4000bce - 399
400 - 1399
1400 - 1499
1500 - 1599
1600 - 1699
1700 - 1799
1800 - 1899
1900 - 1999
THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make. In the first place, supplementary witnesses will be heard at the end of the case for the defendants. Secondly, interrogatories and other documents received by that time must be offered in evidence then. Thirdly, interrogatories and other documents allowed before the end of the evidence but received at a later date will be received and considered by the Tribunal up to the end of the Trial. That is all.
[The Defendant Speer resumed the stand.]
DR. FLACHSNER: Yesterday we finished talking about the utilization of labor in industry, and now we shall turn to the question of how the factories were supplied with manpower; that is to say, the question of mass and special demands for laborers.
Herr Speer, you stated in your testimony of 18 October 1945 first, that you categorically demanded new laborers from Sauckel; secondly, that you knew that among these laborers there would be foreigners; thirdly, that you had known that some of these foreign workers were working in Germany against their will. Please comment on this statement.
SPEER: This voluntary statement is quite correct. During the war I was very grateful to Sauckel for every laborer whom I got through him. Many a time I held him responsible for the fact that through lack of manpower the armament industry did not achieve the results it might have, but I always emphasized the merits which accrued to him because of his activity on behalf of armaments.
DR. FLACHSNER: Now, when in your testimony of 18 October 1945, and at present again, you refer to manpower, do you mean all manpower in general, including German workers, foreigners from occupied countries, and foreigners from friendly or annexed states, and also prisoners of war?
SPEER: Yes. Beginning with the middle of 1943, I was at odds with Sauckel over questions of production and about the insufficient availability of reserves of German labor. But that has nothing to do with my fundamental attitude toward Sauckel's work.
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DR. FLACHSNER: What percentage of the total number of laborers assigned was Sauckel obliged to furnish upon your demands?
SPEER: You mean of the total labor supply, not foreigners?
DR. FLACHSNER: Yes.
SPEER: Up to August, 1944-that is up till the time when I took over the air armament as well-perhaps 30 or 40 percent of all the workers provided. Of course, by far the majority of them were German workers. When in August 1944 I took over the air armament I had no appreciable demand for workers because the bomber attacks on the transportation system in the Reich resulted in a steady decline of armament production.
DR. FLACHSNER: Was your need for labor unlimited?
SPEER: No. The volume of armament production and also of our entire production with my corresponding need for labor was governed by our raw material supply.
DR. FLACHSNER: That means, your need was restricted by the amount of raw materials available?
SPEER: My need for labor was limited by the amount of raw materials.
DR. FLACHSNER: You achieved a marked increase in production figures for armament. In order to achieve this increase, did the workers employed increase proportionally?
SPEER: No. In 1944 7 times as many weapons were manufactured as in 1942, 51/~ times as many armored vehicles, and 6 times as much ammunition. The number of workers in these branches was increased by only 30 percent. This success was not brought about through a greater exploitation of labor but rather through the abolition of obsolete methods of production and through an improved system of controlling the production of armament.
DR. FLACHSNER: What was meant by the concept "war production"-"Kriegsproduktion" ?
SPEER: The concept which is frequently used here, "war production," is nothing else but the ordinary concept, production. It comprises everything which is manufactured industrially or by artisans, including the civilian needs.
DR. FLACHSNER: What was meant in Germany by the concept of "armaments"? What did that include?
SPEER: The concept of "armaments" was in no way restricted to that sphere which was outlined through the Geneva prisoner-of-war agreement. The modern concept of "armaments" is a much
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more comprehensive one. It includes a much wider sphere of activity. There were no basic principles set down for our concept of "armaments., The characteristic of an armament factory was that as an intermediary authority, the Armament Inspectorate took care of it and watched over it. In Germany, for instance, the entire production of raw steel belonged to armament; all rolling mills, foundries and forges; the production or the manufacture of aluminum and modern synthetic materials; the chemical production of nitrogen or fuel or synthetic rubber; the production of synthetic wool; the manufacture of individual items the use of which in armament cannot be predicted at the time of their manufacture such as ball bearings, gears, valves, engine pistons, and so forth, or the production of tool machinery; the setting up of assembly lines; similarly the manufacture of motor cars and the construction of locomotives, of merchant ships, also textile factories, and factories manufacturing leather goods or wooden wares.
In the interrogatories which I sent to my witnesses, I tried to have stated what percentage of the German armament industries produced armaments as defined by the Geneva Convention, and I should like to give you the figures. My co-workers agree unanimously that between 40 and 20 percent of our armament program was concerned with the production of weapons, armored cars, planes, warships, or the general equipment which the various branches of the Armed Forces required. The bulk of the material, therefore, was not armament in the sense of the Geneva Convention. The reason for the expansion of the concept of "armament" in Germany was, besides manufacturing reasons, the preferential treatment which applied to these industries, a treatment which resulted in numerous industries clamoring to be called armament industries.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, in the questionnaires which have not yet been submitted to the Tribunal because the book is not yet ready, the witness Sauer under Figures 7 and 10, the witness Schieber under Figures 6 to 9, and the witness Kehrl under Figures 4 to 7, concern themselves with the definition as applied to the concept of armament.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the last name?
DR. FLACHSNER: Kehrl.
Herr Speer, by way of example, you know Krupp's at Essen. How far did this concern produce armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva prisoner-of-war agreement, that is, weapons, munitions, and objects which are necessary for the direct conduct of war?
SPEER: Krupp's are an excellent example of the fact that an armament concern only reserves a fraction of its production for war
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equipment. Of course, I must point out the fact that especially this Krupp concern was one of those armament industries which, among others, had the smallest production of armament, on a percentage basis.
Krupp's main interest lay in mines, and in three large works which produced unprocessed and highly tempered steel. The manufacture of locomotives and products for the chemical industry were specialties of Krupp's. On the other hand, the actual armament specialty of Krupp's-the construction of armored turrets for warships, and large special guns-was not at all exploited during this war. Only in 1944 did Krupp erect the first big factory for the production of guns near Breslau. Up to that time Krupp was mainly concerned with the designing of new weapons, while for the production other firms were licensed. All in all, one can say that at Krupp's, 10 to 15 percent of the personnel turned out armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva Agreement, even though the entire works were classified as armament works.
DR. FLACHSNER: What did you and your Ministry have to say as to whether a factory would receive German or foreign workers?
SPEER: My Ministry had no influence in that direction at all. The need for workers was reported to my Ministry by the industries which were subordinate to me. They reported a total figure of workers needed, and there were no specifications as to whether foreign workers, prisoners of war, or German workers were wanted. This total figure was forwarded to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor. Sauckel refused to accept detailed demands, and he was quite right in this respect, for he could not issue detailed directives to the offices subordinate to him concerning the percentage of German or foreign workers which were to be allocated locally to the various factories.
The ultimate distribution of workers to the factories was taken care of by the labor offices without any intervention of my offices or agencies. Therefore, here too, we did not exert influence as to whether Germans, foreigners or prisoners of war were allocated to any factory. The factory then had to report back to us about the number of workers newly received. This report was turned in to my Ministry in a lump figure so that I could not tell whether and what number of foreign workers or prisoners of war the total figure contained. Of course, I knew that foreign workers worked on armament equipment, and I quite agreed to that. ~
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, to facilitate matters for the Tribunal I would like to remark that Figures 1, 7, 8, and 17 of the questionnaire of the witness Schmelter deal with these
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questions. In the questionnaire of Schieber, Numbers 10, 11, 30, and 31 deal with this point. Furthermore, in the questionnaire of Kehrl relevant material is contained in the answers to Numbers 8 and 9.
Herr Speer, who sent in the demands for manpower needed in armament to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?
SPEER: The demands for workers were split up into various sectors, according to the different economic branches. There were approximately 15 different sectors which placed their demands. I placed demands for Army and Navy armament and for construction, and beginning with September of 1943, for the sectors chemistry, mining, and other production. Air armament had its special labor allocation department, and their demands were voiced by the Reich Air Ministry.
DR. FLACHSNER: In the questionnaires, the witness Schmelter has dealt with this matter in his answer to Question 2; the witness Schieber in his answers to Questions 2, 3, and 5; and the witness Kehrl under Questions 2 and 3.
Weren't the demands for labor for the three branches of the Armed Forces centralized in your Ministry?
SPEER: No. Of course, beginning with March 1942, I had nominally taken over the Armament Office under General Thomas from the OKW, and this Armament Office was a joint office of all three Armed Forces branches, where labor allocation problems were discussed too. Through an agreement between Goering and me it was decided that air armament, independently of me, should look after its own interests. This agreement was necessary since at first, as Minister for Army Armament, I had a biased interest and therefore did not want to make decisions regarding the demands for labor of a unit that was not subordinate to me.
DR. FLACHSNER: How far are you responsible for the employment of prisoners of war in armament, and here I mean armament in a restricted sense and in contradiction to the Geneva Convention?
SPEER: I did not exert my influence to have prisoners of war employed contrary to the directives given out by the OKW. I knew the point of view held by the OKW, according to which the Geneva Convention was to be strictly observed. Of course, I knew as well that these Geneva regulations did not apply to Russian prisoners of war and Italian military internees. I could not exert any influence on the allocation of prisoners of war to the individual factories. This allocation was determined by the labor offices in connection with the offices depending on the chief of Prisoner of War Affairs, the "Stalag."
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DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection I should like to refer to the questionnaire of the witness Schmelter, to his reply to Question 14.
Herr Speer, who was the competent officer on the intermediate level under the OKW?
SPEER: The supervision of the proper allocations of prisoners of war was carried out by the Military Economy Officer (Wehrwirtschaftsoffizier) as the intermediary authority. He was incorporated in the office of the Military Area Commander who was under the jurisdiction of the Army.
DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit by Mr. Deuss, who is an American statistics expert. This is Document 2520-PS.
According to this affidavit, 400,000 prisoners of war were employed in the production of war equipment. These figures are supposed to originate from statistics in your Ministry. Will you comment on this figure?
SPEER: The figures are well known to me through my activity as a Minister, and they are correct. This figure of 400,000 prisoners of war covers the total number of prisoners of war employed in armament production.
It is a wrong conclusion drawn in this affidavit that all these prisoners of war were connected with the production of objects of armament as specified by the Geneva Convention. Statistics concerning the number of prisoners of war employed in those industries which produced armament goods as specified in the Geneva Convention were not kept by us and, therefore, no such figure can be compiled from my documents.
Apart from that, this figure of 400,000 prisoners of war includes 200,000 or 300,000 Italian military internees, all of whom were brought into my production field at that time. This affidavit does not prove, therefore, that prisoners of war were employed in the production of armament goods as such.
DR. FLACHSNER: The Central Planning Board was mentioned here Frequently. You were a member of this board. Can you describe in detail the origin of the Central Planning Board and its sphere of activity?
SPEER: When in 1942 I assumed my office it was imperative to centralize the allocation and distribution of various materials for the three branches of the Armed Forces, and to guarantee the proper direction of war economy for a long time to come. Up to that time this matter had been taken care of in the Ministry of Economy, and partly in the OKW. Both these agencies were much too weak to prevail against the three Armed Forces branches.
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In pursuance of my proposal, in March 1942 the Central Planning Board was established by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Its three members, Milch, Korner, and myself, were entitled to make joint decisions only, which, however, could always be reached without any difficulty. It is obvious that through my predominant position I was the decisive factor in this Central Planning Board.
The tasks of the Central Planning Board were clearly outlined and laid down in Goering's decree, which I had drafted. To make statistics on the demands for labor or on the allocation of workers was not a matter which was laid down in this decree. This activity was not carried out systematically by the Central Planning Board despite the documents presented here. As far as the decisions regarding demands and allocation of labor were concerned, I tried to have this done by the Central Planning Board, since this would have been an essential factor in the directing of the entire economy. This, however, always met with Sauckel's refusal because he considered it as interfering with his rights.
DR. FLACHSNER: To this point I submit the decree of Goering regarding the establishment of a Central Planning Board under the Four Year Plan. It was published on 25 April 1942, and this shall be Document Number Speer-42, Exhibit Number 7.
Mr. President, this text may be found on Page 17 of the English document book.
The sphere of activity of the Central Planning Board...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What number are you giving to it? On the document here it has got Speer Number 142.
DR. FLACHSNER: No, that must be a typographical error. It should be 42, Mr. President; it may be found...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number?
DR. FLACHSNER: Exhibit Number Speer-7.
THE PRESIDENT: What does 42 mean? What is the point of putting 42 on it if its exhibit number is 7?
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, that is the number according to which the document was admitted when we compiled the document book. However, the Exhibit Number 7 is the decisive number in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLACHSNER: It is only meant to facilitate finding it in the document book. It is on Page 17 of the English text; and I might be allowed to call the attention of the High Tribunal to Figure 3 of the decree. According to this, the Central Planning Board had to decide on all the necessary new industrial projects,
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on the increase in the production of raw materials and their distribution, and also on the co-ordination of the demands on the transportation system. This decree does not provide for any regulation of the labor problem.
Herr Speer, how did it come about that, despite this, labor demands were discussed in the Central Planning Board?
SPEER: These minutes of all the 60 meetings of the Central Planning Board which took place from 1942 until 1945 are contained in the stenographic records. These 5,000 typed pages give a clear report on the tasks and the activities carried out by the Central Planning Board. It is quite obvious to any expert that there was no planning with regard to manpower allocation, for it is clear that a plan regarding labor allocation would have to be revised at least every 3 months, just as we had to do for raw materials. In fact, three to four meetings took place in the Central Planning Board which were concerned with labor allocation. These three or four discussions were held for the following reasons: In the years 1942 and 1943, that is, before I took over the management of the total production, whenever soldiers were recruited for the Armed Forces, I had reserved for myself the right to distribute the various recruitment quotas in the different sectors of production. At one meeting this distribution was effected by the Central Planning Board as a neutral committee. At this session, of course, there was a representative of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, since at the same time the problem of replacements had to be dealt with. Another problem which was discussed by the Central Planning Board was the distribution of coal for the following year. Just as in England, coal was the decisive factor in our entire war economy, too. At these discussions we had to determine at the same time how the demands for labor supply for the mines could be satisfied by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, because only in agreement with him could proper plans be made for the following year. From this discussions resulted on the allocation of Russian prisoners of war in mines, a matter which has been mentioned here. Furthermore, two sessions took place in which the demands put forward by all interested parties were actually discussed, and in a way which the Prosecution would like to generalize as applying to the entire activities of the Central Planning Board. These two sessions took place in February and March of 1944, and no others were held either before or after. Besides, these two sessions took place during my illness. Even at that time it was not quite clear to me why it was that just when I was ill Sauckel first complied with my wish to have the Central Planning Board included, and then later went back on his promise.
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DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution have submitted various extracts dealing with sessions of the Central Planning Board.
As far as you know, are these extracts taken from the stenographic records, or are they taken from the minutes?
