[The witness Bock resumed the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in closed session tomorrow afternoon at 2 o'clock. That is to say, it will not sit in open session after 1 o'clock tomorrow.

Mr. Barrington, had you finished?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other Chief Prosecutors who want to cross-examine? Then, Dr. BOEHM, do you wish to re-examine?

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I should like to ask a few brief questions on the cross-examination yesterday.

Witness, will you please answer these questions as briefly as possible. Do you know the basic principle, the foremost in the SA: equal rights for everyone?

BOCK: Yes, I know the principle. It was also taught in the schools.

HERR BOEHM: Is it true that the higher position of an SA man, which was mentioned here yesterday, meant only the respect held for him in the national community on the strength of his contribution to the realization of the aims of the Third Reich?

BOCK: The SA man was always trained to observe order and discipline and to obey directives and the law.

HERR BOEHM: Were the privileges which were mentioned here yesterday something different from the respect for the SA man as a political soldier?

BOCK: The SA man had no privileges. He could earn certain rights in connection with his services which enabled him to advance more easily, socially speaking, but otherwise he was subject to the law in all respects.

HERR BOEHM: You mentioned yesterday that the SA man was not armed, that he only carried an SA dagger. From Sturmfuehrer up, he had in addition some firearm for which he needed a license, like every German who wanted to carry firearms.

BOCK: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: Now, as a member of the SA, within the circle of persons in question here, did the individual who carried a pistol have a right to use it against other nationals?

BOCK: No, the. SA man who carried a weapon was bound to realize just like any other citizen that he could use it only in an emergency for his own defense.

HERR BOEHM: Article 10 was read to you yesterday, stating that the high position of the SA man must not be disgraced by treatment of damaging, disparaging, or unjust character.

BOCK: The rights were the consequences of certain duties. If the SA man was under special obligation he had to have special rights. But never -- that was constantly emphasized -- could he overstep the existing laws in any way.

HERR BOEHM: Article 18 says especially that the SA man may use weapons that were entrusted to him to the extent I have just stated, that is, only in the execution of his services and for legitimate self-protection. Does this not mean that the SA man, like every other German citizen, had to obey the existing regulations concerning the possession and the use of weapons?

BOCK: I have already said so once. The SA man was subject to the existing rules. That means, of course, that he needed a police license or a proper pass stating how and when he was entitled to use his weapon.

HERR BOEHM: Was it not true that the SA man, because he was in the SA and because more was asked of him than of any other citizen, would, receive more severe punishment if he committed an offense with his weapon?

BOCK: An order was in existence that the SA man, when on trial, was to be punished especially severely, and that special standards were to be applied in determining his punishment if he 'had committed any offense.

HERR BOEHM: Another quotation from the service regulations of 12 December 1933 was read to you yesterday, stating that all violations of discipline were to be punished. Does that not mean that violations, that is, discipline infringements, were punished by the Supreme SA Leadership and that orderliness was a ruling principle in the SA?

BOCK: The leaders particularly made especially strenuous efforts to see to it that every SA man kept within the limits of the law. In addition, we had strict orders that the SA man, if he had committed any offense anywhere in civil life, had to be reported, that a report was also made to us by the judicial authorities and that the person in question was then given disciplinary punishment.

HERR BOEHM: The document which was shown to you yesterday, of 12 December 1933, on Page 33, Number 6, says, "Right is what is advantageous to the Movement; wrong is what harms it." Did this phrase mean anything more than the English proverb "Right or wrong, my country"?

BOCK: According to any conception and interpretation, it means that the man has rights within the framework of his duties and that, on the other hand, if he does wrong, and oversteps the limits of the law, he also thereby harms his fatherland.

HERR BOEHM: The training directives were also shown to you, and Pages 7 and 9 of them were pointed out to you. There is talk here of policing duties, of drill, shooting practice, exercises in open country, and sports. Did not the pentathlon in the Olympic Games consist of just that? Did not the athletes taking part march into the stadium in good order and in a way made possible only by previous exercise? Did they not also shoot and drill; did they not also engage in sports, all the forms of sports which are listed here?

TBE PRESIDENT: Don't you think this is really more a matter of argument than examination? We have had this argument as to whether or not it was for sport or whether or not for military purposes over and over again. We have got to make up our minds about it. It doesn't help very much to have it put in again. in reexamination.

HERR BOEHM: Yes, Mr. President. I would not have asked this question if the witness had not been referred to the fact that sports were the last-mentioned of the exercises in these training directives. I should like to point out that the other exercises which are listed here were also carried out in the pentathlon of the Olympic Games, and I hardly think that they involve a military or militaristic attitude.

May I now ask the witness one more question.

[Turning to the witness.] Incidentally, you did not answer my previous question: Were not the same or very similar exercises carried out in the pentathlon of the Olympic Games?

BOCK: I was interrupted by the President. I was present at the Olympic Games and I know the various forms of sport well. We carried out all the drill so that we could appear in public in a disciplined fashion like all sport organizations, and make a good impression. Because we were later to organize these large-scale games, we chose in general the exercises of the Olympic Games, and these were taught and practiced by us. We shot, we held obstacle races, and we used all these exercises in our training.

HERR BOEHM: On Page 8 of the training directives which were submitted to you yesterday it says that in drill-fl-As would be the only exercise resembling military training-"the training should be put into effect energetically. After exercise in the basic movements, applied drill tests should be tackled, as they occur in drill movements necessary in political assignments." In connection with the wording of these instructions, did you think of military training or militaristic training when it was a question of drill within the SA?

BOCK: To us, the drill and the training of the men as individuals as well as in closed formations were always done for the purpose of presenting a unified picture in public appearances.

HERR BOEHM: I have no more questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I should now like to call the next witness, SCHAEFER.

[The witness SCHAEFER took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.

WERNER AUGUST MAX SCHAEFER (Witness): SCHAEFER.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that your full name?

SCHAEFER: Werner August Max SCHAEFER.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swearby God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the puretruth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

HERR BOEHM: Witness, -what are you by profession?

SCHAEFER: I am a Government Director in the Penal Execution Administration.

HERR BOEHM: Were you a member of the NSDAP or any of its branches?

SCHAEFER: I have been a member of the Party since 1928.

HERR BOEHM: Were you a member of the SA?

SCHAEFER: I have been a member of the SA since 1932. I became an SA Oberfuehrer in 1938.

HERR BÖM: The witness Raymond Geist said in an affidavit that one thousand local assembly places of the SA were used to keep people under arrest. Do you know anything about that and is this allegation true?

SCHAEFER: I have no knowledge of the figure of one thousand local assembly places used to keep people under arrest.

HERR BOEHM: Would you have known anything about such places, if they had existed in that number?

SCHAEFER: If they had existed in that number, I should certainly have known of them; actually, a few of these places did exist, but quite shortly after conditions had become settled they were dissolved or taken over and administered by the Gestapo.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct to say that these arrest places were an emergency measure in the period around 1-933?

SCHAEFER: Yes, it was definitely an emergency measure. At that time, at the time of the assumption of power, we were in a state of latent civil war in Germany. It was therefore necessary to arrest active opponents in order to put into effect what the Fuehrer had decreed in connection with the assumption of power, namely, that the revolution was to be carried out without bloodshed.

HERR BOEHM: Is it true that extensive discovery of weapons caused the arrests in 1933, and that these arrests were carried out to avoid chaotic conditions, which would have resulted if these weapons had not been confiscated?

SCHAEFER: Yes. A large number of such weapons were found and it did not remain unknown to us that a large number of our active opponents were willing to use these weapons to bring about such chaotic conditions.

HERR BOEHM: Can one say that the SA, in confiscating the weapons at that time, was carrying out an assignment of the State?

SCHAEFER: Yes. It was a state assignment by the Prussian Minister of the Interior and Minister President, Goering, who used the SA as an auxiliary police force on that occasion.

HERR BOEHM: Dr. Diels says in an affidavit that it was his task to curb the tendencies of the central political police toward the SA and its ideology, and to follow up the innumerable complaints about illegal actions by the SA due to the fact that some radical SA Fuehrer, appointed Police Presidents, had allowed lawless conditions to arise between July and November 1933. Since you were in that district, what can you say about Dr. Diels' statement?

SCHAEFER: As far as I recall -- and I can remember it very well -- Diels maintained very friendly relations with the then SA Chief of Staff R6hm, and also with the local chief of the Berlin Brandenburg Group, Ernst. Therefore I cannot understand why he should have considered and termed it his main task as chief of the Gestapo to follow up any complaints which were received about the SA. I should like to point out the fact that such undisciplined elements, which might have damaged the Movement and the SA, were restrained by the Movement and by an SA liaison staff at Gestapo headquarters. I know for a fact it was Gruppenfuehrer Ernst who at that time arrested such undisciplined elements on his own initiative and kept them in a separate sector of the Oranienburg Concentration Camp. It was, therefore, not the task of the head of the Gestapo to take action against undisciplined elements of the SA or the Movement; his tasks were quite clearly on another level.

HERR BOEHM: Diels has now restricted his originally far-reaching affidavit to refer mainly to Berlin. What was the attitude of Count Helldorf, who was liquidated by Hitler on 20 July 1944, in this respect?

SCHAEFER: I know Count Helldorf from my activity as SA Fuehrer in Berlin. Shortly after the seizure of power he was, as far as I know, for a short time in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and was then Police President in Potsdam. In this capacity Count Helldorf, I can only say, did everything required and necessary to maintain an orderly police institution. For this purpose he employed old and reliable police officials. As Police President he was also my superior with regard to the concentration camp at Oranienburg. I must mention that he paid frequent surprise visits to Oranienburg and inspected with great thoroughness the measures which had been ordered. He was known to me as a man who advocated the absolute maintenance of correctness and discipline.

HERR BOEHM: I further draw your attention to Diels' statement that the SA formations forcibly entered prisons, abducted prisoners, removed files, and established themselves in the offices of the Police. Is that true? Did such conditions ever exist?

SCHAEFER: I cannot recall such conditions. They would surely have been known to me if they had existed, for I was frequently in Berlin; but I must say that I did not hear of such occurrences. Later too I should have heard something about them when I became an official in the Penal Execution Administration of the Reich. In my opinion the Berlin colleagues would certainly have reported such events to me even afterward, but that was not done.

HERR BOEHM: You were at that time commandant of Oranienburg and associated in Berlin with the men of the Police or of the Gestapo almost every day?

SCHAEFER: I was not in Berlin every day, but still quite frequently, so that such things certainly would not have escaped my notice.

HERR BOEHM: Considering the statement made in his affidavit for the SA that altogether 50 people were the victims of the revolution in Berlin, do you think that Diels' assertion that it was his task to try and transfer the SA camps into the hands of the Government in order to avoid mass murder is true?

SCHAEFER: This statement of Diels' is undoubtedly incorrect. I can say that it in no way corresponded to the ideology of the SA to remove political opponents by committing mass murder. Diels himself in his affidavit gives the figure of 50 victims in Berlin, as you have just read, and that proves what I say. One must not forget that a large part of the political opponents of yesterday were now marching with the SA and that therefore there still existed many personal ties with the camp of the political opponents. If this intention to remove political opponents by mass murder had existed at all, its execution would have met with the greatest resistance within the SA itself; and I may say frankly here that what Diels asserts is in no way true.

HERR BOEHM: Is it true that Diels' position became untenable as a result of constant conflict with the SA? He says so in his affidavit for the Gestapo; but he says that he must also admit that he was Regierungspräsident both in Hanover and Cologne.

SCHAEFER: I know nothing about this alleged deterioration of relations between Diels and the Supreme SA Leadership. I do not think that what he says is correct, because a few yea

rs later I found him to be on very close terms with the then Chief of Staff Lutze; that was in connection with a tour in the Ems district. He was then obviously on very friendly terms with the Chief of Staff, Lutze, and the fact that he was Regierungspräsident in Cologne and especially the fact that he was later Regierungspräsident in Hanover under Chief of Staff Lutze, who was the Oberpräsident there, really contradict this assertion that he had disputes with the SA.

HERR BOEHM: Did, as Diels says, the SA widely confiscate property of peaceful citizens, although in his affidavit for the SA he states that really only the staff of Ernst and the signals section set up by h

im participated in revolutionary activity?

SCHAEFER: Of the looting of so-called peaceful citizens by the SA I know nothing. If some such case did occur, which probably cannot be denied, I should like to say that the generalization of such isolated instances is at considerable variance with the truth. It is quite unjustifiable to generalize these individual cases which undoubtedly occurred, and which, one must not forget, were absolutely possible. I may point out that for example the brown shirt, which the SA man had to buy for himself, could be purchased in all the appropriate stores in Berlin and in the whole Reich. I learned personally of a number of cases in which obscure elements which did not belong to the SA or to the Movement -- and that fact was established later in court proceedings -- welcomed the opportunity of committing illegal actions under cover of the Party uniform. For that reason the Party uniform was finally put under legal protection.

HERR BOEHM: You know that Diels was Gestapo chief in 1933 and 1934; and if one reads his statement that the SA took property away from peaceful citizens, the obvious question arises whether he is not trying to attribute Gestapo customs to the SA.

SCHAEFER: I must say that this assertion of Diels surprises me greatly, because, as I have said, he was at that time on very friendly terms with the leaders of the SA. I cannot quite see how he arrives. at this assertion against, it seems to me, his better knowledge.

HERR BOEHM: He then speaks about 40,000 prisoners in concentration camps, in about 40 illegal camps. Can you say how many concentration camps actually existed at that time?

SCHAEFER: I have no statistics on this point, but I should like to scrutinize this figure of 40,000 internees, and particularly the number of 40 camps which Diels mentions. During 1933 Oranienburg soon became the only camp for political opponents from Berlin and the whole province of Brandenburg. A few transit camps which had existed up till then were dissolved. There could not have been many prisoners in them, because they were transferred to me at Oranienburg; it was a very small number of prisoners.

If one considers that at the time when his figure of 40,000 applies, Oranienburg did not even number one thousand internees, and also, considers that this camp was instituted for a district totalling over 6 million people; if one considers, thirdly, that Berlin was the center of the political opponents of the NSDA-P and therefore had an extraordinarily large proportion of active political opponents, then I can hardly imagine his number of 40,000 internees to be correct. I must say that the figure of 40,000 is absolutely new to me, and I never heard anything about it, not even from Dr. Diels, with whom I was personally on quite friendly terms; I should have known of this figure if it had ever been mentioned.

HERR BOEHM: Diels speaks of approximately 40,000 prisoners. Could you give an approximate figure which might be more correct?

SCHAEFER: That is extremely difficult to say, but the Christmas amnesty ordered by Minister President Goering at that time-and I should like to emphasize particularly that this amnesty was carried out on a very generous scale-allows of some conclusion. 5,000 internees-I well recall this figure-were released from the camps at that time, and Oranienburg for instance, which was I said was the only recognized and state-controlled camp for Berlin and Brandenburg, reduced the number of its inmates to just over 100; over two-thirds of the camp inmates were released at that time.

HERR BOEHM: You were commandant in Oranienburg?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: From when to when?

SCHAEFER: From March 1933 to March 1934.

HERR BOEHM: This camp was guarded by SA men?

SCHAEFER:Yes.

HERR BOEHM: From when to when?

SCHAEFER: From March 1933 to June or July 1934, 1 believe.

