[The Defendant Von Neurath resumed the stands]

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Mr. President, I should like to advise the Tribunal that the first half of the manuscript of my final defense speech in typescript will be ready tomorrow and the second half by next Saturday. I am sorry to say that I personally can furnish only eight copies, six of which are earmarked for the interpreters to facilitate their difficult task. I am sorry that I could not furnish more copies since I personally have no mimeographing machine. I hope the Tribunal will appreciate the fact that after the statement made by the chief prosecutor for the United States on Friday, I cannot make any claims on the technical assistance of the Prosecution.

Therefore, I am asking the Tribunal to decide whether it would be worth while, in order to expedite the presentation, to have the translation of my speech put before them. In this event I would request that the necessary arrangements be made. I am prepared to place my manuscript at the disposal of the Tribunal, under the conditions announced by you, Mr. President. What applies for me personally would, so far as I am advised, apply also for the rest, at least for the majority of Defense Counsel. In order to expedite the proceedings and to reduce the time spent on the presentation of the final defense speeches, it is important to have this point clarified.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, if you would hand in the manuscript to which you have referred, the Tribunal will make arrangements to have it translated into the various languages. I shirk that will meet the position so far as you are concerned.

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has an announcement upon the subject, which I am about to read. The announcement is this:

"In view of the discussion which took place on the 13th of June 1946, on the question of time to be taken by Defense Counsel, the Tribunal has given the matter further consideration.

1

25 June 46

"When the Defense Counsel stated the time they wished to take, the Tribunal observed that some of the defendants required more time than others, and to this extent they did make an apportionment among themselves. The Tribunal feels that the suggested times are much too long and some voluntary restriction should be made.

"Except as to a few of the defendants whose cases are of very wide scope, the Tribunal is of the opinion that half a day to each defendant is ample time for the presentation of his defense; and the Tribunal hopes that counsel will condense their arguments and limit themselves voluntarily to this time. The Tribunal, however, will not permit counsel for any defendant to deal with irrelevant matters or to speak for more than one day in any case. Four hours will be allowed at the beginning for argument on the general questions of law and fact, and counsel should co-operate in their arguments in such a way as to avoid' needless repetition."

As heretofore stated, the Tribunal would like to have a translation of each argument in French, Russian, and English submitted at the beginning of the argument. Counsel may arrange for the translation themselves if they so desire, but if they will submit copies of their arguments to the translating department as soon as possible and not less than 3 days in advance of delivery, the translation will be made for them and the contents of the copies will not be disclosed.

That is all.

Yes, Dr. LUDINGHAUSEN.

DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LUDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Last night we had stopped in our treatment of the various points raised by the Prosecution. I should like to continue now and to put the following question to you, Herr Von Neurath.

The Prosecution is charging you with the fact that in the Protectorate Germans had a preferential position as compared with Czechs and that you were responsible for that. Will you please comment on this?

CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH (Defendant): The position of Germans in the Protectorate was not a preferential position which was vested with any real preferences and advantages as compared with the Czechs, but it was an entirely different position. The Germans had become citizens of the Reich and, therefore, had the rights of Reich citizens, such as the right to vote in Reichstag elections. The Czechs did not have this right to vote, which is understandable in view of the existing difference-variance between

2

25 June 46

the German people and the Czech people. There were at no time any actual advantages connected with the position of the Germans in the Protectorate.

Efforts to have preferential treatment were made, of course, in the chauvinistic Party and in nationalist circles. But I always opposed them vigorously and prevented any practical realization of such efforts. In this connection, however, I should like to stress once more that the Czech people did not consider themselves inferior to the German people in any way.

It was a question simply of a different people which had to be treated, politically and culturally, according to its own characteristics. That was also the reason for the maintenance of the socalled autonomy which meant nothing more than the separation of the two nationalities with a view toward securing for the Czechs their own way of living; and it is evident that this autonomy had to be kept within certain limits, dictated by the prevailing necessities of the Reich as- a whole, especially in times of war.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to deal with the individual points raised in the Czech indictment, or rather the points found in the Czech report, which is the basis for this charge. In this report it is asserted that the freedom of the press was suppressed. Is that correct and what role did Herr Von Gregory play in the treatment of the press?

VON NEURATH: Herr Von Gregory had been the press attaché at the German Legation in Prague and was subordinate to the Propaganda Ministry. Then he came, as chief of my press department, to my administration and controlled the Czech press according to the directives of the Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. The Czech press, of course, was not free-no more than the German press. Control of circulation and other measures, especially censorship measures, were the same.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further raises the charge that the local Czech administrative offices were in many cases dissolved and then reorganized and key positions filled with officials and town councillors who were German or Czech collaborators. Is that correct?

VON NEURATH: These were communities with a considerable German minority, particularly in Moravia. That they should also have a representation in the local administration seemed to me a natural thing. Prague, for instance, had a Czech mayor and a German assistant mayor. This could hardly be objected to. With regard to the attempts of the Germans in the various cities or districts to take a part in the local administration to an extent that did not seem justified by their numerical strength, I intervened and

3

25 June 46 ,

rejected them. In the municipal administrations of purely Czech districts, such as in West Bohemia, there were generally no German representatives at all. But on the other hand, there were Germanspeaking enclaves, such as the region of Iglau, where the Germans were dominant in numbers and thus, of course, in influence as well.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of having-in this way and through the appointment of higher land councillors (Oberlandrate)-germanized the Czech administration, and this report bases its accusations on a statement which you allegedly made to the former Bohemian Landesprasident, Bienert, in which you said, "All that has to be digested in 2 years time."

VON NEURATH: I do not recall having made such a statement. And I-cannot imagine having uttered it. Here we are concerned with the co-ordination of the Czechs-of the Czech with the German administration. The Oberlandrate were not appointed by me, but their of flee was created as a controlling agency by the Reich Government by the decree of 1 September 1939 in connection with the setting up of German administrations and the Security Police. When the Oberlandrate appeared before me to give their reports, I told them time and again that they were not to do any administrative work themselves but were to supervise only. The Czech method of administration was frequently superior to the German, I told them.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: With regard to this I should like to refer to Document Number Neurath-149 of my document book, the decree on the organization of the administration and the German Security Police, dated 1 September 1939. In Paragraphs 5 and 6 the appointment and the duties of these Oberlandrate are described more in detail. A quotation of this document might be redundant.

The Czech indictment further contains a statement by Herr Bienert to the effect that on the problem of the co-ordination of the Czech administration you had remarked to him something like: "That must be carried out strictly; after all, this is war." At the same time Bienert stated in his interrogation that the purpose of this measure, that is, the co-ordination of the Czech and the German administration, had been to assure Germany of a peaceful hinterland during the war.

Will you kindly also comment on this.

VOW NEURATH: It is possible that I told Bienert something along these lines. However, I cannot remember it at this date. But it cam be taken for granted that in the sphere of administration, as in every other sphere in the Protectorate also, the necessities of war were the main concern. Restrictions of the autonomy in the Czech national administration have to be considered from this point of

4

25 June 46

view. That it was my constant endeavor to keep the country quiet in the interest of the Reich, and therewith in the interest of all, can hardly be held against me. Apart from that, I should like to remark that the introduction of restrictions on the autonomy was already contained explicitly in the decree setting up the Protectorate.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to the order contained in my document book under Number Neurath-144, Document Book Number 5. The order was issued by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor on the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and is dated 16 March 1939. Under Article 11 it was even then stipulated that the Reich could incorporate departments of the administration of the Protectorate into their own administration. The Czech report further refers to a statement made by the former Czech Minister Havelka dealing with the persecution of the members of the Czech Legion of the first World War insofar as they held public office. What can you tell us about this question of the Legionnaires?

VON NEURATH: The Czech Legion had been founded in Russia during the first World War. It was composed partially of volunteers, partially of the balance of Czech regiments which had belonged to the old Austro-Hungarian Army and had become prisoners of war in Russia. These Czech Legionnaires enjoyed a certain exceptional position after the founding of the Czech Republic. In part they were filled with strong chauvinistic resentment toward the Reich which dated back to the time of the nationalities fights. This, the so-called Legionnaire mentality, was a catchword in Bohemia; and in times of political unrest it could signify a certain political danger. By the way, this preferential position which the Legionnaires enjoyed was widely attacked in the Protectorate by the Czechs themselves. Therefore an effort was made, and by Frank particularly, to remove the Legionnaires from public office. But this took place only in the crassest cases and only insofar as those Legionnaires had joined the Czech Legion voluntarily, that is, it did not apply to those who were members of the former Austro-Hungarian Army. From the very beginning I tried to make this discrimination, which approximately corresponds to the situation-or corresponds with the distinction-which today is made in Germany between the voluntary members of the SS and the Waffen-SS.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment is further accusing you of having supported the Czech Fascist organization Vlayka. It bases this charge on a memorandum which you yourself wrote concerning a discussion which you had with Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, on 26 March 1940. According to this memorandum you told Hacha that the personal and moral qualities of the Vlayka leaders were well known to you; in any case, you had to

5

25 June 46

confirm the fact that this movement, this organization, was the only one which had taken a positive stand toward the Reich and toward collaboration with the Reich. How about that?

VON NEURATH: The Vlayka movement was the same as the collaborationists in France. This movement worked to bring about a German-Czech collaboration and, in fact, long before the Protectorate was established. But the leaders of this movement were, in my opinion, rather dubious characters, as I shoved in the words to Hacha quoted above. These leaders threatened and slandered President Hacha and members of the Czech Government among others. State Secretary Frank had known these men from former times and he wanted to support them merely in consideration of their former co-operation with him. However, I refused to do this, just as I refused the various applications of these people to visit me.

On the other hand, it is possible that Frank supported them from a fund which Hitler had placed at his disposal without my knowledge and about which Frank was under obligation not to tell me anything.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What attitude, now, did you take to the dissolution of. parties-of political parties-and of trade unions?

VON NEURATH: That was like the control of the press, a necessity which resulted from the system, from the political system of the Reich. In any event, through this step taken by President Hacha and despite the measures taken by Germany, no country suffered less from the war than the Protectorate. The Czech people were the only ones in middle and eastern Europe who could retain their national, cultural, and economic entity almost to its full extent.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to turn to the point raised by the Prosecution which is concerned with an alleged cultural suppression. What can you tell us about the handling of Czech educational affairs?

VON NEURATH: The Czech universities and other institutions of higher education, as has been stated before, were closed at Hitler's order in November 1939. Again and again, at the request of President Hacha and of the Protectorate Government, I appealed directly to Hitler to have these schools reopened. But due to the dominating position of Herr Himmler, I had no success. The consequence of the closing of the universities; of course, was that a large number of young people who otherwise would have become university students now had to look for work of a manual sort. The closing of the institutions of higher learning also had repercussions on the secondary school level. This had already been heavily burdened after the

6

25 June 46

separation of the Sudetenland in the autumn of 1938, for the entire Czech intelligentsia from this region had returned to the Czech-speaking area, or what was later the Protectorate. Hence for the young people from the secondary schools there was hardly any employment left. It was about the same situation which is now prevailing in Germany. Concerning the closing of Czech lower schools and other planned efforts to restrict Czech youth in their cultural freedom and their educational possibilities, I know nothing.

DO VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you yourself approve of the closing of Czech institutions of higher learning ordered by Hitler?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von LUDINGHAUSEN, he said that he tried to intervene and get rid of Hitler's order.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: If that is sufficient for the Tribunal then he need not answer the question further.

THE PRESIDENT: Don't you think that is sufficient?

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I just wanted to have it expressed once again in a somewhat stronger way; however, if the Tribunal is satisfied with the clarification of this problem, I am completely satisfied.

THE PRESIDENT: It would not make it any better if it was said twice.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, if you-but, it is sufficient.

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know anything about an alleged plan, mentioned in the Czech report, to turn the Czech people into a mass of workers and to rob them of their intellectual elite?

VON NEURATH: No. Only a madman could have made a statement like that.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech indictment, or report, asserts that through your agencies, that is, with your consent and endorsement, destruction and plundering of Czech scientific institutions took place. On Page 58 of the German text, Page 55 of the English of this report, USSR-60, it says:

"The Germans occupied all universities and scientific institutions. They immediately got hold of the valuable apparatus, instruments, and scientific installations in the occupied institutions. The scientific libraries were plundered systematically and methodically. Scientific books and films were torn up or taken away. The archives of the academic Senate, the highest university authority, were torn up or burned; and the card indexes destroyed and scattered to the four winds."

What can you tell us in regard to this?

VON NEURATH: In this connection, I can say only that I never heard of any plundering and destruction of the sort described either

7

25 June 46

in Prague or later. The Czech Hochschulen, or institutions of higher education, were closed together with the universities in the year 1939 at Hitler's order. The buildings and installations of the Prague Czech University, as far as I know, were partly put at the disposal of the German university which had been closed earlier by the Czechs, since, after the Czech Hochschulen were closed, they could not be used any longer for Czech scientific purposes.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything at all about this . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I did not understand that answer. As I got it, "The buildings, in part, were put at the disposal of German universities which had been closed by the Czechs."

VON NEURATH: In Prague. In Prague was the. oldest German university; it had been closed by the Czechs after the last war, and after the establishing of the Protectorate it was reopened; and, as far as I know, some of the equipment and buildings were used for this German university.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the removal of scientific equipment, collections, objects of art, and so forth?

VON NEURATH: The only case about which I have any knowledge concerned the removal of historically valuable old Gobelins from the Maltese Palace in Prague These were removed by a member of the Foreign Office in Berlin, allegedly by order of the chief of protocol; and this was done at night, secretly, and without my knowledge or the knowledge of my officials. As soon as I learned of this I contacted the Foreign Office, and I requested immediate restoration. Whether restoration was made, I do not know; that was only in 1941, and meanwhile I had left Prague.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: May I here . . .

VON NEURATH: I know nothing about other incidents. Apart from that, I specifically prohibited the removal of art objects from the Protectorate to the Reich.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to submit an extract from the interrogation of the former State Secretary Frank, dated 10 June 1945. This is Number Neurath-154 of my Document Book Number 5, and I should like to ask the Tribunal to take notice of this statement.

[Turning to the defendant.] What happened to the objects of art and the furniture, which were Czech State property and with which the Czernin Palace in Prague, which you used as your official residence, was furnished?

8

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: This house was the former official residence of the Czech Foreign Minister, and the partly valuable furnishings belonged to the Czech State. Since there was no inventory of any sort of these items, before moving in in the fall of 1939, I called in the Czech director of the castle administration and the Czech art historian, Professor Strecki; and I had a very exact inventory taken. One copy of this inventory was left in my office and another one was deposited with the administration of the castle. After I left Prague in the autumn of 1941, I had a record made through my former caretaker and again in the presence of a representative of the castle administration, Professor Strecki, that the articles which were mentioned in the inventory were actually still there.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need details of the inventory, but there is one thing I should like to ask. The translation came through to me that the inventory was made in the fall of 1938. Was that right?

VON NEURATH: 1939. I only wanted to mention that naturally I did not take any of these articles.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Another point raised by the Czech indictment deals with the confiscation of the so-called Masaryk houses in various cities and with the destruction of Masaryk monuments and monuments erected to other personalities famous in Czech history. What do you know about that?

VON NEURATH: While I was in office, some of these Masaryk houses were closed by the Police because they were centers of agitation against Germany. The destruction or the removal of Masaryk or other Czech national monuments I had specifically prohibited. Apart from that, I expressly permitted the laying of wreaths at the grave of Masaryk at Lanyi, which Frank had prohibited', and this actually took place on a large scale.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: It is further asserted that Czech literature was suppressed and muzzled to a large extent.

