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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I shall dispense with the hearing of the witness Strove, Chief of the Central Department for Agriculture and Food in the Government General. With the permission of the Tribunal I am now calling witness Dr. Joseph Buehler.
[The witness Buehler took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
JOSEPH BUEHLER (Witness): Joseph Buehler.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long have you known Defendant Dr. Hans Frank; and what were the positions in which you worked with him?
BUEHLER: I have known Herr Frank since 1 October 1930. I worked with him in government spheres of service from the end of March 1933. I served under him officially when he was Minister of Justice in Bavaria; later when he was Reich Commissioner for Justice; and still later when he was Minister. From the end of September 1939 Herr Frank employed me in an official capacity in the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: In what capacity did you serve in the Government General at the end?
BUEHLER: From about the second half of 1940 I was state secretary in the government of the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: Were you yourself a member of the Party?
BUEHLER: I have been a Party member since 1 April 1933.
DR. SEIDL: Did you exercise any functions in the Party or any of the affiliated organizations of the Party, particularly in the SA or the SS?
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BUEHLER: I never held an office in the Party. I was never a member of the SA or the SS.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the time during which you were state secretary to the chief of the government in the Government General. Will you please tell me what the relations were between the Governor General on the one side and the Higher SS and Police Leader on the other side?
BUEHLER: I might perhaps say in advance that my sphere of activity did not touch upon police matters, matters relating to the Party, or military matters in the Government General.
The relations of the Governor General to the Higher SS and Police Leader, Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, who was allocated to him by the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police were, from the very beginning, made difficult by essential differences of opinion. These differences of opinion concerned the conception of the task and the position of the Police in general in an orderly state system, as well as the conception in particular of the position and tasks of the Police in the Government General. The Governor General held the view that the Police must be the servant and the organ of the executive of the state and that accordingly he and the state authorities should give orders to the Police and that this assignment of tasks involved a limitation of the sphere of activity of the Police.
The Higher SS and Police Leader Krueger, on the other hand, held the view that the Police in general had, of course, to fulfill tasks originating with the executive of the state but that in fulfilling these tasks it was not bound by the instructions of the administrative authorities, that this was a matter of technical police questions, decisions about which administrative authorities could not make and were not in a position to make.
Regarding the power to give orders to the Police, it was Krueger's view that because of the effectiveness and unity of police activity in all occupied territories, such power to issue orders had to rest with the central authority in Berlin and that he and only he could issue orders.
As far as the duties of the Police were concerned, it was Krueger's opinion that the Governor General's view regarding the limitation of these duties as unfounded for the very reason that he, as Higher SS and Police Leader, was simultaneously the deputy of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the latter's capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.
As far as the relation of the Police to the question of Polish policy was concerned, it was Krueger's view that, in connection with work in non-German territory, police considerations would have to
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play a predominant role and that with police methods everything could be achieved and everything could be prevented. This overestimation of the Police led, for instance, to the fact that, during later arguments between the Police and the administration regarding their respective spheres of work, matters concerning non-German groups were listed among the competences of the Police.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know that as Early as 1939 Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler issued a restricted decree, according to which the handling of all police matters was his own concern or the concern of his Higher SS and Police Leader?
BUEHLER: That this was the case became clear to me from the actions taken by the Police. I did not see a decree to this effect, but I can state this much: The Police in the Government General acted exactly as in the directives which I have described before.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by decree of the Fuehrer, a State Secretariat for Security was instituted. At whose instigation was this instituted and what was the position taken by the Governor General in that connection?
BUEHLER: This decree was preceded by a frightful campaign of hatred against the person of the Governor General. The institution of the State Secretariat for Security was considered by the Police a step, an important step, in the fight for the removal of the Governor General. The matters specified in that decree, or at least the majority of them, were not being transferred to the Police now for the first time, but the actual state of affairs was-the actual course of events had already been-in conformity to the contents of this decree before it was issued.
DR. SEIDL: In the decree implementing this Fuehrer decree and dated 3 June 1942 all the police spheres of activities which were to be transferred to the State Secretary were given in two lists; in an Appendix A, the tasks of the Regular Police; and in an Appendix B. the tasks of the Security Police. Were these police matters at that time transferred completely to the State Secretary and thus to the police sector?
BUEHLER: The administration did not like giving up these matters; so where the Police had not already got hold of them, they were given up only with reluctance.
DR. SEIDL: You are thinking first of all of the spheres of the so-called administrative police, health police, et cetera, are you not?
BUEHLER: Yes, that is to say, the police in charge of communications, health, food, and such matters.
DR. SEIDL: If I have understood your statements correctly, you mean that the entire police system, Security Police as well as SD
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and Regular Police, was directed by the central office, either by Himmler himself or by the Reich Security Main Office through the Higher SS and Police Leader?
BUEHLER: In general according to my observations, it was possible for the Security Police to receive orders direct from Berlin without their going through Krueger.
DR. SEIDL: And now another question: Is it correct that resettlements were carried out in the Government General, by Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality?
BUEHLER: Resettlements, in the opinion of the Governor General, even if carried out decently, always caused unrest among the population. We had no use for that in the Government General. Also, these resettlements always caused a falling off of agricultural production. For these reasons, the Governor General and the Government of the Government General did not, as a matter of principle, carry out resettlements during the war. To the extent that such resettlements were carried out, it was done exclusively by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General, because of this arbitrary resettlement policy, repeatedly had serious arguments with Himmler, Krueger, and SS Gruppenfuehrer Globocznik?
BUEHLER: That is correct. The - intention of preventing such resettlements always led to arguments and friction between the Higher SS and Police Leader and the Governor General.
DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused by the Prosecution of the seizure and confiscation of industrial and private property. What basically was the attitude of the Governor General to such questions?
BUEHLER: The legal provisions in this sphere of the law originated with the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Confiscation of private property and possessions in the annexed Eastern territories and in the Government General was subject to the same regulations.
The decree of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan provided for the creation of a trust office-the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost-with its central administration in Berlin. The Governor General did not want to have the affairs of the Government General administered in Berlin, and therefore he opposed the administration of property in the Government General being entrusted to the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Without interference by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, he established his own rules for confiscations in the Government General and his own trust office. That trust office was headed by an experienced higher official from the Ministry of Economy of Saxony.
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DR.SEIDL: What happened to the factories and works which were situated in the Government General and were formerly the property of the Polish State?
BUEHLER: Factories, as far as they were included in the armament program, were taken over by the military sector, that is to say, by the Inspector for Armaments, who was subordinate to the OKW and later to Minister Speer. Factories outside the armament sector, which had belonged to the former Polish State, the Governor General tried to consolidate into a stock company and to administer them separately as property of the Government General. The chief shareholder in this company was the Treasury of the Government General.
DR.SEIDL: That is to say, these factories were administered entirely separately by the Reich Treasury?
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank's diary in evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number 2233(d)-PS.) This is a discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection Frank said, among other things:
"My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation that they will disappear; they must go away. I have started negotiations for deporting them to the East. This question will be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, to which I shall send State Secretary Dr. Buehler. This conference is to take place at the Reich Security Main Office in the office of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich. In any case Jewish emigration on a large scale will begin."
I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for that conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference?
BUEHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police.
During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration. This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of the Government General in an extremely difficult position.
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Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their health-combating epidemics for instance-almost, or rather, definitely overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front.
At that moment Heydrich's invitation to the Governor General was received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken place in February 1942.
Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion, among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsfuehrer SS, so he said, had received an order from the Fuehrer to round up all the Jews of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Fuehrer had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate, would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the resettlement of the Jews, if not for the sake of the Jews, then for the sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the Police.
I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, his office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence and control in this matter.
DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government General did you know about during your activity as State Secretary?
BUEHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of 1944 called my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. I did not know that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration camp. It had been installed as an economic establishment of the Reichsfuehrer SS, in 1941 I think. Governor Corner came to
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visit me at that time and he told me that he had objected to the establishment of this camp when he talked to Globocznik, as it would endanger the power supply of the city of Lublin; and there were objections, too, on the part of the Police with regard to the danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of this and he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the Governor General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS at the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard which was located there.
In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles from the collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At any rate, Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops in compliance with Himmler's command.
The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to the construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these blueprints. With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete information ever reached the outside. It surprised the Governor Gener
al just as much as it surprised me when the world press released the news about Maidanek.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from the Governor General to the Fuehrer, dated 19 June 1943. I think you yourself drafted that memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the commander of the Security Police is mentioned and quoted verbatim in part. This report of the Security Police mentions also the name of Maidanek.
Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical or probably identical with that camp near Lublin?
BUEHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp outside the territory of the Government General, because the Governor General had repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader that he did not wish to have concentration camps in the Government General.
DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of concentration camps in the Government General?
BUEHLER: I don't know because I did not know of the existence of the camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception camp at Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration camps in general. At that time I brought instructions from Himmler to the camp commandant, according to which transport
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of the inhabitants of Warsaw who had been removed from the city to concentration camps was to cease forthwith.
DR.SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw?
BUEHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or 19 August 1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have forgotten, told me at the time that he did not know about that order, and that he could receive instructions only from the Chief of Concentration Camps.
DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself ever sent a Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp?
BUEHLER: Nothing like that ever happened when I was present.
DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen who were working in the castle at Krakow were taken away by the Security Police against the wishes of the Governor General and during his absence?
BUEHLER: This Jewish workers' colony is known to me because I lived in that came. I also know that the Governor General always took care of the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the Chancellery of the Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, once told me that this group of Jewish workers had been taken away by force by the Police during the absence of the Governor General.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary pacification action. What were the circumstances which occasioned this action?
BUEHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when one morning I was called from the government building, where I performed my official work, to visit the Governor General in the castle. I think I remember that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had also been called. There we met the Governor General together with some officials of the Police. The Governor General stated that, in the opinion of the Police, an extreme act of pacification was necessary. The security situation at that time, as far as I remember, was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed forces were still roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing unrest among the population, and probably giving military training to young Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had recovered from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden defeat in 1939; and they began openly, with little caution and without experience, to start a resistance movement everywhere. This picture I remember clearly because of the statement given by the Police on that or some other occasion.
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DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank's diary, an entry of 16 May 1940. I quote:
"The general war situation forces us to regard the security situation in the Government General very seriously. From a number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion that a large organized wave of resistance among the Poles is present in the country awaiting the outbreak of greater and violent events. Thousands of Poles are reported to have been organized secretly and to have been armed, and are being incited to carry out acts of violence of all sorts."
Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, for instance, an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of Major Huballa in the district of Radom; the murder of families of German blood in Jozefow; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, et cetera.
"Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no doubt that the security situation is extremely serious."
Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time?
BUEHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect.
DR. SEIDL: What happened after that?
BUEHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police might see in these statements the possibility for evading the court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary and I think, quite definitely,
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Brigadefuehrer Streckenbach, the Commander of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his statements might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary court-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission.
In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them.
DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank's diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor General:
"Regarding the question what is to be done with the political criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr. Buehler, Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, Brigadefuehrer Streckenbach, and Ministerial Counsellor Wille."
Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that connection?
BUEHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General told Brigadefuehrer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this discussion took place between Krueger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me, arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained, experienced man.
During the conference with Krueger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to
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that time were to be subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krueger told me privately after the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom one couldn't work, and that in the future he would go his own way.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone into in too great detail.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions.
Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr. Frank mentioned among other things the following: "The difficulties we had had with the Krakow professors were terrible. If we had handled the matter here, it would have taken a different course." Who arrested these professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with this matter?
BUEHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in Krakow to begin his activities, all professors of the University of Krakow were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law. The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the majority of these professors from concentration camps.
This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion, for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like releasing these professors.
DR.SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General concerning mobilization of labor?
BUEHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore, to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers.
On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and improvements were in fact achieved. The
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Governor General was especially opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the influence of the Reichsfuehrer SS opposed them.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275 the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of Brigadefuehrer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures planned by the Security Police?
BUEHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know that he was informed about any such plans.
DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto in Warsaw in 1943?
BUEHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard-that an uprising had broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent resistance was encountered by the German troops.
DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling of that revolt?
BUEHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Fuehrer for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt. Apart from that the adoration assisted in the welfare of the population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not exercise any authority here.
DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are correct. I quote:
"In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August 1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps. As a result of a demarche made by the Governor General, Dr. Frank, to the office of Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the latter prohibited further deportations. The Governor General
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tried to secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich. The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September or October 1944, on the grounds that these Inhabitants of Warsaw were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the Reich and that therefore a general release was out of The question. However, he would be willing to consider individual applications favorably. Individual applications for release from concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the subsequent months.
"Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to be small by Kaltenbrunner. I- myself reported to my office Kaltenbrunner's statement regarding the number of internees, and after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany."
I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an American officer, correct?
BUEHLER: I can supplement it.
THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet been put in evidence?
DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: That doesn't prove it has been put in evidence. Has it been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what "put in evidence" means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit number?
DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you?
DR. SEIDL: I don't want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in evidence.
DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number Frank-1.
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I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of Ibis affidavit are correct, and, if so whether you can supplement this affidavit.
BUEHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question not only once-and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in Kaltenbrunner's power to order such a release. He didn't talk to me about that.
DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps he too did not have the power to release those people?
BUEHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I might gain Kaltenbrunner's interest in a reasonable Polish policy and Irvin him over as an ally tin negotiations with Himmler. At any rate, talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krueger. I gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have helped me if he could.
DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows:
"Obergruppenfuehrer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with the ground daring the war, except where military considerations of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction, all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture Frill be removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil administration.
"I herewith inform you that this new Fuehrer decree regarding the razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further new policy regarding the Poles."
As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on the strength of that message?
BUEHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenfuehrer Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsfuehrer SS. The administration in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On the contrary, I remember that. together with the Governor General, ways which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed. Just what was
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really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything.
DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the interrogation of the witness Dr. Buehler, I should like to inform you that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this witness will be the last one.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say about that?
BUEHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population in the Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and as satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the part of the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans to bring about a Just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack of co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion to German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda from the outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in Europe where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the black market. where so much was destroyed and so much damage was done in order to sabotage the food program, as in the Government General.
To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been provided with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been organized with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a snore or less comprehensive control of mill: and fat supplies could not be carried out. I estimate that the fat sold on the free market and the black market in the Government General was several times the quantity of that controlled and distributed officially.
Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government General had beers carved out of a hitherto self-contained governmental and economic structure and that no consideration had been given effecting a proper economic balance.
The large centers of consumption in the Government General, that is to say, the cities such as Warsaw, Krakow, later Lvov, and also the industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously received their supplies to a very large extent directly from the
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country through the standing market. In these areas of the Government General there Was a lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; there was no systematic chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds revere lacking-all necessary for the directing or controlling of Q supply economy by the state.
The Government General had to construct all these things step by step, and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately difficult. It was not intended to supply the population fully right away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I always saw to it that the directives issued for combating the black market allowed margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that the inhabitants of the cities were given the opportunity of contacting the producers. In 1942 the rations revere to have been Increased; then an order came from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations revere not to be increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were to be allocated to the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken out of the area, but were consumed by the Allied Forces on the spot. The Governor General fought continually against the authorities of the Four Year Plan, in order to achieve an increase and an improvement in the food supplies for the Polish population. That struggle was not without success. In many cases it was possible to increase the rations considerably, especially those of the workers in armament industries, and other privileged groups of the working population.
To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the population of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. On the other hand there were no famines and no hunger epidemics in the Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary committee, which had delegations in all districts of the Government General, saw to the supply of foodstuffs for those parts of the population which revere in greatest need.. I used my influence to have, this committee supplied with the largest possible amount of foodstuffs, so that it should be able to pursue its welfare work successfully, and it is known to me that that committee took special care of the children of large cities.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, Chant were the measures that the Governor General took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his administration?
BUEHLER With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsfuehrer SS, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the Governor General, that an art treasures of the Government General were to be confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government General was successful in preventing this transport to a great extent.
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Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, State Secretary Muehlmann, who claimed to have plenary authority from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I asked to see that authorization. It was signed, not by Goering himself, but by somebody in his circle, Gritzbach. He was entrusted with the task of safeguarding the art treasures of the Government General in the interests of the Reich. In order to bring this commissioner provided as he was with plenary authority from the Reich-into line with the Government General the Governor General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of collecting together the art treasures of the Government General. He collected these art treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I know, from conferences which took place with the Governor General, that the Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these art treasures kept within the area of the Government General.
DR.SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is Document 1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the entire activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and Safeguarding of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government General. On Page 6 of that report it reads, and I quote:
"Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and cultural treasures in the Government General, according to the decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939."
I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give thy order for investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges?
BUEHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the possibility of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary Muehlmann, between the order given by the Reich and the order given by the Governor General. I had also heard that some museum pieces had not been properly taken care of. The investigation showed that State Secretary Muehlmann could not be blamed in any way.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, 3042-PS, Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Muehlmann, and I quote:
"I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the Government General, from October 1939 to September 1943. Goering in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense Council had commissioned me with this duty.
"I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General, Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art
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treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that in case of a German victory they would not have remained in Poland, but would have been used to complement German art collections."
I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the very beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded the property of the Government General?
BUEHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as they were private property, they were temporally confiscated and safeguarded; but the Governor General never thought of transferring them to the Reich. If he had wanted to do that, he could have taken advantage of the wax situation itself in order to send these art treasures to Germany. But where the witness obtained his information, as contained in the last sentence of his affidavit, I do not know.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under Exhibit Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the commander of the Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, to the branch office of Tomassov. There it says, among other things, and I quote:
"The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order on 28 June 1944:",
I skip a few sentences and then quote:
"The Reichsfuehrer SS, with the approval of the Governor General, has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans or attempts at such assassinations have occurred, or where saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only the perpetrators are to be shot but also all their kinsmen are likewise to be executed and their female relatives above 16 years of age are to be put into concentration camps."
Is it known to you whether the Governor General ever spoke about this question with the Reichsfuehrer SS and whether he had given any such approval?
BUEHLER: I know nothing about the issuing of an order of that kind. Once during the second half of 1944, an order came through my hands relating to the joint responsibility of kin, but I cannot say whether that concerned the Reich or the Government General; it was a police order, I Should say. If it had had that formula, "with the approval of the Government General," I should have questioned the Governor General on that point.
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DR. SEIDL: Would such an approval have been consistent with the fundamental attitude of the Governor General to this question as you knew it?
BUEHLER: The fundamental attitude of the Governor General was on the contrary opposed to all executions without trial and without legal reasons.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that from 1940 on the Governor General complained continually to the Fuehrer about the measures taken by the Police and the SD?
BUEHLER: Yes; I myself drew up at least half a dozen memoranda of about the length of the one submitted, addressed to the Fuehrer direct or to him through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. They contained repeater complaints with regard to executions, encroachments in connection with the recruiting of workers, the importation of inhabitants of other regions without the permission of the Governor General, the food situation, and happenings in general which were contrary to the principles of an orderly administration.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted one of these memoranda under the number USA-610. This is a memorandum to the Fuehrer of 19 June 1943. Is this memorandum essentially different to any previous or later memoranda; and what, basically, was the attitude of the Fuehrer to such complaints and proposals?
BUEHLER: This memorandum, which has been submitted, is somewhat different from the previous ones. The previous memoranda contained direct. accusations with regard to these happenings and the encroachments by the Police. When these memoranda remained unsuccessful, acting on the order of the Governor General, I drew up the complaints contained in this memorandum of June in the form of a political proposal. The grievances listed there were not caused by the government of the Governor General; rather they were complaints about Interference by outside authorities.
DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find on 26 October 1943 a long report about the 4 years of German construction work in the Government General which was made by you yourself. On the basis of what documents did you compile that report?
BUEHLER: I compiled that report on the basis of the material which the 13 main departments of the government had given me.
DR. SEIDL: Now a question of principle: What, basically, was the attitude of the Governor General to the Polish and Ukrainian people, as you know it from your 5 years' activity, as the head of the government?
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BUEHLER: The first principle of all was that of keeping peace in this area and of increasing the usefulness of this area as far as possible by improving its resources, economically speaking. In order to achieve that, decent treatment of the population was necessary; freedom and property must not be infringed upon. Those were the principles of policy according to which, wooing on the order of the Governor General, I always carried out my functions as state secretary of the government.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General also tried within the framework of wartime conditions to grant the population a certain minimum of cultural development?
BUEHLER: That was the desire of the Governor General, but the realization of this desire very frequently met with resistance on the part of the Security Police, or the Propaganda Ministry of the Reich, or it was made impossible by conditions themselves. But in principle the Governor General did not ravish to prohibit cultural activity among the Polish and Ukrainian populations.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that he tried particularly to revive higher education and that, evading the directives from the Reich, he instituted so-called technical courses in colleges?
BUEHLER: Instruction was certainly given at the technical schools by Polish professors in Warsaw and Lvov which corresponded approximately to a university education. As a matter of principle, the Governor General also wanted to open secondary schools and seminaries for priests, but that always failed because of the objections of the Security Police. As no agreement could be reached, and acting on the order of the Governor General, in October 1941 on my own authority I promised the opening of secondary schools and, I believe, of seminaries for priests with a certain advisory autonomy for the Poles. Two days after this announcement the Fuehrer's opinion was transmitted to me that I had no authority to announce such measures.
DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank's diary often mentions the principle of unity of administration and the fact that the Governor General was the deputy of the Fuehrer in this territory and the representative of the authority o f the Reich. Does this conception tally with the facts? What other authorities of the Reich and the Party came into the administration of the Government General?
BUEHLER: The authority of the Governor General was limited from the very beginning in many important respects. Thus, for instance, before the establishment of the Government General, the Reichsfuehrer SS had been invested with full power in the matter of the preservation of German Nationality in all occupied territories. The Delegate for the Four Year Plan had equal authority and power
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to issue decrees in the Government General. But many other offices as well, such as those for armaments, post, railways, building, and other departments tried, and tried successfully, to take over parts of the administration of the Government General or to gain some influence over it. After the Governor General had lost his offices as Reichsleiter in 1942, there was a special rush in this direction. I might almost say that it became a kind of sport to diminish the prestige of the King of Poland.
DR. SEIDL: Who appointed, dismissed, and paid the police officials in the Government General and otherwise saw to their interests from the point of view of the Civil Service?
BUEHLER: That was done exclusively by Himmler's administrative office in Berlin.
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even officials of the administration of the Government General were arrested by Krueger and that it was not possible for even the Governor General to effect their release? I remind you of the case of Scipessi.
BUEHLER: Yes. I can confirm that from my own experience. Even from my own circle people were arrested without my being notified. In one such case I instructed the commander of the Security Police that the official was to be released within a certain space of time. He was not released, and I demanded the recall of the commander of the Security Police. The result was that Himmler expressed his special confidence in this commander of the Security Police and the recall was refused.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long was the Government General able to work at all under normal conditions?
BUEHLER: I might almost say, never at any time. The first year was taken up in repairing destruction caused by the war. There were destroyed villages, destroyed cities, destroyed means of transport; bridges had been blown up in very large numbers. After these destroyed objects had been repaired, as far as it was possible under war conditions, the Government General became again able deployment area for the war against the East, against the Russians, and then the transit area to the front and the line of communications area. It was the great repair shop for the front.
DR. SEIDL: Another question: During the war Himmler presented to the Reich Government the draft of a law concerning the treatment of anti-social elements. What was the attitude of Dr. Frank towards this draft?
BUEHLER: As far as I can remember . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that the matters which the witness is going into are really matters of common
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knowledge. Everyone knows about that. I think you might take the witness over this ground a little bit faster than you are.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. He has given the answer already.
Witness, during the war did the government of the Reich . . .
THE PRESIDENT: But I am speaking of the future, Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.
[Turning to the witness.] During the war, Himmler submitted to the Reich Government, the draft of a law concerning the treatment of anti-social elements.
DR. SEIDL: What was the attitude of the Governor General to this?
BUEHLER: The Governor General protested against this. At the conference which I had with Heydrich In February 1942 the latter asked me as a special request to ask the Governor General to redact his protest against the law. The Governor General refused to do this.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has presented a chart which shows Dr. Frank as having authority over the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack. Did such a situation ever exist?
BUEHLER: That must be an error; such a situation never exited.
DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations between the Governor General and the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler?
BUEHLER: The Governor General and the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler as individuals were so different...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I thought we had been hearing all morning what the relations were between the Governor General and the Reichsfuehrer.
DR. SEIDL: Then I will not put that question.
