MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. Before I resume the consideration of Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, I should like to consider briefly the status of the proof before this Tribunal of the matter stated in the first Messersmith affidavit, introduced by the United States, Document 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57. You will recall that Mr. Messersmith in that affidavit made the following general statements:
First, that although Nazi Germany stated that she would respect the independence of Austria, in fact she intended from the very beginning to conclude an Anschluss, and that Defendant Von Papen was working toward that end.
Second, that although Nazi Germany pretended, on the sur- face, to have nothing to do with the Austrian Nazis, in fact she kept up contact with them and gave them support and instruction.
Third, that while they were getting ready for their eventual use of force in Austria, if necessary, the Nazis were using quiet infiltrating tactics to weaken Austria internally, through the use of Christian-front personalities who were not flagrantly Nazi and could be called what they referred to as Nationalist Opposition, and through the device of developing new names for Nazi organizations, so that they could be brought into the Fatherland Front of Austria corporatively, that is as an entire group.
Now let us see briefly what some of our German documents proved, in support of these general statements in the Messersmith affidavit. The excerpts I have already read out of the report from Gainer to Burckel, enclosed in the letter to Seyss-Inquart, Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, showed:
First, that the Austrian Nazi groups kept up contacts with the Reich although they did it secretly in accordance with instructions from the Fuehrer.
Second, that they continued their organization on a secret basis so as to be ready in what they referred to as an emergency.
Third, that they used persons like Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau, who had what they called good legal positions, but who
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could be trusted by the Nazis; and that 5 days after the Pact of July 11, 1936 between Germany and Austria, a pact which specifically pledged the German Government not to interfere either directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of Austria, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, the Austrian Nazis met with Hitler at Obersalzberg and received new instructions; and finally, that Hitler then used Keppler, whose name we shall again meet in a short while in a significant manner as his "contact man" with the Austrian Nazis, with full authority to act for the Fuehrer in Austria and to work with the leaders of the Austrian Nazis.
Then we offered Document 2247-PS, Exhibit USA-64, Von Papen's letter to Hitler of May 17, 1935 that showed that Von Papen had been in contact with Captain Leopold and it showed how Von Papen got Hitler to make a solemn promise of Austria's independence in order to further Papen's internal political gain in Austria.
Then we offered Document 2248-PS, Exhibit USA-63, Von Papen's letter of July 27, 1935, which reviewed the situation 1 year after Dollfuss' death, and pointed out how National Socialism could be made the link for the Anschluss and how National Socialism could overcome the Austrian ideologies, and in which he identified himself completely with the National Socialist goat
We offered Document 2246-PS, Exhibit USA-67, Von Papen's letter to Hitler of September 1, 1936, which Showed how Von Papen advised using both economic and continuing psychological pressure; that he had conferences with the leaders of the illegal Austrian Party; that he was trying to direct the next developments in such a way as to get corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front, and that meanwhile he was not ready to urge that avowed National Socialists be put in prominent positions, but was quite satisfied with collaborators like Glaise-Horstenau.
I think that practically all of the statements in Mr. Messersmith's affidavits have been fully supported by these documents, German documents, which we have introduced. Certain parts of the affidavits cannot be corroborated by documents, in the very nature of things, and I refer specifically to Mr. Messersmith's conversation with the Defendant Von Papen in 1934, which I read to the Tribunal yesterday. But I think those matters are manifestly just as true and just as clear of the defendant's guilt and complicity.
Yesterday I was reading to the Tribunal selected excerpts from Mr. Messersmith's second affidavit, 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, relating to the diplomatic preparations for war. Prior to adjournment,
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I had read to the Tribunal excerpts which established the following propositions:
First, Nazi Germany undertook a vigorous campaign to break up the diplomatic agreements existing in 1933; first-in the West the Locarno Pact supplemented by the French-Belgium Agreement; second-in the East the Little Entente, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and their respective mutual assistance pacts with France, and the French-Polish Pact; third-as for Austria, the special concern of Italy for her independence, that is for Austrian independence.
In the second place, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with extravagant and sometimes inconsistent promises of territorial gain to countries in southeastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland.
In the third place, Mr. Messersmith wrote an official communication to the State Department, pointing out that persons like Von Neurath and Von Papen were able to work more effectively in making these promises and in doing their other work, just because they, and I quote: "propagated the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime."
In the fourth place, in fact, high-ranking Nazis openly stated that Germany would honor her international obligations only so long as it suited her to do so.
There are two more excerpts which I wish to read from this affidavit:
France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter German moves, as I said yesterday. France made attempts to promote an east Locarno pact and to foster an economic accord between Austria and the other Danubian powers. Italy's effort was to organize an economic bloc of Austria, Hungary, and Italy. But Germany foiled these efforts by redoubling her promises of loot, by continuing her armament, and by another very significant strategy, that is the Fifth-Column strategy; that the Nazis stirred up internal dissensions within neighboring countries to disunite and weaken their intended victims.
I read now from Page 7 of the English copy of the second Messersmith affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the paragraph beginning in the middle of the page:
"At the same time that Germany held out such promises of reward for cooperation in her program, she stirred up internal dissensions within these countries themselves, and in Austria and Czechoslovakia in particular, all of which was designed so to weaken all opposition and strengthen the pro
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Nazi and Fascist groups as to insure peaceful acquiescence in the German program. Her machinations in Austria I have related in detail, as they came under my direct observation, in a separate affidavit. In Czechoslovakia they followed the same tactics with the Sudeten Germans. I was reliably informed that the Nazi Party spent over 6,000,000 marks in financing the Henlein Party in the elections in the spring of 1935 alone. In Yugoslavia she played on the old differences between the Croats and the Serbs and the fear of the restoration of the Hapsburg in Austria. It may be remarked here that this latter was one of the principal instruments, and a most effective one, which Nazi Germany used, as the fear in Yugoslavia in particular of a restoration of the Hapsburg was very real. In Hungary she played upon the agrarian difficulties and at the same time so openly encouraged the Nazi German elements in Hungary as to provoke the Government of Hungary to demand the recall of Von Mackensen in 1936. In Hungary and in Poland she played on the fear of communism and communist Russia. In Romania she aggravated the existing anti-Semitism, emphasizing the important role of the Jews in Romanian industry and the Jewish ancestry of Lupescu. Germany undoubtedly also financed the fascist Iron. Guard through Codreanou.