VON NEURATH: The printing and dissemination of Czech anti-German literature was prohibited of course, just as the further dissemination of English and French works was prohibited in the entire Reich during the war. Aside from that, all this material was treated according to the direct orders of the Propaganda Ministry. However, while I was in office, there were still many Czech book stores and book-publishing concerns which published books by Czech authors in large numbers and disseminated them. The selection of Czech books of every type in the book stores was considerably larger than the selection of German books.

9

25 June 46

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Could you say anything about the suppression of Czech cultural life, of theaters, movies, and so forth, to which the Prosecution refers?

VON NEURATH: There was no question at all of a limitation of the cultural autonomy of the Czechs, aside from the university problem. In Prague a great number of large Czech theaters of every description were open all the time, especially the Czech opera and several theaters. On the other hand there was only one permanent German theater with daily performances. There was a constant production of many Czech plays and operas, and the same applied to music. The well-known Czech Philharmonic Orchestra at Prague played Czech music primarily and was absolutely independent regarding its programs.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. LUDINGHAUSEN, we don't need details. The defendant says that theaters and cinema theaters were allowed and there was only one German theater. We don't want any further details about it.

DR. LUDINGHAUSEN: Very well, Mr. President. I asked about these matters only because they are rather extensively dealt with in the Indictment.

[Turning to the defendant.] And what about the film industry, Herr Von Neurath?

VON NEURATH: The same applied to the movie industry. It was even especially active.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to the alleged suppression of religious freedom, of which you are being accused in the Czech indictment. The Czech indictment speaks of a wave of persecution which inundated the churches and which started immediately when the German troops marched in to occupy the country. What about that?

VON NEURATH: A systematic persecution of the churches is quite out of the question. The population was quite free as concerns public worship, and I certainly would not have tolerated any restrictions along this line. The former Under State Secretary Von Burgsdorff has testified to that point here already. It may be true that in individual cases pilgrimages or certain religious processions were prohibited by the Police, even though I personally do not remember it clearly. But that took place only because certain pilgrimages, consisting of many thousands of people, were exploited as political demonstrations at which anti-German speeches were made, At any rate, that had actually occurred several times and had been brought to my knowledge. It is true that a number of clerics were arrested in connection with the action at the beginning of the war, which we have already mentioned here. But these

10

25 June 46

arrests did not take place because the men were clerics but because they were active political opponents or people who were political suspects. In cases of this nature I made special efforts to have these people released.

My personal connections with the archbishop of Prague were absolutely correct and amicable. He and the archbishop of Olmutz specifically thanked me for my intervention on behalf of the Church, as I remember distinctly. I prevented any measure against the public worship of the Jews. Every synagogue was open to the time I left in the autumn of 1941.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the last point, I should like to put one more question about the position of Jews in the Protectorate. What can you tell us about it?

VON NEURATH: The legal position of the Jews had to be coordinated with the position of the Jews in the Reich, according to instructions from Berlin. The directives with regard to this had been sent to me already in' April of 1939. Through all sorts of inquiries addressed to Berlin, I tried and succeeded in not having the laws go into effect until June 1939, so as to give the Jews the opportunity to prepare themselves for the imminent introduction of these laws.

The so-called Nuremberg Laws were introduced into the Protectorate, too, at that time. Thereby- the Jews were removed from public life and from leading positions in the economic life. However, arrests on a large scale did not take place. There were also no excesses against Jews, except in a few single instances. The camp at Theresienstadt was not erected until long after my time of office, and I prevented the erection of other concentration camps in the Protectorate, too.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report accuses you of personally carrying through anti-Jewish measures. They maintain that, first of all, you charged the Czech Government, that is to say the autonomous government, with the carrying through of the anti-Jewish laws and that when Ministerprasident Elias refused to do so, you personally took the necessary steps.

VON NEURATH: As I said just now, the introduction of the anti-Jewish laws came about on Hitler's direct order, that is to say through the competent authorities in Berlin. The representation...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von LUDINGHAUSEN, why do you want to go over all this again? The defendant has given the evidence that he, succeeded in putting off the laws until June 1939 and that then the Nuremberg Laws were introduced. He has given us the various qualifications which he said he made; and then you read him the

11

25 June 46

Czech report and try to get him to go over it all again, it seems to me. It is now quarter past 11.

.DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: All right, then, I shall consider the first question sufficiently answered and we shall not deal with the matter of confiscation either.

[Turning to the defendant.] The Czech report further accuses you of the dissolution of the organizations of the YMCA and YWCA, and the confiscation of their property in favor of German organizations.

VON NEURATH: I must admit that I do not recall these confiscations at all. If this dissolution and confiscation took place before I left, it must have been a police measure only.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions the destruction of Czech economic life and the systematic plundering of Czech stocks of raw materials and accuses you in that regard. What are the facts with regard to that?

VON NEURATH: With the establishment of the Protectorate, the Czech economy almost automatically was incorporated into the German economy. The export trade, for which Czech industries had worked to a considerable degree, was stopped for the duration of the war, that is to say, it had to trade with the Reich.

The Czech heavy industries, especially the Skoda Works and the arms industry, as direct war industries, were taken over to supplement German armaments production by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.

At the beginning I tried especially to avoid selling out of the Protectorate, which would have been hard on the population. An effective means for that purpose was the maintenance of the customs boundaries which existed between Czechoslovakia and Germany. After heated conflicts with the Berlin economic departments, I succeeded in having the customs barrier maintained up to October 1940, for another year and a half, though it had already been rescinded on 16 March 1939.

I believe I am also accused of having been responsible for the removal of raw materials and the like. In that connection I should like to say that the office of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan was the only authority which could take such measures.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to the decree which has already been submitted, the decree dated 16 March 1939, Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5. In this decree I should like to call special attention to Articles 9 and 10.

[Turning to the defendant.] You are further charged with and accused of the fact that the rate of exchange of Czech kronen to

12

25 June 46

marks was established as 10 to l, for in this way the buying out of Czechoslovakian goods was said to have been favored. Are you responsible for the establishing of this rate?

VON NEURATH: No. In the decree of 16 March 1939 dealing with the establishment of the Protectorate-a decree in the drafting of which I did not take part in any way-it was already stipulated that the rate of exchange would be determined by the Reich Government. As far as I know, the same rate was the customary one at the stock exchange and in trade before the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich as well as afterwards. An official rate had to be determined, of course, and this was done through the decree issued by the authorities in Berlin.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In connection with the decree dated 16 March 1939, which was just mentioned and which is to be found under Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book Number 5, I should like to call your attention especially to Article 10 which sets forth: "The ratio of the two currencies, the Czechoslovakian and the German, to each other will be determined by the Reich Government."

[Turning to the defendant.] The Czech report further accuses you of the fact that railroad rails allegedly were removed and taken to Germany. Do you know anything about this matter?

VON NEURATH: I know nothing about this matter and I think this is certainly an error. I know only that in the year 1940 there were negotiations between the German Reich railroads and the Czech State railroads concerning the borrowing of railroad cars and of engines against remuneration. But the stipulation in this case was that this rolling stock could be spared by the transport system in the Protectorate. Aside from that, the railroads in the Protectorate were not under my supervision; but they were directly subordinate to the Transportation Ministry in Berlin.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to Article 8 of the decree which I have just mentioned, a decree which is found under Number Neurath-144 of my Document Book 5.

[Turning to the defendant.] It is further asserted that the Reich Commissioner at the Prague National Bank stopped all payments for abroad and confiscated all the stocks of gold and of foreign currencies of the National Bank.

Did you have anything to do with this matter?

VON NEURATH: I had nothing at all to do with these matters. The Reich Commissioner for the Prague National Bank was appointed directly by the Reichsbank in Berlin, or rather by the Ministry of Finance; and he got his orders from them.

13

25 June 46

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report states further that you are to be blamed, or are to be made coresponsible, for the alleged confiscation of the Czech banks and industrial undertakings by the German economy.

VON NEURATH: The German banks, and to an extent the German industries as well, had a real interest in getting a firm foothold in the economic life of the Protectorate. However, this was something which applied long before the establishment of the Protectorate. Therefore it was not strange that the big German banks, in particular, used the opportunity to acquire Czech stocks and securities; and in this way the controlling interest in two Czech banks together with their industrial holdings were transferred to German hands in a manner which was economically quite correct.

I believe the Union Bank is mentioned in the Czech report, a bank which was taken over by the Deutsche Bank; and I know in this case quite coincidentally that the initiative did not originate on the German side, but rather from the Czech Union Bank itself. But neither I nor my agencies tried to foster this development in any way. Apart from that all these enterprises had Czech general directors, and in very few cases were German officials taken in. By far the largest part of all industrial enterprises remained purely Czech as before.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was the situation with regard to the alleged coercive measures which the Prosecution maintains were used against Czech agriculture? Can you tell something about this and about your attitude and the measures you took?

VON NEURATH: This chapter belongs to the whole scheme of plans by the Party and SS, relative to Germanization, which have already been mentioned. The instrument of this German settlement policy was to be the Czech Land Office (Bodenamt), which in itself was a Czech office, which was a survival of the former Czech office for agrarian reform. Himmler first of all assigned to the Land Office an SS Fuehrer as its provisional leader.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not want to know all the details about this. The Czech report apparently alleges coercion in agriculture. The defendant says that it was due, if any, to the Party and the SS; and he had nothing to do with it. What is the object of his giving us all these details about the history of agriculture in Czechoslovakia? You must realize the Tribunal...

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I should like to point out one thing only.

[Turning to the defendant.] The Land Office, which was acting in the interests of National Socialism, was restaffed by you with

14

25 June 46

new personnel after a long struggle. I considered it important to clarify this too.

Mr. President, I should like to make a general remark. I said yesterday that my examination would last another hour. But yesterday, when I left the session, I found another document book to the indictment which has forced me to deal in greater detail with individual questions here. And for this reason, a reason which I could not foresee, I will have to take additional time.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal has not taken up the question of time at the moment.

Why do you have to go into some questions of-I do not know what the word is, "Allot"-to do with agriculture? Why do you want to go into that? He, the defendant, said he had nothing to do with it.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, in a way he was connected with it, Mr. President, insofar as these agricultural efforts were made through the Land Office.

THE PRESIDENT: If he was connected with it let him explain it. I thought he said the Party and the SS did it.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but via the Land Office, and he prevented this. Perhaps you can tell us briefly about this, Herr Von Neurath.

VON NEURATH: I believe that according to the statements of the President of the Court, that is hardly necessary. As a matter of fact, I had no direct connection with the Land Office. I only succeeded in having a rather unpleasant leader of this office, a member of the SS, removed.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: During your period of office as Reich Protector, was there any compulsory transportation of workers to the Reich?

VON NEURATH: No. In this connection I shall also be brief.

Compulsory labor did not exist at all while I was in the Protectorate. There was an emergency service law which was issued by the Protectorate Government and applied to younger men who were employed in urgently needed work in the public interest in the Protectorate. Compulsory deportations of workers to the Reich did not occur in my time. On the contrary, many young people reported voluntarily for work in Germany, because labor conditions and wages were better in the Reich than in the Protectorate at that time.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: How did your resignation from office-and this is my last question-your leaving your office as Reich Protector come about?

15

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: First of all I should like to tell you why I remained as long as I did, in spite of all these occurrences and difficulties. The reason for it was that I was convinced, and I am still convinced today, that I had to stay as long as I could reconcile this with my conscience, in order to prevent this country, which was entrusted to Germany, from coming under the definite domination of the SS. Everything that happened to the country after my departure in 1941 I had actually prevented through my presence; and even if my work was ever so much limited, I believe that by remaining I not only rendered a service to my own country but to the Czech people as well, and under the same circumstances I would not act differently even today.

Apart from this I believed' that in time of war, especially, I should leave such a difficult and responsible office only in case of the utmost necessity. The crew of a ship does not go below deck and fold their hands in their laps if the ship is in danger.

That I could not comply with the wishes of the Czechs 100 percent is something that will be understood by everybody who had to deal with politics in a practical and not merely theoretical way. And so I believe that by my persevering in of lice I prevented much' of the misery which befell the Czech people after I left. This opinion vitas also shared by a large number of the Czech population, as I could gather from the numerous letters which were addressed to me by the Czech people later on.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And how did it happen that you left, that you resigned from your office?

VON NEURATH: On 23 September 1941 I received a telephone call from Hitler asking me to come to headquarters immediately. There he told me that I was being too mild with the Czechs and that this state of affairs could not be continued. He told me that he had decided to adopt severe measures against the Czech resistance movement and that for this purpose the notorious Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich would be sent to Prague. I did everything in my power to dissuade him from this but was not successful. Thereupon I asked permission to resign, since I could never be responsible for any activity of Heydrich's in Prague. Hitler refused my resignation but permitted me to go on leave. I flew back to Prague and on the following day I continued my journey home. At the same hour that I left Prague, Heydrich arrived.

Then I wrote to Hitler from my home and again asked to resign immediately. When in spite of a reminder I did not receive any answer I repeated my request, and at the same time I explained that under no circumstances would I return to Prague, that I had dissolved my office and I refused to act as Reich Protector from now on. I was not officially relieved from my office until October 1943.

16

25 June 46

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to conclude my examination of the defendant with a brief quotation from the Czech indictment.

THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, was your going on leave made public?

VON NEURATH: Yes. '

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I was just going to quote that, Mr. President. In that text of the Czech indictment it says:

"When at last in the second half of September the underground Czech revolt committees, with the help of the BBC, began a successful boycott campaign against the German controlled press, the German authorities seized the opportunity to aim a heavy blow at the Czech population. On 27 September 1941 radio station Prague gave out the following report:

"'Reich Minister Baron von Neurath, Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, has found it necessary to ask the Fuehrer for a long leave in order to restore his impaired health."'

Then in conclusion it says:

"Under these circumstances the Fuehrer agreed to the request of the Reich Protector and charged SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich with the direction of the office of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia during the time of the illness of Reich Minister Von Neurath."

With this my examination is ended, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: From September 1941 until October 1943, did you live on your own estates, or what?

VON NEURATH: Yes, Mr. President

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: My examination is over.

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' counsel wish to ask the witness any questions?

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Is it known to you that immediately before Germany left the League of Nations, Von Papen followed Hitler to Munich to persuade him to remain in the League of Nations?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is known to me. In fact, I myself induced him to do so.

17

25 June 46

DR. KUBUSCHOK: During the time he was Vice Chancellor in 1933 and 1934, did Von Papen protest in the Cabinet against unfriendly acts of the German policy toward Austria, as for instance, the introduction of the 1,000-mark embargo?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that line was continuously followed by him and by other ministers and naturally by myself, too.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler mention to you that this attitude of Papen's in the Austrian problem induced him to transfer the mission in Vienna to Papen after the murder of Dollfuss?

VON NEURATH: Yes, Hitler did speak about that.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Hitler discuss with you the reasons why he addressed the letter of 26 July 1934 to Papen, announcing that Papen would be sent to Austria?

VON NEURATH: Yes, but the way it happened was as follows: When Hitler told me about his intention to send Papen to Vienna, reminded him that, in order to give the latter any weight, he should first of all, after the events of 30 June, clear up the relationship between himself, Hitler, and Papen, and clear it up publicly. This letter which was read here in Court can be traced to that.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In 1937 you paid a visit to the Austrian Government which led to demonstrations. Were you and Von Papen surprised by these demonstrations, and did you agree with them?

VON NEURATH: The demonstrations were a complete surprise to me, especially because of their tremendous size. They certainly did not please me, because they cast a certain shadow on the discussions between Herr Von Schuschnigg and myself.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, the last question: Before Schleicher's Government was formed there was a meeting of the Cabinet on 2 December 1932. The day before Papen had been given orders by Hindenburg to send the Parliament on leave and to form a new government. Is it correct that Papen reported on this matter to the Cabinet and that Schleicher, as Reichswehrminister, made a statement to the effect that this would lead to civil war and that the forces of the Wehrmacht were too weak to cope with such a civil war?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I remember this occurrence very accurately. We were all somewhat surprised at Schleicher's statement. However it was so well founded that we had to accept it as true.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants' counsel wish to ask any questions?