HERR BOEHM: And under whose orders were these men?

SCHAEFER: These SA men were members of the auxiliary police. As such they were under my direct orders as commandant.

HERR BOEHM: And to whom were you subordinate as camp commandant?

SCHAEFER: As camp commandant I was subordinate to the Regierungspr5sident in Potsdam, who was competent for Oranienburg, to his Police President, Count Helldorf, and, of course, ultimately to the Prussian Minister of the Interior.

HERR BOEHM: And what influence did the then Ffihrer of the Gruppe Berlin-Brandenburg have on the Concentration Camp Oranienburg?

SCHAEFER: The Fi1hrer of the Gruppe Berlin-Brandenburg had no influence on the camp itself. He had no influence on the conduct or the general administration of the concentration camp.

HERR BOEHM: Could one assume that individual actions carried out by him meant terror measures of the SA?

SCHAEFER: I did not hear of any.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know the number of persons interned in the unauthorized transit camps who were released before Christmas 1933?

SCHAEFER: No, I do not know the number, but I may say that there existed only a small number of such camps and a small number of internees in them. I have already explained that only a few internees were transferred to me at Oranienburg as the only camp in existence then. A large part had already been released at that time.

HERR BOEHM: Is there any reason for believing that at that time there were 50,000 internees in the rest of Germany?

SCHAEFER: No, there is no reason for believing that, and I must say that in proportion to the figure of internees in Prussia, which I gave before, the number of 50,000 is absolutely incredible. Prussia was geographically the largest part of Germany, and if there were comparatively few internees in Prussia I cannot imagine that there could have been 50,000 in the rest of the Reich. This figure is new to me.

HERR BOEHM: What do you know about co-operation with the Gestapo in its early stages?

SCHAEFER: In its early stages the Gestapo had only loose connection with Oranienburg. It had only official connections arising from the relation of the political police with the auxiliary police, the SA. In the course of the year, the Gestapo sent persons whom it had arrested to the camp and released them again, at the direction of the Prussian Minister President, when their cases had been examined.

HERR BOEHM: Were there difficulties between the Concentration Camp Oranienburg and the Gestapo in Berlin?

SCHAEFER: Originally no, but later through an incident difficulties arose which I would not like to conceal at this point. On one occasion the Gestapo in Berlin sent two internees to the camp in a severely maltreated condition. Next day I went to see Standartenf-uehrer Schutzwechsler who. was my superior, and asked him to protest, together with me, to the Gestapo in the Prinz Albrecht Strasse, and to demand an explanation which I intended to make the subject of a report to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

I was promised that this explanation would be forthcoming, but on the next day I was called up on the telephone by Standartenfuehrer Schutzwechsler, who told me that he had just learned that the Concentration Camp Oranienburg was to be dissolved immediately. He asked me to come to Berlin at once, as he wanted to go with me to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to investigate why the dissolution of the camp had been ordered so suddenly.

We went to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior together and learned to our great astonishment that after our protest on the previous day at the Prinz Albrecht Strasse, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior had been called up and informed that cases of maltreatment had occurred, and that it had become necessary to dissolve Oranienburg. The suggestion of the Prinz Albrecht Strasse was that all the prisoners in Oranienburg were to be transferred, to the new camps built by the SS in the Ems district. A train was already on the way and had in fact already arrived at Oranienburg.

When I told State Secretary Grauert of the circumstances and explained to him what had induced me to protest at the Prinz Albrecht Strasse on the previous day, he promised me at once to have these circumstances investigated thoroughly, and he did so immediately. In my presence he told Ministerialdirigent Fischer to conduct an investigation of the affair. Fischer was known as a thoroughly correct and reliable old official, and Fischer then actually found the circumstances to be as I had described them to Grauert. It was established clearly that these cases of maltreatment, with which Oranienburg had been charged, had occurred in the Gestapo in Berlin. Thereupon it was decided not to dissolve the camp.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know of cases in which the Gestapo had to penetrate by force into SA camps to liberate prisoners?

SCHAEFER: No. I never heard of such cases.

HERR BOEHM: You did not have such cases in Oranienburg?

SHÄFER: No, no.

HERR BOEHM: Did the Gestapo have decisive influence on the release of internees, or who, in your opinion, was responsible for the releases which took place in the course of time?

SCHAEFER: Various authorities were responsible for the release of prisoners: first, the competent Regierungspräsident and Landrdte who as a result of incessant protests on the part of the relatives of internees were well acquainted with their circumstances. Then the camp itself, and I as commandant of the camp, had an important part in the release of internees. After investigation in some of the cases I made suggestions for the immediate release of the prisoners, but I must say that, above all, it was Minister President Goering himself who at the time showed the greatest concern that the Oranienburg Camp should not be stuffed with prisoners but that as many as possible should be released. I must emphasize that at this point. I recall a Christmas speech of Diels, which he made to the prisoners on the occasion of their release, and in which he said that Minister President Goering had urged that at Christmas very extensive releases of prisoners should take place.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. BOEHM, the Tribunal is not trying this witness. It is trying the criminality of the SA. This is far too detailed about the release of prisoners. He seems not to have got further than 1933 up to the present.

HERR BOEHM: I should like to ask only one more question in this connection: How many people still remained in the camp after the releases at Christmas 1933?

SCHAEFER: Just over 100.

HERR BOEHM: Did you ever have any personal differences with Dr. Diels?

SCHAEFER: No, none at all. On the contrary, when in 1934 1 wrote a book about Oranienburg, he immediately on his own initiative offered to write an introduction for it, and I know that he always praised the camp.

HERR BOEHM: Are you familiar with the testimony of Ministerialdirektor Hans Fritzsche?

SCHAEFER: In part, yes.

HERR BOEHM: Is it true, as he says, that the first commandant of Oranienburg, who was there from March 1933 to 1934, was executed? You were the first commandant, were you not?

SCHAEFER: Yes. His statement is best refuted by the fact that I am now sitting here. Of course the statement is not true.

HERR BOEHM: The journalist Stolzenberg who was allegedly interned in Oranienburg reports that an official investigation took place in Oranienburg. Is that correct?

SCHAEFER: I recall only two such official investigations-the case of the Gestapo, which I mentioned before, and the Seger casein which an official investigation was held.

HERR BOEHM: What were the results of the investigations?

SCHAEFER: As I already said, in the case of the Gestapo it was established that the cases of maltreatment with which we had been charged had actually occurred in the Gestapo in Berlin, and in the Seger case it was proved beyond doubt that Seger had made statements contrary to the truth.

HERR BOEHM: Is it true that further tortures did take place, of which, as Fritzsche says, he learned from individuals in the Gestapo or the Press Office of the Reichsfuehrer SS?

SCHAEFER: I myself was firmly opposed to maltreatment and torture, and my guards knew my attitude well, moreover the inmates of the camp also knew it.

HERR BOEHM: Is it true, as Fritzsche says, that the 30th of June 1934 constituted a purge inasmuch as Gauleiter and SA Fuehrer who had misused their power were removed?

SCHAEFER: In connection with the concentration camps I cannot share this opinion.

HERR BOEHM: The former Reichstag Member for the SPD, Seger, of Dessau, wrote a book on Oranienburg. Do you know it?

SCHAEFER: Yes. Seger himself sent me this book.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know that Seger submitted this book to the Ministry of Justice for the investigation of the complaints which he made?

SCHAEFER: I know that too.

HERR BOEHM: And what did the Ministry of Justice do?

SCHAEFER:The prosecutor competent for the locality of Seger's former residence questioned me in great detail. A thorough investigation was carried out, with the result that, as far as I can recall, the Supreme Court in Leipzig stopped the proceedings.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know that Seger accused you of murder?

SCHAEFER: Yes, I know that.

HERR BOEHM: Was this matter cleared up beyond doubt?

SCHAEFER: Seger accused me of being responsible for the shooting and killing of two internees. This case was cleared up beyond all doubt, so satisfactorily indeed that when this book on my instructions was read to the internees in the camp, one of the persons who, as Seger alleged, had been shot, suddenly stood up and reported that he was alive and well, while the other one was already with his family, having been released; a clear refutation, therefore, by the two men themselves who were said to have been shot.

HERR BOEHM: The statement of fact as given by Seger must therefore plainly be called a lie?

SCHAEFER: Quite.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct, as you say in your book, that the prisoners could even make use of their right of secret ballot, on the basis of the Weimar Constitution?

I SCHAEFER: That is also true. The prisoners took part in the plebiscite on the continued participation of Germany in the League ,of Nations, and it was conducted under the legal rules as laid down in the Weimar Constitution.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. B6hm, I have already pointed out to you that we think you might get on to something a little more important. We are still dealing with 1933 or the beginning of 1934, in the Camp Oranienburg.

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, the SA is charged only with the Camp Oranienburg, and actually the SA guarded Oranienburg only from March 1933 to March 1934. It is therefore not possible to talk ,of any other period.

THE PRESIDENT: That we understand, that this witness tells us that the camp was administered in a perfectly satisfactory and proper manner, and we don't desire details of every day during 1933 and 1934.

HERR BOEHM: Since I expect the book of Seger to be submitted in cross-examination, perhaps the Tribunal will be interested to hear that its title was ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. B6hm, if it is submitted in cross-examination, the witness will then be able to answer questions which are put upon the book. It isn't necessary for you to anticipate possible cross-examination.

HERR BOEHM: Very well, Mr. President. May I continue? Is Seger's assertion true that Gauleiter Laeber of Dessau, furious on account of Seger's escape, came up to you in Oranienburg and slapped you?

SCHAEFER: No, that is not true. I never saw Gauleiter Laeber, and never made his acquaintance. Laeber was never in Oranienburg, I never met him on any other occasion, and there was therefore never any altercation between us.

HERR BOEHM: You said that the false reports on Oranienburg which were spread abroad were intended to poison relations between the nations. Can you support this view

with facts? .

SCHAEFER: Yes. Whenever articles appeared abroad on Oranienburg, for instance, I received an enormous number of threatening and offensive letters, which unfortunately showed that the completely false reports which appeared on Oranienburg had the result that perfect strangers, whom I did not know, and who did not know me, now felt obliged, not only with regard to me, but also with regard to the SA men under my command, and unfortunately also the whole German nation ...

THE PRESIDENT: What you are speaking of now-when did these articles appear, and when did you receive threatening letters?

SCHAEFER: In 1933 and 1934.

THE PRESIDENT: Those appeared then, and you received those letters then?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: Under whose orders were the guards at the Concentration Camp Oranienburg?

SCHAEFER: They were under my orders as their SA Fuehrer.

HERR BOEHM: And to whom was Oranienburg itself subordinate?

SCHAEFER: As I have already said, it was under the Regierungspräsident and the superior office of the Regierungspräsident, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. The SA was called upon for service within the SA auxiliary police to a very small extent. Channels went from the State, in this case the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, to the SA Gruppe, from the SA Gruppe to the SA Brigade and Standarte. My superior SA Fuehrer was at the same time an auxiliary police official, and through these channels the orders from above reached me. I was subject to a double command: For discipline, I was under the SA, and for State measures, I was directly subordinate to the State.

HERR BOEHM: You told the Commission that you received the order for the establishment of this camp from the competent SA Standarte.

SCHAEFER: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: How is that possible?

SCHAEFER: That is in accordance with the channels I have just described: the State, SA Gruppe, Standartenfuehrer, as the man responsible for the use of the auxiliary police, and so, through him, by the State, I received the order to establish the camp.

BEER BOEHM: What persons were brought to the Oranienburg Camp?

SCHAEFER: Mainly, of course, active opponents were sent to the Oranienburg Camp. Then there were elements of the Movement and the SA, who owing to undisciplined conduct had incurred confinement. For this purpose there was a special camp section in Oranienburg. At the same time however informers who had acted for their own personal advantage in denouncing political opponents to further their own interests and against their better knowledge were also imprisoned there. And then -there was a small group of people who, although sympathizing with the NSDAP, might have caused difficulties with foreign powers by their foreign nationality. Among those was the leader of the Russian National Socialists in Berlin, who had to be detained in Oranienburg because he was causing political mischief. He was a man obsessed with fantastic ideas who had in this way to be withdrawn from circulation, though for a comparatively short time, as a matter of fact.

HERR BOEHM: Is it right to say that the groups you have just mentioned could be expected to cause an uprising of some sort against the existing government?

SCHAEFER: Yes, that could be expected from the groups of active political opponents, and it was proved by the weapons which were found in a well-preserved condition.

THE PRESIDENT: We had this already today, about the confiscation of weapons.

HERR BOEHM: No, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: I have written it down myself. I heard it.

HERR BOEHM: I certainly do not want to have it repeated, Mr. President. It is plain that excesses happen in times of revolution. Did excesses also take place on the part of members of the SA and the NSDAP?

SCHAEFER: That cannot and shall not be denied.

HERR BOEHM: How do you explain such excesses?

SCHAEFER: There was, in the first place, a group of political hot-heads who in such a time of revolution went far beyond the goal set for them; but, as I have already clearly said, there were also obscure elements which, uncontrolled, because they came from the outside, had gained admittance into the SA and the Party. For these elements, of course, the seizure of power was the best opportunity

to commit punishable acts, but may I emphasize that we on our part did everything possible to take really strict steps whenever such excesses were reported to us. The Party had formed its own police corps for this purpose, which was known to take action without consideration for persons or position.

HERR BOEHM: What was the basis for arrests and confinement in concentration camps?

SCHAEFER: An order for protective custody had in all cases to be issued first.

HERR BOEHM: Who issued this order?

SCHAEFER: The political police or the Kreis police authority issued these orders.

HERR BOEHM: To what work were the people in the concentration camps assigned?

SCHAEFER: They were used for work in the interest of the concentration camp itself, in the administration, and also for land cultivation work.

HERR BOEHM: Did you, as the commandant, receive complaints -from prisoners about improper treatment?

SCHAEFER: I do not recall that I personally ever received any complaints.

HERR BOEHM: But when it became known that improper conditions actually existed, did you do anything about them?

SCHAEFER: Through constant contact with the internees-I was -in the camp very frequently and for long periods-I occasionally learned of improper conditions. I can give the assurance here that I did everything possible to remove such conditions as soon as I had learned of them.

HERR BOEHM: Did any executions take place during the time in which this camp was guarded by the SA?

SCHAEFER: No.

HERR BOEHM: Were there any instruments for the torture or the extermination of human beings in this camp, while you were commandant?

SCHAEFER: No.

HERR BOEHM: Who was in charge of guarding the camp after you?

SCHAEFER: The SA continued to guard it for some time, about two months, and then the SS took over.

HERR BOEHM: And what can you, as the first commandant of the camp, say about that change-over?

SCHAEFER: The camp was not taken over because of any inadequacies or improper conditions, but because after the 30th of June it became the task of the SS to direct these concentration camps. The Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler took over the concentration camps and administered them with his men. The SA therefore had nothing at all to do with the concentration camps after 1934.

HERR BOEHM: Now I want to ask you, did you have occasion to punish the camp -guards for any excesses which they might have committed?

SCHAEFER: Of course, excesses were punished. If they appeared to be of a serious nature, I was under the obligation to report them to the superior authority-in this particular case, the State. I had to make such reports about two Sturmbannfuehrer and one Sturmfuehrer who were assigned to me. These three men were immediately removed from their positions and were put on trial.