Witness, the Soviet Prosecution, under Exhibit Number USSR-93, (Document Number USSR-93)9 submitted an appendix to the report of the Polish Government. The appendix is entitled "Cultural Life in Poland." I have shown it to you once before and would like you to tell me whether the Governor General, or his government, ever actually issued such directives?
BUEHLER: I do not remember ever having signed such directives or having seen any such directives signed by the Governor General. This document submitted to me, seem;; to me to be a fake or a forgery. That can be recognized from the contents.
DR.SEIDL: In the diary we find a large number of entries referring to the policies of the Governor General which seem to
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contradict what you yourself said before as a witness. How can you explain these contradictions?
BUEHLER: These statements by the Governor General, which have also been called to my attention during previous interrogations, do not merely seem to contradict what I said; they very clearly do contradict what I had to say as a witness. As I myself heard such statements frequently, I have tried to understand how he came to make such statements; and I can only say that Frank perhaps took part more than was necessary in the conferences and affairs of the government officials. There was scarcely a conference an which he did not take part. Thus it happened that he had to speak many times during one day, and I might say that in 99 out of 100 cases he spoke on the spur of the moment, without due reflection, and I frequently witnessed how after making such grotesque statements he would try in the next sentences, or at the next opportunity, to retract them and straighten them out. I also witnessed how he rescinded authority which he had delegated on the spur of the moment. I am sure that if I could go through the diary for every one of these statements, I would be able to give you a dozen-- dozens of other statements to the contrary.
DR. SEIDL: Frank's diary includes . . .
BUEHLER: I should like to say the following: When the Governor General was working with the members of his administration, he never made such statements; at least I cannot remember any. Those statements were always made when the Higher SS and Police Leader was sitting next to him, so that I had the impression that he was not free at such moments.
DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank covers about 10,000 to 12,000 typewritten pages. Who kept this diary-he himself or somebody else?
BUEHLER: According to my observations, the diary was kept by stenographers. At first by one stenographer, Dr. Meidinger, later by two stenographers, Nauk and Mohr. The procedure was that these stenographers were in the room during conferences and took notes.
DR.SEIDL: Is it correct that to a certain extent these stenographers received reports from a third person as to what was said at a conference?
BUEHLER: I often noticed that these stenographers did not take the trouble to record everything literally, but merely wrote summaries of the sense. I was also sometimes asked what this or that person, or cheat the Governor General, had said or thought in some particular instance.
DR. SEIDL: Did the Governor General see these entries in the diary or read them later?
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BUEHLER: From what I know of the Governor General I do not believe that he read them over.
THE PRESIDENT: How can this witness tell whether he read the notes later?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness, Dr. Buehler, was the Governor General's closest collaborator.
THE PRESIDENT: If you wanted to put that sort of question, you should have asked the Defendant Frank.
DR. SEIDL: A further question, Witness. According to your observations what caused the Governor General not to destroy that diary, but to hand it over Men he was arrested?
BUEHLER: On 15 March for the last time I was.. .
THE PRESIDENT: That, again is a matter which rests in the mind of Dr. Frank, not of this witness, why he did not destroy it.
DR. SEIDL: He has answered the question already, and I forego the answer of the witness.
[Turning to the witness.] Now, one last question. In 1942, after the speeches made by Dr. Frank, he was deprived of all his Party offices. What effect did that have on his position as Governor General?
BUEHLER: I have already referred to that. It weakened his authority considerably, and the administration in the Government General became increasingly difficult..
DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly, both in writing and orally, tendered his resignation?
BUEHLER: Yes, written applications for resignation I often worded myself; and I know that he also asked orally many times to be permitted to resign, but that this was never approved.
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, is it correct that by far the largest number of the Polish workers who came to Germany, came into the Reich before April 1942, that is, before Sauckel came into office?
BUEHLER: I cannot make any definite statement about that, but I know that the recruitment of labor produced smaller and smaller results and that the main quotas were probably delivered during the first years.
DR.SERVATIUS: Were the labor quotas which had been demanded from the Governor General reduced by Sauckel in view of the fact that so many Poles were already working in the Reich?
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BUEHLER: I know of one such case; Sauckel's deputy, President Struve, talked to me about it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Is it true that Himmler for his own purposes recruited workers from the Polish area. without Sauckel's knowledge and without observing the conditions which Sauckel had laid down?
BUEHLER: I assume that that happened. Whenever I was told about roundups of workers, I tried to clear matters up. The Police always said, "That is the labor administration," and the labor administration said, "That is the Police." But I know that once, on a visit to Warsaw, Himmler was very annoyed at the loafers standing at the street corners; and I consider it quite possible that these labor raids in Warsaw were carried out arbitrarily by the Police without the participation of the labor administration.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know Sauckel's directives with regard to the carrying out of labor recruitment?
BUEHLER: I have not seen them In detail, and I don't remember them. I know only that Sauckel stated, on the occasion of a visit in Krak6w, that he had not ordered the use of violence.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a speech of Sauckel's?
BUEHLER: No, it was a conference.
DR.SERVATIUS: Do you recall an address which Sauckel made in Krak6w to the various authorities?
BUEHLER: He spoke as a Party speaker.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did he make any statements there about the treatment of workers?
BUEHLER: These statements were made at a conference which preceded the visit to the Governor General.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the nature of his remarks?
BUEHLER: My people had told him and his people that there had been encroachments, and he answered that he had not ordered the use of violence and denied that these events-the arrest of people in motion picture houses or other places of assembly-had ever been ordered or decreed by him.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the structure of the labor administration in the Government General?
BUEHLER: The Labor Department was part of my field of authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have any immediate influence on the carrying out of labor recruitment?
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BUEHLER: Not only did he have influence, but he also sent a deputy who was not under my authority.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was it possible for that deputy to carry out the recruitment of labor direct?
BUEHLER: If he wanted to, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner? Could he give any instructions, or direct orders?
BUEHLER: The recruiting units set up by Sauckel were not under my authority. I tried on several occasions to get these people within my organization, but these attempts were always countered with the argument that these recruiting units had to be used in all the occupied territories and that they could not be attached to one particular area.
In other words, Sauckel's deputy in the Government General, President Struve, who was also in charge of the Labor Department, was on the one hand dependent on Sauckel's directives and did not need to pay attention to me but was also on the other hand responsible to me to the extent that he acted as president of the Labor Department.
DR. SERVATIUS: What branches handled forced recruitment whenever that became necessary? Could the recruiting units do that?
BUEHLER: I do not know. The deputy always denied the fact of forced recruitment.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel wish to ask questions? Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I should like to define your official position more accurately. As from 1940 and until the moment of the liberation of Poland you were Frank's chief deputy, were you not?
BUEHLER: From the end of September until November 1939 I served the Governor General in a leading position on his labor staff. In November 1939 I became Chief of the Department of the Governor General; that was the central administrative office of the Governor General, in Krak6w. During the second half of the year 1940 the designation of this function Was changed to "State Secretary of the Government," and I was State Secretary of the Government until I left Krakow on 18 January 1945.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you were the chief deputy of the Defendant Hans Frank.
BUEHLER: My field of activity was definitely limited. I had to direct the administrative matters. Neither the Police, nor the Party,
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nor the Wehrmacht, nor the various Reich of flees which were directly active in the area of the Government General, were under my authority.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Frank was away, who was then his deputy?
BUEHLER: The deputy of the Governor General was Seyss-Inquart, Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after Seyss-Inquart left?
BUEHLER: After the departure of Seyss-Inquart there was a gap. I cannot recall the month, but I think it was in 1941 that I was assigned as deputy of the Governor General. But that appointment was approved only with certain modifications. I was supposed to represent the Governor General only when he was neither present in the area nor . . .
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Answer me briefly. When Frank was away, did you carry out his duties?
BUEHLER: I answer us my conscience dictates. Whenever Frank was not present within the area, and could not be reached outside the area, then I was supposed to represent him.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. That means that you took over when he was away.
BUEHLER: Yes, whenever he could not be reached outside of the area either.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. That is precisely what I am asking about.
I should like the witness to be shown the typed transcript of the report on a conference of 25 January. Will you show him, first of all, the list of those who were present. The Tribunal will find the passage that I desire to quote. . .
THE PRESIDENT: What year? You said the 25th of January.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943, Mr. President. Your Honors will find it on Page 7, Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number USSR-223), Paragraph 6.
Witness, is that your signature among the list of those present?
BUEHLER: My signature, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means you were present at that conference.
BUEHLER: 1943, yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall quote three sentences from the typed transcript of the report. Please hand the original to the witness.
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I quote three sentences from this document. It is Dr. Frank's speech:
"I should like to emphasize one thing. We must not be too soft-hearted when we hear that 17,000 have been shot. These persons who have been shot are also victims of the ever.... Let us now remember that all of us who are meeting together here figure in Mr. Roosevelt's list of war criminals. I have the honor of being Number 1. We have thus, so to speak, become accomplices in terms of world history".
Your name is second on the list of those present at the conference. Do you not consider that Frank must have had sufficient grounds to number you among the most active of his accomplices in crime?
BUEHLER: About such statements of the Governor General I have already said all that is necessary.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then you ascribe this to the Governor General's temperament?
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, that is not an answer to the question. The question was, do you consider yourself to be one of those criminals?
BUEHLER: I do not consider myself a criminal.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you do not consider yourself a war criminal, will you perhaps recollect who personally-I emphasize the word "personally"-actively participated in one of Frank's most cruel orders with regard to the Polish population? I am talking about the decree of 2 October 1942. Were you not one of the participants?
BUEHLER: Which measures? Which decree? I should like to be shown it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am talking about the decree signed 2 October and published 9 October 1943, Exhibit Number USSR 335, (Document Number USSR-335), the decree, about the creation of the so-called courts-martial conducted by the Secret Police.
BUEHLER: The draft of this degree did not come from my office.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that you deny participation in rendering that cruel decree effective?
BUEHLER: Yes, the decree comes from the Police.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The passage I should like to quote, Mr. President, is on Page 35, of our document book, and in Paragraph 4 of the English translation.
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[Turning to the witness.] Did you not, together with Dr. Weh, at a time when even Frank was undecided about signing, succeed in persuading him to do so and bring into force a decree of a frankly terrorist nature to legalize tyranny by the Police?
I quote Page 142 of the minutes on the conference with State Secretary Dr. Buehler (he evidently means you) and with Dr. Weh, concerning the order issued by Dr. Weh for combating attacks on the German work of reconstruction in the Government General:
"After some brief statements by the State Secretary Dr. Buehler and Dr. Weh, the Governor General withdraws his objections and signs the drafted decree."
Was it not you?
BUEHLER: I request the interpreter to repeat the question.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you: Was it you who persuaded Frank to sign that decree as quickly as possible?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does that mean that the entry is false?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, how am I to understand you, if this is "no" and the other is "no"?
BUEHLER: I can explain that to you exactly. The draft for this decree had been submitted to the Governor General by SS Oberfuehrer Bierkamp who had recently been assigned to the Government General. The Governor General...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please. . .
THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] He is in the middle of his answer. You must let the man answer. What were you saying? You were saying the draft had been made by somebody?
BUEHLER: This draft had been submitted to the Governor General by Bierkamp who had just recently come to the Government General. The Governor General returned this draft and had it revised in the legislative department. When it was presented to the Governor General, the Governor General's doubts were whether the legislative department had revised it or not. I do not assume material responsibility for this draft, and I did not have to.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You simply explained to Frank that the project of the decree had been sufficiently worked over by the competent technical department?
BUEHLER: Yes, by the legislative department.
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MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after that the Governor General signed the decree?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you not the person who, at the meeting of 23 October 1943, when a letter from Count Ronikier, a person evidently known to you, was discussed, referred to the practical Interpretation of this cruel decree of 2 October and stated that the application of the decree would in the future favor the camouflaging of the murder of hostages by giving the shootings of hostages the semblance of a legal sentence? Were you that person?
BUEHLER: I ask that the question be repeated. I understood only part of it.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you the person who, at the meeting of 23 October 1943, stated that the application of the decree of 2 October would, in the future, favor the camouflaging of the shooting of hostages, since it would give them the semblance of a legal sentence?
BUEHLER: It is not quite clear to me. May I repeat what I understood?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you please.
BUEHLER: You want to ask me whether I was the one who, on the occasion of a conference on the 23rd of October 1944...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943.