"Such 'diplomatic' measures reinforced by Germany's vast rearmament program had a considerable effect, particularly in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary, and sufficient at least to deter these countries from joining any combination opposed to German designs, even if not enough to persuade them actively to ally themselves with Nazi Germany.
"Important political leaders of Yugoslavia began to become convinced that the Nazi regime would remain in power and would gain its ends, and that the course of safety for Yugoslavia was to play along with Germany."
I shall not take the time of the Tribunal to read into evidence the detailed official dispatches which Mr. Messersmith sent to the American State Department, showing that Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland were beginning to follow the German line.
As for Italy, Germany's initial objective was to sow discord between Yugoslavia and Italy, by promising Yugoslavia Italian territory, particularly Trieste. This was to prevent France from reaching agreement with them and to block an east Locarno pact. On that I quote again from Document 2385-PS, Exhibit USA-68, the second Messersmith affidavit, in the middle of Page 21 of the English version:
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"While Italy openly opposed efforts at Anschluss with Austria in 1934, Italian ambitions in Abyssinia provided Germany with the opportunity to sow discord between Italy and France and England, and to win Italy over to acceptance of Germany's program in exchange for German support of Italy's plans in Abyssinia."
That, if the Tribunal please, paved the way for the Austro-German Declaration or Pact of 11 July 1936; and in the fall of 1936 Germany extended the hand of friendship and common purpose to Italy, in an alliance which they called the "Rome-Berlin Axis." This, together with Germany's alliance with Japan, put increasing pressure on England and greatly increased the relative strength of Germany.
And so by means of careful preparation in the diplomatic field, among others, the Nazi conspirators had woven a position for themselves, so that they could seriously consider plans for war and begin to outline time tables, not binding time tables and not specific ones in terms of months and days, but still general time tables, in terms of years, which were the necessary foundation for further aggressive planning, and a spur to more specific planing. And that time table was developed, as the Tribunal has already seen, in the conference of 5 November 1937, contained in our Document Number 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25, the Hossbach minutes of that conference, which I adverted to in detail on Monday last.
In those minutes, we see the crystallization of the plan to wage aggressive war in Europe, and to seize both Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in that order.
In connection with the exposition of the aggression on Austria, I have shown first the purpose of the Nazi conspiracy, with respect to the absorption of Austria, and then the steps taken by them in Austria up to this period, that is, November 1937.
I have also outlined for the Tribunal the general diplomatic preparations of the Nazi conspirators, with respect to their program in Europe generally, and with respect to Austria in particular.
It may now be profitable to reconsider the minutes of the meeting of 5 November 1937, in the light of this more-detailed background. It will be recalled that in that meeting, the Fuehrer insisted that Germany must have more space in Europe. He concluded that the space required must be taken by force; and three different possible cases were outlined for different eventualities but all reaching the conclusion that the problem would certainly have to be solved before 1943 to 1945.
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Then there was envisaged the nature of a war in the near future, specifically against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that for the improvement of Germany's military and political positions, it must be the first aim of the Nazis, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westward.
Hitler then considered that the embodiment into Germany of Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute the conquest of food for from 5 to 6 million people, including the assumption that the comprehensive forced emigration of 1 million people from Austria could be carried out. And he further pointed out that the annexation of the two States to Germany, both militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief since they would provide shorter and better frontiers, would free fighting personnel for other purposes, and would make possible the reconstitution of large new German armies.
Insofar as Austria is concerned, those minutes reveal a crystallization in the policy of the Nazi conspirators. It had always been their aim to acquire Austria. At the outset a revolutionary Putsch was attempted, but that failed. The next period was one of surface recognition of the independence of Austria and the use of devious means to strengthen the position of Nazis internally in Austria.
Now, however, it became clear that the need, or the greed, for Austria, in the light of the larger aggressive purpose of the Nazi conspirators was sufficiently great to warrant the use of force in order to obtain Austria with the speed that was designed. In fact, as we shall see later, the Nazis were actually able to secure Austria, after having weakened it internally and removed from it the support of other nations, merely by setting the German military machine into motion and making a threat of force.
The German armies were able to cross the border and secure the country without the necessity of firing a shot. Their careful planning for war and their readiness to use war as an instrument of political action made it possible, in the end, for them to pluck this plum without having to fight a blow for it.
The German High Command had, of course, previously considered preparation against Austria.
I offer in evidence another German document, C-175, as Exhibit USA-69. It, again, is "top secret", with the added legend in German: "Chefsache nur durch Offizier" (matter for the chief only to be delivered through an officer).
This was a top-secret directive of 24 June 1937 of the Reichsminister for War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
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General Von Blomberg. The importance of this top-secret directive is indicated by the fact that the carbon copy, received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, was one of only four copies establishing the directive for a unified preparation for war of all the Armed Forces.
This directive from General Von Blomberg states that although the political situation indicates that Germany need not consider an attack from any side it also states that Germany does not intend to unleash a European war. It then states in Part 1, and I quote from Page 2 of the English text, which, I believe, is Page 4, third paragraph, of the German text:
"The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continued preparedness for war by the German Armed Forces: (a) To counter attacks at any time; (b) To enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities, should they occur."
The directive then indicates that there will be certain preparations for war of a general nature. I quote the first two portions of Paragraph 2, on Page 2 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:
"(2) The preparations of a general nature include:
"(a) The permanent preparedness for mobilization of the German Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament, and full preparedness for war.
"(b) The further working on 'mobilization without public announcement' in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise, both as regards strength and time."