HERR BOEHM: Did you yourself inflict punishments, and if so, what punishments?

THE PRESIDENT: Wasn't this gone into before the Commission?

HERR BOEHM: In part, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: You are dealing with the case of three officers at the moment. Either it was gone into before the Commission or it was not.

HERR BOEHM: It was mentioned before the Commission, Mr. President. But I now wanted to add the question whether SA men, not only these three officers, but SA men, were punished and dismissed.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you can pass on from the three officers.

HERR BOEHM: It is true that in addition to these officers of whom you spoke before the Commission, SA men were also dismissed in this connection?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: Is it true that because of your satisfactory direction of the Camp Oranienburg you became head of the Penal Execution Administration in the Ministry of Justice?

SCHAEFER: In 1934 1 was taken over by the Prussian Ministry of Justice. I was not appointed Chief of the Reich Penal Execution Administration, but I became commander of, the Ems installations, the biggest organization within that administration. Then in the course of the year I became director of a penitentiary, and thereafter I remained in the Penal Execution Administration.

HERR BOEHM: In this connection it maybe necessary to clarify what you understand by "SA auxiliary police."

SCHAEFER: The SA auxiliary police was, as the name says, an auxiliary organ of the Police. In order that the revolution might be carried through without bloodshed according to orders, it was, of course, necessary that there should be close supervision. Since the police forces available were not adequate, the State made use of a comparatively small number of SA men who had a particularly good police record and whose lives had been without reproach. Old and experienced police officials initiated them into their duties, and then together with the police they carried out their services within the limits of general police duties. But this was only a temporary measure.

HERR BOEHM: What did you, as commandant of Camp Oranienburg, consider to be your task?

SCHAEFER: It was my task primarily to direct the camp in a clear and correct way. In addition I had to supervise the measures which were taken against the internees.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I interfere with the greatest possible reluctance with Dr. BOEHM's examination, but I cannot think that he has appreciated the instruction which Your Lordship has repeated to Defense Counsel on several occasions during the last week.

My Lord, this witness gave evidence before the Commission, which I have in front of me. This morning Dr. BOEHM is going into these matters in far greater detail than they were gone into before the Commission. As I understood the order of the Tribunal, it was that counsel should not repeat what was gone into before the Commission, but should select the important points and deal with them and give Your Lordship and the Tribunal an opportunity for judging the witness and seeing his merits and capabilities.

My Lord, I do ask, very respectfully, that some limit should be put on this very extended examination in controversion of the Tribunal's ruling.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Bhm, unless you observe the orders of the Tribunal in this matter the Tribunal will have to stop the examination of this witness. You must consider that.

The Tribunal will now adjourn, in the hope that after the adjournment you will observe the orders. Otherwise, as I say, we will stop the examination of this witness.

[A recess was taken.]

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I intend to observe the order of the High Tribunal that witnesses are to be heard upon topics which were not discussed before the Commission. But the questionnaire submitted to the witness had to be extended somewhat to include the Seger case, details of which we heard only quite recently, and to include questions on the affidavit of the witness Diels, on which this witness had to give views. At the time when this witness was heard before the Commission, both the questionnaire and the affidavit deposed by Diels were still unknown.

THE PRESIDENT: There was no objection about his being examined about the affidavit. That was not dealt with in the Commission before. We do not want you to go over all the details which were gone over before the Commission.

HERR BOEHM: I have only about ten more questions to put to the witness, Mr. President. I shall ask the witness to be as brief as possible.

When you were commandant of Oranienburg, was there any supervision on the part of the State?

SCHAEFER: Yes. The camp of Oranienburg was supervised by the Regierungspräsident at Potsdam, by the Police President, Count Helldorf, and by high officials of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

HERR BOEHM: Did the Kreis police authority have any right of supervision?

SCHAEFER: Yes, the Landrat of the Kreis Barnim.

HERR BOEHM: Did all these authorities actually carry out controls and checks?

SCHAEFER: Frequent checks, and very thorough ones, did take place.

HERR BOEHM: Did foreigners and other prominent personalities have an opportunity of visiting the camp at Oranienburg and of talking with the inmates?

SCHAEFER: Visits of that kind were made at Oranienburg on a very large scale. Those participating were the Foreign Press, the German Press, and private citizens from abroad who were politically interested. They had an opportunity of talking with the prisoners quite freely inside the camp and at their places of work.

HERR BOEHM: Is it correct that on the occasion of one of these visits you were told: "Now you are going to show us only what we are permitted to see and all the rest will remain concealed from us"?

SCHAEFER: That is correct. That was put to me and I thereupon saw to it that these visitors to the camp should be able to go wherever they pleased. There was nothing to hide, nothing to be concealed in Oranienburg. The visitors themselves had an opportunity of forming their own judgment.

HERR BOEHM: Please tell us, briefly, about the food of the internees in this camp.

SCHAEFER: The food for the inmates was good. Proof of that was the fact that the inmates always increased in weight. Apart from that, everything necessary and required was done. to allow the inmates to live under humanly dignified conditions. They even had their own canteen where their daily needs could be met.

HERR BOEHM: Now, just a few questions about the penal camp

s in Emsland. Why were these camps established?

SCHAEFER: In 1933 the penal institutions of Germany were overcrowded, the prime reason being the country's great social distress at that time. It was the special wish of Minister President Goering at that time that prisoners should take part in the large cultivation, projects in the Ems district. The SS was charged with setting up a number of large camps so that prisoners could be collected there for their cultivation work. However, the generous Christmas amnesty of the Minister President made this task problematical, so an offer of filling these camps with criminal prisoners was accepted and carried into effect by the then Prussian Minister of Justice, Kerrl.

HERR BOEHM: Did the-Supreme SA command have jurisdiction over the camps in the Emsland?

SCHAEFER:No, they were State camps, subordinate only to the Reich Ministry of Justice.

HERR BOEHM: You already mentioned that these camps were filled with criminals who were put to work there?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: Now I should like to put a final question to you. How many SA men were used in the concentration camp Oranienburg as guards and as employees of the German Police?

SCHAEFER: When the camp was first erected, approximately 30 to 40; at the time when it had most inmates, approximately 90.

HERR BOEHM: Can you tell me who, from the beginning, furnished the guards at Dachau?

SCHAEFER: As far as I know, Dachau was an SS camp entirely. The SA was never active in Dachau.

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, for the present I have no more questions to put to this witness.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Witness, you probably know it already, but if you do not, you may take it from me that in the last eight months this Tribunal has heard a great deal of evidence about concentration camps. Do you deny, now, that even in 1933 concentration camps were regarded throughout Germany with terror?

SCHAEFER: I did not quite understand the question.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will state it again. Do you deny that. even in 1933 concentration camps were regarded by people throughout Germany with terro

r?

SCHAEFER: Anyone who is arrested always naturally connects a personal horror with his arrest, for the loss of freedom alone compels. him to have a feeling of that sort. But there was no reason, at that time, to be horrified by the thought of such internment.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You have spoken, this morning, about the Reichstag deputy, Herr Gerhard Seger. He wrote a book on the Oranienburg Concentration Camp. I am not going to talk on that book, but do you remember that the title of it was A Nation Terrorized? Do you remember that title?

SCHAEFER: No.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Do you consider that that was a reasonable title to give a book on Oranienburg?

SCHAEFER: No.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Would it have been a reasonable title to give about the. concentration camps at Wuppertal or Hohenstein?

SCHAEFER: I cannot make any statements in that respect. I never knew Wuppertal and as far as Hohenstein is concerned, I only know that the severest measures were taken there when abuses were discovered. Later I learned that the leading men of the Concentration Camp Hohenstein received very long terms of penal servitude and imprisonment.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You know, too, that those severe penalties were reduced in the most serious cases to about half the sentence? Don't you know that?

SCHAEFER: No. That is unknown to me.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You know that the number of people. who were sentenced in Hohenstein was 25 and that the official report about it said that they were not all those who took part in the excesses, but only the most prominent ones? Did you know that?

SCHAEFER: I do not know the particulars. I know only that at that time very severe and strict measures were taken.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: And did you know at that time about the atrocities which were going on in Wuppertal and in Hohenstein? You knew about it at that time, did you not?

SCHAEFER: No.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You knew that those camps, or at any rate you know now that those camps were run by the SA? Is that right?

SCHAEFER: No. I did not know that either.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You did not know they were run by the SA?

SCHAEFER: No. I did not know that.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Witness, I want you to look at a document-which is Number 787-PS, My Lord, in Book 16a, at Page 16. That is a letter written by Dr. Görtner, the Reich Minister of Justice, to Hitler, and he describes at the beginning of the letter the maltreatment of prisoners in Hohenstein, including torture by a Orip apparatus. If you look toward the end of the letter-I should think it is about 10 lines from the end-you will see he is talking about the principal SA offender, one Vogel, and he says: "By his actions he supported the convicted SA leaders and men in their deeds."

That shows that Hohenstein atrocities were done by SA men, does it not?

SCHAEFER: I am afraid that in one brief minute I cannot read through a document five pages long. I should like to say only that I learned afterward that severe measures were taken against the SA leaders and against the SA men who had perpetrated crimes in Hohenstein. I should also like to point out that it was the Minister of Justice Dr. Görtner, himself, who took me over into his Penal Execution Administration as an SA leader known to him personally. That shows that he did not generalize the matters which in this letter he is reporting to the Fuehrer as an isolated case. These are isolated cases, and the criminals concerned in them received their due punishment.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Witness, if you say you do not know what went on in Hohenstein and Wuppertal at that time, let me ask you this: You knew Görtner fairly well. Did you not?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You knew Kerrl fairly well, did you not?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Kerrl was Lutze's uncle, was he not?

SCHAEFER: I know that he was a relative of Lutze; what relative I do not know.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: And he was a very fervent Nazi, too, was he not-Kerrl?

SCHAEFER: Oh, yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Did you not talk with him about these concentration camps, these other concentration camps? You were the commandant of the first concentration camp at Oranienburg. Didn't you talk to him about the others that were springing up, the other concentration camps?

SCHAEFER:No.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Did you talk to Görtnerabout them?

SCHAPER: There was no reason for that, either.

I should like to explain in this connection that it was just the Prussian Minister of Justice, Kerrl, who after numerous visits to Oranienburg selected me on the basis of the fact that Oranienburg appeared to be under a decent and orderly command and, at that time, appointed me to be commandant of the penitentiary camps.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: We will come to that in a minute. I am suggesting to you now that it was just because of the interest that Kerrl took in you that he did in fact appoint you to your position with the "Strafgefangenenlager," later. It was just because of that I am suggesting that you might have talked the whole problem out with him. Did you or did you not?

SCHAEFER: Only insofar as it concerned the Camp Oranienburg.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I see.

SCHAEFER: I remember ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Did you talk to Count Helldorf, the Police President, about the general problem of concentration camps?

SCHAEFER: Also only insofar as it concerned Oranienburg, and in that case, extensively.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I see. Now you say that none of these terrors and atrocities went on in Oranienburg; is that right?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, I have here an affidavit which Rudolf Diels has sworn this morning since you started your evidence, and I will read a little of it to you, and you can tell me if it is true or not.

My Lord, this is Document Number 976; it becomes Exhibit GB-595.

[Turning to the witness.] Rudolf Diels says:

"I received, from various individuals, complaints about ill treatment by SA men in concentration camps. I learned that SA guards had badly ill-treated the following persons in the Concentration Camp Oranienburg: Mr. Ebert, son of the former Reichspräsident; Ernst Heilmann, the leader of the Prussian Social Democrats; Reichstag President Paul Loebe; and Oberpr5sident Lukaschek."

Then he goes on to say:

"I myself gained confirmation of these ill-treatments on the occasion of an inspection tour through Camp Oranienburg. At that time the commandant was SA Fuehrer Sdh5fer. For a short time, conditions improved after my intervention; then they deteriorated again. I myself did not succeed in removing Schider, since he was backed by the SA Leadership."

Is that true or is it not? Did your men ill-treat Herr Ebert, Herr Heilmann, Paul Loebe, and Lukaschek? Did they ill-treat them or did they not?

SCHAEFER: May I be permitted to give the following explanation on this point ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Say yes or no.

SCHAEFER: That I cannot do.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Kindly give an explanation.

SCHAEFER: I cannot make a statement in that form. Herr Loebe was never an inmate of Oranienburg; Herr Lukaschek, to my knowledge, was never an inmate of Oranienburg either. Herr Diels is definitely mistaken in these cases. It is true, however, that the son of the Reich President, Ebert, was an inmate, and it is also true that Herr Heilmann was an inmate there. But I should like to explain that both of those gentlemen, Ebert as well as Heilmann, were maltreated by other inmates after their arrival, and I personally saw to it that they were separated from the group of inmates who had maltreated them.

Ebert was soon released, after a few weeks of internment. He and Heilmann never complained to me personally. I learned of their ill-treatment at the hands of other inmates from a third party and I took steps immediately to prevent such things from happening again.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You said before the Commission, Witness, that it was your endeavor in the Oranienburg Concentration Camp to try to give the inmates a life consistent with human dignity. Do you remember saying that to the Commissioner, "a life consistent with human dignity"? And is this the kind of life you gave to Ebert and Heilmann?

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I presume the answer is yes, is it not?

SCHAEFER: I cannot answer the question so simply, either. I did not say that for Heilmann and Ebert I brought about conditions consistent with human dignity, but I distinctly remember saying just now that I saw to it that they were not subjected to further maltreatment at the hands of the other inmates.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I did not ask you what you said just now; I asked you what you said before the Commission. And you said before the Commission that you endeavored to give the inmates a "life consistent with human dignity," did you not?

SCHAEFER: Yes, of course.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Do you remember saying it or not?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Did you give Heilmann and Ebert a life consistent with human dignity?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You did?

SCHAEFER: I never withheld from them anything consistent with human dignity. Of course, they led a life like that of any other inmate in a camp of that sort.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, but you said...

SCHAEFER: And it is surely quite understandable ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You know that this was supposed to be a camp for prominent persons in considerable numbers, according to Your own evidence, and you said that you wanted to give them an a life of human dignity. But let us not waste any time on this. Let me show you your own book.

My Lord, that is Document Number 2824-PS, and it is Exhibit USA-423. That is the book written by the witness, entitled Oranienburg Concentration Camp, published in 1934.

I want you to look first of all, Witness, at Page 23.

SCHAEFER: Yes, I have the page.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, there is a page where you were writing in rather a sarcastic vein about the people who came into the camps. Do you seethe very short passage where you say-and I think this sums up perhaps your whole attitude as to the object of your camp: "The moment had at last come when our old SA men could refresh the memory of some of these provocateurs who had been especially in the foreground politically." Do you see that?

[The witness made no response.]

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, the translation may not be exactly as it comes in your book; but do you see the passage? It is marked between brackets.

SCHAEFER: Yes, I have found the passage.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, what do you mean by your old SA men refreshing the memories of some of these provocateurs? I thought you said just now that it was the other inmates of the concentration camps who refreshed their memory. It is your own SA men, is it not, who refreshed the memory of Ebert and Heilmann?

SCHAEFER: I would like to ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, you wrote it, you know. Let me refresh your memory a bit. Turn to Page 173.

