4000bce - 399
400 - 1399
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1700 - 1799
1800 - 1899
1900 - 1999
[The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels resumed the stand.]
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the order in which they were dealt with in Court.
The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and Strupp.
The application of the Defendant Schirach is rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan are rejected.
The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted yesterday.
The application for the Defendant Goering for two witnesses, Stuckart and Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may be called upon the subject concerned.
With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal order as follows:
The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents, and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as to the contents of the treaties which has not been
8 June 46
contradicted. The motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal's former decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a witness are accordingly denied.
There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are now sitting for the taking of evidence on the questions with which the organizations are concerned.
That is all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court.
Prince Erbach-Schonberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers, however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach, who is in Gmunden in the American occupied zone of Austria, be brought here and interrogated-outside of this Court but in the presence of the Prosecution-to supplement this interrogatory.
My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit.
I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take care of these matters by correspondence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince Erbach-Schonberg is incomplete or misleading?
8 June 46
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles as follows:
"As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles- that is, the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by the use of force."
This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover, this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or contradictory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. "Rather than by force" contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to these principles. These questions...
Em; PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is:
"As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing relations through peaceful means rather than force."
There is nothing contradictory in that, in English
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, "rather than with force." The word "rather" disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the same thing-namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a peaceful manner only and not by force.
THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing It means that he wanted to establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful means. "Not by force" he means.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no further reason to supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: It couldn't mean anything else in English I don't know what it could mean in German.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, "I would prefer peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means might have to be considered." That would be the interpretation placed on the German translation.
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We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful methods were ever considered.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn't suggest for a moment that Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal have accepted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you would agree to read the words in the sense "and not by force."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have the Tribunal's decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here to depose an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David.
Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to draw our attention to in the Prince's interrogatory?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the letter of Count Pfeil been translated?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted the affidavit in the proper form.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution were prepared to admit the letter?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David.
Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schonberg will be amended in the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl von Pfeil will be admitted.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention one point that arose on Tuesday.
8 June 46
Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued. I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later stages, adopted the same line.
Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn't wish to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the time.
I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl's case, or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with reference to the admission or introduction of this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in so doing.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.
DR. NELTE: I should like to put one question to the witness.
Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal Keitel that-and I quote-"rather than back up his subordinate officers and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them over to the Gestapo."
Can you give us facts about this charge which prove that this was not the case?
VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as superior, was always very well-disposed toward
8 June 46
the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the Eastern Front.
I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel, the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and Reichsfuehrer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate officers.
DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated the 20th of May 1946.
My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit- in which case it should be given a number-or whether it should go to the commission.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct. That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen this affidavit; we do not know what its contains. But we will get a copy, and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.
8 June 46
THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it, and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission.
Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree.
THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nuremberg?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application on Monday.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right. Then, the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
Yes, Dr. Jahrreiss, will you call the next witness?
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal's wish. With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Buchs as my next witness. Major Buchs.
[The witness Buchs took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
HERBERT BUCHS (witness): Herbert Buchs.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold nothing and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of the war?
BUCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff:; and in that capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl
DR. JAHRREISS: And were you in this position until the end of the war? ~
BUCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23 May 1945.
8 June 46
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the Fuehrer's headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these headquarters?
BUCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in Berchtesgaden.
DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Do you know anything about that?
BUCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf.
DR. JAHRREISS: You would say that that was a clique?
BUCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship between themselves or with others?
BUCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on Adolf Hitler himself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three again? They did not come to us quite clearly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.
[Turning to the witness.] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned?
BUCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler's liaison officer to Adolf Hitler; then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the Armed Forces with the Fuehrer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of these three gentlemen?
BUCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as Laison officer to Himmler was, as far as the Fuehrer was concerned, the man to whom he turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation. In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein's sphere were frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant.
DR. JAHRREISS: And how about Bormann?
8 June 46
BUCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views. If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the Fuehrer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the dispute in question.
DR. JAHRREISS: And the third of these gentlemen, Burgdorf?
BUCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher officers with the Fuehrer. It was in just such a case that I saw General Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Fuehrer alone, so that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these three gentlemen.
BUCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because-I believe-he discerned the defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him.
As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also disliked personally.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that?
BUCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the Fuehrer vehemently demanded that Allied flyers who made emergency landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected an Allied airman. At that time the Fuehrer made this demand in a very sharp and pointed
8 June 46
manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did Hitler also make this demand of General Jodl?
BUCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not directly connected with military matters.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did the General make no comment at all on the matter?
BUCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Fuehrer from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude, which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen.
DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a delaying action?
BUCHS: In a case of this kind, in which the Fuehrer in the heat of his rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do-General Jodl used these tactics frequently-but to try by obtaining data, arguments pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices concerned-to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment approach the Fuehrer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in this case we really succeeded even though the Fuehrer's attention was repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements and he demanded that a decree be put into execution.
DR. JAHRREISS: Then was no such order issued?
BUCHS: I know of no such order.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such decree was issued?
BUCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account by the Fuehrer rather sharply. After an air raid on
8 June 46
Munich, Fegelein had described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied, "because I had no orders to do so." At that moment I interpolated on my own account that no such order existed. And then the Fuehrer reproached me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again demanded that the order be carried out.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was it carried out then?
BUCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment of terror-fliers was again put aside.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin-I believe in March 1945-which is supposed to have taken place in the Reich Chancellery, where the Fuehrer again complained that in spite of his demand this decree had not been issued?
BUCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Fuehrer again expressed himself very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Fuehrer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over Germany by means of a corresponding counter/error. . .
DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been present at the entire discussion.
Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Fuehrer's room. Another part took place in the anterooms-as, for instance, that with Kaltenbrunner- while the conversation with Goering was carried on by telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I should like to have the Tribunal's permission to present it as a whole, even though the witness heard only a part.
8 June 46
With regard to JODL the last sentence says, as a whole-I believe, Mr. President, we can save time if I may present it now.
First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller, which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked:
"How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force?" The answer is on the next page and is:
"From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force."
Question 5-and that is the question which concerns us-is on Page 179:
"Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer censured you and the Air Force because such an order was not given?"
Answer, Page 180:
"Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March 1945 was laid before the Fuehrer by Bormann during the situation discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect:
" 'An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops. They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members of the population, threatened with death, and probably would have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and taken them under their protection.'
"Bormann further pointed out to the Fuehrer in a few words that this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the population.
"b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly:
" 'I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail out are not to be protected against the population. These people only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate. Why are my orders not carried out?'
"Surprised by this attack I replied something like this:
" 'I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case be a practical impossibility.'
"Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply:
" 'The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air
8 June 46
Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.'
"Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be present in the background, and went on, addressing him but sometimes not looking at him:
" 'I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.'
"Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the impression of general surprise and disapproval.
"c) After the situation discussion with the Fuehrer I requested an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway. Essential points:
"Koller: 'It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in any way whatsoever-and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal. It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree to this in any way, shape, or form.'
"Kaltenbrunner: 'The Fuehrer has completely mistaken ideas.
The duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what the Fuehrer demands. That is not in the German soldier's line. He does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The Fuehrer has a completely false idea of the views held by our soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at once for a fairly long time anyway.'
"Koller: 'Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as the Fuehrer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what is going to happen to us?'
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"The following was decided at my suggestion:
"No order along the lines decreed by the Fuehrer will be issued by the Air Force or the SD.
"Surrenders to the SD-none.
"In case the Fuehrer should refer to his order again, then, first of all, prevent further action through explanations of the following kind: All members of air crews previously captured, not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture not known to a central office. Therefore a lengthy and difficult process to determine the number of air personnel captured during the last few months.
"Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad.
"Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be appointed.
"d) After the situation discussion with the Fuehrer, I spoke to Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter, and said:
" 'The Fuehrer's order is insane.'-Keitel affirmed, 'It certainly is'-'The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order-and verbally-and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not be carried out-but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either; I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.'
