosecutor. He said that Goering and Keitel did not consider the war against Russia to be a preventive war. On Page 5956 of the record (Volume IX, Page 344) it states that Goering, too, considered the war to be a preventive one and that he only differed in opinion from the Fuehrer insofar as he would have chosen a different period of time for this preventive war. Keitel was, in general, of the same opinion.
Furthermore, the Russian prosecutor submitted a document, Number 683-PS. I do not know what exhibit number he gave. I cannot quite see how this document is to be connected with Jodl; and I have the idea that may be a matter of signature, for the document is signed "Joel," who is not at all identical with the Defendant Jodl. I just wanted to draw attention to this point. Perhaps there is simply a mistake in the names.
Further, the Prosecution said that the defendant made a remark about partisans being hanged upside down, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you have simply made a statement, which you are not entitled to do, about this document. If you want to prove it by evidence you should ask the witness about it. You have told us that this document has nothing to do with Jodl, and that the signature on it is somebody else's. Why didn't you ask the witness?
I am told just now that it has already been proved that it isn't Jodl's document.
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DR. EXNER: The translations this morning were bad; I do not remember having heard that. I do not know whether it is possible for me now in this connection to read something from a questionnaire? It is only one question and an answer in connection with this remark about the hanging of prisoners, and so on. Is that permissible?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it arises out of the cross-examination. DR. EXNER: Yes; the Russian prosecutor brought up the question of whether the defendant made this remark during the discussions about the prisoners, in connection with the guerrilla directive- that members of guerrilla bands could also be quartered during combat.
There it says:
"Question: Is it true or not...?"
Oh yes, I must say that is my Document Number Jodl-60, Exhibit Number AJ-7. Page 189 of Volume III of my document book. It is an interrogatory of General Buhle, which was made in America.
Then it says:
'question: 'According to a stenographic transcript, you also took part in a report on the military situation on the evening of 1 December 1942, which resulted in a lengthy discussion between the Fuehrer and Jodl as to combating partisans in the East. Is that correct?'
"Answer: 'I took part in this discussion, but I no longer remember the exact date."'
THE PRESIDENT: What page did you say, Dr. Exner?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the third page of the third book- or the third document in the third book.
DR. EXNER: It is Page 189. I have just read Question 4. Now I come to Question 5:
"Question: 'Is it or is it not correct that on this occasion Jodl asked the Fuehrer to return the directive which had been drawn up in his office relative to the combating of partisans?' "Answer: 'That is correct.'
"Question 6: 'Is it or is it not correct that in this draft the burning of villages was expressly prohibited?'
"Question 7: 'Is it or is it not correct that the Fuehrer wanted to have this prohibition rescinded?'
"Answer: 'Since I never had the draft of the directive in my hands, I do not know for certain if the burning of villages was expressly prohibited. However this is to be assumed, because
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I remember that the Fuehrer protested against individual provisions of the directive and demanded the burning down of villages.'
"Question 8: 'Is it or is it not correct that the Fuehrer also had misgivings about the draft because he did not want any restrictions to be placed on soldiers who were directly engaged in combating the partisans?' "
According to the minutes Jodl stated in reply:
"This is out of the question here. During the fighting they can do whatever they like, they can hang them, hang them upside down or quarter them; it says nothing about that. The only limitation applies to reprisals after the lighting in those areas in which the partisans were active....
"Answer: 'It is correct that the Fuehrer had fundamental misgivings about these restrictions. Jodl's remark is correct as far as its contents are concerned. I can no longer recall his exact words.'
"Question 9: 'Is it or is it not correct that following thin remark all those present'-Fuehrer, Keitel, Kranke, and you yourself-'including the Fuehrer, laughed and the Fuehrer abandoned his standpoint?'
"Answer: 'It is probable that all of us laughed on account of Jodl's remark. Whether after this the Fuehrer really abandoned his standpoint I do not know for certain. However, it seems probable to me.'
"Question 10: 'Then how were the expressions "hang, hang upside down, quartered," interpreted?'
`'Answer: 'The expressions, "hang," "hang upside down," "quartered," could in this connection only be interpreted as an ironical remark and be understood to mean that in accordance with the directive no further restrictions were to be placed on the soldiers in combat.'
"Question 11: 'Could you perhaps say something about Jodl's fundamental attitude towards the obligation of the Wehrmacht to observe the provisions of international law in wartime?'
"Answer: 'I do not know Jodl's fundamental attitude. I only know that Keitel, who was Jodl's and my own immediate superior, always endeavored to observe the provisions of international law...'
"Question 12: 'Did you ever have the experience yourself that Jodl influenced the Fuehrer to issue an order which violated international law?'
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THE PRESIDENT: None of that last part arises out of the crossexamination.
DR. EXNER: Did you have anything to do with prisoners of war?
JODL: I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war. It was the general Armed Forces Department which dealt with them.
DR. EXNER: Now, one last question.
