Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 11

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Monday, 15 April 1946

Morning Session

MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal: The report is made that the Defendant Ribbentrop is absent from this session of the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents of the Defendant Rosenberg:

The Tribunal rules that all the documents in Book 1, Volume I and Volume II, should be denied, up to and including the book by Hellpach, that is to say, Exhibits 1 to 6 and also Exhibit 7(e) and Exhibit 8.

Secondly, the Tribunal rules that it will take judicial notice of Exhibits 7(a) to 7(d); but it rules that those exhibits, 7 to 7(d), are not to be read at the present stage but may be quoted by counsel in his final speech.

Thirdly, the Tribunal allows Books 2 and 3.

And fourthly, the Tribunal rules that the Defendant Rosenberg shall be called first and any documents which have been allowed may be put to him in the course of his examination.

That is all.

Now, Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: With the agreement of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Hoess.

[The witness Hoess took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Stand up. Will you state your name?

RUDOLF FRANZ FERDINAND HOESS (Witness): Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure

truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath in German.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, your statements will have far-reaching significance. You are perhaps the only one who can throw some light upon certain hidden aspects, and who can tell which people gave the orders for the destruction of European Jewry, and


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can further state how this order was carried out and to what degree the execution was kept a secret.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, will you kindly put questions to the witness.


[Turning to the witness] From 1940 to 1943, you were the Commander of the camp at Auschwitz. Is that true?


DR. KAUFFMANN: And during that time, hundreds of thousands of human beings were sent to their death there. Is that correct?


DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, yourself, have made no exact notes regarding the figures of the number of those victims because you were forbidden to make them?

HOESS: Yes, that is correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore correct that exclusively one man by the name of Eichmann had notes about this, the man who had the task of organizing and assembling these people?


DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore true that Eichmann stated to you that in Auschwitz a total sum of more than 2 million Jews had been destroyed?


DR. KAUFFMANN: Men, women, and children?


DR. KAUFFMANN: You were a participant in the World War?


DR. KAUFFMANN: And then in 1922, you entered the Party?


DR. KAUFFMANN: Were you a member of the SS?

HOESS: Since 1934.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, in the year 1924, were sentenced to a lengthy term of hard labor because you participated in a so-called political murder?


DR. KAUFFMANN: And then at the end of 1934, you went to the concentration camp of Dachau?


DR. KAUFFMANN: What task did you receive?


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HOESS: At first, I was the leader of a block of prisoners and then I became clerk and finally, the administrator of the property of prisoners.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And how long did you stay there?

HOESS: Until 1938.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What job did you have from 1938 on and where were you then?

HOESS: In 1938 I went to the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen where, to begin with, I was adjutant to the commander and later on I became the head of the protective custody camp.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When were you commander at Auschwitz?

HOESS: I was commander at Auschwitz from May 1940 until December 1943.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the highest number of human beings, prisoners, ever held at one time at Auschwitz?

HOESS: The highest number of internees held at one time at Auschwitz, was about 140,000 men and women.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that in 1941 you were ordered to Berlin to see Himmler? Please state briefly what was discussed.

HOESS: Yes. In the summer of 1941 I was summoned to Berlin to Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler to receive personal orders. He told me something to the effect-I do not remember the exact words-that the Fuehrer had given the order for a final solution of the Jewish question. We, the SS, must carry out that order. If it is not carried out now then the Jews will later on destroy the German people. He had chosen Auschwitz on account of its easy access by rail and also because the extensive site offered space for measures ensuring isolation.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During that conference did Himmler tell you that this planned action had to be treated as a secret Retch matter?

HOESS: Yes. He stressed that point. He told me that I was not even allowed to say anything about it to my immediate superior Gruppenfuehrer Glucks. This conference concerned the two of us only and I was to observe the strictest secrecy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the position held by Glucks whom you have just mentioned?

HOESS: Gruppenfuehrer Glucks was, so to speak, the inspector of concentration camps at that time and he was immediately subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the expression "secret Reich matter" mean that no one was permitted to make even the slightest allusion to outsiders without endangering his own life?


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HOESS: Yes, "secret Reich matter" means that no one was allowed to speak about these matters with any person and that everyone promised upon his life to keep the utmost secrecy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you happen to break that promise?

HOESS: No, not until the end of 1942.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Why do you mention that date? Did you talk to outsiders after that date?

HOESS: At the end of 1942 my wife's curiosity was aroused by remarks made by the then Gauleiter of Upper Silesia, regarding happenings in my camp. She asked me whether this was the truth and I admitted that it was. That was my only breach of the promise I had given to the Reichsfuehrer. Otherwise I have never talked about it to anyone else.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you meet Eichmann?

HOESS: I met Eichmann about 4 weeks after having received that order from the Reichsfuehrer. He came to Auschwitz to discuss the details with me on the carrying out of the given order. As the Reichsfuehrer had told me during our discussion, he had instructed Eichmann to discuss the carrying out of the order with me and I was to receive all further instructions from him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly tell whether it is correct that the camp of Auschwitz was completely isolated, describing the measures taken to insure as far as possible the secrecy of carrying out of the task given to you.

HOESS: The Auschwitz camp as such was about 3 kilometers away from the town. About 20,000 acres of the surrounding country had been cleared of all former inhabitants, and the entire area could be entered only by SS men or civilian employees who had special passes. The actual compound called "Birkenau," where later on the extermination camp was constructed, was situated 2 kilometers from the Auschwitz camp. The camp installations themselves, that is to say, the provisional installations used at first were deep in the woods and could from nowhere be detected by the eye. In addition to that, this area had been declared a prohibited area and even members of the SS who did not have a special pass could not enter it. Thus, as far as one could judge, it was impossible for anyone except authorized persons to enter that area.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then the railway transports arrived. During what period did these transports arrive and about how many people, roughly, were in such a transport?

HOESS: During the whole period up until 1944 certain operations were carried out at irregular intervals in the different countries, so that one cannot speak of a continuous flow of incoming transports.


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It was always a matter of 4 to 6 weeks. During those 4 to 6 weeks two to three trains, containing about 2,000 persons each, arrived daily. These trains were first of all shunted to a siding in the Birkenau region and the locomotives then went back. The guards who had accompanied the transport had to leave the area at once and the persons who had been brought in were taken over by guards belonging to the camp.

They were there examined by two SS medical officers as to their fitness for work. The internees capable of work at once marched to Auschwitz or to the camp at Birkenau and those incapable of work were at first taken to the provisional installations, then later to the newly constructed crematoria.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During an interrogation I had with you the other day you told me that about 60 men were designated to receive these transports, and that these 60 persons, too, had been bound to the same secrecy described before. Do you still maintain that today?

HOESS: Yes, these 60 men were always on hand to take the internees not capable of work to these provisional installations and later on to the other ones. This group, consisting of about ten leaders and subleaders, as well as doctors and medical personnel, had repeatedly been told, both in writing and verbally, that they were bound to the strictest secrecy as to all that went on in the camps.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any signs that might show an outsider who saw these transports arrive, that they would be destroyed or was that possibility so small because there was in Auschwitz an unusually large number of incoming transports, shipments of goods and so forth?

HOESS: Yes, an observer who did not make special notes for that purpose could obtain no idea about that because to begin with not only transports arrived which were destined to be destroyed but also other transports arrived continuously, containing new internees who were needed in the camp. Furthermore, transports likewise left the camp in sufficiently large numbers with internees fit for work or exchanged prisoners.

The trains themselves were closed, that is to say, the doors of the freight cars were closed so that it was not possible, from the outside, to get a glimpse of the people inside. In addition to that, up to 100 cars of materials, rations, et cetera, were daily rolled into the camp or continuously left the workshops of the camp in which war material was being made.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And after the arrival of the transports were the victims stripped of everything they had? Did they have to undress completely; did they have to surrender their valuables? Is that true?


16 April 46


DR. KAUFFMANN: And then they immediately went to their death?


DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, according to your knowledge, did these people know what was in store for them?

HOESS: The majority of them did not, for steps were taken to keep them in doubt about it and suspicion would not arise that they were to go to their death. For instance, all doors and all walls bore inscriptions to the effect that they were going to undergo a delousing operation or take a shower. This was made known in several languages to the internees by other internees who had come in with earlier transports and who were being used as auxiliary crews during the whole action.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then, you told me the other day, that death by gassing set in within a period of 3 to 15 minutes. Is that correct?


DR. KAUFFMANN: You also told me that even before death finally set in, the victims fell into a state of unconsciousness?

HOESS: Yes. From what I was able to find out myself or from what was told me by medical officers, the time necessary for reaching unconsciousness or death varied according to the temperature and the number of people present in the chambers. Loss of consciousness took place within a few seconds or a few minutes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you yourself ever feel pity with the victims, thinking of your own family and children?


DR. KAUFFMANN: How was it possible for you to carry out

these actions in spite of this?

HOESS: In view of all these doubts which I had, the only one and decisive argument was the strict order and the reason given for it by the Reichsfuehrer Himmler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you whether Himmler inspected the camp and convinced himself, too, of the process of annihilation?

HOESS: Yes. Himmler visited the camp in 1942 and he watched in detail one processing from beginning to end.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the same apply to Eichmann?

HOESS: Eichmann came repeatedly to Auschwitz and was intimately acquainted with the proceedings.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the Defendant Kaltenbrunner ever inspect the camp?


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DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever talk with Kaltenbrunner with reference to your task?

HOESS: No, never. I was with Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner on only one single occasion.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?

HOESS: That was one day after his birthday in the year 1944.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What position did you hold in the year 1944?

HOESS: In the year 1944 I was the head of Department E1 in the Main Economic and Administrative Office in Berlin. My office was the former Inspectorate of Concentration Camps at Oranienburg.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And what was the subject of that conference which you have just mentioned?

HOESS: It concerned a report from the camp at Mauthausen on the so-called nameless internees and their engagement in armament industry. Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner was to make a decision on the matter. For that reason I came to him with the report from the commander at Mauthausen but he did not make a decision telling me he would do so later.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the location of Mauthausen, will you please state in which district Mauthausen is situated. Is that

Upper Silesia or is it the Government General?

HOESS: Mauthausen...

DR. KAUFFMANN: Auschwitz, I beg your pardon, I made a mistake. I mean Auschwitz.

HOESS: Auschwitz is situated in the former state of Poland. Later, after 1939, it was incorporated in the province of Upper Silesia.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right for me to assume that administration and feeding of concentration camps were exclusively under the control of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?


DR. KAUFFMANN: A department which is completely separated from the RSHA?

HOESS: Quite correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then from 1943 until the end of the war, you were one of the chiefs in the Inspectorate of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?

HOESS: Yes, that is correctly stated.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean by that, that you are particularly well informed on everything occurring in concentration camps regarding the treatment and the methods applied?


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DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, therefore, first of all, whether you have any knowledge regarding the treatment of internees, whether certain methods became known to you according to which they were tortured and cruelly treated? Please formulate your statement according to periods, up to 1939 and after 1939.

HOESS: Until the outbreak of war in 1939, the situation in the camps regarding feeding, accommodations, and treatment of internees, was the same as in any other prison or penitentiary in the Reich. The internees were treated severely, but methodical beatings or illtreatments were out of the question. The Reichsfuehrer gave frequent orders that every SS man who laid violent hands on an internee would be punished; and several times SS men who did illtreat internees were punished.

Feeding and billeting at that time were on the same basis as those of other prisoners under legal administration.

The accommodations in the camps during those years were still normal because the mass influxes at the outbreak of the war and during the war had not yet taken place. When the war started and when mass deliveries of political internees arrived, and, later on, when prisoners who were members of the resistance movements arrived from the occupied territories, the construction of buildings and the extensions of the camps could no longer keep pace with the number of incoming internees. During the first years of the war this problem could still be overcome by improvising measures; but later, due to the exigencies of the war, this was no longer possible since there were practically no building materials any more at our disposal. And, furthermore, rations for the internees were again and again severely curtailed by the provincial economic administration offices.

This then led to a situation where internees in the camps no longer had the staying power to resist the now gradually growing epidemics.

The main reason why the prisoners were in such bad condition towards the end of the war, why so many thousands of them were found sick and emaciated in the camps, was that every internee had to be employed in the armament industry to the extreme limit of his forces. The Reichsfuehrer constantly and on every occasion kept this goal before our eyes, and also proclaimed it through the Chief of the Main Economic and Administrative Office, Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl, to the concentration camp commanders and administrative leaders during the so-called commanders' meetings. Every commander was told to make every effort to achieve this. The aim was not to have as many dead as possible or to destroy


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as many internees as possible; the Reichsfuehrer was constantly concerned with being able to engage all forces available in the armament industry.

DR. KAUFFMANN: There is no doubt that the longer the war lasted, the larger became the number of the illtreated and tortured inmates. Whenever you inspected the concentration camps did you not learn something of this state of affairs through complaints, et cetera, or do you consider that the conditions which have been described are more or less due to excesses?

HOESS: These so-called illtreatments and this torturing in concentration camps, stories of which were spread everywhere among the people, and later by the prisoners that were liberated by the occupying armies, were not, as assumed, inflicted methodically, but were excesses committed by individual leaders, subleaders, and men who laid violent hands on internees.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean you never took cognizance of these matters?

HOESS: If in any way such a case came to be known, then the perpetrator was, of course, immediately relieved of his post or transferred somewhere else. So that, even if he were not punished for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, even then, he was taken away from the internees and given another position.

DR. KAUFFMANN: To what do you attribute the particularly bad and shameful conditions, which were ascertained by the entering Allied troops, and which to a certain extent were photographed and filmed?

HOESS: The catastrophic situation at the end of the war was due to the fact that, as a result of the destruction of the railway network and of the continuous bombing of the industrial plants, care for these masses-I am thinking of Auschwitz with its 140,000 internees-could no longer be assured. Improvised measures, truck columns, and everything else tried by the commanders to improve the situation were of little or no avail; it was no longer possible. The number of the sick became immense. There were next to no medical supplies; epidemics raged everywhere. Internees who were capable of work were used over and over again. By order of the Reichsfuehrer, even halfsick people had to be used wherever possible in industry. As a result every bit of space in the concentration camps which could possibly be used for lodging was overcrowded with sick and dying prisoners.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now asking you to look at the map which is mounted behind you. The red dots represent concentration camps. I will first ask you how many concentration camps as such existed at the end of the war?