"Field Marshal Keitel: 'He will not sign such orders then, and everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But I'll be damned if I issue such an order.'
"Koller: 'The Air Force cannot join in this in any circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.'
"Field Marshal Keitel: 'You are right; neither can I. I must think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.'
"The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the Fuehrer's order.
"e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again
8 June 46
to reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me:
" 'I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me, for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force-or at least defense of the Reich-has failed. What am I to do against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German women and children?'
"Koller: 'The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the enemy's present technical and numerical superiority cannot be eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our favor.'
"Hitler: 'I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible to the German people for the continuation of this situation in the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.'
"Koller: 'That will certainly not improve the situation in the
air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.'
"Hitler: 'No; the Japanese method is the best.'
"Hitler's manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to tank to him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated:
" 'If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my Fuehrer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do would be to treat our air crews in the same way. That is something for which we cannot answer to our men and their relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline would collapse at one blow.'
"Up to that point the Fuehrer had not interrupted me. After his first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be
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lost in thought. He had been Listening, however, and at that point he interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly:
"'So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well. But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and have no other means except this.'
"Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room.
"I) my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfurst) I told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the Fuehrer's order.
"g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began with the following words, 'Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?'
"It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to the Reich Marshal again, and added:
" 'I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it. I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now, in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last conference the Fuehrer will not refer to his order again. If he does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you will have to go to the Fuehrer yourself. What the Fuehrer has ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.'
"The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler's attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary, and ended the interview with these words, 'This is all insane and cannot be done.'
"h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the abovementioned Fuehrer's order were taken neither by the Air Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices, as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Fuehrer's meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces High Command (OKW).
"Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again about this matter.
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"I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events.
"i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive was issued-I think a teletype-in which, as I recall, mention was made of the correspondent's report that occasioned it. It disclosed the fact that the Fuehrer had expressed his displeasure that German soldiers had taken action against their own people.
"No mention was made of the main point of Hitler's order.. If I remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Fuehrer was concerned.
"In my opinion, General Joel had nothing to do with the affair at all."
Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture presented by General Koller correct?
BUCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by the Fuehrer, "This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is based on a mutual life insurance policy of, 'Don't hurt me; I won't hurt you.' " That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which emphasizes what was said...
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions on this point.
THIS PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the offices of the Fuehrer's headquarters were furnished.
BUCHS: Yes, I can still remember.
DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Fuehrer, the Field Marshal, the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall?
BUCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia-particularly the headquarters-the Fuehrer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms.
DR. JAHRREISS: Were maps of Germany hanging there, too?
DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring?
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BUCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever seen such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the Fuehrer's headquarters which could only be intended to show the location of concentration camps. Is that possible?
BUCHS: That is quite out of the question.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there any more detailed statement about . . .?
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.
DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.
DR. STAHMER: Major Buchs, during the time you spent as commanding officer attached to Fuehrer headquarters, were you regularly present at the daily discussions of the situation?
BUCHS: Yes, I participated in the daily military situation discussions.
DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed?
BUCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative-that is to say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be decided was how their transport was to be arranged. .
DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made regarding that transport, and who made them?
BUCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Fuehrer only said in general terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment than our own people. It was just at the time
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of the evacuation of Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I remember that, at the time, the Fuehrer said, "If these officers wish to be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the German civilian population."
DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement, refer to an error, in the record. During the crossexamination of the Defendant Goering on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how they should be transported, there is a statement that the Fuehrer said, "They will have to go even if they march in 'Dreck' (mud)." The actual text is, "They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot." That is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Fuehrer said, "They have got to go even if they have to trek"-that is to march in a column, on foot.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division.
DR. STAHMER: I merely wanted to establish the fact.
[Turning to the witness.] A remark is supposed to have been made in the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, "Take off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow." Do you remember who made that remark?
BUCHS: No, I cannot remember; and I think it is quite impossible.
DR. STAHMER: You do not remember any such remark, or by whom it was made?
BUCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in some connection or other; I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Goering is supposed to have made such a remark.