It is alleged by the Prosecution, and during yesterday's examination it was reaffirmed, that there was or had been a conspiracy between political and military leaders for the waging of aggressive wars and that you were a member of that conspiracy. Can you say anything else about that before we finish?
JODL: There was no conspiracy. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal does not think that that really arises out of the cross-examination. Anyhow, he said it already; he said that he was not a member of a conspiracy. There is no use repeating his evidence.
DR. EXNER: It was again said yesterday that there was a very close connection with the Party and the members of the Party and, of course, that is connected with the conspiracy. That is why I should have thought the question permissible.
THE PRESIDENT: He said already that he was not a member of the conspiracy.
DR. EXNER: In that case, I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I merely wish to join in the objection which Dr. Nelte has raised to the written statement of Lieutenant General Von Osterreich. I refer to the reasons which he has given. That is all.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Jodl, you spoke-I think it was the day before yesterday-about the number of SS divisions at the end of the war. Do you remember that?
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said there were 35 at the end of the war. Is that right, 35 about?
JODL: If I remember rightly, I said between 35 and 38.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is this. You were referring only to Waffen-SS divisions, were you not? Only the Waffen-SS?
JODL: Yes, only the Waffen-SS. It is true they were. . .
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they completely co-ordinated into the Army and under the command of the Army?
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JODL: For tactical operations they came under the Wehrmacht commanders, but not for disciplinary matters. As regards the latter their superior was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was discipline the only thing that brought them under Himmler's jurisdiction?
JODL: He was also looked upon as their commander for all practical purposes. That is seen from the fact that the condition of the divisions, their equipment, and their losses were frequently or almost exclusively reported to the Fuehrer by Himmler himself.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When had they been co-ordinated into the Army? When? What year?
JODL: They were co-ordinated into the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I want to see if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right?
JODL: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the strength of the large troop concentration or an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one time, did you not?
JODL: Yes, I was afraid of that.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. When was that? When?
JODL: It began through. ..
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you fear it? When did you first fear that attack?
JODL: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it arose from the first talks with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on 29 July.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then from the military point of view, from that moment on, it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not?
JODL: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had only been a conjecture.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How could you afford to wait for the political clarifying work if you were afraid of an immediate attack?
JODL: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with, until the spring of 1941. Up to then we only took
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measures for defense. It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for an attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, then, just one other question. I am not at all clear on this. During that attack did you then advise that Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack? What was your advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it?
JODL: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a written statement I made to the Fuehrer in which I drew his attention to the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of course how the campaign would begin, but no human being could imagine how it would end...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): We have heard all that. I did not want to go into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You were afraid that Russia was going to attack. If that was true, why didn't you advise Germany to attack at once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand.
JODL: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into Russia; I merely said that if there were no other possibility and if there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too, could only see the possibility of a preventive attack.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.
[The defendant left the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner?
DR. EXNER: I have four witnesses to bring before the Tribunal, but I should like to begin by making a request. In consideration of my lame leg may I leave it to my colleague Jahrreis to question these four witnesses?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner.
Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only one counsel may appear in court and in the presentation of the case on behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor.
PROFESSOR DR. GERMANE JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the first witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
[The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?
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GENERAL HORST FREIHERR VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS (Witness): Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff during the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: During what period?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff from 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: What was your position on the staff?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was first General Staff officer of the Army, and in my capacity as department chief I was in charge of the Operations Department of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am going to have a document shown you, Document Number 823-PS, Exhibit Number RF-359. It is in document book Jodl, second volume, Page 158. Will you please be good enough to have a look at it.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Do you want me to read the whole document?
DR. JAHRREISS: I want you to glance through it. Who is the author of the document?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is written by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Department QU, Administration Group.
DR. JAHRREISS: By whom is it signed?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is signed by me.
DR. JAHRREISS: By you. To what extent is that document connected with the Defendant Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The document has nothing at all to do with the Defendant Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then please will you look at the signatures at the upper right-hand corner on the first page; there is an initial which can be read as a "J."
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: That must be a mistake. The initial is exactly the same as the one which appears below in the signature to the written note, and this initial is that of the Chief of the Quartermaster Department, Colonel Polleck.
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DR. JAHRREISS: Colonel Polleck?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: If you will look at Page 2,
you will see two signatures at the bottom. The first must be that of the expert. I cannot recognize it for certain. I take it for the signature of the Senior Administrative Counsellor Niehments.
DR. JAHRREISS: You mean the initial behind which there are the Numbers 4 or 9 for the date?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean the top one.
DR. JAHRREISS: The top one?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The top one. The bottom initial is the signature, the initials of Colonel Polleck. When the document had been submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I initialed it again at the top, and marked it for the Quartermaster Department, that is the "QU" underlined at the top. Then it was again initialed by the "QU" chief, and after that it is marked "Administrative Group" and initialed again by the man who dealt with it. In addition I should like to point out that all this relates to prisoners of war, and that was a field of work with which Jodl actually had nothing to do. In the quartermaster and organizational branches of the Armed Forces Operations Staff we had several fields of work which, although they came from his staff . . .