And the directive finally indicates that there might be special preparations for war against Austria. I quote from Part 3, (V Special Case Otto, Page 4 of the English text, and Page 19 of the German text. "Case Otto", as you will repeatedly see, was the standing code name for aggressive war against Austria. I quote:
"Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the monarchy.
"The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration.
"Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people, the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna, and will break any resistance."
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I should now like to call attention to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendants Schacht and Goering, in November 1937.
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): I should like to state my objection to the manner in which Document C-175 has been treated. This document is a study made by the General Staff, which was conceived to meet many different eventualities of war. It even mentions the possibility that Germany might have to go to war with Spain, and might have to carry out a military attack on her.
Only part of this document was read, the part relating to Austria; and thus the impression was given that a plan had been made to march against Austria, whereas it actually says the German Reich had no intention to attack at that time, but was merely preparing for all eventualities.
I should like to request that the reading of this document be supplemented by reading at least the headings of the paragraphs of this document. If these paragraphs of the document are placed before the Court, it will be seen that this was not a plan to march against Austria, but simply a document preparing for all eventualities.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, your objection does not appear to be to the admissibility of the document, but to the weight of the document. The Tribunal has already informed defendants' counsel that they will have an opportunity at the appropriate time, when they come to prepare their defense, to refer to any documents, parts of which have been put in by the Prosecution, and to read such parts as they think necessary then, and to make what criticism they think necessary then.
Your objection is therefore premature, because it does not go to the admissibility of the document. It simply indicates a wish that more of it should be read. You will have the opportunity later to read any parts of the documents which you wish.
MR. ALDERMAN: I suppose, if the Tribunal please, that the fundamental basis of the objection just stated by the distinguished counsel, must have been his theory that Germany never made any plans to invade Austria, and if so, it would seem to follow that Germany never invaded Austria, and perhaps history is mistaken.
I had adverted to two conversations, held by United States Ambassador Bullitt with the Defendant Schacht and the Defendant Goering, in November 1937.
For this purpose, I offer in evidence our Document L-151, offered as Exhibit USA-70. It is a dispatch from Mr. Bullitt, American
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Ambassador in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on 23 November 1937.
Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because that document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal. It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel.
If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. On top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State, November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin en route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Goering, among others.
On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the report: "Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal with Hitler was not through political discussion but through economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore possible to enter into negotiations with him in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, and it might be possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military field, in which he was intensely interested. Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his"-that is Schacht's- "opinion, it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany."
And for the Defendant Goering's statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read from the second memorandum, "Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Goering," on Page 2 of that document, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below the middle of the page:
"The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve certain vital national necessities.
"If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.
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'`I asked Goering what aims especially he had in mind. He replied:
" 'We are determined to join to the German Reich all Germans who are contiguous to the Reich and are divided from the great body of the German race merely by the artificial barriers imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.'
"I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government, at the present time, was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy. But Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. "He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject. He said:
" 'There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the union. Such a solution is absolutely unacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediate casus belli.' Goering used the Latin expression casus belli; it is not a translation from the German, in which that conversation was carried on.
"I asked Goering if the German Government was as decided in its views with regard to the Germans in Bohemia, as it was with regard to Austria. He replied that there could be only one final solution of this question. The Sudeten Germans must enter the German Reich as all other Germans who lived contiguous to the Reich."
These, if the Tribunal please, are official reports made by the accredited representative of the United States in the regular course of business. They carry with them the guarantee of truthfulness of a report made by a responsible official to his own government, recording contemporaneous conversations and events.
My next subject is pressure and threats resulting in further concessions by Austria: a meeting at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938. As I have stated before, the Austrian Government was laboring under great difficulties imposed by its neighbor. There was economic pressure, including the curtailment of the important tourist trade; and there was what the Defendant Von Papen called "slowly intensified psychological pressure." There were increasing demon-
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strations, plots, and conspiracies. Demands were being presented by Captain Leopold and approval of the Nazis was being espoused by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, the new Councillor of the State of Austria. In this situation, Chancellor Schuschnigg decided to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden.
The official communiqué of this conference is quite calm; I invite the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is Document 2461-PS, the official German communiqué of the meeting of Hitler and Schuschnigg at Obersalzberg, 12 February 1938, taken from the official Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 124, Number 21-a.
The communiqué states that the unofficial meeting was caused by the mutual desire to clarify by personal conversation the questions relating to the relationship between the German Reich and Austria.
The communiqué lists among those present:
Schuschnigg and his Foreign Minister Schmidt, Hitler and his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and the Defendant Von Papen.
The communiqué concludes on a rather bright note saying, and I quote:
"Both statesmen are convinced that the measures taken by them constitute at the same time an effective contribution toward the peaceful development of the European situation."
A similar communiqué was issued by the Austrian Government. But in fact, and as I think history well knows, the conference was a very unusual and a very harsh one. Great concessions were obtained by the German Government from Austria. The principal concessions are contained in the official Austrian communiqué of the reorganization of the Cabinet and the general political amnesty, dated 16 February 1938.
That communiqué, as taken from the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, Page 125, Number 21-b, is translated in our Document 2464-PS and I invite the Court's judicial notice of that communiqué.
That communiqué announced a reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, including, most significantly, the appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the position of Minister of Security and Interior, where he would have control of the police. In addition, announcement was made of a general political amnesty to Nazis convicted of crimes.
Two days later another concession was divulged.
I invite the Court's judicial notice to our Document 2469-PS, a translation of the official German and Austrian communiqué con-
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cerning the so-called equal rights of Austrian National Socialists in Austria, 18 February 1938, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-d.
That communiqué announced that pursuant to the Berchtesgaden conference, the Austrian National Socialists would be taken into the Fatherland Front, the single legal political party of Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you tell us what exhibit numbers those two documents were?
MR. ALDERMAN: I am sorry, Sir; Document 2469-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't had that yet. We have had 2461-PS, which is exhibit what?
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, I hadn't read it in. I was asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this as an official communiqué.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to give it an exhibit number?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Nor 2469?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir.
In actual fact, great pressure was put on Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. The fact that pressure was exerted, and pressure of a military nature involving the threat of the use of troops, can be sufficiently established from captured German documents.
