Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 16

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Wednesday, 19 June 1946

Morning Session

MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Von Neurath is absent.

[The Defendant Von Papen resumed the stand.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just before we leave Mr. Messersmith, Defendant, I want to ask you three questions about the other countries in southeastern Europe that Mr. Messersmith mentioned. Did you know that the German Foreign Office financed and directed the Henlein movement among the Sudetendeutschen?

VON PAPEN: I do not believe that I learned of that at that time. In 1935, when this report was written, the Sudeten German question was not acute.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: When did you learn about it?

VON PAPEN: Mainly here in this room.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Did you know that the Reich was supporting Mr. Codreanu and the Iron Guard in Romania?

VON PAPEN: I believe that that was also much later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You learned that sometime later than 1935, did you? When did you learn that?

VON PAPEN: I cannot say; but I believe that events in connection with the Iron Guard in Romania took place about 1937. I may be wrong; but I do not think so.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think perhaps you have the microphone a little too near you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I am sorry.

[Turning to the defendant.] Did you know that in 1944 you were discussed in a Reich state paper edited by the Defendant Kaltenbrunner as being a possible person to do the same thing in Hungary, to arrange for Hungary's acquisition by the Reich, doing the internal work inside Hungary in order that Hungary should be acquired? Did you know that?


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VON PAPEN: No. In the first place, I did not know that; and in the second place I may say that the idea is impossible, because I was a close friend of the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy. In my interrogatory to Admiral Horthy I asked him a question which he unfortunately failed to answer because he did not remember. It says that in the autumn of 1943 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Keresctes-Fischer, handed me a document showing that German or German and Hungarian forces wanted to bring about the incorporation of Hungary into the Reich through a revolt. At Regent Horthy's desire, I at once handed this document over to Herr Von Ribbentrop and asked him to take the appropriate measures to prevent it. That is all set down in the files, and the Hungarian Minister of the Interior will be able to confirm it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see my point. I do not mind whether you would have taken it or not. The point that I am putting is that you were the choice. Don't you know that? You know the document I am referring to, D-679, with many comments by Kaltenbrunner, in which you were discussed as being the possible person to do the internal work in Hungary.

My Lord, it is Page 78 of Document Book 11, and Page 46 of the German Document Book 11.

VON PAPEN: Sir David, I went over this note the day before yesterday after you submitted it here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you with it if you only learned it here. The only point I want to know is this. Did you know in 1944 that you were being suggested in a German state document as being the person who might do the internal work in Hungary in order that Hungary might be acquired by the Reich? If you say you do not know, I shall not trouble you with it any further. You say you only knew that since the day before yesterday?

VON PAPEN: Yes, and in the second place, it is a historical fact that I repeatedly opposed these efforts in Hungary which aimed in one way or another, ultimately by occupation, at making Hungary a part of the German Reich. I considered that the most mistaken and most impossible policy imaginable.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will not trouble you about the documents since you have not known; we will come to another point.

You remember Gauleiter Rainer, the gentleman with whom you had the fortuitous and I am sure very interesting talk on the eve of the Anschluss; Dr. Rainer, the witness? I would just like you to look at Dr. Rainer's view of the position when you took over, and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with that.


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My Lord, it is Page 6 of Document Book 11; the document is 812-PS. It starts on Page 6 and the passage which I am going to refer to is on Page 8.

Have you got the passage that begins:

"Thus began the first phase of battle, which ended with the July uprising of 1934. The decision for the July uprising was right; but many mistakes were made in carrying it out. The result was the complete destruction of the organization, the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the 'Altreith,' and, with regard to the political relationship between Germany and Austria, a formal acknowledgement of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two States, the Fuehrer liquidated the first stage of the battle and began a new method of political penetrations"

Would you agree that that is a correct description of your work, "a new method of political penetration"?

VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. That is a very inaccurate description of my activity.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you don't agree with Dr. Rainer, tell me-you know, you must know very well, the witness Dr. Paul Schmidt. You know him?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. Now I think you will agree with me that he is one of the personalities against whom nobody had said a word during this Trial. Do you agree? I haven't heard a word of criticism of Paul Schmidt. Don't you agree with me?

VON PAPEN: Do you mean the witness-the interpreter Schmidt or the Foreign Minister Schmidt?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter.

VON PAPEN: Paul Schmidt, the interpreter. I will give you my opinion on that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you agree that he is a trustworthy person or not? Do you say that he is not a trustworthy person?

VON PAPEN: I have nothing to say against the human qualities of Herr Schmidt, but I have a very strong objection to the fact that Herr Schmidt takes the liberty of criticizing my political activities in Austria.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, before you explain it, just have a look at it. You will find Dr. Paul Schmidt's affidavit


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on Page 41 of Document Book 11, that is Page 37 of the German document book, Document 3308-PS. Now just listen to Dr. Paul Schmidt's view, Paragraph 8:

"Plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss necessitated a more cautious approach to this problem for a time; but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League of Nations plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made the resumption of thee Austrian program safer. When Goering visited Rome early in 1937, he declared that the union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and must be expected sooner or later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained silent and uttered only a mild protest when I translated them into French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a Party matter, in which Von Papen's role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move."

Then, Defendant, so that we are being quite clear, he makes a mistake, and it is a speech of Hitler's on 18 February to which, unfortunately, the translator has put your name. I am not relying on that. But what I do want to know whether you agree with is that it was your role, ". . . to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways. . ." Do you agree with that as a correct description of your program, your mission in Austria?

VON PAPEN: On the contrary, Sir David, the exact opposite is the case. I explained my task in Austria very clearly and distinctly to the Tribunal.


VON PAPEN: It was a task of pacification and normalization and a continuation of the policy of the grafting together of the two States in an evolutionary way. And now may I say a few words more concerning this affidavit of Dr. Schmidt? At the time when the witness sat here in this chair we established the fact that this affidavit was placed before him when he was still in bed in the hospital after a severe illness, and this document was given to him for his signature. . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, with respect to that, the Tribunal will deal with it. We have heard all about it and Dr. Schmidt has been cross-examined and I think you may take it that the Tribunal know everything about the circumstances of the affidavit. If you have anything to comment on the contents of it,


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I am sure the Tribunal would willingly let you, but you need not comment on the circumstances. That is all before the Tribunal.

VON PAPEN: I will comment on the contents, I will state that Minister Schmidt, who later played a highly influential role with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, in the years which are under discussion here had a very subordinate position in the Foreign Office which did not afford him insight-any exact insight-into conditions in Austria and into my policy and my reports.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if that is so. . .

VON PAPEN: Sir David, Herr Von Neurath will be able to confirm that for you tomorrow or the day after.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we won't argue that any further. The Tribunal have the whole of Dr. Schmidt's record before them and the affidavit. Now you said you told the Tribunal about your conception of your mission in Austria. If that was your conception of your mission in Austria, why was it necessary for you to get hold of the position of the explosive chambers in Austrian strategic roads? That was rather going back to the development of the "top hat" idea to which you objected so strongly, wasn't it?- Well, if you don't remember, let me remind you. It is Document D-689, Page 101.

The Tribunal will find the passage actually on Page 102, and it is 90 and 91 in the German version of Document Book 11, becoming GB-504.

This is the opening of the Grossglockner Road, which, as you know, is a road of some strategic importance going from Salzburg to Carinthia. Do you remember that, after your description about The people being in Salzburg and singing everything except the Horst-Wessel song, and then the German drivers competing, in the third and next paragraph you say:

"The building of this road is undoubtedly a first-class work of culture, in which Reich-German construction firms took the main and decisive part. The chief engineer of the Reich-German firm which built the tunnel at the highest point offered to inform me of the position of the explosive chambers in this tunnel. I sent him to the military attaché."

That was your combining culture and showing the excellence of German road constructions with obtaining the position of the explosives of the tunnel at the important strategic portion of the road. Why did you consider that of sufficient importance to send it to Hitler with three copies to the Foreign Office?

VON PAPEN: Sir David, I am giving an exact account of what happened at the inauguration of this road.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't want that. The Tribunal can get that. What I am asking you is why you were sending to Hitler the fact that the Reich-German engineer was disclosing to you the explosive chambers on the important part of this road where this road could be blocked? Why were you sending that to Hitler? That is what I want you to tell the Tribunal.

VON PAPEN: Because it seemed interesting to me that this man approached me voluntarily and told me, "At this and this point, the

tunnel can be blown up." You know that at that time our relations with Italy were very strained and that Italy mobilized on the Brenner border. For that reason it seemed of interest to me that this new connection between Italy and Germany could be broken again at any suitable time. Moreover, I referred the matter to my military attaché because it did not interest me personally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you had then moved out of the class of doing that sort of thing yourself. You were the head of the mission and it was a matter for the military attaché.

But was that your plan, Defendant, that, when you introduced German Kultur as showing the road making, at the same time you were getting the strategic information which you could pass on to your Government, undermining the Austrian Government's strategic plans to use the road?

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant said, did he not, that it was a road which joined Germany to Italy?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. The road actually goes from Salzburg, which is practically on the German border, to Carinthia in south Austria, so it was a new highway, taking traffic north and south in Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: Did it actually connect Germany with Italy, or did it connect Austria with Italy?


[Turning to the defendant.] Well, let's take something else in which you were interested. You were also reporting as to where the Austrian supply of munitions and manufacture of munitions were going to be situated, were you not?

VON PAPEN: I do not remember.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, if you don't recall it, look at it yourself. It is Document D-694. You will find it a few pages on.

It is Page 110, My Lord, in the English book; Page 108 of the German book. It will become Exhibit GB-505. Its date is 26 November 1935. It is Page 110 and the passage that I am going to read is Page 111.


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Defendant, you ought to find it just at the top of Page 112 of the German version. You are dealing with the influence of Herr Mandel, whose Jewish extraction you referred to, and then you go on to Prince Starhemberg. It reads:

"After the manufacture of munitions for Italy in Hirtenberg had to be stopped because of Italian protests, he, Mandel, loaded the entire factory on to the railway, in order to continue work in Italy."

Then, note the next words in brackets:

"Incidentally, an interesting situation for Austria's supply of munitions . . ."

Was that one of your conceptions of restoring normal relations, that you should report on the movements in the Austrian munition manufacture?

VON PAPEN: No, that was not my task proper, but this report shows, Sir David, that I was repeating a talk with the Polish Minister Gavronski, who told me that this munitions factory, the only one which existed in Austria, was being moved to Italy. I wrote, with regard to this, that it is a remarkable circumstance if a country has to get its munitions supplies from a foreign country. You must surely admit that that is a peculiar situation and one that deserves inclusion in a report.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your explanation. I won't waste time on it.

Now, I want to pass-and again I want to deal with it very quickly-to your own personal experiences in Austria.

You remember when you went to the Salzburg Festival in 1935, when you had been there about a year; do you remember? I don't know because you probably went every year.

The point that I want to remind you of is this. Do you remember when you went there that 500 National Socialists greeted you with music and made such a demonstration that some other guests in the hotel wanted to telephone or telegraph to the Federal Chancellery to say that the German Ambassador had caused a great Nazi demonstration? Do you remember that?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the reference to that is at Page 102, Document D-689, which I have already referred to, Page 102 of Document Book 11.

Well now, let me take another example. Do you remember the meeting of the comrades of the first World War at Wels?



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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was, if my recollection is right, in 1937, was it not?

VON PAPEN: Quite right, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And all the preparations had been made for a nonpolitical meeting, a reunion of the Austrian regiments and old comrades from the German regiments, and after the meeting they were to have a sort of dinner or lunch together, and the evening was to finish in jollity and song. That was the program, wasn't it?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That meeting was addressed by General Glaise-Horstenau and yourself?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Glaise-Horstenau- without any disrespect to him-I think you will agree made a not very powerful speech. That was your impression, wasn't it, a not very powerful speech? Interesting but not dynamic? Believe me, I am not being offensive to the general. I am merely trying to get the point.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You made a speech which lasted for quite a short time, didn't you? Do you remember?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: After your speech, there was beating and shooting through the streets of Wels, wasn't there? There was a riot there, wasn't there?

VON PAPEN: May I give you a more exact description?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can. I wanted to establish the fact. You are perfectly entitled now to give your explanation.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there a document on this?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no document on this.

VON PAPEN: A meeting had been arranged in Wels between organizations of the old German Army from the first World War, the so-called Warriors' Society, (Kriegerverein) and the veterans' associations of Austria. It was perfectly legitimate and in the spirit of our joint policy that the mutual experiences during the first World War should be renewed between these formations. At this meeting, which according to my wish and that of the Austrian Government was to be completely nonpolitical in character, the following events took place: When I arrived, the place where this


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meeting of veterans' associations was held, was surrounded by between 5,000 and 10,000 people. The Austrian Government, to receive their German guests, brought an honor company of the Army, and when the Austrian band played the Austrian national anthem on my arrival, these 10,000 people who surrounded the place sang the German national anthem, for the tune is the same, as you know.

When in the course of the celebration I made a brief speech I found myself constantly interrupted by thousands of people, in a demonstrative manner. Of course, I immediately realized that the Austrian National Socialists had planned a big political demonstration here; so I broke off my speech, and shortly afterwards I left the place, and left Wels also.

It is quite true, as Sir David said, that when the celebration broke up and the Austrian police wanted to proceed against the thousands of persons who were demonstrating, very unfortunate incidents occurred.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if that is your explanation, I have put the facts of the incident. Now I want to pass to another point, because I can only give examples of your activities in Austria.

Before you heard the evidence of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, do you remember the phrase "the Trojan Horse technique" being referred to with regard to Austria?

VON PAPER: Yes. Seyss-Inquart did not want to lead the Trojan Horse.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but before that, you know, you had referred to the Trojan Horse technique.

My Lord, it is Document Book 11, Page 133. The passage I am referring to is from Page 134. The document is D-706, which will become GB-506. It is Page 163, Sergeant Major.

That is your report of 21 August 1936, where you quote an instruction of the Prague Secret Service to its Vienna branch, which says:

"Unfortunately it must be noted that the wild National Socialist excesses of 29 July of this year have not had the result we expected. Austria's approach to the Third Reich in the field of foreign politics is making further progress, as well as the process of cultural collaboration between the two sister nations. One can also assume from your most recent reports that the Trojan Horse of National Socialism is bringing greater confusion into the ranks of the Fatherland Front and particularly into the ranks of the Heimatschutz


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(Home Guard). Opposition to the normalizing of German-Austrian relations, which is extremely dangerous to Austrian independence, appears nevertheless to be relatively very great; it obviously lacks only good organization."

Now, does that Czech report describe correctly what was going on, the superficial normalization of relations and the Trojan Horse movement working inside the country?

VON PAPEN: Sir David, that is the opinion of the Czech Secret Service and perhaps of the Czech Government.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I remind you, Defendant, that it is the opinion quoted by you in your report to the Fuehrer, and not contradicted. There is not a word in your report suggesting that it is not the truth. In fact you say you introduce it, "To illustrate the present position in Austria..."