BUEHLER: 1943-who, on the occasion of a conference on 23 October 1943 stated-stated what?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that the application of the decree of 2 October would help to camouflage the shooting of hostages.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I wish to quote now, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of the English translation of Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number 2233-PS), Paragraph 4. I shall now quote your own words to you:
"State Secretary Dr. Buehler considers it advisable that all those Poles who are to be shot should first be tried by regular court-martial proceedings. In the future one should also refrain from referring to such Poles as hostages, for the shooting of hostages is always a deplorable event and merely provides foreign countries with evidence against the German leadership in the Government General".
BUEHLER: I said that, and thus I objected, and wanted to object, to the shooting of hostages and to executions without court-martial proceedings.
23 April 46
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you consider that a court consisting of high-ranking police officials represents justice and is not a travesty of the very idea of justice?
BUEHLER: To which court do you refer? I pleaded for courts-martial.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is the very court I am talking about, the "Standgericht" or summary court-martial, composed of Gestapo officials centralized in the Government General, according to the decree of 2 October.
BUEHLER: I can give you information about the reasons which may have led to this stiffening of the summary court-martial order of 2 October, so that you may understand how, psychologically, such a degree came about.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not interested in psychology. I am interested in knowing if a court, composed of secret police officials and considered to be a court, is not in fact sheer mockery of Me very idea of a court of justice?
BUEHLER: The summary courts martial had to be appointed exactly in accordance with the decree. I am not of the opinion that a summary court martial, simply because it is composed exclusively of police, should not be considered a court. But I did not make these statements which you have held against me now in reference to this decree of 2 October; rather I demanded, in general, sentences by courts-martial, and termed the shooting of hostages a regrettable fact.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You are not giving me a direct answer to my question. Perhaps you will remember Paragraph 3 of the decree which stipulates how these counts were to be composed. Show the witness Paragraphs 3 and 4. I am reading Paragraph 4 into the record:
"The summary court-martial of the Security Police are to be composed of one SS Fuehrer of the office of the commander of the Security Police and the SD, and of two members of these organizations".
Would a court of this composition not testify a priori to the nature of the sentence which the court would impose?
BUEHLER: Did you ask me?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes.
BUEHLER: Whether I consider a summary court-martial a court? I think, you are asking me about things which have nothing to do with my field of activity. I do not know what reasons were given for composing these courts in this fashion. I cannot therefore say anything about it.
23 April 46
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will look at the signature to that decree. It is signed by Frank, and it was you who persuaded Frank to sign that decree.
BUEHLER: I thought that I had corrected that error before. I did not persuade Herr Frank to sign that order. Rather, I told him that that order had been worked out in the legislative department. As before, I must now deny any responsibility for this order, because it did not belong to my sphere of activity.
MR.COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall pass on to another series of questions. Do you recollect the following subparagraph of that decree, particularly the report of Obergruppenfuehrer Bierkamp at the conference of 27 October 1943 in Krakow?
BUEHLER: I cannot remember without notes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show him the passage which I wish to quote. The passage I wish to quote, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of our document, the last paragraph of the text. I quote the passage in question:
"Pursuant to the decree of even date, the Security Police have detained many people who since 10 October have committed criminal acts. They have been condemned to death and will be shot as an expiation for their crimes. Their names will be made known to the population by means of posters, and the population will be told that such and such people may expect a pardon, provided there are no further murders of, Germans. For every murdered German, 10 Poles will be executed.... "
Does it not testify to the fact that from the very first days of the enforcing of Frank's decree, it merely served to mask mass executions of hostages?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then to what does it testify if, for each slain German, 10 Poles entirely unconnected with the crime were to be executed In accordance with these so-called "verdicts"?
BUEHLER: In my opinion it testifies that 10 Poles would be allot who had committed crimes punishable by death, and who had been sentenced to death.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: For each German killed?
BUEHLER: It is possible that these Poles were called hostages. That is possible.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the decree camouflaged the system of taking hostages?
23 April 46
BUEHLER: No, it was rather that real shootings of hostages no longer occurred. Real shootings of hostages occur when people who are not criminals, who are innocent, are shot because of an act committed by someone else.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this will be a convenient time to break off?
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
23 April 46
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has heard with the deepest regret of the death of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. His loss will be most deeply felt in America, where he had proved himself to be a great public servant. But it is fitting that this Tribunal, upon which the representatives of the United States sit, should express its sympathy with the American people in their great loss.
After serving as Dean of the Law School of Columbia University he was appointed Attorney General of the United States in 1923, and two years later he became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. In 1941 he became Chief Justice and discharged the duties of that high office with great ability and in accordance with the highest traditions.
The Tribunal desires that I should express its sympathy in acknowledgment of the great loss the American people have sustained.
Mr. Justice Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, is a member of the Supreme Court over which the Chief Justice presided, and perhaps he would like to add a few words.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal: It is not only because he was the head of the judicial system of the United States that the news of the passing of Chief Justice Stone brings sadness to every American heart in Nuremberg, but because he was the personal friend of so many of us. He had a rare capacity for personal friendship. No one was more kind to, and thoughtful of, the younger men who from time to time came to Washington; and they found in him a guide, philosopher, and friend.
Now, I know that not only do I feel the loss of a personal friend but that the American representatives on the Tribunal, Mr. Biddle and Judge Parker, feel the same way, and many of the younger men on the staff had intimate contact with the Chief Justice which you might not expect if you had not known Harlan Stone.
As Attorney General he took over the Department of Justice at one of its most difficult periods and imparted to it the impress of his integrity, an impress which stayed with it and was traditional in the department, as we well know.
As a Justice of the Court he was a forward-looking man, open-minded, always patient to hear the arguments of both sides and to arrive at his decision with that complete disinterestedness and detachment which is characteristic of the just judge. He presided with great fairness and with kindness to his associates and to those who appeared before him.
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It is the passing of a man who exemplified in public life those sturdy qualities which we have come to associate with the New Englander.
The consolation of his friends lies in this: He died exactly as he would have chosen to die, in full possession of his faculties and in the discharge of his duties.
I express great appreciation that this Tribunal has seen fit to take note of his passing and to allow us to record on behalf of the American Bar our appreciation of his talents and character.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, before proceeding to a further examination of the witness, I feel that I ought to make the following statement:
During the examination of the witness by counsel for the defense Dr. Seidl, the former stated that the document, which is an official appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, was a forgery. This document sets out the losses suffered by the Polish Republic in objects of cultural value. The Soviet Prosecution does not wish to enter into any controversies on the subject, but it does request the Tribunal to note that this is an official appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, and that it considers the statement of the witness as libelous.
THE PRESIDENT: [To the witness.] Did you say anything then?
BUEHLER: I was going to say that it was a document that contained a list of art treasures.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that the document, Colonel Smirnov, a document which contains a list of art treasures?
BUEHLER: No, I do not mean that.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. It is a list of losses in cultural treasures. It is a list of libraries and of the losses suffered by these libraries during the reign of the Germans in Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: It is USSR-93, is it not, the document you are referring to?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is an appendix to the Document Number USSR-93, an official report by the Polish Government.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it deals with certain directives. That was the evidence that was given this morning.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. This is a list of losses sustained. It is an official appendix to the report of the Polish Government. It contains no directives, but it does state the sum total of the losses sustained by the public libraries in Poland.
23 April 46
THE PRESIDENT: [To the witness.] Is there anything you want to say about it?
BUEHLER: Yes. I do not think the description just given applies to the document which I had in mind. The document which I question contains directives regarding German cultural policy in the Government General. It does not deal with art treasures or details of library property.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What I took that you said this morning was that the directives which you thought were referred to in the document did not appear to have been made, or at any rate you had not heard of them, and you thought they might be forgeries.
BUEHLER: I questioned the document.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the document.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I proceed to the next question?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You state that you personally, as well as the administration of the Government General, had no close connection with the activities of the Police. Have I understood you correctly?
BUEHLER: May I hear that question again, please?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You declare that neither you personally nor the administration of the Government General were in any way closely connected with the activities of the Police. Have I understood you correctly?
BUEHLER: We had daily contact with the Police, but we had differences of opinion. Moreover, the Police were not under my jurisdiction; the Chief of Police was in no way under my orders.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case the Police did not come within your competence?
BUEHLER: No, it was not one of my duties.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How then can you explain that no one but you carried out successful negotiations with the Police for the exploitation of the property of Jews executed in the concentration camps? Do you remember these negotiations?
BUEHLER: I did not quite understand you.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you: If you had no direct relations with the Police, how can you explain the fact that you, and none other but you, were the person who carried out successful negotiations with the Police for the exploitation of property belonging to Jews murdered in the concentration camps? Do you remember these negotiations with the Police?
23 April 46
BUEHLER: I do not remember any such negotiations, and I could not have conducted them. In any case the Administration was the department which, by order of the Four Year Plan, had to effect the confiscation of Jewish property.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, have I your permission to submit a document handed to us by the American Prosecution, Document Number 2819-PS? It is a directive issued by the Administration of the Economic Department of the Government General and addressed to the Governors of Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, and Galicia. May I submit this document?
I quote the following from the text of this document:
"Subject: Transfer of Jewish movable property from the SS to the Government.
"I inform you herewith that on 21 February 1944, in the presence of various departmental directors, an agreement was reached by State Secretary Dr. Buehler and the Higher SS and Police Leader, Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe, that movable Jewish property, insofar as it is, or will be in the future, in storehouses, will be placed at the disposal of the Government by the SS. In execution of the agreement arrived at I have ordered that the taking over of the goods stored in the various SS depots shall take place in the shortest possible time. Goods deriving from confiscation and safeguarding have likewise been turned over to me by the commander of the Security Police and the Security Service. Please get in touch with the local SS and Police Leader in order to come to an understanding ...."
Here I interrupt the quotation. After this, Witness, do you still insist that you had no relations with the Police?
BUEHLER: I was in touch with the Police daily in my work, I do not want to deny that for a moment; but I had no right to give orders to the Police.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case the property of Jews murdered in the concentration camps of Poland was, as a result of your negotiations, transferred to warehouses in the Government General?
BUEHLER: That is not correct. The property mentioned was not that which proceeded from Jews who were killed, but simply property which came from Jews and which was removed by the Police after having been converted through the administration department in the regular way.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But could the Security Police or the SD be in possession of property belonging to Jews who were not murdered?
23 April 46
BUEHLER: Why not, Right from the beginning the Police had taken over Jewish problems, and therefore also came into possession of their property in this manner.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did the Auschwitz depot in Chopin Street also keep the property of Jews who had not been murdered? Of Jews who were still alive?
BUEHLER: The depots which have been mentioned here are not to be interpreted as being concentration camps, but as depots where goods were stored.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What other depots were there for storing the movable property of Jews besides those in the concentration camps?
BUEHLER: I do not know what things looked like in concentration camps, as I have never entered or seen one; but that the Police took possession of movable Jewish property is something I was certainly told about by the director of nay trustee department.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you this: In 1944 when the machines of destruction were working at top speed at Auschwitz and Maidanek, what depots or warehouses existed for the storage of Jewish movable property besides those which stored the movable property of Jews executed in concentration camps? Do you know of any other warehouses and where they were located?
BUEHLER: The Jews were deprived of their property on the spot. I have never assumed that Jewish property was to be found in concentration camps. I did not know anything at all about these camps. Where the Police took that movable property was not clear to me, but depots must have existed.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would draw your attention to the date-21 February 1944. At that time were there any Jews still alive in Poland, or were the Jewish ghettos already quite empty?
BUEHLER: The Jewish ghettos were empty, but there were still some Jews; I know that because they were being used in one way or another in the armament industry. Jewish property could not have been removed from the territory, it must have been somewhere in the Government General, very probably near the ghettos or wherever else the evacuation of Jews took place. And this telegram, I repeat, does not concern stores which were in concentration camps; they were everywhere. Every place had property stored somewhere which originated from the resettlement of the Jews.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then the Jewish ghettos were already empty. In that case, what happened to the Jews from Poland?
23 April 46
BUEHLER: When these Jewish ghettos were emptied, I assumed they were resettled in the northeast of Europe. The chief of the RSHA had definitely told me at the conference in February 1942 that this was the intention.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: On the 21 February 1944 the front line ran through the Government General. How and where could the Jews have been transferred to the northeast?
BUEHLER: According to the conference this was to have taken place in 1942.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The document is dated 1944, 21 February 1944.