SPEER: They are taken from the stenographic records. Besides these stenographic records, minutes were taken on the result of the meeting. These minutes are the actual result of the meeting. No material from the actual minutes has so far been submitted by the Prosecution. The contents of the stenographic records are, of course, remarks and debates which always take place when matters of such importance are dealt with, in every war economy of every country, even when the authorities involved are not directly responsible for questions such as those dealing with labor allocation.
DR. FLACHSNER: Therefore, do these quotations which have been heard here concern decisions made by the Central Planning Board or by you?
SPEER: I have already answered that.
DR. FLACHSNER: I would like to put one more question to you. You were the Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Four Year Plan? What about that?
SPEER: In March 1942, Goering, giving heed to my proposal, created the office of Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War Production, in the Four Year Plan, and I was appointed to that office. This was purely a matter of form. It was generally known that Goering had quarreled with my predecessor, Todt, since armament problems for the Army had not been put under his control in the Four Year Plan. In assuming this capacity as Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War Production, I had subordinated myself to Goering. In fact, the Plenipotentiary for Armaments and War Production never achieved any influence. I issued no directives whatsoever in that capacity. As Minister I possessed sufficient authority, and it was not necessary that I should use the authority which I had under the Four Year Plan.
DR. FLACHSNER: For the benefit of the High Tribunal, when dealing with the question of the Central Planning Board perhaps I might refer to the fact that statements were made relative to it by the witness Schieber in his questionnaire under Figures 4 and 45, and by the witness Kehrl in his questionnaire under Figure 2.
Now I shall turn to the problem of the responsibility for the number of foreign workers in general.
Herr Speer, the Prosecution charges you with coresponsibility for the entire number of foreign workers who were transported
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to Germany. Your Codefendant Sauckel has testified in this connection that first of all he worked for you in this matter, so that his activity was primarily determined by your needs. Will you please comment on this?
SPEER: Of course, I expected Sauckel to meet above all the demands of war production, but it cannot be maintained that he primarily took care of my demands, for beginning with the spring of 1943 I received only part of the workers I needed. If my maximum had been met, I should have received all of them. For this I need cite but one example. During that same period some 200,000 Ukrainian women were made available for housework, and it is quite certain that I was of the opinion that they could be put to better use in armaments production. It is also clear that the German labor reserve had not been fully utilized. In January 1943 these German reserves were still ample. I was interested in having German workers-including, of course, women-and this nonutilization of German reserves also proves that I cannot be held solely responsible for covering the essential needs, that is, for demanding foreign labor.
DR. FLACHSNER: I should like to point out that the following witnesses have made statements in connection with this problem in their respective questionnaires: The witness Schmelter in Points 12, 13, and 16; the witness Schieber, in Point 22; the witness Rohland in Points 1 and 4; and the witness Kehrl in Point 9.
Herr Speer, if you or your office demanded workers, then of course you knew that you would receive foreign workers among them. Did you need these foreign workers?
SPEER: I needed them only in part, in view of my requirements for production. For instance, the coal mines could not get along without Russian prisoners of war. It would have been quite impossible to employ German reserves, which consisted mainly of women, in these mines. There were, furthermore, special assignments for which it was desirable to have foreign skilled labor, but the majority of the needs could be met by German workers, even German female workers. The same principle was followed in the armament industries in England and America and certainly in the Soviet Union, too.
THE PRESIDENT: Can't you go on, Dr. Flachsner? There is no need to wait.
DR. FLACHSNER: Yes. In my documentary evidence I shall return to this point in more detail.
Herr Speer, I should like to go back to your testimony of 18 October 1945. In it you stated several times that you knew that the workers from occupied countries were being brought to
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Germany against their will. The Prosecution alleges that you approved of the use of force and of terror. Will you comment on that?
SPEER: I had no influence on the method by which workers were recruited. If the workers were being brought to Germany against their will that means, as I see it, that they were obliged by law to work for Germany. Whether such laws were justified or not, that was a matter I did not check at the time. Besides, this was no concern of mine. On the other hand, by application of force and terror I understand police measures, such as raids and arrests, and so on. I did not approve of these violent measures, which may be seen from the attitude I took in the discussion I had with Lammers on 11 July 1944. At that time I held the view that neither an increase in police forces, nor raids, nor violent measures were the proper thing. In this document I am, at the same time, referred to as one of those who expressed their objections to the violent measures which had been proposed.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, that is Document 3819-PS; which the Prosecution submitted in the cross-examination of, I believe, the Defendant Keitel and of the Defendant Sauckel. I did not include it in my document book.
Herr Speer, why were you against such violent measures?
SPEER: Because through violent measures of that kind a regular allocation of manpower in the occupied countries would not have been possible in the long run. However, I wanted production to be regulated and orderly in the occupied countries. Measures of violence meant to me a loss of manpower in the occupied countries, because there was the danger that these people would in increasing numbers take to the woods so as not to have to go to Germany, and thus strengthen the lines of the resistance movements. This, in turn, led to increased acts of sabotage and that, in turn, to a decrease of production in the occupied countries.
Therefore, time and again the military commanders, and the commanders of the army groups, as well as myself, protested against large-scale measures of violence as proposed.
DR. FLACHSNER: Were you especially interested in the recruiting of workers from specific countries, and if so, why?
SPEER: Yes. I was especially interested in labor recruitment from France, Belgium and Holland-that is, countries in the West- and from Italy, because, beginning with the spring of 1943, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had decreed that mainly workers from these regions were to be assigned for war production. On the other hand, the workers from the East
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were mainly to be used for agriculture, for forestry, and for the building of railroads. This decree was repeatedly stressed to me by Sauckel, even as late as 1944.
DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection I should like to refer to Document 3012-PS, which is Exhibit USA-190. This document is found on Page 19 of the English text, and Page 16 of the French text of my document book. I quote from the conference of the Economic Inspectorate South in Russia. Peuckert-the delegate of Sauckel in Russia-states here, and now I quote:
". . . provisions have been made for employing workers from the East principally in agriculture and in the food economy, while the workers from the West, especially those skilled workers required by Minister Speer, are to be made available to the armament industry..."
Document 1289-PS, which is Exhibit Number RF-71, may be found on Page 42 of the English text of my document book and Page 39 of the French and German texts. Here we are concerned with a file note by Sauckel on 26 April 1944 and I quote:
"Only by a renewed mobilization of reserves in the occupied western territories can the urgent need of German armament for skilled workers be satisfied. For this purpose the reserves from other territories are not sufficient either in quality or in quantity. They are urgently needed for the requirements of agriculture, transportation, and construction. Up to 75 percent of the workers from the West have always been allocated to armament."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flachsner, speaking for myself, I don't know what the problem is that you are trying to solve, or what argument you are putting forward, in the very least. I don't know what relevance this has at all. What does it matter whether they came from the West or whether they came from the East? I understand your argument, or the defendant's argument, that the armament industry, under the Geneva Convention, does not include a variety of branches of industry which go eventually into armament, and it only relates to things which are directly concerned with munitions. But when you have placed that argument before us, what is the good of referring us to this sort of evidence?
I mean, I only want to know because I don't understand in the least what you are getting at.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, this is to prepare for the problem to which we are now turning, and that is the problem of the blocked or protected factories (Sperrbetriebe). By setting up these blocked factories, Speer, if I may put it that way, wanted to put an effective stop to the transfer of workers from the West to
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Germany. Therefore I first have to show that up to that time his workers, the labor for his industries, mainly came from the West. I want to establish that...
THE PRESIDENT: Supposing he did want to stop them from coming from the West; what difference does it make?
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, Speer is being charged with actively having taken part in the deportation of workers from the West, workers who were used in his armament industries. Now, the date is important here. Beginning with the year 1943 he followed a different policy. Before that time, as may be seen from the evidence, the workers who had come to Germany had to a large extent been voluntary workers.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, if you can prove that they were an voluntary workers it would be extremely material, but you are not directing evidence to that at all.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, this is the final goal of my evidence. I should like to carry it on through, if possible, to the end.
THE PRESIDENT: I am only telling you that I don't understand what the end is.
Go on; don't wait any further.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor designated Italy and the occupied western territories as the countries from which foreign laborers would mainly be recruited for armament purposes.
How far did you endorse Sauckel's measures in these countries?
SPEER: Up to the spring of 1943 I completely endorsed them. Up to that time no obvious disadvantages had resulted for me. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, workers from the West refused in ever-increasing numbers to go to Germany. That may have had something to do with our defeat at Stalingrad and with the intensified air attacks on Germany. Up to the spring of 1943, to my knowledge, the labor obligations were met with more or less good will. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, frequently only part of the workers who had been called up came to report at the recruiting places.
Therefore, approximately since June 1943, I established the so-called blocked factories through the military commanders in France. Belgium, Holland, and Italy soon followed suit in establishing these blocked industries. It is important to note that every worker employed in one of these blocked factories was automatically excluded from allocation to Germany; and any worker who was recruited for Germany was free to go into a blocked factory in his
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own country without the labor allocation authorities having the possibility of taking him out of this blocked factory.
DR. FLACHSNER: What consequences did this have on the recruitment of laborers in the occupied western territories?
SPEER: After the establishment of the blocked factories, the labor allocation from the occupied countries in the West to Germany decreased to a fraction of what it had been. Before that between 80,000 and 100,000 workers came for instance from France to Germany every month. After the establishment of the blocked factories, this figure decreased to the insignificant number of 3,000 or 4,000 a month, as is evident from Document RF-22. It is obvious, and we have to state the facts, that the decrease in these figures was also due to the resistance movement which began to expand in the West at that time.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did you and your offices endorse the policies followed by Sauckel at that time?
SPEER: No. At that time the first serious difference arose about the "blocking" of these workers from labor allocation in Germany. This came about through the fact that the loss of laborers, which I had in the production in the occupied countries, was larger than the number of workers who came to Germany from the occupied countries of the West. This may be seen from Document RF-22. According to it perhaps 400,000 workers came from France to Germany in 1943, especially during the first half of the year. Industrial workers in France, however, decreased by 800,000, and the French workers in France who worked for Germany decreased by 450,000.
DR. FLACHSNER: Why did you demand to take over the entire German production from the Ministry of Economics in the summer of 1943?
SPEER: According to my opinion there was still a considerable latent reserve in the German production, since the German peace economy had not been converted into a war economy on a sufficiently large scale. Here was, in my opinion, next to the German women workers, the largest reserve of the German home labor supply.
DR. FLACHSNER: What did you undertake when the total production was handed over to you by the Ministry of Economy?
SPEER: At that time, I had already worked out the following plan. A large part of the industry in Germany produced so-called consumer goods. Consumer goods were, for instance, shoes, clothing, furniture, and other necessary articles for the Armed Forces and for the civilian requirements. In the occupied western territories, however, the industries which supplied these products were kept
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idle, as the raw materials were lacking. But they nevertheless had a great potential. In carrying through this plan I deprived German industries of the raw materials which were produced in Germany, such as synthetic wool, and sent them to the West. Thereby, in the long run, a million more workers could be supplied with work in the country itself; and thus I obtained 1 million German workers for armament.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did you not thereby want to increase armament production or help it along in France as well?
SPEER: No. All these plans failed. Before the outbreak of war the French Government did not succeed in building up armament production in France, and I also failed, or rather my agencies failed, in this task.
DR. FLACHSNER: What were your intentions with this new plan? What advantages did you gain?
SPEER: I will comment on it quite briefly. Through this plan I could close down whole factories in Germany for armament; and in that way I freed not only workers, but also factory space and administrative personnel. I also saved on electricity and transportation. Apart from that, since these factories had never been of importance for the war effort they had received hardly any foreign workers; and thus I almost exclusively obtained German workers for the German production, workers, of course, who were much more valuable than any foreign workers.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did not such a plan entail dangers and disadvantages for the German industrial development?
SPEER: The disadvantages were considerable, since any closing down of a factory meant the taking out of machinery, and at the end of the war a reconversion to peacetime production would take at least 6 to 8 months. At that time, at a Gauleiter meeting at Posen, I said that if we wanted to be successful in this war, we would have to be those to make the greater sacrifices.
DR. FLACHSNER: How was this plan put into effect?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flachsner, what has the Tribunal got to do with the details of these plans? What do we care whether his plans were efficient or whether they were inefficient? The only question this Tribunal has got to decide is whether they were legal in accordance with the character of international law. It does not matter to us whether his plans were good plans or bad plans, or what the details of the plans were, except insofar as they are legal or illegal.
DR. FLACHSNER: Yes, Mr. President.
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THE PRESIDENT: It is a mere waste of our time to go into the details of these plans.
DR. FLACHSNER: I wanted to show that the tendencies, or rather the tendency, followed by the defendant in his labor allocation policy was to employ foreigners in their own country and to use the German reserves solely for his own purpose, that is, for armament proper. Thus everything which...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Flachsner, that is a question of efficiency, not of legality. What he is saying is that he had a lot of German workers, good workers, and they were producing consumer goods instead of producing armament goods. He thought it better to institute his industries so that the workers could remain in France or the other western countries.
What have we got to do with that? If they were forced to work there, it is just as illegal as if they had been brought to Germany to be forced to work. At least, that is the suggestion that is made by the Prosecution.
DR. FLACHSNER: Yes, but I thought and believed. ..
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear defendants' counsel at 2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon on the question of the apportionment of time for the defendants' counsels' speeches.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, please tell us briefly how you and M. Bichelonne, the French Minister of Economy, agreed on your program; but please be concise.
SPEER: Immediately after taking over production in September 1943, I agreed with Bichelonne that a large-scale program of shifting industry from Germany to France should be put into operation, according to the system I already described. In an ensuing conference, Bichelonne stated that he was not authorized to talk about labor allocations with me, for Minister Laval had expressly forbidden him to do so. He would have to point out, he said, that a further recruitment of workers on the present scale would make it impossible to adhere to the program which we had agreed upon. I was of the same opinion. We agreed, therefore, that the entire French production, beginning with coal, right up to the finished products, should be declared as "blocked industries." In this connection both of us were perfectly aware of the fact that this would almost inhibit the allocation of workers for Germany, since, as I have already explained, every Frenchman was free to enter one of
20 June 46
these blocked factories once he had been called up for work in Germany. I gave Bichelonne my word that I should adhere to this principle for a protracted period, and, in spite of all difficulties which occurred, I kept my promise to him.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, in connection with this I should like to quote from Document R-124, which is Exhibit USA-179. It is on Page 37 of the English document book. It is a speech of Sauckel's before the Central Planning Board and has been mentioned frequently. I shall quote from it only what follows:
". . .when I came to France the next time my agencies in France stated:... Minister Bichelonne has concluded an agreement with Minister Speer according to which only French workers are to be considered for allocations in France and none of them need go to Germany any more. This coincided with the first large-scale conference."
Herr Speer, what were the consequences of this change-over of labor allocation from Germany to France?
SPEER: I have already mentioned that. Beginning with 1 October recruiting of labor came almost to a complete standstill.
DR. FLACHSNER: Later on I shall comment in detail, on the strength of documents, on the effect of this Speer-Bichelonne plan and on the tendency pursued by Speer in connection with the various attempts to apply this principle. At the moment I shall therefore discontinue the questions on the subject and will confine myself to quoting from the official French document, RF-22, Page 20 of the English text of my document book, Page 17 of the German and French texts. I quote:
"Finally a real hostility arose between Sauckel and Speer, who was commissioned with the organization of forced labor in the occupied territories."
