FIFTY-SIXTH DAY
Monday, 11 February 1946

Morning Session

COL. POKROVSKY: The Tribunal has at its disposal the diaries of the Defendant Frank.

In the one marked "Diary of the Year 1943, V," we find on Pages 1070-1072 an important entry; in the Russian translation this passage is on Page 5 of the addenda to the "Excerpts from Frank's Diaries," and on Page 321 of your document book, marked in pencil. I quote this passage:

"Krakow, 23 October 1943.

"The Governor General makes a report at the Administrative Academy on 'The Leadership Principle in Government.' From the point of view of constitutional and international law, the Government General, as an appendage to Greater Germany, constitutes a part of the territory over which the power of

Greater Germany in Europe extends. The sovereignty over this territory belongs to the Fuehrer of Greater Germany and on his behalf it is exercised by the Governor General who, as the deputy of the Fuehrer, possesses all his powers."

I would like to inform you, Your Honors, of two more documents of a strictly official nature.

In the Reichsgesetzblatt for 1939, Part I, Page 2077-Page 333 of

your document book presented by us as Exhibit Number USSR-296 (Document Number USSR-296)-is published the "Fuehrer's and Reich Chancellor's Decree on the Administration of the Occupied Polish Territory," dated 12 October 1939.

I shall read into the record Paragraph 2 of this decree. It consists of two subparagraphs:

"Paragraph 2:

"1. I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Frank as Governor General of the occupied Polish territories.

"2. I appoint Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart as Deputy Governor General."

In the same Reichspesetzblatt but this time for 1940, Part I,

Page 399, is published a decree regarding the power to grant pardons in the occupied Polish territories. It is registered with the

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Tribunal as Document USSR-289 (Exhibit Number USSR-289) and is on Page 336 of the document book. It reads:

"In the occupied Polish territories I delegate to the Governor General of occupied Polish territories the power to confirm death sentences as well as pardons or to reject applications for pardons, with the right further to delegate his powers."

The power of life and death, the sovereign prerogative, was entrusted in a Poland occupied by the Hitlerites, to the Defendant Frank.

It would not be misplaced to recall that it was this same Hitler who had said that he would show, by the concrete example of a mutual relationship between the Polish and the German peoples, that such a form of intercourse had been found "which would usefully serve the cause of peace as well as the welfare of both nations."

I have spoken of the kind of example that was intended, and what the welfare was to which reference had been made.

The 6 April 1941 was marked by a new crime planned and carefully prepared beforehand by the Hitlerite conspirators. Without any warning or declaration of war, they attacked Yugoslavia.

The attack on Yugoslavia was a gross breach of Article 3 of the Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1928. The Delegations of Great Britain and of the United States have already submitted to the Tribunal a considerable number of documents referring to the subject of the treacherous attack on Yugoslavia. I have only to submit a few new proofs and to establish a connection between these new documents and those already read into the record. Official German documents enable us to reconstitute events with exceptional vividness. In this case German pedantry turns against the authors of the criminal plan.

On 27 March 1941 Adolf Hitler held a special conference regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. On the same day he signed a topsecret Directive 025, for the High Command (Oberbefehlshaber) only. Both documents, filed under Document Number 1746-PS, are among the evidence already accepted by the Tribunal.

Subparagraph 2 of Directive 025 has already been quoted in full in the speech of the Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. The first subparagraph of this document was also read into the record on 7 December 1945. I should like to add a few more lines and read Paragraph 3 into the record. This passage is on Page 337 of the document book. It states as follows:

"In detail I order the following:

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"a) As soon as the concentration of sufficient forces is concluded and meteorological conditions permit, all Yugoslav antiaircraft and Belgrade must be destroyed by continuous day and night air attacks.

"b) If possible, simultaneously, but under no circumstances sooner, Operation Marita must be started, with the primary limited objective to seize the harbor of Salonika."

I believe that three points should be stressed here:

1) The intention of carrying out the total destruction of the capital of the state;

2) The correlation between the aggression against Yugoslavia and the aggression against another country, Greece-the aggression against Greece was coded, as the Tribunal knows, under the name of Operation Marita;

3) The necessity to complete the concentration of German forces as well as meteorological conditions were the factors that determined the time limits for the attack.

As in all previous cases of criminal fascist aggression, we see one and the same thing-the criminal intent of the predatory invader, treachery, and cold calculation.

Preparations for the successive acts which had been carried on over a very long period followed the customary Hitler routine, already disclosed by the prosecutors: Fifth Column activities, the use of the protection of the German minority as a slogan and the lying practice of peaceable declarations combined with unceasing preparations for invasion. As I have already stated, the preparation of the crime was carried on over a very long period and followed the customary Hitler routine already disclosed by the prosecutors.

On 27 March 1941, on the very day when Hitler signed Directive 025, he personally conducted, in Berlin, a special conference on the situation in Yugoslavia. The minutes of this conference were presented by the United States Prosecution on 4 December 1945 as Document Number 1746-PS.

Other documents relating to this conference have also been registered under the same number. At the conference, the objective was determined with absolute precision and a plan of action was presented. You will, Your Honors, find the passage I have quoted on Page 349.

Hitler declared:

". . . we are not going to wait for any declarations of loyalty by the new government, but to carry out all preparations for the destruction of the Yugoslav armed forces and of Yugoslavia itself as a national unit.

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". . . it is especially important from the political point of view that the blow against Yugoslavia should be carried out with the utmost violence and that its military destruction should be effected with lightning speed."

And a little further back in the document is stated:

"No diplomatic inquiries will be made and no ultimatum presented.... The attack will start as soon as the necessary

supplies and troops are ready."

Thus, Hitler was not in the least interested in the factual attitude of one or the other Yugoslav Government toward Germany, but in the factual destruction of Yugoslavia as a state; and he strove to accomplish this destruction with cruelty and lightning speed.

The operational staff of the OKW, meticulously following Hitler's directive regarding a cruel and rapid destruction of Yugoslavia, speedily worked out a detailed plan for co-ordinated operations of the German and Italian Armies. It was issued as an official operational directive dated 23 March 1941. I consider - it essential to reread three lines of this document, already submitted to the Tribunal under the same Document Number 1746-PS. You will find it on Page 352 of the document book. I read Paragraph 4 of this document into the record.

". . . The German task is to attack Yugoslavia with the greatest possible concentration of forces, to smash its armed forces and destroy it as a state."

I cannot but remind the Tribunal of the terminology used by Hitler and the other fascist conspirators. Hitler said, "There can be no question of sparing Poland." He demanded, "Yugoslavia is to be eliminated as a state, ruthlessly and with lightning speed."

Mercilessness, ruthlessness, extermination of peoples and states: such was the style and meaning of the actions of the fascist conspirators.

The aggression against Czechoslovakia, the attack on Poland, the desire to destroy Yugoslavia, all these were links in the same chain. But the chain does not end with these links

The task of the next representative of the U.S.S.R. Prosecution will be to show Your Honors that the fundamental purpose of these criminals, the main link in the center of all of the Hitlerite conspiracies, was the attack on the U.S.S.R.

The documents relating to the crimes against Yugoslavia will prove that, in attacking that country, the fascist conspirators strictly followed their customary methods. Even in detail they repeated their earlier crimes perpetrated against Poland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Even in case we did not know who actually organized the attack on Yugoslavia, the very nature of the facts, the sequence

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of events, the manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, would unmistakably indicate the culprits.

I turn to Document USSR-36, (Exhibit Number USSR-36) under which number I offer in evidence the Official Report of the Yugoslav Government.

The first section, entitled "The Systematic Preparation of the Conspiracy for the Enslavement and the Destruction of Yugoslavia," contains a series of valuable information. I wish to cite that excerpt from this document which you will find on Page 355 of the document book, Paragraph 4 on Page 3 of the Russian text, 3rd paragraph from the top reads:

"The Government of the Third Reich and the Hitlerite Party secretly organized the German minority. Settled in Yugoslavia by the Austrian emperors over a century ago, the Germans enjoyed as brothers full rights and a cultural autonomy. They had their own schools and their representatives in parliaments as well as in the local government. They numbered half a million (that is about three percent of the total population). From 1920 they had their mass organization-the Swabian-German Cultural Union-'Kulturbund' for short. And out of this very organization and through it, as well as out of all the Germans in Yugoslavia, the Nazi Party created

a political and military organ for the destruction of Yugoslavia."

I believe I can skip several lines without loss and quote further:

"In Yugoslavia, the Nazi Gaue were secretly formed and Gauleiter appointed. Under the guise of various physical training and sport associations, Hitlerite units were organized half a million strong. Numerous 'tourists,' 'travellers,' 'businessmen,' and 'relatives' came from the Reich-in reality they were Nazi instructors and organizers."

I skip a number of details which can be disregarded, and pass to the second paragraph of the same section on Page 4-that would be Page 356 in your document book-where the manner is described in which the Fifth Column was further strengthened. I now shall read into the record Paragraph 2, beginning with the second subparagraph:

"The Hitlerites drew into their orbit all the separatist and chauvinistic elements, as for instance, Pavelich's Ustasha; the Zbor, a movement headed by Ljotec; the MFRO (the Macedonian fascist movement), headed by Vanca Mihajlovic; and organized them as terrorist organizations with headquarters in Berlin. On the other hand, acting through their agents, Prince Paul, Stojadinovic, Cvetkovic, and Cincar-Marcovic,

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they attracted the pan-Serbian centralists and turned them into a terrorist group which, from the vantage points of governmental authority, was 'peacefully' to deliver Yugoslavia into slavery by adhering to the Tripartite Pact."

Further, the report emphasizes the fact that, while organizing numerous branches of the Fifth Column, the Hitlerites continually gave newer and more perfidious assurances about their ostensibly friendly intentions with regard to Yugoslavia. This is discussed in Paragraph 3 on Page 5 of the Russian text; our Document Number USSR-36. You will find this passage, Your Honors, on Page 357 of the document book:

"3. At the time when both the Hitlerite Government and the Party were so thoroughly and with such versatility preparing their conspiracy to invade and occupy Yugoslavia, Hitler seized every opportunity to declare to the whole world, on behalf of the same Government, the same Party, and the whole of Germany, that Yugoslavia could count on them as devoted friends."