You are introducing it as correct information for the Fuehrer, so you cannot, I suggest, write it off by saying it is merely a Czech report.

VON PAPEN: Yes, I do. Let me point out that this report was written on 21 August 1936. That is 1 month after the conclusion of our July Agreement, which you asserted was a deceitful maneuver, but which we and the Austrian Foreign Minister established as a very seriously intended agreement. We were now on a completely different basis with Austria and for that reason I quoted this peculiar Czech report as an interesting document to show how, in spite of our efforts for normalization, the Czechs regarded matters in Austria.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you leaving that document?


THE PRESIDENT: What about the last paragraph?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I will certainly deal with that.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases. It goes on:

"Besides, it appears hopeless and also impracticable for us to strive to influence Austrian legitimism or the Heimwehr movement. There are, on the other hand, comparatively strong elements in Austrian Catholicism which could, with certain reservations, be called democratic. These elements, which are gradually grouping themselves round the Freiheitsbund (Freedom League) and which are inclined on principle to work for an agreement with the Social Democrats,


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represent, in our opinion, that group which would in certain 'circumstances be inclined to bring about a revolution in internal politics in Austria."

Did you put that forward as also representing your view?

VON PAPEN: Sir David, I gave the Court a most exact explanation of the aims and character of the Freiheitsbund yesterday; and the Court knows from the report that the Czech Government endeavored to exert a certain amount of political influence on this Freiheitsbund. That is quite clear from the connection. This is all in the Czech report.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you were putting it forward, were you not, as your view to Hitler that, to speak loosely, the Catholic Left might be used as a means of approach by you. That is really what you are saying.

VON PAPEN: Sir David, surely you do not want to impute that I submitted a Czech report to Hitler in order to identify myself with this report.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what I am accusing you of. If you write to the head of the State, "To illustrate the present position in Austria, I append an extract from a report. . . " then what I am suggesting is that that means this report accurately represents the position, as I see it. That is what I am putting to you.

VON PAPEN: No, for another report which you also submitted to the Court shows that I asked Hitler to work against these efforts made by the Czech Government to exert influence on the Freiheitsbund by binding it to ourselves. I am of quite different opinion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you asked Hitler to give 100,000 Reichsmarks to the Freiheitsbund. That is exactly what you are following out in what you have suggested here, that they might be a body who would be a useful point d'appai for you in order to gain an influence with another section of Austrian opinion. I am suggesting to you that the two things are quite consistent. You tell Hitler that they are useful.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you support them with 100,000 Reichsmarks. That is what I am putting to you.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That you were all the time burrowing under one section of Austrian opinion after another in order to work towards the suppression of the freedom of Austria- that is what I am putting to you. I do not think there is any doubt about it.


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VON PAPEN: Sir David, if this report shows anything clearly, it is the fact that, apart from the National Socialists in Austria, there were other groups, namely, the Christian Trade Unions and the Freiheitsbund, who worked politically towards the union of the two countries. And you cannot say I am committing a crime if, as a diplomat who wants to bring about such an aim in an evolutionary way, I co-operate with the interests of these groups.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There was not anything very evolutionary about the Trojan Horse, was there? However, that may be comment. Let us go on to another point.

Did you know Baron Gudenus?

VON PAPEN: No, I did not know him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that he was the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto. Do you remember?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that is shown in my report.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well now, let us just look and see what Baron Gudenus had to say.

Your Lordship will find that on Page 93, and it is 72 to 75 of the German version, Document D-687 which will become GB-507. It is Paragraph 2 (b) and it appears on Page 74, Defendant.

"Baron Gudenus, the closest confidant of the Archduke Otto, writes to. . . "

There is a mistake there, my Lord. The "me" should be "one." " . .. one of my acquaintances on 30 March:

". . . I brought back many gratifying impressions of the progress of our Movement with me from Austria; but I cannot deny that in some respects the Government's policy worries me greatly. Of what use is it that the ringleaders of February and July 1934-or those of them who were caught-are sentenced, if the Government is too weak, too slovenly, or intentionally too tolerant, to prevent 'brown' and 'red' propaganda being carried on privately unhindered in the cinema, in the press, and on the radio, and mainly by State officials or organs of the Fatherland Front, supported and paid by financial and other means which are pouring in bountifully from Germany. What is that learned idealist Schuschnigg actually doing? Does he not notice that Papen and the other 'brown' agents in his own country continually spit into the hand so persistently held out to them? He must not imagine that he can thus maintain and save Austria, as long as Hitler rules in a Germany which is painted brown inside and out. The methods over there have, it is true, become more clever and more careful, but this makes them all the more dangerous."


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That was about 7 months after your arrival.

"Sinister also are the continual differences between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg. . . " and so on.

Now, isn't it correct, Defendant, that anyone, that everyone, even a visiting monarchist agent, knew that these activities were going on with you on the top and the Austrian National Socialist Party working underneath?

Before you answer, it is only fair to look at your own comment on that.

"The difficulties of the internal Austrian situation could hardly be described more graphically than in this letter."

Why did you not say to Hitler, if these were the facts: "Baron Gudenus is talking nonsense. I am carrying out a perfectly honest moral assignment for the normalizing of relations with Austria." Why did you not deny it, if it was not true?

VON PAPEN: It seems to me that this report shows, in the first place, that I passed on to Hitler with complete frankness all the reports which I received, even that of an adherent of the Hapsburg restoration. Obviously to 100 percent...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am suggesting, Defendant, that you passed them on because they were true; you adopted them and passed them on to Hitler because they were true reports; that that was a true picture of the situation. That is what I am suggesting to you. You just tell the Tribunal, were they true or were they not? If they were not true, why did you pass them on without saying they were not true? That is what I am asking you.

VON PAPEN: If you read this report by Baron Gudenus, you will see that he speaks of internal conditions in Austria and of the sinister differences existing between Schuschnigg and Starhemberg, the rivalry between their guards, and the constant underground Republican sentiment.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is 3 lines out of 20. There is a lot more before you come to that part. That is what I am asking you about; the other 17 lines of the report.

VON PAPEN: Sir David, the points which I have just mentioned are proof of the internal weaknesses of the Austrian Government, on which I am reporting. If you mean that I should have explained to Hitler that I was not a "brown" agent, well surely on 26 July we came to a very clear agreement as to under what conditions my work in Austria was to be done. There was no necessity for me to explain that to Hitler in a report. I sent this report for his information only.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your explanation, just look at the next paragraph of your letter. It shows in another way how you were working. Paragraph 3:

"The film 'The Old and the Young King'. . ."-the Tribunal may not remember, but you correct my recollection. That is a film, if I remember rightly, dealing with Friedrich-the relations of Friedrich Wilhelm I and Friedrich the Great. Am I right?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "The film 'The Old and the Young King' was shown here for the first time a few days ago in the presence of Herr Jannings."-That is Emil Jannings, the actor.-'`It provoked enthusiastic demonstrations. The scene where the king stresses the fact that 'French trash and Roman books do not mean anything to Prussia' led to particularly vociferous applause. The police wanted to ban it. Together with Herr Jannings, we explained to them that, should this film be banned, we would take steps to prohibit the showing of all Austrian films in Germany. This had the desired effect. The film-except for the above-mentioned scene, which was expunged-is being shown now and will be shown on the screen at Klagenfurt and Graz within the next few days

"Yesterday I received Jannings and a number of actors from the Burgtheater as my guests. He said he was very satisfied with his success, and we discussed in detail plans for a Bismarck picture for the production of which I recommended Beumelburg to write the script."

That is, you were forcing a film which contained Prussian propaganda to be shown in Austria on the threat of excluding Fraulein Wessely and "Maskerade" and the other Austrian films of that time

from the German market; you were forcing your propaganda on the threat of excluding Austrian films; is that right?

VON PAPEN: Yes, and I will also tell you the reason. I must enlarge your historical knowledge of these things, Sir David. Frederick the Great played a very important part in the relations between Germany and Austria, as you know; and at that time we were trying, in the relationship between our two countries, to clear up the historical inaccuracies which originated in the time of Frederick the Great. For this purpose the famous Austrian historian, Professor Srbik, wrote a big work. The film which we are discussing served the purpose of showing that a great German history is common to both peoples alike. To help the cultural rapprochement of the two countries I insisted that this film should be shown, and this was done.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I have not the slightest doubt about your motives in wanting the film to be shown, Defendant, but what I am asking you is, why you pressed it against the wish of the Austrian authorities by threat of excluding Austrian film production from the German market? Why did you threaten the Austrian authorities in that way?

VON PAPEN: It frequently happened that the Austrian police were afraid that certain films might be made a basis for demonstrations. But after we had talked matters over with the police, and had agreed that certain parts of the film should be cut, they were quite ready to admit it; and of course, I also told them that if we did not reach an agreement, the consequences would be that Germany would send no more films to Austria.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, again I put the point. Do you remember telling the Tribunal that you did not keep up contacts with the NSDAP in Austria? Is that correct?

VON PAPEN: No, it is not correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did keep up contacts?



VON PAPEN: I did not understand.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Intimate contacts? Were your contacts close?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if they were not, will you just turn a page back. It is probably Page 72 of your report. It is the same report.

My Lord, it is Page 93 of Your Lordship's book.

You began that report by saying:

'I have first to report on the development of the local NSDAP:

"On 23 March complete agreement was reached in Krems between Captain Leopold, (Retd.) and Generaldirektor Neubacher. In accordance therewith, Neubacher subordinated himself to Leopold in every way and recognized him as Fuehrer for Austria. As soon as Schattenfroh is released from the concentration camp, he will become deputy leader, while Neubacher, as the closest confidant of Leopold, will be consulted on every important question."

Furthermore, Leopold has nominated somebody else and asked him to be deputy, while:


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"Major General Klupp, (Retd.) will be taken into consultation in strict confidence," and I want to read the last lines: "Furthermore, Leopold expressed the desire that at long last, the continual intrigues against him on the part of emigres living in the Reich-of the type of Frauenfeld and his friends-be stopped."

That is a pretty complete picture of the set-up of the Party in Austria, wasn't it?

VON PAPEN: Well, Sir David, may I call to your attention the fact that this report is dated 4 April 1935, a date previous to the July Agreement, when my interest in these Party affairs can still

be readily understood.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you attach importance to the date, just look at the report of 1 September 1936, which is on Page 33 of Document Book 11, Page 26 of the German book. You remember this is the report which you referred to, and you said: "For the method to be employed (Marschroute) I recommend on the tactical side continued and patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime."

You told the Tribunal that that meant you wanted a change in the officials of the Ministry of the Interior. I am not going to trouble about a statement like that, but just go on for a moment: "The conference on economic relations proposed for the end of October will be a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects.

"In discussion both with Government officials and with leaders of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who take their stand entirely on the Agreement of 11 July, I am trying to direct the next developments so as to aim at corporative representation of the Movement in the Fatherland Front."

Now, it is quite clear, is it not, that you were on 1 September 1936, after the agreement, having discussions with the leaders of the illegal Party, Leopold and Schattenfroh, so may we take it-I don't want to spend time on it-that throughout your time in Austria you were in close and constant touch with the leaders of the Austrian National Socialist Party?

VON PAPEN: No, Sir David, the conference which you just mentioned refers to and is justified by the July Agreement; I have already explained that to the Court yesterday. In the July Agreement Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg promised that members of the National Opposition would be called upon for co-operation. Consequently it was, of course, my duty to be interested in whether


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and to what extent the co-operation of such forces was actually sought by Schuschnigg. That was the subject of this talk with the leaders, and I can state expressly that my contact with the Austrian Party, after the July Agreement, was only in this connection.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, I am not going to go into that further. I have referred the Tribunal to two documents, and there are other references which I need not worry about.

I want you to come now to November 1937. Could you fix as carefully and closely as you can the date of your meeting with the Defendant Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch?

VON PAPEN: Yes, I met the Defendant Seyss-Inquart by accident-that is, not by appointment-at the Olympic Winter Games at Garmisch-Partenkirchen in January 1938.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: January 1938. I just want to collate these dates. You had become very friendly with the Foreign Minister Guido Schmidt, who gave evidence here, had you not?

VON PAPEN: I was on very friendly terms with the Foreign Minister, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you gave him the "Du," although you were 20 years his senior; you had given him the "Du" for some time? You had been on intimate relations? Is that right?

VON PAPEN: I do not think that a friendship can be measured by 20 years' difference in age. I regarded Herr Schmidt, as I have said, as an upright man.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will agree with me that it is unusual for an Ambassador to be on terms with a Foreign Minister, especially one 20 years his junior-not his contemporary- on such terms that he used the familiar "Du" to him. Won't you agree with me that it is a quite unusual form of intimacy between an Ambassador and a Foreign Minister?

VON PAPEN: Sir David, if you had ever been in Austria in your life, you would know that in Austria almost everyone says "Du" to everyone else, and to clear up this incident, may I add the following: On the day of our separation, when I left Austria, I said to Foreign Minister Schmidt, of whom I am very fond, "Dear friend, we have worked together so much, now we can say 'Du' to each other."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, what I am interested in is this: It was in November 1937 that you and Dr. Guido Schmidt first began to discuss the question of Herr Schuschnigg meeting Hitler, was it not?

VON PAPEN: I believe that I discussed this matter not only with Foreign Minister Schmidt but also with Herr Von Schuschnigg himself at that time. After a discussion between them. . .


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment; will you answer my question? You discussed with Schmidt-you heard Dr. Schmidt give his evidence that the Defendant Goering had told him with great frankness, as the Defendant Goering said he told everyone else and has told this Court, that he was out for the union of Germany and Austria by any means and at all costs. You heard Dr. Schmidt say that Goering had told him that that was his view, and I say, in all fairness, it is perfectly consistent. It is the view he has expressed here and apparently to a lot of other people. Do you remember that Dr. Schmidt said that? You can take that from me.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have heard that the Defendant Goering said that, not only to Dr. Schmidt, but to Mussolini and to the High Tribunal, and I think to several other people. Had he never said it to you?

VON PAPEN: No, Sir David. With regard to the Austrian. ..

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that it was his view?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn't know that was Goering's view?

VON PAPEN: Please let me say something. Of course, I knew that Goering's wish was to bring about a union of the two States, and I myself was present at the talk with Mussolini.

Please consider, however, that at that time Herr Goering was not competent to decide foreign policy. The question of what our policy in Austria should be had been agreed upon between Hitler and myself exclusively and I do not remember discussing it with Marshal Goering in the years between 1936 and 1938.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I am dealing with November 1937, at the moment, and 3 months later the Defendant Goering was very competent in foreign politics in the Austrian question, as you, who listened to the accounts of his telephone conversations, must know.

I just want you to take the dates as we have got them now. Goering had told Schmidt his views; you and Schmidt were discussing this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. In January you had a political discussion with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch.