[There was no response.]

The Prosecution?

18

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): At the time about which Dr. Kubuschok has just been asking you, in the second half of 1932, did you know that President Von Hindenburg, the Defendant Von Papen, and General Von Schleicher were discussing and considering very hard what would be the best method of dealing with the Nazi Party?

VON NEURATH: No. As I have already testified, I had no connection in that respect. I knew absolutely nothing about all these negotiations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to make it clear, I am not suggesting you were in the negotiations. But didn't you know that the problem as to how to deal with the Nazi Party was exercising the minds of the President and the Defendant Von Papen and General Von Schleicher; that it was a very urgent problem in their minds?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And again, do not think, Defendant, I am suggesting that you were in the negotiations. You may take it-well, I will make all the suggestions perfectly clear.

You knew that in the end the method which commended itself to President Von Hindenburg, to the Defendant Von Papen, and to General Von Schleicher was that there should be a government with Hitler as Chancellor, but well brigaded by conservative elements, in harness with conservative elements; that was the plan that was ultimately resolved on? You knew that much, I suppose, didn't you?

VON NEURATH: Yes, but the plan was not quite like that. At that time, the time you are talking about, there was only mention of the fact that we were obliged to bring the Nazi Party into the Government.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But eventually, when the Nazi Party came in, on 30 January 1933, the plan was that it would be well harnessed to conservative elements. That was the idea in President Von Hindenburg's mind, was it not?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you were one of the conservative and stable elements, if I understand you rightly; isn't that so?

VON NEURATH: Yes. It has been explained here that it was the special wish of President Von Hindenburg that I should remain in the Government.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In order to keep Hitler's Government peace-loving and respectable. Is that a fair way of putting it?

19

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: Yes, so as to prevent Hitler's revolutionary movement in general from exercising their methods too much within the Government, too.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, Defendant, you have told us that up to this time you had been a diplomatist. When you became a Minister, did you not think that you had some responsibility for keeping the Government respectable and peace-loving as a Minister of the Reich?

VON NEURATH: To be sure, but the question was only how far it was in my power to accomplish this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't want to go into the workings of your mind too much, I just want to get this clear. You realized that as a Foreign Minister, and as a well-known figure to all

the Chancelleries of Europe, that your presence in the Government would be taken throughout Europe as a sign of your approval and your responsibility for what the Government did, did you not?

VON NEURATH: I doubt that very much. Perhaps one might have hoped so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let's consider it. Is it your case that up to November of 1937 you were perfectly satisfied with the peace-loving intentions and respectability of the Government?

VON NEURATH: I was convinced of the peaceful intentions of the Government. I have already stated that. Whether I was satisfied with the methods...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What about respectability? By ' respectability" I mean the general standard of decency that is required by any government, under which its people are going to be reasonably happy and contented. Were you satisfied with that?

VON NEURATH: I was by no means in agreement with the methods, above all in connection with the domestic policy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to look at that for a moment. Did you know about the "Brown Terror" in March of 1933, some 6 weeks after the Government was formed?

VON NEURATH: I only knew of the boycott against the Jews, nothing else.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the affidavit that has been put in evidence here, made by the American Consul, Mr. Geist, Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420?

VON NEURATH: May I see it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let me remind you. It is a long affidavit, and there are only one or two parts I want to put to you.

20

25 June 46

Mr. Geist gives detailed particulars of the bad treatment, the beating, and assaulting, and insulting, and so on, of Jews as early as March 1933. Did you know about that?

VON NEURATH: I know of these occurrences; I do not know this affidavit, I have not seen it, but I do know about the occurrences from complaints made by foreign diplomatic representatives. And according to them-and as concerns my attitude to these events-I repeatedly applied to Hitler and urgently implored him to have them stopped. But I do not know anything more about the details.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just leaving that affidavit for 1 he moment, as Foreign Minister, you would receive-you did receive, did you not, a synopsis or account of what was appearing in the foreign press?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that I did but whether I received all of those things I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me take an example. You had been Ambassador at the Court of St. James from 1930 to 1932, if my recollection is right; had you not?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you realized-whether you agreed with what was in them or not-the London Times and the Manchester Guardian were newspapers that had a great deal of influence in England, didn't you?

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that in April 1933 both these newspapers were full of the most terrible stories of the ill-treatment of Jews, Social Democrats, and Communists in Germany?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite possible. I cannot remember it any more now; but those were certainly the very cases which I brought up before Hitler, drawing his attention to the effect that this was having abroad.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I just want to consider the extent which these papers were alleging. As early as the 12th of April 1933 the Manchester Guardian was saying:

"The inquirer, by digging only an inch below the surface, which to the casual observer may seem tranquil enough, will, in city after city, village after village, discover such an abundance of barbarism committed by the Brown Shirts that modern analogies fail..."-describing them as an instrument-'. . . of a Terror that although wanton is systematic- wanton in the sense that unlike a revolutionary Terror it is

21

25 June 46

imposed by no outward necessity, and systematic in the sense that it is an organic part of the Hitlerite regime."

Did you know that this and quotations like these were appearing in responsible British papers?

My Lord, that is D-911, which is the collection of extracts and with Mr. Wurm's affidavit, will be Exhibit GB-512.

· [Turning to the defendant.] Did you know that was the line the was being taken, that it was systematic in the sense of being an organic part of the Hitler regime?

VON NEURATH: No, in that sense certainly not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you know that the British paper, the Manchester Guardian, was quoting, " . . . an eminent German conservative, who is in close touch with the Nationalist members of the German Government, and certainly more sympathetic to the Right than to the Left..." has given the number of victims as 20,000-as many as 20,000 in April? Did you know that the figure was being put that high?

VON NEURATH No, and I do not believe it, either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us see what the German press was saying.

On the 24th of April 1933 the Times was quoting the Hamburger Fremdenblatt which, in turn, was invoking official sources and stating that there were 18,000 Communists in prison in the Reich and that the 10,000 prisoners in Prussia included many social intellectuals and others.

Would the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, which had a very long career as a newspaper, if it misquoted official sources under your Government in April 1933 I have misrepresented the position? It would not, would it?

VON NEURATH: That I do not know, but I do know that a lot of trouble is always being stirred up by means of figures.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But Defendant, Nemesis a figure quoted, as far as I know, by a responsible Hamburg paper, as an official figure, requoted by the London Times, which is the principal paper in England. Wasn't that sufficiently serious for you to bring it up in the Cabinet?

VON NEURATH: I am very sorry, but with all respect to the papers-and even the London papers-they do not always tell the truth.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No. That is a perfectly reasonable comment. Newspapers, like everyone else, are misinformed. But when you had a widespread account of terrible conditions giving large numbers, did you not, as one of the respectable elements

22

25 June 46

in this Government, think that it was worthy of bringing it up in Cabinet and finding out whether it was true or not?

VON NEURATH: How do you know that I did not do that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I am asking. Did you bring it up, and what was the result when you did?

VON NEURATH: I have already told you before that I always remonstrated about these incidents, with Hitler-not in the Cabinet, but with Hitler.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I asked you. You see, Defendant, what I asked you was why you did not bring it up in the Cabinet. Here was a Cabinet established with conservative elements to keep it respectable. Why did you not bring it up in the Cabinet and try and get the support of Herr Von Papen, Herr Hugenberg, and all the other conservative gentlemen in the Cabinet of whom we have heard? Why did you not bring it up?

VON NEURATH: For the very simple reason that it seemed to be more effective to tell Hitler directly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In April 1933, some 2 months after it was formed, are you telling the Tribunal that you did not think it was worth while to bring a matter up in the Reich Cabinet? Within 2 months of Hitler coming into power, it had become so "Fuehrer-principled" that you could not bring it up in the Cabinet?

VON NEURATH: I repeat-and after all I alone should be the one to judge-that I considered direct representations made to Hitler more effective.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, I just want-I do not suppose you were interested, but did you know about the putting into concentration camps of any of the gentlemen that I mentioned to the Defendant Von Papen: Herr Von Ossietzski or Herr Muhsam or Dr. Hermann Dunker, or any of the other leftwing writers and lawyers and politicians? Did you know that they had gone to a concentration camp from which they never returned?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know at all?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, you knew-as your documents have shown-when you went to London in June, you knew very well how, at any rate, foreign opinion had crystallized against Germany because of the treatment of the Jews and the opposition parties, did you not, when you went to the world economic conference in June?

23

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: Yes. That was mentioned by me in a report that was read in Court.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now you say that your reaction was to go to Hitler and protest. I just want to look at what the existing documents show that you did. Now, let us take April, first of all. Would you look at Document D-794?

[The document was handed to the defendant.]

My Lord, it is Document Book 12a, Page 8. It will be Exhibit GB-513.

Now, this is a letter from you to Hitler dated the 2d of April 1933:

"The Italian Ambassador telephoned me last night and informed me that Mussolini had declared himself prepared to deny, through the Italian delegations abroad, all news about the persecution of the Jews in Germany that had been distorted by propaganda, if we should consider this course useful. I thanked Herr Cerruti, also on your behalf, and told him that we would be glad to accept his offer.

"I regard this friendly gesture of Mussolini's as important enough to bring it to your notice."

What did you think had been distorted by propaganda?

VON NEURATH: Yes, please read this part. Here it says, "the news had been distorted by propaganda." That is what it is about.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I was so interested in, Defendant. What did you think had been distorted, and how much knowledge had you, so that you could decide whether the news had been distorted or not?

VON NEURATH: That I really cannot tell you any more today.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew that Jews had been beaten, killed, taken away from their families, and put into concentration camps and that their property had been destroyed and was beginning to be sold under value. You knew that all these things were happening, did you not?

VON NEURATH: No, certainly not at that time. That they were beaten, yes, that I had heard; but at the time no Jews were murdered or perhaps only once in one individual case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, so you see that the Times and Manchester Guardian of that date gave the most circumstantial examples of typical murders of Jews? You must have seen that; you must have seen that the foreign press was saying it. Why did you think that it was distorted? What inquiry did you make to discover whether it was distorted?

24

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: Who-who-who-who gave me information about-about-about-murders?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am putting it to you that it was in the foreign press. I have given you the two examples from the press of my own country; and' obviously from what Signor Mussolini was saying, it was in the press of other countries. You must have known what they were saying. What inquiries did you make to find out whether it was true or not?

VON NEURATH: I used the only way possible for me, namely through the police authorities concerned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask Himmler, or did you ask the Defendant Goering?

VON NEURATH: Most certainly not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What? You asked Himmler? Or did you ask the Defendant Goering? Why not? Why not? He was the head, inventing the Gestapo and the concentration camps at that time. He would have been a very good man to ask, would he not?

VON NEURATH: The man who could have given me information was the chief, the supreme head of the Police, and it was in no way personally...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you ask the Defendant Frick?

VON NEURATH: In any case, I did not ask him personally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now...

VON NEURATH: Certainly not personally.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May I suggest to you that I do not went to take up time? Why did you not take the trouble to ask Goering or Frick or anyone who could have given you, as I suggest, proper information?

Would you look at Document 3893-PS?

[The document was handed to the defendant.]

The Tribunal will find it at Page 128 of Document Book 12a. My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-514.

This is the Volkischer Beobachter, quoting you on the 17th of September 1933, on the Jewish question:

"The Minister had no doubt that the stupid talk abroad about purely internal German affairs, as for example the Jewish problem, will quickly be silenced if one realizes that the necessary cleaning up of public life must temporarily entail individual cases of personal hardship but that nevertheless it served only to establish all the more firmly the authority of justice and law in Germany."

25

25 June 46

Was that your view in September 1933, of the action against the Jews and against the left-wing sympathizers up to that time, that it was a 'necessary cleaning up of public life," which would, of course, temporarily involve "individual cases" of hardship, and that was necessary "more firmly" to establish "the authority of justice and law in Germany"? Was that your view?

VON NEURATH: I told you during-during-during my-I think it was the day before yesterday in answer to the question of what my attitude was toward the Jewish problem, that in view of the inundation and domination of public life in Germany by Jews which occurred after the last war, I thought it absolutely right to have these things either eliminated or restricted. That is what I am referring to here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that it is right-I mean, you are not running away from what you said on the 17th of September 1933 - -that you thought the treatment of the Jews in 1933 a "necessary cleaning up of public life" in Germany? Are we to take it that your view then is your view now, and you do not deviate from it at all? Is that right?

VON NEURATH: That is still my view today, do you not see, only it should have been carried out by different methods.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right. Well, we will not go into discussions of it.

Am I to take it that you knew and approved of the break-down of political opposition?

VON NEURATH: No, that is...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, let us take it by stages. Did you believe in the prescribing, the making illegal of the Communist Party?

VON NEURATH: In those days, most certainly, because you have heard, have you not, that we were facing civil war.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very well. You agreed with that. Did you agree with the breaking down and making illegal of the trade unions?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did you do to protest against the breaking down of the trade unions?

VON NEURATH: That was in a sphere-this sphere did not concern me at all. I was Foreign Minister and not Minister of the Interior.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, again, I am not going to argue with you. You thought it was perfectly right as

26

25 June 46

Foreign Minister to remain and give your support and authority to a government. which was doing something of which you disapproved, like breaking down the trade union movement. Is that how we are to take it?

VON NEURATH: Yes. Did you ever hear that a minister. . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now what about...

VON NEURATH: I would like to say, did you ever hear that every cabinet minister must leave the cabinet if he does not agree with one particular thing?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Every cabinet minister for whom I have any respect left a cabinet if it did something of which he morally disapproved, and I understood from you that you morally disapproved of the breaking down of the trade union movement. If I am wrong, correct it. If you did not disapprove, say so.

VON NEURATH: I did not think that it was immoral. It was a political measure, but not an immoral one.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then let us take Number 3, take the Social Democratic Party, that was a party which had taken a great share in the Government of Germany and of Prussia for the years since the war. Did you think it right, morally right, to make that party illegal and unable to take any further share in the carrying on of the country?

VON NEURATH: No, certainly not. But I do not at all know . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Let us get it clear. Did you think it right or not?

VON NEURATH: I just told you "No" but I do not at all know whether you...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What did, you do to protest against that? What did you do to protest against the Dissolution of the Social Democratic Party?

VON NEURATH: The most I could do against this dissolution was to state my objections.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To whom did you state your objection against the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party?

VON NEURATH: To Hitler, again and again.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Again and again you didn't raise the dissolution of the parties, the opposition parties? You never raised that in the Cabinet; that is right, isn't it?

VON NEURATH: I cannot remember whether this question was discussed in the Cabinet; I do not know any more.

27

25 June 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. All right. Let us just pass to another aspect and still on 1933. I just want you to have in mind what was happening in 1933. Did you know that after you had announced that Germany was leaving the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, that orders for military preparations to deal with the possibility of war, as consequent on that action had been got out?

VON NEURATH: No. In 1932-1933 I knew nothing about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In 1933, yes, it started-in Document C-140, Exhibit USA-51-on the 25th of October 1933. Now, Defendant, you were Foreign Minister. Are you telling the Tribunal that neither had Hitler nor Marshal Von Blomberg-I think he was Reichswehrminister-that none of them told you, as a result of this action, "we shall have to have the preparations ready in case sanctions, including military sanctions, are imposed on Germany." Did none of them tell you that that was to be the result of your move in foreign policy?