I have our Document 1544-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-71
This document consists of the Defendant Von Papen's own notes on his last meeting with Schuschnigg, on February 26, 1938. I quote the last two paragraphs of these notes. This is Von Papen speaking, in his own notes:
'I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that he"-that is, Schuschnigg-"had acted under 'brutal pressure' in Berchtesgaden. I myself had been present and been able to state that he had always and at every point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied that he had actually been under considerable moral pressure; he could not deny that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any. concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He answered: 'To be honest, no."'
And then Von Papen says:
"It appears to me of importance to record this statement.
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"In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria could have maintained her status with the help of non-German, European combinations. This question could be decided only according to the interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same conviction and would act accordingly."
Thus we have, through the words of Von Papen, Schuschnigg's contemporary statement to Papen of the pressure which had been exerted upon him as recorded by Von Papen in an original, contemporaneous entry.
For diplomatic purposes, Papen, who had been at Berchtesgaden, kept up the pretense that there had been no pressure applied.
But the Defendant General Jodl, writing the account of current events in his diary, was much more candid. We are fortunate in having General Jodl's handwritten diary in German script which I can't read. It is our Document 1780-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-72.
I may say that General Jodl, in interrogations, has admitted that this is his genuine diary in his handwriting.
This diary discloses not only the pressure at Berchtesgaden, but also the fact that for some days thereafter Defendant Keitel and Admiral Canaris worked out a scheme for shamming military pressure in order, obviously, to coerce President Miklas of Austria into ratifying the agreement. It started from Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. It will be noted that the approval of President Miklas was needed to ratify the Berchtesgaden agreement; that is, with respect to naming Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and Security.
And so the Nazi conspirators kept up the military pressure with threats of invasion for some days after the Berchtesgaden conference in order to produce the desired effect on President Miklas. I quote from General Jodl's diary, the entries for February 11, February 13, and February 14, 1938. The entry of 11 February: "In the evening and on 12 February General K."-Keitel- "with General Von Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
"13 February: In the afternoon General K."-Keitel-"asks Admiral C."-Canaris-"and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure, by shamming military action, should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
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"14 February: At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office VII and initiates the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations."
The proposal for deceptive maneuvers reported on by Defendant Jodl are set forth in Document 1775-PS, a captured German document, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA-73.
The proposals are signed by the Defendant Keitel. Underneath his signature appears a note that the Fuehrer approved the proposal. In the original document that note is handwritten in pencil.
The rumors which Keitel proposed for the intimidation of Austria make very interesting reading. I quote the first three paragraphs of the suggested order:
"1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.
"2. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria:
"(a) Through V-men"-V-Männer-"in Austria.
"(b) Through our customs personnel"-staff-"at the frontier.
"(c) Through travelling agents.
"3. Such news could be:
"(a) Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the sector of the VII A.K.
"(b) Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.
"(c) Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has been called for a conference to Berlin. As a matter of fact, this is the case."
-That reminds me of a lawyer from my own home town who used to argue a matter at great length, and then he would end up by saying. "and, incidentally, it is the truth."
"(d) The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have called up reinforcements.
"(e) Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade"-Gebirgsbrigade-"in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden." '
The total pattern of intimidation and rumor was effective, for in due course, as we have already seen from the communiqués referred to, President Miklas verified the Berchtesgaden Agreement
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which foreshadowed National Socialist Austria and then the events culminating in the actual German invasion on 12 March 1938.
Mr. President, would this be a convenient moment for a recess?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.
[A recess was taken.]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had reached the subject of the events culminating in the German invasion of Austria on 12 March 1938, and first under that, the plebiscite and the preparations for both German and Austrian National Socialists.
The day after his appointment as Minister of the Interior of Austria, Seyss-Inquart flew to Berlin for a conference with Hitler. I invite the Court to take judicial notice of the official German communiqué covering that visit of Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, as it appears in the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 128, Number 21-c, a copy of which will be found in our Document 2484-PS.
On March 9, 1938, 3 weeks after Seyss-Inquart had been put in charge of the police of Austria and was in a position to direct their handling of the National Socialists in Austria-3 weeks after the Nazis began to exploit their new prestige and position with their quota of further victories-Schuschnigg made an important announcement.
On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that he would hold a plebiscite throughout Austria the following Sunday, March 13, 1938. The question to be submitted in the plebiscite was: "Are you for an independent and social, a Christian, German, and united Austria?" A "yes" answer to this question was certainly compatible with the agreement made by the German Government on 11 July 1936 and carried forward at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. Moreover, for a long while the Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the question of Anschluss, but the Nazis apparently appreciated the likelihood of a strong "yes" vote on the question put by Schuschnigg in the plebiscite, and they could not tolerate the possibility of such a vote of confidence in the Schuschnigg Government.
In any case, as events showed, they took this occasion to overturn the Austrian Government. Although the plebiscite was not announced until the evening of 9 March, the Nazi organization received word about it earlier in that day. It was determined by the Nazis that they had to ask Hitler what to do about the situation (that is, the Austrian Nazis), and that they would prepare a letter of protest against the plebiscite from Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg;
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and that, pending Hitler's approval, Seyss-Inquart would pretend to negotiate with Schuschnigg about details of the plebiscite.
This information is all contained in the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel, transmitted as I have already pointed out to Seyss-Inquart, and which has already been received in evidence-our Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61.
I quote briefly from Page 7 of the English test, the paragraph beginning on Page 11 of the German original:
"The Landesleitung received word about the planned plebiscite through illegal information services, on 9 March 1938 at 10 a.m. At the session which was called immediately afterwards, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had known about this for only a few hours, but that he could not talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on this subject. But during the talks he made us understand that the illegal information we received was based on truth, and that in view of the new situation, he had been cooperating with the Landesleitung from the very first moment. Klausner, Jury, Rainer, Globocnik, and Seyss-Inquart were present at the first talks which were held at 10 a.m. There it was decided that:
"First, the Fuehrer had to be informed immediately; secondly, the opportunity for the Fuehrer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Minister Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and thirdly, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the Government until clear instructions and orders were received from the Fuehrer. Seyss-Inquart and Plainer together composed a letter to Schuschnigg, and only one copy of it was brought to the Fuehrer by Globocnik, who flew to him on the afternoon of 9 March 1938.