I am one date out of order. On 11 November, as Mr. Dodd put to Dr. Seyss-Inquart, he had written a letter to Dr. Jury saying, "I don't think anything will happen this year, but the developments will take place in the spring." Then, after that letter, he sees you


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at Garmisch in January, and in February you finally arrange this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Didn't you know very well that the whole object of the meeting was to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to the Reich's wishes, the appointment of Seyss-Inquart, a general political amnesty which would release all the members of the Nazi Party in Austria and put them at the disposal of their leaders, and a declaration of equal rights for the Party? Didn't you know that the whole object of the meeting was to get Herr Schuschnigg to agree to these terms so that you would have the Austrian National Socialist Party unfettered and free to work for Germany's interests in Austria?

VON PAPEN: In my talk with Dr. Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch-Partenkirchen we discussed the necessity of making the Austrian Nazi Party independent, that is, under all circumstances removing it from the influence of the Reich, in the form agreed upon in the July Agreement, and with the aim that the way should be paved for a union of our two countries, and that that aim should be pursued from the Austrian side in terms of foreign policy, and not by the Reich.

When I met Seyss-Inquart in Garmisch no mention was ever made of this meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg. I was at that time not in a position to know whether such a talk would ever take place. That was not decided until 5 February, as you will recall. In other words, we discussed only the perfectly general question of how we could get nearer to our goal.

May I further recall to your memory that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had received an official commission from the Federal Chancellor to investigate all existing possibilities of incorporating the National Opposition, that is, the Austrian National Socialist Party, into Schuschnigg's political program. That was his official mission, so that after all I had a right to discuss these things with him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Wasn't Dr. Rainer-the witness that the Tribunal has seen-wasn't he present at the Garmisch meeting too?

VON PAPEN: That seems to have been the case, Sir David; I do not remember it any more. Seyss-Inquart has told me that it is possible that Dr. Rainer joined us on a walk. I personally do not remember. I did not carry on any political discussion with Rainer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, you have given your explanation as of the turn of the year. I just want to remind you of one other point. You were very well aware of the Von Blomberg


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and Von Fritsch crisis in the Army, were you not? I don't want to go into disagreeable details again, because it is not at present before the Tribunal, but you knew that that crisis had arisen?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you will see the importance of this. General Von Fritsch had been at the War Academy with you, had he not?

VON PAPEN: Yes, quite right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was an old friend, and you knew, as I think everyone who has mentioned his name in this Court has said, that General Von Fritsch was a man of the highest character and that the sort of charge that was brought against him was one which anyone who knew him would regard with ridicule if it wasn't so tragic, and they would regard it with contempt? That was your view?

VON PAPEN: Absolutely.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you had a pretty good

idea, had you not, apart from the treatment of Field Marshal Von Blomberg, that Von Fritsch had been the subject of a trumpedup charge in order to prevent him becoming head of the Armed Forces? You knew that, didn't you?

VON PAPEN: In any case, that became clear to me later, when I learned of the circumstances.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE No, no, that is not the important thing, Defendant, your state of mind on 5 February 1938. You knew by then that the Nazi clique in the Government had brought a framed-up charge against a man whom you regarded as the soul of honor, did you not?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now with that knowledge, on 5 February, after you see Hitler, you tell him about the fact that Schuschnigg may come, and he jumps to it at once. He says, "Go and get Schuschnigg," doesn't he? He was quite bored, if I may put it that way, with what you had to say up to that point. As soon as you say there is a chance of a meeting with Schuschnigg, Hitler seizes it like a trout to a May fly, doesn't he, or rather, like a lion to the kill; that is right, isn't it?

VON PAPEN: Yes, Sir David. I described to the Court the impression made on me by events in Berlin and by my own dismissal on 4 February. Do you think it is surprising that I now tried, just because I was afraid another course would be adopted, to bring about this long-desired discussion between the two chiefs of state which I hoped would clear up the differences and prevent


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the adoption of a radical course? I told Foreign Minister Schmidt and Chancellor Schuschnigg that, when I asked them both to take part in a discussion to clear up matters if they could possibly do so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I am not going to go through the circumstances of the meeting of 12 February, because I went through them with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the Court is well aware of them.

I want to ask you this one question, and I do ask you to consider it carefully because the question of your own veracity may depend on it.

Are you now saying that there was no pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg at that interview?

VON PAPEN: Sir David, I never made such a statement-you know that yourself, because it is in my reports; I myself said that pressure was exerted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL- FYFE: What I am asking you is this, and please let me make it quite clear because the Court have heard the evidence of your friend Dr. Schmidt and a lot of other evidence. I only want to ask you the one question, and please get it clear.

Do you now, on this day, say that pressure was not put on Chancellor Schuschnigg to make him agree to the terms of 12 February? That is the one question I want to ask you, and I give you the chance of answering. What do you say today? Was or was not pressure put on Herr Schuschnigg?

VON PAPEN: Yes; I never denied it. I do not understand why you ask me. I never denied it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Ribbentrop denied it quite strongly, but we won't go into that.

Now, one other question and then I am finished with Austria.

Did you arrange a meeting between Hitler and Cardinal Innitzer,

VON PAPEN: Yes, I did; and that was...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange that the leaders of the Church and the diplomatic corps, apart from the French and British representatives, should be present at Hitler's entry into Vienna?

VON PAPEN: As for the leaders of the Church, it is not customary for them to be present at parades, and I certainly did not suggest it. As to the diplomats...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you arrange for the diplomatic corps to be present?


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VON PAPEN: It is possible that some of my diplomatic colleagues asked me if they could attend this ceremony, and I said that of course they could attend; why should they not?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am not going to argue about the way you put it.

My Lord, I have now finished with Austria. I have three very minor matters which I hope will take a short time, but this might be a convenient period in which to recess.


[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, are the Tribunal to take it that broadly you were against the anti-Semitic movement and propaganda?

VON PAPEN: On the contrary, it was my aim and my desire, and it constituted the entire program of my work, to contribute as far as possible to a union between the two countries, because that was the great wish of the German nation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not think you can have understood my question. Let me repeat it. I am now coming to the Jews.

VON PAPEN: Oh, the Jews?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, let me repeat it again. Are the Tribunal to take it that broadly you were against anti-Semitic action and propaganda?

VON PAPEN: Yes; I have already told the High Tribunal just what my attitude in principle was toward the racial question and toward the question of the elimination of foreign influence in certain cultural aspects of public life. These are two entirely different questions, however.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: yes, I appreciate that. Now, will you look at Document 3319-PS, which is Exhibit GB-287?

My Lord, it begins at Page 48 of Document Book lla. It is on Pages 44 and 45 of the German book.

The part I want you to refer to is on Pages 58 and 59. This, Defendant, is from a confidential report of the work session of the consultants on Jewish questions of the German missions in Europe, on 3 and 4 April 1944. I want you just to look at Page 44, I think, of the German version, Page 58 of the English, at the contribution to this discussion of a certain Herr Posemann, from Turkey. Was he from your staff? If you would not mind, just say "yes" or "no," because it must go to a short end. . .


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VON PAPEN: May I tell you just who Herr Posemann was?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said, if you would tell me, was he a member of the Embassy staff, and if not, what was he; that is what I want to know.

VON PAPEN: No; certainly not. Herr Posemann was a German bookseller who had settled in Ankara. He was certainly not a member of my Embassy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, at any rate, he was a consultant of the German Foreign Office for this discussion. Now, just listen to what he says:

"Early last year the Turkish Government struck a blow at Jewry in connection with an attempt to solve the minorities problem. Very drastic measures were taken to carry out this action. Suspicions on the part of Allied circles that purely anti-Jewish measures were concerned were countered by Turkey with references to simultaneous measures taken against the minorities. At any rate, Turkey abandoned further measures to find a solution of the minorities problem and therewith of the Jewish problem. For this reason it is impossible to continue to practice anti-Jewish propaganda under our direction at the present moment, as it is undesirable and would be a burden on Turkey's present foreign policy. There are no anti-Jewish publications in Turkey, apart from caricatures and comic books about Jews. The first signs of realization of the extent of international Jewish domination are evident in the translation of the Protocol of the Elders of Zion and of Ford's book, The International Jew. The sale and distribution of these brochures have been promoted by the Embassy. For the time being, work is possible only within this narrow range since, as was already emphasized, an anti-Jewish propaganda obviously inspired by Germany might cause us unfavorable political complications."

Now, do you believe in the Protocol of the Elders of Zion? Do you believe it is a correct and authentic work?

VON PAPEN: Not at all, no.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why was the marketing of these brochures being promoted by the Embassy?

VON PAPEN: Perhaps I may give the Tribunal a very brief explanation on the whole connection of this meeting. The meeting had been called by the Foreign Office, and was to be attended by experts from the embassies and legations who had been specifically employed to deal with the Jewish problem. In my Embassy


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there was no such expert, as I always refused to have one. For this reason the Party had of its own accord instructed the bookseller Herr Posemann to deal with this problem, and had delegated him to attend this conference.

If Herr Posemann here sets forth that the Embassy circulated the propaganda brochures which are mentioned here, then he is gravely mistaken. Firstly, the Turkish Government would never have tolerated the circulation of such material, and secondly, you, Sir David, can convince yourself today that all these brochures are still lying in the basement of my Embassy at Ankara.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that this statement made at the Foreign Office meeting, you say, is wrong?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you had nothing to do with that; that is your answer? I want to ask you one or two things about the Catholic Church. You remember the Fulda Declaration of the Bishops?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right, is it not? That was made and based on an assurance which Hitler gave to the Church of his good intentions, on 23 March 1933? Do you remember Hitler's making a statement like that?

VON PAPEN: Not only on the 23d, but also in the Government declaration Hitler expressly stated his view that every policy must be based on both the Christian denominations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that in turn was the result, at least in part, of a statement of yours at a Cabinet meeting on 15 March 1933, when you stressed the importance of incorporating political Catholicism into the new State; that is a correct and factual statement, is it not? That is the way the thing works out?

VON PAPEN: Completely, Sir David.


VON PAPEN: I made every effort to induce Hitler to establish this Christian basis of his policy firmly by means of solemn engagements; and I think I have already explained to the High Tribunal that I really made every effort to carry through this program.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now let me ask you to look once again at Document 11, Page 96; Page 78 of the German version, which is Document 2248-PS. It is your report to Hitler of 27 July 1935. Now in that report you use these words: "...the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany..."


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My Lord, it is on Page 99 of the English text and it is Page 86 of the German text. My Lord, it is the first paragraph, Page 99: "Cultural problems have a special significance. The way in which Germany deals with her political and religious difficulties, the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without weakening the Christian foundations of Germany will not only have a decisive reaction on England or Catholic Poland. We may rather say that the solution of the German-Austrian question stands or falls with it."

Now, what I want you to bear in mind: This is your account to Hitler in July 1935, over 2 years after the Concordat: "....the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany. . ." Now your counsel quoted one passage of His Holiness the Pope's allocution, and I would just like you to look and tell the Tribunal whether you agree with the next passage, which occurs after the bit quoted by Dr. Kubuschok. My Lord, this is a new document-no, My Lord, I am sorry. It is an old exhibit. It is Document 3268-PS, which is Exhibit USA-356. Your Lordship remembers that Dr. Kubuschok quoted a portion, in his document book, of the Pope's allocution. My Lord, I have some extra copies.

Now after the bit which Dr. Kubuschok quoted as to the Concordat having prevented worse evils, His Holiness goes on to say: "The struggle against the Church did, in fact, become more and more embittered: the disbanding of Catholic organizations; the progressive suppression of the flourishing Catholic schools, both public and private; the enforced weaning of youth from family and Church; the pressure brought to bear on the conscience of the citizens, and especially of civil servants; the systematic defamation, by means of clever, closely organized propaganda, of the Church, the clergy, the faithful, and of the Church's institutions, teaching, and history; the closing, disbanding, and confiscation of religious houses and other ecclesiastical institutions; the complete suppression of the Catholic press and publishing houses."

Do you agree with His Holiness that that is a correct description of the action of the German Reich against the Catholic Church?

VON PAPEN: Completely.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you also to look at the "Mit Brennender Sorge," which is Document 3280-PS.

Your Lordship will find it at Page 40 of Document Book 11-I am sorry, My Lord, it is Page 47. I said 40. It is 40 of the German text.


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Now, if you notice, that is quite early, on 14 March 1937, 4 years after the Concordat, and he says in the second sentence at the beginning:

"It discloses intrigues which from the first had no other aim than a war of extermination. In the furrows in which we had labored to sow the seeds of true peace, others-like the enemy in Holy Scripture-sowed the tares of suspicion, discord, hatred, calumny, of secret and open basic hostility to Christ and His Church, fed from a thousand different sources and employing every available means. They, and they only, along with their silent or vocal protectors are responsible for the fact that on the horizon of Germany there is now to be seen, not the rainbow of peace, but the threatening stormcloud of destructive religious wars."

Now, Defendant, what I want you to tell the Tribunal-do you agree with that?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you agree with these statements of the head of the Church, how could you possibly write to Hitler, 2 years after the Concordat, in July 1935, that he had "eliminated political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundations of Germany"? It was absolutely wrong, wasn't it, that Hitler and the Nazis had not touched the Christian foundations of Germany? They had uprooted them and were in process of destroying them?

VON PAPEN: Sir David, you are confusing two completely different things, political Catholicism...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I don't want to interrupt you, but I have made that point quite clear. The point I am putting to you is not the elimination of political Catholicism. I am not, for the moment, dealing with the relation between you and Monsignor Kaas. What I am dealing with is your other statement, that it had been done without touching the Christian foundations of Germany. What I am putting to you is what His Holiness is saying, that the Christian foundations of Germany were being destroyed. I don't mind, for the moment, about the views that Monsignor Kaas had of you or you had of Monsignor Kaas. I know what they are.

VON PAPEN: Let me explain these things to you. The struggle against the Church and its institutions, against which His Holiness the Pope inveighs in his encyclicals in the years 1937 and 1945, and in which he recognized the intensification of the situation obtaining during the war-all of these things were an attack on the Christian foundations of Germany, an attack which I always condemned most


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strongly. But this has no connection at all with the elimination of so-called political Catholicism for which I hoped and which I demanded. These are two completely different things. Perhaps it is hard for you to understand, since you are not familiar with circumstances in Germany.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Please believe, Defendant, that I have spent a great deal of time in pursuing the troubles between you and Monsignor Kaas. I am not going to bring them out before the Tribunal because they are not important. I appreciate and agree-not as well as you do, but I appreciate the position of political Catholicism and I am not asking you about that. I am asking you about your statement. Why did you say to Hitler that he had not touched the Christian foundations of Germany? That is what I want to know. You must have known in 1935 that that wasn't true?