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HOESS: At the end of the war there were still concentration camps. All the other points which are marked here on the map mean so-called labor camps attached to the armament industry situated there. The concentration camps, of which there are 13 as I have already said, were the center and the central point of some district, such as the camp at Dachau in Bavaria, or the camp of Mauthausen in Austria; and all the labor camps in that district were under the control of the concentration camp. That camp had then to supply these outside camps, that is to say, they had to supply them with workers, exchange the sick inmates and furnish clothing; the guards, too, were supplied by the concentration camp.

From 1944 on, the supplying of food was almost exclusively a matter of the individual armament industries in order to give the prisoners the benefit of the wartime supplementary rations.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What became known to you about so-called medical experiments on living internees?

HOESS: Medical experiments were carried out in several camps. For instance, in Auschwitz there were experiments on sterilization carried out by Professor Klaubert and Dr. Schumann; also experiments on twins by SS medical officer Dr. Mengele.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the medical officer Dr. Rascher?

HOESS: In Dachau he was a medical officer of the Luftwaffe who carried out experiments, on internees who had been sentenced to death, about the resistance of the human body to cold and in high pressure chambers.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Can you tell whether such experiments carried out within the camp were known to a large circle?

HOESS: Such experiments, just like all other matters, were, of course, called "secret Reich matters." However, it could not be avoided that the experiments became known since they were carried out in a large camp and must have been seen in some way by the inmates. I cannot say, however, to what extent the outside world learned about these experiments.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You explained to me that orders for executions were received in the camp at Auschwitz, and you told me that until the outbreak of war such orders were few, but that later on they became more numerous. Is that correct?

HOESS: Yes. There were hardly any executions until the beginning of the war-only in particularly serious cases. I remember one case in Buchenwald where an SS man had been attacked and beaten to death by internees, and the internees were later hanged.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But during the war-and that you will admit-the number of executions increased, and not inconsiderably.


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HOESS: That had already started with the beginning of the war.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the basis for these execution orders in many cases a legal sentence of German courts?

HOESS: No. Orders for the executions carried out in the camps came from the RSHA.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Who signed the orders for executions which you received? Is it correct that occasionally you received orders for executions which bore the signature "Kaltenbrunner," and that these were not the originals but were teleprints which therefore had the signature in typewritten letters?

HOESS: It is correct. The originals of execution orders never came to the camps. The original of these orders either arrived at the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps, from where they were transmitted by teletype to the camps concerned, or, in urgent cases, the RSHA sent the orders directly to the camps concerned, and the Inspectorate was then only informed, so that the signatures in the camps were always only in teletype.

DR. KAUFFMANN: So as to again determine the signatures, will you tell the Tribunal whether the overwhelming majority of all execution orders either bore the signature of Himmler or that of Muller in the years before the war and until the end of the war.

HOESS: Only very few teletypes which I have ever seen came from the Reichsfuehrer and still fewer from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Most of them, I could say practically all, were signed "Signed Muller."

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is that the Muller with whom you repeatedly talked about such matters as you stated earlier?

HOESS: Gruppenfuehrer Muller was the Chief of Department IV in the RSHA. He had to negotiate with the Inspectorate about all matters connected with concentration camps.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you say that you went to see the Gestapo Chief Muller because you, on the strength of your experience, were of the opinion that this man because of his years of activities was acting almost independently?

HOESS: That is quite right. I had to negotiate all matters regarding concentration camps with Gruppenfuehrer Muller. He was informed on all these matters, and in most cases he would make an immediate decision.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Well, so as to have a clear picture, did you ever negotiate these matters with the defendant?



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DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you learn that towards the end of the war concentration camps were evacuated? And, if so, who gave the orders?

HOESS: Let me explain. Originally there was an order from the Reichsfuehrer, according to which camps, in the event of the approach of the enemy or in case of air attacks, were to be surrendered to the enemy. Later on, due to the case of Buchenwald, which had been reported to the Fuehrer, there was-no, at the beginning of 1945, when various camps came within the operational sphere of the enemy, this order was withdrawn. The Reichsfuehrer ordered the Higher SS and Police Leaders, who in an emergency case were responsible for the security and safety of the camps, to decide themselves whether an evacuation or a surrender was appropriate.

Auschwitz and GrossRosen were evacuated. Buchenwald was also to be evacuated, but then the order from the Reichsfuehrer came through to the effect that on principle no more camps were to be evacuated. Only prominent inmates and inmates who were not to fall into Allied hands under any circumstances were to be taken away to other camps. This also happened in the case of Buchenwald. After Buchenwald had been occupied, it was reported to the Fuehrer that internees had armed themselves and were carrying out plunderings in the town of Weimar. This caused the Fuehrer to give the strictest order to Himmler to the effect that in the future no more camps were to fall into the hands of the enemy, and that no internees capable of marching would be left behind in any camp.

This was shortly before the end of the war, and shortly before northern and southern Germany were cut. I shall speak about the Sachsenhausen camp. The Gestapo chief, Gruppenfuehrer Muller, called me in the evening and told me that the Reichsfuehrer had ordered that the camp at Sachsenhausen was to be evacuated at once. I pointed out to Gruppenfuehrer Muller what that would mean. Sachsenhausen could no longer fall back on any other camp except perhaps on a few labor camps attached to the armament works that were almost filled up anyway. Most of the internees would have to be sheltered in the woods somewhere. This would mean countless thousands of deaths and, above all, it would be impossible to feed these masses of people. He promised me that he would again discuss these measures with the Reichsfuehrer. He called me back and told me that the Reichsfuehrer had refused and was demanding that the commanders carry out his orders immediately.

At the same time Ravensbruck was also to be evacuated in the dame manner but it could no longer be done. I do not know to


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what extent camps in southern Germany were cleared, since we, the Inspectorate, no longer had any connections with southern Germany.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It has been maintained here-and this is my last question-that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner gave the order that Dachau and two auxiliary camps were to be destroyed by bombing or with poison. I ask you, did you hear anything about this; if not, would you consider such an order possible?

HOESS: I have never heard anything about this, and I do not know anything either about an order to evacuate any camps in southern Germany, as I have already mentioned. Apart from that, I consider it quite impossible that a camp could be destroyed by this method.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?

DR. MERKEL: Witness, did the State Police, as an authority of the Reich, have anything to do with the destruction of Jews in Auschwitz?

HOESS: Yes, insofar as I received all my orders as to the carrying out of that action from the Obersturmfuehrer Eichmann.

DR. MERKEL: Was the administration of concentration camps under the control of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?


DR. MERKEL: You said already that you had nothing to do with the RSHA.


DR. MERKEL: Please, will you emphasize, therefore, that the Gestapo as such had nothing to do with the administration of the camps or the accommodation, feeding, and treatment of the internees, but that this was exclusively a matter for the Main Economic and Administrative Office?

HOESS: Yes, that is quite correct.

DR. MERKEL: How do you explain it then that you, nevertheless, discussed different questions concerning concentration camps with Muller?

HOESS: The RSHA, or rather Amt IV, had the executive power for the directing of all internees into camps, classification into the camp grades 1, 2, 3, and furthermore, the punishments which were to be carried out on the part of the RSHA. Executions, the accommodation of special internees, and all question which might ensue therefrom were also taken care of by the RSHA or Amt IV.


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DR. MERKEL: When was this Main Economic and Administrative Office created?

HOESS: The Main Economic and Administrative Office existed since 1933 under various names. The Inspectorate of Concentration Camps was, however, subordinated only to this Main Economic and Administrative Office since the year 1941.

DR. MERKEL: Then these concentration camps were from the very beginning under the control of this Main Economic and Administrative Office, that is to say the SS and not the State Police.


DR. MERKEL: You mentioned the name of Dr. Rascher a while ago. Do you know this doctor personally?


DR. MERKEL: Do you know that Dr. Rascher before beginning his work at Dachau had become a member of the SS?

HOESS: No, I know nothing about that. I only know that later he-I still saw him in the uniform of an Air Force medical officer. Later he was supposed to have been taken over into the SS, but I did not see him again.

DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions. Thank you very much.

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, at the beginning of your examination you stated that when you were ordered to the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, he told you that the carrying out of this order of the Fuehrer was to be left to the SS and that the SS had been ordered to do it. What is to be understood under this general title SS?

HOESS: According to the explanations of the Reichsfuehrer, this could only mean the men guarding the concentration camps. According to the nature of the order only concentration camp crews and not the Waffen-SS could be concerned with the carrying out of this task.

HERR BABEL: How many members of the SS were assigned to concentration camps, and which units did they belong to?

HOESS: Toward the end of the war there were approximately 35,000 SS men and in my estimation approximately 10,000 men from the Army, Air Force, and the Navy detailed to the labor camps for guard duties.

HERR BABEL: What were the tasks of these guards? As far as I know, the duties varied. First, there was the actual guarding and then there was a certain amount of administrative work within the camp.

HOESS: Yes, that is correct.


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HERR BABEL: How many guards were there within the camps for, let us say, 1,000 internees?

HOESS: You cannot estimate it in that way. According to my observations about 10 percent of the total number of guarding personnel were used for internal duties, that is to say, administration and supervision of internees within the camp, including the medical personnel of the camp.

HERR BABEL: So that 90 percent were therefore used for the exterior guarding, that is to say, for watching the camp from watch towers and for escorting the internees on work assignments.


HERR BABEL: Did you make any observations as to whether there was any illtreatment of prisoners to a greater or lesser degree on the part of those guards, or whether the illtreatment was mainly to be traced back to the so-called Kapos?

HOESS: If any illtreatment of prisoners by guards occurred- I myself have never observed any-then this was possible only to a very small degree since all offices in charge of the camps took care that as few SS men as possible had direct contact with the inmates, because in the course of the years the guard personnel had deteriorated to such an extent that the standards formerly demanded could no longer be maintained.

We had thousands of guards who could hardly speak German, who came from all lands as volunteers and joined these units, or we had older men, between 50 and 60, who lacked all interest in their work, so that a camp commander had to watch constantly that these men fulfilled even the lowest requirements of their duties. It is obvious that there were elements among them who would illtreat internees, but this illtreatment was never tolerated.

Besides, it was impossible to have these masses of people directed at work or when in the camp by SS men only; therefore, inmates had to be assigned everywhere to direct the other prisoners and set them to work. The internal administration of the camp was almost completely in their hands. Of course a great deal of illtreatment occurred which could not be avoided because at night there were hardly any members of the SS in the camps. Only in specific cases were SS men allowed to enter the camp, so that the internees were more or less exposed to these Kapos.

HERR BABEL: You have already mentioned regulations which existed for the guards, but there was also a standing order in each camp. In this camp order certainly punishment was provided for internees who violated the camp rules. What punishment was provided?


15 April 46

HOESS: First of all, transfer to a penal company (Strafkompanie), that as to say, harder work and restricted accommodations; next, detention in the cell block, detention in a dark cell; and in very serious cases, chaining or strapping. Punishment by strapping was prohibited in the year 1942 or 1943-I cannot say exactly when-by the Reichsfuehrer. Then there was the punishment of standing at the camp gate over a rather long period, and finally corporal punishment.

However, no commander could decree this corporal punishment on his own authority. He could only apply for it. In the case of men, the decision came from the Inspector of Concentration Camps, Gruppenfuehrer Schmidt, and where women were concerned, the Reichsfuehrer reserved the decision exclusively for himself.

HERR BABEL: It may also be known to you that for members of the SS, too, there were two penal camps which sometimes were called concentration camps, namely, Dachau and Danzig-Matzkau.

HOESS: That is right.

HERR BABEL: Were the existing camp regulations and the treatment of members of the SS who were put in such camps different from the regulations applying to the other concentration camps?

HOESS: Yes; these two detention camps were not under the Inspectorate for Concentration Camps, but they were under an SS and Police court. I myself have neither inspected nor seen these two camps.

HERR BABEL: So that you know nothing about the standing orders relating to those camps?

HOESS: I know nothing about them.

HERR BABEL: I have no further questions to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. HAENSEL: I have a question that I would like to ask the High Tribunal A second defense counsel has been requested for the SS. Is it permitted that several questions be put for the second defense counsel?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ruled a long time ago that only one counsel could be heard.


FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): Witness, you just mentioned that members of the Navy were detailed to guard concentration camps.


15 April 46


FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Were these concentration camps, or were they labor camps?

HOESS: They were labor camps.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Are labor camps barracks camps of the armament industries?

HOESS: Yes, if they were not accommodated in the actual factories themselves.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I have been informed that soldiers who were to be assigned for guard duty at labor camps were given over to the SS.

HOESS: That is only partially correct. A part of these men- I do not recall the figures-was taken over into the SS. A part was returned to the original unit, or exchanged. Exchanges were continually taking place.


COL. AMEN: If the Tribunal please, first I would like to submit, on behalf of our British Allies, a series of exhibits pertaining to the Waffen-SS, without reading them. It is merely statistical information with respect to the number of Waffen-SS guards used at the concentration camps.

I ask that the witness be shown Documents D745 (ab), D746 (ab), D747, D748, D749 (b), and D750, one of them being a statement of this witness.

[The documents were submitted to the witness]

Witness, you made the statement, D749 (b), which has been handed to you?


COL. AMEN: And you are familiar with the content of the others?


COL. AMEN: And you testify that those figures are true and correct?


COL. AMEN: Very good. Those will become Exhibit Number USA-810.

Witness, from time to time did any high Nazi officials or functionaries visit the camp at Mauthausen or Dachau while you were there?



15 April 46

COL. AMEN: Will you state the names of such persons to the Tribunal please?

HOESS: I remember that in 1935 all the Gauleiter inspected Dachau guided by Reichsfuehrer Himmler. I do not remember them individually.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any of the ministers having visited either of those camps while you were there?