"Negotiations with the Government were not successful. Therefore, they were stopped by Seyss-Inquart in accordance with the instructions he received from the Fuehrer .... On 10 March all the preparations for future revolutionary actions already had been made ... and the necessary orders given to all unit leaders .... During the night of the 10 to 11, Globocnik returned from the Fuehrer with the announcement that the Fuehrer gave the Party freedom of action ... and that he would back it in everything it did."
-That means the Austrian Nazi Party.
Next, Germany's actual preparations for the invasion and the use of force.
When news of the plebiscite reached Berlin, it started a tremendous amount of activity. Hitler, as history knows, was determined
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not to tolerate the plebiscite. Accordingly, he called his military advisers and ordered the preparation of the march into Austria.
On the diplomatic side he started a letter to Mussolini indicating why he was going to march into Austria, and in the absence of the Defendant Ribbentrop (who was temporarily detained in London), the Defendant Von Neurath took over the affairs of the Foreign Office again.
The terse and somewhat disconnected notes in General Jodl's diary give a vivid account of the activities in Berlin. I quote from the entry of 10 March:
"By surprise and without consulting his Ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimicists in the absence of plan or preparation. The Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it.
"This same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from the Cairo Olympic Committee. General Von Schobert is ordered to come as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the district leader, Gauleiter Buerckel, in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 9:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General Von Viebahn, to give him all drafts. 'Prepare Case Otto.' "1300 hours, General K."-which I think plainly means Keitel-"informs Chief of Operational Staff and Admiral Canaris, Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office. Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which forced the Fuehrer to take action.
"1830 hours, mobilization order is given to the Commander of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps, without Reserve Army." (Document Number 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72).
Now, it is to be noted that Defendant Von Neurath was at this critical hour acting as Foreign Minister. The previous February the Defendant Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and Von Neurath had become President of the Secret Cabinet Council. But in this critical hour of foreign policy the Defendant Ribbentrop was in London handling the diplomatic consequences of the Austrian transaction. As Foreign Minister in this hour of aggression, involving mobilization and movement of troops, use of force and threats to eliminate the independence of a neighboring country, the Defendant Von Neurath resumed his former position in the Nazi conspiracy.
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I now offer in evidence our Document W102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler's mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive. First the caption, "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces" with some initials; "referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies." This is the 11th copy; top secret:
"1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.
"4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide the actual moment for invasion.
"5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms."
I also over in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows:
"Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.
"Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Number 427/38,"-with some symbols.-
"Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.
"1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.
"2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl."
Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before
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it a relatively full account of the way in which the German Government on 11 March 1938 deprived Austria of her sovereignty. First I shall give the report of the day's events in Austria as given by the Austrian Nazis. I refer to Document 812-PS, Exhibit USA-61, a report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel, and I shall read from Page 8 of the English version. For the benefit of the German interpreter I am starting following a tabulation: First case, second case, third case, and following the sentence, "Dr. Seyss-Inquart took part in these talks with the Gauleiter."
"On Friday, 11 March, the Minister Glaise-Horstenau arrived m Vienna after a visit with the Fuehrer. After talks with Seyss-Inquart he went to see the Chancellor. At 11:30 a.m. the Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnik, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischböck, and Muhlmann participated. Dr. Seyss-Inquart reported on his talks with Dr. Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers.
"In regard to Rainer's proposal, Von Klausner ordered that the Government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 1400 hours, signed by legal political 'front' men, including both Ministers and also State Councillors Fishböck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in 3 weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution.
"On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to the Fuehrer calling for help were prepared.
"Klausner placed the leadership of the final political actions in the hands of Rainer and Globocnik. Schuschnigg called a session of all ministers for 2 p.m. Rainer agreed with Seyss-Inquart that Rainer would send the telegram to the Fuehrer and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power unless he received news from the session of the Ministers' Council before that time. During this time all measures had been prepared. At 2:30 Seyss-Inquart telephoned Rainer and informed him that Schuschnigg had been unable to take the pressure and had recalled the plebiscite but that he refused to call a new plebiscite and had ordered the strongest police measures for maintaining order. Rainer asked whether the two Ministers had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart answered, 'No.' Rainer informed the Reichskanzlei through the German Embassy, and received an answer from Goering through the same channels, that the Fuehrer will not consent to partial solutions and that Schuschnigg must resign. Seyss-Inquart was informed
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of this by Globocnik and Muehlmann. Talks were held between Seyss-Inquart and Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg resigned. Seyss-Inquart asked Rainer what measures the Party wished taken. Rainer's answer: Reestablishment of the Government by Seyss-Inquart, legalization of the Party, and calling up of the SS and SA as auxiliaries to the police force. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that everything might be threatened by the resistance of Miklas, the President. Meanwhile word arrived from the German Embassy that the Fuehrer expected the establishment of a government under Seyss-Inquart with a national majority, the legalization of the Party, and permission for the Legion"-that is the Austrian Legion in Germany-"to return, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m.; otherwise German troops would cross the border at 8 p.m. At 5 p.m. Rainer and Globocnik, accompanied by Muhlmann, went to the Chancellor's office to carry out this errand.
"Situation: Miklas negotiated with Ender for the creation of a government whim included Blacks, Reds, and National Socialists, and proposed the post of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart. The latter rejected it and told Rainer that he was not able to negotiate by himself because he was personally involved, and therefore a weak and unfavorable political situation for the cause might result. Rainer negotiated with Zernatto. Director of the Cabinet Huber, Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau, Legation Councillor Stein, Military Attaché General Muff, and the Gruppenfuehrer Keppler,"-whose name I told you would reappear significantly-"who had arrived in the meantime, were already negotiating. At 7 p.m. Seyss-Inquart entered the negotiations again. Situation at 7:30 p.m.: Stubborn refusal of Miklas to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor; appeal to the world in case of a German invasion.
