Based upon the proposals and information presented to the Commission, upon the hearings, proceedings, and deliberations of the Commission to date, and upon the proceedings, discussions, and reports of its several committees and subcommittees, all as set forth in this report, the Commission has made the following additional findings of a general nature:

1. That scientifically, technologically, and practically, it is feasible

(a) to extend among "all nations the exchange of basic scientific information" on atomic energy "for peaceful ends", (2)

(b) to control "atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes", (2)

(c) to accomplish "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons", (2) and

(d) to provide "effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions" (2)

2. That effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their nuclear fuel derivatives. Appropriate mechanisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of seizure--including one or more of the following types of safeguards: accounting, inspection, supervision management, and licensing-must be applied through the various stages of the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuels and are used. . . . Ownership by the international control agency of mines and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as mandatory.

3. That, whether the ultimate nuclear fuels be destined for peaceful or destructive uses, the productive processes are identical and inseparable up to a very advanced state of manufacture. Thus, the control of atomic energy to insure its use for peaceful purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the provision of effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions must be accomplished through a single unified international system of control and inspection designed to carry out all of these related purposes.

4. That the development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters of domestic concern of the individual nations, but rather have predominantly international implications and repercussions.

5. That an effective system for the control of atomic energy must be international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention which in turn must be administered and operated by an international organ or agency within the United Nations, possessing adequate power and properly organized, staffed, and equipped for the purpose.

Only by such an international system of control and inspection can the development and use of atomic energy be freed from nationalistic rivalries with consequent risks to the safety of all peoples. Only by such a system can the benefits of widespread exchange of scientific knowledge and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy be assured. Only such a system of control and inspection would merit and enjoy the confidence of the people of all nations.

6. That international agreement to outlaw the national production, possession, and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of any such international system of control and inspection. An international treaty or convention to this effect, if standing alone, would fail (a) "to ensure" the use of atomic energy "only for peaceful purposes" (3) and (b) to provide "for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions," (3) and thus would fail to meet the requirements of the terms of reference of the Commission. To be effective such agreement must be embodied in a treaty or convention providing for a comprehensive international system of control and inspection and including guarantees and safeguards adequate to insure the carrying out of the terms of the treaty or convention and "to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions."(3)

Based upon the findings of the Commission, . . . the Commission makes the following recommendations to the Security Council with respect to certain of the matters covered by the terms of reference of the Commission, which recommendations are interdependent and not severable, embodying the fundamental principles and indicating the basic organizational mechanisms necessary to attain the objectives set forth in the General Findings, paragraph 1 (a)-(d) above.

1. There should be a strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection aimed at attaining the objectives set forth in the Commission's terms of reference.

2. Such an international system of control and inspection should be established and its scope and functions defined by a treaty or convention in which all of the nations Members of the United Nations should be entitled to participate on fair and equitable terms.

The international system of control and inspection should become operative only when those Members of the United Nations necessary to assure its success by signing and ratifying the treaty or convention have bound themselves to accept and support it.

Consideration should be given to the matter of participation by non-members of the United Nations.

3. The treaty or convention should include, among others, provisions

(a) Establishing, in the United Nations, an international control agency (hereinafter called "the agency") possessing powers and charged with responsibility necessary and appropriate for the prompt and effective discharge of the duties imposed upon it by the terms of the treaty or convention. Its rights, powers, and responsibilities, as well as its relations to the several organs of the United Nations, should be clearly established and defined by the treaty or convention. Such powers should be sufficiently broad and flexible to enable the authority to deal with new developments that may hereafter arise in the field of atomic energy. The treaty shall provide that the rule of unanimity of the permanent Members, which in certain circumstances exists in the Security Council, shall have no relation to the work of the agency. No government shall possess any right of veto over the fulfilment (sic.) by the agency of the obligations imposed upon it by the treaty nor shall any government have the power, through the exercise of any right of veto or otherwise, to obstruct the course of control or inspection.

The agency shall promote among all nations the exchange of basic scientific information on atomic energy for peaceful ends, and shall be responsible for preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes.

The agency should have positive research and developmental responsibilities in order to remain in the forefront of atomic knowledge so as to render the agency more effective in promoting the beneficial uses of atomic energy and in eliminating its destructive ones. The exclusive right to carry on atomic research for destructive purposes should be vested in the agency.

Research in nuclear physics having a direct bearing on the use of atomic energy should be subject to appropriate safeguards established by the international control agency in accordance with the treat or convention. Such safeguards should not interfere with the prosecution of pure scientific research, or the publication of its results, provided no dangerous use or purpose is involved.

Decisions of the agency pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by the treaty or convention should govern the operations of national agencies for atomic energy. In carrying out its prescribed functions, however, the agency should interfere as little as necessary with the operations of national agencies for atomic energy, or with the economic plans and the private, corporate, and State relationships in the several countries.

(b) Affording the duly accredited representatives of the agency unimpeded rights of ingress, egress, and access for the performance of their inspections and other duties into, from, and within the territory of every participating nation, unhindered by national or local authorities.

(c) Prohibiting the manufacture, possession, and use of atomic weapons by all nations parties thereto and by all persons under their jurisdiction.

(d) Providing for the disposal of any existing stocks of atomic weapons and for the proper use of nuclear fuels adaptable for use in weapons.

(e) Specifying the means and methods of determining violations of its terms, setting forth such violations as shall constitute international crimes, and establishing the nature of the measures of enforcement and punishment to be imposed upon persons and upon nations guilty of violating the terms of the treaty or convention.

The judicial or other processes for determination of violations of the treaty or convention, and of punishments therefor, should be swift and certain. Serious violations of the treaty shall be reported immediately by the agency to the nations parties to the treaty, to the General Assembly, and to the Security Council. Once the violations constituting international crimes have been defined and the measures of enforcement and punishment therefor agreed to in the treaty or convention, there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a wilful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms.

The enforcement and punishment provisions of the treaty or convention would be ineffectual if, in any such situations, they could be rendered nugatory by the veto of a State which had voluntarily signed the treaty.

4. In consideration of the problem of violation of the terms of the treaty or convention, it should also be borne in mind that a violation might be of so grave a character as to give rise to the inherent right of self-defense recognized in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The treaty or convention should embrace the entire program for putting the international system of control and inspection into effect and should provide a schedule for the completion of the transitional process over a period of time, step by step in an orderly and agreed sequence leading, to the full and effective establishment of international control of atomic energy. In order that the transition may be accomplished as rapidly as possible and with safety and equity to all, this Commission should supervise the transitional process, as prescribed in the treaty or convention, and should be empowered to determine when a particular stage or stages have been completed and subsequent ones are to commence.

Notes:

(1) The United States and the United Nations: Report of the President to the Congress for the year 1946, Department of State publication 27.35, the United States and the United Nations Report Series 7, pp. 190-194. For the text of the First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, December 31, 1946, see Department of State publication 2737, the United States and the United Nations Report Series 8. While containing certain language modifications, these General Findings and Recommendations are, in all essentials, the same as those put forward for the approval of the Commission by the United States Representative on December 5, 1946, and on December 17, 1946. Back

(2) Commission's Term of Reference, art. V, Resolution of the General Assembly. January 24. 1946. Back

(3) Commission's Terms of Reference, article V, Resolution of the General Assembly, January 24, 1946. Back