VON NEURATH: No, nor was there any action to be feared,.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now it is rather- you will agree with me-it is rather odd not to inform the Foreign Minister of the possible consequences of his policy in the military preparations you are taking to deal with it; it is rather odd, isn't it in any system of government, of totalitarian, democratic, or anything you like, it is rather odd not to tell the Foreign Minister what you are doing in the way of military preparations, to deal with his policy, isn't it? '

VON NEURATH: I certainly had to decide on the opinion as to whether any danger threatened from our withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, that is, I had to decide whether this might have any probable consequences. The military had their own opinion, and presumably-but I do not know, anyhow, I was not informed; but there were certain discussions amongst the General Staff, I assume.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I just want to sum up for 1933 and I want to do that quickly. May I take it, that up to the end of 1933, despite these matters which I have put to you, that you were perfectly satisfied with the respectability and peaceloving intentions of the Government; is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Well, now, just let us turn to 1934. You remember your conversation with Mr. Dodd, the American Ambassador,- which you mentioned in your Document Book Number 1, at Page 54. It was on the 28th of May 1934; and Mr. Dodd

28

25 June 46

had told you, apparently, what he had said to Hitler about the way Americans are trying to control profiteering by great financial interests. He said he was glad that-then he says that you said that you were glad that he had informed Hitler and then Mr. Dodd added "that the Chancellor had not agreed with me." Then he says:

"don Neurath Divas silent for a moment after my remarks. It was plain that he was entirely of my way of thinking. He begged me to say to Washington that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the German Government purpose, but he did not commit himself on Hitler."

What did you mean by that, ". . . that the outbreak against Jews was entirely contrary to German Government purpose..."?

VON NEURATH: By that I wanted to say that the members of the Cabinet, the majority of them, were against these methods. Apart from that, I can add that I had just asked Mr. Dodd to go and see Hitler personally so as to give backing to the suggestions I was making to Hitler. I took him there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you know, in May 1934, that the German Government was going in for systematic and virulent anti-Semitism, didn't you know that?

VON NEURATH: Anti-Semitic propaganda, I knew mainly from Herr Goebbels' speeches.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; well, let us pass to something a little more concrete. Had you any reason for disliking General Von Schleicher or General Von Bredow?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What Divas the effect on your mind of these two gentlemen and Frau Von Schleicher being killed in the blood purge of the 30th of June 1934?

VON NEURATH: I hardly need to answer that. Of course, I was repulsed by it, that is clear; but then I told you the other day that unfortunately in the case of such a revolt, innocent people always have to suffer as well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. But just let us get it clear. You told the Tribunal the other day that you thought-and had some reason for thinking-that there was a movement in the SA, that is, a movement led by Rohm and Ernst' and I suppose people that you would-consider undesirable, of that sort. What reason had you to suppose that General Von Schleicher and General Von Bredow had been in a conspiracy, if any?

VON NEURATH: I had no reason at all, and I do not believe today that they were plotting.

29

25 June 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you hear about the unfortunate way in which Herr Von Papen kept on losing secretaries at the same time? You remember, you know.

VON NEURATH: Exactly the same.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Herr Von Bose and Jung were killed, Von Tschirschky was arrested, and two other gentlemen were also arrested? Did you hear about that?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I did, through Herr Von Papen.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you regard the blood purge of the 30th of June as just another element in the necessary cleaning up of public life?

VON NEURATH: To the extent that it was carried out with all the outrages and murders of innocent people, most certainly not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you go on in a government that was using murder as an instrument of political action?

VON NEURATH: I have already told you twice that in the case of such revolutions such mishaps cannot be avoided, most unfortunately.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now, let us take just another of your 1934 experiences. You knew about the terroristic acts that were going on in Austria in May and June of 1934, did you not? And by "terroristic acts?'-don't let us have any doubt about it-what I mean is causing explosions in Austrian public utilities and railways and things like that. I mean dynamite. I don't mean anything vague. You knew that such acts were going on in Austria in May and June 1934, did you not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I heard about it, and I always opposed that sort of thing because I knew that it was done by Nazis; and let me say once more, mostly by Austrian Nazis.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What position did Herr Kopke have in your Ministry on the 31st of May 1934?

VON NEURATH: He was the Ministerial Director.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Ministerial Director: Quite a responsible position, was it not?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Herr Kopke reporting to you on the 31st of May 1934, on a visit of Baron von Wachter?

VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just think; you know. Baron von Wachter was one of the leaders of the Putsch against

30

25 June 46

Dollfuss 6 weeks later on the 25th of July. Don't you remember Herr Kopke making a report to you and you passing it on to Hitler? VON NEURATH: No, I cannot remember that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let's refresh your memory if you don't remember it. Would you look at Document D-868? It will become Exhibit GB-515. Just look at it. I will read it over, but just look at the signatories carefully; and if you will be good enough to look at the top, I think you will find on the original, there are your own initials; and on the left hand side there is a note: "The Reich Chancellor has been informed 6/6." That is on the 6th of June. That is initialed "L" by Lammers-Dr. Lammers. Then there is a note below that: "From the Reich Chancellor on 6th June," also initialed by Lammers I think. And on the other side you will see there is 'a note which is certainly initialed "rammers." "Habicht is coming today...L 6/6." And this memorandum comes back from the Reich Chancellor to the Foreign Office on the same day. Now just let's see what report you were getting from Austria and passing on to Hitler. We will omit, unless you want it particularly, a description of Baron von Wachter's fresh, youthful appearance in Paragraph 1; but it goes on to say:

"His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite. Herr Von Wachter drew up for me, too, a picture of the situation in Austria which was, in some of its colors, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Regardless of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr Von Wachter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite. Thus the great terrorist action, as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up, was by no means committed by Marxists but by the Austrian SA and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or its preparation. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater."

31

25 June 46

Then he says that the main seat of unrest is Carinthia, and where conditions were worst. And then he says:

"Herr Von Wachter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, that is, by means of the centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could; of course, be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Wachter, was in complete agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today."

Now just let's pause there for a moment. Herr Habicht was appointed about that time press attaché at the German Embassy in Vienna. The appointment of Herr Habicht as press attaché would be done either by you or with your approval, would it not? It was under your department?

VON NEURATH: Right now I no longer know if Herr Habicht- Herr Habicht was the National Socialist leader (Landesleiter) for

· Austria in Munich and whether or not he went to Vienna as press attaché I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you can take it that he went to Vienna as press attaché at this time, at the end of May 1934; and what I am asking you is, was it not either at your order or with your approval that he was given a post which gave him diplomatic immunity in the middle of his plottings?

VON NEURATH: If Herr Habicht was really there, this happened neither with my knowledge nor with my approval; but presumably it was arranged by the Ministry of Propaganda to whom these press men were subordinated.

SIR, DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you will agree with me, Defendant, that this is not a very pleasant document; it does not describe a very pleasant state of affairs. Let me remind you, this came from your Ministerial Director to you and went on to the Fuehrer and came back from Dr. Lammers with a note: "Habicht is coming today." Surely as...

VON NEURATH: To the Fuehrer?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, yes.

VON NEURATH: Besides, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to point out to you that here only the Austrian National Socialists are being discussed. With them I had nothing at all to do.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am pointing out to you is that the document, this Foreign Office document goes to the

32

25 June 46

Reich Chancellery; it comes back on the 6th of June with a note from Dr. Lammers saying, "Habicht is coming today." You must have known all about Habicht on the 6th of June. It is mentioned in this report.

VON NEURATH: Not at all. I have this note from Lammers which means that Habicht was coming to see the Reich Chancellor. And this report from my Ministerial Director I immediately passed on to the Reich Chancellor to show him what the conditions were in Austria. That was the reason.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you remember Herr Von Papen giving evidence a few days ago; and when I asked him who were the leading Reich German personalities who influenced the Putsch in Austria in July 1934, he thought for a long time and the only leading Reich German personality that he could remember as influencing the Putsch was this very Herr Habicht?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well then, what I am putting to you is-and pausing there to get it-that you knew very well, on the 6th of June 1934, that Herr Habicht, this leading Reich personality according to the Defendant Von Papen, was organizing revolution in Austria, didn't you?

VON NEURATH: Whatever makes you suppose a thing like that? Herr Habicht never came to see me. He went to see the Reich Chancellor.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You saw this report. This is a report of your Ministerial Director. I have just read what Von Wachter thought.

VON NEURATH: There is not one word about Herr Habicht in it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I just read that to you. May I remind you:

"The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Wachter, was in complete agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters."

In other words, what Wachter is putting to the Foreign Office were the views of Habicht no less than himself.

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is certainly in there. Well, all these terrorist acts and all these disturbances which are described in this document were brought to the attention of the Reich Chancellor by myself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look what the report says at the foot of the page:

"But when nothing happened in the meantime, and on the other hand the countermeasures of the Austrian Government

33

25 June 46

grew more brutal and severe from day to day, the radical elements made themselves felt once more and came forward with the statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical reasons and was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of opposition and had in view, as his own political aim, merely the weakening of Dollfuss' hateful system, though in a way which should be as unobtrusive as possible to the outside world. They are now working with this argument."

Listen to the next bit, his suggestion to you, the nearest warning of trouble which any Foreign Minister ever heard of:

"One constantly stumbles on this idea during discussions and it is secretly spreading. A change must be made soon and a uniform leadership created. Otherwise, as Herr Von Wachter concluded his impressive description, a disaster may occur any day which would have the worst possible consequences in foreign policy, not only for Austria alone, but above all for Germany herself."

And then, dramatically, in the middle of the conversation, Herr Von Wachter receives a telephone message that he had better not go back to Vienna or he will be arrested on his arrival; and within 6 weeks he had started the Putsch and Chancellor Dollfuss had been shot. Do you remember now? Did you not appreciate, at the beginning of June 1934, that there was the greatest danger of an uprising and-trouble in Austria?

VON NEURATH: Yes, quite definitely so. That is the very reason why I sent, the report to the Chancellor. I could not interfere in Austria.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps you can tell me, on the question on which the Defendant Von Papen was unable to specify, who, in your opinion, were the other prominent Reich German personalities who were behind the Dollfuss Putsch in Austria? You say you were not. Who, in your opinion, were these personalities that Herr Von Papen mentions as being behind the Dollfuss Putsch?

VON NEURATH: I know absolutely none. I know only Habicht, and him I knew only as a person against whom I protested to Hitler because of his inflammatory actions. Apart from him I did not know any Reich Germans. The others were all Austrian National Socialists who have been mentioned innumerable times during the Trial but whom I did not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not mentioning them. I am mentioning the Defendant Von Papen's prominent Reich German personalities, and I am trying very hard to find out who they were

34

25 June 46

Are you taking the same line, that the only one you can remember is the press attaché, Herr Habicht? Is that all you can help the Tribunal in this matter?

VON NEURATH: I have already said-and that will have to suffice-I do not know anyone.

SIR DAVID MAXELL-FYFE: Is it your opinion that your Minister, Dr. Rieth, knew nothing about this, despite what Mr. Messersmith says on that point? Do you think Dr. Rieth knew nothing about the Putsch?

VON NEURATH: I cannot tell you to what extent Herr Rieth was informed. You know, however, that when he acted ostentatiously later on that I recalled him right away. Apart from that, I always forbade the ministers to meddle in such matters.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You haven't any doubt in your own mind that Dr. Rieth knew all about the impending Putsch, have you?

VON NEURATH: Oh yes, I have considerable doubts that he knew all about it. I do not believe so because his whole character was not at all like that

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, at any rate, you knew on the 25th of July that the Austrian Nazis had made this Putsch and had murdered Dollfuss?

VON NEURATH: That is not exactly a secret.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I know it. A lot of these things were not secrets. What I am interested in was your knowledge-when you found out.

VON NEURATH: Afterward, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn't that give you any qualms about remaining in a government which had extended its policy of murder from at home to abroad, through the Party elements in Austria?

VON NEURATH: If I were responsible for every single murderer, for every single German murderer who was active abroad, then I would have had a lot of work to do, would I not?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew, Herr Von Neurath- and I shall remind you how in a moment-you knew that the Austrian NSDAP was in close touch with, and acting under, the orders of Hitler all the time when Hitler was head of your Government; you knew that perfectly well, didn't you?

VON NEURATH: He was the chief of the NSDAP. It is quite natural that they were collaborating with him.

35

25 June 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now there is just one other point . . .

VON NEURATH: Yes. I want to tell you another thing: I continuously remonstrated with Hitler, together with Herr Von Papen, about the fact that this Herr Habicht was doing the things he was.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will take that up in a moment. I just want to get one point of fact. Does this accord with your recollection: I have been through all the reports of the Defendant Von Papen; and apart from three personal reports, two dealing with Herr Von Tschirschky and one dealing with abuse of Hitler, which is of no political significance, we have 28 reports. Nineteen of these reports are marked as being copies to the Foreign Office. Is that in accord with your recollection, that three out of four of Herr Von Papen's reports would come to you to be seen by you?

VON NEURATH: That I cannot tell you at this late day.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are quite right, Herr Von Neurath. You wouldn't know how many went to you, but you say you saw a considerable number of Herr Von Papen's reports. I think there were 19; I am sure you can take it that they are marked-I9 are marked, "Passed the Foreign Office".

VON NEURATH: I do believe you, yes; but the question is how many were submitted to me, for I did not receive every individual report from every ambassador or minister abroad. Otherwise, I would have been drowned in paper.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite agree; but what I asked you was, did you receive these from Herr Von Papen, who was supposed to be in a rather special position dealing with a very difficult problem? Did you receive a considerable number of reports from Herr Von Papen to Hitler as passed to you?

VON NEURATH: I can tell you only that I received some reports but certainly not all. I cannot tell you more than that today.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

36

25 June 46

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to get two or three facts clear about 1935 before I put some questions to you.

On the 10th of March Germany announced the establishment of an air force and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I don't want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the Secret Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at General Thomas' comment on it.

My Lord, it is at Page 52 of Document Book 12. It is about Page 71 of the German document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Number 12a or b?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Number 12, My Lord. That is the original one; Page 52, My Lord.

"The Central Directorate of the supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that it is necessary to discuss this matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to 1933 in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the National Socialists came into power, and especially by the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization." (Document 2353-PS)

And you will remember that on the same day the Defendant Schacht had been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy.

Did you appreciate at the time, Defendant, that that law was the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization?

VON NEURATH: Yes, but only in case of a war, that is, in case of mobilization.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that the point that I am putting to you is that it had already been declared valid for carrying out war preparations. Didn't you understand that it was a big step forward for war preparations?

37

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: Not at all. It was not a big step forward' at all. It was only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In every country you have to guarantee the co-operation of the various offices in the event of an attack.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is your view. Now, at this time, up to May 1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still staffed by diplomats or Foreign Office officials of the older school and had not yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you receive any warnings from your own staff as to the happenings in Austria, or the rearmament, the declaration of the air force, and the conscription?

VON NEURATH: I was advised about happenings in Austria, as can be seen from the report which you submitted to me. The reestablishment of the Armed Forces was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of course I knew about that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but-I am sorry, probably I did not put the proper emphasis on the word. When I said warning I meant a real warning from your officials that these happenings were making Germany regarded abroad as being bloodthirsty and warmongering. Did you get any warnings from your officials?

VON NEURATH: Certainly not, for that was not the case, and if any assertions like that were being made abroad, they certainly were not true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, would you look at Document 3308-PS, the affidavit of the interpreter Paul Schmidt.

My Lord, it is Page 68 of Document Book 12a, and it is Page 65 or 66 of the German version, Paragraph 4.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, just let me read you Paragraphs 4 and 5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says:

"4. The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods, both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive

38

25 June 46

arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis."

Defendant, let's take that. In these three points, is it correct, as Herr Schmidt says, that the attempted Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Of lice?