On 17 January 1938, that is, some weeks before the occupation of Austria, Hitler had a meeting with the then Prime Minister of Yugoslavia at which the Defendants Goering and Von Neurath were present. The original document from which I shall quote certain passages was submitted to the tribunal as Document Number TC-92. The extract which I shall quote further on as documentary evidence, is dated 4 December 1945. You will find it on Page 411 of the document book.

On 4 December 1945 a printed collection of German documents dealing with the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece was offered to you in evidence. In the listing of documentary evidence it is referred to as Document Number TC-92.

On Page 68-and you will find it as I have already stated on Page 411 in your document book, as Document Number 28 of that collection-we have a transcript of the conversations which took place during the conference of 17 January 1938. I consider there is no need to read the entire document into the record. I shall limit myself to the following three remarks made by Hitler on that occasion, "As regards Yugoslavia, Germany is highly interested in the existence of a strong Yugoslavia." Somewhat later in the course of the same conversation Hitler spoke the second sentence, "Whatever may happen there, Yugoslavia's present boundary will remain as inviolable as the border on the Brenner is today." In addition Hitler, at this meeting, made the following statement, ". . . the German nationality group in Yugoslavia was loyal to the Yugoslav Government...."

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On 30.January 1939, some weeks before the occupation of the Czechoslovak Republic, Hitler made the following declaration about Yugoslavia in his speech before the Reichstag-this quotation is to be found on Page 412 in your document book:

". . . a state which since the Great War has more and more

attracted the attention of our people, in Yugoslavia. The respect which the German soldier felt for that valiant people in the past, has grown ever stronger and developed into sincere friendship...."

The fascist conspirators considered it useful to include this speech as Document Number 32 in the book from which I just have quoted and presented to the Tribunal as Document Number TC-92.

On 1 June 1939, that is, before the fascist attack on Poland, Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, whom the official report of the Yugoslav Government calls a Hitlerite agent, paid a visit to Hitler. On this occasion, Hitler stated in Berlin-you will find the passage on Page 413 in your document book:

". . . Germany's friendship with the Yugoslav nation did not spring up suddenly. It was deepened and strengthened by the tragic complications of the World War."

Then, after having made a few more statements which are of no interest to the Tribunal, he continued:

"I am all the more confident that now when, as a result of the historic events, we have become neighbors with common frontiers established forever, the friendly relations between Germany and Yugoslavia, trustful and steadfast, will not only secure lasting peace between both our peoples and countries, but moreover will serve as a calming element for our nervous, excitable continent."

I repeat once more that I quote from the book, Document Number TC-92.

In his next customary speech after the defeat of Poland, before the Reichstag on 6 October, Hitler reassured Yugos

lavia of his love of peace and of his friendly attitude in the following words:

". . . after the annexation had taken place, I assured Yugoslavia in the same manner that her frontier with this country shall be regarded as inviolable by Germany from this moment on, and that we want to live in peace and friendship with her...."

I am now going to read into the record a few paragraphs from Subparagraph 2 on the first section of the report of the Yugoslav State Commission for the investigation of the crimes perpetrated by the aggressors. The excerpts in question begin with Paragraph 3,

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on Page 6 of Exhibit Number USSR-36 (Document Number USSR-36). In your document book it is Volume I, Section I.

Thus, Hitler regularly gave assurances about friendly relations with Yugoslavia and about the inviolability of her boundaries while, at the same time, his band of conspirators and enslavers were already tightening the ring of war around Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia was completely surrounded by Hitler's Panzer divisions, and when the government of the Centralist Fifth Column of Prince Paul, Cvetovic, and Macek was ready to join the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941, that is, 10 days before the attack on Yugoslavia, the Defendant Ribbentrop stated as follows-on Page 413 of your document book you will find it, in Document Number 2450-PS:

"Germany herself-and I solemnly state this-has neither territorial nor political interests in this region."

The Tribunal has already been handed a certified extract from Document Number 72 of the above-mentioned German book.

An official note from the Reich Government of the same date reads as follows-you will find this on Page 415 of the document book:

"Mr. Prime Minister: On behalf and on the direction of the German Government, I have the honor to report to Your Excellency as follows:

"In connection with today's adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact, the German Government affirms its resolution to respect at all times the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia....

"Signed, Joachim von Ribbentrop."

The culminating point in the execution of the breach of faith so cunningly prepared by the fascists is the following statement made by Hitler on 6 April 1941, that is, at the moment when the perfidious and treacherous attack on Yugoslavia had already begun. It is under Document Number TC-92 in your book of documents, on Page 414:

'`The German people feel no hatred towards the Serbian people. Above all, the German people see no reason to start a war against the Croats and Slovenes; they want nothing from these peoples."

Certified excerpts have been handed to the Tribunal from the documents of the German book already quoted on Pages 1 and 4.

At the same time when he was speaking in this manner, the occupation, annexation, and dismemberment of the Yugoslav State was already taking place. Soon after began the bombing of undefended cities, towns, and settlements; forcible evictions; deportations to camps; punitive expeditions; and hundreds of other acts

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that were a part of the planned extermination of the Yugoslav people, which resulted in the death of 1,650,000 Yugoslav men, women, and children.

On the question of the preparation for the attack on Yugoslavia and the individuals who directly supervised this crime, we have at our disposal two very valuable pieces of evidence.

The first is the original affidavit of the German General Lohr. Prior to and at the time of the aggression against Yugoslavia, he was in command of the 4th Air Fleet. It was precisely his air units which carried out the raids on Belgrade. He is undoubtedly a man well acquainted with the course of operations and its leaders.

On 24 May 1945 General Lohr was taken prisoner by the Yugoslav forces. During interrogations to which he was subjected between 24 May and 6 June 1945 he states-you will find the respective excerpts on Page 416, as excerpts from our Document Number USSR-253 (Exhibit Number USSR-253). We submit the originals of these excerpts to the Tribunal:

"I and my staff went on March 26 to Sofia as the campaign against Greece was about to begin.

"On the following day, 27 March 1941, the coup d'etat took place in Yugoslavia. I was called unexpectedly to Berlin, where I received orders from Reich Marshal Goering to prepare for air operations against Yugoslavia....

"After this, preparations against Yugoslavia were begun. At my first meeting with Goering I was not told of the date of the beginning of the war against Yugoslavia. At Vienna, I received a written order in which the beginning of the operations was fixed for 6 April."

Passing over the rest of the statement, I proceed to read into the record excerpts from the minutes of the interrogation of the former Field Marshal of the German Army, Friedrich Paulus. In accordance with the wish of the Tribunal, we submit the original of this interrogation.

Friedrich Paulus was interrogated on 12 January 1946 by the Chief Prosecutors of the U.S.S.R. His testimony is registered with us as Exhibit Number USSR-182 (Document Number USSR-182). You will find the passage quoted on Page 419 of your document book. My colleagues of the Soviet Delegation will probably revert to this document when dealing with subsequent matters. I shall therefore merely quote that part which refers to the preparations for the attack on Yugoslavia.

"It was clear to both German and Hungarian officers that these military preparations must have- been based on the preparation of military collaboration between Germany and Hungary."

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THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that the first interrogatory to which you refer-General Lohr's- which is contained in Document Number USSR-253, is an official document?

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The official document of your Government. The other interrogatory to which you refer, of Field Marshal Paulus, is not an official document, is it?

COL. POKROVSKY: The minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus have been compiled in compliance with all legal standards of procedure applying to such interrogations by judicial organizations in the U.S.S.R. He is interrogated as a witness with the warning that he must tell the truth, in accordance with Articles 95 and 92 of our penal code. These documents, in the U.S.S.R., are considered as absolutely official documents, of full probative value, to be submitted to the Tribunal when necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us where the interrogatory was made?

COL. POKROVSKY: Paulus was interrogated in person in Moscow, on 12 January 1946. This, Sir, must have been pointed out at the beginning of the interrogation.

THE PRESIDENT: The date is on the document, but not the place. Go on, Colonel.

COL. POKROVSKY: With your permission, I shall continue my quotation from the minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus, submitted to you:

"It was clear to the Hungarians that Germany's assistance was in order to prepare the Hungarian Army in good time and in advance for future combined military operations, thus incorporating an ally into its ranks.

"With the later attack on Yugoslavia, which followed this, there was no need for special explanations as to the object of these military preparations.

"It was clear that armed forces were being made ready for war with the U.S.S.R., as the attack on Yugoslavia was part of the operational plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R.

"With the defeat of Yugoslavia, the right flank, which was to be formed at the beginning of military operations against Russia, was secured."

I shall leave out one paragraph which deals with another subject, and continue to quote: '

"The preparation of the combined German-Hungarian attack on Yugoslavia was entrusted to me. On 27 or 28 March 1941 237 11 Feb. 46

I was called before Hitler at the Reich Chancellery where, besides Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Halder, and Brauchitsch were present. Halder met me with the following words:

" The Fuehrer has decided to attack Yugoslavia In order to eliminate the threat to the flank during the offensive against Greece and to seize the main Belgrade-Nish railway line which runs in a southerly direction. But the main objective of the attack on Yugoslavia is to have our right flank secure when later on the Plan Barbarossa shall be carried out.

"'Your task is to go to Vienna immediately in my special train, and to transmit the orders and explain the situation to Field Marshal List (12th Army Group), General Von Kleist (Panzer group), and Colonel Von Witzleben (Chief of Staff of the 2d Army), who have been called there.

" 'From Vienna, you are to proceed to Budapest and there to co-ordinate with the Hungarian General Staff the strategic employment of the German forces on Hungarian territory and the participation of the Hungarian forces in the invasion of Yugoslavia.' "

The participation of Hitlerite generals of the very highest rank in the treacherous attack on Yugoslavia simply does not fit, in any way at all; into the execution of purely military tasks only.

I shall read one more document into the records, Document Number 1195-PS. You will find it in your document book on Page 423.

On 9 January 1946 four lines were read here from the second section. The time has now come to read it in full:

"Copy. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Operational Staff, Section L, (IV/QU), Number 00630/41; top secret, commanders only, Fuehrer's headquarters, 12. 4. 1941.