HOESS: Do you mean by this the inspection tour of 1935?

COL. AMEN: At any time while you were at either of those concentration camps.

HOESS: In 1938 Minister Frick was at Sachsenhausen with the Regierungsprasident.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other ministers who were there at any time?

HOESS: Not at Sachsenhausen, but at Auschwitz, the Minister of Justice.

COL. AMEN: Who was he?

HOESS: Thierack.

COL. AMEN: And who else? Do you recall any others?

HOESS: Yes, but I do not remember the name for the moment.

COL. AMEN: Well, who?

HOESS: I have already stated that in the record, but at the moment I cannot recall the name.

COL. AMEN: All right. You have testified that many of the execution orders were signed by Muller. Is that correct?


COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of those execution orders to which you testified were signed by...

DR. STEINBAUER: Pardon me, Mr. President, documents have been submitted and the witness is being questioned about the contents. The Defense is not in a position to follow the Prosecution because we do not know the contents of these documents. I request. that we receive copies of them.

THE PRESIDENT: Haven't copies of these documents been handed to the defendants?

COL. AMEN: Yes, so I understood. We have copies here. However, five German copies have been distributed.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the matter can be looked into.


15 April 46

COL. AMEN: Witness, I was asking you about these execution orders which you testify were signed by Muller. Do you understand?


COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of these execution orders which you testify were signed by Muller were also signed by order of, or as representative of, the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner?

HOESS: Yes. That was on the copies that I had in the originals. Afterwards, when I was employed at Oranienburg, it said underneath, "I. V. Muller''-"in Vertretung Muller" (as representative, Muller).

COL. AMEN: In other words Muller was merely signing as the representative of the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner? Is that not correct?

HOESS: I must assume so.

COL. AMEN: And, of course, you know that Muller was a subordinate of the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner.


COL. AMEN: Witness, you made an affidavit, did you not, at the request of the Prosecution?


COL. AMEN: I ask that the witness be shown Document 3868-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-819.

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

COL. AMEN: You signed that affidavit voluntarily, Witness?


COL. AMEN: And the affidavit is true in all respects?


COL. AMEN: This, if the Tribunal please, we have in four languages.

[Turning to the witness.] Some of the matters covered in this affidavit you have already told us about in part, so I will omit some parts of the affidavit. If you will follow along with me as I read, please. Do you have a copy of the affidavit before you?


COL. AMEN: I will omit the first paragraph and start with Paragraph 2:

"I have been constantly associated with the administration

of concentration camps since 1934, serving at Dachau until

1938; then as Adjutant in Sachsenhausen from 1938 to 1 May


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1940, when I was appointed Commandant of Auschwitz. I commanded Auschwitz until 1 December 1943, and estimate that at least 2,500,000 victims were executed and exterminated there by gassing and burning, and at least another half million succumbed to starvation and disease making a total dead of about 3,000,000. This figure represents about 70 or 80 percent of all persons sent to Auschwitz as prisoners, the remainder having been selected and used for slave labor in the concentration camp industries; included among the executed and burned were approximately 20,000 Russian prisoners of war (previously screened out of prisoner-of-war cages by the Gestapo) who were delivered at Auschwitz in Wehrmacht transports operated by regular Wehrmacht officers and men. The remainder of the total number of victims included about 100,000 German Jews, and great Numbers of citizens, mostly Jewish, from Holland, France, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, or other countries. We executed about 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at Auschwitz in the summer of 1944."

That is all true, Witness?

HOESS: Yes, it is.

COL. AMEN: Now I omit the first few lines of Paragraph 3 and start in the middle of Paragraph 3:

". . . prior to establishment of the RSHA, the Secret State Police Office (Gestapo) and the Reich Office of Criminal Police were responsible for arrests, commitments to concentration camps, punishments and executions therein. After organization of the RSHA all of these functions were carried on as before, but pursuant to orders signed by Heydrich as Chief of the RSHA. While Kaltenbrunner was Chief of RSHA orders for protective custody, commitments, punishment, and individual executions were signed by Kaltenbrunner or by Muller, Chief of the Gestapo, as Kaltenbrunner's deputy."

THE PRESIDENT: Just for the sake of accuracy, the last date in Paragraph 2, is that 1943 or 1944?

COL. AMEN: 1944, I believe. Is that date correct, Witness, at the close of Paragraph 2, namely, that the 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at Auschwitz in the summer of 1944 were executed? is that 1944 or 1943?

HOESS: 1944. Part of that figure also goes back to 1943; only a part. I cannot give the exact figure; the end was 1944, autumn of 1944.

COL. AMEN: Right.


15 April 46

"4. Mass executions by gassing commenced during the summer of 1941 and continued until fall 1944. I personally supervised executions at Auschwitz until first of December 1943 and know by reason of my continued duties in the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps, WVHA, that these mass executions continued as stated above. All mass executions by gassing took place under the direct order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I received all orders for carrying out these mass executions directly from RSHA." Are those statements true and correct, Witness?

HOESS: Yes, they are.

COL. AMEN: "5. On 1 December 1943 I became Chief of Amt I in Amt Group D of the WVHA, and in that office was responsible for coordinating all matters arising between RSHA and concentration camps under the administration of WVHA. I held this position until the end of the war. Pohl, as Chief of WVHA, and Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of RSHA, often conferred personally and frequently communicated orally and in writing concerning concentration camps...." You have already told us about the lengthy report which you took to Kaltenbrunner in Berlin, so I will omit the remainder of Paragraph 5.

"6. The 'final solution' of the Jewish question meant the complete extermination of all Jews in Europe. I was ordered to establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941. At that time, there were already in the General Government three other extermination camps: Belzek, Treblinka, and Wolzek. These camps were under the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and SD. I visited Treblinka to find out how they carried out their exterminations. The camp commandant at Treblinka told me that he had liquidated 80,000 in the course of onehalf year. He was principally concerned with liquidating all the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto. He used monoxide gas, and I did not think that his methods were very efficient. So when I set up the extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyklon B. which was a crystallized prussic acid which we dropped into the death chamber from a small opening. It took from 3 to 15 minutes to kill the people in the death chamber, depending upon climatic conditions. We knew when the people were dead because their screaming stopped. We usually waited about onehalf hour before we opened the doors and removed the bodies. After the bodies were removed our special Kommandos took off the rings and extracted the gold from the teeth of the corpses."


15 April 46

Is that all true and correct, Witness?


COL. AMEN: Incidentally, what was done with the gold which was taken from the teeth of the corpses, do you know?


COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal?

HOESS: This gold was melted down and brought to the Chief Medical Office of the SS at Berlin.


"7. Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that we built our gas chamber to accomodate 2,000 people at one time whereas at Treblinka their 10 gas chambers only accommodated 200 people each. The way we selected our victims was as follows: We had two SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine the incoming transports of prisoners. The prisoners would be marched by one of the doctors who would make spot decisions as they walked by. Those who were fit for work were sent into the camp. Others were sent immediately to the extermination plants. Children of tender years were invariably exterminated since by reason of their youth they were unable to work. Still another improvement we made over Treblinka was that at Treblinka the victims almost always knew that they were to be exterminated and at Auschwitz we endeavored to fool the victims into thinking that they were to go through a delousing process. Of course, frequently they realized our true intentions and we sometimes had riots and difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently women would hide their children under the clothes, but of course when we found them we would send the children in to be exterminated. We were required to carry out these exterminations in secrecy but of course the foul and nauseating stench from the continuous burning of bodies permeated

the entire area and all of the people living in the surrounding communities knew that exterminations were going on at Auschwitz."

Is that all true and correct, Witness?


COL. AMEN: Now, I will omit Paragraphs 8 and 9, which have to do with the medical experiments as to which you have already testified.

"10. Rudolf Mildner was the chief of the Gestapo at Katowice . . . from approximately March 1941 until September 1943. As


15 April 46

such, he frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz for incarceration or execution. He visited Auschwitz on several occasions. The Gestapo court, the SS Standgericht, which tried persons accused of various crimes, such as escaping prisoners of war, et cetera, frequently met within Auschwitz, and Mildner often attended the trial of such persons, who usually were executed in Auschwitz following their sentence. I showed Mildner through the extermination plant at Auschwitz and he was directly interested in it since he had to send the Jews from his territory for execution at Auschwitz.

"I understand English as it is written above. The above statements are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at Nuremberg, Germany, on the fifth day of April 1946."

Now I ask you, Witness, is everything which I have read to you true to your oven knowledge?


COL. AMEN: That concludes my crossexamination, except for one exhibit that our British allies would like to have in, which is a summary sheet of the exhibits which I introduced at the commencement of the crossexamination. That will be Exhibit Number USA-810. It is a summary of the earlier exhibits that I put in with respect to the Waffen-SS at the commencement of my cross examination.

Now, I understand, Your Lordship, that both the Soviet and the French delegations have one or two questions which they consider peculiar to their country which they would like to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you will remember that the Tribunal was assured by Counsel for the Prosecution that, so far as witnesses were concerned, with the exception of one or two particular defendants, the Prosecution would have only one crossexamination and now, since that assurance was given, this is the second instance when the Prosecution have desired to have more than one crossexamination.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is correct, Mr. President, that the Prosecution did make that statement; however, the Prosecution reserved the right to do otherwise on certain occasions when deemed necessary. Since, in this case, the Prosecution represent four different states, occasions do arise when each of the prosecutors feels that he has the right to ask the defendant or witnesses individual questions particularly interesting to his own country.


15 April 46

THE PRESIDENT: Will you indicate the nature of the questions which the Soviet Prosecution desire to put? I mean the subjects upon which they are. I don't mean the exact questions but the subject.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. Colonel Pokrovsky, who intends to ask the questions, will report on the subject to the Tribunal.

COL. POKROVSKY: May I report to you, Mr. President, that the questions of interest to the Soviet Prosecution are those dealing specifically with the annihilation of millions of Soviet citizens and some details connected with that annihilation. At the request of the French Prosecution, and in order to clarify the contents I would also like to ask two or three questions connected with the documents which in due course were submitted as Document F709(a) to the Tribunal by the French Prosecution. This is really all there is; however, these questions do have great importance for us.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal, as has just been stated, made the rule, with the assent of the Prosecutors, that in the case of the witnesses there should be one crossexamination. There is nothing in the Charter which expressly gives to the Prosecution the right for each prosecutor to cross-examine and there is, on the other hand, Article 18 which directs the Tribunal to take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause unreasonable delay, and, in the opinion of the Tribunal in the present case, the subject has been fully covered and the Tribunal therefore think it right to adhere to the rules which they have laid down in this case. They will therefore not hear any further crossexamination.

Do you wish to reexamine, Dr. Kauffmann?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I will be very brief.

Witness, in the affidavit which was just read, you said under Point 2 that "at least an additional half million died through starvation and disease." I ask you, when did this take place? Was it towards the end of the war or was this fact observed by you already at an earlier period?

HOESS: No, it all goes back to the last years of the war, that is beginning with the end of 1942.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 3-do you still have the affidavit before you?


DR. KAUFFMANN: May I ask that it be given to the witness again?

[The document was returned to the witness.]


15 April 46

Under Point 3, at the end you state that orders for protective custody, commitments, punishments, and special executions were signed by Kaltenbrunner or Muller, Chief of the Gestapo, as Kaltenbrunner's deputy. Thus, do you wish to contradict what you stated previously?

HOESS: No, this only completes what I said over and again. I read only a few decrees signed by Kaltenbrunner; most of them were signed by Muller. ~

DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 4, at the end, you state:

"All mass executions through gassing took place under the direct order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I received all orders for carrying out these mass executions directly from RSHA."

According to the statements which you previously made to the Tribunal, this entire action came to you directly from Himmler through Eichmann, who had been personally delegated. Do you maintain that now as before?


DR. KAUFFMANN: With this last sentence under Point 4, do you wish to contradict what you testified before?

HOESS: No. I always mean regarding mass executions, Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann in connection with the RSHA.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 7, at the end, you state-I am not going to read it-you were saying that even though exterminations took place secretly, the population in the surrounding area noticed something of the extermination of people. Did not, at an earlier period of time-that is, before the beginning of this special extermination action-something of this nature take place to remove people who had died in a normal manner in Auschwitz?

HOESS: Yes, when the crematoria had not yet been built we burned in large pits a large part of those who had died and who could not be cremated in the provisional crematoria of the camp; a large number-I do not recall the figure anymore-were placed in mass graves and later also cremated in these graves. That was before the mass executions of Jews began.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you agree with me if I were to say that from the described facts alone, one could not conclusively prove that this was concerned with the extermination of Jews?

HOESS: No, this could in no way be concluded from that. The population . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What was your question about?

DR. KAUFFMANN: My question was whether one could assume from the established facts-at the end of Paragraph 7-that this


15 April 46

concerned the so-called extermination of Jews. I tied this question to the previous answer of the witness. It is my last question.

THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence of Paragraph 7 is with reference to the foul and nauseating stench. What is your question about that?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Whether the population could gather from these things that an extermination of Jews was taking place.

THE PRESIDENT: That really is too obvious a question, isn't it? They could not possibly know who it was being exterminated.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough for me. I have no further questions.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I ask the Tribunal's permission to ask a few supplementary questions, for during crossexamination the witness stated that the Defendant Frick had visited the concentration camps Sachsenhausen and Oranienburg in 1938.

Witness, when an inspection of the concentration camp of Oranienburg took place at that time, 193738, was there any evidence at all of atrocities?



HOESS: Because there was no question of atrocities at that time.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that at that period of time the concentration camp at Oranienburg was still a model of order and that agricultural labor was the main occupation?

HOESS: Yes, that is right. However, work was mainly done in workshops, in woodfinishing workshops.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you give me any details as to what was shown at that time at such an official visit?

HOESS: Yes. The visiting party was shown through the prisoners' camp proper, inspected the quarters, the kitchen, the hospital, and then all the administrative buildings; above all the workshops, where the inmates were employed.

DR. PANNENBECKER: At that time were the quarters and the hospitals already overcrowded?

HOESS: No, at that time they were normally filled.