VON NEURATH: Not only the career personnel of my office were disquieted over this but I, of course, was also disquieted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And taking the last sentence:

"This concern"-that is the disturbance by the Putsch-"over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes"-blood purge and the Putsch-"were of influence in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning..."

Is that correct, that among your staff the concern was heightened by recognizing that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and the Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the consultative pact?

VON NEURATH: No, that is a personal opinion of the interpreter Schmidt.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, with respect to you, Defendant, it is not. What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of your experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am platting to you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were concerned that these events had had their effect on the consultative pact?

VON NEURATH: Not in the least.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, at any rate. . .

VON NEURATH: I can only repeat, the two things had no connection with each other.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is he correct in his last statement that that arrangement was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis?

VON NEURATH: That I cannot say; I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Welt now, just look at the next paragraph.

"The announcement in March of the establishment of a German Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded this as a further

39

25 June 46

very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude toward the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler."

Now, just let us take that. Did-do you agree that the career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded the Franco-Soviet pact as a further very severe, very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy?

VON NEURATH: I do not know in the name of which personnel Herr Schmidt is making these statements. But I, at any event, heard nothing to the effect that my career personnel had expressed these opinions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well,- here is Herr Schmidt saying, "The career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath." That is you.

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you saying that Herr Schmidt, who after all was a career official although he was an interpreter for a great deal of the time-are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is accurate when he says that your permanent officials expressed their concern to you?

VON NEURATH: But quite decidedly. How could Herr Schmidt, who was only an insignificant civil servant at that time, know what my career personnel told me and in addition, how could Schmidt judge this? And I should also like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that this affidavit, or whatever it may be, was submitted to him after a serious illness and that he personally knew absolutely nothing more about the contents. That now . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You may rest assured, the Tribunal will correct me if I am wrong, that I put these paragraphs to Herr Schmidt and he agreed with them when he was giving evidence before this Tribunal.

But now just look at one other statement at the end of Paragraph 6. Well, we'll just-we will read Paragraph 6, because I want to ask you about the end:

"The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed that the Franco-Soviet Pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the League Covenant. On the

40

25 June 46

same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in Mein Kampf, offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon. I personally knew about it and discussed it approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in Government circles consulted by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France. Neurath's position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath than in the general run of 'old school' diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold in disrespect."

Well, now, if this minor official, of whom you just talked, knew about and discussed the march into the Rhineland some 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred, how much before it occurred had you discussed it?

VOW NEURATH: Herr Schmidt must have been clairvoyant, for 2 or 3 weeks in advance even I did not know anything about it. I heard of it about 1 week before Hitler's decision, and if I-if it says here that I-that it was generally known in the Foreign Ministry that I was the only one in the Government circles consulted by Hitler who was confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France, it certainly turned out that I was right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were right-but is it true that you were the only person in Government circles who thought that it could be occupied without interference by Britain and France? Is that true?

VON NEURATH: I am not in a position to say whether I was the only one, but at any rate, I was convinced of this on the basis of my knowledge of international conditions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so that at any rate, whatever the limitations of Paul Schmidt, he knew what your position was quite accurately. Was he not right about it in the last sentence, that your position throughout the period was one which would make Hitler look to you rather than to the rest, the other figures of pro-Nazi diplomacy and foreign affairs, because you were the person who was encouraging him? Is that not the position?

41

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: I did not encourage him in any way, but I described the situation to him as I saw it, and it was later proved that I had been right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I just want you to deal with one other point, which is really 1936, but we will deal with it as I have been dealing with Austria.

You have said once or twice that you objected very strongly to the description of the Austrian treaty, the treaty between the Reich and Austria of the 11th of July as being a subterfuge or a facade. That is right; is it not? You objected very strongly to that view?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Hitler had given instructions to the Gauleiter of the Austrian NSDAP to carry on the struggle at the same time as the treaty was signed?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not know anything about that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me remind you. I do not want to put anything that seems unfair.

My Lord, it is Document Book 12, Page 97.

[Turning to the defendant.] This is the report of Dr. Rainer, whom the Tribunal has had the advantage of seeing, and if you will look at the end of one paragraph he says:

"The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons."-That is Defendant Seyss Inquart and Colonel Glaise-Xorstenau-"Papen mentioned Glaise-Horstenau to the Fuehrer as being a trusted person."

Now the next paragraph:

"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the Party . . ."

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you say 97 of Document Book 12?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did, My Lord, yes. Yes, My Lord; it is the third paragraph and begins, "At that time . . ."

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE If Your Lordship please:

"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria, in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do." (Document Number 812-PS)

42

25 June 46

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was another "at that time" that we were looking at. Could you give us some other indication?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is in the middle.

THE PRESIDENT: It is on 98 in ours.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am so sorry, My Lord. The paging must be different. I beg Your Lordship's pardon.

[Continuing.] "At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austria National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor..."

Mind you, this is the man who is making this statement.

". . . successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Dr. Rainer and Globocznik visited the Fuehrer at the Obersalzberg, where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the

fight. At the same conference the Gauleiter received organizational instructions from Globocznik and Hiedler."

Did you not know-did Hitler not tell his Foreign Minister, who had just supervised the conclusion of this treaty, that he intended to give the illegal Gauleiter instructions as to how to carry on the fight? Didn't he tell you that?

VON NEURATH: No, he did not tell me that, but I do remember-I believe it was the same Dr. Rainer who appeared here as a witness-who stated that Hitler summoned him and other Gauleiter and told them that in the future they were to observe strictly the agreements of 1936. By the way, the matter that you just quoted is not mentioned at all in the document which was submitted to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, that's not mentioned. What is mentioned is the political instructions for carrying out the fights and the organizational instructions from Globocznik. At any rate, you knew nothing about that?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it is rather difficult for you to judge whether the treaty is made sincerely if you do not know the instructions that are given to the illegal Party in Austria by Hitler, is it not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, naturally.

43

25 June 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just let's deal with one or two other points. I would just like you to look at what Mr. Messersmith says at the end of 1935. You remember this statement-I will give you the reference in a moment-that:

". . . Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are 'diplomats of the old school.' They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime."

Now, can you tell us up to the date on which Mr. Messersmith wrote that-on October 10, 1935-of a single instruction of Hitler's that you had not carried out?

VON NEURATH: I did not quite understand. A single instruction . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE My Lord, I am sorry; I mislaid the reference. It is Document Book 12, Page 107. That is the reference to it.

[Turning to the defendant.] You see, Mr. Messersmith is there saying that you and the Defendant Von Papen and Von Mackensen are servile instruments of the regime. Now, I am just asking you whether you could tell us up to the date that Mr. Messersmith wrote, on 10 October 1935, any instruction of Hitler's that you had refused to carry out.

VON NEURATH: Not only one, but quite a few. I have testified as to the number of times I contradicted Hitler, and I have expressed myself about what Mr. Messersmith is assuming here again-about the importance of Mr. Messersmith's affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, I put it this way: Up to October 10, 1935, what did you tell the Tribunal was the most serious thing that Hitler had ordered you to do and you had refused to carry out? What was the most serious-the one that mattered most?

VON NEURATH: Well on the spur of the moment, that is a question that I cannot answer. How should I know what the most serious question was which I opposed? I opposed all sorts of things.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you can't remember what you think is the most serious, I shan't trouble you with it any more, but I want...

VON NEURATH: Well, you are quite welcome to submit it to me, but don't produce an allegation out of a clear sky without giving me the chance to refute it.

44

25 June 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was asking you to tell us, but I will pass on to what another American diplomat put. I would like to ask you about Mr. Bullitt's report, with which I gather you agree. My Lord, that is L-150, and it is at Page 72 of the Document Book 12.

My Lord, I hope that there is no difference, of the paging-72 of mine.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; it is 74.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it is 74. I am sorry, My Lord.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, it is the second paragraph there. After saying that he had a talk with you, he says:

"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until 'the Rhineland had been digested.' He explained that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. 'As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop . . ."'

You agree you said that? '

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes, certainly. Yesterday or the day before I testified in detail about what that was supposed to mean. Moreover, it does not make any difference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE I would like to see if you agree with the meaning I suggest. That is that as soon as you had-got your fortifications in sufficiently good order on your western frontier, you would proceed to try and secure an Anschluss with Austria and to get back the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia Isn't that what it means? '

VON NEURATH: No, no, not at all. That is quite clear in the document. What I meant by this and what I expressed was that these countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and France, would change their policy toward Germany, because they could no longer march through Germany so easily.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You appreciate, Defendant, what I am putting to you? I think I made it quite clear-that at the time that you were facing the Western Powers with the remilitarization

45

25 June 46

of Germany and the Rhineland-that is in 1935 and 1936-you were then giving assurances to Austria, which Hitler did in May 1935, and you made this treaty in 1936. As soon as you had digested your first steps, you then turned against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. I am suggesting, you see, that you were talking the exact truth and prophesying with a Cassandra-like accuracy. That is what I am suggesting-that you knew very well that these intentions were there.

VON NEURATH: What?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say you didn't?

VON NEURATH: Not at all, not at all, not at all! That is an assumption on your part, for which there is absolutely no proof.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We win not argue it further because we will come on to just one other point before we proceed to 1937.

You have told the Tribunal, not once but many times that you did not support the Nazi attitude toward the Christian churches, of oppressing the churches. That is I have understood you correctly, have I not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, and you say that you resisted and actively intervened against the repression of the Church. Would you just look at Document 3758-PS.

My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-516. My Lord, Your Lordship will find it in Document Book 12a, Page 81.

[Turning to the defendant.] This is an entry which must have been fairly early in 1936 in the diary of the Reich Minister of Justice:

"The Reich Foreign Minister transmits, with a personal note for confidential information, Q letter from Cardinal State Secretary Pacelli"-that is the present Pope-"to the German Ambassador in the Vatican, in which he urges an act of pardon for Vicar General Seelmeyer. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, remarks to this that after the heavy attacks on German justice by the Holy See in the note of 29 January, there is no reason in his opinion to show any deference to the Vatican. He recommends it, however, since for foreign policy reasons it is to our interest not to let our good personal relations with Pacelli cool off."

Now, Defendant, will you tell me anything that showed the slightest personal interest in the fate of Father Seelmeyer, or were you only concerned with showing a firm front to the Vatican and not losing your good relations with Cardinal Pacelli?

46

25 June 46

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the document has just been submitted to me; I have had no opportunity whatsoever to look this document over and inform myself about it. Likewise, I do not know of there having been any talk about a diary of the Reich Minister of Justice up to now in this Trial. Therefore, I am not in a position to judge how the Reich Minister of Justice could have made this entry in his diary at all.

Since these notes have apparently been taken out of their context, it is not possible for me to form any kind of a picture of the significance of the entry as a whole, and naturally it is even less possible for the defendant to do so.

Therefore, I must protest against the admissibility of this question and against the submission of this document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a perfectly good captured document. It is a copy of the original diary of the Reich Minister of Justice, and it is therefore admissible against the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von LUDINGHAUSEN, you can see the original document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, actually, I am just told by my American colleagues that this diary has been used before, that extracts were put in in the case against the Defendant Von Schirach.

VON NEURATH: Mr. President, I have no objection . . .

THE PRESIDENT: One moment.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I could not understand a word, Mr. President. I am sorry, I could not understand. I can hear now.

THE PRESIDENT: When you make an objection, you should see that the instrument is in order.

What I said was that you can see the original document. And I am told now that the original document has been used before, and that therefore there is nothing to prevent its being used in crossexamination. It is a captured document, and you can see the original.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I did not know that, Mr. President.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am putting to you, Defendant, is that your statement to the Minister of Justice shows no concern for the individual priest about whom the complaint had been made; it is merely concerned with your relations with the Vatican and with Cardinal Pacelli, as he then was. Is that typical of your interferences? Is this typical of your interferences for the sake of ill-treated priests?

47

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: I naturally cannot remember this case any more, but the way it stands there in the entry I was perfectly justified. According to the entry, I said that we had no reason to show any special consideration after the then Cardinal State Secretary, or Pope had attacked German justice, but that, as Foreign Minister I considered it important not to disturb our relations with Pacelli. I cannot see what conclusions you want to draw from this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I don't want to trespass on the ground of my Soviet colleagues, but you know that the Czech report accuses you, with complete impartiality as far as sect is concerned, of your Government ill-treating the Catholics, Protestants, Czech National Church, and even the Greek Church in Czechoslovakia. You know that all these churches suffered during your protectorate-do you agree that all these churches suffered under your protectorate?

VON NEURATH: No, not at al!.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, I won't go into the details, but I am suggesting to you that your care about the various religious confessions did not go very deep.

VON NEURATH: That is again an assertion on your part which you cannot prove.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would just like to put one thing. You remember telling the Tribunal this morning of the excellent terms that you were on with the archbishop of Prague?

VON NEURATH: I said that I had good relations with the archbishop.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at this copy.

My Lord, this is a copy, but General Ecer assures me that he can get the original from the Czech Government files. I received it only a half hour ago. General Ecer, who is here from Czechoslovakia, says that he can vouch for the original.

I'd like the defendant to look at it. Is that a letter which you received from the archbishop?

My Lord, it is Document D-920, and it will be Exhibit GB-517:

"Your Excellency, very esteemed Herr Protector of the Reich:

"Your last letter has filled me with such sorrow because I could not but gather from it that not even Your Excellency is prepared to believe me-that I lost consciousness and had to call university Professor Dr. Jirasek, who remained beside my sickbed for an hour-he is coming again today, together with the specialist on internal diseases...."

And then he gives his name.

48

25 June 46

"Your Excellency may be sure that I shall always do what I can to please you. But please, have mercy on me, too, and do not demand that I should act against the laws of the Church.

"Yours, et cetera, Karl Cardinal Kaspar, M. P. prince archbishop."

Do you remember that?

VON NEURATH: I cannot say what this refers to. I have no idea; there is nothing in it, and I cannot tell you what it referred to.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can't remember this occasion when the prince archbishop wrote to you and told you the

effect, the illness that he had suffered from and beseeched you not to ask him to do something against the laws of the Church? It doesn't remain in your mind at all, does it?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, we'll leave that. Well now, I want you to just tell me this, before we pass on to the later occurrences in 1937. You remember you dealt yesterday with your speech-I think it was to the German Academy of Law. You remember the speech, in August of 1937? I can give you a reference. Would you like to look at it?

VON NEURATH: I only need the reference to where I spoke.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE You remember it, I only wanted to save time. Don't you remember? I will put it to you if you like. It is the speech of the 29th of August 1937, and I will give you the reference in one moment. What I wanted to ask you was this-you said:

"The unity of the racial and national will created through Nazism with unprecedented elan has made possible a foreign policy by means of which the chains of the Versailles Treaty were broken."

What did you mean by "the unity of the racial will" produced by Nazism?

VON NEURATH: By that I probably meant that all Germans were unified more than ever before. At this date I can no longer tell you what I meant by this, either. But nevertheless I was merely establishing a fact.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now tell me. That was in August 1937. You told the Tribunal the effect that the words of Hitler, on the 5th of November 1937, had upon you, and your counsel has put in the statement by Baroness van Bitter. After these words...

49

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: In November?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, November of 1937.

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, after these words had had that effect, with whom did you discuss them among the people who had been present at the Hossbach interview?

VON NEURATH: This speech was not made at Berchtesgaden at all. That is a mistake; it was at Berlin, this address.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I didn't say Berchtesgaden; I said at the Hossbach conference. We call it the Hossbach conference because he took the minutes.