My Lord, I am sorry that these passages have not been translated. I only had them looked up this morning.

THE PRESIDENT: You ought to let him answer the other question you put to him on Page 23.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I beg Your Lordship's pardon. I did not realize he wanted to say something.

Witness, you wanted to say something on the passage on Page 23. Will you?

SCHAEFER: Yes, yes. This sentence is taken out of its context. To understand this sentence clearly, one would have to read the whole paragraph. The way in which it is taken out of its context and please do not misunderstand me-it becomes, in your sense, in the sense of the Prosecution ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, give the Tribunal briefly the sense of the context. Tell us what the sense of the context is.

SCHAEFER: I cannot, of course, explain the whole context, since you only read this one sentence to me. But I should like to say one thing, that when I spoke of human dignity, I did not mean it in an ambiguous but in the perfectly straightforward sense; and also that this sentence, taken out of its context, does not prove the opposite.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, I will leave that passage then. Will you now turn to Page...

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean, what is the context, what is the context from which it is torn? What do you mean by "refreshing their memories"?

SCHAEFER: May it please the High Tribunal, may I perhaps for my own information quickly reread the context. I no longer have my book so, completely in mind, and to answer this question, I must flrst read through these lines; then perhaps I can give the answer which Your Lordship desires.

THE PRESIDENT: You are saying, are you not, you don't know what you mean by "refreshing their memories"?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Let me help you a little by referring you to another passage not very far away from that. Just turn to Page 25, and you will see a passage in between brackets there.

"Rarely have I seen such marvellous educators as my old SA men, some of whom were themselves of proletarian origin and who took on with extraordinary devotion these Communist swashbucklers who acted in a particularly insolent manner." Isn't refreshing the memory of the provocateurs the same thing really as the education-the marvellous education which your old SA men gave to them? What is the education? If you don't know what you mean by "refreshing their memories," what did you mean by "marvellous education"?

SCHAEFER: I understand your meaning-you expect me to admit that maltreatment actually did take place. I think I understood you correctly, but I should like to state ...

THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question, please. The question is: What did you mean by the education that you last spoke of?

SCHAEFER: I mean an education through personal example, not an education through maltreatment or similar misdeeds.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Look back again to Page 23, and you will see another passage in brackets. "To conceal.. ." Page 23, have you got it?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: To the effect, "To conceal the fact that some of the prisoners had not been treated too gently, meanwhile, would be stupid as well as completely incomprehensible; incomprehensible inasmuch as such treatment was in accordance with an urgent necessity." What was the urgent necessity of not treating the prisoners too gently? Are you going to say it was purely disciplinary treatment? It is the same page as the first bracket I read, you know, from the same page as "refreshing their memory." Well, I will leave that passage and turn now to Page 173.

SCHAEFER: May I give you an answer to this? I wrote quite freely and openly about these matters in this book, and I do not wish to deny that there were a very few isolated cases in which it became necessary to treat inmates who acted in a certain way-to treat such inmates accordingly. r have no reason to conceal now, and I did not conceal in my book, that such incorrigible rowdies -- I have no other name for them -- had of course to be taken to task accordingly.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You were writing your book in some spirit of exultation over a Nazified Germany in 1934, weren't you? Turn to Page 173 ...

SCHAEFER: I should like to say something on this point too ...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how you did treat them. You said in certain cases inmates had to be treated accordingly. "Accordingly" meaning, I suppose, not too gently; is that what you meant?

SCHAEFER: My Lord, the question ran simply be answered in this way: If an inmate believed-and there were such cases-that he had to impose his own will by means of brutality, then it was my duty to call his attention emphatically to the fact that at that moment he did not have the right to do so.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Tell the Tribunal what it was-be brief, but tell the Tribunal what it was that you had particularly against Ebert and Heilmann. What was your complaint against t

hem that needed treatment?'

SCHAEFER: Ebert and Heilmann aid not receive any special treatment in that sense, and we had no reason whatever for treating them in any special way. They did not receive any special treatment, as I said, but ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Go on.

SCHAEFER: Both of them were treated in a normal fashion, and they cannot claim that they received any other treatment. At any rate, I know of none.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Let's see what the normal fashion was. Turn to Page 173. Have you got Page 173? Read the part in brackets.

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will read the translation: "And then next day, in fatigue dress, Ebert with a shovel and Heilmann with a broom, ready for work in the forecourt of the camp. Nothing was so comforting to the prisoners in the camp as the sight of their prominent fellow-internees going to work in the same way. They were on a par with them." That is what you call the same treatment, the normal treatment, was it?

SCHAEFER: Every inmate of the camp received fatigue clothing for work to save his own clothing. Each one received trousers and a coat and we did not and could not make an exception in the case of Ebert and Heilmann. Moreover, as far as I remember today, both of them asked to participate in manual labor, a request which was granted them.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You know, I suppose, that Heilmann eventually died a cripple in a concentration camp, don't you?

SCHAEFER: No, I do not know that.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You and your SA men created and operated Oranienburg as a result of orders issued originally by Guering, did you not, as Minister of the Interior for Prussia? That is where your orders came from, through SA channels?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: And you have told the Tribunal that the SA who were looking after the camp under you were put under the orders of the Police, and that they, in fact, became deputy policemen for the purpose, is that your evidence?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Tell me this. Why do you suppose that Goering chose SA men to do this job? Was it because the ordinary police would not do it?

SCHAEFER: No. A little while ago I explained that the police forces at our disposal were not sufficient to insure a revolution without bloodshed, which the Fuehrer had demanded in his order, and for this purpose therefore the Prussian Ministry of the Interior used the selected SA men as auxiliary police.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Supposing that the ordinary police had been sufficient, are you telling the Tribunal that if the ordinary police had run these concentration camps at Oranienburg, Wuppertal, and Hohenstein -- are you telling the Tribunal that these excesses would have occurred if the ordinary police would have run them? Would you even have had these isolated incidents that you talked about if the ordinary police would have run them?

SCHAEFER: There were police officials * in Oranienburg from the first day of the camp's existence. I do not know how it was at Wuppertal, but I should like to say that no SA man or SA leader did so on

who participated in any isolated instance of an outrage the strength of -an order, but on his own account. His action was not covered by any order, and it did not protect him from the punishment which he received.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I suggest to you, Witness, the SA were chosen to run Oranienburg for the very simple reason that the SA alone could be relied on by the Movement to run it on sufficiently brutal lines. Do you agree, or don't you?

SCHAEFER: N( , I cannot agree with you.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: If you have forgotten what Goering thought about the ordinary police at that time, let me read you a short passage from a speech he made on the third of March 1933, which must have been just exactly about the same time that he gave the order to found Oranienburg Camp.

My Lord, it is Document Number 1856-PS; it is in Document Book 16 a at Page 28, and it is Exhibit USA-437.

[Turning to the witness.] Now this is what Goeringsaid just at the time that he was ordering Oranienburg to be started by you. He said:

"Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any judicial thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any bureaucracy. Here I do not have to administer justice; my mission is only to destroy and exterminate, nothing more. This struggle will be a struggle against chaos and I shall not conduct it with the power of any police; a bourgeois state might have done that. Certainly I shall use the power of the State and the Police to the utmost, my dear Communists, so do not draw any false conclusions. But the struggle to the death, in which my fist will lie heavily upon your necks, I shall conduct with those down there-and they are the Brown Shirts."

Did you ever hear or read that speech at that time? It doesn't look as if Goering thought much of the ordinary police when he ordered Oranienburg to be started, does it?

Are you telling the Tribunal that after that speech Goering intended to create a camp which would be mild and humane and just, as you tried to describe in your evidence?

SCHAEFER: I do not know this speech, but I see that it is said to have been delivered on 3 March 1933. At that time Camp Oranienburg was not in existence, it was not then about to be set up and it had not been planned.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: It came into existence the same month.

SCHAEFER: At the end of March, yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, Witness, I put it to you that the truth about Oranienburg is this,- in a sentence:

When you first established Oranienburg Concentration Camp it was an ordinary brutal SA concentration camp, but late in the summer of 1933 you decided to use it as a show camp to demonstrate to foreign countries how mild and just the concentration camp system was. Is that right or wrong?

SCHAEFER: No, that is not correct; it is not correct in any way.

I could today -- and in my present situation, it will carry most weight if I say so publicly -- I could call as witnesses here the first inmates of the Camp Oranienburg who were living there at the time I was commandant; I could call them to testify that I was not prepared top create a model camp simply for the sake of outward appearances. A decent direction of a camp of that sort represented my innermost convictions, and I should Eke to say that this was not merely a question of common sense, but a matter of feeling.

And may I add another thing: I went through the political struggle in Germany, which was very bitter, and I wen knew that by creating martyrs one does not strengthen one's own position. It is quite logical, therefore, that I could never take an interest in creating martyrs.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, didn't you write your book as part of this idea of having a show camp to convince foreigners? Isn't that part of the idea of your book? It was written to convince foreigners anyway, was it not? You said so to the Commissioner, you know.

SCHAPER: Quite true, I said so; but may I complete this explanation? I said at that time exactly what I am saying now. I wrote this book deliberately to refute the lying reports-and I cannot call them anything else-which had appeared about this camp abroad, to refute them as a matter of duty. That, in my opinion, was a right which I was entitled to claim.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Who commissioned you to write this book? Was it Goering? Did Goeringsuggest that you should write this book?

SCHAEFER: I can say in all frankness that no one commissioned me to write this book, but...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Did you consult Goering?

SCHAEFER: No. I think that Herr Goeringprobably sees me for the very first time today; and I am seeing him for the first time at such close quarters. We never discussed these matters.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Did you consult the Prussian Ministry of Justice when you wrote your book?

SCHAEFER: No. I have already stated quite clearly that I did not discuss this book with a third party in any way, but that I wrote it because an enormous number of these newspaper reports were sent to me, and because I myself thought it necessary to vindicate Camp Oranienburg. I considered it to be my duty ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Now, tell me about these newspaper reports. Were they adverse criticisms of Oranienburg only, or of other camps? Was Oranienburg the only one they criticized? Perhaps it was.

SCHAEFER: These articles? I did not hear the translation of the first part of your question.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: You told us that you had many articles in the press which were adverse and which required refuting. Were they adverse to Oranienburg only, or to other camps?

SCHAEFER: Naturally I could only reply to the articles which dealt with Oranienburg; I did not concern myself with other camps.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I did not ask you that. Were there any other articles about other camps? Did you see any articles about other camps?

SCHAEFER: I do not recall any. I received only articles which concerned Oranienburg.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Who sent them to you then? Goering?

SCHAEFER: They came from all sorts of people, from various

classes of the population and also from foreigners who were interested in bringing their press to my attention.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well now, one of the articles was written in The Times newspaper, the English paper, was it not? And you reproduced it in your book. That article was very adverse to Oranienburg.

My Lord, there are extracts from that article in Document

Book 16a, at Page 35, and it is Document Number 2824(a)-PS.

[Turning to the witness.] I just want to point out to you two or three short extracts, because I am going to suggest to you that they were perfectly true-this is at Page 112 in your book, I think:

"We got to Oranienburg Concentration Camp. We had to stand fallen in at attention for over three hours. Anyone who tried to sit down was beaten. Each of us got a small mug of coffee and a piece of black bread, our first food that day."

Then, a bit further on:

"Prominent prisoners were beaten more often than the others, but everyone got his full share of blows."

And a little further on:

"They also sometimes rubbed black shoe polish into the prisoners all over, and checked up next day to see if it had all been washed off."

And further on again:

"Most of the prisoners were not allowed to mention the blows they had received, but every night we could hear their cries. Those who were released had to sign two papers, a white one which stated that the treatment in the camp was good, and a blue one."

Now that article also mentioned, among the well-known prisoners, a Dr. Levy. Is that correct? Do you remember Dr. Levy?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: And in your book, after publishing this Times article, you published a letter from Dr. Levy to The Times on 25 September 1933 -- that was about six days after the article -- in which Dr. Levy denied that there were any atrocities at Oranienburg. Can you find that letter?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: That letter of Dr. Levy's was written in Potsdam, was it not? It says "Potsdam" underneath the envelope.

SCHAEFER: Yes, I can see that in the book it says, "Potsdam, the 25th of September." But may I explain something in this connection?

This article which you read in extracts just now refers to boys of the social welfare organizations of the Jewish community in Berlin, who were taken to Oranienburg at the time. These boys were really criminal elements of which the Jewish community had rid itself by paying the necessary amount of money to put them in a special ,educational home. It is absolutely incorrect ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: What has that got to do with Dr. Levy? I said, wa

s Dr. Levy's letter written from Potsdam? Are you telling the Tribunal that that letter was written voluntarily, or did you get it out of him by threats? You could have got it out of him by threats easily, could you not? You could, couldn't you?

SCHAEFER: May I ask you to listen to the end of my explanation. I am coming to Dr. Levy now. It was Dr. Levy-and I can give this assurance here quite openly and publicly-who at that time personally asked to see me and requested that these boys of the Jewish social Welfare, who were not at all behaving themselves, be segregated in a section of their own. Dr. Levy was a well-known defense lawyer who was at that time interned in Oranienburg. He was released again soon after his arrival. I personally remember that Dr. Levy, when he left Oranienburg, said good-bye to me in a very cordial manner. I am not at all of the opinion that he was forced at Potsdam to write this article or this letter to me which then appeared in The Times. On the contrary, I would assume that Dr. Levy put "Potsdam" on top of the letter in order to make it distinctive, because the name Levy was not a rare name in Germany at that time. Perhaps in that way he wished to make it clear that the defense lawyer Dr. Levy from Potsdam was the author of the letter. I cannot think of any other explanation and I am quite sure that it would be possible, even today, to question Dr. Levy. At that time he was in the prime of life; I am sure he is still alive today, and it must be possible to summon him and hear him on this question. But I can never believe that Dr. Levy allowed himself to be forced t6 write an article of that sort. But even assuming that he was forced, who should have forced The Times to print a report which was not in agreement with their opinion?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I am not going to argue with you about that. My suggestion is perfectly clear, that Dr. Levy's letter was a transparent attempt on your part to refute the Times article, which you knew to be true. We won't argue that any more. You evidently disagree. But you will agree to this, won't you, that Dr. Seger seems to have agreed with the Times article in his book, doesn't he? In his book, A Nation Terrorized, he seems to be very much of the same idea as the Times article? Look at another letter in your book now...

SCHAEFER: May I give you an answer to that too. The book written by Seger is not called, A Nation Terrorized, but it is called Oranienburg. And I should like to say this at once, Herr Seger knowingly committed perjury when, at the beginning of his book, he used the form of oath customary in German courts, and then had his statements refuted in every case.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I understand what your position is on that and I am sure the Tribunal does too, but just look at one more letter in your book before I finish. Turn to Page 241. Have you got it? Now there toward the bottom of the page is a letter from an inmate which you published in much the same way as Dr. Levy's letter, I suggest, to show how good conditions were. And you see over the page, on Page 242, he says in this letter: "Dear Mr. SCHAEFER: The days at Oranienburg will always be among the best memories of my life." Do you see that passage? "The days at Oranienburg will always be among the best memories of my life."

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Don't you think that that is too good to be true, or do. you support that today?