VON PAPEN: But, Sir David, that is a complete distortion of the contents of this report. I am telling Hitler that the Christian foundations of Germany must not be weakened and that may still be read in the report today: "Political Catholicism must be eliminated without weakening the Christian foundations of Germany."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you appreciate how it begins. You say ". . . that a clever hand which eliminates it without touching..." Just let me remind you: Didn't you say, in your interrogation, that your trouble-part of your trouble in the summer of 1934, before you made the Marburg speech, was due to the nonfulfillment of the Concordat, that after it had been signed, with the consent of Hitler, ". . . he treated it just as a scrap of paper and I couldn't do anything"? Then there was the persecution of the Churches and the Jews at the same time. That was late in 1933 and in 1934. Is that your view in 1934, ". .. that there had not only been treating of the Concordat as a scrap of paper but persecution of both the Churches and the Jews"?

VON PAPEN: I do not know which document you are quoting from, Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is your interrogation on the morning of 19 September 1945.

VON PAPEN: Yes, of course. When I delivered the Marburg speech, I believed that the State was violating all these things; otherwise, I would not have made the speech. But in this speech, Sir David, I again expressly emphasized the fact that no European occidental state can exist without a Christian foundation, and that by disregarding our Christian basis we would cut ourselves off from the group of Christian peoples and from our mission in Europe.


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I could scarcely say it more clearly than that. And perhaps I can tell you something else on the subject of political Catholicism. You have . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do as you want to. I especially want to avoid burdening the Tribunal with the exchanges between you and Monsignor Kaas, because both of you used harsh language and it might not sound very good if I repeated it now. If you want to go into it, do, but don't open it up unless you must.

VON PAPEN: I regard this accusation which you are making against me as one of the most tremendous for it violates my whole conception.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you remember you told the Tribunal just before the adjournment that you had introduced Cardinal Innitzer to Hitler when you went into Austria. You remember that after the statement to which Dr. Kubuschok has referred, that Cardinal Innitzer in a broadcast from Rome made it clear that he was only accepting the Nazi rule of Austria on certain conditions. Do you remember that?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I would just like to see what happened to Cardinal Innitzer.

This is a new document, My Lord, D-903, which becomes GB-508. My Lord, this is a statement in the form of an affidavit from a priest, Dr. Weihbacher, which I only got from Vienna on 7 June.

You will see that this priest-well, at any rate I take it he is a priest; he is the archbishop's secretary in the cathedral chapter. Let's just look at it.

"On 8 October 1938"-that is a little over 6 months after you had arranged for Cardinal Innitzer to meet Hitler-"a serious attack was made by youthful demonstrators on the archbishop's palace in Vienna. I was present during the attack and can therefore describe it from my own experience." Then he describes how they smashed window panes, broke in the gate. The priests took the archbishop into an inner room and hid him there. They took the cardinal to safety in the personalia archive and locked the iron door behind him, and:

". . . then we two priests, seeing ourselves opposed by a crowd of invaders, personally took up a stand at the entrance to the cardinal's house chapel in order to prevent any destruction from being wrought there at least."

My Lord, this is about 10 lines from the foot of the page.

"Shortly after we had reached the chapel, the invaders stormed into the cardinal's rooms adjoining the chapel. As soon as


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they reached the door we warded them off. Pieces of wood came flying into the chapel; I received a push that knocked me over; but we managed to prevent them from entering the chapel. The demonstrators were youths aged from 14 to 25 and numbering about a hundred. After we had warded off the first troop, we opened up the Tabernacle and consumed the consecrated wafers so as to prevent the Most Holy from being desecrated. But new invaders were already storming in; and we warded them off. In the meantime an indescribable orgy of destruction was going on in the remaining

rooms among all the fittings. With the brass rods holding the carpet in place on the staircase, the youths destroyed tables and chairs, candelabras and valuable paintings, and in particular all the crucifixes."

Then it describes the plate-glass doors and so on, and there was an alarm when the cardinal was discovered. This priest himself was dragged from the chapel by about six people and dragged across the anteroom to the window with shouts of "We'll throw the dog out of the window."

And then, eventually, the police came, and you will notice their idea of what was proper reparation.

"Then a lieutenant colonel of police arrived and apologized. He was followed by a representative of the Gestapo who expressed his regret that the police had not been very active in their intervention.

"Meanwhile other demonstrators attacked the cathedral rector's house at 3 Stephansplatz where they threw the cathedral curate Krawarik out of the window into the yard. This priest lay in hospital until February with both thighs fractured."

Now I ask you to look at the penultimate paragraph:

"That the demonstration was not the result of youthful wantonness or embitterment, but a well-laid plan known to official quarters, is obvious from the speech of Gauleiter Burckel who, on 13 October on the Heldenplatz, in the basest possible manner represented the cardinal as guilty."

Now, Herr Von Papen, you had a great responsibility in relation to Cardinal Innitzer, had you not? You had introduced him to Hitler. You must have learned from the ramifications and communications of the Catholic Church of this attack on the cardinal's house 6 months after the Anschluss, did you not? You must have learned of this.

VON PAPER: I heard about it later, of course.


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SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What protest did you make when you heard of this disgraceful attack on the principles of the Church, the throwing of the cathedral curate out of the window and breaking both his thighs, the desecration of the chapel, the breaking of crucifixes? What protest did you make about it?

VON PAPEN: I should like to remind you, Sir David, that I had resigned from office more than 6 months before and no longer had anything whatsoever to do with these matters. Naturally the details of the incident were in the highest degree regrettable and, indeed, amounted to criminal attacks; but the details did not appear in the German press, so that I am probably seeing them for the first time in this form here. But let me add...

THE PRESIDENT: But, Defendant, you haven't answered the question. The question was: What complaint did you make about it?

VON PAPEN: I made no protest, for I was no longer in an official position at the time. I was a private citizen, and all I learned officially about these things was what the German papers were allowed to publish.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, Defendant, surely you have told us that you were one of the leading Catholic laymen in Germany. You are not going to tell the Tribunal that in the Catholic Church it wasn't known to every bishop in Germany and probably to every parish priest that this abominable and sacrilegious insult had been offered to a prince of the Church in his own house in Vienna. Surely it would permeate through the Church in a few days.

VON PAPEN: That is quite possible, Sir David; but would you expect me, a private citizen, to do anything? What could I do? The Tribunal did not take notice of the discussion which I brought about between Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler. You mentioned that for the first time here today.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is exactly why I am putting this incident to you, that you were responsible for bringing about the meeting between Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler in March of 1938. When His Eminence is attacked in October, I should have thought- it is not for me to express my thoughts-that you might have taken the trouble to protest to Hitler, and all that you do is to take another job under Hitler within 6 months, in April 1936.

What I am asking you is why you didn't make a protest. You could have written to Hitler. The Defendant Goering has expressed his great religious interests. A number of the other defendants have said that they had great religious sympathies. Why couldn't you have got in touch with them?


19 June 46

VON PAPEN: Because in autumn 1938 I retired from political life; I was living in the country and was no longer taking any active interest in politics. But perhaps I may say just why I was responsible for promoting a meeting with Cardinal Innitzer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that is not the point that I am interested in at the moment, the meeting on 15 March. I am interested in the fact that this took place, that you knew of it, and made no protest.

Now I am going to come to another point. Dr. Kubuschok can raise it later on, if he wants.

Defendant, you have heard a number of your codefendants giving evidence and saying that they didn't know of the terrible repressive measures that were taking place in Germany. You knew very well about these repressive measures, did you not? You knew about the action of the Gestapo, the concentration camps, and later you knew about the elimination of the Jews, did you not?

VON PAPEN: I only knew this much, that in the years 1933 and 1934 political opponents were interned in the concentration camps. I very frequently protested against the methods used in concentration camps. In various cases I liberated people from these camps; but at that time I was quite unaware that murders had even been committed in them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let me take that up. It is good to get down to a concrete instance.


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that at the beginning of 1935 your secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was ordered to return from Vienna to Berlin for examination by the Gestapo. Do you remember that?

VON PAPEN: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you remember that he refused to go and he sent you a detailed report of his reasons for not going? Do you remember that?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let us look at that together very shortly.

My Lord, that is Document D-685, which would become Exhibit GB-509; Your Lordship will find it at Page 87 of Document Book 11, and it is at Page 60 of the German version.

Now, at Page 87 there is Herr Von Tschirschsky's own letter to you, in which he says, at the end of the second paragraph: "I am


19 June 46

not in a position... to comply with the Gestapo demand to report to Berlin for interrogation."

And then he says that-to quote his own words-that he has been influenced only by the "human, understandable desire to live" and then he sends a report, he encloses a report, to you of what had happened to him on 30 June which got him into the bad books of the Gestapo.

Do you remember that?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And summarizing the beginning of it, which would be almost humorous if it did not show such a dreadful state of affairs, your secretary, Herr Von Tschirschsky, was arrested simultaneously by two competing groups of Reich policemen, I think the Criminal Police and the Gestapo, and there was a severe danger of Herr Von Tschirschsky and some of the police being shot before they could decide who was to take him into custody. But I want you to come to when he is taken into custody.

My Lord, it is at Page 89, and it is at the end of Page 65 of the German version, Defendant.

You see, this is after, I think, the Gestapo had won the internecine struggle and it got possession of the body of Herr Von Tschirschsky, and then he says, just toward the end-My Lord, it is the middle of Page 89.

He is told the other police are following the Gestapo and he says:

". . . we went to the Gestapo building in the Prinz AlbrechtStrasse and through a courtyard to a back entrance. There was another exchange of words between the two groups of Criminal Police. I again joined in this debate and suggested as a way of clearing up the misunderstanding that a man from each of the groups should see some higher authority in the building and let him decide what should be done. There would still be three Criminal Police officials and four SS men available to guard me and the other two gentlemen. This course was adopted; and eventually they came back and explained that the misunderstanding was now cleared up and we could be taken away. Whereupon we were taken by three SS men, not accompanied by the Criminal Police officials, on a lengthy trip through the building into the basement. There we were handed over without comment and were ordered by the SS men on duty there to go and sit on a bench against the wall, in the passage. We were then forbidden to talk to each other. I spent a few hours like this sitting on the bench. It would make too long a story to give further details of the


19 June 46

events which took place during this time. I will therefore restrict myself to the case of the shooting of a well-known personality who was publicly stated to have committed suicide.

"The person in question was brought in under the escort of three SS men and led past us into a cell running parallel to our corridor. The leader of the detachment was an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, short, dark, and carrying an Army pistol in his hand. I heard the command 'Guard the door!' The door leading from our corridor into the other one was shut. Five shots were fired and immediately after the shots the Hauptsturmfuehrer came out of the door with the still smoking pistol in his hand, muttering under his breath, 'That swine is settled.' Feverish excitement reigned all around; cries and shrieks of terror were heard from the cells. One of the SS men on duty, a comparative youngster, was so excited that he apparently lost all consciousness of the entire situation and informed me, illustrating his remarks with his fingers, that the person concerned had been liquidated by means of three shots in the temple and two in the back of the head."

You had a pretty good idea of SS and Gestapo methods after Herr Von Tschirschsky had given you that report, hadn't you?

VON PAPEN: Yes, and you can also see that this report...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell us, before we leave that elevating extract which I have just read, who was the well-known person who was supposed to have committed suicide and who was shot with three shots in the temple and two in the back of the head. Who was it?

VON PAPEN: I cannot tell you. I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you mean to say that Herr Von Tschirschsky was on your staff for several months afterwards and he never told you who this was?

VON PAPEN: I do not recall, Sir David, that he discussed this matter with me; and in any case I may have forgotten it. In any event one of the personalities who died on 30 June.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just pause. You say you might have forgotten. Do you mean that dreadful occurrences like this were so familiar to you that you cannot remember the account of the actual shooting of a supposed suicide who was a prominent person?

Have another think. Cannot you tell the Tribunal who this unfortunate man was?


19 June 46

VON PAPEN: If I remembered that, I would willingly tell you. I have no reason to conceal the information.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let the Tribunal see how you passed this on to Hitler. You believed, did you not, that Herr Von Tschirschsky was telling the truth? You said so. You believed he was telling the truth, didn't you?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at page . . .

My Lord, it is Page 86 of the English version; and, Defendant, it is 58 of the German book, Page 58.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are you going to investigate the facts as to what happened to the man who made this report?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes, I will clear that up, I am so sorry.

Defendant, just before we come to what happened when he made the report, Herr Von Tschirschsky himself was-I think he went to a concentration camp and had his head shaved and then eventually after a certain period he was released and rejoined your service and was in your service up until February of 1935. Is not that so, Defendant?

VON PAPEN: Yes, that is quite correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord. That takes up the story until we come to February 1935. He is then asked to report to the Gestapo and then this correspondence takes place.

Now, you see that in your letter to Hitler of 5 February, which is Document D-684, Exhibit GB-510, you say:

"As already reported yesterday by telegram, I have passed on to Herr Von Tschirschsky the order of 2d instant, repeating the demand that he appear on the date fixed by the Gestapo, 5 February.

"He then announced to me officially that he would not comply with this order as he was convinced that he would be killed in one way or another. He will give all his reasons for this refusal in a report which I will submit as soon as I receive it.

"Yesterday I finally relieved Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I had already suspended for the duration of the proceedings, of his post. It goes without saying that I shall break off all connections of an official nature as soon as the files and such have been handed over tomorrow."


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Then you say you telegraphed the Defendant Von Neurath and you had given Herr Von Tschirschsky sick leave. Then just look at the last paragraph.

"After I had repeatedly asked that Herr Von Tschirschsky be given a chance to clear himself before a regular judge of the

charges laid against him, I am naturally exceedingly sorry that the affair is now ending thus. I left nothing undone to induce Herr Von Tschirschsky to take the course indicated to him of submitting to interrogation by the Gestapo."

Defendant, is that right, that you left nothing undone to get this man in your staff sent to his death to be murdered by the Gestapo?

VON PAPEN: I think it would be fair, Sir David, to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the other letters which show that I asked Hitler not only once, but repeatedly, to have the matter of Tschirschsky investigated by means of a regular trial.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is quite true and it was referred to in that letter.

VON PAPEN: Yes, of course, but please let me finish...


VON PAPEN: When this proposal was turned down and the Fuehrer would not agree to have a regular trial, he, Hitler, let me know that he would use his personal influence, and that he would assume personal responsibility that nothing would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky if he was investigated by the Gestapo. You will also find that in these letters. The Fuehrer promised him exceptional immunity if he would allow himself to be interrogated by the Gestapo. Therefore, after the suggestion for a regular trial had been turned down and Hitler had promised that nothing would happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky, I asked Herr Von Tschirschsky to submit to the investigation, as the charges made against him had to be cleared up somehow. But I believe . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you turn back to your letter of 31 January, which you will find...

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think you should read the whole of this letter which you have just been on, 5 February, at some stage.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will. My Lord, I am so sorry. My Lord, I do not want to omit anything; but I am, of course, trying to shorten the matter; but I will read anything Your Lordship wants.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ought to be in possession of the whole letter. You stopped at the word "courier," in the middle, with reference to reporting.


19 June 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. With reference to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian Government:

"With regard to reporting his dismissal to the Austrian Government, I am afraid that if I dismiss him abruptly tomorrow, the matter will become the theme of public discussion. I think this scandal should be avoided and I have therefore given Herr Von Tschirschsky sick leave in the meantime, as far as the public is concerned. I shall report his dismissal later.