VON NEURATH: I have already told you yesterday with wham I spoke, General Von Fritsch, and with Beck, who was then Chief of the General Staff; and I also testified that we agreed at that time jointly to oppose Hitler and the tendency which he had revealed in this speech.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you speak about it to Hitler?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I testified yesterday in detail that I did not have a chance to speak with Hitler until 14 or 15 January, because he had left Berlin and I could not see him. That was the very reason why I asked for my resignation at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE Did you speak about it to Goering or Raeder?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to just tell me one word or two about this Secret Cabinet Council to which you were appointed after you left the Foreign Office.

Would you look at the first sentences of the report of that meeting on the 5th of November?

My Lord, it is Page 81 in the English Document Book 12, and Page 93 of the German document book.

It is only the first two sentences, Defendant:

"The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such importance that its detailed discussion would certainly, in other states, take place before the Cabinet in full session. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided not to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet because of its importance."

Then, if you will look at the people who were there: There is the Fuehrer; the Minister for War; the three Commanders-in-Chief; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

50

25 June 46

Now, Defendant, supposing that in February or March 1938, Hitler had wanted to discuss Austria before the same Council, the same limited number of people. Just let us see who would have taken the places of the people who were there. Instead of Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch, you would have had the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and Von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief, would you not?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I believe so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As a matter of fact, Raeder and Goering maintained their positions; the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had taken yours; and you were president of the Secret Cabinet Council. Lammers was secretary of the Cabinet, and Goebbels had become more important as Minister of Propaganda.

Well now, I would just like you to look and see who the people were that formed the Secret Cabinet Council.

Your Lordship will find that on Page 8 of Document Book 12; and it is Page 7 of the German document book.

[Turning to the defendants] Now, do you see who they are? There are the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, the Defendant Goering, the Fuehrer's Deputy, Hess, Dr. Goebbels, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, Von Brauchitsch, Raeder, and Keitel. You are saying, if I understand you, that this Secret Cabinet Council had no real existence at all. Is that your case?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why were you receiving special funds for getting diplomatic information as president of the Secret Cabinet Council?

VON NEURATH: I did not receive any. I should like to know...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, didn't you?

VON NEURATH: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us just have a look at this. Would you look at Document 3945-PS?

My Lord, it is 129 in Document Book 12a. It will be Exhibit GB-518.

If you will look at the letter of the 28th of August 1939 from Lammers to you:

"In conformity with your request, I have had the sum of 10,000 Reichsmark, which had been placed at your disposal for special expenses in connection with the obtaining of diplomatic information, handed to Amtsrat Koppen.

"I enclose the draft of a certificate showing how the money was used, with the request to send me the certificate after execution, at the latest by the end of the financial year."

51

25 June 46

And if you will turn over to the next page, 131, you will see that at the end of March, which was toward the end of the financial year, you signed a certificate saying:

"I have received 10,000 Reichsmark from the Reich Chancellery for special outlays entailed in obtaining diplomatic information."

Now, will you tell us why you were getting special expenses for obtaining diplomatic information?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I can tell you that. That is an expression used at the request of Lammers who had the treasury of the Reich Chancellery under him, so that I could meet the expenses of my office; that is, for one typist and for one secretary. And in order to justify this to-I do not know which authority, what this authority is called, to the Finance Ministry-I had no special budget- Herr Lammers asked me to use this expression. That can be seen from a certificate which is also in there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is all right. I am going to refer to the other letters. But why was it necessary that the expenses of your one secretary and one typist should not be audited? As it shows on pages...

My Lord, the pages are 134 and 135.

VON NEURATH: I just said that...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: On Page 134 you will see there is a letter from you to Lammers: "In my bureau there is a need to incur special expenses, to audit which it does not appear to me advisable."

Why wasn't it advisable to audit the expenses of your typist and secretary?

VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you that just now. But at any rate, I did not use any more money for diplomatic information; but these are merely office expenses which I figured in there. And so at the end of this letter which you have submitted to me there is...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now...

VON NEURATH: Please, let me finish my statement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly.

VON NEURATH: There is a report here to me, from my-from this secretary, in which he says-no, this is not the letter I thought it was.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you are finished, I anticipated you might say it was office expenses. Would you look at Document 3958-PS?

52

25 June 46

My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-519.

[Turning to the defendant.] I submit, that shows you your office expenses were carried on the ordinary budget, the letter of 8 April 1942 to you.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the book?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, yes; I am so sorry. It is 140. I beg Your Lordship's pardon.

[Turning to the defendant.] That is a letter to you which says:

"The Reich Minister for Finance has agreed that the budgetary needs announced by you for the financial year 1942 be shown in Special Plan 1. I therefore have no objections to having the necessary expenditure granted-even before the establishment of Special Plan I-within the limits of these amounts, namely:

"For personal administrative expenditures, up to 28,500 Reichsmark; for official administrative expenditures, up to 25,500 Reichsmark; total 54,000 Reichsmark."

That was providing for your office and personal expenditures during the same period for which you were getting these additional sums. So I am suggesting to you that if these sums of 10,000 marks which you got every now and then were not for office expenditures, I would like you to tell the Tribunal what they really were for.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I would be very pleased if I were also told about this, for I no longer know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Well, they are your letters, and you got the money. Can't you tell the Tribunal what you got it for?

VON NEURATH: No, I cannot right now. Perhaps I can tell you afterward.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Possibly it was for obtaining diplomatic information, it says-

My Lord, Dr. Von LUDINGHAUSEN makes the point that the letter I put was in 1939. Of course, there were other letters. I have not troubled the Tribunal with each one, but there is another letter in which there is a reference to a payment on the 9th of May 1941, and, of course, another reference to a payment on the 30th of June 1943. My Lord, these are Pages 133 and 134. I am sorry; I did not give the details. Perhaps I ought to have indicated that.

THE PRESIDENT: The letter on Page 137, which may have some bearing, is a letter from the man signed "K"-from the man who made the previous applications?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

53

25 June 46

Perhaps would you like to look at that, Defendant? It is Document 3945-PS, a letter of the 14th of July 1943, signed "K":

"When I went into the matter of the special funds, the competent people in the Reich Chancellery showed an entirely understanding attitude in this matter and asked for a written application from Your Excellency. When I replied that I did not wish to produce such an application before success was guaranteed, they asked for a little more time for a further exchange of views. After a few days I was told that I could Produce the application without hesitation, upon which I handed over the letter which I had previously withheld. The amount requested has been handed to me today and I have duly entered this sum in my special cashbook as a credit."

VON NEURATH: Yes, but in spite of this...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-;: Well, now does that help you? Can you tell the Tribunal what were the outlays, the special outlays for the obtaining of diplomatic information for which you received this money?

VON NEURATH: I am very sorry; I absolutely cannot-I can no longer recall this matter at all. And the remarkable part is that this letter is dated the 14th of July 1943, when I no longer had any functions whatsoever, when I had left altogether. At this moment, I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is very strange, you know. In a further letter, in Document 3958-PS, on 8 January 1943, and in succeeding letters on the 4th of March and the 20th of April, the end of your occupation of the premises of 23 Rheinbabenallee is explained there and when your expenses ceased when you went to live in the country. I was just going to ask you about that-a lithe about that house. If you will just look at the affidavit of Mr. Geist, the American consul...

My Lord, that is Document 1759-PS, Exhibit USA-420.

[Turning to the defendant.] I referred to this this morning, and the passage that I want you to tell us about is in the middle of a paragraph.

My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11 of the affidavit in the English version.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have the separate document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, it is at the foot of Page 11. The paragraph begins:

"Another instance of the same nature occurred with regard to my landlord..."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

54

25 June 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if Your Lordship goes on another 10 lines, after explaining about his landlord having to give up his house to the SS, he says:

"I know that on many occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the prospective purchaser or his agent would appear accompanied by a uniformed SA or SS man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood and knew the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner. Indeed, he was my next-door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath's house was worth approximately 250,000 dollars."

[Turning to the defendant.] Was that 23 Rheinbabenallee?

VON NEURATH: Yes, yes...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired it for you, so that the president of the nonexistent Secret Cabinet Council could have it as an official residence? Who acquired it?

VON NEURATH: I did not understand that. Who did what?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who acquired 23 Rheinbabenallee? Who got it?

VON NEURATH: I can tell you about that. In the year 1937, when Hitler was erecting the large buildings for his Reich Chancellery, he told me one day that I would have to move from my apartment, which was situated behind the Foreign Office, because he wanted the garden for his Reich Chancellery, and the house would be torn down.

He said that he had given instructions to the Reich Building Administration to find other living quarters for me. The Reich Building Administration offered me various expropriated Jewish residences. But I refused them. But now I had to look for a house myself, and my personal physician, to whom I happened to mention this matter, told me that he knew of a place in Dahlem, that was Number 23 Rheinbabenallee, where he was house physician to the owner. This owner was Lieutenant Colonel Glotz, who was the brother of a close friend of mine. I informed the Reich Building Administration about this and told them that they should get in touch with this gentleman. In the course of the negotiations, which were conducted by the Reich Building Administration, a contract of sale was drawn up for the price quoted by Mr. Geist, and the price was in marks, not in dollars. This sum, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Glotz, was paid to him in cash, and on his wish I persuaded the Finance Minister to have this money transferred to Switzerland.

55

25 June 46

I might remark that I was still Foreign Minister at the time. Afterward, I remained in this house for the simple reason that I did not find another one, and Herr Von Ribbentrop, my successor, moved into the old Presidential Palace.

Then in the year 1943 this house was destroyed. At the moment, therefore, I still cannot explain what these moneys were for and whether they were official payments made by the Reich Treasury. With the best intentions, I cannot tell you. But the statements made by Mr. Geist here are completely wrong as I have just stated. I did not buy or have this house transferred from a Jew, but from the Christian Lieutenant Colonel Glotz.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You tell us that you passed the money on to Switzerland on his account?

VON NEURATH: I? Yes. Because Herr-Herr Glotz went to Switzerland. I believe, indeed, his wife was non-Aryan.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. I would just like to put the next sentence and then I will leave this document:

"I know too that Alfred Rosenberg, who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in similar fashion."

Do you know anything of that?

VON NEURATH: I do not know how Herr Rosenberg acquired his house.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, Defendant, I want you to come now to March of 1938. Perhaps I can take this shortly if I have understood you correctly. You know that the Prosecution complained about your reply to the British Ambassador with regard to the Anschluss. As I understand you, you are not now suggesting that your reply was accurate; but you are saying that that was the best of your information at the time, is that right?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is quite correct. It is true. That was an incorrect statement but I just did not know any better; do you see?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say that you did not hear- that neither Hitler nor Goering told you a word about these ultimatums which were given first of all to Herr Von Schuschnigg and secondly to President Miklas; you were told nothing about that? Is that what you are telling?

VON NEURATH: No, at that time-at that time I knew nothing. I heard about them later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am going to leave that. I am not going into that incident in detail-we have been

56

25 June 46

over it several times-in view of the way that the defendant is not contesting the accuracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I should dike to know when he heard of the true facts.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged.

[Turning to the defendant.] When did you hear of the true facts of the Anschluss?

VON NEURATH: I heard the details for the very first time here, when this report of Legation Counsellor Hewel was submitted to me. Prior to this time I probably heard that there had been pressure exerted on Herr Schuschnigg, but nothing else. I actually learned the exact details for the first time here in Nuremberg.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I only want to get it quite clear. You say that between the 11th of March and your coming to Nuremberg, you never heard anything about the threat of marching into Austria, which had been made by the Defendant Goering, or Keppler, or General Muff on his behalf? You never heard anything about that?

VON NEURATH: No, I heard nothing of that sort.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then I do want to ask you about the assurance that you gave to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin. I would like you to look at Document TC-27 which you will find in Document Book 12, Page 123 of Document Book 12. The passage that I want to ask you about is in the sixth paragraph. After dealing with the conversation with the Defendant Goering about the Czechoslovak mobilization, it goes on:

"M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject"-that is, the Czechoslovak mobilization-"and today"-that is, the 12th of March-"spoke with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925."

Now, you have told the Tribunal-we have had the evidence of Baroness von Hitter-that the meeting on the 5th of November had this very disturbing effect on you and in fact produced a bad heart attack. One of the matters that was discussed at that meeting was attack, not only on Austria but also on Czechoslovakia, to protect the German flank. Why did you think, on the 12th of March, that Hitler would ever consider himself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty which meant that he had to refer any dispute with Czechoslovakia to the Council of the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice? Why on earth did you think

57

25 June 46

that that was even possible, that Hitler would submit a dispute with Czechoslovakia to either of-these bodies?

VON NEURATH: I can tell you that quite exactly. I already testified yesterday that Hitler had me summoned to him on the 11th for reasons that I cannot explain up to this day and told me that the march into Austria was to take place during the night. In reply to my question, or rather to my remark that that would cause great uneasiness in Czechoslovakia, he said that he had no intentions of any kind at this time against Czechoslovakia and that he was-he even hoped that relations with Czechoslovakia would be considerably improved by the invasion or occupation of Austria.

From this sentence and from his promise that nothing would happen, I concluded that matters would remain as they were and that, of course, we were still bound to this treaty of 1925. Therefore, I was able to assure M. Mastny of this with an absolutely clear conscience.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you believe a word that Hitler said on the 12th of March? Did you still believe a word that Hitler said on the 12th of March 1938?

VON NEURATH: Yes, still at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought Von Fritsch was a friend of yours; wasn't he?

VON NEURATH: Who?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Colonel General Von Fritsch; he was a friend of yours?

VON NEURATH: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not believe that he had been guilty of homosexuality did you?

VON NEURATH: No, never.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn't they-didn't you know that he had been subject in January 1938 to a framed-up charge? ;

THE PRESIDENT: Will you please answer instead of shaking your head.

VON NEURATH: Yes, I knew that, of course; and I learned of it and the fact that this charge was a fabrication of the Gestapo but not of Hitler, at least in my opinion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, didn't you know that those-these unsavory matters concerning Field Marshal Von Blomberg and Colonel General Von Fritsch had been faked up by members of the Nazi gang, who were your colleagues in the Government?

58

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: Yes. The details were unknown to me, of course.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, you remember that at the time of Munich, when you came back to the field-came back into activity for some time, President Benes did appeal to this German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention and Hitler brushed the appeal to one side. Do you remember that? In September 1938?

VON NEURATH: No; that, I do not know, for at that time I was not in office any longer and I did not get to see these matters at all. I do not know about that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you don't know; of course, it was in the German press and every other press that he appealed to this treaty and Hitler refused to look at it; but you say that you honestly believed on the 12th of March that Hitler would stand by that Arbitration Treaty; that's what you said?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I had no misgivings.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that might be a convenient moment to break off.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Defendant, you spoke yesterday with regard to the memorandum of Lieutenant General Friderici. Do you remember in that memorandum he referred to a memorandum of yours on how to deal with Czechoslovakia?

Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document 3859-PS, so that the Tribunal can see your attitude toward the Czechs from your own words.

My Lord, that is at Page 107 of Document Book 12a.

[Turning to the defendant.] I will read first your letter to Lammers of the 31st of August 1940.

My Lord, that will be Exhibit GB-520.

[Turning to the defendant.] You say:

"Dear Herr Lammers: Enclosed I send you the memorandum which I mentioned in advance in my letter of 13 July 1940 . . . about the question of the future organization of the Bohemian-Moravian country. I enclose another memorandum on the same question, which my Secretary of State K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me and which, in its train of thoughts, leads to the same result"-I ask you to note the next words-"and with which I fully agree. Please present both memoranda to the Fuehrer and arrange a date for a personal interview for myself and State Secretary Frank. As I

59

25 June 46

have heard from a private source that individual Party and other offices intend to submit proposals to the Fuehrer for separating various parts of the Protectorate under my authority, without my knowing these projects in detail, I should be grateful to you. if you would arrange the date for my interview early enough for me, as the competent Reich Protector and one who understands the Czech problem, to have an opportunity, together with my State Secretary, to place our opinions before the Fuehrer before all sorts of plans are suggested to him by other people."