"Reference: OKW/L, (IV/QU), Number 4434/41; top secret, commanders only, of 3 April 1941.

"Provisional Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.

"I. The Fuehrer has issued the following directions for the partition of Yugoslavia:

"1) Former territory of Styria and Carniola.

"The territory of the former Styria, extended to the south by a strip of about 90 kilometers in breadth and 10 to 15 kilometers in depth, will go to Gau Styria.

"The northern part of Carniola, with a borderline running south only as far as the river Sava but north of Ljubljana, according to the attached OKH map, is to become part of Carinthia.

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"The High Command of the Army (OKH) is to hand over the territory occupied by the German troops, to the competent Gauleiter, subarea by subarea, as soon as the pacification of the country permits.

"The handing over of the territory occupied by the Italians will be prepared by a letter from the Fuehrer to the Duce and carried out under direct orders from the Foreign Office. Until that time no measures whatever are to be taken on the German side. (Teletype OKH-General Quartermaster, Abt. Kr. Ver~v., A., Ob. Kdo. 2 I, Number 801/41, top secret, is hereby executed.)

"2) The territory beyond the River Mur (t~bermur-Gebiet).

"The territory beyond the River Mur borders closely upon Hungary, conforming with the historic boundary. A later colonization of the German population living in the northwestern part of this territory has been taken into consideration. The handing over of this territory to the Hungarians will be regulated by the High Command of the Army.

"3) Banat.

"The territory from the point where the River Drava cuts the Hungarian boundary to the confluence of the River Tisa with the Danube is to go to Hungary. The territory east of the Tisa will be at first under German protection, as will the territory south of the Danube and east of the general line: confluence of the River Morava and the Danube-Pozarevac-PetrovacBolJavac-Knjazevac-Kalna. This territory includes the Bor copper mines and the adjoining coal district in the southeast. The above line is considered as the basis and provisional demarcation line. At first, German military government is to be established under the High Command of the Army.

"4) Southern Serbia.

"The territory inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians goes to Bulgaria, in conformity with the ethnographical boundary. Preliminary delimitation of the frontier, from the military viewpoint, will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Army, which will prepare the handing over to Bulgaria.

"5) Old Serbia.

"The territory of old Serbia will be placed under German military administration under the High Command of the Army.

"6) Croatia.

"Croatia becomes an independent state within its ethnographical boundaries. There will be no interference on the part of Germany with its internal policy.

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"7) Remaining territories including Bosnia and Montenegro.

"The political organization of these territories will be left to

Italy. Here also the restoration of an independent state of Montenegro can be considered.

"II. The Demarcation of Boundaries:

"1) As far as the demarcation of boundaries has not been laid down in Part I, it will be carried out through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office, the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and the Reich Minister of the Interior.

"The Operational Staff of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (L IV QU) is the executive organ for the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

"2) The High Command of the Army will forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces its military recommendations relative to the drawing up of boundaries outside the territory of the protectorate south of the Danube, where this has not been already laid down by the Fuehrer.

"3) The War Economic and Armament Office of the OKW will forward as soon as possible to the Operational Staff (Section L) its recommendations regarding the boundaries of the territory of the protectorate south of the Danube (Part I, Paragraph 3).

"4) As far as the Italians are concerned, the tactical boundaries between the armies hold good in the meantime.

"Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed, Keitel."

This document, signed by the Defendant Keitel, smashes to pieces the mendacious statement of the nonparticipation of the OKW in the political side of the fascist plan or conspiracy. The

German generals, as a body, were not merely an obedient tool in Hitler's hands.

The OKW, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Gestapo were interwoven into one sole entity. This is also borne out by the next document.

General Nedic, ex-Prime Minister of the quisling Yugoslav Government, in his depositions gives some interesting information on this question.

Before reading into the record a few excerpts from his depositions, I must say a few words concerning four Germans, whom Medic mentions by name. He speaks of Kraus, Turner, Kiesel, and Kronholz.

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Dr. Kraus was chief of the Gestapo South East, with central offices in Belgrade. Dr. Turner was chief of staff of the civil administration department attached to the German Military Command in Serbia. Dr. Kiesel was Dr. Turner's deputy. Kronholz held no official post. He had lived in Yugoslavia even before the war and was director of the German transport firm Schenker A.G. Subsequently he' turned out to be an important German intelligence agent. This information is certified by the Yugoslav Extraordinary Commission for the investigation of German atrocities. After this explanation, I shall read into the record a short excerpt from the evidence of the Serbian quisling, General Medic. A true copy of the interrogation or rather excerpts from his minutes are registered by us as Document Number USSR-288; I am able to submit to you now, for your perusal, the original of these minutes with Nedic's signature. Unfortunately I am not in a position to leave it with you in its entirety because it refers to a case concerning Yugoslavia which has not yet been finished, but I can hand it to you for perusal by the Tribunal, while the certified excerpts remain with us as evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that you wish to put this document in as evidence and then to withdraw it for the purpose of its being used in some other cases; is that right?

COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to submit to you as evidence in this case, the excerpts from the minutes, duly certified by the Yugoslav Extraordinary Commission, in order that the minutes now. in your hands, that is-the original minutes-may be returned to Belgrade where they will be presented as a document needed in another case which is still under investigation. I would therefore request you to keep a copy for the Tribunal after you have satisfied yourselves that this copy tallies with the original.

THE PRESIDENT: Well then, if that is so, we must ask you to deposit with this Tribunal a photostatic copy of this document, because, of course, all the documents or photostatic copies which are put in evidence must de deposited with the General Secretary of this Tribunal. So, if you will undertake to have a photostatic copy made of this document and left with the General Secretary, I think the Tribunal is agreed that you may do so, that you may use this document.

COL. POKROVSKY: Will the Tribunal be satisfied with the certified photostatic copy, in addition to the certified excerpts and a photostatic copy of the part which I am about to quote?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

COL. PROKOVSKY: Thank you.

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"I came to know Kronholz during the occupation period, before I became Prime Minister. As far as I can remember, he was brought to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus. . . . Then Kronholz insisted that I should accept the proposed post.

"Turner received me in the presence of Dr. Kiesel and said that he authorized me, through General Dankelmann, the German military commander in Serbia, to form an authoritarian government....

"Almost simultaneously with the creation of my government, the Germans established contact with a group of Chetniks under the command of Pecanac, who had until then been hiding In the forests., The contact was also established through the Chief of the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus. Shortly after this, Pecanac arrived in Belgrade, called to see me, and offered his services. That is how my government came to form its first armed units."

A little farther on, in the same minutes, we find the following record of Nedic's testimonies:

"As soon as the formation of my government had been proclaimed at the beginning of September 1941, a delegation with authority from Draga Michailovic called on me to start negotiations."

Nedic enumerates the terms, which are of no interest to us, and then says:

"I, for my part, accepted all these terms and offers. Draga Michailovic received money and the Germans permitted this." This is the end of the quotation.

Still another part of this record seems of importance to me; it concerns Nedic's visit to Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. Nedic stated:

"I noticed that at the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop, a demand was made that I should place all the spiritual and material resources of Serbia at the disposal of the German Reich for the continuation of the war."

Speaking of this meeting with Hitler, Nedic stated:

"He shouted at me, emphasizing that the order concerning 100 for one not only would have to be altered, but that it should have been increased to 1000 for one. He added also that he was prepared to exterminate the entire population if the Serbians continued to act like rebels.'' '

The head of fascist Germany wished to control the Slav countries as if they were his own patrimony. Here he was helped by generals,

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diplomats, industrialists, and intelligence officers. All the acts of aggression were prepared and realized with their direct participation.

I repeat: The German generals as a body were not merely an obedient tool in Hitler's hands. The Defendants Keitel, Jodl, and Goering personally participated in the planning, preparation, and realization of crimes against peoples and states.

Document 1195-PS added yet another proof in the establishment of this fact. The above named defendants, together with Neurath, Frick, Schirach, Frank, Seyss-Inquart, and Ribbentrop, are directly guilty of the very grave crimes which I reported to the Tribunal.

National Socialism cannot be separated from the idea of war. This is acknowledged by the HiMer slaves themselves.

In other words, Hitlerism and aggressive war are one and the same thing. And if wars are not always planned by military leaders only, it is always they who conduct them. The responsibility for aggression, for aggressive war, for the death of millions, for bestialities, for the destruction of cultural treasures and material wealth, must be borne by all the major war criminals now sitting in the dock.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.7

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I would like to ask the Tribunal for a ruling as to a general question of submission of evidence. The Russian Delegation has submitted books which contain statements by generals and statesmen, without these statements being accompanied by an official remark by the Soviet authorities.

The documents which have been given to me today-USSR-149. 150, and 294-are only photostats of handwritten manuscripts. They contain neither a remark which could qualify them as affidavits, nor do they represent testimonies taken before a Soviet official or officer, nor do they represent governmental or official declarations.

I should be grateful to the Tribunal if it would make a decision on this question in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The opinion of the Defense Counsel is that such statements have only the value of a personal presentation by the Prosecution but no probative value.

THE PRESIDENT: May I see the documents?

[The documents were presented to the Tnbunal.]

The Tribunal have no objection to the course taken by Dr. Nelte in drawing their attention to these documents at this stage. But they think it will be better for them to wait until the documents are actually offered in evidence before they consider whether or not

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they will admit them. If and when the documents are offered in evidence, they will then consider whether they will admit them or not.

COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to present Major General Zorya, State Councillor of Justice of the 3rd Class, who will present the materials on the following theme of "Aggression against the Soviet Union."

DR. LATERNSER: I should like to point out that the decision of the Tribunal, that every defendant's counsel should receive, sufficiently in advance, a copy of all documents which are to be submitted as evidence in the course of the proceedings, has not been complied with. It is, therefore, difficult for the Defense to follow the proceedings because the documents submitted have not been distributed in sufficient quantity.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the Tribunal have ever imposed upon the Prosecution the duty of supplying a copy of every document to every member of defendants' counsel.