BUCHS: I think that is quite out of the question.
In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at once during these conference and much more rapidly than usual. The stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither look up nor make certain who
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actually made such and such a remark at such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the stenographers.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please complete my statement.
I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision...
THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to put your questions to the witness before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence directly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.
DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was announced without the Defense having first been notified.
DR. MARTIN LOFFLER(Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must emphasize them because...
THE PRESIDENT: On what point, Dr. Loffler?
DR. LOFFLER: On the point that the witnesses caned today cannot be questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether.
rim; PRESIDENT: Dr. Loffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be
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represented and heard. That is with reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future date in this Court.
The Tribunal have given the matter full and it doesn't desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the counsel for the organizations.
DR. LOFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal's grounds, but we feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss of that witness.
I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr. President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission because the number...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Loffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it further, but they don't desire to hear any further argument about it. It is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.
The Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LOFFLER: May I give one explanation . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Did you, hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.
DR. LOFFLER: Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions.
[Turning to the witness.] Your memory of that conference doesn't seem to be entirely clear.
BUCHS: May I ask which conference?
MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan.
BUCHS: I am not aware that it was incorrect in any point.
MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don't remember any mention being made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their boots on.
BUCHS: Yes, that is what I said.
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MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is-I can't find the actual place; I had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to- but you know that that is in the actual stenographer's notes, do you not?
BUCHS: So it was said.
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer could hardly put that remark down unless it was said?
MR. ROBERTS: But you didn't hear the remark; therefore, you don't know who said it?
MR. ROBERTS: That is all I ask on that.
I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the status of Hitler's brother-in-law, when Hitler got married?
MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of his new-found brother-in-law?
MR. ROBERTS: That is all.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further question to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
[The witness left the stand.]
DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Professor Dr. Schramm.
[The witness Schramm took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM (Witness): Percy Ernst Schramm.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war?
SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Until the end?
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SCHRAMM: Until the end-that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.
DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces Operations Staff?
SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I kept the War Diary of that staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: Was there a special reason why you received that task?
SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the University of Gottingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief.
DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events connected with that staff, would you not?
SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Fuehrer's situation discussions or the internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important document passed through my office during those two years.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of General Jodl's activities.
SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General's activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which, of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared on the General's desk at some time or other. To look at it from another angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest, in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast.
DR. JAHRREISS: Please speak more slowly.
SCHRAMM: It was the General's task not only to have up-to-date information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational adviser to the Fuehrer.
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DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of war?
SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army, and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with those of the Eastern Front.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000 teleprint messages in a year?
SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed through the War Diary office, and that they were so [demonstrating] thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through my of lice. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000.
DR. JAHRREISS: Perhaps you may be able to help us with a question which has been repeatedly touched upon here, but to which no precise answer has ever been given. Do you know anything about an order from Hitler saying that generals must not resign?
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember that very exactly from an order which appeared in the middle of 1944, repeating with great strictness an order already issued before my time-that must have been during 1940 or 1941. That order was about 11/~ typewritten pages in length and most forcefully worded. Its contents are still clear in my mind, because I discussed it afterwards with several of my comrades. The order stated that every commanding officer-and the departments under him correspondingly-was entitled to mention any objections he might have to the measures of the Supreme Command, but that he would then have to obey unconditionally the order once it was given him by higher quarters-that is to say, he would have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. It added that it was impossible for a commander to resign in consequence of this. The reason stated was that the sergeants in the trench could not tell their company commander that they wanted to resign when they were not in agreement with his orders.
I repeat, it was so emphatically worded that we talked about it a great deal. From that time on, the commanders had even less chance of evading an order from the Supreme Command.
DR. JAHRREISS: Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a little more slowly?
This order-the contents of which you have just described to us, and by means of which you have established the date of the
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final and most stringent formulation of this order also apply to a man like General Jodl?
SCHRAMM: If it applied to the commanders, it naturally applied all the more to General Jodl.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now turn to another question.