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a minute, Witness. I do not mind your giving us a lecture, but I should like to get to the point. There are remarks in the margin of this document, do you see them?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is any one of them written by Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No, they are initialed with a "K" for Field Marshal Keitel
DR. JAHRREISS: But the French Prosecution assert that these are comments made by Jodl on the prisoner-of-war question; and if I understood you correctly, you mean to say that this was not possible at all for reasons of competency?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Apart from the fact that there is not a mark on the document made by Jodl it is unlikely that Jodl had any knowledge of the affair at all, because of the way
in which it had to be dealt with.
DR. JAHRREISS: But is it not correct, Witness, that Department "QU" came under Jodl?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Actually, it is correct, but in "QU" Department, just as in "Org." Department there were several fields of work which the Generaloberst had given up and which
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were dealt with either directly by the head of the department, or through the deputy chief, with the Chief of the OKW.
DR. JAHRREISS: You say prisoner-of-war questions were among those, is that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Among other things also the question of prisoners of war.
DR JAHRREISS: What other work did this Department "QU" have?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As its main task or in its first department, "QU-1," Department "QU" looked after nothing but supplies and also supervised the provisioning of the various theaters of war, which came directly under the OKW. The second department was occupied mainly with military administration, and the third department dealt with general questions, such as the prisoner-of-war system-for example, questions concerning international law and so on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the Fuehrer's headquarters?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the "Org." Department, an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but in the neighborhood of Berlin.
DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of Department "QU" by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the Chief of OKW?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of cases.
DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the beginning of the war?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army.
DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your duties there?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of positions in the higher command of flees for mobilization.
DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too?
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VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too.
DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1 October 1939 on?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold this position for the next mobilization year.
DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1 October-let us say on 5 or 6-then Jodl would not have been Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff: at all?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on...
MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers that are submitted have no relevancy at ale
THE PRESIDENT: I don't quite understand what the relevancy of the evidence at the moment is.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the Tribunal for consideration.
THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at another date, and we have no challenge of that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1 October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something else would have happened. That does not help us very much.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was the only thing to be shown.
May I continue, Mr. President?
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THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the Tribunal rules you may not go into that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially connected with the suppression of partisans?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with by my department from that date on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of partisans, issued in May 1944?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous regulation concerning guerrilla warfare?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first had to get further experience.
DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it correct to speak of a "guerrilla war," as has been done here several times?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard to time and space.
DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting went beyond the general conception of the franc-tireur system?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by "extent"?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by "extent" the dimensions of the area affected by guerrilla fighting.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with regard to people involved?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in it.
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DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was ever any mention of Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very limited extent.
DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is that true?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that.
DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to the intentions of the military leaders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Why?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla fighting was urgently needed at the front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht command wished for their purposes?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case, because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and, although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were most successful.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of the 1st Cossack Division. '
DR. JAHRREISS: When, please?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943.
DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW about the difficulties he was having in his division?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine from my old regiment. He came to see me at
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headquarters and on that occasion-in the summer of 1943 or maybe
during the autumn-talked to me in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit, particularly because of the Government's policy in the East. At that time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government's policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care Of the affair?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence in the interests of our volunteer units.
DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Fuehrer.
DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties with morale? What has that got to do with this case?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the decisive question.
[Turning to the witness.] General...
THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my question will become a leading one.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you coronet take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are leading to decisive ones.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand.
THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.
7 June 46
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?
DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness has, in fact, already answered my question.
THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it a little further but. . .
THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss'?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the witness.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May 1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946, are correct.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following statement. I quote:
"It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the civilian population in operational areas and the methods of guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews."
I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have arrived at that view?
7 June 46
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the Fuehrer's order?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Fuehrer always held the view that anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to the Fuehrer.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler's?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether disagree with this arrangement' because we hoped that in these zones the Reichsfuehrer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves, which were mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces released for the front.
DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.
DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander, Southwest?
7 June 46
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief?
DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army; and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.
DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried out strictly from a military standpoint?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.
DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding international law in these wars of aggression?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every positive attitude to the Fuehrer's successes, there was a certain anxiety about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the forces, which made careful work difficult.
7 June 46
After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it was the general opinion of the officers that the Fuehrer would continue to be successful in maintaining peace.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards Hitler after the Munich Agreement?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction among them that, thanks to his policy, the Fuehrer would continue to preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the Fuehrer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that to render the Fuehrer's political aims feasible it was only necessary to keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe should be produced by the laying down of arms.
DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember...
THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of war?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive begun?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first preparations were begun in about September 1944.
DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the offensive informed before it began?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, "no." The first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned; but I do know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these movements.
7 June 46
DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very territory?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]