You no doubt have before you a copy of the Tribunal's order upon the subject, and I believe that the order is posted upon the board in the defendants' Information Center. If I remember correctly, it is that a certain number of originals or photostatic copies shall be deposited in the Information Center, and that a certain number of copies of the documents shall be supplied to the defendants' counsel, and that, for the rest, the defendants' counsel must rely upon the fact that every document or part of a document which is put in evidence is read in open court and, therefore, comes through the earphones to defendants`, counsel and will appear in the shorthand notes. We have provided that copies of the shorthand notes shall be supplied to defendants' counsel as soon as possible after the day on which the evidence is given. Beyond that we have not thought it right to impose a duty upon the Prosecution to supply documents to the defendants' counsel.

Is that not in accordance with your recollection?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the American Prosecution, the British Prosecution, and also the French Prosecution, in the course of the proceedings, handled this in such a way that enough copies of all documents were made available to the Defense for each defendant's counsel to have one copy before him. I believe that what is possible for the other Prosecution should also be possible for the Soviet Prosecution, in order to facilitate the work.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a belief on your part which is not strictly in accordance with the Tribunal's orders. The Tribunal has not made that order, and it may be that the United States and Great Britain have gone beyond the Tribunal's orders, and have supplied a copy to each defendant's counsel. But, as I say, the

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Tribunal has not as yet seen fit to impose that duty upon the Prosecution.

I suppose you don't really know exactly how many copies of these Soviet documents have been deposited in the Information Center?

DR. LATERNSER: I don't know the exact number. At any rate, there were not enough for each defendant's counsel to get a copy of each document, as was the case, so far, with the other Prosecutions.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you no doubt understand the very. great difficulties of making translations and making copies. I am sure that the Soviet prosecutors will do everything in their power to assist defendants' counsel, but, as I say, we have not imposed upon the Prosecution the duty of supplying one copy of a translation into German of each document for each defendants' counsel. I can only express the hope that the Soviet prosecutors will do the best they can.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I remember, when the fact became known that the press had received 250 copies of the documents, you, Mr. President, expressed the opinion that it should then also be possible to distribute 25 copies to the defendants' counsel. That was, at that time, the opinion of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal's orders on this subject are in writing and you will find them in the defendants' Information Center. I have stated my recollection of them; if I am wrong, you can bring me a copy of the document and I will withdraw my statement.

MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): May it please Your Honors, it is my task to present the documentary evidence dealing with the aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, organized by the fascist war criminals now sitting in the dock.

This charge of the crime, mentioned in Subparagraph a, Article VI of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, was formulated in Paragraph 6, Section 4, Count One of the Indictment in the present case, and in Section IV of the opening statement by the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.

Among the many criminal wars which German fascism, with predatory aim, waged against the freedom-loving nations, the attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics occupies a place by itself.

It can be safely said that the predatory war against the Soviet Union was the keynote of the entire fascist conspiracy against peace. The aggressive actions on the part of German fascism committed

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prior to the attack on the U.S.S.R., and in part the German aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, were, as has been demonstrated by my colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, merely stages on the road to the attack on the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian wheat and coal from the Don Basin, nickel from the Kola Peninsula, and oil from the Caucasus, the fertile steppes of the pre-Volga region and the forests of Bielorussia all played a decisive part in the criminal schemes of the fascist aggressors.

The war against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics Divas also waged by fascist Germany with the intent of enslaving and exploiting the Soviet peoples.

In the war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the animal hatred of the Hitlerites against the Slav peoples found its full horrifying expression.

And finally, German imperialism, appearing in its fascist edition, saw in the seizure of the wealth of the Soviet Union and in its incalculable resources of food and raw materials a base for the realization of their far-reaching aggressive aims to achieve, first, ascendancy over Europe, and, later on, ascendancy over the whole world.

The well-known formula of German imperialism, "Drang nach Osten," mentioned in the opening statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., was at different times and in many different ways disguised by the fascist criminals, but always, in all their aggressive plans, pride of place was given to the attack on the Soviet Union.

"If new territory is desired"-wrote HiMer in his book, Mein Kampf-"in substance it can be secured at the expense of Russia. The new empire must move along the paths trodden by the knights of old." (Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, Munich edition, 1930, Page 742.)

The fact that having definitely brought fascist aggression to a head in 1939, Hitler began the war in the West, did not substantially change anything in this basic conception of fascism.

Under Document Number 789-PS the United States Prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the transcript of the conference held on 23 November 1939 between Hitler and the members of the German Supreme Command.

At this conference, Hitler, according to his own expression, gave a "survey of the thoughts dominating him in connection with the events to come."

In the course of this survey he declared-you will find the passage I am now reading on Page 3 in the document book lying on the table of the Tribunal, Page 2 of the Russian text:

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"For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West. It came about by force of events that for the nearest future the East dropped out of the picture"

This statement by Hitler bore witness to the fact that the attack on the Soviet Union remained within the plans of fascist aggression, and the whole question was reduced only to the problem of selecting the most favorable moment for this attack.

It should be noted that this western version of the start of fascist aggression was not considered as the most favorable version by the authors of the aggression.

This same Hitler, exactly 5 months prior to the above-mentioned conference, at another conference of 23 May 1939 (Document Number L-79), while briefing his accomplices on the present situation and political aims, had said-the passage I am now quoting is Page 6 of the document book, "If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanse in the East."

The vast expanses in the East, according to the aspirations of Hitler's conspirators; were to play a decisive part during the conflict in the West.

Therefore, when the fascist hordes were unable to force the Channel, stopped at its shores, and were obliged to find new ways of aggression, the conspirators immediately began to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union. This attack was the basis of all their plans of aggression, without which they could not be realized.

I believe it is not necessary to refer to documents of an earlier period, and particularly to quote any further from Hitler's book, Mein Kampf, where questions connected with the predatory attack on the Soviet Union were formulated long before 1939.

This book has already been presented to the Tribunal, and relevant passages from it were quoted as evidence by our United States and British colleagues.

The Soviet Prosecution desires to submit to the Tribunal a series of documents which bear witness to the fact that the aggression of fascist Germany against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was committed with malice aforethought.

Among these documents there are files from various archives captured by units of the advancing Red Briny, statements by fascist leaders published in the press, including those by several of the defendants, and depositions by persons who were in possession of reliable information as to how the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were actually carried out.

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The documents of the Soviet Prosecution are presented under the following sections:

1. Pre

parations for war in Germany itself. 2. Assuring the security of the preparations for war by the intelligence activities. 3. The securing by the fascist conspirators of the participation of the satellite countries in the aggression against the Soviet Union.

I shall begin with Section 1, which I shall call, "Preparations for War in Germany Herself."

The statements of Hitler and his accomplices demonstrate that the idea of a criminal attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had for a long time been ripe in the minds of the fascist conspirators. But apart from this fact, we are also interested in the question as to when this intention began to take on the concrete form of direct military preparations for the predatory war against the Soviet Union.

On 18 December 1940 the directive known to the Tribunal as directive Number`21, Plan Barbarossa-the document of the United States Prosecution numbered 446-PS-was put into its official form. The moment when the signature of the Supreme Command appears on such a document is the moment which crowns long and intensive work by all who formed the links in the. chain of military administration.

This work may not have been governed by written orders. The secrecy camouflaging this work often made it necessary to have recourse to verbal orders. And, on the other hand, many orders of a routine nature, on the strength of an already existing strategic project, became correlated, although outwardly they seemed to have no connection with it.

It therefore appears that, with regard to establishing the actual moment at which military plans for the attack on the Soviet Union began . . .

THE PRESIDENT: General Zorya, the Tribunal observes that you are about to read a deposition of General Warlimont, who, the Tribunal understands, is in Nuremberg, and the Tribunal considers that, in accordance with the order that it made the other day in another case, in the case of another deposition, that if the defendants' counsel desired, and you wish to use this deposition, you ought to be prepared to allow General Warlimont to be submitted to the defendants' counsel for cross-examination.

GEN. ZORYA: I am about to read into the record an extract from the interrogation of General Warlimont. This interrogation was carried out by General Alexandrov of the Soviet Prosecution, and if the Defense desires to call General Warlimont for cross-examination here before the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution will do its utmost to satisfy this request.

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THE PRESIDENT: That is, of course, on the supposition that I am right to saying that General Warlimont is in Nuremberg- available in Nuremberg. Go on.

GEN. ZORYA: I am definitely of the opinion that it would be useful, when establishing the actual moment of the beginning of military operations for the attack on the Soviet Union, to resort not to documents only-for not everything is always put down in writing-but to revert to the testimony of people who participated directly in the realization of these preparations.

I should now like to pass on to those depositions of Walter Warlimont which you, Mr. President, have just mentioned. These depositions were given by Warlimont on 13 November 1945. I am presenting them as evidence under Document Number USSR-263.

Walter Warlimont, as is known, was the Chief of the Department of National Defense in the OKW, and later Deputy Chief of the Operational Staff.

I shall read into the Record that part of his deposition which touches on the question before us. I ask you to turn to Page 2 of the Russian text of this document, which is on Page 20 in the bundle of documents presented by the Russian Prosecution on the question, and the answers to questions put to Warlimont:

"Personally, I first heard of this plan"-that is Plan Barbarossa-"on 29 July 1940. On that day General Jodl arrived in a special train at Bad Reichenhall, where Department 'L' of the Operational Staff was stationed. HiMer was in Berchtesgaden. This struck us immediately, because General Jodl had, till then, hardly ever, I believe, come to see us. Besides myself, the three other senior officers were ordered to be present."

I now skip several lines and pass on to Page 3 of the minutes of Warlimont's interrogation; this will be Page 21 in the bundle of documents:

"I cannot repeat his statements verbatim. The meaning was as follows: Jodl said that the Fuehrer had decided to prepare for war against Russia. The Fuehrer justified this by saying that war had to come one way or another, so that it would be better to prosecute this war in connection with the one already being fought, and, in any case, to start the necessary preparations for it."