General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a civilian and a professor; and I assume, therefore, that you possess the detachment required to enable you to make up your mind on the matter and to supply the Tribunal with facts which will permit it to form its decision. Can you give us facts which would of necessity form a basis for judgment for or against?
SCHRAMM: If the question aims at establishing whether or not the General was a Party general, then I deny it most emphatically. It was utterly immaterial to the General whether the members of his staff were Party members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time for it; and with regard to my documents I can only tell you that I do not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn. What the General committed to paper-and these papers, as I have seen myself, run into thousand was always strictly confined to military matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having seen in my files any document of a political nature inspired by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or written by himself.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; but perhaps he was fond of the limelight and had great ambitions; and perhaps, and outside of the files...
SCHRAMM: I can answer that question with a definite 'no," because I know from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him and that he disliked it because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any ambition, because if the General was ambitious he certainly had chosen the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed himself to criticism from those below him- from people who did not know the underlying reasons. From that time on he was criticized a good deal, and he did not receive from higher quarters the recognition he deserved. I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at the time of Adolf Hitler's death, had scarcely more German war decorations
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than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of political aspirations.
DR. JAHRREISS: During this Trial there has been frequent mention of a speech made by the General during the winter of 1943-44 addressed to the Gauleiter. I do not know whether you know anything about that speech.
SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember it exactly.
DR. JAHRREISS: What do you remember exactly?
SCHRAMM: First of alp let me tell you that the reason why I remember it exactly is because I received the material on which the speech was based. After it was no longer needed, it was given to me for my War Diary. It was like this:
That was a speech for which material was collected in the various departments. For this purpose an enormous map was needed, which was difficult to prepare because it was larger than the offices in which we were working. The speech was made at this annual meeting in Munich on 8 or 9 November. The particular reason for the General making a speech outside the usual military circle was the following: Italy's dropping out of the war in September 1943 had led to a break in the Southern Front extending from Marseilles to Athens, a distance of 4,000 km. We had succeeded in filling the gap again, but a good deal of uneasiness was felt by all those who understood the situation.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the speech being made. The speech is in evidence and, in my submission, the reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, please go on telling us about the attack.
SCHRAMM: This was the one reason...
THE: PRESIDENT: No, no, I said that the Tribunal upheld Mr. Roberts' objection as to what the witness must say. That's a mistranslation.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was a misunderstanding. I am sorry. It was wrongly translated.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, I want to show you a document which was submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution 2 days ago, Document 1808-PS. Perhaps you will just look through the whole of the document first.
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?
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DR. JAHRREISS: No, it is a document which the Prosecution submitted in the course of the cross-examination 2 days ago.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up separately by me during the cross-examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed up loose towards the end of the crossexamination, Document 1808-PS.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. May I go on?
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, does your signature appear at the foot of the second last page, on the right?
SCHRAMM: Yes. This is a file which I started after the attempt of 20 July 1944, in order to have a permanent record of what was being done in the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I want to add in this connection that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was in no way involved in that conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the war archives. The signature and the corrections are partly mine, and partly those of my clerk.
DR. JAHRREISS: I want to draw your attention to Number 5 in this file of documents.
DR. JAHRREISS: It is dated 25 July. Do you have it?
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you draw it up?
SCHRAMM Yes, I drew it up myself.
DR. JAHRREISS Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of yours was?
SCHRAMM: The officers of the staff were called to our mess hall at short notice. We were told that the General wanted to address his staff. As not all the officers were able to attend, I was ordered to take notes, so that the other officers could be informed of what the General had said. I remember clearly that I jotted down a few key words, still standing, so this is not a shorthand record. I cannot write shorthand. There was no time to find a stenographer.
DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did you base this on your notes?
SCHRAMM Yes. Afterwards, probably on the following day, I reconstructed the General's speech as far as possible from my notes. I am not certain, of course, if all the details are quite accurate, because the notes which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy for that. And, of course, I am particularly doubtful about the accuracy of the actual words spoken. I now. see that there are
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41/2 pages. The speech was, of course, very much longer than that. It is therefore a compressed account.
DR. JAHRREISS: A compressed account only . . .