I pass on to the next question. Tell me, does not the fact that the police chiefs attended all the conferences at the headquarters of the Governor General and that the Governor General arranged for special conferences to be held dealing exclusively with police matters indicate that the very closest relations existed between the administration department of the Governor General and the Gestapo?
BUEHLER: I have already mentioned at the beginning that the view of the Governor General was that he should have jurisdiction over the Police. This is the reason why the Governor General repeatedly called the Police for discussions around the conference table. But that did not prevent the Police from going their own way and using methods or their own.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But were no conferences held by the Governor General for dealing directly and exclusively with police problems, and with police problems only?
BUGLER: Yes, from time to time.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. Then will you tell me who took Krueger's place when he was removed from his post as Chief of Police?
BUEHLER: As far as I can remember Krueger was removed from his post in Krak6w in November 1943 and was replaced by Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were your personal relations with Koppe?
BUEHLER: The relationship with the Police under Krueger had always been hostile, and whenever the administration department had any wish that involved police jurisdiction, such wishes had always been frustrated by Krueger; therefore, after Krueger had left Krak6w I tried to establish a comradely relationship with the new Higher SS and Police Leader, so that in this manner I could influence the work of the Police and the methods employed by them.
23 April 46
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Could you answer briefly: What exactly were your personal relations with Koppe? Were they good or bad?
BUEHLER: They were comradely.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to show you one document. You, Mr. President, will find the passage on Page 38, Paragraph 2, of the English translation. I am reading the passage into the record. It is a statement made by Frank to Himmler at the conference with Himmler on the 12 February 1944:
"Immediately after the exchange of greetings, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler entered into conversation with me and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe. The Reichsfuehrer asked me right at the beginning how I was co-operating with the new Secretary of State for Security, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe. I expressed my deep satisfaction at the fact that between myself and SS Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe, as well as between him and State Secretary Dr. Buehler, there existed extraordinarily good relations of friendly co-operation." (Document Number 2233-PS.)
Does that statement by Frank correspond to the fact, Witness?
BUEHLER: At that time Koppe had been in the Government General only a few weeks. This statement confirms just what I said here at the beginning, namely, that after Krueger had been replaced by Koppe I tried through comradely relations with Koppe to gain influence over the police powers in the Government General. Thus there had been no friction up to that time.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And between Koppe and Dr. Buehler, that is, between Koppe and yourself, there existed the most comradely collaboration; is that correct?
BUEHLER: I repeat, my relations with Koppe were comradely. Apart from that, the problems with which we had to deal brought me into daily contact with Koppe. For instance, there was this question of Jewish property. One could not possibly have discussed such a question with Krueger, as he held the view that all Jewish property belonged to the SS.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Koppe took over the post of Chief of Police, was there any change with regard to the Polish population? Did the police measures become less severe? Did they become less repressive with Koppe's arrival?
BUEHLER: I believe they were milder.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to follow the minutes of one particular administrative conference of the 16 December 1943, held at Krakow.
23 April 46
Please show the witness the original.
Incidentally, is that your signature on the list of those present? On Page 154.
BUEHLER: Government meeting, 16 December 1943? Yes, I signed that; that is right.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, do you remember who Ohlenbusch was?
BUEHLER: Ohlenbusch was the President of the Department of Propaganda.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was he in any way connected with the Police or with the administration?
BUEHLER: Ohlenbusch participated in the government meetings, at which the Police were also present as a rule.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he himself, in his own function, did he have any connection with the Police or not?
BUEHLER: As a state official and head of a government department he did, of course, have connections with the Police, official connections.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he was an official of the civilian administration of your organization?
BUEHLER: Yes, of course. As far as his official position was concerned, he was subordinate to me.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am reading into the record a short extract from Page 176. Your Honors will find it on Page 33 of our document book, Paragraph 3, Ohlenbusch's speech:
"It would be well to consider whether, for reasons of expediency, one should not, as far as possible, carry out executions on the spot where the attempt upon the life of a German took place. One ought, perhaps, also to consider whether special execution sites should not be created for this purpose, for it has been confirmed that the Polish population streamed to the execution grounds, which were accessible to all, in order to put the blood-soaked earth into containers and take them to the church." (Document Number 2233-PS.)
Do you not consider this question a purely police question?
BUEHLER: It does not mention buckets of blood in my translation.
It says containers. I do not think that the blood could be carried away in buckets.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We are talking here about containers into which the blood-soaked soil was placed. Do you not consider that the question of organizing secret execution grounds was purely a matter for the Police?
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BUEHLER: I am of the same opinion. For this reason this matter was by no means approved of. But perhaps I may add that at the same time German pedestrians in Krak6w and Warsaw were being shot in the back daily, without any reason, and that this affair was due to the excitement which...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you about something else, Witness. Do you not consider the fact that this question was discussed at the initiative of Ohlenbusch as positive proof that even the petty officials in the civilian administration interfered in police matters and were in direct contact with the Police?
BUEHLER: No, I would not say so. This was not suggested as a police measure. It arose from the threat under which all Germans lived at that stage of the occupation.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This question of secret execution grounds-did it arise on Ohlenbusch's initiative? I trust you are not going to deny this.
BUEHLER: What do you mean by this question?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did it arise on-was it provoked by the initiative of Ohlenbusch? You are not going to deny it?
BUEHLER: I do not know whether this was discussed at all. In my opinion there was not . . .
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The typewritten report of that conference is before you, and you were present at that conference.
BUEHLER: Yes, there are statements made by Ohlenbusch, if I am not mistaken. Yes, it mentions "President Ohlenbusch" here. That is right.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall proceed to the next question. Did SS Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe not report on the subject at all during the conference? I will quote a brief excerpt which Your Honors will find on Page 34, Paragraph 2. It is on Page 180 of your document book.
". . .For the railway outrage 150 and for the No German officials, 50 Polish terrorists were executed either on the spot or in the immediate vicinity. It must be remembered that the shooting of 200 people affects at least 3,000 (nearest relatives)..." (Document Number 2288-PS.)
Do you not consider this as evidence that with the arrival of Koppe the same savage measures of repression were used against the people of Poland?
BUEHLER: Inasmuch as this mentions the shooting of 150 and 50 people this obviously concerns the shooting of hostages, which never did have the approval of the Governor General or my approval.
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If I have nevertheless stated that in its entirety Koppe's regime appeared milder to me, then I must stand by that statement of mine.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that the hostage system did not meet either with your approval or with the approval of the Governor General; is that correct?
BUEHLER: It did not have my approval, and I do not think it had the approval of the Governor General.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please look at Page 185 of the document in your possession. I begin with the quotation:
"The Governor General expressed his gratitude and recognition to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe for his effective work and spoke of his satisfaction that an expert with such high qualifications should be at the head of the police organization in the Government General. He promised SS Obergruppenfuehrer Koppe the active co-operation of all offices in the Government General and expressed his best wishes for the success of his work." (Document Number 2233-PS.)
How are we to interpret this statement in the light of your previous answer?
BUEHLER: This statement of the Governor General does not apply to these 50 and 150 people. It applies to the work in its entirety which was to be done by Koppe in the Government General. And one of the principles that was to be applied to that work- which I helped bring about-was that shootings of hostages were to cease. It is quite possible that in this case that principle had not yet been applied.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you please wait one minute. Just before this you read Koppe's report on the shooting of the hostages, Page 180. And after that the Governor General expressed his approval. This means that it was precisely this activity of Koppe's that the Governor General had approved?
BUEHLER: Well, this was not the only statement made by Koppe. The statement of the Governor General was in reference to all the statements made by Koppe, and not to detached portions.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. In that case he also approved, among other things, of this statement, that is to say, this report.
BUEHLER: But I know that the Governor General, together with me, was exerting pressure on Koppe in order to stop the shooting of hostages.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you kindly inform me who, while Krueger was still Chief of Police, issued instructions for the
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shooting of one male inhabitant from each house which displayed a poster announcing a Polish national holiday?
BUEHLER: That is unknown to me.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask to have the corresponding document submitted to you. It is in the document book, on Page 1, Paragraph 7:
"The Governor General received District Chief, Dr. Waechter, who reported on the appearance in some districts of inflammatory posters on the occasion of the 11 November (the Polish Day of Liberation). The Governor General ordered that from every house where a poster remains exhibited one male inhabitant is to be shot. This order is to be carried out by the Chief of Police. Dr. Waechter has taken 120 hostages in Krak6w as a precautionary measure."
Do you remember that? Who then introduced this criminal practice of taking hostages?
BUEHLER: Are you trying to say that I was present during that conference?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you about something else.
BROILER: Please, will you answer my question? Was I there or was I not?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not obliged to answer your question. It is you, Witness, who have to answer mine. It is I who am interrogating you, not you who are examining me. Kindly answer the next question. You resided in Krak6w. Acting on Frank's orders, Dr. Waechter, as a precautionary measure, detained 120 hostages. Do you wish to say that you knew nothing about this either?
BUEHLER: I know nothing about this measure; nor is it known to me that hostages were shot.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question. Have I understood you correctly-did you state today that there was no famine in Poland?
BUEHLER: Yes, there was no famine in Poland.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you to be shown the speech of Dr. Buehler, State Secretary-that obviously means you-at a meeting on the 31 May 1943, in Krak6w. I begin the quotation:
". . . The Government of the Government General has for a long time been clear on the point that the scale of food rations allowed to non-Germans cannot be continued any
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longer without the population taking matters into its own hands or being driven to insurrection... The difficulties of the food situation, which naturally have a bad effect on the morale of the population, the enormous rise in prices, the exaggerated and narrow-minded salary and wage policy, have driven part of the Polish population to despair." (Document Number 2233-PS.)
Did you say that?
BUEHLER: I could follow the first part, but I could not find the last sentence.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you kindly follow the text. In the text you will find both the first part and the last sentence: ". . . have driven part of the Polish population to despair." Please study the text.
BUEHLER: Where does it say so, please? Would you show it to me?
[The text was indicated to the witness.]
I made these statements, and...
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then I also have the following question to ask you. Do you not think that your announcement in 1943 bears witness to the fact that you have today testified falsely before the Tribunal?
BUEHLER: No; no. What I meant by my statement was that the population would take things into its own hands. When for instance a worker remained away from his place of work for 3 days to go in search of food, this was considered by me to be a desperate step on the part of the worker.
However, I said this morning that it was very difficult for the population to obtain the necessary food supplies but that it was not impossible, so that I did not notice famine at all in the Government General.
And please may I ask you to consider that 80 percent of the population of the Government General were country people, so that there could be no famine on a large scale unless the countryside had been completely despoiled, and that was not the case.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that as a result of the food quotas established in the Government General a revolt might arise, and you said that the population was driven to despair by hunger. Is that not evidence that a famine was raging in the country?
BUEHLER: By "revolt" I meant "unrest," not an armed uprising. It is quite clear that morale and the will to work did suffer by reason of the insufficient rations. I stated this morning how it was that adequate provisioning of the population could not be carried
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out. On the other hand, however, there was such a widespread free market and black market that even the worker, if he had sufficient time, could obtain food; and if he did not have time, he took it. That was what I meant by the workers taking things in their own hands.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please, answer this question. Were only such educational possibilities left to the Poles as would- according to the plan of Frank and Goebbels-merely emphasize the hopeless destiny of their nation?
BUEHLER: Efforts to keep down the level of education of the Polish population were noticeable. These tendencies originated from Himmler in Berlin.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer: What was done with the Polish universities?
BUEHLER: They were closed and they were not reopened. However, technical courses were arranged in Warsaw and in Lvov in which these people received university education; but, to be sure, these courses had to be closed by demand of the Reich.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recollect under whose signature the decree was issued to close the universities. Perhaps you will recognize this signature? It is an official report.
BUEHLER: The decree regarding the appointment of university trustees was signed by the Governor General in November 1940.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell me whether technical schools only were left in Poland?
BUEHLER: Not technical schools alone remained open; there were, for instance, commercial schools, and the attendance there was very large. Apart from that, there were craft schools and elementary schools, which were set up on a large scale.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, only those schools were left which trained artisans, and petty commercial clerks and tradesmen?
BUEHLER: Whether only petty or also more important traders attended them I do not know. At any rate commercial schools were permitted.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to know on whose initiative the royal palace at Warsaw was destroyed?
BUEHLER: I do not know for certain. I heard once that it had been the Fuehrer's wish that the castle in Warsaw, which was heavily damaged, should be razed to the ground.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And by whose personal order was this castle, the royal castle of Warsaw destroyed?