I skip several lines which are not relevant to the question we are dealing with and continue:

"Then or at a later date Jodl declared that Hitler intended to begin the war against the Soviet Union as early as the autumn of 1940, but later he gave up this idea. The reason was that

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the deployment of the troops at that time could not yet be executed. For this purpose the necessary conditions in Poland did not exist; railways, quarters, and bridges were not prepared for the advance of the tanks; communication lines and airdromes were not organized.... Therefore an order was given to establish all the conditions for the preparation and execution of such a campaign."

To the question put by the Prosecution as to whether this order was issued on 9 August 1941 and called "Aufbau Ost," Warlimont replied:

"Yes, this order was prepared by the staff leaders in accordance with the instructions of General Jodl....

"In General Jodl's opinion, the concentration could take place only after all the preparations indicated in this order had been made"

Further on in his statement, Warlimont said that Plan Barbarossa, originally called "Fritz," was presented to Hitler on 5 December 1940, after which it Divas re-edited and issued on 18 December.

I think that the testimony of a man like Friedrich Paulus, a former field marshal of the German Army, who, as is known, was directly concerned both in the preparations and in the execution of Plan Barbarossa, can give considerable help in investigating the preparation of this plan.

I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus, dated 9 January 1946, given in a camp for prisoners of war, and marked Document Number USSR-156, and request that it be accepted as evidence.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I just wanted to remark that I do not possess a copy of the document concerning Paulus. But it seems to be the same statement which it has not. yet been possible to give to the defendants' counsel. If the Soviet Prosecution could give me the statement now, I would then decide if I could present my protest for decision now in the form in which I raised it at the beginning of this session.

[Copies of the document were submitted to Dr. Nelte.]

According to the original before me now, this is a similar statement by Field Marshal Paulus. Paulus has expressed his opinion in a letter to the Government of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Delegation has, I assume, now presented the original to you. This photostat bears no official certification by the Soviet authorities, nor is the statement an affidavit which could be admitted as evidence.

Therefore, I ask the Tribunal in this particular case to give a general decision on the question which I raised at the beginning of this session as well, so that in the future the Soviet Prosecution will be familiar with the treatment of such statements by the Tribunal.

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THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any answer to what Dr. Nelte has said?

GEM. ZORBA: Yes, I do.

In accordance with the wish of the Tribunal, as expressed in a previous session, the Soviet Prosecution has taken the necessary measures for originals of all the documents of the Soviet Prosecution, or else documents certifying the authenticity of these documents to be placed at the disposal of the Tribunal through the good' offices of the General Secretary, with indications of the places where they are to be found.

Moreover, bearing in mind that certain witnesses, whose evidence will be presented in a forthcoming session by the Soviet Prosecution, are of considerable interest and that it is possible that the Defense may wish to cross-examine them, the Soviet Prosecution will take all necessary measures to bring some of these witnesses to Nuremberg in order to hear their verbal evidence. Special interest attaches to the deposition of Paulus, extracts from which I propose to quote in my report, and which must be checked no later than this evening, after which Friedrich Paulus will be brought to the courtroom.

THE PRESIDENT: Then I understood from what you said, General, that as far as the photostatic copy of Field Marshal Paulus' statement is concerned, a certificate will be furnished-as we indicated the Tribunal wishes-that the photostatic copy is a true copy of the original, and so far as the question of producing witnesses of importance is concerned, Field Marshal Paulus will be produced as a witness for the defendants' counsel to cross-examine.

That meets your objection, I think, Dr. Nelte.

DR. NELTE: The basic principle of this question, as it appears to me, lies in the fact that official proof should be given that the statements contained in the documents submitted really represent what the persons who made them meant to say. Written statements are never more than a dubious substitute for a personal examination of a witness.

The Defense is fully aware of the difficulties encountered, particularly by the Soviet Prosecution, in producing witnesses where, for instance, reports are to be found. The Defense realizes the fact, but in those cases in which the individuality of the witness and the importance of certain questions really do matter, the personal examination of witnesses should be preferred to any statement. Wherever this is impossible, for reasons which we are unable to judge, it would however, at any rate, be desirable that those people who have made these statements should make them in the form of an affidavit or an interrogatory.

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If the Soviet Delegation should produce a certificate to the effect that these statements are corresponding to the original statements, it would not mean that the documents would acquire an increased value in our eyes. We do not doubt for one moment that statements of this kind are in the possession of the Soviet Delegation. The Defense is interested not so much in the formal confirmation of the statements as in the possibility of increasing the material evidence. If the Soviet Prosecution could assist us in this respect, we should be grateful.

THE PRESIDENT: You can go on, General.

GEN. ZORYA: I repeat, I believe that the testimony of Friedrich Paulus can be of great assistance to us in our investigation. I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus to which I have just referred and shall now read into the Record that part of his testimony which refers to the history of the preparation of Plan Barbarossa.

I request you to open the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal on Page 27, and there, in the text of Paulus' testimony, on Page 2, you will find the passages underlined in pencil, which I now intend reading into the Record. From 3 September...

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, General, since it is now a quarter to one you had better not begin this document before the adjournment.

GEN. ZORYA: I obey, Mr. President.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

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Afternoon Session

GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, in pursuance of the statement made by the Soviet Delegation, I will ask for permission to bring before the Tribunal for direct examination the field marshal of the former German Army, Friedrich Paulus, who win be examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.

[The witness, Paulus, took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you please tell me your name?

FRIEDRICH PAULUS (Witness): Friedrich Paulus.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: "I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing."

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: Would you like to sit down?

GEN. RUDENKO: Your name is Friedrich Paulus?

PAULUS: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You were born 1898?

PAULUS: 1890.

GEN. RUDENKO: You were born in the village of Breitenau, in the district of Kassel, in Germany?

PAULUS: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: By nationality you are a German?

PAULUS: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You are field marshal of the former German Army?

PAULUS: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Your last official position was Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army at Stalingrad?

PAULUS: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Will you please tell us, Witness, did you on 8 January 1946, make a statement to the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics?

PAULUS: Yes, I did.

GEN. RUDENKO: You confirm this statement?

PAULUS: Yes, I confirm this statement.

GEN.RUDENKO: Please, tell us, Witness, what you know regarding the preparation by the Hitlerite Government and the German High Command of the armed attack on the Soviet Union.

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PAULUS: From personal experience, I can state the following: On 3 September 1940 I took office with the High Command of the Army as Chief Quartermaster I of the General Staff. As such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and had in addition to carry out the instructions of a general operational nature which he delegated to me.

When I took office I found in my sphere of work, among other things, a still incomplete operational plan dealing with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational plan had been worked out by the then Major General Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose had been temporarily transferred to the High Command of the Army.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Oberst Halder, turned over to me the continuation of the work which was

ordered by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, on the following basis:

An investigation was to be made as to the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, with regard to the terrain, the points of the attack, the manpower needed, and so forth. In addition it was stated that altogether about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. It was furthermore to be taken into consideration that from the beginning Romanian territory was to be utilized for the deployment of the German southern army. On the northern flank the participation of Finland in the war was taken into account, but was ignored in this operational plan of the army.

Then, in addition, as a basis for the plan which was to be worked out, the aims_the instructions of the OKW-were given: First, the destruction of those parts of the Russian Army stationed in the west of Russia, to prevent the units which were fit for fighting from escaping deep into Russia; second, the reaching of a line from which the Russian air force would be unable to attack German territory effectively, and the final aim was the reaching of the Volga-Archangel line.

The operational plan which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November and was followed by two military exercises with the command of which the General Staff of the Army entrusted me. Senior officers of the General Staff of the Army were also assigned. The basic strength requirements assumed in these military exercises were: The launching of one army group south of the Pripet territory, specifically from southern Poland and from Romanian territory, with the aim of reaching the Dnieper-Kiev line and south of it; north of the Pripet territory another army group, the strongest, from the area around Warsaw and northward, with the general direction of attack being the Minsk-Smolensk line, the intention

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being to direct it against Moscow later; then a further army group, namely Army Group North, from the area of East Prussia, with the initial direction of attack being through the Baltic States toward Leningrad.

The conclusion which was drawn from these military exercises was at that time that in case of actual hostilities provision should be made firstly for reaching the general line Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried forward if the situation developed favorably, supply lines, e! cetera being adjusted accordingly. In connection with these military exercises and for the evaluation of the theoretical experience gained therefrom, there was a further conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the chiefs of the general staffs of the army groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, there was a speech about Russia by the then chief of the section Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kinsel, describing Russia's geographic and economic conditions, the Red Army, et cetera. The most significant point here was that no preparations whatever for an attack by the Soviet had come to our attention.

With these military exercises and conferences that I have just described the theoretical considerations and plans for this offensive were concluded. Immediately thereafter, that is on 18 December 1940, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive Number 21. This was the basis for all military and economic preparations which were to be carried out. In the Supreme Command of the Army this directive resulted in going ahead with the drafting and working out of directions for troop deployments for this operation. These first directions for troop deployment were authorized on 3 February 1941 by Hitler after a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the Obersalzberg; thereupon they were forwarded to the troops. Later on several supplements were issued. For the beginning of the attack the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces had calculated the time which would make it possible for large troop movements to be made on Russian territory. That was expected from about the middle of May on. Preparations were made in accordance with this. Then at the end of March this date underwent a change, when Hitler decided, due to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, to attack this country. Consequently, in the orders issued at the beginning of April 1941 this tentative date for the start of the operation...

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast. I think you had better begin again where you said that at the end of March Hitler made a change in the plan.

PAULUS: [Continuing] Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date foreseen for the beginning of the attack had to be

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postponed by about five weeks, that is to the last half of June. And, indeed, this attack then did take place on 22 June 1941.

In conclusion, I confirm the fact that the preparation for this attack on the Soviet Union, which actually took place on 22 June 1941, dated back to the autumn of 1940.

GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances . . .

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared?

[To the witness] Did you give the date from which the preparations went forward?

PAULUS: I gave it at the beginning: From the time my personal observations began, when I entered office, on 3 September 1940.

GEN.RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances was the participation of the satellite states secured?

PAULUS: From personal observation, I can say the following regarding this:

About September 1940, just at the time when I had received this operational study for the attack on the Soviet Union there was planned from the outset the use of Romanian territory for the deployment of the German right or, that is to say, south wing, and that was taken into consideration from the outset. A military mission headed by the then Lieutenant General of Cavalry, Hansen, was sent to Romania. A whole panzer division, the 13th, was transferred to Romania as a training unit. To those who knew about the plans for the future it was obvious that this step could only serve the purpose of preparing the future partner in the war for the task intended for him.