Now, I would just dike to take what I hope will be the gist of your own memorandum. If you will turn it over-this is your memorandum-take the first paragraph, Section I:

"Any considerations about the future organization of Bohemia and Moravia must be based on the goal which is to be laid down for that territory from a state-political (staatspolitisch) and ethnic-political (volkspolitisch) point of view.

"From a state-political standpoint there can be but one aim: total incorporation into the Greater German Reich; from an ethnic-political standpoint to fill this territory with Germans."

And then you say that you point the path; and if you go on to Section II, in the middle of Paragraph 2, you will find a subparagraph beginning-

My Lord, it is the top of Page 109, Your Lordship's copy:

"These 7.2 million Czechs, of whom 3.4 millions live in towns and communities of under 2,000 and in the country, are led and influenced by an intelligentsia which is unduly puffed up in proportion to the size of the country. This part of the population also tried, after the alteration of the constitutional situation of this area, more or less openly to sabotage or at any rate postpone necessary measures which were intended to fit the circumstances of the country to the new state of affairs. The remainder of the population, that is small craftsmen, peasants, and workmen, adapted themselves better to the new conditions."

Then, if you go on to Paragraph 3, you say:

"But it would be a fatal mistake to conclude from this that the Government and population behaved in this correct manner because they had inwardly accepted the loss of their independent state, and incorporation into Greater Germany. The Germans continue to be looked upon as unwelcome intruders and there is a widespread longing for a return to the old state of affairs, even if the people do not express it openly.

60

25 June 46

"By and large, the population submit to the new conditions but they do so only because they either have the necessary rational insight or else because they fear the consequences of disobedience. They certainly do not do so from conviction. This will be the state of affairs for some time to come.

"But"-go on to Section III-"as things are like that, a decision will have to be taken as to what is to be done with the Czech people in order to attain the objective of incorporating the country and filling it with Germans as quickly as possible and as thoroughly as possible.

"The most radical and theoretically complete solution to the problem would be to evacuate all Czechs completely from this country and replace them by Germans."

Then you say that that is not possible because there are not sufficient Germans to fill it immediately.

Then, if you go on to Paragraph 2, to the second half, you say- My Lord, that is the last six lines of Page 110:

"It will, where the Czechs are concerned, rather be a case on the one hand of keeping those Czechs who are suitable for Germanization by individual selective breeding, while on the other hand of expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years. If we use such a procedure, Germanization can be carried out successfully." Now, Defendant, you know that in the Indictment in this Trial we are charging you and your fellow defendants, among many other things, with genocide, which we say is the extermination of racial and national groups, or, as it has been put in the well-known book of Professor Lemkin, "a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves." What you wanted to do was to get rid of the teachers and writers and singers of Czechoslovakia, whom you call the intelligentsia, the people who would hand down the history and traditions of the Czech people to other generations. These were the people that you wanted to destroy by what you say in that memorandum, were they not?

VON NEURATH: Not quite. Here there are. . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But just before you answers what did you mean by saying, in the last passage that I read to you, ". . Expelling those who are not useful from a racial standpoint or are enemies of the Reich, that is, the intelligentsia which has developed in the last 20 years"? Did you mean what you said? Were you speaking the truth when you said it was necessary to expel the intelligentsia?

61

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: To that I can answer only "yes" and "no." First of all, I should like to say that from this report it becomes apparent that the memorandum was written by Frank. I joined my name to it, and this was on 31 August 1940. The memorandum which I-the memorandum which is referred to in the Friderici report is from a-is dated later I think, although I do not know offhand.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you will find-I will give you, in a moment, the letter from Ziemke, who transmits Hitler's view, and I think you will find that it is this memorandum that Hitler is dealing with. I will show you Frank's memorandum in a moment. I am suggesting to you now, as you say to Lammers, that you enclosed your memorandum and you enclosed another memorandum, of which I will read you the essential part in a moment, which is the memorandum of Karl Hermann Frank. But this is a...

VON NEURATH: They are both by Frank.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I'll show it-no; but look at your own letter of the 31st of August: "Enclosed I send you the memorandum," and you go on: "I enclose another memorandum... which my State Secretary K. H. Frank has drawn up independently of me... with which I fully agree." I am suggesting to you, you know that this is your-this is your memorandum referred to as '~e-in the Friderici document...

My Lord, that is Page 132 of Document Book 12.

[Turning to the defendant.] ... where General Friderici says, "After ample deliberation the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum." I am suggesting to you that this is your memorandum which you sent on to Lammers for submission to the Fuehrer. Are you saying-are you really going to tell the Tribunal that this is not your memorandum?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not want to say that at all. At the moment I really do not know any longer. I did not write it, but I agreed with its contents; the letter to Lammers says so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, if you agreed with its contents, what did you mean by saying that you would have to expel the intelligentsia, except that you were going to break down the Czechs as a national entity and expel the people who would keep going that history and tradition and language? Isn't that why you wanted to expel the intelligentsia?

VON NEURATH: I never mentioned the word "destroy," but said that the intelligentsia . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I said "expel"...

62

25 June 45

VON NEURATH: I see.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: . . . which is your own word.

VON NEURATH: The class of the intelligentsia was the greatest obstacle to co-operation between Germans and Czechs. For that reason, if we wanted to achieve this co-operation, and that was still the aim of our policy, then this intelligentsia had to be reduced in some way and principally their influence had to be diminished, and that was the meaning of my explanation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, you said to achieve your policy, but by achieving your policy you meant to destroy the Czech people as a national entity with their own language, history, and traditions, and assimilate them into the Greater German Reich. That was your policy, wasn't it?

VON NEURATH: My policy was, first of all, to assimilate Czechoslovakia, as far as possible. But in the final analysis that could not have been achieved for generations. The first thing to do was to bring about co-operation so as to have peace and order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now before I put to you the memorandum of Frank with which you entirely agree, would you look at Paragraph VII of your own memorandum?

My Lord, it is Page 113 of Document Book 12a.

[Turning to the defendant.] In Section VII you say:

"If one considers the gigantic tasks facing the German nation after a victorious war, the necessity for a careful and rational utilization of Germans will be apparent to everyone. There are so many tasks that have to be tackled at once and simultaneously that a careful, well-thought-out utilization of the Germans who are suitable for carrying out these tasks is necessary.

"The Greater German Reich will have to make use of the help of foreigners on a large scale in all spheres and must confine itself to appointing Germans to the key positions and to taking over branches of public administration where the interests of the Reich make it absolutely necessary . . ."

You were, in this memorandum, blueprinting the plans for dealing with the Czechs after the war on the basis of the German victory; that is, that they should disappear as a nation and become assimilated to the German Reich. Wasn't that what was in your mind?

VON NEURATH: To make the Czechs disappear as a nation was altogether impossible. That was not possible at all. But they were to incorporate themselves more closely into the Reich, and that is what I mean by the word "assimilate."

63

25 June 46

Moreover, it is also stated in this memorandum-earlier, much earlier-that from the racial point of view-if you want to use that unpleasant expression-there was an extraordinarily large number of Germans within Czechoslovakia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just turn over and see how the-your State Secretary's memorandum with which you entirely agree-how that runs.

My Lord, Your Lordship will find the beginning of that is enclosure Number 2 on Page 115.

[Turning to the defendant.] The State Secretary states his problem. He says, in the second sentence:

"The question as to whether the Protectorate, with a Reich Protector as its head, is suitable for settling the Czech problem and should therefore be retained or whether it should now give place to some other form of government is being raised by various people and is the cause of this memorandum. It will briefly: (A) Indicate the nature of the Czech problem; (B) analyze the present way in which it is being dealt with; (C) examine the proposed alterations from the point of view of their suitability, and finally: (D) express an independent opinion on the whole question."

Well now, I would like you just to look at your State Secretary's independent opinion with which you entirely agree.

THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn't you to read the last two lines?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh yes, My Lord, I'm sorry. "On a correct decision depends the solution of the Czech problem. We thus bear the responsibility for centuries to come."

Now, My Lord, Frank's own opinion starts on Page 121 in Section D of the memorandum, and he begins by saying:

"The aim of Reich policy in Bohemia and Moravia must be the complete Germanization of area and people. In order to attain this there are two possibilities:

"I. The total evacuation of the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia to a territory outside the Reich and settling Germans in the freed territory; or

"II. If one leaves the majority of the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia the simultaneous application of a great variety of methods working toward Germanization, in accordance with an X-year plan.

"Such a Germanization provides for: 1) The changing of the nationality of racially suitable Czechs; 2) the expulsion of racially unassimilable Czechs and of the intelligentsia who

64

25 June 46

are enemies of the Reich, or 'special treatment' for these and all destructive elements; 3) the recolonizing of the territory thus freed with fresh German blood."

Now, I want you just to turn to where your State Secretary gets down to concrete suggestions as to this policy of Germanization. Remember that you entirely agree, in your letter to Lammers.

If Your Lordship will turn to Page 123, there is a heading "Youth; fundamental change in education; extermination of the Czech historical myth."

[Turning to the defendant.] That is the first point: Destroy any idea they might have of their history, beginning with the time of St. Wenceslaus, nearly a thousand years ago. That is your first point.

"Education toward the Reich idea; no getting on without perfect knowledge of the German language; first doing away with the secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools; never again any Czech universities, only transitionally the Collegium Bohemicunz at the German university in Prague; 2 years compulsory labor service.

"Large-scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the German national soil from the north to the suburbs of Prague.

"Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become merely a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to disappear completely as an official language.

"Marriage policy after previous racial examination.

"In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier Gaue must be excluded.

"Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the granting of advantages as an inducement, severest police methods, with exile and 'special treatment' for all saboteurs. Principle: 'Zuckerbrot und Peitsche."'-What is that "Zuckerbrot und Peitsche"?

"The employment of all these methods has a chance of success only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its head controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The direct subordination of the 'master in Bohemia' to the Fuehrer clarifies the political character of the office and the task, and prevents the political problem from sinking down to an administrative problem."

In other words, it was essential to this policy that you should keep your job as Reich Protector and Frank should keep his as State Secretary, and the Gauleiter of the Danube should not be able to interfere and take away Brno as the capital of his Gau.

65

25 June q6

Defendant, do you tell this High Tribunal, as you told Dr. Lammers, that you entirely agree with what I suggest to you are dreadful, callous, and unprincipled proposals? Do you agree with these proposals?

VON NEURATH: No, I do not agree in the least.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, why did you tell Lammers you did? Why, when things were going well' did you tell Lammers that you did agree with them?

VON NEURATH: Later I made an oral report to the Fuehrer about this. Apart from that, the statements which you just made show quite clearly that this first memorandum was written by Frank, who then added the second memorandum to it, and if you say, as you said at the end just now, that it was my purpose to remain in office as Reich Protector, then I can only tell you that the purpose, if there was a purpose in this connection, was that Frank wanted to become Reich Protector. However, from the point of view of the contents of this memorandum, I can certainly no longer identify myself with them today, nor did I do so on the occasion when I reported to 'the Fuehrer. This becomes clear from the testimony which I gave yesterday. This testimony. . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I'm not concerned with your testimony yesterday; I am concerned with what you wrote in 1940 when you wrote-and I will read the words again; I have read them three times:

"I enclose another memorandum on the same question which my State Secretary, K. H. Frank, has drawn up independently of me"-independently of me-"and which in its train of thoughts leads to the same result, and with which I fully agree."

Why did you...

VON NEURATH: I have just now told you that I no longer agree with these statements today, and that at the time when I verbally reported to the Fuehrer, I did not support these statements either, but to the contrary, I made the proposals to him which I explained yesterday and to which I received his agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, are these documents correctly copied? Because you see that in the letter of the 31st of August 1940 there is a reference in the margin, "Enclosure 1; Enclosure 2."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Therefore, the letter identifies the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is so. The one is, as I am suggesting, the defendant's; the other is Frank's.

66

25 June 46

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And you have mentioned, Defendant, about what-that you dealt with them otherwise to the Fuehrer. I suggest to you that that is not true, that is not true that you dealt with them otherwise to the Fuehrer. I am putting it quite bluntly that it is not true.

VON NEURATH: In that case I must regret to say that you are lying. For I-I must know. After all, I must know whether I talked to the Fuehrer. I delivered a verbal report to him in person and Frank was not present.

SIR DAVID MAXWWLL-FYFE: Well now, just let us look at the report, at your report. Your Lordship will find it on Page 7.

We will see whether it is true or not.

Phi PRESIDENT: Page what?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 7, My Lord. It is Document D-739 of the same book, 12a; it is Exhibit GB-521.

Now, this is a memorandum, a secret memorandum of the representative of the Foreign Office in the Office of the Reich Protector, of the 5th of October.

[Turning to the defendant.] You will remember your letter was the 31st of August. It says:

"Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector and State Secretary Frank by the Fuehrer, I have learned the following from authentic sources:

"To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Gurtner, gave a report on the Czech resistance movement, during the course of which he maintained that the first trial of the four chief ringleaders would shortly take place before the Peoples' Court.

"The Fuehrer objected to this procedure and declared that execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through legal sentences, as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter. The Czechs would regard any sentence as an injustice. As this matter had already entered the path of legal procedure it was to be continued with in this form. The trials were to be postponed until after the war, and then amidst the din of the victory celebrations, the proceedings would pass unnoticed. Only death sentences could be pronounced, but would be commuted later on to life imprisonment or deportation.

67

25 June 46

"Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the Fuehrer touched on the following three possibilities:

"1. Continuation of Czech autonomy in which the Germans would live in the Protectorate as co-citizens with equal rights. This possibility was' however, out of the question as one had always to reckon with Czech intrigues.

"2. The deportation of the Czechs and the Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility was out of the question too, as it would take 100 years.

"3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by Germanizing the Czechs, that is, by their assimilation. The latter would be possible with the greater part of the Czech people. Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections or who were anti-German were to be excepted from this assimilation. This category was to be weeded out. "The Fuehrer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the multitude of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The Fuehrer further decided that, in the interests of a uniform policy with regard to the Czechs, a central Reich authority for the whole of the Bohemian and Moravian area should remain at Prague.

"The present status of the Protectorate thus continues." And look at the last sentence:

"The Fuehrer's decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank."

Now, Defendant, although you answered me so sharply a moment ago, that document says that after the reception of the Reich Protector and the State Secretary, the representative of the Foreign Office in your office says that the decision of the Fuehrer followed the lines of the memoranda put forward by you and your State Secretary Frank. Why do you say that I am wrong in saying it is untrue that a different line was followed by the Fuehrer? It is set out in that document.

VON NEURATH: To that I have the following reply to give: First of all, the document shows that the Fuehrer touched upon the following three eventualities with reference to the question of the future of the Protectorate. They are the three possibilities which I said yesterday I had proposed. The document also shows, though not directly, that the cause for this Fuehrer conference was primarily quite a different one than merely deciding the question of the Protectorate. On the contrary, the Minister of Justice was present and a legal question in regard to the treatment of the members of

68

25 June 46

the resistance movement was the cause for the discussion and Frank came to Berlin for this reason. I had been to Berlin before that and I tamed to the Fuehrer, not about the memorandum, which I had in my hand, but about my misgivings in general and the future of our policy in the Protectorate. My report included those proposals which are mentioned here under 1, 2, and 3.

It says there at the end, "The decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and State Secretary Frank." That remark was added by Herr Ziemke or whoever had written the document, but what I said yesterday about the policy is correct. And even if I admit that at that time in the letter to Lammers I did identify myself with these enclosures it was nevertheless dropped.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to remind you that in the passage which I referred to last in your memorandum, as opposed to that of Frank, you were putting forward the organization of the Greater German Reich. I take it in this way, that you envisaged yourself that in the event of a German victory in the war the Czech part of Czechoslovakia would remain part of a Greater German Reich.