And then a few lines further on:
"The superiority of the former over the latter which made itself felt more and more during the . . . occupation facilitated to a large degree the resistance against the removal of workers."
The text shows that the first-mentioned, the Defendant Speer, and the military commander. . .
THE PRESIDENT: That is all cumulative; that's what you have been proving three or four times already.
DR. FLACHSNER: Very well, I shall not continue with it.
I only want to rectify a mistake, Herr Speer. It is mentioned in the document that you had something to do with organizing forced labor in France; is that true?
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SPEER: No, the organization of labor in France was not under my control.
DR. FLACHSNER: You have already mentioned that this shifting of the labor program was not only confined to France. Will you tell me to which other countries it also applied?
SPEER: Summarizing the last question: The program was extended to Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The entire production in these countries was also declared blocked, and the laborers in these blocked industries were given the same protection as in France, even after the meeting with Hitler on 4 January 1944, during which the new program for the West for 1944 was fixed. I adhered to this policy. The result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from France to Germany as compared with 500,000, proposed during that conference; and from other countries, too, only about 10 percent of the proposed workers were taken to Germany.
DR. FLACHSNER: What about the figures applying to workers from the Protectorate?
SPEER: Everywhere only a fraction of the numbers proposed was sent.
DR. FLACHSNER: A document, Number 1739-PS, Exhibit RF-10, has been submitted by the Prosecution. It is on Page 23 of the English text of my document book and is a report by Sauckel dated December 1942; also there is a document, Number 1290-PS, on Page 24 of the English text, which has also been submitted. These documents appear to show that, according to Sauckel's personal assertions, from the beginning of his activities until March inclusively there was an excess supply of labor. Is that true?
SPEER: Yes, that is true.
DR. FLACHSNER: Document 16-PS, Exhibit USA-168, which is on Page 25 of the English text of my document book, shows that Sauckel was not in favor of using German women in all the armament industry, but in the summer of 1942 he had several hundred thousand Ukrainian girls placed at the disposal of German households.
These three documents together show that Speer in his Ministry cannot be held responsible for the total number of workers who came to Germany.
I should also like to present another document as Exhibit Number Speer-8. Mr. President, it is given Number 02 in the document book, and it is on Page 26 of the English text. It refers to a meeting of the Central Planning Board.
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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flachsner, you are not stating the exhibit numbers of any of these documents, so that you are not offering them properly in evidence at all. I mean you are referring now to 02, which is some numbering which we have got nothing whatever to do with.
DR. FLACHSNER: May I then present this document as Exhibit Number 8?
THE PRESIDENT: What about the one before? Oh, that is already in. Perhaps it would be well to submit a list afterwards, giving the proper exhibit numbers for all these documents you are referring to.
DR. FLACHSNER: Yes, Mr. President, I shall be glad to do that. I should like to quote-this is a remark made by Speer:
"For this it is necessary to supply the industries with new German workers, even unskilled labor, because I cannot replace all those which we have to give up as soldiers, with foreigners. The German supply is simply becoming too scanty. Already today we are having one case of sabotage after another and we do not know their origin. Cases of sabotage will arise. The measures which will have to be taken in order to switch at least I million Germans over to the armament industry are extremely hard and will, in my opinion, lower the entire living standard of the upper classes. Therefore this means that, roughly speaking, we are going to be proletarians for the duration of the war, if it lasts a long time. This matter has to be faced' coolly and soberly. There is no alternative."
This opinion and project of Speer, namely, to exploit ruthlessly the labor reserve within Germany, was Pot realized until the summer of 1944. And this was a subject for argument between Speer on one side, and Sauckel and the Gauleiter on the other. The testimony of the witnesses in the questionnaires will deal with it. To assist the Tribunal I should like to state that with Schieber, it is the answer to Question 22; with Rohland, it is the answer to 1 and 4; with Kehrl, it is answer Number 9; and in the case of Schmelter it is Questions 13 and 16. Unfortunately, I cannot quote the pages of the English book, Mr. President, because I have not yet seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the document you were referring to?
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, the fired-in questionnaires in the supplement volume of my document book, which I hope is now in the hands of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is.
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DR. FLACHSNER: Besides, I should like to reserve the right to submit these documents in toto at the end of my examination. I am only taking the liberty of referring to the points in which the witnesses have dealt with this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLACHSNER: Furthermore, we are informed about the different opinions presented by Sauckel and Speer through a conference of Speer's during a meeting of the Central Planning Board on 21 December 1943. I refer to Page 27 of the English text of my document book and it will be my Exhibit Number 9. I quote...
THE PRESIDENT: You don't need to quote it, Dr. Flachsner; I thought I had made it clear to you that we are not concerned with the efficiency or the inefficiency of these plans.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, there is an important document submitted by the Prosecution. It is the minutes of a meeting with Hitler on 4 January 1944. It has been submitted as 1292-PS, Exhibit USA-225. I refer to Page 28 of the English text of my document book. How was this meeting arranged?
SPEER: It was called by request of Hitler.
DR. FLACHSNER: For what reason?
SPEAR: To settle the arguments between Sauckel and myself.
DR. FLACHSNER: And what was Hitler's decision?
SPEER: His decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with Hitler. These blocked factories were to be maintained, and for this purpose Sauckel was given the order to obtain 3,500,000 workers from the occupied territories. Hitler gave the strictest instructions through the High Command of the Armed Forces to the military commanders that Sauckel's request should be met by all means.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did you agree to this decision?
SPEER: No, not at all; for if it were executed my program of shifting industries to the West had to collapse.
DR. FLACHSNER: And what action did you take after that?
SPEER: Contrary to the Fuehrer's decision during that meeting, I informed the military commander of the way I wanted it, so that in connection with the expected order from the High Command of the Armed Forces the military commander would have two interpretations of the meeting in his hands. Since the military commander was agreeable to my interpretation, it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.
DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection, may I present a document whim is on Page 29 of the English text of my document book'
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Page 26 of the German and French texts. This is a teletype message from Speer to General Studt in Paris. It will be Exhibit Number 10. Two things appear from this letter. First, Speer wrote, and I quote:
"Gauleiter Sauckel will start negotiations with the appropriate agencies with regard to the occupied western territories, in order to achieve clarity on the manner and possibility of the execution."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the point in reading that, Dr. Flachsner?
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, the Prosecution has submitted this document, 1292-PS, to prove...
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant just told us what's in the document. He has told us the substance of the whole affair. We quite understand what the difference of opinion between Sauckel and Speer was.
DR. FLACHSNER: This document shows the reaction on the part of the defendant, namely what he did, so that Hitler's decision, as such, would be contravened or at least weakened. In this letter the defendant said to General Studt...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flachsner, the Tribunal has given you the clearest possible indication of the view they take about these matters of different plans and differences of view between Sauckel and Speer. Why don't you pass on to some other part of your case if there is any other part of it?
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss the argument between these two. I am trying to show the actions taken by Speer so as to put his point of view into practice. This does not refer to...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is irrelevant. As I said just
now, the defendant has told us what he did. It is not necessary to read it all out to us again.
DR. FLACHSNER: Very well. In that case, may I go on to present a document which is on Page 30 of the English text of my document book, Page 27 of the German and French texts; Exhibit Number Speer-11. It is a letter from Speer to Sauckel dated 6 January 1944, and it is ascertained in this letter that for the French industrial firms working in France 400,000 workers should be reserved at once, and another 400,000 workers during the following months, who therefore would not be deported.
What results did these two letters have, Herr Speer, with reference to Hitler's order that 1 million workers should be taken from France to Germany?
SPEER I should like to summarize the entire subject and say a few words about it. We had a technique of dealing with inconvenient
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orders from Hitler that permitted us to by-pass them. Jodl has already said in his testimony that for his part he had developed such a technique too. And so, of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only clear to the expert as to their meaning and the results they would have to have.
From the document which is being presented now, from Sauckel's speech on 1 March 1944, Document Number R-124, it is evident, too, what the results were in regard to the labor allocation in the occupied territories. The result is clear and I have already described it here, and I think we can therefore pass to Page 49.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, can you give me a description of the results of the air attacks on the occupied' western territories?
SPEER: Yes. In this connection I should again like to summarize a few points. The invasion was preceded by heavy air attacks on the transportation system in the occupied western territories. As a result of that, beginning with May and June 1944, production in France was paralyzed and 1 million workers were unemployed. With that, the idea of shifting production had collapsed as far as I was concerned; and according to normal expectations of the French officials, too, the impression was general that a large-scale movement toward Germany would now set in.
I gave the order that in spite of the fact that the entire French industry was paralyzed the blocked factories should be kept up, although I knew as an expert that their rehabilitation, considering the damage to the transportation system, would not be possible in less than 9 or 12 months, even if the air attacks should cease entirely. I was, therefore, acting against my own interests here.
The French Prosecution has confirmed this in Document RF-22. The corresponding passages are indicated in the document book.
Between 19 and 22 June I had a conference with Hitler and' I obtained a decree according to which the workers in the occupied territories, in spite of the difficulties of transport, had to remain on the spot no matter what happened. Seyss-Inquart has already testified that a similar decision applied to Holland. Upon my orders the workers in these blocked factories even continued to receive their wages.
DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection I submit Exhibit Number Speer-12. It is an extract from the Fuehrer conference from 19 to 22 June 1944, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. The document is on Page 22 of the English text of my document book.
Herr Speer, you would have had to be aware of the fact that following this decision of yours at least 1 million unemployed
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workers in all the western territories would be unproductive for quite a long time. How could you justify such a decision?
SPEER: I must say quite openly that this was the first decision of mine which had its inner justification in the war situation having
deteriorated so disastrously. The invasion was a success. The heavy air attacks on production were showing decisive results. An early end of the war was to be forecast and all this altered the situation as far as I was concerned. The practical conclusions I drew from this situation will become apparent through various other examples which I shall put forward in the course of the Trial. Of course, Hitler was not of the same opinion during that period. On the contrary, he believed that everything ought to be done in order to utilize the last reserves of manpower.
DR. FLACHSNER: Please describe briefly your attitude toward the meeting of 11 July 1944, to which we have already referred once before. This was Document 3819-PS. Please be very brief.
SPEER: During this meeting of 11 July I maintained my point of view. Once again I pointed to Germany's reserves, as becomes apparent from the minutes, and I announced that the transport difficulties should not be allowed to influence production, and that the blocked factories were to be kept up in those territories. Both I and the military commanders of the occupied territories were perfectly aware of the fact that with this the well-known consequences for these blocked factories would be the same as before, that is, that the transfer of labor from the occupied western territories to Germany would be stopped.
DR. FLACHSNER: The French Prosecution has presented a Document Number 814, Exhibit RF-1516. It presented it during the session of 30 May, if I remember correctly. It came up during the cross-examination of your Codefendant Sauckel.
According to this order troops were to round up workers in the West. Please give a brief statement on that. So as to refresh your memory, I want to say that reference is made in this telegram to the meeting of 11 July.
SPEER: The minutes of the meeting show, as I said before, that I opposed measures of coercion. I did not see Keitel's actual order.
DR. FLACHSNER: Number 824 is another document submitted by the French Prosecution on the same subject. It is a letter by General Von Kluge dated 25 July 1944; Exhibit RF-515. It refers to the telegram from Keitel which has been previously mentioned. Do you know anything about it, and whether that order was ever actually carried out?
SPEER: I know that the order was not carried out. To understand the situation, it is necessary to become familiar with the
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atmosphere prevailing about 20 July. At that time not every order from headquarters was carried out. As the investigations after 20 July proved, at that time in his capacity as Commander, West, Kluge was already planning negotiations with the western enemies for a capitulation and probably he made his initial attempts at that time. That, incidentally, was the reason for his suicide after the attempt of 20 July had failed. It is out of the question...
THE PRESIDENT: You gave the number 1824. What does that mean?
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, Number 824 is the number which the French Prosecution has given to this document. That is the number under which it has submitted it. Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain the exhibit number. I have made inquiries, but I have not had an answer yet.
I am just given to understand that it is RF-1515. That is its exhibit number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SPEER: It is out of the question that Field Marshal Kluge, in the military situation in which he found himself, and considering his views, should have given orders for raids and measures of coercion at that moment. The release of the Sauckel-Laval agreement, which was mentioned in this document, had no practical significance, since the blocked factories were maintained, and thus this agreement could not become effective. This was well known to the officials in France, and the best proof for the fact that the order was not carried out is Document RF-22 of the French Prosecution, which shows that in July 1944 only 3,000 workers came to Germany from France. If the military authorities had used measures of coercion, it would have been a simple matter to send a very much larger number of workers than these 3,000 from France to Germany.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did you use your influence to stop completely the allocation of labor from occupied territories to Germany?
SPEER: No; I must state quite frankly that although I did use my influence to reduce the recruitment of labor or to put an end to measures of coercion and raids, I did not use it to stop the allocation of labor completely.
DR. FLACHSNER: I shall now pass to another problem.
The Prosecution has touched upon and mentioned the Organization Todt. Can you briefly explain the tasks of the Organization Todt to the Tribunal?
SPEER: Here, again, I shall give a little summary. The tasks of the Organization Todt were exclusively technical ones, that is to say, they had to carry out technical construction work; in the East,
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particularly road and rail construction, and in the West the construction of concrete dugouts which became known as the so-called Atlantic Wall. For this purpose the Organization Todt used foreign labor to a disproportionately high degree. In the West there were about 20 foreigners to 1 German worker; in Russia there were about 4 Russians to 1 German. This could only be carried out in the West if the Organization Todt could use local construction firms and their work-yards to a considerable extent. They supplied the technical staff and recruited their own workers, it being clear that these firms had no possibility to recruit by coercion. Accordingly a large number of workers of the Organization Todt were volunteers; but naturally a certain percentage always worked in the Organization Todt under the conscription system.
Here the Organization Todt has been described as part of the Armed Forces. As a technical detail it should be stated in this connection that foreign workers did not, of course, belong to it, but only German workers who naturally in occupied territories had to figure as members of the Armed Forces in some way or other. The Prosecution had a different opinion on this matter.
Apart from the Organization Todt there were certain transport units attached to my Ministry, which were working in occupied territories, and it is for a certain reason that I am anxious to state that they were on principle recruited as volunteers. The Prosecution has alleged that the Organization Todt was the comprehensive organization for all military construction work in the occupied territories. That is not the case. They only had to carry out one quarter to one-fifth of the construction program.
In May 1944 the Organization Todt was taken over by the Reich and subsequently made responsible for some of the large-scale construction programs and for the management of the organization of the Plenipotentiary for Control of Building in the Four Year Plan. This Plenipotentiary for Control of Building distributed the contingents coming from the Central Planning Board and was responsible for other directive tasks, but he was not responsible for the carrying out and for the supervision of the construction work itself. There were various official building authorities in the Reich, and in particular the SS Building Administration had their own responsibility for the building programs which they carried out.
DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution has alleged that you had concentration camp inmates employed in the armament industry and has submitted Document R-124, Exhibit USA-179.
Mr. President, this document is on Page 47 of the English text in my document book. It is about a conference with Hitler in September 1942.
How did that conference come about, Herr Speer?
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SPEER: When in February 1942 I took over the armament department of the Army there were demands for considerable increases all along the line; and to meet them it was necessary to construct numerous new factories. For this purpose Himmler offered his concentration camps both to Hitler and to me. It was his plan that some of these necessary new constructions, as well as the necessary machinery, should be housed within the concentration camps, and were to be operated there under the supervision of the SS. The chief of the armament department of the Army, Generaloberst Fromm, was against this plan, and so was I. Apart from general reasons for this, the first point was that uncontrolled arms production on the part of the SS was to be prevented. Secondly, this would certainly entail my being deprived of the technical management in these industries. For that reason when planning the large armaments extension program in the spring of 1942, I did not take into consideration these demands by the SS. Himmler went to see Hitler and the minutes of this conference, which are available here, show the objections to the wishes which Hitler put to me upon Himmler's suggestions.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to draw your attention to Page 44 of the German text, which is Page 47 of the English text. It is Point 36 of a Fuehrer protocol. There it says, and I quote:
". . . beyond a small number of workers it will not be possible to organize armament production in the concentration camps . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flachsner, the witness has just given us the substance of it, has he not?
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, according to this document you proposed that factories should be staffed entirely with internees from concentration camps. Did you carry that out?
SPEER: No, it was not carried out in this form because it soon became clear that it was Himmler's intention to gain influence over these industries and in some way or other he would undoubtedly have succeeded in getting these industries under his control. For that reason, as a basic principle, only part of the industrial staff consisted of internees from concentration camps, so as to counteract Himmler's efforts. And so it happened that the labor camps were attached to the armament industries. But Himmler never received his share of 5 to 8 percent of arms, which had been decided upon. This was prevented due to an agreement with the General of the Army Staff in the OKW, General Buhle. The witness will testify to this.
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DR. FLACHSNER: May I further draw your attention to Document 1584-PS, on Page 48 of the English text in my document book. It is Exhibit USA-22'1, and is a letter from Himmler to Goering dated 9 March 1944. Himmler is emphasizing the fact that if his responsibility, that is to say, that of the SS, would be extended, a speeding-up and an increase in production could be expected. The accompanying letter from Pohl to Himmler shows that it was proposed to supervise and control the employment of concentration camp inmates and even to use the SS as responsible works manager. According to his experience and knowledge, it would not be sufficient merely to assign the internees to other industries. The SS, therefore, wished to supervise and control the labor employment in these industries.
This document shows something else, however; for it confirms the statement of the Defendant Speer that inmates of concentration camps were also paid premiums if they proved particularly efficient; furthermore, it shows on the last page that on an average the working hours of all internees were 240 hours per month, which would correspond to 60 working hours per week.
I also refer to a document which has already been mentioned yesterday; it is Number 44 and has already been submitted by me as Exhibit Number 6; it is in the second document book. Mr. President, that is the first book in the supplementary volume.
This document shows clearly how far the extension of the SS industries was determined by Himmler's and Pohl's ambition. The document also states, and I quote:
". . . the monthly working hours contributed by concentration camp inmates did not even amount to 8 million hours, so that most certainly not more than about 32,000 men and women from concentration camps can be working in our armaments industries. This number is constantly diminishing."
Mr. President, this sentence is on Page 90, at the bottom. You will find it there in the English text.
The letter also shows that the author computes nearly the same number of working hours as is mentioned by Pohl in his letter; namely 250 hours per month, which is approximately 63 hours per week.
Herr Speer, through this letter you learned of the fact that workers, particularly foreigners, were not returned to their old places of work when for certain acts they had become involved with the Police, but that they were taken to concentration camps. What steps did you take then?
SPEER: Here again I should like to summarize several points. I received the letter on or about 15 May in Berlin, when I returned
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after my illness. Its contents greatly upset me because, after all, this is nothing more than kidnaping. I had an estimate submitted to me about the number of people thus being removed from the economic system. The round figure was 30,000 to 40,000 a month. The result was my declaration in the Central Planning Board on 22 May 1944, where I demanded that these workers, even as internees, as I called them, should be returned to their old factories at once. This remark, as such, is not logical because, naturally, the number of crimes in each individual factory was very low, so that such a measure was not practicable. Anyhow, what I wished to express by it was that the workers would have to be returned to their original places of work. This statement in the Central Planning Board has been submitted by the Prosecution.
Immediately after the meeting of the Central Planning Board I went to see Hitler, and there I had a conference on 5 June 1944. The minutes of the Fuehrer conference are available. I stated that I would not stand for any such procedure, and I cited many arguments founded entirely on reason, since no other arguments would have been effective. Hitler declared, as the minutes show, that these workers would have to be returned to their former work at once, and that after a conference between Himmler and myself he would once again communicate this decision of his to Himmler.
DR. FLACHSNER: I submit Exhibit Number 13, which is an extract from the Fuehrer conference of 3 to 5 June 1944; you will find this document on Page 92 of the document book.
SPEER: Immediately after this conference I went to see Himmler and communicated to him Hitler's decision. He told me that no such number had ever been arrested by the Police. But he promised me that he would immediately issue a decree which would correspond to Hitler's demands; namely, that the SS would no longer be permitted to detain these workers. I informed Hitler of this result, and I asked him once more to get in touch with Himmler about it. In those days I had no reason to mistrust Himmler's promise because, after all, it is not customary for Reich Ministers to distrust each other so much. But anyhow, I did not have any further complaints from my assistants concerning this affair. I must emphasize that the settling of the entire matter was not really my affair, but the information appeared so incredible to me that I intervened at once. Had I known that already 18 months before Himmler had started a very similar action, and that in this letter, which has been submitted here...
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, this is Document 1063-PS, and it is Exhibit USA-219. I have reproduced it on Page 51 of the English text of my document book. That is the document to which the witness is now referring.
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How far did your efforts go to get workers for the armaments industry from concentration camps?
SPEER: I wanted to make a brief statement with reference to the document.
Had I known this letter, I would never have had enough confidence in Himmler to expect that he would correctly execute his order as instructed by Hitler.
For this letter shows quite clearly that this action was to be kept secret from other offices. These other offices could only be the of lice of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor or my own office.
Finally, I want to say in connection with this problem that it was my duty as Minister for Armament to put to use as many workers as were possibly available for armaments production, or any other production. I considered it proper, therefore, that workers from concentration camps, too, should work in war production or armament industries.
The main accusation by the Prosecution, however, that I deliberately increased the number of concentration camps, or caused them to be increased, is by no means correct. On the contrary I wanted just the opposite, looking at it from my point of view of production.
DR. FLACHSNER: May I refer in this connection to the answers of the witness Schmelter to Numbers 9 and 35 in the questionnaire which was submitted to him, and to the answer of the witness Schieber to Number 20.
Herr Speer, Document Number R-124, Exhibit USA-179, which was submitted by the Prosecution, contains several remarks you made during the meetings of the Central Planning Board.
Mr. President, may I draw your attention to Page 53 of the English text of my document book.
Herr Speer, what do you mean to say by your remark concerning "idlers" in the meeting of 30 October 1942?
SPEER: I made the remark as reproduced by the stenographic record. Here, however, I had an opportunity to read all the shorthand notes of the Central Planning Board and I discovered that this remark was not followed up in any way and that no measures by me were demanded.
DR. FLACHSNER: On the same page of the document book, Mr. President, there is a statement from a meeting on 22 April 1943.
Herr Speer, what do you have to say in connection with that remark regarding Russian prisoners of war?
SPEER: It can be elucidated very briefly. This is proof of the fact that the conception "armaments" must be understood in the
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Ray I have explained, because the two sectors from which the 90,000 Russians employed in armaments originated, according to this document, were the iron, steel, and metal industries with 29,000; and the industries constructing engines, boilers, vehicles and apparatuses of all sorts with 63,000.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, the Prosecution has also mentioned a remark made by you on 25 May 1944. That, too, can be found on Page 53 of the English text of the document book. There you said at a conference with Keitel and Zeitzler that in accordance with Hitler's instructions the groups of auxiliary volunteers were to be dissolved, and that you would effect the transfer of the Russians from the rear army areas.
SPEER: Here, again, I read through the shorthand notes. It can be explained briefly. The "Hiwi" mentioned in the document are the so-called auxiliary volunteers who had joined the troops fighting in Russia. As the months went by, they took on large proportions, and during the retreat they followed along, as they would probably have been treated as traitors in their own country. These volunteers were not, however, as I desired it, put into industry, since the conference which was planned did not take place.
DR. FLACHSNER: Please make a brief statement concerning Sauckel's memorandum, 556-PS, which was submitted by the Prosecution, of a telephone call on 4 January 1943 which refers to labor allocation.
SPEER: After this telephone call further measures were to be taken in France to increase the number of workers available for allocation. Minutes of a Fuehrer conference which I found recently, namely, those of the meeting of 3 to 5 January 1943, show that at that time Hitler's statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people in France for local industry and economy.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I shall submit this document later because up to now I have not yet had the opportunity to...
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal how long you are going to be, Dr. Flachsner?
DR. FLACHSNER: I hope, Mr. President, that I shad be through before 5 o'clock this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: You will not lose sight of what I have said to you already about the relevance of the argument and evidence you have been adducing up to date?
DR. FLACHSNER: I will not, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, this morning we stopped at a discussion of Sauckel's telephone message of 4 January 1943 regarding the matter of labor allocation. As you have already stated, the minutes of a Fuehrer conference of 3 to 5 January, which I shall submit to the Tribunal later on, are connected with this. Will you please make a brief statement on the subject of that discussion?
SPEER: This record states that measures must be taken to raise economy in France to a higher level. It contains stern injunctions from Hitler concerning the ways and means that he contemplated using to this end. It states that acts of sabotage are to be punished with the most rigorous means and that "humanitarian muddleheadedness" is out of place.
These minutes also show that at that time I asked Hitler to transfer the management of production questions in France to me, a step which was actually taken several months later.
I mention this only for the purpose of making it clear, while I am still in a position to testify as a witness, that I did not carry out Hitler's policy of abandoning all "humanitarian muddleheadedness" in France.
My attention was drawn to one case in which 10 hostages were to be shot as a reprisal for acts of industrial sabotage committed in the Meurthe-et-Moselle district. At that time I managed to prevent the sentence from being carried out. Roechling, who was at that time in charge of iron production in the occupied western territories, is my witness in this case. That is the only case I know of where hostages were to be shot on account of sabotage in production.
I can also prove that, through a decision by Hitler dated September 1943, I was responsible for providing a supplementary meal in addition to the existing ration for factory workers employed in France. In a letter which I sent to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in December 1943, I strongly urged the necessity not only of paying wages to the workers in the occupied western territories, but also of making available to them a corresponding quantity of consumer goods-a line of policy which doubtless does not accord with the policy of plundering the western regions, on which so much stress has been laid by the French Prosecution.
All three documents are in my possession and they can be produced. I only mention these facts to show that I neither approved nor followed the very harsh policy laid down by Hitler for application in France in the records of 3 to 5 January.
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DR. FLACHSNER: I now turn to another point. Herr Speer, what did you have produced in France; that is, on the basis of your program?
SPEER: We have already discussed this at sufficient length No armament goods were manufactured, only bottleneck parts and consumer goods.
DR. FLACHSNER: Very well. I merely wanted to get that clear.
The Prosecution has submitted to you minutes of a Fuehrer conference-R-124-dated March 1944 and containing a statement that you discussed with Hitler the Reich Marshal's proposal to deliver prisoners of war to France.
What can you say to that?
SPEER: This record is dated 3 March 1944. From January until May 1944 I was seriously ill, and the discussion took place without me. A member of my staff was in charge of this discussion-a man who enjoyed the confidence of Hitler in an unusually high degree. In any case, the proposal was not carried out.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, you attended the session of 30 May, at which the question was discussed of how the of lice of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor came to be established. Will you comment briefly on that point?
SPEER: I should like to say that I wanted a delegate to deal with all labor allocation problems connected with my task of military armament production. My chief concern in the allocation problem, at the beginning of my term of office, was with the Gauleiter, who carried on a policy of Gau particularism. The nonpolitical offices of the Labor Ministry could not proceed against the Gauleiter, and the result was that manpower inside Germany was frozen. I suggested to Hitler that he should appoint a Gauleiter whom I knew to this post-a man named Hanke. Goering, by the way, has already confirmed this. Hitler agreed. Two days later, Bormann made the suggestion that Sauckel be chosen. I did not know Sauckel well, but I was quite ready to accept the choice. It is quite possible that Sauckel did not know. anything about the affair and that he assumed-as he was was entitled to do-that he was chosen at my suggestion.
The office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was created in the following way:
Lammers declared that he could not issue special authority for a fraction of labor allocation as that would be doubtful procedure from an administrative point of view, and for that reason the whole question of manpower would have to be put into the hands of a plenipotentiary. At first they contemplated a Fuehrer decree. Goering
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protested on the grounds that it was his task under the Four Year Plan. A compromise was made, therefore, in accordance with which Sauckel was to be the Plenipotentiary General within the framework of the Four Year Plan, although he would be appointed by Hitler.
This was a unique arrangement under the Four Year Plan. Thereby Sauckel was in effect subordinated to Hitler; and he always looked upon it in that way.
DR. FLACHSNER: You have heard that Sauckel, in giving his testimony on 30 May, said that Goering participated in the meetings of the Central Planning Board. Is that true?
SPEER: No, that is in no way correct. I would not have had any use for him, for after all, we had to carry out practical work.
DR. FLACHSNER: The Prosecution has submitted a statement by Sauckel dated 8 October 1945, according to which arrangements for his delegates to function in the occupied territories were supposed to have been made by you. Is that true?
SPEER: No. In 1941 I had not yet anything to do with armament; and even later, during the period of Sauckel's activity, I did not appoint these delegates and did not do much to promote their activities. That was a matter for Sauckel to handle; it was in his jurisdiction.
DR. FLACHSNER: The French Prosecution quoted from the record of Sauckel's preliminary interrogation on 27 September 1945. According to this record you gave a special order for transport trains with foreign workers.
SPEER: I believe it would be practical to deal at the same time with all the statements made by Sauckel which apply to me; that will save time.
DR. FLACHSNER: Please go ahead.
SPEER: Arrangements for transport trains were made by Sauckel and his staff. It is possible that air raids or a sudden change in the production program made it necessary for my office to ask for transport trains to be rerouted; but the responsibility for that always rested with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
Sauckel also testified here that after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started on the "total war effort." But that is not correct in this form. Stalingrad was in January 1943, and Goebbels started on his "total war effort" in August 1944. After Stalingrad a great reorganization program was to be carried out in Germany in order to free German labor. I myself was one of those who demanded this. Neither Goebbels nor I, however, was able to carry out this plan. A committee of three, Lammers, Keitel, and Bormann, was formed; but owing
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to their lack of technical knowledge they were unable to carry out their task.