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, I should like to know more about the circumstances in which the General made that speech, the actual words of which we do not possess. That was...
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is my respectful submission-again in the interests of saving time-to mention that these matters are all very irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler's life, and that Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are not relevant at all.
DR. JAHRREISS:- Mr. President . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope you'll do it briefly.
DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, will you please be very brief and quote the personal circumstances?
SCHRAMM: The General appeared on the scene with white bandages around his head. We were all most surprised that he should have recovered so quickly from the attempt considering that he had been standing right next to the explosion. I must say that, at that time, we were deeply impressed by the concentrated energy with which he reappeared before his staff and by his moral attitude to such an attempt.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
[There was no response.]
Does the Prosecution want to?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call the next witness, General Winter?
[The witness Winter took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.
AUGUST WINTER (Witness): August Winter.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
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THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you take part in the beginning of the Russian campaign? ~
WINTER: Yes, I took part as the first general staff officer of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt's army group.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, may I point out to you that I want you to allow a small pause after my question and to speak in general more slowly than you have just been doing.
DR. JAHRREISS: Can you tell me-since you had a very responsible position-what was officially said to be Hitler's reason, at that time, for the German attack on the Soviet Union?
WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure.
DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the frontier, did you not?
WINTER: Yes, in this staff.
DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south?
WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South.
DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not?
DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the official reason given, that of a preventive war?
WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army group-including the commander, the chief, and the operations department under my command-that the reason given for the campaign was the true one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active preparations for an offensive campaign.
DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this impression?
WINTER: We had a number of facts which confirmed that impression, according to our ideas. I may state them briefly. First of all, there was the strength of the troops we encountered which, although I cannot give you figures now, was greater than the figures mentioned in our marching orders. Then there was the extraordinary deployment of troops, so near and like a front, which struck
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us, with unusual large proportions of armored troops far exceeding anything we had expected, and the deployment of a comparatively strong group opposite the Hungarian border which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive force. One point is particularly significant; the fact that during the first week we found that captured enemy staffs were equipped with maps which covered a large area of German or ax-Austrian territory which, again, did not seem in keeping with purely defensive considerations. In addition we observed a number of smaller things, not very important in themselves.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, just now you spoke of evidence which, in your opinion, was particularly significant-namely, the finding of these maps which you described a few minutes ago. Why is that particularly significant-more significant than the other things you have mentioned?
WINTER: It is particularly noticeable that the units on the Russian Front were equipped with maps covering much more than the area which would normally be included in a defensive reconnaissance area-even allowing for the fact that at the beginning of a campaign such reconnaissance might go beyond the enemy's frontier.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been mentioned in this courtroom the fact that after marching into the Ukraine, our troops found themselves faced with exceptional circumstances and difficulties in certain Ukrainian cities. Have you any idea of what I mean?
WINTER: Yes, that is obvious. We encountered an enormous number of these difficulties when we approached the Dnieper. I imagine that you are referring to the matter of remote-controlled explosions, or delayed-action explosions, which were carried out, as it seemed, on a very large scale in our fighting zone in the Kiev-Kharkov-Poltava area. They caused us a great deal of trouble, and they forced us to adopt extensive countermeasures at the time.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?
WINTER: I heard that things were blown up in Odessa, but I cannot give you details.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know the details about Kharkov?
WINTER: I know about Kharkov indeed, because something happened there which caused us to adopt certain security measures. In the battles along the west border of Kharkov which were rather long and serious, a divisional staff with all its main material-I cannot remember its number-was destroyed by a delayed-action explosion of this kind. This caused orders to be issued for the carrying out of special security searches in all buildings which had to be
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used for accommodation of staffs and other authorities from that time on.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you, Witness, actually handle a Russian map, or see one, which indicated plans for such blowing-up operations?
WINTER: No, I cannot remember seeing such a map.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another point. You said a few moments ago that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?
WINTER: Infantry General Von Sodenstern.
DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another subject. If I remember correctly, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt retired at that time or was dismissed; is that right?