"Gruppenfuehrer Keppler explained that the Fuehrer did not yet have an urgent reason for the invasion. This reason must first be created. The situation in Vienna and in the country is most dangerous. It is feared that street fights will break out any moment because Rainer ordered the entire Party to demonstrate at 3 o'clock. Rainer proposed storming and seizing the Chancellor's palace in order to force the reconstruction of the Government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler but was carried out by Rainer after he discussed it with Globocnik. After 8 p.m. the SA and the SS marched in and occupied the Government buildings and all important positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30 p.m. Rainer, with the approval of
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Klausner, ordered all Gauleiter of Austria to take over power in all eight gaue of Austria, with the help of the SS and SA and with instructions that all Government representatives who try to resist, should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
"With this the revolution broke out, and this resulted in the complete occupation of Austria within 3 hours and the taking over of all important posts by the Party.
"The seizure of power was the work of the Party supported by the Fuehrer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the Government. The national result in the form of the taking over of the Government by Seyss-Inquart was due to the actual seizure of power by the Party on one hand, and the Political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other; but both factors may be considered only in relation to the Fuehrer's decision on 9 March 1938 to solve the Austrian problem under any circumstances and the orders consequently issued by the Fuehrer."
We have at hand another document which permits us virtually to live again through the events of March 11, 1938, and to live through them in most lively and interesting fashion. Thanks to the efficiency of the Defendant Goering and his Luftwaffe organization we have a highly interesting document, obviously an official document from the Luftwaffe headquarters headed as usual "Geheime Reichssache" (top secret). The letterhead is stamped "Reichsluftfahrtministerium Forschungsamt". If I can get the significance of the German, Forschungsamt means the Research Department of Goering's Air Ministry. The document is in a characteristic German folder and on the back it says, "Gespräche Fall Österreich" (Conversations about the Austria Case) and the paper cover on the inside has German script writing, which in time, I will ask the interpreter to read; but it looks to me as if it is "Privat, Geheime Archive," which is Secret Archive, Berlin, "Gespräche Fall Österreich" (Case Austria). I offer that set of documents in the original file as they were found in the Air Ministry, identified as our 2949-PS. I offer them as Exhibit USA-76, and, offering them, I am reminded of Job's outcry, "Oh, that mine enemy would write a book!"
The covering letter in that file, signed by some member of this research organization within the Air Ministry, and addressed to the Defendant Goering, states in substance-well, I will read the English translation. It starts: "To the General Field Marshal. Enclosed I submit, as ordered, the copies of your telephone conversations."
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Evidently the defendant wanted to keep a record of important telephone conversations which he had with important persons regarding the Case Austria, and had the transcriptions provided by his Research Department. Most of the conversations transcribed and recorded in the volume I have offered, were conducted by the Defendant Goering, although at least one interesting one was conducted by Hitler. For purposes of convenience our staff has marked these telephone calls in pencil with an identifying letter running from "A" through "Z" and then to "AA." Eleven of these conversations have been determined by a screening process to be relevant to the evidence of this particular time. All the conversations which have been translated have been mimeographed and are included in the document books handed to the defendants. The original binder contains, of course, the complete set of conversations. A very extensive and interesting account of events with which we are much concerned can be developed from quotations from these translated conversations.
I turn now to copies of the telephone conversations. The first group in Part A of the binder took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified by the letter "F" for Field Marshal, and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as 'S". The transcript prepared by the Research Institute of the Air Ministry is in part in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. I quote from Part A of this binder, and because of the corroborated nature of this transcript and its obvious authenticity, I propose to quote this conversation in full.
"F"-hereafter I shall use Goering and Seyss-Inquart-
"F: How do you do, doctor? My brother-in-law, is he with you?'
"Seyss-Inquart: 'No."'
Hereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:
"Goering: 'How are things with you? Have you resigned or do you have any news?'
"Seyss-Inquart: 'The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S' "-Seyss-Inquart- " 'and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered; among others, curfew at 8 p. m.'
"Goering replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. Goering will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the
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behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.
"Thereafter a conversation took place between Goering and the Fuehrer. Afterwards Goering again telephoned Seyss-Inquart. This conversation was held at 15:05.
"Goering told Seyss-Inquart that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our Government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently the national Ministers, Seyss-Inquart, and the others are being requested immediately to hand in their resignations to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. Goering added that if after a period of 1 hour no report had come through, the assumption would be made that Seyss-Inquart would no more be in a position to telephone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. Seyss-Inquart was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg's resignation."
Thus you see that at 2:45 p.m. Goering told Seyss-Inquart over the telephone that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the elections; and 20 minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. That is your second ultimatum.
When informed about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet. Shall I go into another one of these?
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better adjourn now until 2 o'clock.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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Afternoon Session
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart with which I dealt this morning, the Defendant Goering telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Legation in Vienna. I have reference to the telephone conversation marked "TT" on Page 2, Part C, of Document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first place, the Defendant Goering showed concern that the Nazi Party and all of its organizations should be definitely legalized promptly. I quote from Page 2 of the transcript:
"Goering: 'Now to go on, the Party has definitely been legalized?'
"Dombrowski: 'But that is-it is not necessary even to discuss that?'
"Goering: 'With all of its organizations.'
"Dombrowski: 'With all of its organizations within this country.'
"Goering: 'In uniform?'
"Dombrowski: 'In uniform.
"Goering: 'Good.'
"Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour, which means everything is all right."
In addition, Goering stated that the Cabinet-the Austrian Cabinet-must be formed by 7:30 p.m. and he transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from Page 3 of the English text of the transcript of the conversation:
"Goering: 'Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer, and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten: Fischbodk must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.'
"Dombrowski: That is understood.'
"Goering: 'Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the Armed Forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.'
"Dombrowski: 'Yes, yes.'
"Goering: 'Give me the name.'