My Labor Allocation Department was further mentioned by Sauckel in his testimony. This worked as follows: Every large factory and every employer of labor had an allocation department which, naturally, came under mine. None of these departments, however, encroached in the slightest degree on Sauckel's tasks. Their sphere of activity was not very great, as may be seen from the fact that each was one of 50 or 60 departments coming under my office. If I had attached very much importance to it, it would have been one of my six or eight branch offices.
Sauckel further mentioned the Stabsleiter discussions which took place in his office. A representative of my Labor Allocation Department for Army and Navy armament and for building attended these conferences. At these meetings, which were attended by about 15 people who were in need of labor, the question of priority was settled on the basis of Sauckel's information on the state of economy generally. These were really the functions erroneously ascribed here to the Central Planning Board.
In addition it was asserted that I promoted the transport of foreign workers to Germany in April 1942 and that I was responsible for the fact that foreign workers were brought to Germany at all. That, however, is not true. I did not need to use any influence on Sauckel to attain that. In any case, it is evident from a document in my possession-the minutes of a Fuehrer conference of 3 May 1942-that the introduction of compulsory labor in the western region was approved by the Fuehrer at Sauckel's suggestion.
I can further quote a speech, which I delivered on 18 April 1942, showing that at that period I was still of the opinion that the German building industry, which employed approximately 1.8 million workmen, was to be discontinued to a large extent to divert the necessary labor to the production of armaments. This speech which I made to my staff, in which I explained my principles and also discussed the question of manpower, does not contain any mention of the planning of a foreign labor draft. If I had been the active instigator of these plans, surely I would have mentioned the subject in this speech.
Finally, in connection with Sauckel's testimony, I must correct the plan of the organization submitted here. It is incorrect in that the separate sectors enumerated in it are classified under various ministries. In reality these sectors of employers of labor were classified under various economic branches, independently of the ministries. They only corresponded where my own Ministry and the Air Ministry were concerned.
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It is also incorrect in stating that the building industry was represented in the Ministry of Economics. That came under my jurisdiction. From 1943 on, the chemical and mining industries, both of which are listed under the Ministry of Economics, were under my jurisdiction. To my knowledge, these branches were represented through plenipotentiaries in the Four Year Plan even prior to September 1943 and stated their requirements directly to Sauckel independently of the Ministry of Economics.
This plan further is incorrect in stating that the demands for these workers from individual employers went directly to Hitler. It would have been impossible for Hitler to settle this dispute between 15 employers. As I have already said, the latter attended the Stabsleiter conferences, over which Sauckel presided.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, what did you do with your documents at the end of the war?
SPEER: I felt bound to preserve my documents so that the necessary transition measures could be taken during reconstruction. I refused to allow these documents even to be sifted. They were turned over in their entirety to the Allied authorities here in Nuremberg, where I had a branch archive. I handed them over when I was still at liberty in the Flensburg zone. The Prosecution is thus in possession of all my documents to the number of several thousand, as well as all public speeches, Gauleiter speeches, and other speeches dealing with armament and industry; some 4,000 Fuehrer decisions, 5,000 pages of stenographic records of the Central Planning Board, memoranda, and so forth. I mention this only because these documents show conclusively to what extent my task was a technical and economic one.
DR. FLACHSNER: In your documents, as far as you remember, did you ever make statements regarding ideology, anti-Semitism, et cetera?
SPEER: No; I never made any statements of the kind, either in speeches or memoranda. I assume that otherwise the Prosecution would be in a position to produce something like that.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, you also figured as armament Minister on the list of members of the new Government drawn up by the men responsible for the Putsch of 20 July. Did you participate in the attempted assassination of 20 July?
SPEER: I did not participate, nor was I informed of it in advance. At that time I was against assassinating Hitler.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, this point is mentioned in interrogatories by the witness Kempf under Point 9 and the witness Stahl under Point 1.
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[Turning to the defendant.] What was the reason why you, as the only minister from the National Socialist regime, were on the opposition list?
SPEER: At that period I was working in collaboration with Army experts of the General Staff and the commander of the Home Defense Forces. Both staffs were the nucleus of the attempt of 20 July. I had particularly close relations with Generaloberst Fromm, chief of the Home Defense Forces, and also with Generaloberst Zeitzler, the Chief of the Army General Staff. After 20 July Fromm was hanged and Zeitzler was dismissed from the Army. A close contact developed through this collaboration, and these circles recognized my technical achievements. I assumed at that time that that was why they wanted to retain me.
DR. FLACHSNER: So political reasons did not play any part in that connection?
SPEER: Certainly not directly. Of course, I was well known for the fact that for a long time I had spoken my mind emphatically and in public regarding the abuses which took place in Hitler's immediate circle. As I found out later, I shared the opinions of the men of 20 July in many points of principle.
DR. FLACHSNER: What were your relations with Hitler in regard to your work?
SPEER: My closest contact with him, in my capacity of architect, was probably during the period from 1937 to September 1939; after that, the relationship was no longer so close on account of the circumstances of the war. After I was appointed successor to Todt a closer but much more official working relationship was again established. Because of the heavy demands made upon me by my armament work, I had very little opportunity to go to headquarters. I only visited the Fuehrer's headquarters about once in 2 or 3 weeks. My 4 months' illness in the spring of 1944 was exploited by many people interested in weakening my position, and after 20 July the fact that I had been scheduled for the Ministry undoubtedly occasioned a shock to Hitler-a fact which Bormann and Goebbels used to start an open fight against me. The details are shown by a letter which I sent to Hitler on 20 December 1944 and which has been submitted as a document.
DR. FLACHSNER: Were you able to carry on political discussions with Hitler?
SPEER: No, he regarded me as a purely technical minister. Attempts to discuss political or personnel problems with him always failed because of the fact that he was unapproachable. From 1944 on, he was so averse to general discussions and discussions on the war situation that I set down my ideas in memorandum form
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and handed them to him. Hitler knew how to confine every man to his own specialty. He himself was therefore the only co-ordinating factor. This was far beyond his strength and also his knowledge. A unified political leadership was lacking in consequence, as was also an expert military office for making decisions.
DR. FLACHSNER: Then, as technical minister, do you wish to limit your responsibility to your sphere of work?
SPEER: No; I should like to say something of fundamental importance here. This war has brought an inconceivable catastrophe upon the German people, and indeed started a world catastrophe. Therefore it is my unquestionable duty to assume my share of responsibility for this disaster before the German people. This is all the more my obligation, all the more my responsibility, since the head of the Government has avoided responsibility before the German people and before the world. I, as an important member of the leadership of the Reich, therefore, share in the total responsibility, beginning with 1942. I will state my arguments in this connection in my final remarks.
DR. FLACHSNER: Do you assume responsibility for the affairs covered by the extensive sphere of your assignments?
SPEER: Of course, as far as it is possible according to the principles generally applied and as far as actions were taken according to my directives.
DR. FLACHSNER: Do you wish to refer to Fuehrer decrees in this connection?
SPEER: No. Insofar as Hitler gave me orders and I carried them out, I assume the responsibility for them. I did not, of course, carry out all the orders which he gave me.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I turn now to a second part of my evidence in the case of the defendant. This presentation is not meant to exonerate the defendant from those charges, brought against Speer by the Prosecution, which apply to his actual sphere of activity.
This part concerns itself rather with the accusations raised by the Prosecution against the defendant as a member of the so-called joint conspiracy. This second part is relatively brief and I assume that I shall be able to conclude my entire presentation of evidence within an hour.
In this matter we are concerned with Speer's activity in preventing Hitler's destructive intentions in Germany and the occupied countries and with the measures he took and the attempts he made to shorten a war which he believed already lost.
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I assume that the High Tribunal will agree to my presentation. Herr Speer, up to what time did you devote all your powers to obtaining the strongest possible armament and thus continuing the war?
SPEER: Up to the middle of January 1945.
DR. FLACHSNER: Had not the war been lost before that?
SPEER: From a military point of view and as far as the general situation was concerned, it was certainly lost before that. It is difficult, however, to consider a war as lost and to draw the final conclusions as regards one's own person if one is faced with unconditional surrender.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did not considerations arising out of the production situation, of which you were in a position to have a comprehensive view, force you to regard the war as lost long before that?
SPEER: From the armament point of view not until the autumn of 1944, for I succeeded up to that time, in spite of bombing attacks, in maintaining a constant rise in production. If I may express it in figures, this was so great that in the year 1944 I could completely re-equip 130 infantry divisions and 40 armored divisions. That involved new equipment for 2 million men. This figure would have been 30 percent higher had it not been for the bombing attacks. We reached our production peak for the entire war in August 1944 for munitions; in September 1944 for aircraft; and in December 1944 for ordnance and the new U-boats. The new weapons were to be put into use a few months later, probably in February or March of 1945. I may mention only the jet planes which had already been announced in the press, the new U-boats, the new antiaircraft installations, et cetera. Here too, however, bombing attacks so retarded the mass production of these new weapons-which in the last phase of the war might have changed the situation-that they could no longer be used against the enemy in large numbers. All of these attempts were fruitless, however, since from 12 May 1944 on our fuel plants became targets for concentrated attacks from the air.
This was catastrophic. 90 percent of the fuel was lost to us from that time on. The success of these attacks meant the loss of the war as far as production was concerned; for our new tanks and jet planes were of no use without fuel.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did you ten Hitler about the effect on production, of the bombing attacks?
SPEER: Yes, I told him of this in great detail, both orally and in writing. Between June and December 1944 I sent him 12 memoranda, all with catastrophic news.
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DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to submit to the Tribunal a document, a Speer memorandum of 30 June 1944. It is reproduced on Page 56 of the English document book and will be Exhibit Number 14. I should like to quote from this. Speer writes to Hitler:
"But in September of this year the quantities required to cover the most urgent needs of the Wehrmacht cannot possibly be supplied any longer, which means that from that time on there will be a deficiency which cannot be made good and which must lead to tragic consequences."
Speer informed Hitler in another memorandum, dated 30 August 1944, on the situation in the chemical industry and the fuel production industry. This is Page 62 of the English text, Exhibit Number 15. I quote only one sentence:
". . . so that these are shortages in important categories of those materials necessary for the conduct of modem warfare."
Herr Speer, how was it possible that you and the other coworkers of Hitler, despite your realization of the situation, still tried to do everything possible to continue the war?
SPEER: In this phase of the war Hitler deceived all of us. From the summer of 1944 on he circulated, through Ambassador Hewel of the Foreign Office, definite statements to the effect that conversation with foreign powers had been started. Generaloberst Jodl has confirmed this to me here in Court. In this way, for instance, the fact that several visits were paid to Hitler by the Japanese Ambassador was interpreted to mean that through Japan we were carrying on conversations with Moscow; or else Minister Neubacher, who was here as a witness, was reported to have initiated conversations in the Balkans with the United States; or else the former Soviet Ambassador in Berlin was alleged to have been in Stockholm for the purpose of initiating conversations.
In this way he raised hopes that, like Japan, we would start negotiations in this hopeless situation, so that the people would be saved from the worst consequences. To do this, however, it was necessary to stiffen resistance as much as possible. He deceived all of us by holding out to the military leaders false hopes in the success of diplomatic steps and by promising the political leaders fresh victories through the use of new troops and new weapons and by systematically spreading rumors to encourage the people to believe in the appearance of a miracle weapon-all for the purpose of keeping up resistance. I can prove that during this period I made continual reference in my speeches and in my letters, which I wrote to Hitler and Goebbels, as to how dishonest and disastrous I considered this policy of deceiving the people by promising them a miracle weapon.
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DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, were orders given to destroy industry in Belgium, Holland, and France?
SPEER: Yes. In case of occupation by the Allies, Hitler had ordered a far-reaching system of destruction of war industries in all these countries; according to planned preparations, coal and mineral mines, power plants, and industrial premises were to be destroyed.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did you take any steps to prevent the execution of these orders?
DR. FLACHSNER: And did you prevent them?
SPEER: The Commander, West was responsible for carrying out these orders, since they concerned his operational zone. But I informed him that as far as I was concerned this destruction had no sense and no purpose and that I, in my capacity of Armament Minister, did not consider this destruction necessary. Thereupon no order to destroy these things was given. By this, of course, I made myself responsible to Hitler for the fact that no destruction took place.
DR. FLACHSNER: When was that?
' SPEER: About the beginning of July 1944.
DR. FLACHSNER: How could you justify your position?
SPEER: All the military leaders whom I knew said at that time that the war was bound to end in October or November, since the invasion had been successful.
I myself was of the same opinion in view of the fuel situation. This may be clearly seen from the memorandum, which I sent to Hitler on 30 August, in which I told him that in view of this development in the fuel situation no operational actions by the troops would be possible by October or November. The fact that the war lasted longer than that can be ascribed only to the standstill of the enemy of Pensive in 1944. This made it possible to throttle our fuel consumption and to give the Western Front new supplies of tanks and ammunition. In these circumstances I was perfectly willing to accept responsibility for abandoning the industries in the western countries to the enemy in an undamaged condition, for they could be of no use to them for at least 9 months, the transport system having been destroyed beforehand. This memorandum coincides with the protection of the unemployed workers in the blocked factories-a matter which Is dealt with this morning.
DR. FLACHSNER: Did Hitler sanction these measures?
SPEER: He could not sanction these measures for he knew nothing about them. It was a period of such hectic activity at
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headquarters that he never thought of checking up on the measures taken for destruction. Later, in January 1945, reports appeared in the French press on the rapid reconstruction of their undestroyed industries. Then, of course, serious charges were raised against me.
DR. FLACHSNER: The French Prosecution has submitted a document, RF-132. This is a report by the field economics officer attached to the Wehrmacht commander for the Netherlands. According to this report, a decree by the Commander, West was still in existence in September 1944. This said that destructive measures were to be taken only in the coastal towns and nowhere else, and the field economics officer for the Netherlands stated, as may be seen from the document, that the order issued by the Commander, West was obsolete and that he himself had therefore decreed on his own initiative that the industries in Holland should be destroyed. How was this possible and what did you do about it?
SPEER: As a matter of fact, some overzealous lower officials caused the basic decrees not to destroy in the West to be ignored. Our communications system for orders had been largely destroyed through bombing attacks. Seyss-Inquart had drawn my attention to the fact that destruction was to take place in Holland. He has already testified that I authorized him not to take destructive measures. This was in September 1944. In addition, in order to prevent such destruction, on 5 September 1944, acting without authorization, I directed the managers of the coal and iron production and the chief of the civilian administration in Luxembourg to prevent destruction in the Minette ore mines, in the Saar coal mines, and the coal mines of Belgium and Holland, et cetera. In view of the hopeless war situation at that time, I, as the person responsible for supplying electric current, continued to furnish current to the undertakings on the other side of the front so that the pump stations in the coal mines would not have to stop working, because if these pump stations had stopped the mines would have been flooded.
DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection, I am submitting a copy of a letter from Speer to Gauleiter Simon at Koblenz. This is Exhibit Number Speer-16, Page 57 of the English text in my document book.