WINTER: When the attack on Rostock failed in November 1941 and permission to withdraw his leading units had been refused by the OKH, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt sent a report to the OKH, to the army to which we were subordinated, in which he said that if the necessary confidence was not felt in his leadership, he must ask the Fuehrer to nominate a new commander for that army group I have a painfully accurate recollection of this incident, because I myself drafted the telegram and the Field Marshal made that addition with his own hand.
The telegram was dispatched in the evening, and Hitler's answer, relieving him of his post, arrived in the course of the same night.
DR. JAHRREISS: So that his application was granted?
WINTER: The application was granted. But perhaps I may tell you that there were repercussions later with Hitler. A few days afterwards Hitler himself flew to Mariupol in order to obtain information about the actual situation on the spot. On his homeward flight, he visited Field Marshal Von Rundstedt's Poltava headquarters and had a discussion with him. In the course of this discussion, Hitler-I cannot tell you for certain whether I witnessed this scene myself, or whether the Chief Adjutant Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards-I repeat, there was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again reproached the Field Marshal for having put that alternative question, and said to him:
"In the future I do not intend to tolerate any such applications to resign. When I have once made a decision, the responsibility is transferred to me. I myself am not in a position to go to my superior, for instance, God Almighty, and to say to him, 'I am not going on with it, because I don't want to take the responsibility."'
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We considered, at the time, that that scene was of basic importance, and I may add that, to judge from the orders later given on that point, our impression was correct.
DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether Hitler, at some later date, altered his decision not to allow that in the future?
WINTER: No, he certainly did not alter his decision. Because,
as I know, there were two occasions, I believe, on which orders to that effect were issued, forbidding resignations on the part of a commander, or an officer in a leading position, on grounds of unwillingness to assume responsibility.
DR. JAHRREISS: I now come to another point. If I am properly informed, you were in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the later stages of the war, were you not?
WINTER: On 15 November 1944 I was called there to succeed General Warlimont who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15 November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you regularly attend the situation discussions with the Fuehrer?
WINTER: Yes, I was there on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the week.
DR. JAHRREISS: There has been a great deal of discussion about these situation conferences in this courtroom, and a great many events took place at them which are of importance for this Trial; but up to now, no real picture has yet been presented to us of what those situation discussions really were. Can you explain the procedure of such a situation discussion with reference to its length and the number of people present?
WINTER: The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon's program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while there was a second situation discussion at 2 o'clock in the morning, of no importance to us here. In it, reports were made only by the junior General Staff officers of the OKH for the Eastern Front and of the Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front.
MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, I have a submission again in the interest of time. The Defendant Jodl gave evidence as to these conferences, and no one put one word of cross-examination to suggest that his evidence was not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure repetition on a point which is not disputed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear anything of a general or detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in particular that you want to prove about them.
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DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask at this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts means that in this case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon-in cross-examination can be considered proved? I am not sure whether I have made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is based on the supposition that something has been heard...
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you need lay down any hard and fast rules, but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these "situation conferences," and he was not cross-examined on it. It doesn't seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences with any other witness.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, it is possible in military life for an officer to receive an order with which he does not agree, is it not?
DR. JAHRREISS: In that case, is it possible for him to put his divergent opinion on record?
WINTER: In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility existed from the time of Moltke. An order from Hitler which came out in 1938-I think, in winter 1938-39-removed such a possibility once and for all. An order was issued at the time prohibiting even chiefs of general staffs and command authorities from putting their divergent opinions on record.
DR. JAHRREISS: In order to avoid creating difficulties for the interpretation, will you please explain the word ''Aktenklindig''?
WINTER: According to that it was not possible to include in the official files or in the war diaries of events kept by command staffs any comments to the effect that the chief was not in agreement with the decision or order of his superior.
DR. JAHRREISS: It was canceled?
WINTER: These possibilities existed previously, but since 1938 they no longer existed as they were done away with.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, General, I am now going to have a document shown to you, Document D-606, a document which the Prosecution also submitted during cross-examination 3 days ago. I am afraid I do not know the exhibit number. Perhaps it is...