"Dombrowski: 'Well, your brother-in-law, isn't that right?"' -That is Huber, the brother-in-law of the Defendant Goering.-
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"Goering: 'Yes.'
"Dombrowski: 'Yes.'
"Goering: 'That's right, and then also Fischböck."'
And about 20 minutes later, at 5:26 p.m., Goering was faced with the news that Miklas, the President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the folder, the part marked with capital R, Pages 1 and 2:
"Goering: 'Now remember the following: You go immediately, together with Lieutenant General Muff, and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier, will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lieutenant General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please inform us immediately about Miklas' position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before, action was delayed, but now the situation is such that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship."' -There follows in the transcript a sentence which is broken up.-" M." -I suppose that means Lieutenant General Muff.-" 'does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations.' " -There is again an interruption in the transcript.-" 'And then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets; so remember, report must be given by 7:30. Lieutenant General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.' "
An hour later, at 6:28 p.m., Goering had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When he told Keppler that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering said-I read from Part H, about a third of the way down on the page:
"Goering: 'Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him. Just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that S. I."' -Seyss-Inquart-" 'shall call on the National Socialist
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guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order."'
After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed the Defendant Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him, and there might be definite word in about 10 minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows-I quote from Page 2 of Part H. beginning about the middle of the page:
"Goering: 'Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancery as usual, but it has to be done fast. I can hardly justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power. All right?'
"Seyss-Inquart: 'But if he threatens?'
"Goering: 'Yes.'
"Seyss-Inquart: 'Well, I see; then we shall be ready.'
"Goering: 'Call me via Blitz.' "
In other words, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas retrained obdurate. The plan which was already discussed involved the use of both the National Socialist forces in Austria and the German troops who had been crossing the borders. Later that night Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation at about 11 o'clock. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows, and I quote from Part I of this folder:
"Goering: 'OK' "-What's the German word for OK? Schön.-" 'I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now. Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance will immediately be subjected to our court martial, the court martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?'
"Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes.'
"Goering: Including leading personalities; it does not make any difference.'
"Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes, they have given the order not to offer any resistance.'
"Goering: 'Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.'
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"Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes.'
"Goering: 'Well, now you are officially authorized.'
"Seyss-Inquart: 'Yes.'
"Goering: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.' "
I am sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o'clock instead of 11. I meant to say 8 o'clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the Defendant Goering was planning to invade a peaceful neighboring state, he planned to try what he referred to as major war criminals before German court martial, the leading personalities. So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of action for taking over power. Something else very significant was sent on that subject over the telephone, at least so far as those transcripts indicate. But there was another historical event which was discussed over the telephone. I refer to the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting the German Government to send troops into Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A conversation held at 8:48 that night between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows-I read from Page 1 of Part L:
"Goering: 'Well, I do not know yet. Listen, the main thing is that if Inquart takes over all powers of Government he keeps the radio stations occupied.'
"Keppler: 'Well, we represent the Government now.'
"Goering: 'Yes, that's it. You are the Government. Listen carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: The provisional Austrian Government which, after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, considered it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request for support in its task of preventing bloodshed. For this purpose, it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible.'
"Keppler: 'Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups."'
Now let us talk about sending German troops to put down disorder. The SA and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And a few minutes later, the conversation continued thus, reading from Page 2 of Part L:
"Goering: 'Then our troops will cross the border today.'
"Keppler: 'Yes.'
"Goering: 'Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.'
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"Keppler: 'Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the office of the Federal Chancellor.'
"Goering: 'Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him-well, he does not even need to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say, "Agreed." '
"Keppler: 'Yes.' .
"Goering: 'He should call me at the Fuehrer's or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler."'
Well, of course, he did not need to send the telegram because Goering wrote the telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in the first conversation, Part A, held at 3:05 p.m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9:54 p.m. a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M:
"Dietrich: 'I need the telegram urgently.'
"Keppler: 'Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.'
"Dietrich: 'This is marvelous. Thank you.'
"Keppler: 'Listen to the radio. News will be given.'
"Dietrich: Where?'
"Keppler: 'From Vienna.'
"Dietrich: 'So Seyss-Inquart agrees?' .
"Keppler: 'Jawohl.' "
Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications with Austria were now suspended but the German military machine had been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in evidence captured Document C-182, offered as Exhibit USA-77, a directive of 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This directive, initialed by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of Austria in view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:
"Top secret; Berlin, 11 March 1938, 2045 hours; Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, OKW,"-with other symbols-"35 copies, 6th copy. C-in-C Navy"-pencil note-"has been informed. Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.
"1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian Government have not been fulfilled.
"2) The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw before the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.
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The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.
"3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to Directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.
"I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full as quickly as possible."
Signed Adolf Hitler; initialed by Jodl and by a name that looks like Warlimont.
And then some interesting communications with Rome to avoid possibility of disaster from that source. At the very time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds, and that was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian border in 1934 on the occasion of July 25, 1933-the Putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria.
With what a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10:25 p.m. that night from Prince Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The situation can really be grasped by the rereading of the conversation. The record of the conversation shows the excitement under which Hitler was operating when he spoke over the telephone. It is a short conversation, and I shall read the first half of it from Part N of the transcript of 2949-PS. I am afraid your title Part N may be blurred on the mimeographed copy. "E" is Hessen and "F" is the Fuehrer.
"Hessen: 'I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. Il Duce accepted the whole thing in a very friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria; Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus, and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.'
"Hitler: 'Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this.'
"Hessen: 'Yes.'
"Hitler: 'Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.'
"Hessen: 'Yes, I told him that, too.'
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"Hitler: 'As soon as the Austrian affair been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin; nothing matters.'
"Hessen: 'Yes, my Fuehrer.'
'Hitler: 'Listen, I shall make any agreement, I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.'
"Hessen: 'Yes, my Fuehrer.'
"Hitler: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.'
"Hessen: 'Yes, my Fuehrer.'
The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl's diary to the letter which Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated March 11. It may be found in the official publication Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 135, Number 24-a. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it, and you will find a translation of it appearing in our Document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote-and I quote: 'I have decided to re-establish order in my fatherland-order and tranquility-and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision."