DR. PANNENBECKER: How did these quarters look?

HOESS: At that period of time, living quarters looked the same as the barracks of a training ground. The internees still had bed clothing and all necessary hygienic facilities. Everything was yet in the best of order.


15 April

DR. PANNENBECKER: That is all. I have no further questions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Witness, what was the greatest number of labor camps existing at any one time?

HOESS: I cannot give the exact figure but in my estimation there were approximately 900.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was the population of these 900?

HOESS: I am not able to say that either; the population varied. There were camps with 100 internees and camps with 10,000 internees. Therefore, I cannot give any figure of the total number of people who were in these labor camps.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Under whose administration were the labor camps-under what offices?

HOESS: These labor camps, as far as the guarding, direction, and clothing were concerned, were under the control of the Economic and Administration Main Office. All matters dealing with labor output and the supplying of food were attended to by the armament industries which employed these internees.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And at the end of the war were the conditions in those labor camps similar to those existing in the concentration camps as you described them before?

HOESS: Yes. Since there no longer was any possibility of bringing ill internees to the main camps, there was much overcrowding in these labor camps and the death rate very high.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

[The witness left the stand.]

Dr. Kauffmann, does that close your case?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I wish to call another witness with the permission of the Court, the witness Neubacher.

[The witness Neubacher took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

HERMANN NEUBACHER (Witness): Hermann Neubacher.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath in German.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, what was your position before the war and during the war?


15 April 46

NEUBACHER: For 5 years during the war I was abroad on diplomatic missions. Before the war I was Mayor of the City of Vienna.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?


DR. KAUFFMANN: How long have you known him?

NEUBACHER: I met Kaltenbrunner for the first time in Austria in 1934 in connection with the so-called appeasement action of the engineer Reinthaller in Austria. Later I saw him again, after the Anschluss.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In the year 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA. Are you acquainted with that fact?


DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know whether Kaltenbrunner was glad to take this position?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner told me, I believe at the end of 1943, that he did not wish to take that position, that he had declined three times but then had received a military order to accept. He added that he had requested and had been given a promise to be relieved of this office after the war.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you made any observations from which may be deduced how the defendant looked upon his task as Chief of the RSHA?

NEUBACHER: I had a number of conversations with Kaltenbrunner during my official visits to the Main Office from time to time, but they all dealt with foreign intelligence and foreign policy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The RSHA was in control of the Gestapo; are you familiar with that fact?


DR. KAUFFMANN: According to your knowledge of the defendant's character can you tell whether he had the prerequisites and the qualifications necessary for the taking over of the police executive? '

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner, as far as I was acquainted with him, had no knowledge of police work when he assumed his office. Besides, in the year 1941 he wanted to abandon his police career.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What proofs do you have for this?

NEUBACHER: At that time I was a special representative for economic questions in Romania. Kaltenbrunner told me that he did not like a police career, that he did not understand anything


15 April 46

about police work and furthermore, had no interest for it. He was interested, however, in foreign political affairs.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is really evidence which ought to be given. It cannot affect his official position, the fact he did not like it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner was called the successor of Heydrich. Does this apply to him in the full sense of the word?

NEUBACHER: It cannot, and that I know because...

THE PRESIDENT: That's a matter of argument. This witness' opinion cannot affect the position of Kaltenbrunner. This witness cannot testify whether he was called a successor to Heydrich or another Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution speak in a disdainful way that Kaltenbrunner was the successor of the illfamed Heydrich. This witness knows them both, therefore I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already admitted that he was the successor of Heydrich. You may ask him if he was another Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Please, will you tell whether he was called a second Heydrich?

NEUBACHER: Himmler himself used this expression...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal feels that that is incompetent.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I understand. I now come to the next question:

Is there anything to show just why Himmler selected the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?

NEUBACHER: From remarks which Himmler made to me..

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the witness can give any evidence as to what Himmler thought. Himmler appointed him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness, so far as I am told, will report something from a conversation with Himmler, which clearly shows that Himmler selected Kaltenbrunner, and no one else, because he did not fear Kaltenbrunner in any way. The Prosecution contend exactly the opposite. He therefore knows that the Prosecution's contention is entirely incorrect.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you can ask what Himmler said about the appointment, if he said anything to this witness. You can ask him what did Himmler say about the appointment to Kaltenbrunner.


15 April 46

DR. KAUFFMANN: Please begin, Witness.

NEUBACHER: During the course of a conversation with Himmler when I was at his office at headquarters to look at the death mask of Heydrich, Himmler said to me that he had suffered an irreparable loss by the death of this man. After Heydrich, there was not a single person who could any longer direct this gigantic office. That could only be done by the man who had built it up. Upon my question, "What about Kaltenbrunner?" Himmler said as follows:

"Of course as an Austrian you are interested in that matter. Kaltenbrunner will have to become familiar with the work. He is now fully occupied with matters of interest to you, with foreign intelligence."

These were the remarks of Himmler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you have any knowledge of the fact that soon after he assumed office in the year of 1943, Kaltenbrunner assiduously tried to establish contact abroad, because he considered the military situation at that time as hopeless?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner was, as I know from many conversations, always striving for a so-called "talk with the enemy." He was convinced that we could not come out of this war favorably without the use of some large scale diplomacy. I did not discuss further details with him concerning the war. In Germany everyone was sentenced to death who, even to one other person, expressed a doubt about the victory of Germany.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner support you in your efforts to mitigate as much as possible the terror policy in Serbia?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I owe much to Kaltenbrunner's support in this respect. The German police offices in Serbia knew, through me and through Kaltenbrunner, that the latter, as Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service, wholeheartedly supported my policy in the southeast area. I succeeded therefore in making my influence felt in the police offices, and the support from Kaltenbrunner was valuable to me in my endeavors to overthrow, with the help of sensible officers, the former system of collective responsibility and reprisals.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the basic attitude of Kaltenbrunner towards the Jewish question?

NEUBACHER: Once, I spoke very briefly with Kaltenbrunner about this subject. When rumors of a systematic action swelled up I asked Kaltenbrunner, "Is there any truth in this?" Kaltenbrunner briefly told me that that was a special action which was not under his command. He kept aloof from the action, as far as I could observe,


15 April 46

and later-I believe it was at the beginning or the end of 1944-he told me briefly, that a new course had been adopted in the treatment of the Jews. His voice sounded the pride of his success.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner is characterized as "hungry for power." Do you know what kind of a life he led?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner led a simple life. He never acquired a fortune...

THE PRESIDENT. The Prosecution has not called him "hungry for power." There is no charge against him as being "hungry for power."

DR. KAUFFMANN: Hungry for power and cruel. Both of these words were expressly used.

THE PRESIDENT: But being "hungry for power" or "cruel" is quite different.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I am just asking about the first term.

THE PRESIDENT: I was just wondering where these terms were used.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Indictment contains both these terms: "hungry for power" and "cruel".

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It certainly is not in the Indictment. We find no allegation in the Indictment which reads "hungry for power and cruel," and we do not recollect any mention being made in the statement in the Prosecution's case.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But I would not have had notes taken on it Otherwise. In the Indictment there is a page with the heading "Summary and Conclusion." I am referring to the last paragraph, where it says:

"As all other Nazis, Kaltenbrunner was hungry for power. In order to assure himself of power he signed his name in blood-a name which will remain in memory as a symbol for cruelty, for..."

THE PRESIDENT: Where are you reading from? What are you reading from?

DR. KAUFFMANN: From the Indictment, on the last page, under the heading "Summary and Conclusion."

MR. DODD: I think I can clarify the matter. It is rather clear that the counsel is reading from my trial brief. The trial brief was never offered in evidence in court, but it was handed to the counsel

DR. KAUFFMANN: If that will not be maintained I do not need to ask any questions on that point.


15 April 46

I now come to the next question. Do you know, Witness, whether Kaltenbrunner gave an order for the evacuation of concentration camps?


DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner, from your experience and observations, do everything as chief of this office to mitigate inhuman measures or prevent their application?

NEUBACHER: I must call your attention to the fact that I was abroad for 5 years and could little observe what was happening within Germany. As I have come to know Kaltenbrunner, I do not doubt that he gave way to the illusion that he was able to influence the course of events. He was in no way capable of doing so.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thus, I come to the last question:

Do you know of a case where he used his power against a measure of the Police to liberate two church dignitaries of the Orthodox Church in Serbia?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I am familiar with that. These two church dignitaries . . .

THE PRESIDENT: How is this relevant to Kaltenbrunner?

DR. KAUFFMANN: He is accused of having persecuted the churches throughout his whole policy. The Prosecution expressly accuse Kaltenbrunner of persecuting churches, with the annihilation of Christianity as his objective; this I can say with assurance is contained in the records; and it is to this that my question refers.

THE PRESIDENT: The answer to it cannot answer any charge against Kaltenbrunner, can it?

DR. KAUFFMANN: If a defendant tried to exterminate churches, then he would not take a measure exactly opposite to that policy. The witness will be able to attest to this fact.

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to churches or with reference to individual people?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Individual people as representatives of the church of course. I do not believe you can separate the two.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the question is incompetent.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. Then I have concluded my examining of the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]


15 April 46

Afternoon Session

[The witness Neubacher resumed the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Kauffmann?

DR. KAUFFMANN: My examination of this witness is finished.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Defense want

to ask questions?

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have some questions to put which

are, of course, not in any way connected with Kaltenbrunner, but which refer to subjects which will have to be dealt with later during the case of the Defendant Funk. Since the witness can be called only once, however, I have no other choice than to put to the witness now these questions, which really ought to be put later.

Witness, you said today that the German Foreign Service had sent you to Romania-I believe on questions of economy. Is it correct that during the time you were working in Romania, you were also representing and handling economic interests in Greece?

NEUBACHER: In the autumn of 1942, notwithstanding my assignment in Romania, I received a special assignment, together with an Italian financial expert, Minister D'Agostino, to prevent by proper methods the total devaluation of currency and the total disruption of the economic structure in Greece.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you suited for such a difficult task

by training and previous experience? Please tell us briefly, which posts you held before, so that we can judge whether you were capable of carrying out this task in Greece; but please, Witness, be very brief.

NEUBACHER: I was one of the foremost economic leaders in Austria. At the age of 28 I was a director; at 30 I was the general manager of the Viennese Settlement Corporation; and at the age of 33 I was directing a large combine in the building trade and building material industry. I was an executive of the Austrian National Bank and a member of the Austrian Customs Auxiliary Council.

I was a member of the Russian Credit Committee of the City of Vienna and a member of the Commission of Experts for the investigation of the collapse of the Austrian Credit Bank Corporation.

Therefore, I was qualified for this task by extensive economic experience.

Moreover, I was quite familiar with the economic problems of the Balkans, since I had last worked on economic questions relating to the Balkans in the central finance administration of I. G. Farben in Berlin.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, several days ago when I visited you in prison, I gave you a report of a commission of the Royal Greek


15 April 46

Government, addressed to the International Military Tribunal, and I asked you to read it and state your opinion. Is this report correct?

Mr. President, it is Exhibit USSR-379, and it has the additional Document Number UK-82.

Witness, in this report of the commission the matter is presented as if the economy of Greece had been entirely destroyed by German authorities and that Greece had been plundered, et cetera. In the end this reflects on the Defendant Funk. Please do not go into detail, but tell us briefly what is your impression in this connection.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to make the following statement before the Tribunal: In regard to the report of the Greek Government, which was presented before the Tribunal by the Soviet Prosecution as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, it seems to me that the question of the Defense Counsel, asking the witness to give his opinion on this particular matter, should be rejected because the witness is not competent to give an opinion on the report of the Greek Government. The Defense Counsel can ask him a concrete question in regard to any particular fact, but that is all.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, if it is desired, I can, of course, put the questions individually. It will probably take a little longer, but if the Soviet Russian Prosecution so desires I agree. May I now question the witness? Witness, is it correct...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Dr. Sauter, what exactly is it that you want to ask the witness about this report?

DR. SAUTER: The report of the Greek Government, which has been submitted by the Russian Prosecution, states, for instance, that Germany in its occupation of Greece plundered the country and brought about a famine by exporting an excessive amount of goods. It states that the country was charged excessive occupation costs, and that the country was heavily prejudiced by the clearing system, et cetera. Through this witness, who as the economic expert of the German Foreign Office handled these problems in Greece at that time, I propose to prove: First, that these statements are untrue; second, that this state of affairs prevailed already when the German troops marched in and was not created by the German authorities; and, last, that it was the Defendant Funk who tried repeatedly to improve matters for Greece through the clearing system and had considerable amounts of gold brought to Greece.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, can't you put a few short questions to show that the scheme which this witness introduced into Greece was in accordance with international law and was not unfair to Greece? If you could do that, that would meet the case, wouldn't it?


15 April 46

DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is what I wanted to do, and I am sure that the witness would have done so on his own initiative.

Now, then, Witness, are you acquainted with the viewpoint of the German economic authorities, and particularly of the Defendant Funk, in regard to the question of the clearing of debts incurred by Greece and the question of how Greece was to be treated with regard to this clearing system?

NEUBACHER: Concerning the mutual financial charges and obligations, I spoke at one time to the Reich finance Minister, Schwerin Von Krosigk, and it was proposed that at some later date after the war the claims and counterclaims were to be settled on the basis of a common denominator.

DR. SAUTER: And at that time, during the war, how was the question of this clearing dealt with?

NEUBACHER: Regarding the economic events in Greece, I can give you information based on my own observations only, starting with October 1942. At that time, when I first came to Athens, the Greek currency had already been considerably devaluated, and the circulation of banknotes had increased by something like 3,000 percent.