MR. ROBERTS: Well, that's the Number 3606. It's Exhibit GB-292, My Lord. I put it in separately in cross-examination, in their book...
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THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.
DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know this document?
WINTER: I am acquainted with the document. It has my file reference number on it.
DR. JAHRREISS: Did you write it yourself?
WINTER: No, General Jodl wrote it personally. But I can see a blank space under Figure 11. I do not know whether it is complete. The document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained here; but now that I have looked at it, I can see that it is dealt with in the file copy from my quartermaster's department. The third copy must have been sealed and attached to the same records.
Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was drawn up at my headquarters under the responsibility of General Jodl, and the order stated that all angles should be worked on which would prevent the Fuehrer from coming to such a decision-that is, of leaving the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the point of view of international law and from the point of view of the psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home. I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me. He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy and so formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its success with Hitler under all circumstances-for his idea must not be allowed to be put into practice.
DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant's counsel want to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I ask whether the prohibition regarding interrogation applies to this witness? And I want to point out that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff and of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not matter whether he is or not. You can question him before the Commission. I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this question.
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THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. Dr. Laternser, if there is any witness who is not residing in Nuremberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question.
[Turning to the witness.] You have told us that Germany attacked the Soviet Union in breach of their Non-aggression Pact, because Germany feared an attack from the Soviet Union.
WINTER: May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff officers in the high command of an army group that was deployed in the Ukraine, were given that reason by our commanding officer. Whether politically...
MR. ROBERTS: Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that Hitler decided, in July 1940, to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18 December 1940-446-PS, it is Page 53 of Book 7- that on 18 December Hitler stated that the Armed Forces must be prepared to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single attack of lightning-like speed. We know that the attack was not until 22 June. It does not look as though the leaders of Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russia, or should we say the Soviet Union, breaking the Non-aggression Pact.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Diddle): Witness, you had to take retaliation measures in the Ukraine, did you not?
WINTER: We did not undertake any reprisals-as far as the troops were concerned-in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no recollection now of any such instances.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Diddle): What measures did you take against the resistance of the population?
WINTER: During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was involved, there was no resistance by the population in the operational zone In the Ukraine. Only in rear areas were there fights, at that time, with struggling Russian troop units. A resistance on the part of the population did not occur-as far as I know-until later when the operational zone had already been limited in the rear, and then there was resistance against political Reich commissioners.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Very well. You were not there at that time?
WINTER: The command to which I belonged was withdrawn from the front at the end of January, or in the early days of February 1943. The rear area lines were at the Dnieper at that time.
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THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, in conclusion I have only two interrogatories to submit to the Tribunal; and I want to read a few lines from one of them-something which was forgotten.
To begin with, the interrogatory, Exhibit AJ-8, Document Jodl-61, an interrogatory of Waizenegger, which I herewith submit and beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice R its contents. And then there is Exhibit AJ-6, Document Jodl-59, an interrogatory of Brudermuller, with reference to which I wish to make a similar request. Then, from the last to be submitted, Exhibit AJ-12, Document Jodl-65, General Greiffenberg's statement, I should like to quote the important parts. It is a question of the attack against Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not, after the Simovic Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken up a position against us. This is in the third volume of my document book on Page 211. The Simovic Putsch was over, and the question was whether there was an immediate threat from Yugoslavia at the time.
"Question: Is it a fact that Yugoslavia, immediately after the coup d'etat of the army, started to deploy her armies on all her borders?
"Answer: I know only the front which was opposite the German Twelfth Army, located at the Bulgarian border. Here the Yugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border.
"Question: Is it a fact that the Army 'List,' of which you were the commander at the time, had the order, before the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia, to respect strictly the neutrality of Yugoslavia during the pending attacks on Greece, and that not even supply trains should be dispatched through Yugoslavian territory?
"Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given to respect Yugoslavia's neutrality.
"Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order? "Answer: No."
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, a number of interrogatories have not yet come in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know. At any rate, I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart from that, I have completed my case. THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not?
Very well, the Tribunal may adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]