SCHAEFER: May I say the following: It is true, quite true. I admit that this letter was written in a mood of exuberance and joy at being free again. But I do not doubt that the author of the letter quite truthfully meant what he wrote in this letter to me. One ought to hear him personally on this matter.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: He may have had the best intentions, but why should he say that the days in a concentration camp, where his liberty was taken away, were among the best memories of his life? Can any man be...

SCHAEFER: Perhaps I might be permitted to say that before the concentration camps existed there were men-and I belonged to them-who stood in line in front of the unemployment agencies and who suffered very great misery, men who here in the concentration camp had enough to eat for the first time. That I should like to make quite clear.

M

AJOR BARRINGTON: They had enough to eat, and you remember you told the Commissioner that you had them weighed and they all gained in weight. If you will look at the last two pages of your book I think you will see that you published there a table or a list of the weights of the prisoners, showing how much they had gained while they were in the camp. Have you got that?

My Lord, that is Document Number 2924(b). It is on Page 17, I think-Page 32, immediately after the Times article.

[Turning to the witness.] Now that is a list, isn't it, which shows the name of the prisoner, or his Christian name and the initials of his surname, and the weight on a certain date and then, after a certain period, what he had gained. Well, now, I am going to suggest to you that those weights are so fantastic that they can't possibly be true. Just look down, you will see that you have had some of them printed in bolder type than the others. Look at Hermann H. from Wriezen. Have you got it?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: On the 26th of June he weighed 54 kilograms; on the 6th of September he weighed 68. That is an increase of 14 kilograms or 21/2 English stones in two and a half months. And look down further, you will see Erich L., who gained 15 kilograms in six months. And further down, Paul S., who gained 15 kilograms in four months; and if you look over the page you will see Fritz T. who started at 55 kilograms and very nearly gained half his own weight in three months, 19 kilograms in three months; that is 3 English stones in three months. Dor3't you think those are rather fantastic figures, impossible to believe? Well I'll put it another way to you; I'll make another suggestion, see if you will accept this explanation. If the Times article was true about the poor food and conditions, and if my suggestion is right that you afterward decided to have a show camp and to improve the conditions, isn't this list of weights quite consistent with the prisoners having first of all lost weight under the bad conditions and then gained it again rapidly when you improved conditions? Do you like that explanation? I am not saying it is right, but that is another explanation; or are you maintaining that these figures are correct? Are you maintaining that these figures are correct?

SCHAEFER: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I notice that you don't include Dr. Levy's weight in here; you don,1 include Dr. Seger's weight, do you? Or perhaps they lost weight, did they?

SCHAEFER: Perhaps they maintained their weight. This is only a list of weights, only an extract from the list of weight increases. You are assuming right from the beginning that these are fantastic figures. I would like to say, however, that even today I stand by whatever is set down in this book, and this list which is reproduced here is accurate and correct, and I would like to suggest to you that you ask a medical man what possibilities of gaining weight a man has who through years of unemployment has been exhausted and run down who then once again enters a nutritional phase in which he receives daily his regular meals and the things to which he is entitled. I am not a medical man, but I believe that without difficulty a physician will confirm to you that within four months a man can gain that amount of weight. In May of this year, I myself lost 50 pounds through insufficient food in the camp. In the course of . ...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, I suppose then that these men

must have been very disappointed when they were given the generous Christmas amnesty, weren't they?

SCHAEFER: About Christmas 1933, conditions in Germany had already changed essentially. I believe I may say that things were considerably better than in the year before.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is all the questions I have, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. BOEHM, have you any questions to ask the witness?

HERR BOEHM: Witness, was Hohenstein a Prussian camp?

SCHAEFER: No, Hohenstein, was far as I know -- I hope I am not mistaken in my geography -- is in Saxony.

HERR BOEHM: Was Wuppertal a camp of the State?

SCHAEFER: That I do not know.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know that Vogel, who was mentioned earlier, was an official of the Gestapo for the Land of Saxony?

SCHAEFER: No. I heard his name for the first time today; I do not know it.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know that in his application he requested the quashing of the proceedings, not in his capacity as a member of the SA, but in his capacity as an official of the Gestapo.?

SCHAEFER: I gathered from this letter, which I had just now for a few minutes, that he did this in his capacity as an official.

HERR BOEHM: Do you know that the SA suffered 300 casualties in killed and 40,000 in wounded during the struggle for power?

SCHAEFER: The figure of men killed is known to me. The exact figure of those wounded I do not know; I know only that it exceeded 10,000 by far.

HERR BOEHM: Is it not perhaps possible, after all, that many a member of the SA thought of the 300 killed and the 40,000 wounded comrades at the time when political opponents were taken to the Camp Oranienburg?

SCHAEFER: That cannot be denied, but no one was justified in taking any action which from the beginning was prohibited by the decree of the Fuehrer; on the other hand one must realize that the seizure of power occurred at a time when political tension was at its highest.

HERR BOEHM: Did anybody commission or order you to write the book Oranienburg?

SCHAEFER: No. As I have already said, I received no commission and no order for it.

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I have no further question to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

[The witness SCHAEFER resumed the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire, Dr. BOEHM.

[The witness left the stand.]

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, as next witness I should like to examine the witness Gruss. He is the witness who is to be questioned concerning the people who went over from the Stahlhelm to the SA.

[The witness Gruss took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Would you state your full name, please?

THEODOR GRUSS (Witness): Theodor Gruss.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

HERR BOEHM: Witness, how old are you?

GRUSS: 64 years old.

HERR BOEHM: Were you a member of the Party?

GRUSS: No.

HERR BOEHM: Or any of its branches?

GRUSS: No.

HERR BOEHM: Were you a soldier?

GRUSS: Yes, in the first World War.

HERR BOEHM: What was your rank?

GRUSS: Gefreiter (Corporal).

HERR BOEHM: And what was your rank in the Stahlhelm?

GRUSS: I was Chief Treasurer of the Stahlhelm.

HERR BOEHM: From when to when were you in the Stahlhelm?

GRUSS: From 1919 until it was dissolved in 1935.

HERR BOEHM: What was your task after the dissolution of the Stahlhelm in November 1935?

GRUSS: I had to carry out the liquidation of the Stahlhelm.

HERR BOEHM: And how long did you do that?

GRUSS: Until 1939.

HERR BOEHM: -How was the transfer of the Stahlhelm to the SA carried out?

GRUSS: At the end of April 1933 the first Bundesfuehrer, Reich Minister Franz Seldte, removed the second Bundesfuehrer, Duesterberg, from his post in violation of the Bund statute and assumed dictatorial command of the Stahlhelm. One day later, Seldte, in a radio speech, declared his entry into the Party and placed the Stahlhelm under Hitler. In June 1933, Hitler, in an agreement with Seldte, issued an order according to which

(1) The Stahlhelm Youth, the so-called Scharnhorst Bund, was to be incorporated into the Hitler Youth;

(2) The Young Stahlhelm and the sports units were placed under the Supreme SA Leadership;

(3) The rest of the Stahlhelm remained under the leadership of Seldte.

A few weeks later, in July 1933, a new order came from Hitler.

He ordered that now the entire Stahlhelm was to be placed under the Supreme SA Leadership, and directed that the Young Stahlhelm and the sports units were to be reorganized in view of their incorporation into the SA. On 4 July 1933, the leadership of the Stahlhelm undertook reorganization of the Bund and established:

(1) The Wehrstahlhelm, which was made up of the Young Stahlhelm, the sports units, and all Stahlhelmer up to the age of 35.

(2) The remainder of the Stahlhelm (Kern-Stahlhelm), made up of all members over 35 years of age.

Then the Wehrstahlhelm was incorporated into the SA as a separate formation with its own leaders, the field-gray uniforms, and the Stahlhelm, flags. This incorporation was completed around the end of October 1933.

At the beginning of November another order was issued by Hitler according to which the SA Reserves I and II were to be set up. The SA Reserve I was to be made up of units of the Stahlhelm, by the men from 36 to 45 years of age. The SA Reserve II was to include the older age groups, that is, men over 46. But, it never played any role, and was just registered in the lists.

On the other hand the units of the Stahlhelm were set up to form the SA Reserve I and were transferred to the SA, again with their own leaders, as separate units and in Stahlhelm uniforms. This operation was completed by the end of January 1934. 1 believe it was on 24 January that Chief of Staff Röhmreported to Hitler that the entire Stahlhelm had been incorporated into the SA.

Just as previously the Wehrstahlhelm was placed under the SA groups, the SA Reserve I was now also placed under the command of the SA groups, which meant in both cases ...

THE PRESIDENT: Isn't this all set out in detail in the Commission evidence?

HERR BOEHM: No, Mr. President. The examination of this witness by the Commission was not conducted in the way the examinations are generally carried out. This witness was only very briefly examined by the Commission because for one thing his state of health was very poor at that time, and there is no other alternative now except to examine this witness more fully before the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: The only topic he is dealing with is the merger of the Stahlhelm in the SA in 1933, isn't it? That is the only evidence he is giving and surely that is adequately dealt with in the Commission evidence.

HERR BOEHM: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything else that you want to get from him?

HERR BOEHM: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What is it? But you aren't getting it at present, you are getting the way in which the Stah1helm, was. merged in

the SA.

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, the members of the Stahlhelm consider it very important that the manner in which they were transferred into the SA should be presented to the Tribunal; how they were transferred by way of orders and that, as they assert, they in no wise volunteered for the SA, and I believe in this connection I may ...

THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that, but you aren't telling me, are you, that that wasn't stated in the evidence in the Commission, that they were taken over compulsorily by the SA.

HERR BOEHM: Yes, but I wanted the individual events as they actually occurred to be presented here to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we have got the summary of the evidence before us and it seems to me that the evidence he is giving-, now is the same as the evidence he gave then.

HERR BOEHM, It is true that a great part of the evidence giver)was the same, Mr. President, but he had just finished his testimony in this connection and I would have come to the next question anyhow.

[Turning to the witness.] Did the units of the SA Reserve I continue to exist until the collapse in 1945?

GRUSS: Not all of them. A large part of these units was in the course of ' years, particularly at the beginning of the war, transferred to the active SA. Here they were either assigned to the Front SA or attached to the Front SA as reserve groups, while the rest of the SA Reserve I units remained as before.

HERR BOEHM: Why did this incorporation of the SA Reserve into the SA take place?

GRUSS: The SA, particularly at the beginning of the war, began to show gaps. These gaps were filled through the transfer of the SA Reserve I. The primary purpose, however, was to have the Stahlhelmer, who were always recognized as an opposition, under better supervision of the SA.

HERR BOEHM: Why were you yourself not put into the SA?

GRUSS: I was already too old at that time, and besides, I was a Freemason.

HERR BOEHM: Over and beyond the orders given, was pressure exerted in connection with the incorporation of the Stah1helm into the SA?

GRUSS: Yes, to a large extent. First of all the transfer did not take place on a voluntary basis. It was done on orders; for example, in the case of the Wehrstahlhelm-and this is how it was done in most cases-the Wehrstahlhelmer were called together for a rollcall, they were told that they had been transferred, and then an SA Fuehrer who was present took over the Wehrstahlhelm. No one was asked whether he wanted to be transferred. Immediately upon the incorporation of the Stahlhelm, it became apparent that the majority of the Stahlhelmer resented and resisted this incorporation. Stahlhelmer who did not want to join the SA were in many cases threatened with arrest. There are cases where punishment in the form of police arrest for ten days and longer was inflicted in this connection. Furthermore, the Stahlhelmer were told that by staying away from the SA an order of Hitler's would not be obeyed and this implied hostility to the State, which always had serious consequences. Whoever was charged with hostility to the State was reported to the police as politically unreliable and was especially watched by the police. It could at any time happen that he might be arrested without any reason and put into prison or a concentration camp. Being pronounced an enemy of the State also had the very serious consequence that the means of subsistence were nearly always either seriously curtailed or even withdrawn. Civil servants who as Stah1helmer did not want to be in the SA were pronounced enemies of the State and removed from their positions, frequently even with loss of pension. About the same applied to employees in private industry. They always lost their positions because the heads of a concern did not want to employ men who were enemies of the State. We in the Bund Leadership tried at the time in many hundreds of cases to help those Stahlhelmer who applied to us for aid, by taking these cases to the labor courts. But in most of the cases we did not succeed in having these people reinstated in their positions. The court mostly confined itself to granting them a compensation. The tribulations which a Stahlhelmer who did not want to belong to the SA had to undergo were in some cases so great that I recall with certainty several cases of suicide if Stahlhelmer who no longer could stand the strain.

HERR BOEHM: Do these observations of yours extend all over Germany?

GRUSS: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: Could it be true that deceptive maneuvers also took place when the Stahlhelm was incorporated?

GRUSS: Yes, in my opinion, deceptive maneuvers did take place. For example, I have already mentioned that the Wehrstahlhelm as well as the SA Reserve I were permitted to be incorporated as separate formations with their own leaders, and in the field-gray uniform. After a short time, however, these promises were simply broken and the Wehrstahlhelm as well as the SA Reserve I had to don the brown uniform of the SA. Thus they were no longer recognizable in the SA as former Stahlhelmer. 'Then there was one point which especially caused a lot of dissatisfaction. The Stahlhelmer had been promised that after the transfer they could remain members of the Stah1helm-t

his was the so-called double membership. They were allowed to participate in the activities of the Stahlhelm as long as it did not interfere with their service in the SA. But this promise also was withdrawn very soon and this caused the greatest difficulties to the Stahlhelmer who wanted to remain loyal to their Bund, and entailed many arrests and punishments of all kinds.

HERR BOEHM: At the time when Seldte turned over the Stahlhelm to Hitler, did he represent the will of the Stahlhelm Bund?

GRUSS: No, he did not. The vast majority of the Stahlhelmer did not approve the measures of Seldte. There were very heated quarrels in the Stahlhelm on account of this and if the Stahlhelm did not break away at the time it was only because the Stahlhelmer said: "We did not take an oath to the person of Seldte. We swore allegiance to the Stahlhelm and to the front-line soldiers."

HERR BOEHM: What ranks did the Stahlhelmer receive in the SA and what significance did they have?

GRUSS: Here too one could speak of a deceptive maneuver inasmuch as the Stahlhelm leaders had been expressly promised that they would serve in the SA with the same ranks. But this promise was not kept either. The Stahlhelm leaders were set down one or two ranks. Shortly thereafter, they were even relieved of their commands and held in reserve. Only a few of them still remained in positions of command. Most of them had really no longer anything to do in the SA, but they could not get out of the SA. According to my observation, no Stahlhelm leaders got beyond the rank of a Standartenfuehrer in the SA unless they were special exceptions, that is, men who distinguished themselves through exceptional activity on behalf of National Socialism. With regard to ranks, the National Socialist Reiter Korps, which included many Stahlhelmer, occupied a special position. But as regards the leaders, the Reiter Korps was more or less left alone. Here most of the Stahlhelm leaders up to Standartenfuehrer retained their command, although there were among these Stahlhelmer many who were in opposition.

HERR BOEHM: Was the attitude of the Stahlhelmer transferred to the SA different from the attitude of the ordinary SA?