Greece also suffered an economic setback due to the fact that, in addition to a progressing inflation, an attempt had been made to introduce in Greece a planned economy with ceiling prices along German lines. The result was, of course, that the merchants selling Greek goods suffered losses when they were paid later. On the Other hand, when I arrived there the importers of German goods made tremendous profits, because they paid Reichsmark at the rate of 60 on the clearing and resold the goods at a rate of about 30,000. This chaos, due to the inflation in connection with the attempt of introducing a planned economy on the German pattern, could be remedied only by transforming the black market in Greece into a completely free market. The two experts of the Axis Powers introduced this measure with considerable success at the end of October 1942. Within a few weeks all shops and markets were full of goods and foodstuffs; the prices of food dropped to one-fifth and prices of manufactured products to one-tenth. This success could be maintained for 4 months in spite of increasing inflation.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Neubacher, is it true that the Defendant Funk, who was Reich Minister of Economy at that time, proposed during a conversation or in correspondence he had had with you that, in spite of the shortage of goods prevailing in Germany, a considerable amount of goods should be sent from Germany and other European countries, particularly to Greece?


15 April 46

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk, with whom I discussed the difficulties of my task, and I both fully agreed that a maximum of goods should be transported to Greece, and certainly not only food. I secured not only 60,000 tons of food at that time but also German export goods, since it was hopeless to try to stop an inflation or the effects of an inflation on the prices, if there were no supplies. Reich Minister Funk supported exports to Greece with the view to a restoration of normal market conditions with every means at his disposal.

DR. SAUTER: You know, Witness, that since transport from Germany to Greece had become impossible, the Defendant Funk made every effort to have goods transported on neutral ships, furnished with British navicerts, from Germany to Greece in order to combat as far as possible the already impending famine.

NEUBACHER: I think that was between 1941 and 1942 when l had not yet arrived in Greece. In 1943, when shipping in Greek waters had completely stopped for us, because all ships had been torpedoed and the railroads had become the object of incessant acts of sabotage and dynamiting, I, with the help of the Swedish Minister, Alar, who directed the International Relief for Greece, applied for British navicerts for food transports to Greece. The British granted this application, and when our own means of transport had ceased to exist, the Swedish boat Halaren went from Trieste or Venice to the Piraeus once a month, loaded with German food supplies for Greece.

DR. SAUTER: And Funk, the Reich Minister of Economy at that time, played an important part in these actions, did he not?

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister of Economy Funk took a very positive interest in the Greek question, a question which is unique in the history of economy, and he supported me in my efforts with every means at his disposal.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that the Defendant Funk advocated in particular that the occupation costs should be kept as low as possible, and that he took the view that it would be preferable that a considerable part of the occupation costs should rather be charged to the German account so that Greece should not be overburdened? What do you know about that?

NEUBACHER: I know too little of the details of what happened in Berlin; but at long intervals I reported to Reich Minister Funk about the situation in Greece, and I know that he made my reports the basis for his own interventions. He was perfectly aware of the fact that the Greek economic problem during the war and within the blockade was so infinitely complicated that all efforts had to be made to prevent a complete dissolution of the monetary value and


15 April 46

the economic structure; and he intervened at all times in that respect.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Defendant Funk act in such a way that the Greek currency, drachma currency, was devaluated, or that it deteriorated? Or did he, on the contrary, endeavor to back the drachma value, particularly for the purpose of preventing a catastrophic famine? Please state briefly what you know about that.

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk always made every effort in the latter direction. He proved that by enforcing exports to Greece

and finally by the grant of a considerable amount of gold for the purpose of slowing down the Greek inflation-which grant, in accordance with the Four Year Plan, involved the gravest sacrifice for Germany.

DR. SAUTER: You say "a considerable amount of gold." There was very little gold in Germany during the war. Can you tell us how large the amount of gold was which the Defendant Funk sent to Greece at that time for the purpose of backing the drachma to some extent and preventing the impending catastrophe? How large was the amount?

NEUBACHER: All told, one and one third million pounds sterling were invested in Greece and Albania, to my recollection.

DR. SAUTER: One and one third million pounds sterling?

NEUBACHER: Greece and Albania got that amount.

DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I have a last question. Is it correct that all these efforts on the part of the German economic management and the German Minister of Economy were often frustrated and foiled, particularly by Greek merchants? To quote just one example, there were cases where German factories sold German engines for 60 drachmas to Greek merchants-that is to say, 60 drachmas which had actually no value-and the Greek merchant sold these same engines which they had bought for 60 drachmas from Germans to the German Armed Forces at 60,000 drachmas apiece. These are supposed to be cases which you discovered and on which you reported to the Defendant Funk, and that is why I am asking you whether that is true.

NEUBACHER: I have the following comment to make about that. It did, in fact, happen, but I want to state that the Greek businessmen had to do that in consequence of inflation and the black market. The Greek people are much too intelligent to be caught up in an inflation. Every child there is a businessman. Therefore, the only possible method for counteracting this obvious speculation, which in itself is not dishonest, was that of converting the black market into a totally free market on sound business lines; and that was the end of these experiments.


15 April 46

DR. SAUTER: This transformation of the black market into a free market, a problem which also played an important part in France, was brought about by your activity in agreement with the Defendant Funk?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I introduced this measure together with my Italian colleague D'Agostino at the end of October 1942.

DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, Witness.

Mr. President, I have no further questions.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, Members of the Military Tribunal, for your information I am going to examine the witness on the question of the Anschluss.

Witness, you have described to the Tribunal your economic activities. Were you not active politically as well?

NEUBACHER: I was politically active as the chairman of the Austro-German People's Union.

DR. STEINBAUER: What were the aims of that Austro-German People's Union?

NEUBACHER: The Austro-German People's Union was an organization which stood above parties and religious denominations, and which, in a onesided manner, aimed at revising the Anschluss prohibition in the peace treaties by solving the question of the Austro-German Anschluss peacefully through plebiscite. In the executive committee of this Austro-German People's Union, all parties were officially represented with the exception of the National Socialist and Communist Parties. The German organization of the same name was under the leadership of the Social Democratic President of the German Reichstag, Paul Loebe.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have here a list of the executive committee which is dated 1926. You appear as chairman and Stoats rat Paul Speiser as deputy. Dr. Arthur SeyssInquart is named as treasurer, and then there is Dr. Benedikt Kautsky, one Georg Stern, Hofrat and President of the Banks' Association, and a certain Dr. Stolper. Is that correct?


DR. STEINBAUER: Why did all these members who represented different party lines and religious denominations strive toward the Anschluss at that time?

NEUBACHER: After the conclusion of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, a movement on the broadest basis started in Austria for the union of this country, which was suffering from severe economic depression, with Germany. Men from all parties and all religions joined this movement, as you can see from the names which you, Herr Doctor, have just mentioned.


15 April 46

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know by which way and under what conditions this was intended in 1918, especially with regard to the position of Vienna as capital of the Reich and seat of the Court?

NEUBACHER: There were no clear ideas about the technical form of such a distant goad; but every Austrian, on the basis of a historically well-founded pride, was agreed that the city of Vienna should rank as the second capital of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry. The Tribunal isn't really concerned with whether or not any Anschluss was desirable, or whether it was just or not. The Tribunal is concerned with whether it was obtained by violence and force. Most of this evidence does not seem to be relevant at all.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, unfortunately I must say that my opinion differs from that of the Tribunal, because I believe- and that applies not only to the Defendant SeyssInquart, but also to the other defendants who participated in the Anschluss, namely, Goering, Ribbentrop, Papen, Neurath-that it is important to know the economic, political, and cultural auspices and the political situation of Austria at the time when these men were striving toward an Anschluss. Therefore, I am of the opinion that it is important to ascertain just what the general attitude was. I have taken the liberty of including in my document book a short historical report to clarify the various views.

Witness, then, in 1938 you became Mayor of the City of Vienna?

NEUBACHER: That was after the Anschluss.

DR. STEINBAUER: At the same time, SeyssInquart was Reichsstatthalter for the Gau of Vienna, or rather the State of Austria; is that correct?

NEUBACHER: I became Mayor of Vienna under Seyss-Inquart on the morning of 13 March 1938, when he was still Austrian Federal Chancellor. At that time SeyssInquart was Federal Chancellor of Austria.

DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. How long did you remain in office as Mayor of the City of Vienna?

NEUBACHER: According to the Austrian Law, until February 1939. Then Burckel became Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Vienna, and thereby automatically supreme head of the communal administration. Thus...

DR. STEINBAUER: That is enough. Thank you. And what was the relationship between SeyssInquart on the one hand and the Commissioner for the Reichsvereinigung, Burckel, on the other hand?

NEUBACHER: The relations were notoriously bad. Burckel disregarded the authority of the Reichsstatthalter, SeyssInquart. He


15 April 46

ruled over his head, and he tried by every method of slander, intrigue, and provocation to overthrow SeyssInquart and remove him from of lice. And he succeeded.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to question?


THE PRESIDENT: No questions?


THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: There are still six interrogatories outstanding. I hope that I will be permitted to submit them as soon as they are received; and may I also reserve for myself the right, in connection with the application I made 2 days ago, to apply for some one of the witnesses in writing, that is, witnesses from among those who appear in the affidavits submitted by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean you want to cross-examine somebody from whom the Prosecution has submitted an affidavit?


THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of affidavits which have already been put in?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am speaking of the affidavits which were submitted for the first time 2 days ago.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks you should make up your mind very soon as to whether you want to cross-examine those persons.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Certainly. I intended to put that application to you, but the Tribunal told me to make that application in writing.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Apart from that, I have finished my case for today.


DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we understood that Dr. Dix wanted to have the question of his documents settled on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. Did you anticipate that that would take long?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I might just consult Mr. Dodd- I don't think it will, but I would just like to verify that, if Your Lordship will allow.

THE PRESIDENT: What does Dr. Dix say?


15 April 46

DR. DIX: I do not think it will take long, perhaps a quarter of an hour. However, I shall have to reply to the Prosecution, and therefore the length of my reply depends upon the length of the statement made by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, there would seem to be some advantages in taking it now, because otherwise we have got to stop at some particular time, and we shan't know how long it is going to take. If we take it now, it does not so much matter, and then we could go on with Dr. Thoma afterwards.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, my friend Mr. Dodd thinks it will take about a half hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Thoma, you have no objection to that, have you?



MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have before me an index which is submitted by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.

First, I assume that I should proceed by taking up the exhibits to which we have objected.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not sure that I have that index before me. Have you got a copy of it we could have?

MR. DODD: I have just the one copy, which was supplied to us by Dr. Dix.

THE PRESIDENT: Has it been supplied to the Tribunal?

MR. DODD: I don't think so; I don't know.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you could indicate what the documents are without our having them before us. Would you give the numbers when you indicate the documents?

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.

As to the first four documents, Number 1 is a book by Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission. Number 2 is also an excerpt from that book; so is Number 3. We object to all of those on the ground that they only represent the opinion of Sir Nevile Henderson; they do not recount historical fact. Number 4 is an excerpt from a book written about Dr. Schacht by a man by the name of Karl Bopp. We object to that on the same ground; that it is the opinion of the author and not pertinent here.

Exhibit Number 5 is an excerpt from the book written by Mr. Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision. Our objection to this excerpt is based on the same grounds; it contains only an opinion of Mr. Welles and, however valuable in some places, it is incompetent here.


15 April 46

Exhibit Number 6 is the book by Viscount Rothermere which was already passed upon by the Tribunal with respect to the application of the Defendant Goering. We renew the objection that was made at that time, citing again that it is only the opinion of this gentleman and is of no value before this Tribunal.

Exhibit Number 7 is the Messersmith affidavit, which was offered in evidence by the Prosecution. We have no objection to that, of course.

Exhibit Number 8 is also a Prosecution exhibit. No objection.

Number 9, likewise.

Number 10 is an affidavit or declaration by the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and we have no objection to that.

Passing on, we have no objection until we reach Exhibit Number 14, Ambassador Dodd's diary-and it is not really an objection there. We ask that we be given the dates of the entries-they have not been given to us thus far-or the pages from the diary from which it is intended to quote.

We go on to Exhibit Number 18. The intervening exhibits, of course, we have no objection to...

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I understand this is really a question of what shall be translated, is it not?

MR. DODD: Yes. We are objecting now, because we want to save the labor of the translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then you go on to 18.

MR. DODD: Yes. Number 18 consists of three parts: (a), (b), and (c). They are statements of Paul Boncour, of Briand, and of Lord Cecil. They are statements about Germany's right to rearm. We object to them because they are not statements made by officials of any of these governments-of these two governments. No source is given in the excerpt which is to be quoted, and it appears that they are nothing more than opinions, given after these men had retired from office.

Passing on, then, we come to Exhibit Number 33. That is a speech by Dr. Schacht in 1937. Our only question about it-we are not questioning at all its relevancy, of course, but we would like to know whether or not the original is available. We have not been able to find out yet.

Number 34 is a speech by Adolf Hitler. It is very brief, and I am rather loath to make too much objection to it, except that I cannot see its relevancy here. It does not seem to pertain to any of the issues that have been raised in this place, and unless Dr. Dix has something in mind that we have not been apprised of, we would object to it.

THE PRESIDENT: What does it deal with, Mr. Dodd?


15 April 46

MR. DODD: It deals with rearmament, generally; but it does not say anything about Dr. Schacht or any of the allegations here. It seems to be just a general statement about rearmament.

We have an objection to Exhibit Number 37. It is a letter from Dr. Schacht to Mr. Leon Fraser. Our objection is that we would like to know whether or not the original is available; and if it is-why, we would have no objection.

Number 38 is a newspaper article from a newspaper in Zurich, Switzerland about what Dr. Schacht's thoughts were; and we object to that. The author is unknown, to begin with. It is only a newspaper account and seems to be immaterial and unimportant here.

Exhibit Number 39 is a letter written by one Richard Morton, addressed to the Solicitor of the Treasury in Great Britain. It was forwarded here to the General Secretary, I believe. In any event, we object to it on the ground that it is not competent. It purports to tell what Morton thought about Schacht and about some assistance that Morton received from Schacht. We would suggest that if Dr. Schacht's counsellor, Dr. Dix, feels that Morton has really some pertinent and relevant testimony to give here, it could be done by way of an interrogatory. He is in London, and it would be, we submit, a more proper way to proceed, rather than offering this letter, which was written without any direction or basis.