Further, in regard to Hungary:

In December 1940 Colonel Lazslo, the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, came to the headquarters of the Army High Command at Zossen. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization. The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of regrouping its units, which were organized in brigades, into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized troops and of panzer units. The chief of the Organization Division of the General Staff of the Army, then Major General Buhle, and myself advised Colonel Lazslo. At the same time, several Hungarian military commissions were in Berlin, and with them also the Hungarian Minister of War, General Von Bartha, and they discussed armament deliveries to Hungary with German authorities.

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It was clear to all of us who were informed as to future plans that all these measures, including the supplying of arms to other armies, were only conceivable at that time if these weapons were to be employed in future military projects.

Regarding Hungary there is a further point:

Due to the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler, at the end of March 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On 27 or 28 March I was called to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where there had just been a conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army had participated, that is, had been ordered to be present.

When I arrived I was advised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia in the first place to eliminate a threat to the flank of the intended operation against Greece, and get hold of the rail line going from Belgrade southward through Dish, and then also with an eye to the future-to Plan Barbarossa-to keep the right flank free from the outset.

I was instructed to go to Vienna, taking with me a number of competent General Staff officers of the Army, to deliver and explain pertinent orders to German commanders, and then to travel on without fail to the Hungarian General Staff in Budapest. and to reach an understanding with it on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia.

On 30 March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Werth, of the infantry and then with the chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Lazslo. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly, and the desired result was achieved. This result was then put down on maps. The map that I received from the Hungarian General Staff contained not only the deployment of the troops intended for the attack against Yugoslavia, but also forces on the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, which were to be placed there to protect our rear against the Soviet Union.

The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.

As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler's view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and in addition, that she was afraid

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of falling behind Romania which was allied with Germany. HiMer saw Hungary from this point of view also with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many premature promises of territory. I can cite one example: The question of the Dragowitsch oil territory. Later, when the attack began against Soviet Russia, the 17th German Army which was fighting at that point had the explicit order from the Supreme Command to take the Dragowitsch oil fields at all costs before the arrival of the Hungarians.

Regarding this future partner, according to my observation the procedure of Hitler was such that he counted on her certain participation and therefore delivered the armament to her and helped with the training, but that he kept to himself the time when he would initiate the ally into his plans.

Thirdly, the Finnish question. In December 1940 the first visit of the Chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was made to the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen. Lieutenant General Heinrichs had a conference with the Chief of the Army General Staff, the contents of which I no longer remember; but he made a speech about the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 before the General Staff officers of the High Command of the Army, and the General Staff officers of the Army groups who happened to be present at the time in connection with the discussion of the military exercises.

This speech before these General Staff officers had its great significance at that time because of the fact that it was delivered at the same time that Directive Number 21 of 18 December was issued. This speech was significant, it dealt with experiences won in the war with the Red Army and in addition gave an insight into the value of the Finnish troops as possible future partners in the war.

I took part in a second conference with the Chief of the Finnish General Staff at the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen, in the second half of May 1941. The Chief of the Finnish General Staff arrived. from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Army. The subject of the subsequent conferences in Zossen with the General Staff of the High Command of the Army was the co-operation of the Finnish forces in the south in Plan Barbarossa in co-operation with Army Group North-which was to proceed from the deployment area in East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was

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reached that the Finnish troops in the south were to synchronize their movements with the advance of German Army Group North and likewise that the joint advance later against Leningrad should be subject to consultations and agreements depending on the development of events.

Those are the personal observations which I made regarding the first appearance and the enlistment of allies in preparations for the aggression.

GEN. RUDENKO: How, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on the U.S.S.R. carried out-the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces?

PAULUS: The attack on the Soviet Union took place as I have related, according to a plan prepared carefully and well in advance. The troops for this attack were at first assembled in the rear of the deployment area. By special orders they were then moved by groups into jumping-off positions, and then took up their position along the entire long front from Romania to East Prussia for a simultaneous attack. The Finnish theater of war was excluded from this operation.

Just as the large-scale operational plan, as I described it at the beginning, was to a certain extent tried out theoretically, the detailed employment of troops was discussed during military exercises by the staffs of army groups, corps, and divisions and drawn up in orders down to the details long before the beginning of the war.

A large-scale diversion, which was to be organized in Norway and along the coast of France was designed to simulate an invasion of Britain in June 1941 and thus divert Russia's attention.

All measures were taken not only for operational but also for tactical surprise, as for instance, the prohibition of open reconnaissance on and across the boundary before the beginning of the war. That meant on the one hand, that possible losses which might be caused due to the lack of reconnaissance had to be taken into account for the sake of surprise, but on the other hand it meant that a surprise attack across the boundary by the enemy was not feared.

All of these measures show that it was a question of a criminal attack.

GEN. RUDENKO: How would you define the aims pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?

PAULUS: The aim to reach the Volga-Archangel line, which was far beyond German strength, is in itself characteristic of Hitler's and the National Socialist leadership's boundless policy of conquest. From a strategic point of view, the achievement of these aims

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would have meant the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. With the winning of the line I have mentioned the main areas of Soviet Russia with the capital, Moscow, would have been conquered and subjugated, together with the leading political and economic center of the Soviet Union. Economically, the winning of this line would have meant the possession of important agricultural areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production in Russia, and also the main network of communications in European Russia.

How much Hitler was bent on taking economic objectives in this war can best be shown from an example out of my personal experience.

On 1 June 1942, on the occasion of a conference of commanders-in-chief in the region of Army Group South in Poltava, Hitler declared, "If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grosny, then I must end this war."

For the utilization and the administration of the territories to be conquered, economic and administrative organizations had already been formed and were kept in readiness long before the beginning of the war.

To summarize I should like to state that the objectives given indicate the conquest of the Russian territories for the purpose of colonization with the utilization and spoliation of and with the resources of which the war in the West was to be brought to a conclusion, with the aim of finally establishing domination over Europe.

GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of the criminal initiation of the war against Soviet Russia?

PAULUS: May I please have the question repeated?

GEN. RUDENKO: I repeat the question...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have lust put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory, is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his opinion.

Is that what Counsel for the Defense wish to object to?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President, that is what I want to do.

GEN. RUDENKO: Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this question rather differently.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

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GEN. RUDENKO: Who of the defendants was an active participant in the initiation of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: Of the defendants, as far as I observed them, the top military advisers to Hitler. They are the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; Chief of the Operations Branch, Jodl; and Goering, in his capacity as Reich Marshal, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Economy.

GEN. RUDENKO: In concluding the interrogation I shad make a summary. Have I rightly concluded from your testimony, that long before 22 June the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose of colonizing the

territory of the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: That is beyond doubt according to all the developments as I described them, and also in connection with all the directives issued in the well-known Green File.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the French Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The British?

BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The United States?

UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants' counsel?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as Counsel for the General Staff,<. I ask you to afford me the opportunity to examine the witness tomorrow morning. The presentation of the witness by the Prosecution came as a surprise to the defendants' counsel, at any rate, and I think a consultation about the questions to be asked, especially in view of the importance of the testimony, is absolutely necessary. I therefore ask to be permitted to conduct the cross-examination at the beginning of tomorrow morning's session.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if the Prosecution has no objection, the Tribunal thinks that this application ought to be granted.

GEN. RUDENKO: If the Tribunal so wishes, the Prosecution will not object.

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. I don't know whether any other member of the defendants' counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I assume that all defendants' counsel may conduct their cross-examination of the witness, General Paulus, tomorrow morning?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I was only asking whether any other member of the defendants' counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.

DR. NELTE: I personally would be able to put my questions after the recess.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire and the case will go on. He will be recalled tomorrow morning and in the meantime you will go on with your case.

[The witness left the stand, and Major General Zorya approached the lectern.]

THE PRESIDENT: General, you won't, I presume, think it necessary to read any more of Field Marshal Paulus' statement, will you?

GEN. ZORYA: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.

GEN. ZORYA: Referring to the explanation concerning the beginning of the criminal attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, I should like to remind the Tribunal that in the morning session of the Tribunal on 30 November 1945, the witness, Lahousen, was interrogated and gave evidence of sufficient interest in our case.

Among other things, this witness, when enumerating the more intimate members of the inner circle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Army, mentioned Pieckenbrock by name.

I present to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-220, the testimony of the former chief of Section I of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General of the former German Army, Hans Pieckenbrock, former chief and colleague of Lahousen. Pieckenbrock gave this testimony in the order prescribed by the laws of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, on 12 December 1945.

For the moment I should like to read a few lines only into the record from Pieckenbrock's testimony, relating to the matter which we are now investigating. These lines are on Page 1 of the Russian text of his testimony and they are marked with a red pencil. This Page 1 corresponds to Page 34 of the document book.

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"I must say"-said Pieckenbrock-"that already since August and September 1940 the Foreign Armies East of the General Staff of the Army began to increase considerably its intelligence assignments to the Abwehr concerning the U.S.S.R. These assignments were unquestionably connected with the preparation of war against Russia.

"The more precise dates for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union I learned in January 1941 from Canaris. I do not know what sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the Soviet Union was fixed for 15 May."

The Soviet Prosecution also has at its disposal the testimony of the former chief of Department III of the German Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General Franz von Bentivegni of the former German Army, which was given by him on 28 December 1945. I present those documents under Document Number USSR-230

I shall at the same time also only read into the record those parts of Bentivegni's testimony underlined in red pencil, which have a direct bearing on the beginning of military preparations against the Soviet Union. These first two excerpts of the testimony are on Page 37 in the document book which is submitted to the Military Tribunal:

"I learned first of Germany's preparation for a military attack on the Soviet Union in August 1940, from the head of the German Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris. In an unofficial conversation which took place in Canaris' office he told me that Hitler had started to take measures for an Eastern campaign, which he had spoken about as early as 1938 in his speech at a meeting of Gauleiter in Berlin.

"Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler's had now begun to take concrete form. This was evident from the fact that divisions of the German Army were being forwarded in large numbers from the West to the eastern frontiers and, in accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia."

These are the first two paragraphs of Bentivegni's testimony. And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual

time of fascist Germany's military preparations for the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, I should like to dwell for a moment on the testimony of General Muller. This testimony, dated 8 January 1946, was written in a camp for prisoners of war. I present it to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-149.

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All the material to which I have so far referred emanated from circles of the highest commanding officers of the German Army.

THE PRESIDENT: General, on this document of General Muller, does it appear where that document was made and where General Muller is now?

GEN. ZORYA: The photostat bears a date written in General Mueller's hand. This date is 8 January 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Where?

GEN. ZORYA: If I might have a look at the photostatic copy which I have just presented to the Tribunal, I would be able to tell you where the date is written.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but there are many prisoners-of-war camps. We want to know which one and where it is.

GEN. ZORYA: In a camp located near Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this document got any authenticating signature on it at all? So far as we are concerned, isn't it simply a photostatic copy of a writing by somebody?

GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, this document, like all other documents which have been submitted so far by the Soviet Delegation, is a noncertified photostatic copy.

Taking into consideration the wish of the Tribunal and in execution of this wish the Soviet Prosecution took measures to ensure that only the originals of these documents or documents whose authenticity is certified will be presented in complete order to the General Secretary. This will be done in the course of several days and all the material will be given in best order to the General Secretary.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where the writer of the document is now?

GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already. If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the general's whereabouts.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn now. That will enable you to consult your colleagues.

[A recess was taken.]

DR.NELTE: Mr. President, to my regret I must present the same objections to this document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet Union under USSR-149, and must submit the same request

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which I made this morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have not yet made a decision in regard to this question.

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal has already made a decision.

I think it would be better if, when defendants' counsel go to the place from which they wish to speak, they would arrange these earphones before they speak.

I say the Tribunal has already made a decision which governs this case. They pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union that documents which were not identified as authentic documents, must be identified as authentic, and the Soviet prosecutor at that time undertook to certify that all documents which he made use of were certified as authentic documents. And if they are not so certified, they will be struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this document.

This document is a document which appears to be a document, a letter, or report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does not contain upon its face any certification showing that it is an authentic document. The Counsel for the Soviet Union said before we adjourned, that he undertook-as he had already undertaken-to produce a certificate that the document was an authentic document; that is to say, that it was written by the person who purported to write it, and in those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document provisionally.

If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document will be stricken from the record.

DR.NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will accept a letter written to the Soviet Government or a statement as documentary evidence for the contents of this statement.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said provided that it is certified as an authentic document. I have said that more than once.

DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the Prosecution or the Government of the Soviet Union or to any other Prosecution would become documentary evidence by the certification that it has actually been written by the person who signed it, which would make it impossible for the Defense to cross-examine the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are dealing with witnesses who are scattered all over the globe, and as we are informed that it is not the practice in the Soviet Union for affidavits to be made in such cases, the Tribunal considers such a document to fall within Article 19-provided it is an authentic document.

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We are affording the defendants' counsel the greatest assistance in bringing witnesses to this Court, but we cannot undertake to bring witnesses from all over the world upon questions which are very often of very little importance.

DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am grateful to the Tribunal for their willingness to assist us. Therefore I only request to ascertain in each case where the person, who has made that statement, has his residence, so that the Defense may try to reach him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the immediate vicinity of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think that it was only fair, if such a document as this were to be put in evidence, that he should be produced for examination or cross-examination by the defendants' counsel, but we do understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the vicinity of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and I am reminding defendants' counsel that they can always apply, if they think right, to issue interrogatories which would be put to any such person as this who has written such a document as this.

DR.NELTE: Thank you.

GEM. ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to make inquiries about General Muller. General Muller is in a prisoner-of-war camp, Number 27, in Krasnogorsk, in the MOSCONV region. May I continue my statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

GEN. ZORYA: All the material, Your Honors, which I have mentioned to date emanated from circles of fiche Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. If I can so express myself, General Muller belonged to the middle category of German generals. He was Chief of Staff of an army; he commanded an army group. His testimony reflects a series of events which may be considered worthy of attention, since they explain the circumstances accompanying Germany's preparations against the Soviet Union.

I wish to refer to Page 40 of the document book. There you will find the first page of General Mueller's statement. The first paragraph, Page 1, of the statement is marked with red pencil. I now proceed to quote from it:

"The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union began as early as July 1940. At that time I was first general staff officer in the staff of Army Group C at Dijon in France. General Field Marshal Von Leeb was commander-in-chief. This army group consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 7th Armies, which were occupation armies in France. Besides this, Army

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Group A (Rundstedt), whose task was to prepare 'Case Sea Lion' (the invasion of England by Army Group B-Von Bock) was also in France. The staff of Army Group B was transferred to the East (Poser) during July and was given the following forces, transferred from France-part of the armies of occupation: The 12th Army Command (List), 4th Army Command (don Kluge), and 18th Army Command (don Kuchler), plus several general commands and about thirty divisions. A greater part of this number was taken from Army Group C (don Leeb).

"Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order for the demobilization of 20 divisions. This order was cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not demobilized. Instead of this, after their return to Germany they were sent on leave, and thus kept ready for rapid mobilization.

"Both measures, the transfer of about five hundred thousand men to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order disbanding about three hundred thousand men, show that already in July 1940 plans existed for war operations in the East.

"The next order which gives evidence of Germany's preparations for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued in September 1940 regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new army command (A.O.K. 11) of several general commands and about forty divisions and panzer divisions. The forming of these units was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the commander of the reserve army (Generaloberst Fromm), partly in France, but mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the OKH called me to Fontainebleau. The Chief Quartermaster I in the General Staff of the Army, then Lieutenant General (afterwards Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the order that my staff (Army Group C) was to be transferred to Dresden by 1 November and that Army High Command II (Generaloberst Weichs) which was under the command of the staff, should be transferred at the same time to Munich. The task was the leading of training of the abovementioned 40 divisions which were to be newly created.

"In accordance with this order, confirmed later by signature by the Chief of the General Staff Halder, the transfer of these units was carried out on time. These 40 divisions were put into action in the invasion of the Soviet Union."

Thus initiated, the preparation for the military attack on the

Soviet Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with customary German pedantry.

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I would, Your Honors, remind the Tribunal that the witness, Paulus, stated at this session that in August 1940 the elaboration of the previous plan of attack on the Soviet Union, known as Plan Barbarossa, was already so far advanced as to render possible the conducting of two military exercises under the direction of Paulus. THE PRESIDENT: General, I don't think it is necessary to read the statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has already given the evidence tin the witness box.

GEL. ZORYA: I am not reading it into the record. I am merely referring to a circumstance which will enable me to proceed to General Mueller's statement that this system of military exercises, which originated in the General Staff of the German Army, eventually spread over the entire Army and that the entire armed forces participated in the execution of these games which, per se, were already a preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the record that passage of the statement which is underlined in blue pencil, Page 41 of the bundle of documents: "Insofar"-General Muller states-"as in the future the Army was to attack the Soviet Union, the first plan was to train soldiers and general staff officers.

"Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders from the Chief of the General Staff Halder to attend the military exercises of Rundstedt's army group at St. Germain, near Paris. The object of this military exercise was the attack and advance from Romania and South Poland in the direction of Kiev and southwards. The plan had in mind the intention also of the participation of Romanian troops. In the main this military exercise anticipated the conditions of the future order concerning the strategic deployment of forces, to which I will refer later.

"The director of the military exercises was the Chief of the General Staff of the Rundstedt army group. There were present: Rundstedt, Halder, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the 6th Army, Colonel Heim, of the 11th Army, Colonel Wohler, and of Kleist's tank group, Colonel Zwickler and several generals of the panzer forces. The military exercises were held at the place occupied by Rundstedt's army group, approximately between the 31st January and 2d February 1941. The exercise demonstrated the necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces."

The documents I have presented to date characterize the measures of the military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the strategic deployment of the German armies for launching an attack against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

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As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period of 1940 and were put into action at least 6 months prior to the appearance on the scene of Directive Number 21 concerning the Plan Barbarossa.

I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken by the fascist conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet Union.

Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September 1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl.

This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number 1229-PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I do not intend to quote this document again, but I do consider it essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand that the regrouping of armies on Germany's Eastern front should be camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should remain under the impression that action of some kind Divas brewing against the Balkans.

The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the Protectorate and in Austria.

The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of antiaircraft units and of the insignificant extent of roadbuilding activities.

I here take the liberty of, making two pertinent observations. According to Pieckenbrock's testimony, the intensification of the work of this intelligence organization against the Soviet Union began prior to the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course, was not limited to the spreading of false information on the regrouping of forces from West to East.

I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni.

On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni's deposition, it is said-I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil-beginning at the last paragraph, Page 1 of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of the document book:

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"In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received from Canaris orders to intensify the work for counterintelligence in the localities where concentration of the German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place."

On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1, Bentivegni continues:

"In accordance with this order, I immediately gave a corresponding order to the German Abwehr agencies, Danzig, Konigsberg, Posen, Krakow, Breslau, and Vienna."

And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39 of the document book, I read:

"In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives for the preparations for the execution of the Plan Barbarossa.

"a) Preparation of all links of Abwehr III for carrying out active counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, as for instance the creation of the necessary counterintelligence groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended for taking part in the operations on the Eastern front, and paralyzing the activity of the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence organs.

"b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow against Great Britain.

"c) Counterintelligence measures to keep secret the preparations being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the transfer of troops to the East be kept secret."