GRUSS: Yes, by its very nature the Stahlhelm was something entirely different from the SA. Anyone who joined the Stahlhelm did so voluntarily and of his own volition. Not everyone was accepted in the Stahlhelm. Everyone was first carefully looked over. Then the Stahlhelm had a Bund Charter, a constitution which gave its members the right to elect on a completely democratic basis those leaders whom they wanted, or to remove those leaders whom they did not want. The two Bund Leaders themselves had to submit from time to time to the assembly of members, who then decided about their re-election.

The main characteristic of the Stahlhelm, however, was the carrying on of the tradition of the front-line comradeship formed in the field-that unique, comradeship which in all circumstances demands that "I must give everything for my comrade and help him, always." That was, as we called it, front socialism. No difference was made between rich and poor, between rank and position. We Stahlhelmer were all equals.

It must be added that the people who joined the Stahlhelm generally came from the moderate middle-class, or I might say from the conservative part of the population. These people were not in favor of extremes and radicalism. They stood for a moderate and peaceful development and, taken all in all, one should realize that the Stahlhelm was made up of quite a special class of people and that this had to result in much friction with the SA.

HERR BOEHM: Did the Stahlhelmer bring military views with them into the SA?

GRUSS: Yes, but only to the extent that within the Stahlhelm there was often talk of the first World War, in which almost all of us had participated. But we were not a military organization, as was often asserted of the Stahlhelm because it had a military command. However, it was quite impossible to lead a mass movement of one and a half million members without such commands, which to the Stahlhelmer, as old soldiers, had become second nature.

But otherwise we really never thought that there would be another war. We had had enough of the first World War and considered it our task to spread the idea among the people that problems could be solved without war and bloodshed. Not only in Germany did we represent this point of view. We established contacts abroad as well, especially with the foreign organizations of front-line soldiers, because we thought that these veterans would understand us best when we said that there must never be another war.

HERR BOEHM: Was the idea of soldierly comradeship designed to serve the preparation of a war of aggression?

GRUSS: No; from what I just said it should be clear that the Stahlhelmer never thought of a war of aggression; the idea of soldierly comradeship served the sole purpose of spreading the virtues of comradeship formed in the field among wide circles in order that it might peacefully lead to a better understanding among nations.

HERR BOEHM: What were the views of the Stahlhelm toward the political parties of Germany?

GRUSS: The Stah1helm was opposed to all -radical political tendencies. It did not follow the principle of extermination and destruction. It tried again and again to unite these extreme tendencies with a more moderate one based on enlightenment, persuasion, and propaganda. Proof that the political opponents of the Stahlhelm did after all understand this was shown in the spring of 1933 when many persecuted members of the SPD and KPD sought protection and aid in the Stahlhelm. They were accepted by us, but as a result the Stahlhelm. found itself involved in serious conflicts with the Party. The Party could not approve that people persecuted by it should be protected by the Stahlhelm. Typical of this were the events in the spring of 1933 in Brim wick, where an Ortsgruppe of the Stahlhehn held a meeting. The SA surrounded the place where the meeting was being held and arrested all the members. Upon investigation, it was shown that of approximately 1,500 participants over 1,000 were former members of the SPD and the KPD. We had accepted them when they had proved to us that they were decent people and that the majority of them had been at the front with us.

HERR BOEHM: Were the Stahlhelmer opposed to trade unions?

GRUSS: No. Here too the Stahlhelmer were only opposed to the excesses. The Stahlhelm itself had its own union, the Stahlhelm Mutual Aid. It included almost all the workers who were members of the Stahlhelm, and I wish to point out that 25 to 30 percent of the members of the Stahlhelm were workers. However, in the summer of 1933 the Stahlhelm Mutual Aid was compulsorily dissolved.

HERR BOEHM: Did the Stahlhelm carry on anti-Semitic propaganda?

GRUSS: There were many opinions and views represented in the Stahlhelm. Everyone could actually think what he liked; but I never heard of an order by the leaders of the Bund against Jews, and no such order was ever given. Besides, that was quite impossible because the Second Bundesfuehrer, for example, was Duesterberg who was, as we all knew, of Jewish origin, and in spite of this, Duesterberg was the best-liked and most popular Stahlhehnfuehrer. In the central office of the Bund in Berlin one of my closest associates was a Stah1helmer who was married to a Jewess. We did not concern ourselves about that at all. We had many Jews in the Stahlhelm because we had not adopted the radical racial theory of the Party and were always opposed to it. In addition to Duesterberg we had other Jews as Stahlhelmfuehrer. There were Jews, half-Jews, and Freemasons in the Stahlhelm, therefore there could not have been any anti-Semitic tendency in the Stahlhelm, with the exception of a few circles who did not, however, have the upper hand.

HERR BOEHM: What was the effect of this Stahlhelrn training when the Stahlhelm was transferred to the SA?

GRUSS: It was doubtless this pronounced Stah1helm training which caused the majority of the Stahlhelmer to resist the incorporation. There were three points in particular which the Stahlhelmer could never understand, and which always separated, him from the SA. There was, first, the autocratic Fuehrer principle. In the Stahlhelm there were only elected Fuehrer, which did not exist in the SA. Then the Stahlhelmer could not agree with the radicalism which was to be observed in the SA, and furthermore they could not get used to the idea of totalitarianism.

HERR BOEHM: Well, now I should like to ask you: why did the Stahlhelmer not leave the SA again?

GRUSS: Well, if that had been possible, large numbers of them, believe me, would have left again, but leaving the SA was almost impossible. There were really only two possibilities of leaving the SA. One was honorable discharge and the other was expulsion. Honorable discharge was awarded when one could prove without doubt, for example, that one was very seriously ill, but only a very small fraction of the Stahlhelm could take advantage of this opportunity to leave the SA. For many Stahlhelmer only expulsion was possible because the SA had recognized , very early from the opposition of the Stah1helm that these were elements hostile to it. As a result, expulsion was ordered in many cases if they wanted to harm the Stahlhelmer seriously.

To the examples which I had given earlier in connection with the term "enemy of the State" I should 'like to add the following: Expulsion from the SA was recorded on the papers of the Stahlhelmer. If the Stahlhelmer wanted to accept a new position, it was immediately to be seen that he had been dismissed from the SA, and that was such a serious offense that no one wanted to have him.

Stahlhelmer who wanted to join the Reichswehr were not accepted if they had been dismissed from the SA.

The result was, if you take into consideration what I have said before, that there were so many serious difficulties that many Stahlhelmer who were otherwise brave and courageous men hesitated to leave the SA because they could not take on themselves the responsibility of endangering the livelihood of their family.

HERR BOEHM: And over what period of time did these observations of yours extend?

GRUSS: Up to the time of the war

.

HERR BOEHM: And from whom did you learn the things which you have told us here?

GRUSS: In my position as Treasurer of the Bund, I spoke constantly with many Stahlhelmer about these matters. In addition, I had to read innumerable reports.

HERR BOEHM: Did you, as liquidator of the Stahlhehn, maintain any contact with the transferred Stahlhelmer beyond the settlement of business matters?

GRUSS: Yes, I did.

HERR BOEHM: Were you permitted to do so?

GRUSS: No; I was allowed to settle the business affairs of the Stahlhelm, but I was warned by the Gestapo against any attempt to continue the Stahlhelm in a camouflaged form. I repeatedly had clashes with the Gestapo on that account. But I constantly tried, because many of my old comrades kept telling me that I must do so because there was no one else left.

HERR BOEHM: And of what did your activity consist in holding the Stahlhelm together?

GRUSS: I spoke to many individual Stahlhelmer myself. They came from all parts of Germany to see me in Berlin. I was in contact with many of them by correspondence. Furthermore, I mailed circulars camouflaged as business letters to the old Stahlhelmer from which they -could...

THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] What have we got to do with this, Dr. B6hm?

HERR BOEHM: The purpose of it is to show the Tribunal what the nature of the ideas and the ideologies of the men in the Stahlhelm was.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are defending the SA against a charge of being a criminal organization. You are now trying to show us what the ideology of the Stahlhelm was. You have been nearly an hour over this witness already. Practically everything he has said is written down in this summary of his evidence, the summary which we have before us, his evidence to the Commission.

HERR BOEHM: Yes, but I must give the Tribunal some idea about the attitude of this witness and the one and a half million men who came from the Stahlhelm to the SA. As to the few remaining questions-there are four or five-I shall try to be as brief as possible.

You mean to say then, Witness, that this continuation of the Stahlhelm after July 1934was illegal?

GRUSS: Yes, because it was not permitted.

HERR BOEHM: And about how large was the circle of persons with whom you were in contact in this connection?

GRUSS: I myself was in contact with only a few hundred former Stahlhelmer, but these were only the liaison men. Behind them were the many thousand in the various cities.

HERR BOEHM: Were there other contacts among the Stahlhelmer?

GRUSS: Yes. Aside from the contact with me, everywhere in Germany in the various towns independent groups of Stahlhelmer had been formed which sometimes were of quite considerable size. For instance, in Berlin I often participated in meetings where there were 150 to 200 Stahlhelmer. In order that the Gestapo...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. B6hm, if this is intended to show that this witness knew the circumstances about the Stahlhelm, surely you can leave that to re-examination if it is challenged. Why should you anticipate that they will challenge this witness that he doesn't know anything about the Stahlhelm? Presumably he does. Until it is challenged, you can leave it to re-examination.

HERR BOEHM: I shall ask my last, or last but one, question.

Do you know, Witness, that transferred Stahlhelmer participated in crimes which were charged against the SA, for example, the persecution of the Jews?

GRUSS: No, I know nothing about that, although I should have known about it if it were true. It would have been a quite remarkable fact if it had been established that Stahlhelmer had participated in the persecution of Jews. I refer to the statements which I made about the nonexistence of an anti-Semitic tendency in the Stahlhelm.

HERR BOEHM: Did you observe that the antagonistic attitude of the Stahlhelmer in the SA was general, or were there indications that considerable numbers of Stahlhelmer gradually changed their opinion?

GRUSS: This antagonistic attitude of the Stahlhelmer, in the case of the great majority, remained unchanged until the end. Actually, I should go so far as to say that the longer the Third Reich lasted, the stronger this proposition became among the Stahlhelmer. I do not believe that there were many Stahlhelmer who abandoned their opposition during the course of the years. Of course, there are always some such cases among a large number of people, but they were only exceptional cases.

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put to this witness at the moment.

DR. HANS GAWLIK (Counsel for the SD): Witness, do you know whether the Stahlhelmer who were in opposition were watched by the SD?

GRUSS: I know nothing about their being watched-by the SD. I always heard that only the Gestapo and the local police watched the Stahlhelmer.

DR. GAVJLIK: The son of Duesterberg made an affidavit, Number Stahlhelm-4, stating that the Stahlhelmer who were in opposition had been watched by the SD. Are these statements with regard to the SD incorrect?

GRUSS: I am of the opinion that the son of Duesterberg must have been mistaken in this case. I myself never heard that the SD persecuted or watched the Stahlhelm.

DR. GAWLIK: Thank you.

COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness, you have spoken about the radical and extremist tendencies of the SA.

GRUSS: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You mean, do you not, that they were terrorists and gangsters?

GRUSS: When I said here radical and extremist tendencies, I meant those groups of people in the SA -who already at that time had severely damaged the reputation of the SA. But they were only groups; by that I mean that it was not-the whole- SA, but

only parts of it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: There were groups in every town in Germany, weren't there?

GRUSS: I cannot say whether they were in every town in Germany, but there were no doubt such groups in many cities.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You are saying, aren't you, that the Stahlhelmer were forced to join the SA throughout Germany?

GRUSS: Yes.

COL. PHEELIMORE: That was done by threats by the local SA leaders who took them over, isn't that right? That's what you are saying?

GRUSS: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Can there be any doubt that those threats and those arrests you spoke about were ordered by the SA leadership?

GRUSS: According to my judgment, these threats, arrests, and everything connected with them, were initiated by the SA leadership. Of course, in view of the large number concerned, it may have happened that also the Party or other formations of the Third Reich participated, but in the main, however, this pressure was exercised by the SA itself.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And you have spoken of the boycott of a man who was dismissed from the SA. Are you saying that that was the case all over Germany, if a man was dismissed, he was boycotted?

GRUSS: At any rate, in those cases of which I knew, and there were very many, such a boycott was carried out. I know for example of such a boycott in a small town. There the conditions were entirely ...

COL. PHILLIMORE: I do not want instances. And you say that a man - would not be able to join the army? That can only have been, can it not, that the SA leadership communicated his name to the army as having been dismissed?

GRUSS: It is possible that the SA gave these names to the army, but I do not know exactly. I only know one thing-that the Stahlhelmer who wanted to join the army, for example former officers, were not accepted if their papers showed that they had been dismissed from the SA.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I just want to ask you one or two more questions about the SA. Do you know Minister Severing?

GRUSS: Like every other German, I know Minister Severing from the time when he was a minister. I do not know him personally.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know of him as a man of integrity?

GRUSS: I personally consider Severing a man of integrity.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you listen to his description of the SA in the early days, before the seizure of power.

GRUSS: I do not know this description.

COL. PHILLIMORE:

"Wherever the SA was able to exercise its terror unhindered

it did so in the following manner: They had indoor battles against people who thought differently. Those were not the ordinary little brawls between political opponents during elections; that was organized terror."

Is that a fair description of the SA during the years before the seizure of power?

GRUSS: I believe that on the whole Severing describes it correctly.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know the witness Gisevius?

GRUSS: No, I do not know him.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you listen to his words:

"During the early part of the struggle for power, the SA constituted a private army for carrying out the orders of the Nazi Party. Whoever had not entirely made up his mind had it made up for him by the SA.

"Their methods were primitive but effective. One learned the new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks beside every SA marching column, a few stalwart SA men went along giving pedestrians a crack on the head if they failed to perform the correct gesture at least three steps in front of the SA flag; and these Storm Troopers acted the same way everywhere."

Again I ask you, is that a correct description of the behavior of the SA as you knew it?

GRUSS: Well, to that I must say I am not really competent to pass judgment on the SA of the early period. My observations were made from 1933 on; I might say I was bound to make them officially because I was Bund Treasurer of the Stahlhelm. But before that time I was a bank director and not so greatly interested in the SA. But I will admit that...

COL. PHILLIMORE: Well then, I will put to you one more, my last question.

THE PRESIDENT: Are these statements in evidence?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, My Lord. The first statement I put is from Minister Severing's evidence in the record (Volume XIV, Page 273). The second statement is from Gisevius' evidence (Volume XII, Page 271).

THE PRESIDENT: The nature of this witness' evidence has been that the Stahlhelmer were incorporated into the SA by force. He has not said anything about the SA being an orderly or properly run organization.

COL. PHILLIMORE, My Lord, he has spoken of their radical and extremist tendencies and by inference one can assume that he was speaking of the SA.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that is what he said about the SA?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, one can give it no other meaning.

THE PRESIDENT: If he said that about the SA, that is not giving evidence on behalf of the SA as an organization and you are not entitled to challenge him about that. If he had been giving evidence saying that the SA was a perfectly well-behaved organization, then this cross-examination might be relevant; but if he has not said that I do not quite see how the cross-examination is relevant.

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, witness after witness has appeared for the SA before the Commission.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but not this witness on this aspect of the matter. Let us deal with this witness. This witness has said nothing before us which shows that the SA was an orderly or well-behaved organization.