Then we move down to Exhibit Number 49, being correspondence between the publisher of Ambassador Dodd's diary and Sir Nevile Henderson. It is reprinted in the volume containing Dodd's diary. It is rather vague to me just what the relevance of the entry is here, or how it could be shown in that fashion.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it long?

MR. DODD: Not very long, no.

Now, I am a little bit confused about the last few exhibits, running from 54 to 61. We are only informed that 54 is the record of Goering's testimony before this Tribunal, and so on-the record of so and so before the Tribunal: three excerpts from Goering's testimony and four from the statements of Lt. Brady Bryson, made in connection with the Prosecution's presentation of the case against the Defendant Schacht. I, of course, simply say that it is unnecessary to have these translated or do anything more than refer to them. They are already in the record, and I do not know just what Dr. Dix has in mind. I have no objection, of course, to his reference to them or any other such use as he may properly make.

THE PRESIDENT: Are those excerpts long?

MR. DODD: Well, I don't know. It is just a matter of copying them over again from the record. They are already in the record of this Court.


15 April 46


MR. DODD: You see, if Your Honor pleases, I do not have them before me.

That amounts to our view on the applications of Dr. Schacht's counsel at this time. If there are any questions, I should be glad to answer them. I have not gone into much detail here.

THE PRESIDENT: No, that is all right. Dr. Dix can answer now. Yes, Dr. Dix.

DR. DIX: Concerning the objections raised to Numbers 1 to 6, I readily admit to Mr. Dodd that these documents are matters of argument rather than evidence. Schacht will argue the fact that prominent persons abroad represented the same views which were the basis for his entire attitude, including the question of rearmament. He will quote these opinions; and I, too, in my final speech, shall refer to these passages for the purpose of argument. If Mr. Dodd says, therefore, that this is not 60 much evidence as it is argument, he is right. But, in my opinion we are not now arguing the question of what is to be officially submitted as evidence to the Tribunal according to procedure. We are merely arguing-or rather we are discussing-whether these documents should be translated, so that if Schacht quotes them during his examination, or if I quote them during my speech, the Tribunal would be able to follow the quotation easily. We have observed that the Tribunal-and this seems fairly obvious-prefer the documents which are being quoted here to be submitted in translation so that they can follow exactly. Therefore, regarding Numbers 1 to 6-and, incidentally, the same applies to all the documents contained in Exhibit Number 18-I am not attempting to have them admitted in evidence: I am merely recommending that they be translated in the interest of everyone concerned, 50 that in case they are quoted the translation can be given to the Tribunal. It is merely a question of being practical. This applies to 1 to 6 and all under 18.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, hasn't the Tribunal already ruled that both the document books of Viscount Rothermere and the speech or book by M. Paul Boncour are not to be put in evidence and are not to be referred to?

DR. DIX: I only know of one ruling of the Tribunal to the effect that no arguments regarding the justice or injustice of the Versailles Peace Treaty will be admitted. We shall, of course, obey that ruling of the Tribunal. But we will not quote these passages in order to discuss the justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty. That is not Schacht's intention or mine. To cite an example:

The Prosecution considers that a certain attitude of Schacht's proves that by backing armament he supported and wanted


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aggression. He wants to disprove this by referring to the fact that certain prominent foreigners took the same view, and that these men could not possibly mean to further German aggression by adopting that view. That is only one example. But at any rate the purpose is not to give academic lectures on the justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty-which I had not intended in any event, since I feel that such arguments would find but deaf ears. It is not my habit to use arguments which I believe will receive no response. May I continue?

Concerning Number 18 may I-I beg to apologize. I have just heard Mr. Dodd's statements, and I must reply at once. I must first assemble the material. I have noted down that under. Number 18, which I 'have just mentioned-and this also applies to Numbers 1 to 6-Mr. Dodd is missing the sources. That may be due to the fact that he has had only the index to the document. The sources and documents are quoted in the actual quotations.

I now turn to Number 37. It is Schacht's letter to a certain Fraser. I understood Mr. Dodd to say that he was raising no objection but that he merely wanted to know where the original document is located. It is a letter from Schacht to Fraser, the late president of the First National Bank. The original of that letter-if it still exists-would be among the papers left by the deceased Mr. Fraser, to which I have no access, nor has any one else.

One moment, Mr. President. Schacht tells me that he has only a copy which bears his signature and, therefore, is a so-called autocopy. This autocopy was deposited in Switzerland during the war because of its contents. This autocopy, signed personally by Schacht, is here, and the copy in the document book has been taken from it. The fact that it is a true copy has been certified by Professor Kraus, and I think that as far as possible it has been adequately identified. So much for Number 37. Then I have made a note regarding Number 34. Just one moment, please. Number 34 is another case where the source was missing. The same applies as above. The source is stated in the document book-namely, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik. This compilation has been used a great deal as a source of evidence. Then objections have been raised. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the objection to 34 was not that the original was not available, but it was a speech by Hitler which was about rearmament and did not seem to be relevant.

DR. DIX: Yes, that is correct. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Mr. Dodd, of course, could not recognize the relevancy of the document. Schacht could recognize it, since he alone knows his inner development. This is a speech of Hitler's in which there is a passage which confirmed the slowly developing suspicion on Schacht's part


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that this policy not only would lead to a war of aggression, but that possibly Hitler actually desired the war. This suspicion was particularly roused by this passage in the speech made by Hitler in the Reichstag on 28 February 1938. This speech is an important milestone in presenting Schacht's inner attitude toward Hitler and his policy, beginning with Schacht's adherence in the year 1933 through the turning-point when distrust started and developed into opposition, which was increased to continuous preparations for revolt. For that reason, I believe it is relevant evidence. That is Number 34.

Then there is Number 38. That is the article from the Baster Nachrichten. In my opinion it is evidence of the greatest importance. At any rate, I shall fight to my very last breath to have that document admitted. Subject: Before the war-the fight against the war; during the war-the fight and the attempts to bring about an early peace, the fight against the spreading of the war.

In 1941-that is to say, before Russia's entry into the war and before the entry of the United States into this war-Schacht had a conversation with a political economist from the United States, which he did not recollect until an acquaintance sent him the article which had appeared in the Baster Nachrichten of 14 January 1946. He said, "Of course, now I remember. Four years ago, in the spring of 1941, I had this conversation with an American political economist." The name, he has still forgotten. This conversation shows once more the efforts he made as late as 1941 to tie threads and get contacts to prevent any spreading of the war, particularly by opening pourparlers with the United States and the men around President Roosevelt.

We have no other evidence to prove the fact that this conversation took place, since we cannot call upon this professor, because Schacht has forgotten his name. But it is the professor himself who is anonymously speaking In this newspaper edition of 14 January 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, what is the nature of the conversation which you say is reported in this newspaper?

DR. DIX: It is a fairly long article. Perhaps I may pick out a few points so that the Tribunal can understand the nature of the conversation. The professor relates in this interview that at that time Schacht took an extremely critical attitude toward the National Socialist system of government; that he had pointed out the dangers of maintaining such a system because this would lead to a complete mortification of intellectual activities. Thereupon, he goes on further to tell the professor that this war was entirely senseless, and that, when considered from a higher level, it would be senseless and futile even for a victorious Germany. He explained to the professor that every means should be employed to stop the


15 April 46

war, because in an orderly world-in a world put in order by a just peace-the governments would automatically become liberal. In the end he suggests, therefore, that an attempt should be made at all costs to establish contact between the nations, particularly with representative men from the United States, before Russia and America entered the war.

He goes on to regret that Roosevelt-I beg your pardon-he goes on to name Roosevelt-and his friends-as the very man who could carry out the great task of helping to contrive such a meeting artfully and carefully. It is an attempt, Your Lordship, similar to the one which appears in the letter to Fraser, which I quoted before. Fraser, too, belonged to the closer-at any rate, let us say to these people who had access to President Roosevelt. It is the last desperate effort, relying on the confidence Roosevelt had in him personally, to contribute his part to bring about peace before it was too late.

Such an attitude is, of course, of extraordinary relevancy in rebutting the charge of aggression, and that is why I think that the Tribunal should under any circumstances admit this article as evidence. We cannot, after all, assume that this professor is not telling the truth Technically, it might be possible to try to discover his name from the Basler Nachrichten; but I am afraid that the Basler Nachrichten will not disclose the name without having made further enquiries from the professor in America. It is questionable whether he will permit his name to be disclosed, and we may have serious difficulties. Since personal experience shows that the professor's report in the Basler Nachrichten is true, then why would he not speak the truth here? Moreover, he is a respected man. That is why I think that this piece of evidence is equivalent to a personal examination of the professor. Therefore, I urge you to admit this document not only for translation but also in evidence. That was Number 38.

As to Morton, I am perfectly agreeable to sending an interrogatory to Morton; but I believe that this would be a superfluous effort. Actually, I need this letter of Morton's only to prove the fact that Lord Montagu Norman, on his return from a BIZ meeting to England in 1939, told this man Morton-who was a respected citizen of Frankfurt am Main, associated with the Metallgesellschaft and later emigrated-that Schacht was in considerable personal danger on account of his political attitude. That is the main fact which I am to prove with this letter, and it is contained in the letter. This letter was not written by Morton to me or to Schacht. It is a letter which was addressed to the Solicitor of the Treasury, and from there it was given to the Prosecution here, and the Prosecution has been kind enough to inform us of the letter. We thought it would be too much trouble to have Morton called as a witness. I am perfectly


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willing to draft a questionnaire, but I think it would be a more simple and just as reliable a method if the Tribunal permitted me to quote two short passages from that letter. I am, however, equally prepared to send an interrogatory to London. That is Number 39.

Regarding Number 49, this is correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor of the diary of the late Ambassador Dodd. It is of the greatest importance in establishing the reliability of the statements in the Dodd diary, which not I but the Prosecution has quoted repeatedly to the detriment of Schacht, as far as I can remember. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I should like to emphasize that we are far from questioning the reliability of the late Ambassador Dodd. Both Dr. Schacht and myself knew him personally, and we consider him to be an absolutely honorable man. But the Tribunal know that this diary, which was based on hasty notes made by the ambassador, was edited by his children after his death. Therefore, it is possible that mistakes may occur, bad mistakes. This becomes evident in the correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor of the diary, where Sir Nevile Henderson points out that a conversation, or several conversations- which according to the diary Dodd is supposed to have had with him-were quoted quite wrongly. I believe there can be no better proof of the unbiased unreliability of this diary-I repeat, only the unbiased unreliability-than this correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor. Therefore, in order to test the credibility of this evidence which was produced by the Prosecution, and to reduce its value to the proper proportion, I ask to have this document admitted in evidence.

Regarding Numbers 54 to 61, I do not intend in any way to introduce evidence by means of these documents. It is perfectly agreeable to me if they are not translated, but the thought I had in mind was merely that of making the work of the Tribunal easier. I will examine Schacht with reference to these passages of Goering's testimony. If the Tribunal believe that it is not necessary to have these excerpts available when they are quoted or if it prefers to use the record only or have the record which is here brought up for use, then of course it will not be necessary to translate these passages. It is, therefore, merely a question of what the Tribunal consider to be the most practical way. We have made the excerpts, and if the Tribunal wish, they will be translated.

Now there is left only the affidavits. Mr. Dodd did not mention them; but I think at the time when Sir David and I discussed the witnesses and affidavits here in court in open session the affidavits had already been admitted by the Tribunal. Of course, reserving the right of the Prosecution to ask counter questions or call the witnesses for crossexamination after having read the documents,


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that is their privilege. We have been satisfied with affidavits instead of the personal appearance merely in order to save time; but if the Prosecution wishes these witnesses, from whom we have affidavits, to appear, then, of course, the Defense is perfectly agreeable to this.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.

The following documents will be translated:

Number 7, Number 8, Number 9, Number 14, Number 18, Number 33, Number 34, Number 37, Number 38, Number 39, and Number 49.

With reference to documents 54 to 61, which are already in the record, they will not be translated, but Dr. Dix is requested to give references to those documents in his document book.

Documents 1 to 6 will not be translated at all.

I meant that the documents which I have not alluded to will be translated-the documents which I have not referred to specifically will be translated.

Now, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, first of all I am submitting copies of the documents which were granted me this morning and which are from Rosenberg's publications-Tradition and Our Present Age, Writings and Speeches, Blood and Honor, Formation of the Idea, and The Myth of the 20th Century-as evidence of the fact that the defendant did not participate in a conspiracy against the peace and in the psychological preparation for war. These excerpts contain speeches which the defendant made before diplomats, before students, before jurists, and are meant to prove that on these occasions he fought for social peace, and that, in particular, he did not want the battle of ideologies to result in foreign political enmity. In these speeches he advocated respect for all races, spoke against the propaganda for leaving the church, advocated freedom of conscience and a sensible solution of the Jewish problem, even giving certain advantages to Jews. In particular, he called for equality and justice in this matter. I ask the Tribunal to take official notice of these speeches, and with the permission of the Tribunal I call the Defendant Rosenberg to the witness stand.

[The Defendant Rosenberg took the stand]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

ALFRED ROSENBERG (Defendant): Alfred Rosenberg.


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THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-to speak the pure truth- and withhold and add nothing.

[The defendant repeated the oath in German.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. THOMA: Mr. Rosenberg, will you please give the Tribunal your personal history.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you have not given your exhibits any exhibit numbers, have you?

DR. THOMA: Yes, I have. That is Rosenberg-7(a).

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, they have all been numbered?


THE PRESIDENT: Very well. When you refer to any of the documents, you will give them their exhibit number.

DR. THOMA: Yes, indeed.

[Turning to the defendant.] Will you give the Tribunal your personal history...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute, Dr. Thoma. For the purposes of the record, you see, which is contained in the transcript, I think you ought to read out a list of the documents which you are putting in, stating what the exhibit numbers are. Have you got a list there of the documents you are going to offer in evidence?


THE PRESIDENT: Will you just read it into the record?

DR. THOMA: Exhibit Rosenberg-7, The Myth of the 20th Century.


DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-7(a), Gestaltung der Idee (Formation of the Idea); Rosenberg-7(b), Rosenberg, Blat and Ehre (Blood and Honor); Rosenberg-7(c), Rosenberg, Tradition and Gegenwart (Tradition and Our Present Age); Rosenberg-7(d), Rosenberg, Schriften and Reden (Writings and Speeches); and Rosenberg-8, Volkischer Beobachter, March and September 1933.

THE PRESIDENT: That one was excluded by the Tribunal. Numbers 7(e) and 8 were excluded.

DR. THOMA: I did not cite 7(e) but Rosenberg-8.

THE PRESIDENT: You cited 8, though.

DR. THOMA: Yes, I mentioned Rosenberg-8, and I beg to apologize.

THE PRESIDENT: Number 8 is excluded, too.



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[Turning to the defendant.] Mr. Rosenberg, please give the Tribunal your personal history.

ROSENBERG: I was born on 12 January 1893 in Reval in Estonia. After having graduated there from high school I began to study architecture in the autumn of 1910 at the Institute of Technology at Riga. When the German-Russian front lines approached in 1915, the Institute of Technology, including the professors and students, was evacuated to Moscow, and there I continued my studies in this capital of Russia. The end of January or the beginning of February 1918 I finished my studies, received a diploma as an engineer and architect, and returned to my native city.

When the German troops entered Reval, I tried to enlist as a volunteer in the German Army, but since I was a citizen of an occupied country, I was not accepted without special recommendation. Since in the future I did not want to live between the frontiers of several countries, I tried to get to Germany.

To the Baltic Germans, notwithstanding their loyalty toward the Russian State, German culture was their intellectual home, and the experience I had had in Russia strengthened my resolution to do everything within my power to help prevent the political movement in Germany from backsliding into Bolshevism. I believed that this movement in Germany, because of the precarious structure of the system of the German Reich, would have meant a tremendous catastrophe. At the end of November 1918 I travelled to Berlin and from there to Munich. Actually, I wanted to take up my profession as an architect, but in Munich I met people who felt the way I did, and I became a staff member of a weekly, which was founded at that time in Munich. I went to work on this weekly paper in January 1918 and have continued in literary work since that time. I lived through the development of the political movement here in Munich until the Rate-Republic in 1919 and its overthrow.

DR. THOMA: You just mentioned Germany as your intellectual home. Will you tell the Tribunal by which studies and by which scientists you were influenced in favor of the German mentality?

ROSENBERG: In addition to my immediate artistic interests in architecture and painting, I had since childhood pursued historical and philosophical studies and thus, of course, instinctively I tended to read Goethe, Herder, and Fichte in order to develop intellectually along these lines. At the same time, I was influenced by the social ideas of Charles Dickens, Carlyle, and, with regard to America, by Emerson. I continued these studies at Riga and, naturally, took up Kant and Schopenhauer and, above all, devoted myself to the study of the philosophy of India and related schools of thought. Later, of course, I studied the prominent European historians of the


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history of civilization; Burckhardt and Rohde, Rankeand Treitschke, Mommsen and Schlieffen. Finally, in Munich I started to study modern biology more closely.

DR. THOMA: You frequently mentioned in the course of your speeches "the embodiment of the idea." Was this due to Goethe's influence?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it is a matter of course that the idea, to see the world as an embodiment, goes back to Goethe.

THE PRESIDENT: [To Dr. Thoma.] The Tribunal, you see, want you to confine yourself to his own philosophy and not to the origins of these philosophies, insofar as you are referring to philosophical subjects at all.

DR. THOMA: How did you come to the NSDAP and to Hitler in Munich?

ROSENBERG: In May 1919 the publisher of the journal which I mentioned was visited by a man by the name of Anton Drexler, who introduced himself as the chairman of a newly founded German Labor Party. He stated that he advocated ideas similar to those expressed by this journal, and from that time I began to have connections with a very small group of German laborers which had been formed in Munich. There in the autumn of 1919 I also met Hitler.

DR. THOMA: When did you join Hitler?

ROSENBERG: Well, at that time I had an earnest conversation with Hitler, and on that occasion I noticed his broad view of the entire European situation.

He said that in his opinion Europe was at that time in a social and political crisis, such as had not existed since the fall of the ancient Roman Empire. He said that seats of unrest were to be found everywhere in this sphere, and that he was personally striving to get a clear picture from the viewpoint of Germany's restoration to sound conditions. Thereupon, I listened to some of the first speeches by Hitler which were made at small meetings of 40 and 50 people. I believed, above all, a soldier who had been at the front, and who had done his duty silently for 4 1/2, years, had the right to speak now.

At the end of 1919, I entered the Party-not before Hitler, as it is contended here, but later. In this original Party I was assigned Number 625 as a member.

I did not participate in setting up the program. I was present, however, when this program was read and commented upon by Hitler on 24 February 1920.


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DR. THOMA: Then you gave a justification for the Party program and probably wanted to solve the problems which referred to the social and political crisis. How did you picture the solution?

ROSENBERG: In response to different inquiries regarding the 25 points of the program, I wrote a commentary at the end of 1922, which has been read to the Tribunal in fragments. Our general attitude at the time may perhaps be stated briefly as follows:

The technical revolution of the 19th Century had certain social and mental consequences. Industrialization and the clamor for profit dominated life and created the industrial state and the metropolis with all its backyards and estrangement from nature and history.

At the turn of the century, many people who wanted to regain their homeland and its history turned against this onesided movement. The revival of tradition, folk song and folklore of the past, originated with the youth movement of that time. The works of art, for instance, by Professor Schultze-Naumburg and by some poets were a characteristic protest against this onesided movement of the time, and it is here that National Socialism attempted to gain a foothold-in full consciousness though, that it was a modern movement and not a movement of retrospective sentimentality. It linked itself with the social movement of Stocker and the national movement of Schonerer in Austria without using them in their entirety as a model.

I should like to add that the name "National Socialism," I believe, originated in the Sudetenland, and the small German Labor Party was founded under the name of "National Socialist German Labor Party."

If I may say so, what finally animated us in essence and the reason for our calling ourselves National Socialists-for, you see, many terrible things have been delivered during these 3 months by the Prosecution, but nothing has been said about National Socialism -we were, at the time, aware of the fact that there were two hostile camps in Germany, that in both camps millions of decent Germans were fighting; and we found ourselves facing the problem of what could be acceptable to both these camps from the viewpoint of national unity and what was preventing an understanding between these two camps. In short, at that time as well as later we explained to the proletarian side, that even if the class conflict had been and still was a factor in social and political life, nevertheless, as an ideological basis and permanent maxim it would mean eternal disunity of the nation. The direction of a movement for social appeasement or any kind of social conflict by an international center was the second decisive obstacle to social reconciliation. The call for social justice, raised generally by labor, was, however, justified, worthy, and necessary. Concerning the bourgeoisie, we believed we


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would be able to establish that in some cases the reactionary caste prejudice of privileged circles had worked to the detriment of the people and secondly that the representation of national interests should not be based on privileges of certain classes; on the contrary, the demand for national unity and dignified representation was the right attitude on their part. From this resulted the ideas which Hitler . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, would you try to confine the witness to the charges which are against him? The charges against the defendants are not that they attempted to reconstruct Germany, but that they used this form of reconstruction with a view to attacking outside-races and nations outside.

DR. THOMA: But, in my opinion, we have to devote some time to Rosenberg's train of thought to determine the motives for his actions; but I will now ask him this:

Did you realize that these questions of socialism and the questions of labor and capital were in truth international questions? And why did you fight against democracy as a matter of international struggle?

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think this is a continuation of this same line of examination, and I should like to say that no one in the Prosecution has made any charge against this defendant for what he has thought. I think we are all, as a matter of principle, opposed to prosecuting any man for what he thinks. And I say with great respect that I feel very confident that is the attitude of this Tribunal. Therefore, we think it is entirely unnecessary to spell out whatever thoughts this defendant had on these subjects, or on any other, for that matter.

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the defendant is also accused of fighting democracy; and that is why I believe I should put this question to him.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the question?

DR. THOMA: Why he was fighting democracy-why National Socialism and he himself fought against democracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that has got anything to do with this case. The only question is whether he used National Socialism for the purpose of conducting international offensives.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, National Socialism as a concept must be dissected into its constituent parts. Since the Prosecution maintains that National Socialism was a fight against democracy, a onesided stress on nationalism and militarism, he ought now to have the opportunity to say why National Socialism supported militarism, and whether that was actually the case. National Socialism must be analyzed as a concept in order to determine its constituent parts.


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THE PRESIDENT: What National Socialism was has already been shown to the Tribunal, and he is not disputing the fact that there was a Fuehrer principle introduced into Germany. There is no question about that, why it teas introduced. If it was introduced for solely internal purposes there would be no charge in respect of that. The only charges are that National Socialism was used for the purpose of making aggressive war and perpetrating the other crimes which we have heard of.

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the charge of waging a war of aggression was preferred because it was a war against democracy based on nationalism and militarism.

THE PRESIDENT: Democracy outside Germany, not in Germany.

DR. THOMA: Then I should like to ask the defendant how he will answer the charge that National Socialism preached a master race.

ROSENBERG: I know that this problem is the main point of the Indictment, and I realize that at present, in view of the number of terrible incidents, conclusions are automatically drawn about the past and the reason for the origin of the so-called racial science. I believe, however, that it is of decisive importance in judging this problem to know exactly what we were concerned with.

I have never heard the word "master race" ("Herrenrasse") as often as in this court room. To my knowledge, I did not mention or use it at all in my writings. I leafed through my Writings and Speeches again and did not find this word. I spoke only once of super humans as mentioned by Homer, and I found a quotation from a British author, who in writing about the life of Lord Kitchener said the Englishman who had conquered the world had proved himself as a creative superman (Herrenmensch). Then I found the word "master race" ("Herrenrasse") in a writing of the American ethnologist, Madison Grant, and of the French ethnologist, Lapouge.

I would like to admit, however-and not only to admit, but to emphasize-that the word "superman" (Herrenmensch) came to my attention particularly during my activity as Minister in the East- and very unpleasantly-when used by a number of leaders of the administration in the East. Perhaps when we come to the question of the East, I may return to this subject in detail and state what position I took in regard to these utterances which came to my attention. In principle, however, I was convinced that ethnology was, after all, not an invention of the National Socialist movement, but a biological discovery, which was the conclusion of 400 years of European research. The laws of heredity discovered in the 1860's, and rediscovered several decades later, enable us to gain a deeper


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THE PRESIDENT: What National Socialism was has already been shown to the Tribunal, and he is not disputing the fact that there was a Fuehrer principle introduced into Germany. There is no question about that, why it teas introduced. If it was introduced for solely internal purposes there would be no charge in respect of that. The only charges are that National Socialism was used for the purpose of making aggressive war and perpetrating the other crimes which we have heard of.

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the charge of waging a war of aggression was preferred because it was a war against democracy based on nationalism and militarism.

THE PRESIDENT: Democracy outside Germany, not in Germany.

DR. THOMA: Then I should like to ask the defendant how he will answer the charge that National Socialism preached a master race.

ROSENBERG: I know that this problem is the main point of the Indictment, and I realize that at present, in view of the number of terrible incidents, conclusions are automatically drawn about the past and the reason for the origin of the so-called racial science. I believe, however, that it is of decisive importance in judging this problem to know exactly what we were concerned with.

I have never heard the word "master race" ("Herrenrasse") as often as in this court room. To my knowledge, I did not mention or use it at all in my writings. I leafed through my Writings and Speeches again and did not find this word. I spoke only once of super humans as mentioned by Homer, and I found a quotation from a British author, who in writing about the life of Lord Kitchener said the Englishman who had conquered the world had proved himself as a creative superman (Herrenmensch). Then I found the word "master race" ("Herrenrasse") in a writing of the American ethnologist, Madison Grant, and of the French ethnologist, Lapouge.

I would like to admit, however-and not only to admit, but to emphasize-that the word "superman" (Herrenmensch) came to my attention particularly during my activity as Minister in the East- and very unpleasantly-when used by a number of leaders of the administration in the East. Perhaps when we come to the question of the East, I may return to this subject in detail and state what position I took in regard to these utterances which came to my attention. In principle, however, I was convinced that ethnology was, after all, not an invention of the National Socialist movement, but a biological discovery, which was the conclusion of 400 years of European research. The laws of heredity discovered in the 1860's, and rediscovered several decades later, enable us to gain a deeper


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insight into history than many other earlier theories. Accordingly, race . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the defendant is going back now into the origins of the views which he held. Surely, all we have got to consider here is his statement in speeches and in documents and the use to which he put those statements, not as to whether they were 400 years old, or anything of that sort.

DR. THOMA: The defendant just spoke about the racial problem and I will take the opportunity to speak on the so-called Jewish problem as the starting point of this question. I would like to ask the defendant the following question: How was it . . .

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, already my colleague, Mr. Dodd, pointed out that the Prosecution has submitted to the defendant an accusation stating in concrete terms his crimes: aggressive wars and atrocities. I suppose that the most correct way of carrying on the interrogation of his client on the part of Dr. Thoma would be to ask him questions directly connected with the charges of the Prosecution. I do not suppose that the Tribunal intend to listen to a lecture on the racial theories, National Socialism, or other theories.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I shall deal with the individual questions later; but, since the ideology and the philosophy of the Nazis has been called criminal here, I think the Defendant Rosenberg should be given some opportunity to state his views.

[Turning to the defendant.] Of course, it would be better, and perhaps more appropriate, Herr Rosenberg, if you were a little more brief in some respects.

Now I would like to ask the following question: You believed that the so-called Jewish problem in Europe could be solved if the last Jew left the European continent. At that time you stated it was immaterial whether such a program was realized in 5, 10, or 20 years. It was, after all, merely a matter of transport facilities, and, at the time, you thought it advisable to put this question before an international committee. How and why did you arrive at this opinion? I mean to say, how, in your opinion, would the departure of the last Jew from Europe solve the problem?

ROSENBERG: In order to comply with the wash of the Tribunal, I do not want to give a lengthy exposition of my views as evolved from my study of history-I do not at all mean the study of anti-Semitic writings but of Jewish historians themselves.