Herr Speer, with regard to the other occupied countries apart from France, Belgium, and Holland, did you use your influence to prevent destruction?
SPEER: From August 1944, in the industrial installations in the Government General, the ore mines in the Balkans, the nickel works in Finland; from September 1944, in the industrial installations in Upper Italy; beginning with February 1945, in the oil fields in
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Hungary and the industries of Czechoslovakia. I should like to emphasize in this connection that I was supported to a great extent by Generaloberst Jodl, who quietly tolerated this policy of nondestruction.
DR. FLACHSNER: What were Hitler's intentions with regard to the preservation of industry and means of existence for the German population at the beginning of September 1944, when enemy troops approached the boundaries of the Greater German Reich from all sides?
SPEER: He had absolutely no intention of preserving industry. On the contrary, he ordered the "scorched earth" policy with special application to Germany. That meant the ruthless destruction of all animate and inanimate property on the approach of the enemy. This policy was backed by Bormann, Ley, and Goebbels, while the various branches of the Wehrmacht and the competent ministries opposed it.
DR. FLACHSNER: Since these efforts by Speer to prevent the application of destructive measures, which had been considerably intensified, also applied to areas then considered part of the German Reich, such as Polish Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine, Austria, the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, I should like to have this topic admitted as part of my evidence.
Herr Speer, did the commanders of the armies in the wider German area that I have just defined have executive powers to carry out orders of destruction?
SPEER: No. As far as industries were concerned, those executive powers were vested in me. Bridges, locks, railroad installations, et cetera, were the affair of the Wehrmacht.
DR. FLACHSNER: In your measures for the protection of industry, did you differentiate between the territory of the so-called Altreich and those areas which were added after 1933?
SPEER: No. The industrial region of Upper Silesia, the remaining districts of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, Alsace-Lorraine, and Austria, of course, were protected against destruction in the same way as the German areas. I made the necessary arrangements by personal directives on the spot-particularly in the Eastern Territories.
DR. FLACHSNER: What steps did you take against the scorched earth policy?
SPEER: I returned from a trip to the Western Front on 14 September 1944 and found the decree awaiting me that everything was to be destroyed ruthlessly. I immediately issued a counterdecree officially ordering all industrial installations to be spared. At that time I was very much upset about the fact that industries were
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now to be destroyed in Germany in the hopeless war situation, and I was all the more upset because I thought I had succeeded in saving the industries in the occupied western territories from destruction.
DR. FLACHSNER: I should like to submit a document in this connection, a decree by Speer dated 14 September 1944 for the protection of industries. It is on Page 58 of the English text of my document book; Exhibit Number 17.
Herr Speer, did you succeed in getting this order carried out?
SPEER: The scorched earth policy was officially proclaimed in the Volkischer Beobachter at the same time in an official article by the Reich press chief, so that I realized quite clearly that my counterdecree could not be effective for any length of time. In this connection I used a method which is perhaps typical of the means employed by Hitler's immediate circle. In order to dissuade him from the scorched earth policy, I made use of the faith which he induced in all his co-workers that the lost territories would be recaptured. I made him decide between the two situations: Firstly, if these industrial areas were lost, my armament potential would sink if they were not recaptured; and secondly, if they were recaptured they would be of value to us only if we had not destroyed them.
DR. FLACHSNER: You thereupon addressed a letter to Bormann.
I should like to submit this letter as Exhibit Number 18, Mr. President; Page 59 of the English text of the document book. This teletype . . .
SPEER: I think we can dispense with the quotation.
DR. FLACHSNER: Yes. You sent this teletype message to Bormann before you discussed the contents with Hitler?
SPEER: Yes. I should like to summarize...
THE PRESIDENT: Would you give the French page as well so that the French members may have it?
DR. FLACHSNER: It is Page 56 of the French text of the document book.
SPEER: Hitler approved of the text which I suggested to him, in which I gave him the alternative of either considering the war as lost or of leaving the areas intact. For the time being there was in any case no danger, because the fronts remained stable. Hitler insisted particularly on the destruction of the Minette ore mines in France; but in this case too I was successful, as may be seen from the document, in preventing the destruction of these
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mines-again by exploiting Hitler's hopes of a successful counterattack.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, the document to which the defendant has just referred is an extract from the Fuehrer decree of 18 to 20 August 1944; and I submit it as Exhibit Number Speer-19. It is reproduced in the supplement to my document book, Page 101.
Herr Speer, how did this order originate?
SPEER: I have already told you.
DR. FLACHSNER: The term "paralysis" frequently occurs in your document in connection with industrial installations, et cetera. Will you tell the Tribunal just what you mean by the use of this term?
SPEER: I can only say briefly that this concerns the removal of specific parts, which put the plant temporarily out of commission; but these parts were not destroyed; they were merely concealed.
DR. FLACHSNER: You emphasized a few minutes ago that up to January. 1945 you tried to achieve the highest possible degree of armament. What were your reasons for giving up the idea after January 1945?
SPEER: From January 1945 onward, a very unpleasant chapter begins: The last phase of the war and the realization that HITLER had identified the fate of the German people with his own; and from March 1945 onward, the realization that Hitler intended deliberately to destroy the means of life for his own people if the war were lost. I have no intention of using my actions during that phase of the war to help me in my personal defense, but this is a matter of honor which must be defended; and for that reason I should like to tell you briefly about this period of time.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, what was the production situation in the various activities under your jurisdiction at the end of January 1945?
SPEER: The fuel production had been quite inadequate since the beginning of the attacks on fuel plants in May 1944, and the situation did not improve afterwards. The bombing of our transportation centers had eliminated the Ruhr area as a source of raw material for Germany as early as November 1944; and with the successful Soviet offensive in the coal areas of Upper Silesia, most of our supply of coal from that region had been cut off since the middle of January 1945.
Thus we could calculate precisely when economy must collapse; we had reached a point at which, even if there were a complete cessation of operations on the part of the enemy, the war would
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soon be lost, since the Reich, because of its lack of coal, was on the verge of an economic collapse.
DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection, I submit a memorandum which Hitler received from Speer on 11 December 1944, as Exhibit Speer-20. Mr. President, you will find an extract on Page 64 of the English document book, Page 61 of the German and French books. It states, and I quote:
"In view of the whole structure of the Reich economy, it is obvious that the loss of the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area will in the long run spell ruin for the whole German economy and the further successful prosecution of the war. This would mean, in fact, the total loss of the Ruhr territory as far as the German economy is concerned, with the exception of products manufactured locally within the sector... It is superfluous to discuss the consequence resulting for the whole German Reich if it is deprived of the Ruhr territory. . ."
On 15 December 1944, in connection with the Ardennes Offensive which was then imminent, Speer pointed out to Hitler in detail the consequences entailed by a possible loss of Upper Silesia.
In this connection I submit Speer's memorandum-Page 102 of the supplementary volume of my document book in the English text and the same page in the French text. This is an extract from a memorandum addressed to the Chief of the Army General Staff, dated 15 December 1944, Exhibit Number 21.
SPEER: This memorandum was addressed to Hitler as well.
DR. FLACHSNER: It is not necessary to quote from this memorandum. It points out that a possible loss of Upper Silesia would make fighting impossible even after a few weeks and that the Wehrmacht could in no way be supplied with armaments. A large part of Upper Silesia was actually lost shortly afterwards. On 30 January 1945, Speer again sent a memorandum to Hitler-Page 67 of the English text of the document book, Page 64 in the French text. I submit this document as Exhibit Number 22, and I quote only the following:
"After the loss of Upper Silesia, the German armament production will no longer be in a position to cover even a fraction of the requirements of the front as regards munitions, weapons and tanks, losses on the front, and equipment needed for new formations."
By way of special emphasis, there follows this sentence-and I quote:
"The material superiority of the enemy can therefore no longer be compensated, even by the bravery of our soldiers."
Herr Speer, what did you mean by the last sentence I quoted?
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SPEER: At that time Hitler issued the slogan that in defense of the fatherland the soldiers' bravery would increase tremendously and that vice versa the Allied troops, after the liberation of the occupied territories, would have less will to fight. That was also the main argument employed by Goebbels and Bormann to justify the use of all means to intensify the war.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, did other sources advise Hitler in the same way that you yourself did?
SPEER: In this connection I shall take several points together. Guderian, the Chief of Staff of the Army, reported to Ribbentrop at that time to tell him that the war was lost. Ribbentrop reported this to Hitler. Hitler then told Guderian and myself at the beginning of February that pessimistic statements of the nature of those contained in my memorandum or the step I had taken in regard to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs would in future be considered as high treason and punished accordingly. In addition, some days later, in a situation conference, he forbade his other close collaborators to make any statements about the hopelessness of the situation. Anyone who disobeyed would be shot without regard for position or rank and his family would be arrested.
The statements which Guderian and I made to Hitler about the hopelessness of the war situation had precisely the opposite effect from that which we desired. Early in February, a few days before the beginning of the Yalta Conference, Hitler sent for his press expert and instructed him, in my presence, to announce in the most uncompromising terms and in the entire German press, the intention of Germany never to capitulate. He declared at the same time that he was doing this so that the German people should in no case receive any offer from the enemy. The language used would have to be so strong that enemy statesmen would lose all desire to drive a wedge between himself and the German people.
At the same time Hitler once again proclaimed to the German people the slogan "Victory or Destruction." All these events took place at a time when it should have been clear to him and every intelligent member of his circle that the only thing that could happen was destruction.
At a Gauleiter meeting in the summer of 1944 Hitler had already stated-and Schirach is my witness for this-that if the German people were to be defeated in the struggle it must have been too weak, it had failed to prove its mettle before history and was destined only to destruction. Now, in the hopeless situation existing in January and February 1945, Hitler made remarks which showed that these earlier statements had not been mere flowers of rhetoric. During this period he attributed the outcome of the war in an increasing degree to the failure of the German people, but he never
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blamed himself. He criticized severely this alleged failure of our people who made so many brave sacrifices in this war.
DR. FLACHSNER: Generaloberst Jodl has already testified before this Court that both Hitler and his co-workers saw quite clearly the hopelessness of the military and economic situation. Was no unified' action taken by some of Hitler's closer advisers in this hopeless situation to demand the termination of war?
SPEER: No. No unified action was taken by the leading men in Hitler's circle. A step like this was quite impossible, for these men considered themselves either as pure specialists or else as people whose job it was to receive orders-or else they resigned' themselves to the situation. No one took over the leadership in this situation for the purpose of bringing about at least a discussion with Hitler on the possibility of avoiding further sacrifices.
On the other side there was an influential group which tried, with all the means at their disposal, to intensify the struggle. That group consisted of Goebbels, Bormann, and Ley, and, as we have said, Fegelein and Burgsdorff. This group was also behind the move to induce Hitler to withdraw from the Geneva Convention. At the beginning of February Dr. Goebbels handed to Hitler a very sharp memorandum demanding our withdrawal from the Geneva Convention. Hitler had already agreed to this proposal, as Naumann, who was State Secretary to Goebbels, told me. This step meant that the struggle was to be carried on with all available means and without regard for international agreements. This was the sense of the memorandum addressed by Goebbels to Hitler.
It must be said that this intention of Hitler and Goebbels failed on account of the unanimous resistance offered by the military leaders, as Naumann also told me later.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, the witness Stahl said in his written interrogatory that about the middle of February 1945 you had demanded from him a supply of the new poison gas in order to assassinate Hitler, Bormann, and Goebbels. Why did you intend to do this then?
SPEER: I thought there was no other way out. In my despair I wanted to take this step as it had become obvious to me since the beginning of February that Hitler intended to go on with the war at all costs, ruthlessly and without consideration for the German people. It was obvious to me that in the loss of the war he confused his own fate with that of the German people and that in his own end he saw the end of the German people as well. It was also obvious that the war was lost so completely that even unconditional surrender would have to be accepted.
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DR. FLACHSNER: Did you mean to carry through this assassination yourself, and why was your plan not realized?
SPEER: I do not wish to testify to the details here. I could only carry it through personally because from 20 July only a limited circle still had access to Hitler. I met with various technical difficulties . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear the particulars, but will hear them after the adjournment.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, will you tell the Tribunal what circumstances hindered you in your undertaking?
SPEER: I am most unwilling to describe the details because there is always something repellent about such matters. I do it only because it is the Tribunal's wish.
DR. FLACHSNER: Please, continue.
SPEER: In those days Hitler, after the military situation conference, often had conversations in his shelter with Ley, Goebbels, and Bormann, who were particularly close to him then because they supported and co-operated in his radical course of action. Since 20 July it was no longer possible even for Hitler's closest associates to enter this shelter without their pockets and briefcases being examined by the SS for explosives. As an architect I knew this shelter intimately. It had an air-conditioning plant similar to the one installed in this courtroom.
It would not be difficult to introduce the gas into the ventilator of the air-conditioning plant, which was in the garden of the Reich Chancellery. It was then bound to circulate through the entire shelter in a very short time. Thereupon, in the middle of February 1945, I sent for Stahl, the head of my main department "Munitions," with whom I had particularly close relations, since I had worked in close co-operation with him during the destructions. I frankly told him of my intention, as his testimony shows. I asked him to procure this new poison gas for me from the munitions production. He inquired of one of his associates, Oberstleutnant Soika of the armament of lice of the Army, on how to get hold of this poison gas; it turned out that this new poison gas was only effective when made to explode, as the high temperature necessary for the formation of gas would then be reached. I am not sure whether I am going too much into detail.
An explosion was not possible, however, as this air-conditioning plant was made of thin sheets of tin, which would have been torn to pieces by the explosion. Thereupon I had conferences with Hanschel, the chief engineer of the Chancellery, starting in the middle of
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March 1945. By these discussions I managed to arrange that the antigas filter should no longer be switched on continuously. In this way I would have been able to use the ordinary type of gas. Naturally, Hanschel had no knowledge of the purpose for which I was conducting the talks with him. When the time came, I inspected the ventilator shaft in the garden of the Chancellery along with Hanschel; and there I discovered that on Hitler's personal order this ventilator had recently been surrounded by a chimney 4 meters high. That can still be ascertained today. Due to this it was no longer possible to carry out my plan.
DR. FLACHSNER: I shah now come to another problem. Herr Speer, you have heard the testimony of the witnesses Riecke and Milch in this courtroom; and they have already testified to your activities after the middle of February 1945, which you undertook in order to secure the food position. What do you yourself have to say in regard to your work in that direction?
SPEER: I can say quite briefly that the preferential food supplies which I finally put into effect were arranged at the time for the purpose of planned reconversion from war to peace. This was at the expense of armament, which I personally represented. The tremendous number of measures which we introduced would be too extensive to describe here. All of these decrees are still available. It was a question of arranging, contrary to the official policy, that shortly before their occupation large towns should be sufficiently supplied with food and of taking every step to insure that, despite the catastrophe in transportation, the 1945 crop should be insured by sending the seed in good time, which was a burning problem just then. Had the seeds arrived a few weeks too late, then the crops would have been extremely bad These measures had, of course, a direct, disadvantageous effect on armament production which cannot be measured. But at any rate, armaments were only able to maintain production through reserves until the middle of March, after which there was no armament production worth mentioning. This was due to the fact that we had only 20 to 30 percent of the transportation capacity at our disposal, which necessitated preference for food transports over armaments. Therefore transportation of armaments was, practically speaking, out of the question.