"I shall return to the Tschirschsky affair and its connections with other current Gestapo questions in Vienna later, in a detailed report."

My Lord, I am grateful.

THE PRESIDENT: You left off after the word "Gestapo" in the next paragraph.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will read the whole thing again. "After I had repeatedly asked..."

THE PRESIDENT: No, you read that down to "Gestapo," but you did not go on with the rest.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: "But if he persists in his resolve to avoid this interrogation, even though he knows that this means social and material ruin for himself and his family, and as he has given me his word that he will do nothing while an émigré which would be harmful to the Fuehrer and to the country, I can only add my wish that everything should be avoided which could turn this affair into an open scandal."

I am grateful, My Lord.

Now, Defendant, you had already said to Hitler on 31 January, which was 5 days before that-Page 84, My Lord, and the foot of Page 55 and the beginning of 56 of the German book:

"Herr Von Tschirschsky, whom I have, incidentally, for the time being relieved of his duties, has now learned from several sources which he-and I myself as well, unfortunately-regards as authentic, that some persons belonging to the Gestapo have for some considerable time been planning to liquidate him."

My Lord, that will be Document D-683, Exhibit GB-511.

You believed that it was authentic on 31 January that the Gestapo wished to neutralize him. On 5 February, in the part that the Tribunal just asked me to read, you say it will be the ruin of his social and material position for himself and his family, but if


19 June 46

the thing is kept quiet, your wish is that everything be done to avoid a scandal.

Now, Defendant...

VON PAPEN: My wish was first of all that everything possible should be done to have the matter cleared by means of a public trial.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was your first wish, but you very soon gave that up.

VON PAPEN: Just a moment, please. After Hitler had refused to agree to my wish, and after he had determined that Von Tschirschsky would enjoy the personal protection of Hitler during his investigation by the Gestapo-that is, if the head of the State says "I will be responsible for the fact that nothing will happen to Herr Von Tschirschsky!" then you will allow that naturally the only course of action open to me is to say to Herr Von Tschirschsky, "Take this course and let them interrogate you; for after all you have to clear yourself of the suspicion resting on you."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, let me remind you that there is not a word in your letter of 5 February about any promise from Hitler to give an indemnity to Herr Von Tschirschsky. All that you are saying is that he will disappear into disgrace. There is nothing in any other letter either.

VON PAPEN: Yes. It is in one of Tschirschsky's reports. I cannot find it at the moment.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you can find anything about an indemnity, I can only tell you that I have not been able to find it in any of your letters.

VON PAPEN: But it is there.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the defendant could look for this document at the recess, at 1 o'clock.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, very well. My Lord, if there is such a document, I am very sorry; I don't know about it.

Yes, My Lord; I am sorry. I think I have got the reference. On Page 91, My Lord. It is not in the defendant's letter, but there is a reference in Herr Von Tschirschsky's report. On Page 91, My Lord. Page 69 It says:

"In conclusion-the reason why I feel myself under no obligation either to appear before the Gestapo or to return to the Reich at all, in spite of the extraordinary protection promised me by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor-I make the following declaration:


19 June 46

"During the period of my activities in Berlin, information had already frequently reached me to the effect that there existed in the Reich a terror organization which had sworn the oath of mutual allegiance in life and death. It is expressly pointed out to men who are or who may be accepted into this brotherhood that they are under an obligation to submit to the secret court and that they are in duty bound when carrying out their tasks to feel that they belong in a high degree to the brotherhood and only in a smaller degree to Adolf Hitler. I could not have believed this monstrous thing, had I not been informed of it about 6 months previously by a man in the Reich-I wish to stress this particularly-who is not opposed to the Third Reich, but quite the opposite, a man who in his innermost convictions believes in Adolf Hitler's mission, a Reich-German and a National Socialist of many years' standing, who himself at one time was to be asked to join this brotherhood but who was able to withdraw from it cleverly. This man has assured me of his willingness publicly to announce the names which he mentioned to me of members of this brotherhood, or to swear an affidavit to this effect in case these people should be already dead. He must only be assured that this terrorist brotherhood is no longer active, especially as there are persons belonging to this brotherhood who are among those most trusted by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor."

I am sorry; I knew there was nothing in the letters from the defendant, but I had forgotten that there was this passage in the letter.

Now, that was Von Tschirschsky. You told us that Baron von Ketteler was murdered at the end of your time in Vienna. You remember Baron van Ketteler's father was murdered, if my memory is right, and that caused the German expedition against the Boxers in China. That is the family the gentlemen belonged to, is it not?


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the effect of this, the murder of Von Ketteler, on you after the experience with Von Tschirschsky was that you were ready to take new employment under the Nazi Government in Turkey.

There is just one other point that I want to put to you.

VON PAPEN: May I add just a few remarks on this point? I told the Court...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Herr Von Papen, I will finish on that because I think we have the other reference to Marchionini's affidavit, and then you can make all the other remarks you like.


19 June 46

Why didn't you after this series of murders which had gone on over a period of 4 years, why didn't you break with these people and stand up like General Yorck or any other people that you may think of from history, stand up for your own views and oppose these murderers? Why didn't you do it?

Now you can give your explanation.

VOW PAPEN: Very well. You can see that I submitted Von Tschirschsky's report on these murders to Hitler, in all its details, but what you do not know is the fact that I myself frequently told Hitler that such a regime could not possibly last; and if you ask me, Sir David, why despite everything I remained in the service of the Reich, then I can say only that on 30 June I personally broke off the relations into which we had entered on 30 January. From that day onward I did my duty-my duty to Germany, if you wish to know. I can understand very well, Sir David, that after all the things we know today, after the millions of murders which have taken place, you consider the German people a nation of criminals, and that you cannot understand that this nation has its patriots as well I did these things in order to serve my country, and I should like to add, Sir David, that up to the time of the Munich Agreement, and even up to the time of the Polish campaign, even the major powers tried, although they knew everything that was going on in Germany, to work with this Germany.

Why do you wish to reproach a patriotic German with acting likewise, and with hoping likewise, for the same thing for which all the major powers hoped?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The major powers had not had their servants murdered, one after the other, and were not close to Hitler like you. What I am putting to you is that the only reason that could have kept you in the service of the Nazi Government when you knew of all these crimes was that you sympathized and wanted to carry on with the Nazis' work. That is what I am putting to you-that you had this express knowledge; you had seen your own friends, your own servants, murdered around you. You had the detailed knowledge of it, and the only reason that could have led you on and made you take one job after another from the Nazis was that you sympathized with their work. That is what I am putting against you, Herr Von Papen.

VON PAPEN: That, Sir David, is perhaps your opinion; my opinion is that I am responsible only to my conscience and to the German people for my decision to work for my fatherland; and I shall accept their verdict.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have finished.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.]


19 June 46

Afternoon Session

THE PRESIDENT: Had you finished, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I had finished.

THE PRESIDENT: Did any of the other prosecutors wish to cross-examine?

Dr. Kubuschok?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the cross-examination yesterday it was pointed out to you that in your report to Hitler of 27 July 1935- British Document Book lla, Page 79-you point out that, according to legal findings, leading Reich-German personalities applied the use of force in Austria in July 1934. In this connection you mentioned the name Habicht. I should like to receive some information about the personality of Habicht. Was Habicht a Reich German?

VON PAPEN: Habicht was a Reich German and had his headquarters in Munich. He was Provincial Inspector (Landesinspekteur) of the entire National Socialist Party in Austria. That means the following:

The Austrian Party had a Gauleiter in Austria, but it was directed from Munich from the Reich Party Directorate by a specially appointed Landesleiter, Provincial Inspector Habicht. Since this man had charge of the whole Austrian Party, his position in the Party was, of course, considered as a leading one. One could not call him a "liaison officer," but a leading Reich-German personality.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In cross-examination yesterday various letters were submitted to you which you wrote to Hitler between 4 and 17 July 1934. These letters should be gone into more closely. What was the purpose of the letters?

VON PAPEN: I am glad to have an opportunity to go into this correspondence once more. One must consider the situation which existed at that time: Bose shot, three co-workers arrested, great excitement; and everyone who was in any way in opposition was under suspicion of being connected with this SA revolt. It was similar to the situation after 20 July 1944.

Therefore the first goal was to clear up the Bose case as well as the other cases through legal proceedings. I requested that in my first letter of 4 July. I also demanded this rehabilitation in further letters, but it was a prerequisite to establish first of all that we were not in any way connected with the SA conspirators.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the letters you assure Hitler of your faithfulness and loyalty. Is this not astonishing after the events of 30 June?


19 June 46

VON PAPEN: It may seem astonishing to an outsider, but not to a person who remembers the hysterical atmosphere of those days, for at that time everyone who had been in any opposition at all or who had criticized the system was branded as a co-conspirator. For that reason I thought it advisable to make it clear, by means of such a letter, that I and the Vice Chancellery had nothing to do with this conspiracy.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution thinks your letters have only the purpose of rehabilitating your own person. What do you have to say about this?

VON PAPEN: I ask that the Tribunal study these letters. In them it can be seen that I repeatedly pointed out that my co-workers too must be absolutely rehabilitated. In the letter of 12 July, on Page 3, I say that the honor of my own officials is also my own honor; and I repeatedly demanded that the Bose case be cleared up.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What did you believe to be able to achieve through the legal proceedings which you suggested?

VON PAPEN: Legal proceedings would have had two effects: In the first place, nonparticipation in the Putsch would have been established; and that would necessarily have shown that the arrest of my co-workers and the killing of Bose had been an arbitrary act, an act for which those responsible were to be punished.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a letter of 14 July you welcomed Hitler's speech of justification before the Reichstag on 13 July What comment do you have to make on this?

VON PAPEN: I may ask you to look at the text of this letter. I welcomed the suppression of the intended second revolution, but this must by no means be taken as recognition of the acts of violence carried out against persons not participating in the revolution; and furthermore, the following is to be considered: The events of 30 June were divided into two parts. In the first place, Hitler himself had turned against the revolting SA; the fact that such a revolt was actually planned seemed quite credible to all of us, for the rumors of a second revolution had been current in the country for weeks. In Marburg I had already made reference to it. The revolt of the SA leaders, who represented an effective power, could be considered a danger to the State; and the executions had been directed against SA leaders who were especially well-known and whose names were connected with the excesses of 1933.

The second part of the action had been directed against persons outside this circle. Slowly the news of the individual cases leaked out. The justification for taking steps against these persons was in part explained by saying that they had some sort of connection


19 June 46

with SA leaders and that some of them had offered resistance. That had to be cleared up, for here an emergency law could be referred to; but it was not possible to deviate from an orderly legal procedure. Hence my letter to Hitler of 12 July, in which I asked him not to deviate from the orderly legal procedure. I warned him against identifying himself with these events, and I demanded from him-referring to the Bose case-the latter's rehabilitation and legal proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: We have got the letters, Dr. Kubuschok.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, the purpose of this questioning is to clear up the matter and to explain the contents of the letters, but I believe the defendant has said enough and we can go on to another question now.

Your letter of 17 July is signed without a complimentary closing, and also deviates from other letters in its general form. How do you explain this?

VON PAPEN: On 17 July, I had to consider my efforts to achieve legal proceedings as having failed. I had not even received nay files back. For that reason, I gave up further efforts and there vas no longer any reason to announce my resignation publicly.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: You mean to put it off.

Now I come back to a document which the British Prosecution referred to today. It is 2248-PS in the British Document Book lla, Page 99. The representative of the British Prosecution has tried to obtain an explanation from the defendant. I believe difficulties in the translation and the manner of expression in general have made it a bit hard to understand. I will read the sentence in question once more and ask the defendant to explain this sentence. I will quote on Page 99 of the English text, the second paragraph from the top.

"The way Germany..."

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, we have had a very long explanation already.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, the explanation suffered from the fact that the defendant did not understand the translation correctly or that the British Prosecution did not understand the defendant. The form of the German text is not clear. The defendant will be able to explain it very easily. The explanation goes...

THE PRESIDENT: All right, go on then, go on.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: "The way in which Germany deals with politico-religious difficulties, the clever hand which eliminates political Catholicism without touching the Christian foundation


19 June 46

of Germany, will not only have a decisive effect on England,"

et cetera.

Please explain the sense of this sentence which I have just read.

VON PAPEN: I meant to say to Hitler, "You must eliminate political Catholicism with a clever hand, but the religious foundation must under no circumstances be touched." It depended upon the clever solution of this question...

THE PRESIDENT: No question of translation arises. The passage was read to us verbatim as it is before us, and it was read by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe to the defendant, and the defendant has given the same answer over and over again in answer to Sir David.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, may I point out the following: The whole sentence was in the future tense, the whole sentence...

THE PRESIDENT: It was read to us just now by the interpreter verbatim in the words which are before us in the book and the words which were put by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe to the defendant. There is no question of difference of tense at all.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, there is a special language difficulty, because in the first part the first two verbs are in the present tense in connection with the auxiliary "wird" used later; and in accordance with German language usage the present is to be understood as meaning the future also. In the opinion of the British Prosecution, the first two verbs "deals" and "eliminates" are to be considered past tense, and that is the difference.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a matter of verbal argument on the words of the document.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. Now one last question to the witness.

A while ago Cardinal Innitzer's talk to Hitler in Vienna was discussed. What occasioned you to arrange this meeting of Hitler with Cardinal Innitzer?

VON PAPEN: With our march into Austria and the Anschluss of Austria to the Reich, Hitler had joined a Catholic country to Germany; and the problem, which was to be solved, was winning this country from the interior as well. That was possible only if Hitler recognized the religious basis, recognized what rights Catholicism had in this country; for this reason I arranged a talk between Cardinal Innitzer and Hitler in order to make sure that Hitler in the future would follow a policy which stood on a Christian basis in Austria.

By arranging this interview, I thought I would be able to do one last service for Austria; that was the reason.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: That is the end of the examination.


19 June 46

THE PRESIDENT: I have just two or three questions I should like to ask you.

When did you first hear about the murder of Jews?

VON PAPEN: I believe, My Lord, that that was during the war.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the war lasted 6 years. When during the war?

VON PAPEN: I cannot say with certainty, My Lord. I cannot say on my oath when it was.

THE PRESIDENT: You cannot say with more certainty than that?

VON PAPEN: No; our general knowledge was that the Jews were sent to camps in Poland. But we knew nothing of a systematic extermination of Jews such as we have heard of here.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness whose affidavit your counsel has put in evidence, Marchionini, what do you know about him?

VON PAPEN: Marchionini, My Lord, is a very well-known professor who was employed by the Model Hospital in Ankara and who was also my family doctor.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got your volumes of exhibits before you?


THE PRESIDENT: Could the defendant have Volume III?

[The documents were handed to the defendant.]

Volume III; it's in the affidavit from Marchionini, the last paragraph of the answer to Question 6.