VON NEURATH: No, I beg your pardon. It had already been incorporated and here it is also expressly stated that it should remain in that condition, as a protectorate but as a special structure.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Well now, I just-are you saying that your policy, after this period-this was in the autumn of 1940- that your policy towards the Czechs was sympathetic?

VON NEURATH: I do not think it changed except when there were strong resistance movements there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, why was it that you forbade, in the middle of 1941, any reference of the handling-to the discussion of the handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem? Why did you forbid its discussion?

VON NEURATH: To prevent these problems which were the cause of this memorandum from arising again and again, namely the problem of individual parts of the Protectorate being torn away and added to the lower Danube or the Sudeten country with a general resettlement. That was the purpose of my report to the Fuehrer, as I explained yesterday, so as to put a stop to that discussion once and for all. ,

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you also-you particularly prohibited, did you not, any public statements addressed to the Czech population? Well, let us look at the document.

69

25 June 46

It is Document Number 3862-PS, My Lord. Your Lordship will ' find it at Page 126 of Document Book 12a. My Lord, it becomes Exhibit GB-522.

[Turning to the defendant.] It is for distribution through your various offices and you say:

`'For the motive stated I order that in the future, when arrangements and publications of any kind concerning the German-Czech problem are made, the views of the whole population are more than ever to be directed to the war and its requirements while the duty of the Czech nation to carry out the war tasks imposed on it jointly with the Greater German Reich is to be stressed.

"Other questions concerning the German-Czech problem are not suitable subjects for public discussion at the present time. I wish to point out that, without detriment to my orders, administrative handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem are to be in no way alluded to." Then the last paragraph:

"Requisite public statements about the political questions of the Protectorate and in particular those addressed to the Czech population are my business and mine alone and will be published in due time."

Why did you want to prohibit so severely the addressing of any public statements to the Czech population?

VON NEURATH: That is addressed not only to the Czech population, but especially to the Germans, and just for this reason- that was some special event which I no longer remember-it says here "for the motive stated I order that"-when there was again a discussion about the future of the Protectorate or something was published. That was the reason and I pointed out that that is why it was forbidden.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Well now, I suggest to you about the your proposals and Frank's speak for themselves. I want you to help me on one other matter.

Do you remember after the closing of the universities that the question arose, what was to happen to the students? There were about 18,000 students who were, of course, out of work because they could not.

VON NEURATH: I beg your pardon, I beg your pardon. There were not so many; there were at the most 1,800 in all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, you got it-with the greatest respect either you are wrong or your office. According to the note from Group X of your office:

70

25 June 46

"According to the data at my disposal the number of students affected the closure"-I should think that would include high schools as well-"for 3 years of the Czech universities is 18,998.

"According to the press communications, dated the 21st of this month only 1,200 persons were arrested in connection with the events of the 15th of this month."

And then your office goes on to say by a process of subtraction that leaves 17,800. You were faced with their occupation.

My Lord, it is Page 104, Document 3858-PS. Exhibit GB-523.

VON NEURATH: I do not want to deny my official's statement. He must have known better than I. I am merely surprised that there should have been 18,000 students in two Czech universities, in a country with a population of 7 millions.

THE PRESIDENT: Hadn't you better check that by the original?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I shall. I am much obliged to Your Lordship. Well, My Lord, it is quite clear that both figures-they are in figures, and they are 18,998, and then there is the check below, and you have to take of e 1,200; that leaves 17,800. My Lord, if it were only 1,800, the second figure could not arise.

DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, somewhere there must be an error. That would have been more for two universities in Czechoslovakia than there were in Berlin at the best of times. There was a maximum of 8,000 to 9,000 in Berlin per year and in the case of a nation of only 7 millions there are supposed to be 18,000 students in two universities. This cannot be right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it may be that there are three age groups. Your Lordship sees that it is "according to the data at my disposal, the number of students affected by the closure for 3 years of the Czech universities is 18,000." It may be that is the intake for 2 years, in addition to present students.

[Turning to the defendant.] Anyhow, this is the figure; and it is this problem which has been dealt with by your Ministry. It may

be that it includes certain high schools, but at any rate, these are your Ministry's documents, and I want to know what happened. This was the minutes, as I understand it, from Dennler, Dr. Dennler, who was the head of Group X of your office to Burgsdorff, who had a superior position; and, if I may summarize it, this letter of 21 November 1939 suggests that the students should be taken forcibly from Czechoslovakia to the old Reich and put to work in the old Reich; and then, the next-on 25 November, you will notice that in Paragraph 2 it says-the writer, who is Burgsdorff, is saying that he is dealing with X 119/39, which is Dennler's memorandum;

71

25 June 46

and Burgsdorff says that he does not want them to go into the Reich because at that time there was some unemployment in the Reich, and suggests that they should be dealt with by compulsory labor on the roads and canals in Czechoslovakia. Now, these were the two proposals from your office.

My Lord, the second one is Document 3857-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-524.

[Turning to the defendant.] What happened to the unfortunate students?

VON NEURATH: Nothing at all happened to them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, did either of these proposals of Dr. Dennler for forced labor in the Reich and of Burgsdorff for forced labor in Czechoslovakia, did they come up to you?

VON NEURATH: No, none of them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did they come to you for decision? Did they come to you for decision?

VON NEURATH: I think they were submitted to me, but I cannot tell you for certain.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, will you agree with me, or perhaps you will be able to correct my knowledge, that this is the earliest suggestion-you said it was not put into effect-but the earliest suggestion of forced labor came from an officer of your department? Do you know of any other department of the Reich that had suggested forced labor as early as November 1939?

VON NEURATH: There is no connection, and, moreover, if you were to look through suggestions made by all your subordinates, then you, too, might find some proposal which you afterward rejected. Suggestions made by an adviser do not mean anything at all.

Apart from that, perhaps I can clear up this figure of 18,000. Here it says, "According to the data at my disposal, the number of students who will be affected by closing the Czech universities for 3 years will be 18,000." It is, therefore, three times 6,000, is it not? Which is approximately 18,000.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I had already put forward that suggestion, Defendant, about 10 minutes ago, but I respectfully agree with you. That is one matter in which we are not in difference.

Well now, you understand what I am suggesting. It is that these proposals germinated in your office, because they were quite in keeping with the proposals in the memoranda which I have just read to the Tribunal, that you should not only get rid of Czech higher

72

25 June 46

education, but you should have forced labor. Do you remember that was in the State Secretary's memorandum? What I am suggesting is that it was in your department-the idea of forced labor-as early as 21 November 1939.

Now, Defendant, I have only one other matter, and I hope, as it is a question of fact, that perhaps you will be able to agree with me on reflection. You suggested this morning that the German university in Prague was closed down after the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1919. That is how it came to us. On reflection, do you not know that it continued and that many thousands of students graduated in the German university of Prague between 1919 and 1939?

VON NEURATH: As far as I know, it was a department of the Czech university, a German part of the Czech university, as far as I know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it continued-it continued as a university?

VON NEURATH: Yes, it continued, but as a Czech university.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but German students came there and could take their degrees in German? It was a permitted language? I suggest to you that there are thousands of people who went there from Austria and from the old Reich-went there as Germans and took their degrees in German.

VON NEURATH: Yes, only the old German university, the socalled Charles University, visas closed by the Czechs. But a German department, or whatever one might call it, still remained. The Germans studied and took their examinations there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think the point is clear. I am not going to argue about the actual thing, but that there was a German university, where German students could study, you will agree.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine further?

STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Defendant, tell us please, when you were Minister of Foreign Affairs did Ribbentrop try to intervene in the foreign affairs of Germany?

VON NEURATH: Is that a question?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, that is a question.

VON NEURATH: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Would you please tell us in what form this intervention took place?

73

25 June 46

VON NEURATH: By communicating to the Fuehrer his own ideas on foreign policy, without giving them to me for consideration.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Yesterday you stated here that in 1936 you had differences of opinion with Hitler and that on 27 of July 1936 you asked to be relieved of your duties as a Minister. This document was cited here yesterday, but did you not write to Hitler then?-and I will read the last sentence of your letter to him:

"Even if I am no longer Minister, I shall be constantly at your disposal, if you so desire, with my advice and my years of experience in the field of foreign policy."

Did you write these words in your letter to the Fuehrer?

VON NEURATH: Yes indeed; yes indeed.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: And did you fulfill the promises you made to Hitler? Whenever it was necessary to cover by diplomatic manipulations the aggressive actions of Hitler, as for instance at the time of the annexation of the Sudetenland, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and so on? Did you help Hitler with your experience? Is that right?

VON NEURATH: That is a great mistake. On the contrary, as I have stated here yesterday and today, I was called in by Hitler only once; and that was on the last phase of the Austrian Anschluss. With that my activities came to an end, but in 1938, to be sure, I went to see him of my own accord, to restrain him from starting the war. That was my activity.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We have already heard this. I would like to ask you another question concerning the memorandum of Friderici without repeating what has already been said here concerning it. You remember this memorandum well, as it was just presented to the Court a short time ago. In the last part of the memorandum of Friderici-it is the last paragraph but one- it is stated:

"If the governing of the Protectorate were in reliable hands and guided exclusively by the order of the Fuehrer of the 16th of March 1939, the territory of Bohemia and Moravia would become an integral part of Germany."

It was for this purpose that Hiker chose you to be Protector; is that not so?

VON NEURATH: Not a bit; that was not the reason at all. The reason was-I have described it in detail yesterday.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. We shall not repeat the reasons; we spoke about them yesterday.

74

25 June 46

Well, you deny that you were precisely the man who was supposed to carry through the invasion of Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: To that I can only answer "no."

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right. Do you admit that you were, in the Protectorate, the only representative of the Fuehrer and of the Government of the Reich, and that you were directly subordinate to Hitler?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right; that is stated in Hitler's decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, it is stated there. I will not read this decree, which would only delay the interrogation. This decree has already been presented to the Court.

Do you acknowledge that all administrative organs and authorities of the Reich in the Protectorate with the exception of the Armed Forces, were subordinate to you?

VON NEURATH: No. I am sorry to have to say that that is a mistake. That is also stated in the same decree of 1 September 1939. Apart from that, there were numerous other organizations, that is, Reich authorities, which were not under my jurisdiction; quite apart from the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Well, as far as the Police are concerned, we will speak about that separately. So you think it is a mistake that the decree does not mention it, or do you interpret the decree otherwise? ~

I shall read the first paragraph of the decree of 1 September 1939. It is stated there:

"All the authorities, offices and organizations of the Reich in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) with the exception of the Armed Forces, are under the jurisdiction of the Reich Protector."

It is also stated in Paragraph 2:

"The Reich Protector supervises the entire autonomous administration of the Protectorate."

And Paragraph 3:

"The office of the Reich Protector is in charge of all administrative branches of the Reich administration with the exception of the Armed Forces."

As you see, it is stated very bluntly and definitely here that all the institutions of the Reich were subordinate to you, while you were subordinate to Hitler.

VON NEURATH: I have to tell you again that as to administrative agencies, yes; but there were a number of other

75

25 June 46

authorities, Reich authorities and offices which did not come under my jurisdiction, for instance, the Four Year Plan.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Now let us pass to the question of the Police. Yesterday, in answer to a question of your counsel, you stated to the Tribunal that as to this decree of 1 September, signed by Goering, Frick, and Lammers, Paragraph 13 was not comprehensible to you. Let us examine other paragraphs of the same chapter concerning the Police.

Paragraph 11 says:

"The organs of the German Security Police in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia have the task of investigating. and combating all hostile attempts toward the government and population in the territory of the Protectorate, informing the Reich Protector as well as the subordinate organizations, keeping them currently informed on important events, and advising them as to what to do."

Paragraph 14 of the same decree states:

"The Reich Minister of the Interior (the Reichsfuehrer SS, and the Chief of the German Police), with the agreement of the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia releases the legal and administrative directives necessary for carrying out this order."

Thus, according to this decree, the Police and the SS were obliged to let you know about all their measures and, moreover, all their administrative and legal acts and measures had been carried out with your knowledge. Do you acknowledge that?

VON NEURATH: No; that is not right. First of all, there was at one time an order that they were to inform me. But that was not carried out and was forbidden by Himmler directly. And the other, the second regulation to the effect that the administrative measures-or whatever it is called-could or should be carried out with my approval, was never applied.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: So you deny it?

VOW NEURATH: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: I now present to you the testimony of Karl Hermann Frank, of 7 March 1946, on this very question; that is, on the question of the Police and to whom they were subordinated.

Mr. President, I present this testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-494.

THE PRESIDENT: Is this in the English book as well, do you know?

76

25 June 46

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No, Mr. President. This document that I am presenting now is an original, signed by Frank.

[Turning to the defendant.] Karl Hermann Frank, during an interrogation, testified:

"According to the order on 'The Structure of the German Administration in the Protectorate and the German Security Police,' all German authorities and offices in the Protectorate and thereby the entire Police, too, excepting the Armed Forces are formally subordinated to the Reich Protector and are bound by his directions. Owing to this the Security Police was bound to carry out this basic political policy set forth by the Reich Protector. Orders as to carrying out State Police measures were mainly issued by the Chief of the Security Police with the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin.

"If the Reich Protector wanted to carry out some State Police measures, he had to have the permission of the Reich Security Main Of lice in Berlin; that is, in this case the State Police also submitted each order for reconfirmation to the Reich Security Main Of lice in Berlin. The same applied also to directives for the carrying out of State Police measures given by the Higher

SS and Police Leader to the Chief of the Security Police."

I would like to draw your attention to this paragraph that I am reading now:

"This system of channels for issuing directives remained in force during the whole existence of the Protectorate and was used as such by Von Neurath in the Protectorate. In general the Reich Protector could, on his own initiative, issue directives to the State Police through the Chief of the Security Police. The carrying out of such directives was, however, subject to approval by the Reich Security Main Office if State Police measures were concerned.

"In regard to the SD (Security Service), which had no executive powers, the authority of the Reich Protector respecting the issuing of directives to the SD was greater and not subject to the approval of the Reich Security Main Of lice in every case."

Do you confirm this testimony of Frank?

VON NEURATH: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: All right.

VON NEURATH: I refer you to a statement by the same Frank, which I have learned about here, which was made last year, during which he said something quite different. He said that the entire Police were not under the Reich Protector, but came under the Chief

77

25 June 46

of the Police in Berlin, namely, Himmler. It ought to be here somewhere-this statement.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Don't worry about it; I will come back to this testimony.

Tell me, please, who was the political adviser in your service?

VON NEURATH: Political adviser?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, political adviser.

VON NEURATH: In general I had various political advisers.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In order not to waste time, I will show you a short document, and I ask you to read it.

On 21 July 1939 the Chief of the Security Police wrote a letter to your State Secretary and Higher SS and Police Leader, Karl Hermann Frank. The letter had the following contents:

"In an order of 5 May 1939 the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia appointed the SD Leader and Chief of the Security Police as his political adviser. I have ascertained that this order has not yet been published or carried out.

Please provide for carrying out this order.

"Signed, Dr. Best."

Do you remember your order now?

VON NEURATH: I cannot remember that decree at the moment, but I do remember that this was never carried out, because I did not have this SD leader as my political adviser.

THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, just one more minute, please, to finish this question, and then we can break off.

[Turning to the defendant.] But did you issue such an order on 5 May?

VON NEURATH: I can no longer tell you about that at this date-but it is probably true. I do not want to deny it; I do not know any more.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: But you did issue this order?

All right. I thank you, Mr. President. It is possible to adjourn now. I shall require 30 minutes more.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 26 June 1946, at 1000 hours.]