The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation of the Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department I of the German Army,. Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the activities of the intelligence service of the German Army in connection with the preparations for the realization of Plan Barbarossa. I would refer you to Page 35 of the document book and to Paragraph 2 from the top. This corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock's testimony. Pieckenbrock states

"In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris and the chief of the espionage detachment (Abwehr II), Colonel Lahousen, about measures connected with Plan Barbarossa. During this conversation they kept referring to a written order on this subject, which Lahousen had. I, personally, as head of Abwehr I, beginning in February 1941 and up to 22 June 1941, more than once had official

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talks with the Chief Quartermaster IV, Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and with the head of the detachment Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kienzl. These conversations dealt with the more precise definition of tasks assigned to Abwehr, with regard to the Soviet Union, and in particular with the verification of old intelligence data about the Red Army, and also details about the dislocation of the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union." ,

I now skip one paragraph of Pieckenbrock's statement and read further:

"All Abwehrstellen which were working with the espionage against Russia were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task-the intensification of espionage work against Russia-was given to an intelligence organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more successful direction of an these field Abwehr organs, a special intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name of Wally I. This staff was in the vicinity of Warsaw in the village Sulajewek. Major Baun, as the best specialist on work against Russia, was appointed chief of the staff of Wally I. Later, when following our example, Abwehr II and Abwehr III had also established staffs Wally II and Wally III, this organ became known as a whole staff Wally, and directed the entire intelligence, counterintelligence, and diversionary work against the U.S.S.R. as a staff had to become active in the front line. At the head of staff 'Wally' was Lieutenant Colonel Schmalschlager."

I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pieckenbrock's statement on Page 36 of the document book:

"From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at which I was also present, I know that a great amount of preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941 many conferences of the leaders of Abwehr II took place at the quarters of Jodl's deputy, General Warlimont They were held in a cavalry school in Krampnitz. One particular question settled at these conferences in accordance with the needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units, Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units among the individual army groups."

In Pieckenbrock's testimony which has just been read into the record, special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with which Lahousen's department had been entrusted, and

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to special task units known under the code name of Brandenburg 800.

Here these points are clarified by the testimony of a former colonel of the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen's deputy in Department II, Ausland Abwehr, attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to the Tribunal as evidence Stolze's testimony of 25 December 1945, which was given to Lieutenant Colonel Burashrikov, of the Counterintelligence Service of the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-231 (Exhibit Number USSR-231), which I beg you to accept as evidence. I shall read into the record individual extracts from this testimony which are underlined in red pencil. I begin the quotation from Page 48 of the document book. Stolze testified as follows:

"I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a special group under code name 'A,' which had to engage in the preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the intended attack on the U.,S.S.R.

"At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and which contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R. after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. This order was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and initialed by General Jodl (or by General Warlimont on Keitel's instructions-I do not quite remember which.)"

I am omitting two lines which are irrelevant to our case and read on: "It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, Abwehr II, in conducting subversive work against Russia, with the help of a net of V men, must use its agents for kindling national antagonism among the people of the Soviet Union." I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the document book on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, and to note the following passages in his testimony:

"In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian National Socialists who were in the German Intelligence Service and other members of the nationalist fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set out above.

"In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnik (code name

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'Consul I' and Bandara, to organize immediately upon Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet armies, and also to convince international public opinion of alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.

"We also prepared special diversionist groups by Abwehr II for subversive activities in the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union."

I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the document book, beginning with the third line from the top you will find Stolze's testimony:

"Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty training regiment for special tasks, Brandenburg 800, under the immediate command of the head of Abwehr II, Lahousen. Among the objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure of operationally important points, such as bridges, tunnels, and important military installations, and holding them till the arrival of the advance units of the German Army.

"Contrary to the international rules governing the conduct of war, the personnel of this regiment, mainly composed of Germans from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy uniforms and equipment in order to camouflage their operations.

"During the course of preparations for Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R., the command of the Brandenburg Regiment also collected supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment, and arms, and organized separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the Russian language."

Your Honors, the testimonies of Stolze, Bentivegni, and Pieckenbrock, which I have presented in evidence, disclose the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of Plan Barbarossa.

I shall not detain the Tribunal any further with these questions. But before proceeding to a further presentation, I should like to point out that the department of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was likewise interested in intelligence work. I shall limit myself to submitting one document which is typical of the manner in which the Hitlerites, by exploiting their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through which country, as was known, the supply routes passed for the delivery to the U.S.S.R. of motor vehicles and war material of the most varied nature.

The document, which I intend to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178 (Document Number USSR-178) was taken by us from the German Foreign Office archives, which fell into the

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hands of advance units of the Red Army. This document is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner's letter to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on a sheet of note paper with the letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the document book before you, you will find this document on Page 52. I read into the record the underlined extracts from this letter:

"28 June 1943; top secret.

"To the Foreign Minister Herr Von Ribbentrop; Berlin; Object: Elections to the Iranian Parliament.

"Most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of exercising German influence on the course of the imminent Iranian parliamentary elections."

And a few lines further on it is stated:

"In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are necessary.... It should also be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany.

"I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one million tomans from the Foreign- Office. This money can be sent by the people whom we are sending there by airplane. "Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS Obergruppenfuehrer."

This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode.

In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office and of the Reich Fuehrer SS waxed in strength and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of espionage work.

I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120), and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The text of the agreement reads:

"By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Fuehrer has entrusted the Reich Fuehrer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic, and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the

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Fuehrer has established that the direction of the Intelligence Service, insofar as foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich Fuehrer SS had been reached:

"1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Fuehrer SS represents an important instrument for obtaining information in the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for this is close, comradely, and loyal co-operation between the Foreign Office and the main office of the Reich Security Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by the diplomatic service is not affected by this.

"2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the main office of the Reich Security Service the information on the situation in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German foreign policy. It hands over to the main office of the Reich Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of the Secret Intelligence Service.

"3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics, obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed..."

THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't it be a sufficient summary of this document with which you are dealing to say that it is a document signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop and that it shows that there was a unification of the German Secret Intelligence Service. The details of that unification are not really a matter which very much concerns this Tribunal, and therefore, as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.

GEN. ZORYA: I summarize this document and would add that this agreement, signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a state of affairs that it became extremely difficult to differentiate prevailing conditions in fascist Germany or to distinguish where Himmler's Gestapo service ended and the Foreign Office activities of the Defendant Ribbentrop began.

I shall now, with the permission of the Tribunal, proceed to the presentation of the next document. The document which I have just read-I am referring to the Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement concerning the conduct of intelligence work abroad-also justifies the assumption that under the name of German diplomatic representation in such countries which maintained normal diplomatic

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relations with Germany, a whole intelligence network of the Gestapo was actively functioning.

If this summary, in the opinion of the Tribunal, corresponds to the contents of the document, I shall proceed to the following section of the report, "The Satellites of Germany."

When Plan Barbarossa was read into the record in Court, there was one part of the entire case which, in my opinion, received comparatively little attention. I refer to Part II of Plan Barbarossa, Document Number 446-PS. This part bears the name of "Presumed Allies and Their Tasks." I should like, here and now, to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the questions touched on in this part. In the first place, I consider it essential to remind you of the contents of this part by repeating it. Document Number 446-PS, Plan Barbarossa, is on Page 14 of the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal. I consider it essential to read out Part II of this case:

"1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.

"The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces will, at the appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German command on their entry into the war.

"2. Romania's task will be to tie up, in co-operation with the group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary services in the rear area.

"3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German northern landing group (units of Group XXI) due to arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will be up to Finland to eliminate Hango.

"4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish railways and coal being available for the movements of the German northern group not later than the beginning of the operation."

In the speech of the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko, attention was drawn to the opening sentence of this section:

"On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia."

This justified the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in pointing out in his speech that on 18 December 1940, the date of the Barbarossa document, Romania and Finland were already following in the wake of the predatory policy of the Hitlerite conspirators.

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There is only one more document which was submitted by the United States Prosecution and which mentioned Germany's presumed allies in her aggression against the U.S.S.R.

This document, numbered C-39, is entitled "Provisional Case Barbarossa." It is, as the Defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a timetable for The preparations of Plan Barbarossa after June 1941. This timetable was confirmed by Hitler. The text of this plan is on Page 57 of the document book. In Part II of this document, entitled "Negotiations with Friendly Powers," we read:

<, "a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any large extent the units stationed for security reasons on the Turkish frontier.

"b) The Romanians have begun, at the instigation of the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania, a partial, camouflaged mobilization in order to be able to close their frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.

"c) Hungarian territory will be used for the deployment of Army Group South only insofar as it would be expedient for introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Romanian forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on this subject will be made to Hungary.

"d) five German divisions have been deployed in the eastern part of Slovakia; the next ones will be unloaded in the area of Prosov.

"e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish general staff take place as from 25 May."

Mr. President, in order to correlate the following documents with the testimony given by Paulus, I shall merely refer to the fact that this witness testified to the previous preparations for military aggression in that fortress which was Romania, thereby proving that corresponding measures for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, founded in the image and pattern of the German Army, were taken in September 1940 when a special military mission was sent to Romania. The chief of this mission was Cavalry General Hansen. His Chief of Staff was Major General Hauffe, his chief quartermaster Major Merk. Major General Von Rotkirch commanded the 13th Panzer Division.

The task of this military mission was the reorganization of the Romanian Army and its preparation for the subsequent attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. The preliminary trend of this task, as Paulus has testified, was given to Hansen and his Chief of Staff by Paulus and they got the last directives from the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.

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General Hansen received directives from two sources: from the OKW where his military mission was concerned, and from the OKH in all questions dealing with the Army. Directives of a military and political nature were received only from the OKW.

The military mission acted as liaison between the German and the Romanian general staffs.

The form assumed by the agreement and, even more, the publication of the true aims of high ranking fascist leaders in the country, did not always suit the satellites.

I now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document Number USSR-233), the minutes of a conversation between Ion Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu which were captured by the advance units of the Red Army. This document, Your Honors, figures on Pages 59-62 of your document book.

In connection with Ribbentrop's speech in Budapest on the subject of Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following annotation in the course of this speech-last paragraph, Page 2 of the Russian text of the document, Page 60 of the document book:

'Without hesitation, I stressed the point that as early as 6 September, when I took over the government of the country, supported only by Monsieur Mihai Antonescu, I declared, without asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of adherence to the Axis powers. I said that this was the only example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a policy which no doubt could only appear odious...."

When making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected it to receive such wide publicity.

Mr. President, I intend to read into the record a long document which will take considerable time.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 12 February 1946 at 1000 hours.]

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