VON PAPEN: One moment, My Lord. I have not found it yet.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no hurry.

VON PAPEN: I have the affidavit now.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have Question 6, or rather the answer to Question 6?

VON PAPEN: The questions are not numbered here.

THE PRESIDENT: It is the last question but one.


THE PRESIDENT: In the answer to that question, he says this: "I clearly remember an incident in spring 1944 when I called upon Von Papen at the request of Herr Barlas, the Refugee Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, to request his assistance in saving 10,000 Jews in France from deportation to Poland for extermination. These Jews had formerly held Turkish nationality which they later renounced."


19 June 46

Then, he says, through your intervention ". . . the lives of these Jews were saved." Is that statement true?

VON PAPEN: Yes, certainly.

THE PRESIDENT: So at any rate by the spring of 1944 you knew that 10,000 Jews in France were about to be deported for extermination?

VON PAPEN: I believe they were to be deported to Poland, My Lord. But we did not know in 1944 that they were to be exterminated. We wanted to protect them from deportation.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said the statement was true.

VON PAPEN: For the purpose of exterminating-I believe that was not said to us at the time. The question was only whether I was willing to help keep 10,000 Jews who were in France from being deported to Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all. You may return to the dock.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I had three witnesses approved by the Tribunal. The witness Freiherr von Lersner could not come here at the time because of transportation difficulties. He cannot be here before the end of July. After the questioning of the defendant and considering the fact that Lersner has answered an interrogatory, I believe I can dispense with the witness. I regret this, because he is a man who was a companion of the defendant during his whole political career, a witness who would have been especially valuable because of his objectivity in these questions. He was president of the German Peace Delegation at Versailles.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have the affidavit or the interrogatory, you can put it in. We do not need any further statements about it.


The second witness was Count Kageneck. Since the questions which were to be asked of Kageneck have been covered in the questioning of the defendant and the cross-examination did not touch upon them, I can also dispense with this witness.

< A NAME="kroll">

There remains only the witness Dr. Kroll, whom I now call to the stand.

[The witness Kroll took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

HANS KROLL (Witness): Hans Kroll.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]


19 June 46

Levi PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, what was your occupation in Ankara?

KROLL: I was the First Counsellor of the Embassy, and later Minister. I was in Ankara from the fall of 1936 until April 1943; from April 1939 until April 1943 I worked together with Ambassador Von Papen as his principal collaborator. Daily, mostly in the morning and in the afternoon, we conferred together for several hours, so that I believe I am well informed about the various phases of his activity during this period in Turkey; that is, about his activity during the war.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: For explanatory purposes I would like to say that these questions will refer mostly to the peace policy of the defendant.

Did you know Herr Von Papen before he became Ambassador in Ankara?

KROLL: No. We met in Ankara.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were you a member of the NSDAP?


DR. KUBUSCHOK: After taking over the position as Ambassador, Herr Von Papen came to Ankara for a short stay. What was the purpose of this visit?

KROLL: Herr Von Papen wanted, first of all, to present himself to the Turkish Government and to obtain information on the general situation.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen at that time, through his conduct and his statements, express his agreement with German foreign policy and, in particular, with the policy toward Poland? Or did he, as far as he was able, attempt to work against this policy?

KROLL: After the arrival of Herr Von Papen, I was, of course, interested to learn what he imagined the future development of the general situation would be and, in particular, the Polish question. I assumed, of course, that as he came from Germany he was well informed about Hitler's plans; and I was disappointed to find that he knew no more than I did, which was nothing at all.

Then we discussed the situation in detail; as far as I was able to tell, Herr Von Papen, who spoke very frankly with me about these things, distrusted Hitler's foreign policy. He was an enemy of war, a true and sincere enemy of war; and, of course, he was also an enemy of war against Poland. He was quite convinced that an agreement could be reached on the Polish question if it could only be made clear to Hitler that a conflict with Poland would of


19 June 46

necessity lead to a World War. He then endeavored, and I must say in very open, clear, and courageous language, to point out this view in his reports. And in his talks with the Turkish statesmen, as well as with the accredited diplomats in Ankara, he attempted to prove that, in fact, a conflict with Poland would of necessity lead to a conflict with England and France. I often told myself later that he was convinced that if everyone, Germans as well as foreigners, had spoken to Hitler in this clear manner, the war would have been avoided.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: After the outbreak of the Polish war, what was the attitude of Herr Von Papen toward the spread of the war to the Nordic States, Holland, Belgium, and finally, Russia?

KROLL: Herr Von Papen, of course, hoped that during this winter pause some agreement would be reached or at least a meeting arranged. He knew that once the action spread to the west, the war would break out in all its horror and that then it would probably be too late to talk things over. Of course, as far as possible, he looked for mediation in Turkey and he was glad and willing to consider any opportunity, such as had resulted from talks with his friend, the Dutch Minister in Ankara, Van Visser. The motive behind this offer of Visser was Holland's wish to have the war ended before spring and along with that the fighting in the west, and the goal was to be a talk between Germany and England.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am interested in knowing what Herr Von Papen's opinion of such a peace was. Did he think that it would be possible to achieve annexation by way of peace, or what was the purpose of this peace which he had in mind?

KROLL: I believe it is known from the previous activity of Herr Von Papen that he was a friend and believer in European understanding. He knew that this war had not begun because of a territorial problem but because of a principle; that is to say, the prevention of future one-sided aggressive wars. And so, in the restoration of the legal status before the beginning of the war, that is, in the restoration of the status quo ante on the basis of 1938, including the restoration of Poland and Czechoslovakia, he saw the prerequisite for instituting pourparlers.

He considered the second prerequisite for the successful carrying on of such pourparlers the restoration of confidence in the German signature, which was known to have been destroyed through Hitler's foreign policy. The only question was how this confidence could be restored. He clearly realized that the prerequisite for this was a basic reform of the regime, with the aim of making Germany a legal state once more. Finally, Herr Von Papen, posted as he was in Turkey, believed he saw the possibility of ending the war by


19 June 46

reaching an understanding, because Turkey was in a better position for mediation than practically any other state of equal importance in foreign politics. It enjoyed the confidence of both belligerent parties, and that is essential for arranging a pourparler. And so he endeavored, in all his talks with Turkish statesmen, to win Turkey over for a mediation. During all his years in Turkey that was the leitmotif of his work, namely, to bring the war to an end as soon as possible. It is a fact that he finally enjoyed the satisfaction of hearing the Turkish President, in 1942 in a big public speech before the Turkish National Assembly, offering the services of Turkey for mediation between the belligerents.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you have knowledge of the efforts of Herr Von Papen to avert a spread of the war toward Turkey, contrary to the efforts of certain circles of the Axis partners around Hitler? During the war there were several crises which you might briefly mention.

KROLL: I should like to say first that Papen's activity in Turkey can be summed up in one word. He considered it his mission to make one and the same the interests of Germany, his country, and the interests of peace. That meant, in effect, that he endeavored to prevent the spreading of the war to Turkey and the Near East and thus create the prerequisite for having Turkey intervene as mediator at the proper time.

Now, as to the crises. I should like to limit myself to those cases in which Herr Von Papen had the impression that the neutrality of Turkey was endangered by the intentions of the Axis partners.

THE PRESIDENT: I think I did before draw your attention to the fact that there was no charge against Von Papen in connection with his activities at Ankara; and also, I may add, that this was a summing-up in one word, I thought.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: There are only a very few cases, Your Lordship. He will tell us about them briefly to complete the general picture.

THE PRESIDENT: The only way in which the evidence can be relevant at all is insofar as it throws light upon Von Papen's activities before he went to Ankara. That is what I pointed out to you before.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I said the other day, Your Lordship, that the personality of a person charged with war conspiracy cannot be judged correctly if only one period of his activity is mentioned. He was at a post where he could do only negative or positive things. It is certainly not irrelevant if at least it may be presented in brief.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this witness has been telling us for a considerable time that Papen's activities were entirely


19 June 46

peaceful and that they were endeavors to make Turkey mediate; and-what he is doing now is simply going on with further details on the same subject, and it is over a period when, as I say, no charge is made against Von Papen at all by the Prosecution.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: If the Tribunal understands that the Defendant Von Papen actually interpreted his mission in Ankara as a peace mission, I need put no further questions to the witness. Then I come to my last questions.

What was the position of Herr Von Papen in regard to the Party, especially as to the Landesleitung in Ankara?

KROLL: On his arrival Von Papen was received with unconcealed distrust. No wonder, for it was known that he was no National Socialist. During these 4 years in Turkey I did not meet anyone who considered him a National Socialist. His relationship to the Party became worse in the course of the years, and finally it resulted in open conflict. That was in 1942, when the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in Ankara once told his colleagues, if it rested with him he would have Herr Von Papen shot. Then he was challenged about it and corrected himself. He said he didn't say that; he only said he would have him put in a concentration camp.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of Von Papen to the Jewish question?

KROLL: In repeated public speeches as well as in his actions, Herr Von Papen quite clearly opposed the anti-Jewish policy of the Party. He was acquainted with Jewish emigrants. He had Jewish doctors; he bought in Jewish stores. In short, I believe that was one of the main reasons which caused this tension between him and the Party.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen even employ a Jewish woman in the Embassy?

KROLL: As far as I know, yes. I believe that was the wife of his servant, his porter.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: She was employed as a telephone operator there? Frau B..., is that right?


DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you know a Herr Posemann? Did he have any connection with the German Embassy?

KROLL: At my time, Posemann was not in the German Embassy. I recall that he had a bookstore in Ankara. He had nothing to do with the Embassy.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What was the attitude of Herr Von Papen in the personnel question? Did he employ National Socialists in the Embassy, or what preferences did he have?


19 June 46

KROLL: It is well known that the Party was never quite satisfied with Von Papen's choice of workers. That was shown by the very severe consequences on 30 June and after the Anschluss. It was somewhat dangerous to be one of his first co-workers.

Of course, he was regarded with suspicion because he did not make a National Socialist command post out of the Embassy, as was done in the Balkans, and because, when he asked for personnel, he chose people who he knew were not National Socialists. I think I need only mention two names, Herr Von Haeften and Legationsrat Von Trott zu Sole, two men who I believe were executed in connection with 20 July. Of course, it was especially held against Von Papen that he opposed all efforts to remove me from my post. I do not know whether I should go into that.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Please do, briefly.

KROLL: Repeatedly-I could really say every month-an attempt was made to have me eliminated as deputy of Von Papen. Finally when that did not do any good, since Von Papen always opposed these attempts, the Landesgruppenleiter, beating the war drum, and the Ortsgruppenleiter of Ankara and Istanbul in the spring of 1942 came to see Von Papen and officially in the name of the Party demanded that I should be removed from my post. Von Papen refused this once more but finally in 1943 the pressure of the Party became too great, especially since other sources conspired against me, and so then I was excluded.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: A final question: During the years you worked together you became well acquainted with the activity of Von Papen and his personality. Perhaps you can give us a brief picture of the defendant.

KROLL: I already said before...

THE PRESIDENT: No, he has already sketched it at very considerable length and we don't want it briefly reiterated.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then I shall dispense with this question. I have finished the examination of the witness.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no questions, My Lord. THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions? Then the witness can retire.

[The witness left the stand.]

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I only need to refer briefly to a few documents. In Document Book 1, I submit Document 24, Page 86. I refer to the note:

"An agreement was reached with the Prosecution to the effect that the fact should be accepted that the Enabling


19 June 46

Act of 24 March 1933 was preceded by two Enabling Acts in 1923."

I refer to Document Book 2, Document 63, an article from The Stars and Stripes of 27 March 1946. These are the peace efforts through Earle. The article is to supplement the interrogatory of Lersner.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 36?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Number 63, Page 153.

Furthermore, I refer to Volume II...

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. This document that you just put before us is a document of 27 March 1946. What are we going to do with that? It is a newspaper article.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: It is a newspaper article on an interview with Earle. He was speaking with Lersner. To supplement the testimony of Lersner, which we do not have here, I should like to use this newspaper article. It enlarges on something which is briefly mentioned in Lersner's written testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: But you had the opportunity of getting an affidavit from Lersner or for putting what questions you wanted to Lersner, and now you are putting in a newspaper article dated 1946 whilst the Trial is going on.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, since I cannot hear Lersner himself because of his absence-we intended to hear him as a witness-the question in the interrogatory was answered rather briefly. To complete it...

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of the interrogatory?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The Lersner interrogatory is dated 15 April 1946. It is Document 93. Date of the interrogatory, 15 April 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal doesn't think that this document ought to be admitted. Newspaper articles whilst the Trial is going on are not the sort of evidence which the Tribunal thinks it right to admit.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In Volume III I submit Document 99, an affidavit by Schaffgotsch, Page 245. It is just being submitted Mr. President. - It is a brief affidavit concerning Papen's vain efforts in the spring of 1934 to reach Hindenburg.

Finally, as Document 100, I shall submit the appeal of the Reich Government of 1 February 1939, which was mentioned yesterday, and also an excerpt on foreign policy from Hitler's speech of 23 March. Yesterday it was referred to during the proceedings

Furthermore, I refer to all documents in all three document books which have been submitted and ask that you take judicial notice of them.


19 June 46

Then I have one final request. Yesterday parts of the discussion of the affidavits of Schroder and Meissner were read into the record. I believe the Prosecution, since they have not made use of the affidavits, will be willing that these parts be stricken from the record.

THE PRESIDENT: It was Meissner's affidavit which was used to some extent, wasn't it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it was. My Lord, I should have thought the most convenient course was that the Tribunal would take it that I have merely put the facts out of the affidavit and would not consider that the evidence of the affidavit was before them. Otherwise, I think it would be very difficult to correct the record, but of course I accept that position.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we think so. We will treat it as those facts having been put to the witness and the witness having answered them, without considering it as a sworn statement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes,-My Lord, purely as my questions.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am now finished with the case of the Defendant Von Papen.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit on Saturday in open session from 10 to 1.

I call on counsel for the Defendant Speer.

DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Perhaps the High Tribunal will recall the fact that when we were discussing the evidence material which I had suggested for presentation in this case I dispensed with the testimony of witnesses and stated that I would limit myself to the use of interrogatories and to the questioning of witnesses outside of the courtroom.

I had hoped I should thus be able to produce my entire evidence. However, I am not in possession of all the interrogatories I sent out. I have only received part of them. I will use those replies which are at my disposal to the best of my ability in the examination of the defendant so that a special presentation of those interrogatories and of the depositions will be superfluous. Despite everything, I hope to conduct the examination of the defendant in such a manner that in my estimation I shall be finished in a day anti at the most 7 hours.


19 June 46

Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal I should like to call the Defendant Speer to the witness box.


[The Defendant Speer took the stand.]

Will you state your full name, please?

ALBERT SPEER (Defendant): Albert Speer.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The defendant repeated the oath.]


DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, will you please tell the Tribunal about your life up until the time you were appointed Minister?