DR. FLACHSNER: Was it possible to carry out such measures, which were openly against the official war plans of "Resistance to the Last," on a large scale? Were there any people at all who were prepared to approve such measures as you suggested and to put them into practice?
SPEER: All these measures were not so difficult; and they were not so dangerous, as one might perhaps imagine, because in those
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days-after January 1945-any reasonable measure could be carried out in Germany against the official policy. Any reasonable man welcomed such measures and was satisfied if anyone would assume responsibility for them. All of these conferences took place among a large circle of specialists. Every one of these participants knew the meaning of these orders without its ever being said. During those days I also had close contacts with reference to other similar measures with the State Secretaries of the Ministries of Transport, of Food, of Propaganda, and later even with the State Secretary of the Party Chancellery, that is, Bormann himself. They were all old Party members and in spite of that they did their duty to the nation at that time differently from the way in which many leading men in the Party were doing it. I kept them currently informed-in spite of Hitler's prohibition-of the developments in the military situation, and in that manner there was much that we could do jointly to stop the insane orders of those days.
DR. FLACHSNER: In which sectors did you see a danger for the bulk of the German people through the continuation of the war?
SPEER: By the middle of March 1945 the enemy troops were once more on the move. It was absolutely clear by then that quite soon those territories which had not yet been occupied would be occupied. That included the territories of Polish Upper Silesia and others outside the borders of the old Reich. The ordered destruction of all bridges during retreat was actually the greatest danger, because a bridge blown up by engineers is much more difficult to repair than a bridge which has been destroyed by an air attack. A planned destruction of bridges amounts to the destruction of the entire life of a modern state.
In addition, beginning with the end of January, radical circles in the Party were making demands for the' destruction of industry; and it was also Hitler's opinion that this should be so. In February 1945 therefore I stopped production and delivery of the so-called industrial dynamiting materials. The intention was that the stocks of explosives in the mines and in private possession should be diminished. As a witness of mine has testified, these orders were actually carried out. In the middle of March Guderian and I tried once more to stop the ordered destruction of bridges or to reduce it Pro a minimum. An order was submitted to Hitler which he refused bluntly, on the contrary demanding intensified orders for the destruction of bridges. Simultaneously, on 18 March 1945, he had eight officers shot because they had failed to do their duty in Connection with the destruction of a bridge. He announced this fact in the Armed Forces bulletin so that it should serve as a warning for future cases. Thus it was extremely difficult to disobey orders for the destruction of bridges. In spite of this existing prohibition
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I sent a new memorandum to Hitler on 18 March 1945, the contents of which were very clear and in which I did not allow him any further excuses for the measures he had planned. The memorandum was brought to the attention of numerous of his associates.
DR. FLACHSNER: The Tribunal will find extracts from that memorandum on Page 69 of the English text of the document book (Exhibit Speer 23).
Will you continue, please?
SPEER: I shall quote something more from that memorandum; on Page 69, Mr. President:
"The enemy air force has concentrated further on traffic installations. Economic transportation has thereby been considerably reduced... In 4 to 8 weeks the final collapse of German economy must therefore be expected with certainty... After that collapse, the war cannot even be continued militarily... We at the head have the duty to help the nation in the difficult times which must be expected. In this connection we must soberly, and without regard for our fate, ask ourselves the question as to how this can be done even in the more remote future. If the opponent wishes to destroy the nation and the basis of its existence, then he must do the job himself. We must do everything to maintain, even if perhaps in a most primitive manner, a basis of existence for the nation to the last."
Then there follow a few of my demands, and I shall summarize them briefly. I quote:
"It must be insured that, if the battle advances farther into the territory of the Reich, nobody has the right to destroy industrial plants, coal mines, electric plants, and other supply facilities, as well as traffic facilities and inland shipping routes, et cetera. The blowing-up of bridges to the extent which has been planned would mean that traffic facilities would be more thoroughly destroyed than the air attacks of the last years have been able to achieve. Their destruction means the removal of any further possibilities of existence for the German nation."
Then, I shall quote briefly the conclusion of the memorandum:
"We have no right, at this stage of the war, to carry out destructions on our part which might affect the life of the people. If the enemies wish to destroy this nation, which has fought with unique bravery, then this historical shame shall rest exclusively upon them. We have the obligation of leaving to the nation all possibilities which, in the more
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remote future, might be able to insure for it a new reconstruction."
This expressed clearly enough something which Hitler must know in any case, because there was no need for much economic insight to realize the results of such destruction for the future of the nation.
On the occasion of the handing over of the memorandum Hitler knew of the contents, since I had discussed it with some of his associates. Therefore his statements are typical of his attitude toward this basic question.
I would not have raised the severe accusation which I made here by saying that he wanted to draw Germany into the abyss with him, if I had not confirmed his statements in that respect in the letter of 29 March 1945.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you meaning May or March?
SPEER: March 1945, Mr. President.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President you will find this document on Page 75 of the English text of the document book, and it is Page 72 in the French text. I submit it as Exhibit Number 24. It is Speer's letter to Hitler dated 29 March 1945.
Will you continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not to read this letter?
DR. FLACHSNER: The defendant wishes to read it himself.
Will you read it?
SPEER: I quote:
"When on 18 March I transmitted my letter to you, I was of the firm conviction that the conclusions which I had drawn from the present situation for the maintenance of our national power would find your unconditional approval, because you yourself had once determined that it was the task of the Government to preserve a nation from a heroic end if the war should be lost.
"However, during the evening you made declarations to me, the tenor of which, unless I misunderstood you, was clearly as follows: If the war were lost, the nation would also perish. This fate was inevitable. There was no necessity to take into consideration the basis which the people would need to continue a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be better to destroy these things ourselves, because this nation will have proved to be the weaker one and the future belongs solely to the stronger eastern nation. Besides, those who would remain after the battle were only the inferior ones, for the good ones had been killed."
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I go on to quote:
"After these words I was profoundly shaken, and when on the next day I read the order for destruction, and shortly after that the strict order of evacuation, I saw in this the first steps toward the realization of these intentions. . ."
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, may I in this connection submit as a Speer document the destruction order of Hitler dated 19 March 1945, which the Tribunal will find on Page 73 of the French and Page 76 of the English text of the document book.
I also submit to the Tribunal the execution order for the traffic and communication systems which you will find on Page 78 of the English text and Page 75 of the French text. They become Exhibit Number Speer-26.
Then I submit the order for destruction and evacuation by Bormann, dated 23 March 1945, which is contained on Page 102 of my document book. The latter document bears the Exhibit Number Speer-27.
Herr Speer, since these are orders with technical expressions, will you please summarize the contents briefly for the Tribunal?
THE PRESIDENT: You said that last one was at Page 102 of the second volume. In my copy is a document of General Guderian of 15 December 1944.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, I have made a mistake. It is not Page 102, it is Pages 93 and 94, I beg to apologize. I have only just received the document today.
Herr Speer, will you briefly elucidate these orders?
SPEER: I can summarize them very briefly. They gave the order to the Gauleiter to carry out the destruction of all industrial plants, all important electrical facilities, water works gas works, and so on, and also the destruction of all food stores and clothing stores. My jurisdiction had specifically been excluded by that order, and all my orders for the maintenance of industry had been canceled.
The military authorities had given the order that all bridges should be destroyed, and in addition all railway installations, postal systems, communication systems in the German railways, also the waterways, all ships, all freight cars, and all locomotives. The aim was, as is stated in one of the decrees, the creation of a traffic desert.
The Bormann decree aimed at bringing the population to the center of the Reich, both from the West and the East, and the foreign workers and prisoners of war were to be included. These millions of people were to be sent upon their trek on foot. No
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provisions for their existence had been made, nor could it be carried out in view of the situation.
The carrying out of these orders alone would have resulted in an unimaginable hunger catastrophe. Add to this that on 19 March 1945 there was a strict order from Hitler to all army groups and all Gauleiter that the battle should be conducted without consideration for our own population.
With the carrying out of these orders, Hitler's pledge of 18 March would be kept, namely, that it would not be necessary ". . . to take into consideration the basis which the people would need to continue a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be better to destroy these things ourselves..." Considering the discipline which came into force in Germany in connection with every order, no matter what its contents, it was to be expected that these orders would be carried out. These orders also applied to those territories which had been included in the Greater German Reich.
During journeys into the most endangered territories, and by means of discussions with my associates, I now quite openly tried to stop the carrying out of these orders. I ordered that the high explosives which were still available in the Ruhr should be dropped down the mines, and that the stores of high explosives which were on the building sites should be hidden.
We distributed submachine guns to the most important plants so that they could fight against destruction. All this, I know, sounds somewhat exaggerated; but the situation at the time was such that if a Gauleiter had dared to approach the coal mines in the Ruhr and there was a single submachine gun available, then it would have been fired.
I tried to convince the local army commanders of the nonsensical character of the task of exploding bridges, which had been given to them, and furthermore by talking to the local authorities I succeeded in stopping most of the evacuation which had been ordered. In this connection the State Secretary of the Party Chancellery, Klopper, deserves credit in that he held up the evacuation orders which were to be sent to the Gauleiter.
When I came back from this journey, I was called before Hitler at once. This was on 29 March 1945. I had intentionally resisted his orders so openly, and I had discussed the lost war with so many of his Gauleiter that my insubordination must have become known to him. Witnessses are available from that period who know that that is what I wanted to achieve.
I did not want to betray him behind his back. I wanted to put the alternative before him. At the beginning of the conference he stated that he had had reports from Bormann to the effect that
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I considered the war as lost and that I had openly talked against his prohibition. He demanded that I should make a statement to the effect that I did not consider the war lost, and I replied, "The war is lost." He gave me 24 hours to think, and it was during those 24 hours that the letter was written from which the extract has been quoted and which has been submitted to the Tribunal in full.
After this period of reflection, I intended to hand him this letter as my reply. But he refused to accept it. Thereupon, I declared to him that he could rely on me in the future, and in that way I was able to get him to hand over to me once more the carrying out of the destruction work.
DR. FLACHSNER: In this connection, may I submit Hitler's order dated 30 March 1945, which the Tribunal will find on Pages 83 of the English and 79 of the French text in the document book. It will be Exhibit Number 28.
Then what did you do on the strength of this new order which you had?
SPEER: I had the text of it drawn up and it gave me the possibility of circumventing the destruction which had been ordered. I issued an order at once re-establishing all my old orders for the safeguarding of industry. In this connection, I did not submit this new order of mine for Hitler's approval, although he had expressly made this proviso in his order.
Contrary to the promise which I had given him, namely, that I would stand behind him unconditionally, I left as early as the following day to see Seyss-Inquart, who has testified to that here, and two other Gauleiter to tell them too that the war was lost and to discuss the consequences with them.
On that occasion I found Seyss-Inquart very understanding. Both my decree for the prevention of destruction and my discussions were contrary to the promise I had given Hitler on 29 March. I considered that this was my natural duty.
DR. FLACHSNER: I submit as Exhibit Number Speer-29 the instructions issued by Speer on 30 March for carrying out the order which has already been mentioned. In the French and German texts of the document book it appears on Page 81 and in the English document book on Page 85.
SPEER: In spite of this, the orders for the destruction of bridges still remained in force; and everywhere in Germany, Austria, and Poland and elsewhere you can see the results today. I made numerous journeys to the front and had many conferences with the commanders of the front-line troops. Perhaps that may have brought about relief in some form or other. Finally, I succeeded
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in persuading the commander of the Signal Corps, on 3 April 1945, to forbid at least the destruction of the signet postal, railway, and wireless installations by means of a new order.
Finally, on 5 April I issued six OKW orders under the name of General Winter, who has been a witness in this courtroom. These orders were to insure the preservation of important railway lines. The orders are still in existence. I issued these orders through my command channels and the channels of the Reich railways; and considering the tremendous mix-up of orders at the time, such orders, which I was not empowered to give, would at least have a confusing effect.
DR. FLACHSNER: Herr Speer, a number of attempts on your part to shorten the war became known to the press. Could you please describe to the Court the situation which has been hinted at in the press.
SPEER: I do not want to spend too much time on things which did not succeed. I tried repeatedly to exclude Himmler and others from the Government and to force them to account for their deeds. To carry out that and other plans, eight officers from the front joined me, all of whom held high decorations. The State Secretary of the Propaganda Ministry made it possible for me on 9 April to speak briefly over the entire German radio system. All preparations were made, but at the last moment Goebbels heard about it and demanded that Hitler should approve the text of my speech. I submitted to him a very modified text. But he forbade even this very modified text.
On 21 April 1945 it was possible for me first of all to record a speech at the broadcasting station at Hamburg. This was to be broadcast as the instructions for the final phase. The recording officials, however, demanded that this speech should be broadcast only after Hitler's death, which would relieve them of their oath of allegiance to him.
Furthermore, I was in contact with the chief of staff of an army group in the East, the Army Group Vistula. We were both agreed that a fight for Berlin must not take place and that, contrary to their orders, the armies should by-pass Berlin. To begin with, this order was carried out; but later several persons empowered with special authority by Hitler were sent outside Berlin and succeeded in leading some divisions into Berlin. The original intention however that entire armies should be led into Berlin was thus not carried through. The chief of staff with whom I had these conferences was General Kinzler.
DR. FLACHSNER: Were these attempts still of any avail at the beginning of April and later on?
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SPEER: Yes. We expected that the war would last longer, for Churchill, too, prophesied at the time that the end of the war would come at the end of July 1945.
DR. FLACHSNER: You have described here how much you did to preserve industrial plants and other economic installations. Did you also act on behalf of the foreign workers?
SPEER: My responsibility was the industrial sector. I felt it my duty, therefore, in the first place to hand over my sector undamaged. Yet several attempts of mine were also in favor of foreign workers in Germany. In the first place, these foreign workers and prisoners of war, through the steps which I had taken to secure the food situation, were quite obviously cobeneficiaries of my work during the last phase.
Secondly, during local discussions on the prevention of blastings, contrary to the evacuation orders which had been received from the Party, I made it possible for the foreign workers and prisoners to remain where they were. Such discussions took place on 18 March in the Saar district, and on 28 March in the Ruhr district. At the beginning of March I made the proposal that 500,000 foreigners should be repatriated from the Reich to the territories which we still held; that is to say, the Dutch to Holland, the Czechs to Czechoslovakia. The Reichsbahn, however, refused to take responsibility for these transports, since the traffic system had already been so damaged that the carrying out of this plan was no longer possible. Finally, both in the speech I intended to make over the German broadcasting system on 9 April and in the attempted Hamburg speech, I pointed out the duties which we had toward the foreigners, the prisoners of war, and the prisoners from concentration camps during this last phase.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to Page 88 of the English text in this connection; it is Page 84 of the French, and I submit it as Exhibit Number Speer-30.