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, but he has said that the SA was a most disorderly organization, It is my submission on cross-examination that I cannot be asked to refrain from continuing to follow on that evidence, unless your Lordship feels it is a waste of time of the Tribunal. In my submission it ig of great importance when you have to judge the evidence of a large number of these witnesses for the SA who have appeared before the Commission. Your Lordship, it will be very short. I want to quote one further statement about the period after 1933. It is by the witness Gisevius (Volume XII, Page 272).

"The SA organized huge round-ups. The SA searched houses. The SA confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people.

The SA put people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves auxiliary police ... Woe unto anyone who got into their clutches. From this time dates the 'Bunker', those dreaded

private prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least one. Robbing became the inalienable right of the SA. The -efficiency of a Standartenfuehrer was measured by the number of arrests he had made, and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the effectiveness with which he 'educated' his prisoners."

[Turning to the witness.] Is that a fair description of the activities of the SA in the months immediately following the seizure of power?

GRUSS: Well, I must say that most of what the author says came to my ears daily at that time in Berlin. But remember that this concerns the SA which was under the Chief of Staff Röhm, and that later the SA was subjected to a purge. I believe that the SA later ...

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, but I will come to that in a minute But that is a fair description of what was happening in Berlin in

the early months of 1933? And, if you had to make a report about this, can you say whether that is a fair description of what was. happening in every town in Germany?

GRUSS: I should like to say, according to my recollection, that Herr Gisevius did not exaggerate. There is a good deal of truth in what he says.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want just to ask you about the Jews. You have said that the Stahlhelm members were not anti-Semitic. Was it because the SA was anti-Semitic in its outlook, was that one of the reasons why you say Stahlhelm members did' not like joining it?

GRUSS: No, it was like this, rather: The Stahlhelm training the moderate democratic concept of the Stahlhelm-excluded any anti-Semitic propaganda, because anti-Semitic propaganda would have been radicalism and such radicalism did not exist with the vast majority of Stahlhelmer.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you know the witness Hauffer? He gave evidence before the Commission.

GRUSS: Yes, I know Hauffer. He was in Dresden formerly.

COL. PHILLIMORE: He said this in his evidence: "We disapproved completely of the Party's policy against the Jews." Was that right?

GRUSS: Yes.

COL.PHILLIMORE: And the Party's policy was the policy of the SA and the SA leadership, wasn't it?

GRUSS: Yes, that is true.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now with regard to the joining of the Stahlhelm, the incorporation of the Stahlhelm in 1933. It is not true to say that all Stahlhelm members were compelled to join, is it?

GRUSS: I said before that certain age groups of the Stahlhelm, had to join and these age groups were transferred as a whole and without exception.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Certainly in the case of anyone over 35, he could have stayed out, couldn't he?

GRUSS: Yes, if they had been asked beforehand, but they were not asked. They were given orders and had to join.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You know the witness Waldenfels who appeared before the Commission? Do you know him, a senior civil servant?

GRUSS: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: He refused to join and he retained his post right up to the war, isn't that correct?

GRUSS: That is correct, but that is the same as my case. Waldenfels was above the age of those who were incorporated into the SA.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Well, he was under 45 at the time, wasn7t he? .

GRUSS: Whether he was under 45 at the time, I do not know, but he is an elderly man, and therefore I assume that he was not affected by the transfer.

COL. PITILLIMORE: He is an elderly man now. He was born on 10 August 1889, according to'his evidence. The witness Rittner has said, you know, that even if pressure was put on a man to join, there was nothing whatever to stop him withdrawing. Now I know you say he would be boycotted, but in fact the number in the SA fell, didn't it, from 41/2 million to 11/2 million between 1934 and 1939?

GRUSS: I have heard of that.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Wasn't that because people were withdrawing?

GRUSS: No; as far as I can see the situation, first of all after 30 June 1934 all followers of Chief of Staff Röhmwere removed from the SA, and there were very many of them. I cannot give a figure, but at all events there were very many. Then, furthermore, hundreds of thousands of SA men were released from the SA, not to return to private life, but, as far as I can recall, to be assigned to other branches of the Party. Only very few of the Stahlhelmer were affected by this release. I know that very well, because Stahlhelmer came frequently to me and said that they hoped to be able to get out of the SA now, but after some time they came back to me and said it was not possible since the Stahlhelm had to remain in the SA so that it could be controlled better.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Once they were in the SA did these members of the Stahlhelm obey orders and perform the same actions as anybody else in the SA?

GRUSS: They had no other choice if they did not want to expose themselves to the extraordinary difficulties which I have described. But it is a fact that often it was the Stahlhelmer who were the ones to refuse to obey orders for -which they could not take the responsibility.

COL.PHILLIMORE: I have no further question.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. BOEHM, have you any re-examination?

HERR BÖ, No.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, in 1933, when the Stahlhelm were incorporated into the SA, can you give me the approximate numbers of the Stahlhelm and the approximate numbers of the SA?

GRUSS: I can only give the approximate strength of the Stahlhelm. I would estimate it at about one million-that is, those people who were incorporated into the SA from the Stahlhelm. I do not know the strength of the SA.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know approximately how many Stahlhelmer there were in the SA on I September, on or about I September 1939?

GRUSS: No, I cannot say that.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how many Stahlhelmer there were at the end of the war, approximately?

GRUSS: If you mean how many Stahlhelmer there were in the SA at the end of the War, I cannot answer that question, either But there may have been about 500,000 to 600,000 Stahlhelmer at the end of the war. As everything in Germany was in great confusion, one can only make an estimate.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you really can't give any approximately accurate figures for the Stahlhelm after 1934?

GRUSS: Do you mean the Stahlhelm. as it continued to exist after 1934 as a Bund, or the Stahlhelm which was transferred into the SA?

THE PRESIDENT: I meant the Stahlhelm which were transferred to the SA.

GRUSS: Well, there must have been about one million.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire, and the Court will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): If Your Lordship pleases, would Your Lordship allow me to mention one brief matter? During the SS case I submitted Document Number 4043-PS, which was a statement by a Polish priest as to the killing of the 846 Polish priests and clergymen at Dachau. The Tribunal did not accept the document at the time because it did not appear to be in satisfactory form. Now the Polish delegation wishes me to submit a further certificate from a Dr. Pietrowski, who said that the priest's statement was made to him, in his presence, and in accordance with the stipulations of Polish law, and that is what constitutes in English law a solemn declaration. I discussed this matter with Dr. Pelckmann and he has no objection to the document going in in its present form."

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter. You may put in the document.

MAJOR JONES: Thank you. There are copies in Russian, French, and German.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. BOEHM, have you another witness?

HERR BOEHM: May I be permitted to call the witness Ji1ttner?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[The witness Juettnertook the stand.]

Will you state your full name, please?

MAX JUETTNER (Witness): Max Juettner.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

HERR BOEHM: Herr Juettner, from 1934 until 1945 you were Chief of the main office "Leadership of the SA," and beginning with 1939 you were, simultaneously, permanent Deputy Chief of Staff of the SA. You are familiar with all questions concerning the SA even before 1933, are you not?

JUETTNER: I only assumed my responsibilities in the Supreme SA Leadership 1 November 1933. From the records and from conversations with the Chief of Staff, R6hm, and my comrades, I am however informed on all essential matters concerning the SA even -before this time.

HERR BOEHM: What did you do until your appointment to the SA leadership? What was your profession and political background?

JUETTNER: Originally, I was a professional officer from 1906 until 1920. After my honorable discharge from the Army I entered the Central German Mining Company. There I started as a common laborer in the mines, but in the course of the years I worked

my way up to a high office position of a large concern. Politically I belonged after 1920 to the German National People's Party for several years. Later I belonged to no party; but from 1920, 1 had,

besides my job, a leading position in the Central German Stahlhelm.

HERR BOEHM: What were the reasons for your appointment into the SA leadership?

JUETTNER: My appointment into the SA leadership was connected with the incorporation of the Stahlhelm into the SA. The Central German Stahlhelm enjoyed a good reputation even among its political opponents. My especially good relations with the miners and also with the trade unions were well known to Röhm. The Central German Stahlhelm was especially successful i

n the social field. All this might have contributed to my appointment. I left the mining industry voluntarily and became a professional SA Fuehrer. In the summer of 1934 1 was taken into the Party.

HERR BOEHM: That means, you came from the Stahlhelm into, the SA?

JUETTNER: Yes.

HERR BOEHM: Besides you, did other leaders of the Stahlhelm get into important positions in the SA?

JUETTNER: I am unable to give you complete figures on that without referring to statistical material. But some time ago I compiled from memory the names of 60 higher and intermediate SA leaders who were formerly members of the Stahlhelm. That means that many former Stahlhelm members were given leading positions in the SA. In the course of time all key positions in the Stahlhelm: the Leadership Office, the Chief of the Office of the Chief of Staff ...

HERR BÖTTNER: In the SA. All key positions in the SA were filled, in the course of time, with Stahlhelmer. They could be found in the Leadership Office, in important positions in the Personnel Office, as Chief of the Office of the Chief of Staff, as Head of the Training Department, and also in the group staffs and as leaders of units.

HERR BOEHM: Can it be said that the positions held by former Stahlhelmer in the SA were such that they were of little influence on the bulk of the SA?

JUETTNER: That cannot be said. These SA leaders who came from the Stahlhelm. and who held these positions, had considerable influence on the education, training, and activity of the SA.

HERR BOEHM: About half an hour ago, a witness by the name of Gruss was examined here who was never a member of the SA, who did not know the conditions in the SA from personal experience, but who testified on a series of questions to which, in my opinion, only an SA man could supply the answers. Did you, during your membership in the SA from the year 1934 until the dissolution of this organization, ever observe any opposition on the part of the SA members who had come from the Stahlhelm?

JUETTNER: I can answer this question clearly and unequivocally with "no." Numerous SA men came to me in the first few months who had formerly belonged to the Stahlhelm. Like myself they felt regret that their fine old organization was no longer in existence, but they, as well as I, hailed the fact that they were now permitted to participate in this great community of the SA.

HERR BOEHM: Did you ever hear of any opposition on the part of these people who had come from the Stahlhelm? Did other SA men complain about this?

J_UTTNER: If I understand you correctly, you are talking of men who were already in the SA?

HERR BOEHM: Yes, men who transferred or were transferred from the Stahlhelm into the SA in the years 1933 and 1934.

JUETTNER: These men, as far as I know, never opposed the SA. I know of no such opposition.

HERR BOEHM: What was the strength of the SA in the year 1933?

J_UTTNER: In 1933 the SA had 300,000 men.

HERR BOEHM: And how many members were transferred into the SA in the years 1933 and 1934?

JUETTNER: You mean members of the Stahlhelm.?

HERR BOEHM: Yes, members of the Stahlhelm.

J_UTTNER: When the Stahlhelm was incorporated into the SA, the Stahlhelm had approximately 1,000,000. members, perhaps a little more. More than half of these were incorporated into the SA, about 550,000 men. This figure is identical with that which the former Bundesfòhrer Seldte has given.

HERR BOEHM: Do you differentiate between the Kern-Stahlhelm and another formation of the Stahlhelm? Would you say that the total of the men coming from the Stahlhelm who were taken over into the SA was approximately 1,000,000?

JUETTNER: After the Stahlhelm was dissolved-I believe that occurred in 1935-it is quite possible that altogether 1,000,000 men came into the SA from the Stahlhelm.

HERR BOEHM: Well, then the ratio in the years 1933 and 1934 was such that the SA consisted of two-thirds Stahlhelmer and of one-third SA men?

JUETTNER: Added to this in 1933-1934 was the SA Reserve II the Kyffhäuserbund. Therefore, the above-mentioned ratio of two-thirds to one-third is not quite correct. But if the original figure, the original strength of the SA as of January 1933 is taken into consideration, then what you have just said is true.

HERR BOEHM: Then, shortly after 1933, the SA experienced a tremendous increase, that is from the original figure of 300,000 it grew to about 4,500,000 men by 1935; is that -correct?

JUETTNER: By 1934 that is true, yes.

HERR BOEHM: Then the Supreme SA Leadership tried to reduce the SA since many people had joined who really had no business there, and by 1939 approximately 3,000,000 men were again eliminated from the SA, so that in 1939 the SA had approximately 1,500,000 members left; is that correct?

JUETTNER: Yes; that is quite correct. The figure of 1,500,000 had however already been reached several years before. The reduction of- the SA was brought about through eliminating:

(1) The SA Reserve II, the Kyffhäuserbund, with about 1,500,000 members.

(2) After the death of R6hm, the NSKK.

(3) Very many SA men who were active in the Political Leadership, such as Blockleiter, Zellenleiter, and so forth.

(4) Chief of Staff Lutze eliminated all those men who for professional or other reasons could not serve or did not wish to serve.

HERR BOEHM: Did you notice that in the course of the reduction of this number from 4,500,000 to 1,500,000 particularly many Stahlhelm members or former Stahlhelm members were eliminated from the SA?

JUETTNER: In this connection I might perhaps refer to the Stahlhelm. in Central Germany, of which I was the head. There, in the large industrial region around Halle, my old Stahlhelm organization after 1935 was actually the nucleus of the SA, which shows that still very many Stahlhelmer had remained in the SA.

HERR BOEHM: And those were the Stahlhelmer who remained in the SA till the end, till the SA was disbanded?

JUETTNER: Yes; and they were not the worst ones.

HERR BOEHM: If now in 1935 and the following years the individual SA man who had come from the Stahlhelm had had the desire to leave the SA, could he have done so?

JUETTNER: He could have done so without difficulty.

HERR BOEHM: Would it have resulted in particular difficulties for him?

JUETTNER: As far as the SA was concerned none whatsoever.

HERR BOEHM: The witness Gruss asserted among other things that such a case would have made it impossible for him to join the army as an officer for example, because his papers would have carried the remark: "Discharged from the SA." Is that correct?

J-UTTNF,R: The witness Gruss seems to have confused matters. He who was punished with discharge from the SA because he had committed an offense of some kind, did, it is true, receive an entry on his papers, "Discharged from the SA," and the effect was the same as a previous conviction in ordinary life.

HERR BOEHM: Well, then you are able to say, in order to make a long story short, that by far the larger part of the Stah1helmer who entered the SA in 1933, or at the latest in 1934, were and remained loyal comrades of yours; is that correct?

JUETTNER: They were and remained my best comrades.

HERR BOEHM: What was the attitude of the Chief of Staff toward the Party leadership and the State leadership?

JUETTNER: Röhm was a strong personality. His word carried great weight in the Party leadership. As a Reich Minister ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. B6hm, the Tribunal would like to know whether your case is that the SA, after the incorporation of the Stah1helm, was a voluntary organization or was involuntary, so far as the Stahlhelm was concerned.

HERR BOEHM: If I understood the question correctly, Mr. President, I can say that the Stahlhelm was a voluntary organization, and that it came into the SA on account of an order.

THE PRESIDENT: There seems to be a certain difference of view between the two witnesse

s that you have called. The Tribunal wants to know what your case was, whether your case is that the SA, after incorporation of the Stah1helm, was a voluntary organization.

HERR BOEHM: After the Stahlhelm was incorporated into the SA, it was of course deprived of its voluntary character, and the organization, that is, each and every member of the Stah1helm, became a member of the SA.

THE PRESIDENT: And was voluntary, you mean, or was in voluntary?