SPEER: I was born on 19 March 1905. My grandfather and my father were successful architects. At first I wanted to study mathematics and physics; but then I took up architecture, more because of tradition than inclination. I attended the universities at Munich and Berlin; and in 1929 at the age of 24, I was the first -assistant at the technical college in Berlin. At the age of 27-, in

1932, I went into business for myself until 1942.

In 1934 Hitler noticed me for the first time. I became acquainted with him and from that period of time onward I exercised my architect's profession with joy and enthusiasm, for Hitler was quite fanatical on the subject of architecture; and I received many important construction contracts from him. Along with putting up a new Reich Chancellery in Berlin and various buildings on the Party Rally grounds here in Nuremberg, I was entrusted with the replanning of the cities of Berlin and Nuremberg. I had sketched buildings which would have been among the largest in the world, and the carrying through of these plans would have cost no more than 2 months of Germany's war expenditure. Through this predilection which Hitler had for architecture I had a close personal contact with him. I belonged to a circle which consisted of other artists and his personal staff. If Hitler had had any friends at all, I certainly would have been one of his close friends.

Despite the war, this peaceful construction work was carried on until December 1941, and only the winter catastrophe in Russia put an end to it. The German part of the manpower was furnished by me for the reconstruction of the destroyed railroad installations in Russia.

DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution, in Document 1435-PS, which is Exhibit USA-216, has quoted a remark from your first speech as a Minister, dated February 1942, in which you state that at that


19 June 46

time you had placed 10,000 prisoners of war at the disposal of the armament industry.

Mr. President, this remark may be found in my document book, on Page 4 of the English text and Page 1 of the French text.

Herr Speer, what do you have to say about this document?

SPEER: At that time in my capacity as an architect I had nothing to say as to whether these workers were to be taken into armaments or not. They were put at the disposal of the Stalag, the prisoner-of-war installation of the OKW. I took it as a matter of course that they would be put at the disposal of armaments in the larger sense.

DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, did you ever participate in the planning and preparation of an aggressive war?

SPEER: No. Since I was active as an architect up until the year 1942, there can be no question about that whatsoever. The buildings which I constructed were completely representative of peacetime building. As an architect I used up material, manpower, and money in considerable amounts for this purpose. This material, in the last analysis, was lost to armaments.

DR. FLACHSNER: Were you . . .

SPEER: One moment, please.

The carrying out of these large building plans which Hitler had supported was, actually and especially psychologically, an obstacle to armament.

DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution asserts you had been a Reichsleiter.

SPEER: No, that is a mistake on the part of the Prosecution.

DR. FLACHSNER: You wore the Golden Party Badge. When and why did you receive it? ~

SPEER: I received the Golden Party Badge from Hitler in 1938. It was because I had completed the plans for a new building program in Berlin. Besides myself, five other artists received this Golden Party Badge at the same time.

DR. FLACHSNER: Were you a member of the Reichstag?

SPEER: In 1941 I was called into the Reichstag by Hitler, that is, outside of an election, as replacement for a member who had left the Reichstag. Hitler at that time told me that in my person he also wanted an artist represented in the Reichstag.

DR. FLACHSNER: Did you ever receive a donation?


DR. FLACHSNER: How did your activity as a Minister start?


19 June 46

SPEER: On 8 February 1942, my predecessor, Dr. Todt, was killed in an airplane crash. Several days later Hitler declared I was to be his successor in his many offices. At that time I was 36 years of age. Up until that time, Hitler considered the main activity of Todt to be in the building sphere, and that is why he called me to be his successor. I believe that it was a complete surprise to every-one when I was called to office as a Minister.

Immediately upon my assuming office, it could be seen that not building but the intensification of armaments was to be my main task, for the heavy losses of material in the battles in Russia during the winter of 1941-1942 was a great blow. Hitler called for considerable intensification of armament production.

DR. FLACHSNER: When you assumed office, did you find an office completely set up in the Reich Ministry for Arms and Munitions?

SPEER: No, Dr. Todt had neglected this function of his up until that time; and in addition, in the fall of 1941 Hitler issued a decree according to which the armament of the Army was to take second place to the armament of the Air Force. At that time he foresaw a victorious outcome of the war in Russia and had decreed that armament was to be concentrated on the imminent war against England and was to be converted to that end. Because of this unbelievable optimism of his, the rescinding of that order was postponed until January 1942; and only *tom that date onward- that is, during the last month of his life-did Dr. Todt start to build up his organization. Therefore I had the difficult task first of all to work myself into a completely new field; secondly, at the same time to create all organizational prerequisites for my task; and thirdly, to restore the decreasing armament production for the Army and to increase production as much as possible within the next few months. As is very well known today, I succeeded in doing that.

DR. FLACHSNER: What promises did you receive from Hitler about the duration of your task and about the set-up of your staff of collaborators?

SPEER: Hitler promised me that I should consider my task only as a war task and that after the war I might once more resume my profession of architect.

DR. FLACHSNER: At this point I should like to mention a passage from Document 1435-PS, which deals with a speech delivered by Speer on 24 February 1942, 10 days after he assumed office. This document shows that he was very reluctant about changing his profession of architect for that of Minister. I quote:


19 June 46

"Finally I can say for myself that my personal contribution is a very large one. Up until very recently I lived in a world of pure ideals."

In Document 1520-PS, which is Exhibit GB-156, found on Page 2 of my document book, Page 5 of the English text and Page 2 of the French and Russian texts, on 8 May 1942 Hitler stated; and I quote: "The Fuehrer thereupon stated several times that the Reich Ministry Speer would be dissolved on the day when peace was concluded."

I should further like to submit Document Number Speer-43 which is a memorandum from Speer to Hitler, dated 20 September 1944. Mr. President, this may be found on Page 6 of the English text, Page 3 of the French and Russian texts. From this document you can see that Speer was considered hostile to the Party ("parteifremd" and "parteifeindlich") by Bormann and Goebbels because of his circle of collaborators. Speer writes in his memorandum, and I quote:

"The task which I have to fulfill is a nonpolitical one. I was content in my work as long as I personally and my work were evaluated only according to professional achievements and standards. I do not feel strong enough to carry out successfully and without hindrance the technical work to be accomplished by myself and my co-workers if it is to be measured by Party political standards."

Herr Speer, can you describe the fundamental principles according to which you built up your Ministry?

THE PRESIDENT: What exhibit number are you giving that?

DR. FLACHSNER: Exhibit Number 1, Mr. President.

Herr Speer, can you describe the fundamental principles which you followed in building up your Ministry?

SPEER: I personally was no expert, and I did not want to act as an expert. Therefore, I selected the best possible experts to be found in Germany as my co-workers. I believed that these men were to be found within industry itself. Therefore, I made up my Ministry of honorary industrial workers. This was done in the United States in a similar way during the war in matters of production. Professional civil servants were lacking in my Ministry, and you cannot really consider my Ministry as one set up along normal lines. In June 1944 I delivered a speech in Essen about the fundamental principles upon which I founded my Ministry and its work, to defend myself against the various attacks against my system in Party circles.

DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I regret, but I believe that the High Tribunal is not yet in possession of my document book


19 June g6

containing the interrogatories. I would have been glad to point out that the statements given by witnesses Saur and Schieber in this connection are summed up in this answer. Now I shall submit...

THE PRESIDENT: If you will give us the references-give us the names of the witnesses; we can take notice of them afterwards. What is the name?

DR. FLACHSNER: The witness Saur and we are dealing with his answers to Points 4, 5, and 8 of the interrogatory. The witness Schieber gives a statement regarding this point under Figure 12 of his interrogatory.

Now I should like to submit the speech given by Speer on 9 June 1944 as Exhibit Number 2. It confirms the testimony which the defendant has made about the set-up of his Ministry by engaging honorary industrial co-workers. I shall quote it. I am sorry to say that this speech also is not contained in Your Honor's supplementary volume. I am very sorry. I will just have to read it, and I quote: "These honorary co-workers drawn from industry..."

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flachsner, it is a little bit inconvenient to the Tribunal not to have these documents before them. You could not possibly postpone the particular documents that you have not got here until tomorrow morning? Shall we have the supplementary volume then?

DR. FLACHSNER: The promise was given me that it would be at my disposal by this afternoon.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; well, then, would it be convenient to leave those parts which are contained in the supplementary volume over until tomorrow?

DR. FLACHSNER: In the Supplementary Volume Number 5 we find a document, very short in part, with which I shall not concern myself today. Only this one speech which I am mentioning now is . . .



"These honorary co-workers, drawn from industry, carry the responsibility to the last detail for what is manufactured in the various enterprises and industries and how it is manufactured "

Then a few lines further down:

"Among your main tasks, next to the awarding of contracts to these industries, is to supervise the restrictions on types, the specialization of industries, involving under certain circumstances the closing-down of certain enterprises; to further rationalization from the point of view of raw


19 June 46

materials, construction, and production; as well as unconditional exchange of experience, without regard to patents."

From various passages of this document it can be seen clearly that Speer considered his office an improvised instrument which made use of the existing authorities of the Reich for the fulfillment of his tasks but without burdening himself with these tasks. The decree of 10 August, which is mentioned in the speech of Speer, shows that he expressly prohibited his offices from turning into administrative offices. The defendant did not want bureaucratic official methods of working in his Ministry.

THE PRESIDENT: What speech of Speer are you referring to? You said the decree of 10 August.

DR. FLACHSNER: It is still the same speech, Mr. President, which I just mentioned. The decree is mentioned therein.

'licit; PRESIDENT: I didn't get what the year was when you began. What was the year?

DR. FLACHSNER: The year was 1942, 10 August; and the speech was given in the year 1944. Therefore, he was referring to a decree which had been in force for some time.

Just how important it was to the defendant to have new nonbureaucratic forces in his Ministry is shown in the passage from his speech which I would like to quote now:

"Any institution which has lasted for some period of time and which exceeds a certain size has a tendency to become bureaucratic. Even if, in one of the first large attacks on Berlin, large parts of the current files of the Ministry were burned, and therefore, for some time, we were lucky enough to have unnecessary ballast taken from us, we cannot expect that occurrences of that sort will continuously bring new vigor into our work."

Herr Speer, so far as the Tribunal wishes, will you please briefly supplement these statements about the tasks of your Ministry from the technical point of view?

SPEER: I shall try to be very brief.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you, Dr. Flachsner, you read us the speech.

DR. FLACHSNER: The speech, yes . . .

THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be very remote to every issue, even as it is, and why you should want to supplement it, I don't know.

DR. FLACHSNER: I thought it might be of interest to the High Tribunal to hear about the sphere of activity which the defendant


19 June 46

had in his capacity as Minister. This speech was made to experts and is, therefore, really only of interest to an expert. I assumed that the High Tribunal would wish to know just what the task of the Production Ministry of Herr Speer was. I think the Prosecution imagined its sphere of activity to be considerably greater than it actually was.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want to know what he says about the tasks of his Ministry, you can ask him. But you have just been reading his speech, and we don't want to...

DR. FLACHSNER: No, no, I do not want that either. He is just to give us briefly some of the technical tasks of his Ministry. That is what I wanted to know.

THE PRESIDENT: You don't seem to be hearing me accurately. Wouldn't it be better if you put your earphones on?

What I said was that you had read the speech and we didn't want to hear any more argument upon the speech from the defendant. If you want to ask the defendant what the tasks of his Ministry are, ask him. What you asked him was, "Do you wish to supplement the speech?"

DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, Will you please tell us what the tasks were which your Ministry had to carry out and please do not refer to the things that I mentioned in the speech.

SPEER: I believe the tasks of a production ministry are well known in all industrial states. I just wanted to summarize briefly which functions I had to concern myself with in detail in this Ministry.

For one, we had to surmount the deficiency in raw materials, metals, and steel. Then, by the introduction of assembly-line work, which is customary in the United States but was not yet current in Germany, the work was systematized; and thus machinery and space were utilized to the utmost. Also, it was necessary to amplify the production programs, for example, for fine steel, aluminum, and individual parts like ball bearings and gear wheels.

One of the most important tasks was the development of new weapons and their serial production; and then, beginning with 1943, the reparation of the damage caused by the extraordinarily sudden bombing attacks, which forced us to work with improvised means and methods.

DR. FLACHSNER: What was the importance of this activity in the sphere of your Ministry?.

SPEER: It is to be taken as a matter of course that this sphere of activity was the most important in our country, if only because it included providing equipment for the Army. I claimed that during


19 June, 46

the war the rest of the economy would have to be regulated according to the exigencies of armament. In times of war, at home, there are only two tasks which count: To furnish soldiers for the front, and to supply weapons.

DR. FLACHSNER: Why was the task of your Ministry purely a war function?

SPEER: Because during peacetime the giving of orders is normally regulated according to supply and demand, but in wartime this regulating factor is lacking.

DR. FLACHSNER: Therefore it was one of the main tasks of your Ministry to exercise a State control over the distribution of orders?


DR. FLACHSNER: Then, at first, you had responsibility only for armaments production for the Army; but at the end of 1944, you were responsible for the entire field of armament and war production. Can you briefly tell me the stage of this development, and how thereby the extent of your task grew?

SPEER: It would be best for me to tell you about the development by dealing with the number of workers I had.

In 1942 I took over the armaments and construction programs with altogether 2.6 million workers. In the spring of 1943 Doenitz gave me the responsibility for naval armament as well, and at this point, I had 3.2 million workers. In September of 1943, through an agreement with the Minister of Economy, Herr Funk, the production task of the Ministry of Economy was transferred to me. With that I had 12 million workers working for me.

Finally, I took over the air armament from Goering on 1 August 1944. With that the total production was marshaled under me with 14 million workers. The number of workers applies to the Greater German Reich, not including the occupied countries.

DR. FLACHSNER: How was it possible to have a task of that magnitude directed by a Ministry that consisted almost exclusively of honorary members, who moreover had no practical routine experience in purely administrative matters?

SPEER: The administrative sectors in the various armament offices retained their tasks. In that way, for example, in the Army, the Heereswaffenamt-the Army Ordnance Office-which contained several thousand workers, gave the orders, supervised the carrying out of these orders, and saw to it that delivery of the orders and payment were carried out in a proper manner. Only in that way did I succeed in having the entire armament production-which


19 June 46

amounted to 3,000 or 4,000 million marks a month-carried through with an honorary co-worker staff of 6,000 people.

DR. FLACHSNER: Were all armament enterprises of a Wehrmacht branch subordinate to you?

SPEER: No. There actually was a small group of enterprises which were run directly by the Wehrmacht branches with their own workers. These were excepted. They were the munition plants and similar industries, and also the enterprises of the SS.

DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution is charging you with the fact you share the responsibility for the recruiting of foreign workers and prisoners of war and for taking manpower from concentration camps. What do you say to this?