It seemed to me that after an epoch of generous emancipation in the course of national movements of the 19th Century, an important part of the Jewish nation also found its way back to its own tradition and nature, and more and more consciously segregated itself from other nations. It was a problem which was discussed at many


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international congresses, and Buber in particular, one of the spiritual leaders of European Jewry, declared that the Jews should return to the soil of Asia, for only there could the roots of Jewish blood and Jewish national character be found.

But my more radical attitude in the political sphere was due partly to my observations and experiences in Russia and partly to my experiences later in Germany, which seemed to particularly confirm their strangeness. I could not conceive how, at the time when the German soldiers returned, they were greeted by a Jewish university professor who explained that the German soldiers had died on the field of dishonor. I could not understand that lack of reverence could go so far. If it had been but an individual reaction, one could have said that the man had slipped. But in the course of 14 years, it became apparent that it was indeed the expression of a definitely alienating tendency.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, I believe we should also discuss the fact that opposition was partly due to the contradiction provoked by certain National Socialist newspaper articles.

ROSENBERG: The statements of the opposite side, as they appeared constantly during these 14 years, had in part already appeared prior to the rise of the National Socialist movement. After all, the incidents of the Rate Republic in Munich and in Hungary took place long before the National Socialist movement was in a position to gain influence.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, what did you have to say to the fact that in the first World War 12,000 Jewish soldiers died at the front?

ROSENBERG: Of course, I have always been conscious of the fact that many Jewish-German citizens were assimilated into the German environment, and that in the course of this development many tragic individual cases appeared, and that these, of course, deserved consideration. On the whole, however, this did not involve the entire social and political movement, especially since the leading papers of the so-called democratic parties recognized the increase of unemployment in Germany and suggested that Germans should emigrate to the French colonies, to the Argentine, and to China. Prominent Jewish people and the chairman of the Democratic Party suggested three times quite openly that, in view of the increase of unemployment, Germans should be deported to Africa and Asia. After all, during those 14 years just as many Germans were expelled from Poland as there were Jews in Germany, and the League of Nations took no effective steps against this violation of the pact in favor of the minorities.


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DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the leader of the foreign policy of lice of the Party. What was your function?

ROSENBERG: The Foreign Policy Office was founded in April 1933. After its accession to power, many foreigners came to Germany in order to obtain information about the origin and nature of the National Socialist Party. In order to create an information center for the Party, the Fuehrer assigned me to direct this office. As I said, it was the task of this office to receive foreigners who were interested in these problems, to give them information, to refer them to the proper organizations of the Party and the State, if they were interested in the labor front, the youth problem, the winter aid work, and so forth We were also interested in working provisionally on certain initial suggestions made to us in the field of foreign trade and, if they deserved support, in transmitting them to those departments of the government particularly concerned.

Furthermore, we studied the foreign press in order to have good archives for future research work and to inform the Party leadership politically by short excerpts from the foreign press. Among other things, I am accused here of having written articles for the Hearst press. On invitation by the Hearst combine, I wrote five or six articles in 1933 or 1934; but, after I had met Hearst once for about 20 minutes at Nauheim, I did not see him or speak to him again. I heard only that the Hearst combine did get into extraordinary difficulties because of the favor shown me by publishing my impartial statements.

DR. THOMA: As the chief of the Foreign Policy Of lice did you at times take official political steps? '

ROSENBERG: In the documents presented here, Document Number 003-PS, 004-PS, and 007-PS, the activity of the Foreign Policy Office had been discussed and submitted; and in regard to this activity I could give a brief luminary to the Tribunal and read from the documents.

DR. THOMA: But I would like you to tell us what steps you took as the chief of the Foreign Policy Of lice to reach a positive agreement among the European nations.

ROSENBERG: Adolf Hitler called a meeting at Bamberg, I believe in 1927, at which he stated his foreign political conviction that at least some nations could have no direct interest in the total extinction of central Europe. By "some nations" he meant particularly England and Italy. After that in wholehearted agreement with him, I tried to find a way to an understanding by personal contacts I had made. Frequently, I had conversations with British Air Force officers of the British Air Forces General Staff. On their invitation I visited


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London in 1931, and at that time had purely informal conversations with a number of British personalities.

And when, in 1932, at a meeting of the Royal Academy of Rome, the topic "Europe" was discussed, I was offered an opportunity to speak, and I made a speech about this problem in which I explained that the development of the last centuries had been determined mainly by four nations and states-namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy. I pointed out that, first of all, these four should define their vital interests so that shoulder to shoulder they would defend the ancient and venerable continent of Europe and its traditions. I believed that these fourfold national roots of the rich European culture represented a historical and political legacy. Excerpts of my speech were published, and parts of it with approval have been translated for the Tribunal.

On the last day of the conference, the former British Ambassador to Italy, Sir Rennell Rodd, came to me and told me that he had just left Mussolini who had told him that I, Rosenberg, had spoken the most important words of the conference.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, may I ask you, please, to be a lime more brief.

ROSENBERG: In May 1933 I was again in London, this time by Hitler's personal order; and I visited a number of British ministers, whose names are not relevant here, and tried again to promote understanding for the sudden and strange development in Germany. My reception was rather reserved, and a number of incidents occurred which showed that the sentiment was very repellent. But that did not prevent me from keeping up these personal contacts and from inviting a great number of British personalities to come to Germany later. It was not within the scope of my assignment to do that.

THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you ask the defendant what the agreement(*) was to be about? Why doesn't he tell us what the agreement was to be about instead of going on talking about an agreement in the abstract?

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I asked the defendant that question because he took steps to come to a positive understanding with England and worked toward that goal. The defendant is accused. . .

THE PRESIDENT: But what was the understanding about?

DR. THOMA: We were concerned with the fact that the defendant went to London in order to . . .


15 April 46

THE PRESIDENT: I want you to ask the defendant. I don't want you to tell me.

DR. THOMA: I have just asked him, Mr. President.

The defendant is accused of having participated the Norwegian action, in that he advocated the violation of Norwegian neutrality.

[Turning to the witness.] Please answer the question. How did you meet Quisling?

ROSENBERG: I met Quisling in the year 1933, when he visited me, and I had a discussion of 20 minutes' duration with him. Subsequently, an assistant of mine, who was interested in Scandinavian culture and had written books about it, corresponded with Quisling. It was all of 6 years before I saw Quisling again, and I did not intervene either In the Norwegian political situation or in the Quisling movement until he visited me in June of 1939, when the tension in Europe had increased, and expressed his apprehensions about the situation in Norway in the event of a conflict. He said it was to be feared that Norway would not be able to remain neutral in such a case, and that his home country might be occupied in the North by Soviet troops and in the South by the troops of the Western powers, and that he viewed things with great concern. My staff leader made a note of his apprehensions and then reported them to Dr. Lammers, as it was his duty to do.

DR. THOMA: When was that?

ROSENBERG: That must have been in June 1939. Thereupon Quisling asked one of my assistants to help to maintain German-Norwegian understanding and especially to Acquaint his Party with the organization and propaganda of our Party movement.

Thereupon, in the beginning of August there were, I believe, 25 Norwegians in our training school in order to train for this propaganda work and then to return home.

DR. THOMA: What were they trained in, and how?

ROSENBERG: I did not see them, nor did I speak to them individually. They were taught how to carry on more effective propaganda, and how the organization of the Party in this field had been built up in Germany. We promised to assist them in this field.

Suddenly, after the outbreak of the war, or shortly before-I do not remember exactly-Hagelin, an acquaintance of Quisling's, came to me with apprehensions similar to those expressed by Quisling. After the outbreak of the war, this assistant of Quisling's deported various details about the activity of the Western Powers in Norway. Finally, in December of 1939, Quisling came to Berlin with the


15 April 46

declaration that, on the basis of exact information, he knew that the Norwegian Government was only seemingly neutral now, and that in reality it was practically agreed that Norway should give up her neutrality. Quisling himself had formerly been a Minister of War in Norway, and therefore, he should have had exact knowledge of these things.

In accordance with my duty as a German citizen, I recommended that the Fuehrer should hear Quisling. The Fuehrer thereupon received Quisling twice, and at the same time Quisling, with his assistant, Hagelin, visited Navy headquarters and gave them identical information. I spoke once to Raeder after that, and he also recommended to the Fuehrer that he listen to Quisling's report.

DR. THOMA: Then you personally transmitted only those reports which Quisling had given you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I would like to emphasize that although Quisling visited me, I had not been engaged on this question-I had not been involved in these political affairs for 6 years. Naturally, I had to consider it my duty to forward to the Fuehrer reports which, if correct, were a tremendous military threat to Germany, and also to make notes of, and report to the Fuehrer, those things which Quisling told me orally-namely, his plan to bring about a political change in Norway and then to ask Germany for support. At this time-I do not know, this development has been described in those documents produced by the Prosecution in words which express it much more precisely than I could summarize it here. In Document Number 004-PS, my staff leader made a short summary of it about 1'/z or 2 months after the Norwegian operation.

DR. THOMA: This document-I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal particularly to this document-was compiled immediately after the Norwegian operation while the impression of its success was still fresh, and it describes the measures which were taken quite unequivocally. It states clearly that Quisling was the instigator, that he suddenly turned up at Lubeck and made reports, that he begged that his people be trained further, and that he came back again and again and always informed Rosenberg about the new developments in Norway.

THE PRESIDENT: What document are you referring to?

DR. THOMA: Document Number 004-PS, Exhibit GB-140. That is in Document Book 2, Page 113.

THE PRESIDENT: The document book is not numbered or paged?

DR. THOMA: I believe the number is at the bottom, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Which book is it you are referring to?


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DR. THOMA: My Document Book Number 2, Page 113. Document Book Alfred Rosenberg, Page 113, Volume II. It is on Page 72 of the English translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, then, what is your question?

DR. THOMA: I would like to point out that on Page 1 it states, "Before the meeting of the Nordic Society in Lubeck, Quisling was in Berlin, where he was received by Rosenberg."

That was in June 1939, as is shown by the Document Number 007-PS. Then. on the next page, it says that in August a course was given in Berlin-Dahlem. It says further that in December of 1939 Quisling reappeared in Berlin on his own initiative and made his reports-that was on the 14th and 15th of December-and Rosenberg, in line with his duty, transmitted to the Fuehrer these reports which Quisling made to him. He did nothing beyond that in this matter, however. Parallel to this, and entirely independently of each other, the same reports were received by Raeder.

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you have anything to add to Document Number 004-PS?

ROSENBERG: Yes. Please let me have the document. [The document was submitted to the defendant] On Page 5 of this Document Number 004-PS, it is stated that Hagelin, Quisling's assistant who moved in Norwegian governmental circles and who had received orders from the Norwegian Government for the purchase of arms from Germany, after the Altmark incident, for instance-that is the incident where a German vessel was fired upon in Norwegian territorial waters-had heard Norwegian deputies of the Storting say that Norway's reserved attitude was clearly a prearranged matter. Further, in the middle of Page 7:

"On 20 March on the occasion of his participation in negotiations regarding German deliveries of antiaircraft artillery, he made a detailed report on the unceasing activity of the Allies in Norway with the acquiescence of the Nygardsvold Government. According to his report, the Allies were already inspecting the Norwegian harbor towns for landing and transport facilities. The French Commander, Kermarrec who had orders to that effect"-incidently I also remember this name spelled Karramac, or something similar-"in a confidential conversation with Colonel Sundlo, the Commander of Narvik, who was also a follower of Quisling, had informed the Colonel about the intention of the Allies to land mechanized troops at Stavanger, Trondheim, and perhaps also at Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola airport near Stavanger."

A little further down it says, and I quote:


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"In his report of 26 March he"-that is, Hagelin-"pointed out once more that the speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister Koht, dealing with Norwegian neutrality and his protests, was not taken seriously either in London by the English or in Norway by the Norwegians, since it was well known that the Government had no intention of taking a serious stand against England."

DR. THOMA: That is what Quisling reported to you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, these were the reports which Quisling had instructed Hagelin to make. I would like to add further that, some time after the Fuehrer had received Quisling he told me that he had instructed the OKW to consider this case from the military viewpoint, and he asked me not to talk about this subject to anybody else. In this connection, I would like to point out also that- as can be seen from the report Document Number 004-PS-the Fuehrer had emphasized that he wanted the entire Scandinavian North to maintain neutrality at all costs, and would change his attitude only if the neutrality was threatened by other powers.

Later, an assistant of mine was ordered by the Fuehrer to keep up connections with Quisling at Oslo, and he received a certain sum from the Foreign Of lice to support; propaganda friendly to Germany to counteract other propaganda. He also returned to Germany with reports about the opinions of Quisling. Later I heard -and this was entirely understandable-that this assistant, who was a soldier at that time, had also received military intelligence reports which he disclosed after the Norwegian operation.

DR. THOMA: Please be more brief, Mr. Rosenberg.

ROSENBERG: The Fuehrer did not inform me of his final decision, or whether he had actually decided to carry through the operation. I learned of the entire operation of 9 November through the new paper and thereupon paid a visit to the Fuehrer on that day. Several weeks later, the Fuehrer summoned me and said that he had been forced to make this decision on the basis of concrete warnings which he had received, and documents which have been found gave proof that these warnings had been correct. He said it had been true to the letter that when the last German ships arrived in the fjord of Trondheim, I believe, they had already been engaged by the first of the approaching British vessels.

DR. THOMA: In this connection I have just one more question: Did Hitler ever call on you to attend a foreign political or military conference in your capacity as chief of the foreign policy office?

ROSENBERG: The Fuehrer differentiated strictly between the official foreign policy and the policy followed on account of an initiative or suggestion which was urged upon me from outside. I


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believe all the documents show that he never asked me to participate in any conference concerning foreign policy or military preparations.

DR. THOMA: That is, you were never called upon to participate in the operations against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, et cetera?

I believe, Mr. President, that this is a suitable time to adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 16 April 1946 at 1000 hours]


* The President's question is in response to the foregoing answer of the Defendant Rosenberg in which the interpreter said "to bring about an agreement" instead of "to promote understanding". Back.

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