HERR BOEHM: The Stahlhelm was incorporated into the SY on account of an order and after its incorporation lost its character as an independent organization: it became SA, and each and every former member of the Stahlhelm became a member of the SA.

THE PRESIDENT: What I want to know is whether you con tend, having become members of the SA, it was voluntary or in voluntary?

HERR BOEHM: That is, in my opinion, in connection with Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of 13 March 1945, a legal question. I contend that they became members of the SA on the strength o order and not, in the last analysis, of their own volition. I repeat on the strength of an order.

THE PRESIDENT: You say they were involuntarily incorporate into the SA, involuntary members of the SA?

HERR BOEHM: That is not exactly right, Mr. President. I an saying that they involuntarily got into the SA on the strength o the order, certainly the majority of them.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. BOEHM, I don't doubt what the witness said. I heard what the witness said, and I heard what the last witness said. Mr. Biddle wants to know what your case is. Are you saying that the Stahlhelm, after it has been incorporated into the SA-those members of the Stahlhelm who were incorporate into the SA were involuntary members or were voluntary members. It is for you to make up your mind which case you are putting forward. Possibly it might make my meaning more clear for you case-they could resign from the SA or they could not resign?

HERR BOEHM: That was not supposed to be the subject of m presentation of evidence, Mr. President. I wanted to show, first of all, that the Stahlhelm was incorporated into the SA on the strength of an order, in other words, involuntarily. This was probably the consensus of opinion among the bulk of the Stahlhelm. Whether and to what extent they could or could not resign later is the point I want to clarify through this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: All right, go on, Dr. BOEHM. At some stage no doubt you will be able to tell us which of the witnesses you adopt.

HERR BOEHM: Witness, I should like you to continue with you testimony on the question: What was the attitude of the Chief of Staff toward the Party leadership and the State leadership? You said that Chief of Staff Röhmwas a strong personality and that consequently his word carried great weight in the Party leadership. Now I should like you to continue, please.

JUETTNER: Röhm was Reich Minister, and as such he endeavored to exert his influence on the Government in order to pursue his aims. Chief of Staff Lutze was only a Reichsleiter in the Party. In spite of that fact he had no influence on the Party leadership. In the last few years, already before the war, he avoided Gauand Reichsleiter meetings. Lutze did not become a Reich Minister; therefore he had no influence whatsoever on the conduct of Government affairs. Chief of Staff Schepmann was neither Reichsleiter nor Reich Minister. When after 30 June 1934 the SA was reduced to insignificance, the influence of the Chiefs of Staff on Party and Government leadership had disappeared.

HERR BOEHM: And what was the relation of the Chiefs of Staff to the Leadership Corps of the SA? Were the latter kept informed of everything that was planned and intended to be achieved?

JUETTNER: At the leaders' meetings and at training courses in the SA schools, the Chiefs of Staff kept their Leadership Corps informed as to their aims and tasks, especially about the educational tasks of the SA. At the leaders' meetings there was always an open discussion.

HERR BOEHM: What do you think of the Leadership Corps before and after the death of R6hm?

JUETTNER: I know the Leadership of the SA, its aims, and the SA leaders, especially the higher SA leaders, very well. I do not propose to gloss over anything. A small fraction of SA leaders who had turned out to be mere troopers was eliminated. Even those SA leaders had in the past, during the first World War as brave soldiers, and later as members of the Free Corps under the government of Ebert and Noske, deserved well of their country. Their attitude and their way of life, however, were opposed to the principles of-the SA, therefore they had to leave. But the rest, that is the bulk of the SA Leadership Corps, were decent and -clean, and irreproachable in their sense of - justice and duty.

HERR BOEHM: Tell us about the professional Leadership Corps.

JUETTNER: As to the active leaders, the Obergruppenfuehrer and the Gruppenfuehrer, I know their history, their way of life and their political and ethical attitude. Apart from the insignificant number who had to leave, these SA leaders were irreproachable. Not one of them had a police record, not one of them was what one might call a failure, all of them had a civil profession before they were taken into the Leadership Corps of the SA. Their way of life was simple and modest. They received, however, in relation to comparable positions of civil servants or business men, extremely low salaries. All incomes from other sources were charged against them; there was no one in the SA who was allowed more than one source of income; no one could enrich himself personally owing to his position, and only he could spend money on social activities who had means of his own. Of the Gruppenfuehrer and Obergruppenfuehrer who in 1939 were active in the SA Leadership Corps or with the SA Gruppen, half the number lost their lives in the war. They gave their lives in the belief that they had fought for a just cause. They were patriots, and they committed no wrong or ungodly acts. And even today, I pride myself on having belonged to such an upright leadership corps.

HERR BOEHM: Were the SA leaders paid?

JUETTNER: Up to 1933 there were no paid SA leaders. Only the leaders of the so-called Untergruppen, of which there was one in each Gau, received a remuneration of about 300 marks a month. After 1933 a wage scale was established. In 1940 there was a small increase in pay. The maximum basic salary for an Obergruppenfuehrer was 1,200 marks a month. From Scharfuerer up to Obersturmbannfuehrer inclusive, all SA leaders, with the exception of the auxiliary personnel, were honorary workers. Of the entire Leadership Corps, including the nominal leaders, roughly two percent were paid.

HERR BOEHM: How was the SA Leadership Corps organized?

JUETTNER: In the SA we differentiated between:

SA leaders,

SA administrative leaders,

SA medical leaders.

The SA leaders formed the leadership staffs and led the units. The SA administrative leaders handled the budget, financial matters, and the audit. Together with the administrative leaders of the other branches and of the Party they formed a special leadership body and had to follow the directive of the Reich Treasurer. The medial leaders were physicians and pharmacists; they were charged with the medical care of the SA. The administrative and medical leaders had no influence whatsoever on the running of the SA, and they had no right to that. Besides, the SA had leaders for special purposes, the so-called "ZV" leaders and honorary leaders, some of whom are among the main defendants here.

HERR BOEHM: Was not one of the main defendants an honorary leader?

JUETTNER: Yes, I believe several of them were honorary leaders, such as Goering, Frank, Sauckel, Von Schirach, Streicher, and, to my knowledge, perhaps Hess and Bormann.

I might add in this conne

ction that the honorary leaders were never informed about the business affairs of the SA. They had neither the opportunity nor the authority to exert any influence on training, leadership, or use of the SA. They had merely the right to wear the SA uniform and, at meetings and festivities, to take their positions in the ranks of the SA leadership. Even Hermann G6ring -who in 1923 headed the SA temporarily when it numbered but a few thousand men-no longer exerted any influence on the SA after that time, nor did he have any time to do so. His nomination as chief of the "Standarte Feldherrnhalle" was only a formal honor, similar to the honors that were extended in the days of the Kaiser to military leaders of merit, or members-even feminine members of royal families.

Herr Frank was appointed leader of the SA for the former Government General by Chief of Staff Lutze. That too was and remained only a formal honor, because the administration itself was carried out by a special administrative staff under Brigadefuehrer Peltz, and later Kuehnmund. He did not receive any orders concerning the administration of the SA in that region from the Chief of Staff. Such orders went to the administrative staff who, in turn, were responsible to the Supreme SA Leadership.

The "ZV" leaders for special purposes whom I have mentioned could temporarily be called in for duty if they were willing. They were advisory duties, for example on 1~gal and social questions.

HERR BOEHM: Of what types of people did the SA in general consist?

JUETTNER: From the beginning, the SA was made up of former soldiers of the first World War, that is, soldiers and young idealists who loved their country above all. The SA was not, as the witness Gisevius asserted, a mob of criminals or gangsters, but rather, as Sinclair Lewis is said to have written, pure idealists. Many clergymen, many students of theology, belonged to the SA as active members, some until the 'very end.

Each and every SA man will be able to confirm that never at any time were criminal actions demanded of him, and that the SA leadership never pursued criminal aims.

HERR BOEHM: Are you in a position to give us figures with respect to those members of the SA who came into conflict with existing laws?

JUETTNER: In some of the internment camps where thousands of former SA members from all parts of the Reich are interned, investigations were made and the result can very well be applied to judge the entire SA. It was found that of the SA men interned, not even I percent-to be exact, 0.65 percent-had previously been punished as criminals. Opposed to that are the findings of the Reich Bureau of Statistics establishing that 1.67 percent of the entire population of the former Reich was subject to previous convictions.

HERR BOEHM: But how can you explain that in the years 1933 and 1934, for example, excesses and abuses were committed by members of the SA, such as are asserted in the Indictment?

JUETTNER: These excesses cannot and shall not be excused. They are excesses such as occur in every revolutionary movement, for example the German revolution in 1918, or similar incidents in the past in other countries. These excesses were revolutionary actions of dissatisfied political fighters.

HERR BOEHM: Are not there perhaps still other explanations for these excesses?

JUETTNER: One can give a whole series of circumstances, which do not excuse such excesses, but perhaps might explain them:

(1) Before 1933, especially under the government of Schleicher, the police took especially severe measures, and one-sided measures, against the SA. The result was distrust of the police. Conditions were such that in the year 1933 riots and civil war threatened in the interior of the country. Thus it is quite understandable, although not excusable, that many a man felt that he, rather than the police who were considered unreliable, was responsible for the protection of his new State, and in that way let himself become involved in excesses.

(2) Before 1933 a campaign of wild hatred against the SA was conducted. Almost all other political parties participated in this campaign of hate. There were demands to commit violence, posters with the slogan, "Beat the Fascists where you can find them," groups were organized which shouted in chorus "Down with the SA," SA members were molested at their places of work, the children of SA members were annoyed at school; there were boycotts of businesses whose owners were SA members, and there were attacks on individual SA men and also on Stahlhelmer. For example, in my home district of Halle, where I still was at that time, 43 from the ranks of the Stahlhelmer and SA men were killed.

All these circumstances caused a certain amount of anger and indignation, which was understandable, and so many a man believed himself entitled to square old accounts with political opponents after 1933.

As a third reason or circumstance which led to these excesses, I must state the fact that after 1933 there was a rush to join the SA. The fundamental decency of all these individuals could of course not be established and, as has been proved, dark elements and provocateurs sneaked in with the intention of damaging the reputation of the SA. The excesses, therefore, were not just the final note of the political conflict before 1933, but rather in many cases were committed by just such provocateurs. The organization as such is not guilty in that respect. It disapproved of such evildoers, and the leadership strongly condemned such cases when they were reported to them.

HERR BOEHM: Now tell us, what did the SA leadership do in order to prevent such excesses as occurred throughout the year 1933?

JUETTNER: The SA leadership in Prussia worked together with the Prussian Minister for the Interior and his deputies in order to prevent such excesses. Chief of Staff Röhmmade people available for the auxiliary police and selected men from the SA for the Feldj5ger Corps, which was first established in Prussia and proved ,exceptionally useful.

Secondly, the SA leadership, in order to gain and justify confidence, devoted itself to ridding its own ranks of provocateurs. Those dismissed from the police and auxiliary police were at the same time removed from the SA. Anyone who was proved guilty of any excesses was punished. The SA leadership of its own accord further set up an SA Patrol Service in order to watch the deportment of its men in the streets and in public life. And finally it was always the main concern of the SA leadership to have the great number of unemployed put to work, to take them off the streets and put them in proper jobs. The numerous social measures of the SA leadership, such as for example the many institutions for professional re-conversion, the projects for the cultivation of swamps, and similar things were directed toward the same end.

HERR BOEHM: Was the number of the excesses or misdeeds that took place and for which SA members were responsible, a large one?

JUETTNER: In comparison with the strength of the SA, these misdeeds that were ascertained were infinitesimally rare, and in addition to that, another point should not be forgotten. In all of these excesses the SA was always accused, for at that time everyone in a brown shirt was taken for an SA man, regardless of whether he was a member of the SA or not. All that was of necessity bound to create in world opinion a distorted picture of the SA. It was bound to create prejudices detrimental to the SA, because the SA was blamed for many excesses in which SA members did not in the slightest participate.

HERR BOEHM: Is it known to you that s

teps were taken to quash proceedings before civil courts against SA men for such excesses?

TUTTMER: As far as I know, no such steps to quash legal proceedings before civil courts were undertaken by the SA leadership. On the occasion of a general amnesty the SA leadership naturally demanded the pardoning of its own members too.

HERR BOEHM: After the action against the Jews in November of 1938, the Supreme Party Court, however, opposed the conviction of SA members who had participated in the shooting of Jews. Do you know about this request?

JUETTNER: I do not know this request, but I have heard about it here in custody.

HERR BOEHM: And what is your position toward this request?

JUETTNER: If I remember the contents quite clearly, the Supreme Party Court demanded that first of all the man who was responsible for this action be called to account.

HERR BOEHM: Do you consider this attitude of the Supreme Party Court correct?

JUETTNER: I agree with this demand wholeheartedly. It is only to be regretted that the Supremem Party Court did not prevail. But the demand that men who had shot others should go scot-free, that is, escape being sentenced by regular courts, cannot be justified under any conditions.

HERR BOEHM: Well, was such a demand ever made by the SA leadership or by members of the SA?

JUETTNER: The guiding principle of the SA leadership, especially in these actions of November 1938, was that those who had been found guilty were to be punished, not only by the SA but also by the regular courts. As far as Chief of Staff Lutze learned of such cases he always, to my knowledge, advocated such procedure and initiated the necessary steps. The SA even had an agreement with the judicial authorities that if an SA man committed a misdeed and was to be brought before a court, the SA leadership would be notified so that they could suspend this man from service at once and, as the case might be, could prohibit him from wearing the SA uniform and even punish him on their own initiative. This principle was favored and, applied in the action of November 1938 by, Chief of Staff Lutze.

HERR BOEHM: What was the opinion *and the attitude of the SA on the Jewish question?

JUETTNER: The SA demanded that the influence of the Jews in national affairs, in the economy, and in cultural life, be reduced in accordance with their position as a minority in Germany. It advocated a numerus clausus.

HERR BOEHM: And what was the reason for this demand or this attitude?

JUETTNER: This demand, which was not only that of the SA, became general in Germany when after the first World War, in 1918 and 1919, great numbers of Jewish people emigrated from Poland to Germany and entered into the economic and other spheres of life, where they gained considerable influence in an undesirable manner. Through certain large judicial proceedings all this profiteering and this disintegrating influence had become known, and it caused much ill-will and resulted in a movement of opposition. Even Jews who had lived in Germany for a long time, and societies of German citizens of the Jewish faith, took position against these influences in a decided manner. So one can readily see that the demand of the SA was well-grounded.

HERR BOEHM: Did the SA incite others to active violence against the Jews?

JUETTNER: No, in no way. Never did, the Chiefs of Staff, Röhm, Lutze, or Schepmann treat the Jewish question in their speeches, or issue any directives in that respect, much less incite others to violence. The concept of a so-called "master race" was never fostered in the SA; that would have been quite contrary to reason, for the SA received its replacements from all strata. The extermination of a people because of its type was never given any support by the SA, and actions of violence against Jews were not favored by the SA. Quite the contrary, the leadership always objected most strongly to actions of that kind.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that will be a convenient time to break off. How long do you think you are going to be with this witness?

HERR BOEHM: Mr. President, I believe I will need another hour to interrogate the witness, perhaps an hour and a half.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 14 August 1946 at 1000 hours.]