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BUEHLER: I do not know whether it was blown up; that I do not know.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. It was destroyed. Who ordered it to be destroyed, do you know?
BUEHLER: I do not know.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You do not know?
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The quotation which I want to read to you is on Page 1 of the translation of the document submitted by us to the Tribunal. It is a very short quotation. I shall proceed to read it into the record:
". . .The Fuehrer discussed the general situation with the Governor General and he approved of the work of the Governor General in Poland, especially the pulling down of the palace at Warsaw and the intention not to reconstruct the city . . ."
Was it not true that the palace in Warsaw was destroyed by order of Frank?
BUEHLER: It is not known to me that the castle was destroyed. As far as I know there was at one time a project to pull it down, but the plan was abandoned.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, please, was it not in your presence that the Defendant Frank on 21 April 1940 issued an order to apply police measures during the so-called recruitment of labor.
BUEHLER: I should have to see the minutes. I cannot remember it offhand.
[The document was handed to the witness.]
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I should like to quote is on Page 46 of the document, the last paragraph. I quote:
"Discussion with State Secretary Dr. Buehler, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, and Dr. Frauendorfer in the presence of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.
"Subject of discussion is the deportation of workers, especially agricultural workers, to the Reich.
"The Governor General stated that, as all methods in the way of appeals, et cetera, had been unsuccessful, one was now obliged to come to the conclusion that the Poles evaded this duty of work either out of malice, or with the intention of doing Germany indirect harm by not placing themselves at her disposal. He therefore asked Dr. Frauendorfer whether
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there were any measures left which had not yet been taken to win the Poles over voluntarily.
"Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question in the negative.
"The Governor General stated emphatically that a final decision was now required of him. The question now was whether one would not have to resort to some form of coercive measure."
Was that not an order to apply coercive measures when recruiting labor?
BUEHLER: I will not contradict the statement, as I have seen the minutes. It is one of the utterances of the Governor General which, I believe, were not altogether made voluntarily but which in no way altered the course which I took on this question.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question: Were you present at a discussion with Sauckel on 18 August 1942, and was it in your presence that Frank told Sauckel that he-as he put it-"joyfully" informed him that he had shipped a fresh convoy of workers to the Reich with the help of the Police.
BUEHLER: Together with my departmental heads who dealt with the recruitment of workers I had a conference with Reich Commissioner Sauckel before the visit to the Governor General took place. I cannot now remember whether I was present when Reich Commissioner Sauckel visited the Governor General. I ask to see the minutes.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show the defendant, I mean the witness, the passage.
[The document was handed to the witness.]
I will now read into the record two short passages on Pages 918 and 920. Doctor Frank says:
"I am very glad that I can inform you officially that up to this date we have sent to Germany over 800,000 workers. Only a short time ago you asked for another 140,000. I am happy to inform you officially that, in accordance with our agreement of yesterday, 60 percent of these newly requested workers will be sent by the end of October, and the other 40 percent will be dispatched to the Reich by the end of the year."
Then I will ask you to pass on to Page 120. There is only one other sentence I want to quote:
"Besides the 140,000, you can count on a further number of workers from the Government General during the coming year, for we will use the Police to get them."
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Does that not imply the use of Draconian police methods in the so-called recruiting of manpower?
BUEHLER: I do not recollect that I was present on that occasion, so I can in no way confirm whether that was said in this way.
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: [To Dr. Seidl.] Do you want to re-examine?
DR. SEIDL: I have a few more questions to ask the witness.
First of all, I should like to clarify a misunderstanding which seems to have arisen. The question which I put to the witness in connection with Document Number USSR-93 referred only to Appendix 1, which has the title "Cultural Life in Poland." That appendix deals with directives regarding cultural policies which the administration of the Government General was supposed to have issued, and the way I understood the witness was that he only wanted to answer that particular question and not refer to the other appendices, such as, for instance, those dealing with confiscated art treasures.
Perhaps it would have been better if he had not used the word "forged." At any rate, he wanted to say that he did not know the directives in question.
[Turning to the witness.] Witness, is it correct that by far the greater number of Polish workers who were brought to the Reich were volunteers?
BUEHLER: May I, first of all, say that I by no means wished to accuse the Prosecution of committing a forgery. I merely wanted to point out that possibly they were using a forged document. I did not want to accuse the Prosecution itself of a forgery.
Now, regarding the question put by defense counsel, I want to say that according to my observations by far the greater number of all the workers from the Government General went to the Reich voluntarily.
DR. SEIDL: So as to assist your memory, I am going to read a short quotation from the diary, which deals with the recruiting of workers.
On 4 March 1940 the Governor General addressed a meeting of the town mayors of the Lublin district and stated the following regarding the recruitment of workers:
"He rejected the issue of a new decree, as demanded by Berlin, containing particular coercive measures and threats of punishment. Measures which attract attention abroad should be avoided. The forcible transport of people had every argument against it."
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Does that conception reflect the true views of the Governor General?
BUTLER: I was not present during that conference, so I did not hear that utterance by the Governor General, but it does tally with those instructions and principles which the Governor General gave to me and which I have always resolutely observed and carried out.
DR. SEIDL: Were you present during a conference on 14 January 1944-I see you were there-it was a conference with the State Secretary Dr. Buehler, Dr. Koppe, and several others. I quote from it:
"The Governor General resolutely opposes the employment of Police for carrying out such measures. Such a task is not a matter for the Police."
Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly opposed the use of Police in connection with the recruiting of workers?
BUEHLER: That was not the only occasion. The deputy of Reich Commissioner Sauckel was often attacked by him during public meetings when he talked about raids for recruiting workers; but I must state that Sauckel's deputy always declared that it was not he who had given instructions for these raids.
DR. SEIDL: The first quotation which the prosecutor submitted to you was an entry dated 25 January 1943. He asked you whether you regarded yourself as a war criminal. I shall now put to you another passage from that conference, at which you yourself were present. I quote from Page 7 of that entry in the diary. The Governor General stated:
"State Secretary Krueger, you know that orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS can be carried out by you only after you have spoken with me. This was omitted in this instance. I express my regret that you have carried out an order from the Reichsfuehrer without first informing me, in accordance with the orders of the Fuehrer. According to that order, instructions of the Reichsfuehrer SS may be carried out here in the Government General only after I have previously given my approval. I hope that this is the last time that that is overlooked; because I do not want to trouble the Fuehrer about every single case of this kind." (Document Number 2233-PS.)
I shall skip a sentence and continue to quote:
"It is not possible for us to disregard Fuehrer orders, and it is out of the question that in the sphere of police and security direct orders from the Reichsfuehrer should be carried out over the head of the man who has been appointed here by the Fuehrer; otherwise I should be completely superfluous."
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I now ask you, is it correct that there were very frequently such disputes between the Governor General and the Higher SS Police Leader Krueger, and that the Governor General terminated these disputes by asking for cooperation, so that some sort of administration could function in this territory?
BUEHLER: Yes, that is correct, such disputes were our daily bread.
DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has also submitted to you another exhibit, USSR-335 (Document Number USSR-335), the Court-Martial Decree, dated October 1943. I now ask you what the security situation was like in the Government General then, and would it have been at all possible at that time to control the situation with normal criminal procedure?
THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Seidl, has that not already been dealt with very fully in his examination in chief?
DR. SEIDL: I forego having this question answered again. Now one last question, which refers to art treasures.
Is it correct that a portion of the art treasures which were found in the region of Upper Silesia were taken to the last official residence of the Governor General at Neuhaus to be safeguarded, and that the Governor General gave you instructions to prepare a list of these articles and send it to Reich Minister Lammers?
BUEHLER: The Governor General dictated a report to Reich Minister Lammers about the transfer of 20 of the most outstanding art treasures from the property of the Polish State. I was present when it was dictated and I took that report personally to State Secretary Kritzinger in Berlin. It was stated therein that these art treasures, so as to save them from the Russians, had been taken from Seichau, or whatever the place is called, to Schliersee. These art treasures were left unguarded in the official residence of the Governor General.
DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. SEIDL: I have now completed the examination of witnesses, but as the document books have not yet been bound, I would like to suggest that at some later stage, perhaps after the case of Frick, could submit these document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, how many books are you presenting?
DR. SEIDL: A total of five volumes, but I myself have not received them yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Tribunal approved the documents in five volumes?
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DR. SEIDL: They are almost entirely documents which have already been submitted by the Prosecution and an agreement has been reached with the Prosecution regarding the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, we need not wait now for the document books. The document books will be considered by the Tribunal when they are put in and then, if you have anything in particular you want to say upon them in explanation, you may do so.
DR. SEIDL: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you will comment upon them in your final speech. You say that they are mostly documents which have already been put in, and therefore it would not be necessary to make any preliminary comment upon them. You will be able to deal with them in your final speech.
DR. SEIDL: But I should have liked to quote a few passages during my submission of evidence, since this is necessary to establish the connection, and as it would be impossible to do all that during my final speech; but I do not think that too much time will be lost through that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, it would not be very useful to the Tribunal for you to make a commentary upon the documents at a later stage, when your witnesses have been finished and somebody else's-some other defendant's-witnesses have been interpolated; therefore, the Tribunal thinks it will be much better and much more convenient to the Tribunal if you defer your comments on the documents until your final speech.
Well, Dr. Seidl, as I understand, you have two books which are before us now. Three is it?
DR. SEIDL: There is a total of Overbooks. The other three do not appear to have been bound.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you say that most of the documents in them are documents which are already in evidence.
DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, which contains 42 volumes, has been submitted, but the Prosecution has used only those parts which appeared favorable for them. In my opinion it is, therefore, necessary that the connections should to some extent be re-established during the submission of evidence. Also, there are other documents in the document book which I believe should be read, at least in extract, before this Tribunal, but I shall, of course, limit myself to the absolutely necessary passages when I read the documents. I should like to suggest to the Tribunal that the matter be handled as it was in the case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, so that I submit the individual documents to the Tribunal as exhibits. There are several speeches by the Defendant
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Frank, there are decrees and legal regulations, there are two affidavits, and I really think that somehow an opinion with regard to them should be given during the submission of evidence; and, besides, individual documents will have to be given exhibit numbers. Up to now only one document has been submitted as evidence on behalf of the Defendant Frank, and that is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Buehler; but I have the intention of bringing a whole series of further documents formally to the notice of the Tribunal and would like to postpone that only because the Tribunal has not yet received the bound document books.
THE PRESIDENT: When will these other books be ready, Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL: I was told that they would be completed by this evening.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take in dealing with these books?
DR. SEIDL: I think that two hours will be enough.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn now.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal would like you to deal with your documents now, and insofar as they are documents which have already been put in evidence, unless you wish to refer to other passages in them, they think that you need only tell us what the documents are and put them in evidence, unless it is very important to you to refer to any particular document. So far as they are new documents, you will, no doubt, offer them in evidence and make such short comments as you think necessary. But the Tribunal hopes that you will be able to finish this afternoon. With reference to the other books that you have, we understand that you have all the documents in German yourself, and therefore you can refer us to those documents now.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, upon the wish of the Prosecution and also, I believe, of the Tribunal, I have reduced the original bulk of my document books considerably. The first five document books, as I had had them prepared, contained more than eight hundred pages. The new form is considerably shorter; but I have not received the German text of the new form, so that I am not in a position just now to give the number of pages to the Tribunal or to coordinate my page numbers with the numbered pages of the translations. If I may express a wish, it is that we should first wait until the fire document books in their new form are available, because
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otherwise it is very likely that the numbering of the pages would not correspond to the numbering of the individual documents as exactly as might be desired.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it best that you should begin now with the first three volumes. We have them here.
DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal has the first three volumes, then I will begin. I begin with Volume I. The first document on Page 1 is the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, dated 12 October 1939, concerning the administration of the occupied Polish territories. This decree defines in detail the authority of the Governor General. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 some of the limitations to the authority of the Governor General are included, which the witnesses Dr. Lammers and Dr. Buehler have already pointed out. This document bears the number 2537-PS and it will be Exhibit Frank-2.
I pass to Page 3 of the document book. This document is the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the establishment of a State Secretariat for Security in the Government General, dated 7 May 1942. I quote Paragraph 2:
"The State Secretary for Security serves at the same time as deputy of the Reichsfuehrer SS in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality."