SPEER: Neither I nor the Ministry was responsible for this. The Ministry was a new establishment, which had a technical problem to deal with. It took no competence in any field away from an existing authority. The conditions of work were still handled through the old existing authorities. The Food Ministry and the various offices connected with it were responsible for the food supply, and the occupation-supervising agencies in the Reich Labor Ministry were responsible for the maintenance of safe and bearable conditions at the places of work; the Trustees of Labor, working under the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment, were responsible for the salaries and the quality and quantity of work done; and the Health Office of the Reich Ministry of the Interior was responsible for health conditions. The Justice Department and the Police Department were responsible for violations against labor discipline, and, finally, the German Labor Front was responsible for representing the interests of labor with the employers.

The centralizing of all of these authorities lay in the hands of the Gauleiter as Reich Defense Commissioner. The fact that the SS put itself and its concentration camp internees outside the control of the State is not a matter with which I or my Ministry was concerned.

DR. FLACHSNER: Your Codefendant Sauckel testified to the effect that with the carrying out of the recruiting of workers for the industries, his task was finished. Is that correct in your opinion?

SPEER: Yes, certainly, as far as the placing of workers is concerned, for one of the subjects of dissension between Sauckel and me was that the appropriate employment of workers in industry itself had to be a matter of the works manager and that this could not be influenced by the labor office. It applied however only to labor recruitment and not to the observance of labor conditions. In this connection, the office of Sauckel was partly responsible as supervising authority.


19 June 4G

DR. FLACHSNER: To what extent could the works manager conform with the decrees of Sauckel as to labor conditions and so on?

SPEER: The decrees issued by Sauckel were unobjectionable, but the works managers did not always find it possible to carry through the decrees for reasons which were outside their power. The bombing attacks brought about difficulties, disorganized transportation, or destroyed living quarters. It is not possible to make the managers responsible for the observance of these decrees under circumstances which often took on catastrophic proportions after the summer of 1944. These were times of crises and it was a matter for the Reich authorities to determine just how far it was possible to carry through these decrees and it is not right to push this responsibility on the little works manager.

DR. FLACHSNER: How far was the factory manager responsible to your Ministry in this regard?

SPEER: Within the framework of the above-mentioned responsibility which industry enjoyed, the armament factory managers had received a semiofficial function from me. This, of course, applied only to technical tasks.

DR. FLACHSNER: Were there any industries making secret items which were not permitted to be inspected by the Gauleiter? I recall evidence given here where this was reported.

SPEER: There were some industries which concerned themselves with secret matters; but in such cases the works trustee of the Labor Front was represented, and he could report to the Gauleiter on conditions in the factory through the Gauobmann (chief of the Labor Front in a Gau).

DR. FLACHSNER: Did you approve the punishment of people who were unwilling to work?

SPEER: Yes, I considered it right that workers who violated labor discipline should be punished, but I did not demand supplementary measures in this regard. As a matter of principle, I represented the view that a satisfactory work output on the part of 14 million workers could be achieved in the long run only through the good will of the worker himself. This-is a bit of experience which applies generally, causing every employer in the world to do all in his power to have his workers satisfied.

DR. FLACHSNER: Did you support the efforts made by Sauckel to improve the social conditions of the workers, and if so, why did you?

SPEER: Naturally I supported them, even though I did not have any jurisdiction along that line; and the same reasons which I have


19 June 46

Just mentioned applied, for our experience showed that labor which is satisfied has much less loss in the way of material. This for me was very important, considering our deficiency in raw materials. It is obvious moreover that the better quality produced by satisfied laborers is of special significance in time of war.

DR. FLACHSNER: In the records of your discussions with Hitler, there are various directives made by Hitler dealing with the care and the treatment of foreign workers. Did you cause Hitler to give these directives?


DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit three pieces of evidence-first of all, Document Speer-11. Mr. President, this is found on Page 10 of the English text, Page 7 of the French text. In this document, upon Speer's request in March 1942, it was put down; and I quote:

"That the Russians under all circumstances were to receive sufficient food and that civilian Russians were not to be put behind barbed wire and be treated as prisoners of war."

As my next piece of evidence, which will be Exhibit Number 4, I would like to submit Document Number Speer-13. According to this document, in May 1943 Hitler decided, at the suggestion of Speer, that the German as well as Russian miners should receive a substantial amount of supplementary rations and it is specified there that especially the Russian prisoners of war are to receive compensation in the form of tobacco and similar items for special efforts and achievements.

The next piece of evidence is Exhibit Number Speer-5, and it is Document Number 9. Mr. President, this is found on Page 12 of the English text and Page 9 of the German text in the document book. According to this document the food supply in Italian armament plants is to be put at about the level of the German rations. In this connection it is important that Speer, at the same time, issued directives that also the families of these workers receive equivalent care.

I had other documents of this type at my disposal but in order to save the time of the translation department, I did not include them in my document book.

Herr Speer, to whom did the bonuses of the armament industry go, and what did they consist of?

SPEER: We gave out many millions of packages to armament plants. They contained additional food, chocolate, cigarettes, and so forth; and these bonuses were given in addition to all the extra food rations which were determined by the Food Ministry for those who worked longer hours or who did heavy work. In the industries,


19 June 46

these bonuses were given to all workers without distinction, including the foreign workers, prisoners of war, and the workers from concentration camps.

DR. FLACHSNER: I shall again refer to the fact that these bonuses were also given to armament workers from concentration camps later on when discussing another document.

In what form did your Ministry put its demands to the industries?

SPEER: It is important to note that the demands made of industries were only in the manner of production schedules and it was up to the industries to place their demands as to manpower, machinery, and material on the basis of these schedules.

DR. FLACHSNER: Was there often an unusual increase in working hours in industry and how did this happen?

SPEER: Working time should remain uniform in modern assembly-line production during the entire month. Due to the bombing attacks, delays in supplying tools and raw materials set in. As a result the number of hours of work varied from ~ to 12 a day. The average, according to our statistics, might have been 60 hours to 64 hours a week.

DR. FLACHSNER: What were the working hours of the factory workers who came from concentration camps?

SPEER: They were exactly the same as for all the other workers in the industry, for the workers from concentration camps were on the whole only a part of the workers employed; and these workers were not called upon to do any more work than the other workers in the factory.

DR. FLACHSNER: How is that shown?

SPEER: There was a demand on the part of the SS that the inmates of concentration camps be kept in one part of the factory. The supervisors consisted of German foremen and specialists. The working hours, for inherent reasons, had to be co-ordinated with those of the entire industry, for it is a known fact that there is only one rhythm of work in a given industry.

DR. FLACHSNER: It is shown unequivocally from two documents which I shall submit in another connection that the workers from concentration camps in army and naval armament and in the air armament branch worked on an average 60 hours per week.

Why, Herr Speer, were special KZ Camps, the so-called work camps, established next to the industries?

SPEER: The work camps were established so that long trips to the factories could be avoided and in this way permit the workers to arrive fresh and ready for work.


19 June 46

Furthermore, the additional food which the Food Ministry had granted for all workers, including the workers from concentration camps' would not have been received by these men if they had come directly from big concentration camps; for then this additional food would have been used up in the concentration camp. In this way, those workers who came from concentration camps received, in full measure, bonuses which were granted in the industry, such as cigarettes or additional food.

DR. FLACHSNER: Did you know, during your activities, that the workers from concentration camps had advantages if they worked in factories?

SPEER: Yes. My co-workers called my attention to this fact, aura I also heard it when I inspected the industries. Of course, a wrong impression should not be created about the number of concentration camp inmates who worked in German industry. In tote, 1 percent of the labor personnel came from concentration camps.

DR. FLACHSNER: When you inspected establishments, did you ever see concentration camp inmates?

SPEER: Of course, when on inspection tours of industries I occasionally saw inmates of concentration camps who, however, looked well fed.

DR. FLACHSNER: Concerning the report which Herr Speer made about concentration camps and the treatment which the inmates received in factories, I refer to a confidential letter from the office chief Schieber to Speer, dated 7 May 1944. I submit it as Document Number Speer-44, Exhibit Number 6.

Mr. President, I am sorry, this will also be found in the second document book, which has not yet been submitted. But it would be a pity if I were not to discuss it at this time, for it fits so well into this pattern. Therefore, I should like to quote briefly from it.

The office chief Schieber writes to his Minister as follows. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flachsner, the Tribunal thinks it would be much more helpful to them to have the document before them.

We are told that the book will be ready tomorrow afternoon, and that it will not be ready before tomorrow afternoon.

DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I believe that I did everything possible at the time to see that the documents were put at the disposal of the translation department in good time. The difficulty must have arisen from the fact that the interrogatories did not come back in time. I assume that that is what happened.

The quotation from this document is not long, Mr. President. I believe I might as well quote from it now. Or do you wish that. . .


19 June 46

THE PRESIDENT: No; go on, if it is more convenient to you. I do not mind. You may go on.

DR. FLACHSNER: Thank you very much. The office chief Schieber writes to his Minister:

"Considering the care which the manpower from camps received from our factory managers in spite of all the difficulties and considering the general decent and humane treatment which foreign and concentration camp laborers received, both the Jewesses and concentration camp laborers work very efficiently and do everything in order not to be sent back to the concentration camp.

"These facts really demand that we transfer still more concentration camp inmates into armament industries."

And a few lines further down:

"I have discussed this whole matter in great detail with the delegate of Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl, Sturmbannfuehrer Maurer, and especially pointed out that by a decentralized dividing-up of concentration camp laborers it might be possible appropriately to utilize their forces while affording them better nourishment and satisfactory lodging."

Then it says:

"Moreover, Maurer especially points out..."

THE PRESIDENT: You need not make such long pauses as you are making.

DR. FLACHSNER: "Aside from that, Maurer especially points out that Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl constantly improved the food situation of concentration camp inmates working in factories and that by granting additional protein foods, given under constant medical supervision, a marked increase in weight was obtained and thereby better work achieved."

In another document we see that the employment of concentration camp workers in armament industries is recommended, in that advantages accrue to these workers and that for this reason concentration camp inmates are glad to work in armament industries. I refer, in this connection, to Document 1992-PS, which may be found on Page 11 of the document book. It is Page 14 in the English text. This document shows that already in 1937 inmates of concentration camps were being employed in workshops and that this work was quite popular.

Herr Speer, what do you know about the working conditions in subterranean factories?

SPEER: The most modern equipment for the most modern weapons had been housed in subterranean factories. Since we did


19 June 46

not have many of these subterranean works at our disposal, we had to house in the main this latest equipment there. This equipment required perfect conditions of work-air which was dry and free from dust, good lighting facilities, big fresh air installations, so that the conditions which applied to such a subterranean factory would be about the same as those in a night shift in a regular industry.

I should like to add that contrary to the impression which has been created here in Court, these subterranean factories, almost without exception, were staffed with German workers, because we had a special interest in having these modern installations manned by the best workers which were at our disposal.

DR. FLACHSNER: Can you tell us about how many of these factories there were?

SPEER: It was an insignificant number at the end of the war. We were using 300,000 square meters of subterranean premises and were planning for 3,000,000 square meters.

DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, in the year 1943 you visited the concentration camp at Mauthausen? Why did you visit this camp?

SPEER: I learned, when I inspected industries at Linz, that along the Danube, near the camp at Mauthausen, a large harbor installation and numerous railroad installations were being put up so that the paving stone coming from the quarry at Mauthausen could be transported to the Danube. This was purely a peacetime matter which I could not tolerate at all, for it violated all the decrees and directives which I had issued. I gave short notice of an impending visit, for I wanted to ascertain on the spot whether this construction work was an actual fact and request stoppage of the work. This is an example for giving directives in this field even within the economic administrative sphere of the SS. I stated on that occasion that it would be more judicious to have these workers employed during wartime in a steel plant at Linz rather than in peacetime construction.

DR. FLACHSNER: Will you describe the visit to the camp?

SPEER: My visit ostensibly followed the prescribed program as already described by the witness Blaha. I saw the kitchen barracks, the washroom barracks, and one group of barracks used as living quarters. These barracks were made of massive stone and were models as far as modern equipment is concerned. Since my visit had only been reported a short time in advance, in my opinion it is out of the question that big preparations could have been made before my visit. Nevertheless, the camp or the small part of the camp which I saw made a model impression of cleanliness. However, I did not see any of the workers, any of the camp inmates, since at that time they were all engaged in work. The entire inspection


19 June 46

lasted perhaps 45 minutes, since I had very little time at my disposal for a matter of that kind and I had inner repulsive feelings against even entering such a camp where prisoners were being kept.

DR. FLACHSNER: The main purpose of your visit then was to request the stoppage of the work which you considered nonessential to the war effort?


DR. FLACHSNER: On your visit were you able to learn about the working conditions in the camp?

SPEER: No, I could not do that, since no workers were to be seen in the camp and the harbor installations were so far from the street that I could not see the men who were working there.

THE PRESIDENT: The translation that came through to me was that it was against him spiritually to enter such places. Was that correct? Well, what did you say?

DR. FLACHSNER: No. I asked him whether on the occasion of this visit he was able to learn about the working conditions which applied in this camp. That was my question.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you say anything about "spiritually"?



Did you learn, on your visit at Mauthausen or on another occasion, about the cruelties which took place at this concentration camp and at other concentration camps?


DR. FLACHSNER: Now, I should like to conclude my questions on the utilization of workers by asking you: Did you have any interest in the fact that a healthy and sufficiently trained labor supply should be at your disposal?

SPEER: Naturally I had the utmost interest along this line even though I was not competent for this. As from 1942 we had mass production in armament, and this system with assembly-line workers demands an extraordinary large percentage of skilled workers. Because of drafting for military service, these skilled laborers had become especially important, so that any loss of a worker or the illness of a worker meant a big loss for me as well.

Since a worker needed an apprenticeship of 6 to 12 weeks and since even after this for a period of about 6 months a great amount of scrap must be allowed for-for it takes about that much time before quality work can be expected-it is evident that the care of skilled workers in industry was an added worry for us.


19 June 46

DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution has mentioned the so-called extermination by work. Could a change of personnel which would have taken place through extermination by work, be tolerated at all by an industry?

SPEER: No. A change in the workers, in the way in which it was described here, cannot be borne by any industry. It is out of the question that in any German industry anything like that took place without my hearing about it; and I never heard anything of that sort.

DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, the Prosecution asserts that you applied means of terror and brutality so that the achievements of the compulsory workers would be increased to the utmost...


DR. FLACHSNER: Just a moment. I have not finished. The Prosecution is of the opinion that you used SS and Police against recalcitrant workers and favored and recommended the use of concentration camps for such. Is that correct?

SPEER: No, not in that form, for that was against my interests. There were efforts in Germany to bring about increased productivity through very severe compulsory measures. These efforts did not meet with my approval. It is quite out of the question that 14 million workers can be forced to produce satisfactory work through coercion and terror, as the Prosecution maintains.

DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection, please refer to Page 7 of the English text, Page 4 of the French text. I should like to quote from Document Number Speer-43. It says there:

"I do not believe that the second system which might be applied in our economy, the system of compulsion by plant commissars, or extensive proceedings and punishment when output is insufficient, can lead to success."

Now, Mr. President, I have come to the end of my first part.

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until to June 1946 at 1000 hours.]


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