Herr Speer, you have described to us how much during the last phase of the war you were opposed to Hitler and his policies. Why did you not resign?
SPEER: I had a chance to resign on three occasions; once in April 1944, when my powers had been considerably reduced; the second time in September 1944, when Bormann and Goebbels were in favor of my resignation; and the third time on 29 March 1945, when Hitler himself demanded that I should go on permanent leave, which was equivalent to resignation. I turned down all these opportunities because, beginning with July 1944, I thought that it was my duty to remain at my post.
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DR. FLACHSNER: There has been testimony in this courtroom to the effect that the last phase of the war, that is, from January 1945, was justified from the point of view that the nation should be spared unnecessary sacrifices. Were you of that same opinion?
SPEER: No. It was said that military protection against the East would have been necessary to protect refugees. In reality, until the middle of April 1945, the bulk of our last reserves of armored vehicles and munitions were used for the fight against the West. The tactical principle, therefore, was different from the one it should have been if the fight had been carried out with the aims which have been stated here. The destruction of bridges in the West and the destruction orders against the basis of life of the nation show the opposite. The sacrifices which were made on both sides after January 1945 were senseless. The dead of this period will be the accusers of the man responsible for the continuation of that fight, Adolf Hitler. The same is true of the ruined cities, which in this last phase had to lose tremendous cultural values and where innumerable dwellings suffered destruction. Many of the difficulties under which the German nation is suffering today are due to the ruthless destruction of bridges, traffic installations, trucks, locomotives, and ships. The German people remained loyal to Adolf Hitler until the end. He betrayed them with intent. He tried to throw them definitely into the abyss. Only after 1 May 1945 did Doenitz try to act with reason, but it was too late.
DR. FLACHSNER: I have one last question.
Was it possible for you to reconcile your actions during the last phase of the war with your oath and your conception of loyalty to Adolf Hitler?
SPEER: There is one loyalty which everyone must always keep; and that is loyalty toward one's own people. That duty comes before everything. If I am in a leading position and if I see that the interests of the nation are acted against in such a way, then I too must act.- That Hitler had broken faith with the nation must have been clear to every intelligent member of his entourage, certainly at the latest in January or February 1945. Hitler had once been given his mission by the people; he had no right to gamble away the destiny of the people with his own. Therefore I fulfilled my natural duty as a German. I did not succeed in everything, but I am glad today that by my work I was able to render one more service to the workers in Germany and the occupied territories.
DR. FLACHSNER: Mr. President, I have now reached the end of my examination of the Defendant Speer.
May I perhaps draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that statements have been made on the theme which was the
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subject of this afternoon's session by the witnesses: Kehrl, in his interrogatory under 10 and 12; Rohland, under 5, 6, and 8; Schieber,
under 25; Guderian, under 1 to 3, 7 to 9, and on point 6; Stahl, named by Speer, under Points 1 and 2 of his testimony; and Kempf, under Number 10 of her testimony.
Still outstanding are an interrogatory from the witness Malzacher and an interrogatory-which is most important to the defense-of the witness Von Poser, since he was the liaison officer between the General Staff of the Army and Speer's Ministry; these will be handed in when received. Furthermore, still outstanding is the interrogatory of General Buhle, who was the Chief of the Army Staff?, and Colonel Baumbach, who was commander of a bomber squadron. The remaining documents I shall submit to the Tribunal at the end of the final examination of the Defendant Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, curing the negotiations which Baucke had in 1943 and 1944 with Laval in Paris, were there representatives present who came from your department and did they support Sauckel's demands?
SPEER: During these conferences representatives from my departments were sometimes present. They were present for the purpose of protecting the blocked factories and also to see to it that there were no encroachments on the production interests which I planned to protect.
DR. SERVATIUS: So that these representatives were, therefore, not acting to support Sauckel's demands but were against them?
SPEER: It was not the task of these representatives to act for
or against Sauckel's demands, because Sauckel stated his demands in such a definite way that a subordinate official was not in a position to speak either for or against these demands in any way. This would have been a task which I would have had to carry out myself.
DR. SERVATIUS: So that these representatives did not fulfill any task?
SPEER: My representatives were the representatives from the armament, from the heavy armament and war production in the occupied territories, and as such they had their special tasks.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you in 1943, acting independently and without consultation with Sauckel, transfer 50,000 French Organization Todt workers to the Ruhr district?
SPEER: Yes, that is true. After the attack on the Mohne Dam and the Eder Dam in April and May 1943, I went there and in that
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period I ordered that a special group from the Organization Todt should take over the restoration of these plants. I did this because I also wanted the machinery and the technical staff on the spot. This special group right away without asking me brought the French workers along. This had tremendous repercussions for us in the West because the workers on the building sites on the Atlantic Wall, who had up to that time felt safe from Sauckel's reach. . .
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, we are not interested in hearing what was done there. I am only interested in the fact that these 50,000 OT workers were obtained without Sauckel's agreement and by yourself independently; and that you have confirmed, haven't you?
SPEER: Yes, that is true.
DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel was responsible for the ruling on working hours in these plants. Do you know that the 10-hour day was later on ordered by Goebbels in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for Total Warfare, applicable to both Germans and foreign workers?
SPEER: That is probably true. I do not directly recollect it, but I assume it is right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you have stated that the Geneva Convention was not applied to Soviet prisoners of war and Italian civilian internees?
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know that the Geneva Convention, although it was not recognized for Soviet prisoners of war, was nevertheless applied de facto, and that there were orders to that effect?
SPEER: I cannot give you any information about that, because it was too much of a detail and was dealt with by my departments directly. I should like to confirm it for you.
DR. SERVATIUS: I shall later on submit to the Tribunal a document which confirms this.
Do you know that Italian civilian internees, that is, those who came from the Italian Armed Forces, were transferred to the status of free workers and therefore did not come under the Convention?
SPEER: Yes, that is true, and it was done on Sauckel's request.
DR. SERVATIUS: The factory managers were responsible for carrying out Sauckel's orders in the factories. Is that right?
SPEER: As far as they could be carried out, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And you have said that if, on account of special events such as air attacks, it was not possible to carry them out, the supreme authorities in the Reich would have had to take them over?
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DR. SERVATIUS: Which authorities in the Reich do you mean?
SPEER: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.
DR. SERVATIUS: That would be Sauckel
SPEER: Yes. And the German Labor Front, which was responsible for accommodations and working conditions.
DR. SERVATIUS: Which organization did Sauckel have at his disposal to stop these abuses? Was this a matter of practical assistance then?
SPEER: No. I think you have misunderstood me. The "catastrophe emergency" comprised conditions brought about by force majeure. Nobody could remedy them, even with the best will in the world, because every day there were new air attacks. But it is impossible, as Sauckel has testified, to hold the factory manager also responsible for the fact that these conditions could not be alleviated. I wanted to indicate that in such emergencies the leaders in their entirety must get together and decide whether conditions were still bearable or not. In that connection it was the special duty of Sauckel, as the official who made the reports and gave the orders, to convene such meetings.
DR. SERVATIUS: To whom then was he supposed to make such recommendations?
SPEER: To the Fuehrer.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have explained your own administrative organization and you have said that you were an opponent of a bureaucratic administration. You introduced selfadministration for the factories; and on the professional side, you formed "rings" and above them committees which were directed by you.
DR. SERVATIUS: And it was a closed administration which could not be penetrated from the outside by other authorities?
SPEER: Yes, I would not have allowed that.
DR. SERVATIUS: So you were actually the representative of these firms toward the higher authorities.
SPEER: Only as far as the technical tasks were concerned, as I have stated here.
DR. SERVATIUS: You limited yourself to the technical tasks?
SPEER: Well, otherwise I would have been responsible for food conditions, or health conditions, or matters which concerned the
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Police; but that was expecting too much. In that case one would have had to give me another post.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you not refer earlier to the fact that, particularly as far as food was concerned, you had given instructions which would benefit the workers; and are you not in that way confirming my view that you bore the entire responsibility for that sector?
SPEER: Not in the least. I believe that I undertook the actions of the last phase within my general responsibility, but not the particular responsibility for that sector.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then, Witness, you spoke about the responsibility of the Gauleiter as Reich defense commissioners with reference to the armament industries. Could you describe in more detail the scope of that responsibility, because I did not understand it.
SPEER: From 1942, responsibility was transferred to the Gauleiter as Reich defense commissioners to an ever-increasing degree. This was mostly the effort of Bormann...
DR. SERVATIUS: What tasks did they have?
SPEER: Just a minute... who desired the centralization of all the forces of the State and the Party in the Gauleiter. This state of centralization had almost been achieved in full after 1943, the only exception which still existed being my armament offices, the so-called Armament Inspectorates. These, since they had previously come under the OKW, were military establishments which were staffed by officers; and that made it possible for me to remain outside the jurisdiction of the Gauleiter. But the Gauleiter was the central authority in his Gau, and he assumed the right to give orders where he did not have it. The situation with us was, as you know, that it was not so important as to who was vested with authority; it was a question of who assumed the right to give orders. In this case most Gauleiter did assume all the rights, by which means they were the responsible and central authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you mean by "central authority"? Perhaps I may put something to you: The Gauleiter, as Reich defense commissioner, only had the task of centralizing the offices if a decision was necessary in the Gau, for instance, after an air attack, the removal of the damage, construction of a new plant, or acquisition of new grounds, so that the various departments would be brought to one conference table; but he did not have the authority to give orders or make decisions. Is that right?
SPEER: No. I should like to recommend that you talk to a few Gauleiter who will tell you how it was.
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DR. SERVATIUS: In that case, I will drop the question. I will submit the law. You then went on to say, Witness, that During a certain period there was a surplus of labor in Germany. Was this due to the fact that Sauckel had brought too many foreign workers into Germany?
SPEER: There may be an error here. My defense counsel has referred to two documents according to which during the time from April 1942 until April 1943 Sauckel had supplied more labor to the armament sector than armament had requested. I do not know if that is the passage you mean.
DR. SERVATIUS: I can only remember that you said that there had been more workers than were required.
DR. SERVATIUS: You do not mean to say that this had been caused by the fact that Sauckel had brought too many workers in from foreign countries?
SPEER: No. I wanted to prove by that answer that even according to Sauckel's opinion at the time he did not endeavor to bring workers to Germany from France, et cetera, corresponding to my maximum demands. For if in a report to Hitler he asserts that he brought more workers to the armament sector than I demanded, as can be seen from the letter' then it would be clear that he did more than I asked him to do. Actually, it was quite different. In actual fact, he did not supply these workers at all, and we had a heated argument because it was my opinion that he had supplied a far smaller number and had boosted his report to Hitler. However, for this Trial the document is valid.
DR. SERVATIUS: You have just pointed out also that there was an argument between you and Sauckel as to whether there were sufficient labor reserves in Germany; and if I have understood you rightly, you said that if workers had been mobilized in the manner used by England and the Soviet Union, one would not have needed any foreign workers at all. Is that true?
SPEER: No, I did not say that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Well then, how am I to understand it?
SPEER: I have expressed clearly enough that I considered Sauckel's labor policy of bringing foreigners into Germany to be the proper course. I did not try to dodge that responsibility, but there did exist considerable reserves of German labor; that again is only proof of the fact that I was not responsible for the maximum demands made, and that was all I wanted to prove.
DR. SERVATIUS: Are the laws known to you according to which German women and youths were used to a very considerable degree?
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DR. SERVATIUS: Do you also know that officers' wives and the wives of high officials also worked in factories?
SPEER: Yes, as from August 1944.
DR. SERVATIUS: Well then, where were these labor reserves of which you are speaking?
SPEER: I was talking about the time of 1943. In 1943 I demanded in the Central Planning Board that the German labor reserves should be drawn upon, and in 1944 during the conversation of 4 January with Hitler I said the same thing. Sauckel at that time stated-and that can be seen from his speech of 1 March 1944, which has been submitted as a document-that there were no longer any reserves of German workers.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
SPEER: But at the same time he also testified here that he had succeeded in 1944 in mobilizing a further 2 million workers from Germany, whereas at a conference with Hitler on 1 January 1944 he considered that to be completely impossible. Thus he has himself proved here that at a time when I desired the use of internal labor he did not think there was any, although he was later forced by circumstances to mobilize these workers from Germany after all; therefore my statement at the time was right.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, these 2 million workers you have mentioned, were they people who could be employed in industry?
SPEER: Yes, of course.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were they employed directly as skilled workers in industry?
SPEER: No, they had to be trained first.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they not first of all have to go through complicated transfers to be released from one firm to another?
SPEER: Only partly, because we) had a possibility of using them in the fine-mechanical industry and other kinds of work; and also, as everyone who is familiar with American and British industry knows, these modern machines are perfectly suitable to be worked by women, even for difficult work.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is not interested in all these details, Dr. Servatius.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I am very interested in the basic question, because if workers were obtained from foreign countries in excess numbers and if, therefore, there was no necessity for the State to have them, it is of the greatest importance from the point of view of international law in considering the question
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as to whether labor can be recruited That is what I wish to clarify.
I have two more questions, and perhaps I may put them now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you can put two more questions, but not on those details.
DR. SERVATIUS: No, they are questions on other points.
Witness, you have stated that your attempt to subordinate Sauckel to yourself failed. Did you not achieve that subordination in practice by the fact that on the intermediate level Sauckel's Gau labor exchanges would have to do what your armament commissions ordered?
SPEER: No. That is a matter into which I shall have to go in greater detail. If you want an explanation...
DR. SERVATIUS: But you have said "no". . .
SPEER: Yes. But these are entirely new conceptions which should first be explained to the Court, but if "no" is sufficient for you.,.
DR. SERVATIUS: There is no need for any lengthy statement, because if you clearly say "no," the matter is settled.
Witness, one last question. You said that Sauckel decided the question of distributing labor within his working staff.
DR. SERVATIUS: He himself says that the Fuehrer made certain decisions. Must not one differentiate between the wholesale demands for a program where it is a problem of the distribution of labor over a lengthy period, and the distribution which was effected currently according to the progress of the program ?
SPEER: According to my recollection, and also from having read the records I received of the Fuehrer conferences, there are two phases to be distinguished. The first one ended in October 1942, during which there were frequent joint conferences with Sauckel, which I attended. During these conferences the distribution of labor for the next months was discussed in detail. After that time there were no longer any conferences with Hitler, which went into detail, at which I was present. I only know of the conferences of January 1944, and then there was another conference in April or May 1944 which has not yet been mentioned here. During those conferences there was only a general discussion, and the distribution was then carried out in accordance with the directives, as Sauckel says.
DR. SERVATIUS: But that is just what I am asking you. These were lump demands referring to a program, and the basic decision was made that 2 million workers were to be obtained from foreign countries; the subsequent distribution was carried out by Sauckel.
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SPEER: Yes, that is right, and I can confirm Sauckel's testimony that his orders concerning the occupied territories always came from Hitler, since he needed Hitler's authority to assert himself in occupied territory.
DR. SERVATIUS: In that case, Mr. President, I have no further questions. _, '.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 21 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]