On Page 4 I quote Paragraph IV:
"The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police is authorized to give the State Secretary for Security direct instructions in the province of security and the preservation of German Nationality."
This (document will be Exhibit Frank-3 (Document Number Frank-3).
Following the decree of the Fuehrer of 7 May 1942 comes the decree for the transfer of authority to the State Secretary for Security, of 23 June 1942. I do not know whether that decree is already bound in that volume. Apparently that decree, which was added later, has not yet been translated.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date?
DR. SEIDL: 23 June 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: We have one of 27 May 1942.
DR. SEIDL: That decree apparently has not yet been translated because it was added afterwards, and I will put it in the document book later. It will be Document Frank-4. In Paragraph 1 of that decree, we find, "The jurisdictions of the administrative and creative branches of the Police referred to in appendices A and B are now transferred to the State Secretary for Security." In Appendix 1 the spheres of authority of the Order Police are mentioned under
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15 headings-no, I must correct that-26 headings; and in Appendix B the spheres of authority of the Order Police come under 21 headings.
I pass now to Document Book I, Page 5. That is the decree of the Fuehrer concerning the appointment of officials and the termination of this status as officials in the sphere of the Government General, of 20 May 1942. I quote from the figure 3, Paragraph 2:
"The Governor General's sphere of activity does not, in the sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the province of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, or those belonging to the Customs Frontier Service." (Document Number Frank-4(e).)
I pass to Page 6 of the document book, the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, for the Preservation of German Nationality, of 7 October 1939, which is already Exhibit USA-305 (Document Number 686-PS):
The next document is the letter from Reich Marshal Goering to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, of July 1941.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I suggest that an exhibit number be given as we go along so that we can follow better, and later on have some track of the exhibits as they go in. The last one and this one have not been given any exhibit number.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): The last one was Frank-5, was it not?
THE PRESIDENT: No. Frank-5 was the one of the 27th of May 1942.
MR. DODD: We did not know that; we did not get the number over the speaker. I am sorry.
THE PRESIDENT: It may not have been stated but I took it down as that myself. Will you take care to state each time, Dr. Seidl, what the exhibit number is that you are giving. You are dealing now with the letter of the 31st of July 1941.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. This letter has a USA number, namely, 509.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Wait a minute, perhaps I made a mistake. Yes, Mr. Dodd, I think I made a mistake. The reason why Dr. Seidl did not give a number was because it was already in evidence as USA-305. I made a mistake. It was not Frank-5. He only got to Frank-4. The next one is USA-509.
DR. SEIDL: 509 (Document Nu
mber 710-PS). I pass to Page 10 of the document book. That is an order, a directive rather, of the High Command of the Armed Forces concerning Case Barbarossa, USA-135 (Document Number 447-PS), and I quote Paragraph 2:
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"It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government General an operational area of the Army. On the other hand, on the basis of the unpublished Fuehrer decrees of 19 and 21 October 1939 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is authorized to enact measures that are necessary for the execution of his military task and for the security of his troops."
I pass to Page 11 of the document book, a directive for the execution of the Fuehrer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 27 March 1942. I quote Paragraph 4:
"The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor will have at his disposal for the performance of his tasks the authority delegated to me by the Fuehrer to issue instructions to the highest Reich authorities, their subordinate offices, as well as to the offices of the Party and its formations and affiliated organizations; to the Reich Protector; to the Governor General; to the military commanders and the chiefs of the civil administrations."
This document becomes Exhibit Number Frank-5 (Document Number Frank-5).
The next document is on Page 12-the decree by the Fuehrer, concerning a Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 21 March 1942, from which it can be seen that his authority to issue instructions included the Government General. It becomes Exhibit Number Frank-6 (Document Number Frank-6).
The document on Page 13 of the document book deals also with the authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to issue instructions. It is already Exhibit USA-206 (Document Number 3352-PS).
The document on Page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubiowicz, Chairman of the Ukrainian Control Committee, to the Defendant Dr. Frank. It already has the Exhibit Number USA-178 (Document Number 1526-PS); and I will read only the first sentence from that document, in order to show what the relation was between the Defendant Dr. Frank and the author of that letter. I quote:
"Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state the abuses and the painful incidents which create an especially difficult position for the Ukrainian population within the Government General."
Then I pass on to Page 16 of the document book. That is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-275 (Document Number 1061-PS), namely, the report of SS Brigadefuehrer Stroop about the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. I quote the second paragraph of Section II, from
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which it can be seen that the order came directly from the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler:
"When the Reichsfuehrer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, he ordered the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw to transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance which were installed within the ghetto, including the workers and the machines."
The affidavit which the Prosecution submitted during the cross examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner should then really follow after Page 16 of the document book.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): As far as I can gather, there has been some misunderstanding on this point. Under the number mentioned by Dr. Seidl in his document book there is no document referring to the Warsaw ghetto, but there is a document from the Chief of Police and SS in Galicia relating to the solution of the Jewish problem in Galicia. I should like this elucidated.
DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the SS Brigadefuehrer Stroop which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-275. The report by SS Fuehrer Katzmann, which the Russian Prosecutor apparently means, concerning the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia, is on Page 17 of the document book, that is, on the next page. Apparently the insertion of Page 16 in the document book which was prepared for the Russian Prosecution was overlooked.
After that report by Brigadefuehrer Stroop, Exhibit USA-275 should be inserted as Page 16a, the affidavit by SS Brigadefuehrer Stroop which was submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner under Exhibit Number USA-804. That affidavit bears the Document Number 3841-PS. I could not include that affidavit in the document book because it was submitted by the Prosecution only after I had sent the document book to be translated.
As Page 16b another document should be shut-in which was also submitted during the cross-examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit bears the Exhibit Number USA-803, Document Number 3840-PS. That would be Page 16b of the document book.
Now I come to the report which the Soviet Prosecutor had in mind and which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. It is on Page 17 of the document book. That measure has the Exhibit Number USA-277 and the Document Number L-18. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for word:
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"After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers by providing them with scarce goods, et cetera, it was considered necessary to introduce really Draconic measures."
I pass to Paragraph 2 and quote:
"As the administration was not in a position and showed itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply took over the whole question of the employment of Jewish labor. The Jewish labor agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All employment certificates given by firms or administrative offices were declared invalid, and cards given Jews by the labor agencies were made valid again by being stamped by the police offices." I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the letter of the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of 17 April 1943. That document is Number 2220-PS and Exhibit Number USA-175. I quote:
"In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed to prepare written memoranda about conditions in the Government General on which to base our intended report to the Fuehrer.
"The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger has already been submitted to you directly. On the basis of this material I have had a report prepared which sums up the most important points contained therein, subdivides them clearly, and culminates in an explanation of the measures to be taken.
"The report has been checked with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it to you herewith."-It is signed-"Dr. Lammers."
I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote:
"Secret. Concerning conditions in the Government General. .. "The German administration in the Government General has to accomplish the following tasks: 1) To increase agricultural production for the purpose of securing food for the German people and seize as much of it as possible, to allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work essential to the war effort, and to remove the rest for the Armed Forces and the homeland."
I leave out the following points and pass to the letter "B", where Krueger or his assistant criticized the measures of the Governor General. I quote:
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"German administration in the Government General has failed grossly with respect to the tasks listed under "A". Even if a relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces and the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and if the labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things must be made clear: First, these accomplishments were not achieved until the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. Secondly, and above all, there was the omission to create for the attainment of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational, economic, and political character which are indispensable if such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in the situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions in every respect could eventually come about. This failure of the German administration can be explained in the first place by the system of the German administrative and governmental activity in the Government General as embodied in the Governor General himself, and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all questions decisive for conditions in the Government General.
"I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government General.
"From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor General to make a state organization out of the Government General which was to lead its own existence in complete independence of the Reich."
Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote:
"3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and if necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount of satisfaction among the population by allowing certain liberties, especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the population halfway only undermines respect for the Germans. The above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor General inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is already overshooting the goal but which, under the existing conditions and viewed in connection with
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our military situation during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and must achieve the opposite of the aim intended.
"4) The relationship between racial Germans and the Polish-Ukrainian population in the Government General.
"The cases are numerous in which the German administration has permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the Government General to be put into the background in favor of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor to win over the latter. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans resettled from somewhere else were not to be installed immediately as settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be employed as farm workers. A legal foundation for the expropriation of Polish property has not been created so far. Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians, badly and at great expense. In German spas in the Government General the sheltering of children of German citizenship from territories threatened with bombing, and of veterans of Stalingrad was hampered, while foreigners took convalescent vacations there, and so on.
"The big plans for resettlement in the Dublin district for the benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality had found the administration willing to co-operate and assist in the proper manner."
I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:
"The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General personally, and the material failure of the general German administration in the most various fields of decisive -importance has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the native population, but has also brought about the result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly disunited throughout their history, have come together in a united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run. The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general administration-as happened, for example, in the field of the Preservation of German Nationality-led to a condition which made it necessary for other
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administrative bodies (the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality. . .and the Police) to take over these tasks."
Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the repeatedly mentioned report by the Governor General to the Fuehrer of 19 June 1943. The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA:-610. Of this document the Prosecution has so far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very points in this memorandum which the Governor General most severely criticized.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on Page 20?
DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. I have already finished the report which begins on Page 20.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on Page 20?
DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the letter which begins on Page 19, and which already has the number USA-175.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.
DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a memorandum which has already been mentioned by various witnesses and was submitted under Exhibit Number USA-610 (Document Number 437-PS) by the Prosecution. Of this report the Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and 11, which are Pages 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only those passages in the report which were condemned as excesses of the Police, and against which excesses the Governor General complained to the Fuehrer.
I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass on to Page 27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, and I quote under Section 2:
"The almost :complete discontinuation of the possibilities for participation in the cultural field has led, even among the lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent. The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion from the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, that the restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet citizens . . .
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"3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests. As the war goes on the German interest increases in the mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body, led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What was not possible during the course of Polish national history, what even the first years of German dominion could not bring about, namely, the achievement of national unity in a common purpose to hold together through thick and thin, now threatens to become a reality, slowly but surely, because of the German measures. German leadership cannot allow this process of unifying the individual classes of the Polish population to pass unheeded in the face of
the growing power of resistance of the Poles. German leadership should promote class distinction by certain cultural concessions and should be able to play one class off against the other.
"4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure of circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes. The workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage. Improvement of recruiting methods, together with the continued effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, however meager it may be, for the families left behind, would cause a rise in morale, and the result would be an increased desire to work and increased production in the German interest.
"5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning of the war the Polish element was removed from all important positions The available German staff had always been inadequate in quantity and quality. Besides, during the past year, a considerable number of German personnel have had to be transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed forces. Already an increased amount of non-German manpower has had to be obtained compulsorily. An essential change in the treatment of the Poles would enable the administration, while exercising all necessary precaution, to induce
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a greater number of Poles to collaborate. Without this the administration, in view of the present amount of personnel- not to speak of future transfers-cannot continue to function. The increased participation of Poles would further help to raise the morale itself.
"Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a number-of methods employed up till now in the treatment of Poles should be changed or even completely abandoned, at least for the duration of the fighting in Europe.
"1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great is the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already the seizure of a great part of the large Polish estates has understandably embittered those effected by it, who naturally represent that strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. But, because of their numerically small strength and their complete isolation from the mass of the people, their opposition does not count nearly as much as the attitude of the mass of the population which consists mainly of small farmers. The evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no doubt necessary for military-political reasons, has already had an unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many farmers. At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain territorial limits. It was carried out with careful preparation on the part of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding unnecessary hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover-as I have already reported separately- the pace at which it was carried out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among the populace. At short notice families were torn apart; those able to work were sent to the Reich, while old people and children were directed to evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened in the middle of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in considerable lass of life, especially among members of the last mentioned group. The dispossession meant the complete expropriation of the movable and immovable property of the farmers. The entire population succumbed to the belief that these deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of the Poles from the region of the Government General. The general impression was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a
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welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for a long time. Thus it came about that considerable portions of the population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was a tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset agricultural and industrial production according to a definite plan.
"2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to become obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an absolute condition for winning over the Polish population to the fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection against seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good copy for communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children, and old men in public, which took place again and again without the knowledge and against the will of the government, must be prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not apply to the public executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of collective punishments, which nearly always hit innocent persons and are applied against people who are fundamentally politically indifferent, the unfavorable psychological effect cannot possibly be overestimated. Serious punitive measures and executions should be carried out only after a trial based at least upon the elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied by publication of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is carried on in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner, it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a punitive measure which the population considers purely arbitrary, and disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that these German measures are only the prelude to future events. Moreover, collective punishment, which by its nature is directed primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as a sign of strength of the ruling power, which the population expects to strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby liberate them from the insecurity which burdens them."
I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under Section 3:
"Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in 1) and 2) to restore calm in the Government General, security of property among non-agricultural people must also be guaranteed, insofar as it is not counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation or confiscation without compensation
23 April 46
in the industrial sector, in commerce and trade, and of other private property, should not take place in any case if the owner or the custodian has not committed an offense against the German authorities. If the taking over of industrial enterprises, commercial concerns, or real estate is necessary for reasons connected with the war, one should proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a procedure would on the one hand further the initiative of Polish business men, and on the other hand avoid damage to the interests of German war economy.
"4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the Poles, importance must be attached to the influence of the Catholic Church which cannot be overestimated. I do not deny that the Catholic Church has always been on the side of the leading fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous priests also made their influence felt in this direction even after the German occupation. Hundreds of arrests were carried out among them. A number of priests were taken to concentration camps and also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish population, the Church must be given at least a legal status even though it might not be possible to co-operate with it. It can without doubt be won over to reinforce the struggle of the Polish people against Bolshevism, especially today under the effect of the crime of Katyn, for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist regime in the Vistula area, if only out of the instinct of self-preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is necessary to refrain in the future from all measures against its activity and its property, insofar as they do not run directly counter to war requirements.
"Much harm has been done even quite recently by the closing of monasteries, charitable institutions, and church establishments."
THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going to be brief. But you have now read from Page 53 to Page 65.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this kind which is available to me, and in view of the fact that the Prosecution has quoted in full only those passages which the Defendant Dr. Frank himself criticized most severely, I consider it my duty now to read a number of passages, to quote them, in order to give the entire picture correctly and to show what the Defendant Dr. Frank really intended to achieve with this document. I shall only quote a few more lines and then I will pass to another document.
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THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from that document would show what the Defendant Frank was putting forward-one or two paragraphs.
DR. SEIDL: I will go on to the next document, Mr. President, that is on Page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Buehler, which I presented to the witness today and which has been given the document number Frank-1; Page 68 in the document book.
On Page 70 there appears Exhibit USA-473 (Document Number L-49j. If I remember correctly this document has already been read in full by the Prosecution, and I would like to ask the Court only to take judicial notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank.
On Page 72 of the document book is an affidavit of the former Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that this is not really an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is only a letter which Kreishauptmann Dr. Albrecht sent to me through the General Secretary of the Tribunal. I then returned the letter in order to have it sworn to by the witness, but I have to say that until now that sworn statement has not been returned, so that for the time being this exhibit would only have the material value of a letter. Therefore I ask the Tribunal to decide whether that document can be accepted by the Tribunal as an exhibit in the form of a letter.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter before when your application was before it. They will accept the document for what it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit form you will no doubt put it in.
DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Document Number Frank-7. I forego the quoting of the first points and proceed directly to Page 74 of the document book and I quote under Section 4:
"Dr. Frank's fight against the exploitation and neglect of the Government General in favor of the Reich. Conflict with Berlin.
"The first meeting with Dr. Frank occurred shortly after the establishment of the Government General in the autumn of 1939, in the Polish district capital Radom, where the 10 Kreis chiefs of this district had to report concerning the condition of the population in their administrative district and the problem of reconstructing, as quickly and effectively as possible, the general as well as the administrative and economic life. What struck one most was the keen awareness of Dr. Frank and his deep concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression in the instructions not to consider or treat the Government General or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation or as a waste. area, but rather to consider it as
23 April 46
a center of public order and an area of concentration at the back of the fighting German front and at the gates of the German homeland, forming a link between the two. Therefore the loyal native inhabitants of this country should have claim to the full protection of the German administration as citizens of the Government General. To this end the constant efforts of all authorities and economic agencies would be demanded by him, also constant control through supervisors, which would be personally superintended by him in periodical inspection trips with the participation of the specialized central offices. In this way, for instance, the two districts which were administered by me were inspected by him personally three times in 4 years.
"In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who believed it possible to import more from the Government General into the Reich than the former could afford, Dr. Frank asserted vigorously the political independence of the Government General as an 'adjunct of the Reich' and his own independence as being directly subordinated only to the Supreme Head of the State, and not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account to comply with demands which might come to us on the basis of personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or with the ministries concerned; and if by so doing we came into conflict with our loyalty to the Reich, which was equally expected of us, to report to him about it. This firm attitude brought Dr. Frank the displeasure of the Berlin government circles, and the Government General was dubbed 'Frankreich.' A campaign of calumny was initiated in the Reich against him and against the entire administration of the Government General by systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same time attempting to belittle the actual constructive achievements."
I should like to ask the Tribunal merely to take official notice of Section 5, also Section 6, and I will only quote from Section 7.
"7) Dr. Frank as an opponent of acts of violence against the native population, especially as an opponent of the SS.
"Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the Government General, the accusation of the enslaving of the native population as well as deporting it to the Reich, and many atrocities of various kinds which have appeared in the newspaper reports on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, were interpreted as serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far as atrocities are concerned, the guilt lies not with Dr. Frank but in some measure with the numerous non-German agitators
23 April 46
and provocateurs who, with the growing pressure on the fighting German fronts, increased their underground activity; but more especially with the former State Secretary for Security in the Government General, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, and his agencies. My observations in this respect are sketchy, because of the strict secrecy of these offices.
"On the other hand, Dr. Frank went so far in meeting the Polish population that this was frequently objected to by his German compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the just interests of the Polish population is proved, for example, by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of 18 days, the concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish area took place without any disturbance worth mentioning, and that the Eastern railroad was able, with Polish personnel, to move the troop transports up to the most forward unloading points without being delayed by acts of sabotage."
I quote the last paragraph on Page 79:
"This humane attitude of Dr. Frank, which earned him respect and sympathy among considerable groups of the native population, led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, in whose ranks Himmler's statement, 'They shall not love us, but fear us,' was applied as the guiding principle of their thoughts and deeds.
"At times it came to a complete break. I still recall quite clearly that during a government visit to the Carpathian areas in the summer of 1943 in the district center of Stanislav, when he took a wale alone with me and my wife in Zaremcze on the Prut; Dr. Frank complained most bitterly about the arbitrary acts of the SS, which quite frequently ran counter to the political line taken by him. At that time he called the SS the 'Black Plague'; and when he noticed our astonishment at hearing such criticism coming from his lips, he pointed out that if, for example, my wife were to be wrongfully arrested one day or night by agencies of the Gestapo and disappear, never to be seen again, without having been given the opportunity of defense in a court trial, absolutely nothing could be done about it. Some time afterwards he made a speech to the students in Heidelberg, which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded, about the necessity for the re-establishment of a German constitutional state such as had always met the real needs of the German people. When he wanted to repeat this speech in Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, at Himmler's instigation,
23 April 46
to make speeches for 3 months, as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately forgotten, source. The struggle against the methods of violence used by the SS led to Dr. Frank's having a nervous breakdown, and he had to take a fairly long sick leave. As far as I can remember this was in the winter of 1943-44."
I ask the Court to take official notice of Section 8, and I pass on to Page 84 of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS Obergruppenfuehrer Erich Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 21 February 1946. This affidavit becomes Document Frank-8.
THE PRESIDENT: Did this witness not give evidence?
DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the Prosecution, and I made the motion at that time that either I be allowed to interrogate the witness again or be granted the use of an affidavit. On 8 March 1946 the Tribunal made the decision, if I remember correctly, that I could use an affidavit from that witness but that the Prosecution would be free if they desired to question the witness again.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning this matter, and I quote:
"1) Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over the line of the river Bug into the Government General in 1943, Himmler declared the Government General to be a 'guerrilla warfare territory.' Thus it became my duty as Chief of anti-partisan Units to travel about the Government General to collect information and get experience, and to submit reports and suggestions for fighting the partisans.
"In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who was conspiring with the Poles and whom he would expose to the Fuehrer very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches Himmler made against Frank:
"a) At a lawyer's meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank is said to have stated that 'he preferred a bad constitutional state to the best conducted police state'; and
"b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had disavowed some of Himmler's measures and had disparaged, in front of the Poles, those charged with carrying them out, by calling them 'militant personalities.'
"After having, oh a circular tour, personally obtained information on the spot about the situation in the Government
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General, I visited the higher SS and Police Fuehrer Krueger and the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Krakow.
"Krueger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and blamed Frank's faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles for conditions in the Government General. He called for harsher and more ruthless measures and said that he would not rest until the traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the impression, from Krueger's statements, that personal motives also influenced his attitude, and that he himself would have liked to become Governor General.
"After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank. I told him of my impressions; and he went into lengthy details about a new policy for Poland, which aimed at appeasing the Poles by means of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr. Frank considered the following factors responsible for the crisis in the Government General:
"a) The ruthless resettlement action carried out now in the midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless resettlement carried out by the SS and Police Fuehrer Globocznik in Lublin.
"b) The insufficient food quota allotted to the Governor General.
"Dr. Frank called Krueger and Globocznik declared enemies of any conciliatory policy, and said it was absolutely essential that they should be recalled.
"Being convinced that if Dr. Frank failed, he would be succeeded only by a more ruthless and uncompromising person, I promised him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told Frank I shared his opinion that Krueger and Globocznik would have to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew however that Himmler hated him and that he was urging Hitler to have him removed. With such a state of affairs any request on Frank's part to have Krueger and Globocznik recalled would not only be rejected but would even strengthen their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved of their posts within a short time. Dr. Frank agreed to that, and I then made use of the military mistakes that Krueger and Globocznik had committed in order to bring about their recall by Himmler.
"3) The Warsaw revolt of l944..."
THE PRESIDENT: I must point out to you that you said you were going to be only 2 hours over five volumes. You have now been over an hour over one volume, and you are reading practically
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everything in these documents. It is not at all what the Tribunal has intended. You have been told that you may make short comments showing how the documents are connected with each other and how they are connected with all the evidence. That is not what you are doing at all.
DR. SEIDL: In that case I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Paragraph 3 of the affidavit by Von dem Bach-Zelewski.
Paragraph 3 deals with the Warsaw revolt in the year 1944 and the question as to whether the Governor General had anything to do with the crushing of that revolt.
Then I pass on to Page 92.
THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, does the Indictment charge anything in connection with the crushing of the Warsaw revolt in 1944?
DR. SEIDL: There is nothing in the Indictment itself about the part played by the Governor General in the crushing of that revolt. The Soviet Prosecution have, however, submitted a telegram which, while it is not clear whether it was sent, nevertheless connects the Defendant Dr. Frank in some way with the Warsaw revolt. But I shall not go into details about that now.
I pass on to Page 92 of the document book.
This is an affidavit by the witness Wilhelm Ernst von Palezieux, in whose case the Tribunal has approved an interrogatory. But I was told by the Tribunal that in place of an interrogatory I could submit an affidavit. I quote only the two main paragraphs as follows:
"The art treasures stored in the castle in Krakow, from the spring of 1943, were under official and legal supervision there. When speaking to me Dr. Frank always referred to these art treasures as state property of the Government General. Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been made before I came to Poland. The list of the first selection had been printed in book form as a catalogue with descriptions and statements of origin, and had been ordered by the Governor General."
THE PRESIDENT: Now you are reading the affidavit all over again. We do not want that sort of . ..
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I assumed that in those cases where a witness does not appear before the Tribunal in person, it is admissible that either the interrogatory or the affidavit be read, because otherwise the contents of his testimony would not become part of the record nor, therefore, part of the proceedings.
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THE PRESIDENT: That rule was in order that the defendants and their counsel should have the document before them in German; that is the reason for reading the documents through the earphones. The Tribunal will adjourn now, but I want to tell you that you must shorten your presentation of this documentary evidence. We have already been a good deal more than an hour over one book and we have four more books to deal with, and it does not do your case any good to read all these long passages because we have some more weeks of the trial. It is only necessary for you to give such connecting statements as make the documents intelligible, and to correlate them with the oral evidence that is being given.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 24 April 1946 at 1000 hours.]
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