He stated that this was an act of self-defense; that he had no hostile intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when Hitler was at Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more in the famous telegram which the world so well remembers. I again cite Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, Page 156, Number 29, the translation of the telegram being in our Document 2467-PS, and the document reads: 'Mussolini, I will never forget you for this."
We now shift our scene from Vienna to Berlin. We have shifted our scene, I meant, from Vienna to Berlin. It may now be appropriate to come back to Vienna just long enough to recall that late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas did appoint Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart's appointment was made at 11:15 p.m. This is noted in Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 137, Number 25-a, and a translation of the announcement is in our Document 2465-PS.
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Then something had to be done in London to smooth things over there and, accordingly, one more act played on the international scene is set down in the Air Ministry telephone transcript. On Sunday, March 13, 1938, the day after the invasion, Defendant Goering who had been left in Berlin in charge of the Reich by Hitler, who had gone to his fatherland, phoned Defendant Ribbentrop in London. I find this conversation very illuminating as to the way in which these defendants operated, using, if I may employ American vernacular, a kind of international "double talk" to soothe and mislead other nations. I quote from Part 1 of item W of Document 2949-PS:
"Goering:"-speaking to Ribbentrop in London:-" 'As you know, the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschäfte), and therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.'
"Ribbentrop: 'Yes, it is fantastic, is it not?'
"Goering: 'Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist Ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on more and more prominent people of the movement participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist Ministers asked us to back them up so that they would not be completely beaten up again and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would not allow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under any circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg's direct order or with his consent, the communists and the Reds had been armed and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with "Heil Moskau" and so on. Naturally, all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Vaterländische Front would fight to the last man. One could not know that they would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who already had taken over the Government, asked us to march in immediately. We had already marched up to the frontier before this, since we could not know
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whether or not there would be a civil war. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents.' "
There the Defendant Goering was giving to the Defendant Ribbentrop the proper line that he should take in London as to how to explain what had happened in Austria. Of course, when the Defendant Goering said that his story about this matter could be proved by documents, I don't think he had in mind that his own telephone calls might constitute documents.
Another rather interesting item begins on Page 3 of the English test of this Part W-still Goering talking to Ribbentrop in London. This is at the bottom of the page:
"Goering: 'No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you had spoken already to these people. I want you once more, -but no, not at all once more, but generally speaking-tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given an ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but that it also was given by the others, and as far as I know, just a military attaché came along, asked by Seyss-Inquart, because of a technical question."' -you will recall that he was a lieutenant general directed by Göring to go along-" die was supposed to ask whether, in case Seyss-Inquart would ask for the support of German troops, Germany world grant this request. Furthermore, I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us expressly, by phone and by telegram, to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.'
"Ribbentrop: Herr Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna; is everything settled yet?'
"Goering: 'Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and they were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17th division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also, I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw, but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed."'
These are quite interesting explanations that the ultimatum was by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Goering; that Lieutenant
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General Muff, the military attaché, was along just to answer a technical question, and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and telegram for troops. But, perhaps to understand this conversation, we must try to create again the actual physical scene of the time and place as Goering talked over the phone. I quote eight lines from Page 11 of the English text, about in the middle, Part W:
"Goering: 'Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.'
"Ribbentrop: I shall see you this afternoon.'
"Goering: 'The weather is wonderful here-blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony-all covered with blankets-in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in. I have to make the speech. And the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over there.' "-that is, Vienna.
"Ribbentrop: 'That is marvelous.' "
May it please the Tribunal, I have practically come to the end of the material relating to the aggression against Austria. In a moment I shall take up quite briefly the effects of the Anschluss, some of the developments which took place after the German troops marched across the border. What is to come after that is an epilogue, but before developing the epilogue, it may be appropriate to pause briefly for just a moment. I think that the facts which I have related to the Tribunal today show plainly certain things about the defendants involved in the conspiracy, and among the conspirators who particularly took action in the Austrian matter were Von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Ribbentrop, Von Neurath, and Goering.
First, I think it is plain that these men were dangerous men. They used their power without a bridle. They used their power to override the independence and freedom of others. And they were more than bullies squeezing a smaller foe. They were very sly bullies. They compounded their force with fraud. They coupled threats with legal technicalities and devious maneuvers, wearing a sanctimonious mask to cover their duplicity. I think they are dangerous men.
In accordance with the directive of March 11, our Document C-182, Exhibit USA-77, the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak, 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people announcing the invasion, and purporting to justify it. I refer again to Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, Page 140, Number 27, "Proclamation of Hitler." The British Government and the French Government filed protests. The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz,
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and they both expressed their joy over the events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. I refer to the speech of Seyss-Inquart at Linz on 12 March 1938, as contained in the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 144, Number 28-a, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and which you will find translated in our Document 2485-PS.
For a view of what was happening in Vienna, I offer in evidence our Document L-292, telegram 70, American Legation, Vienna, to the American Secretary of State, 12 March 1938, and I offer it as Exhibit USA-78. I quote it in full:
"Secretary of State, Washington; March 12, noon.
"Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets 'National Socialist Germany greets its possession, National Socialist Austria and her new Government in true indivisible Union.'
"Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and impending arrival Austrian Legion. SS and set in undisputed control in Vienna. Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored arrested. Himmler and Hess here."-Signed-"Wiley."
The law-making machine was put to work immediately on the task of consolidation. For all of this material I shall merely refer the Tribunal to the German sources and to the document number of the English translation, but I think I need not offer these legislative acts in evidence but shall merely invite the Court to take judicial notice of them.
First, Miklas was forced to resign as President. I refer to Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 147, Number 30-b. Our translation is in our Document 2466-PS.
In this connection the Court will no doubt recall Goering's telephone conversation as shown in Document 2999-PS, that in view of Miklas' delay in appointing Seyss-Inquart, Miklas would be dismissed. Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President.
He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of March 13, 1938 for the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Belch Statute of Reunion, passed the same day, German law. I cite for that the Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 237, Number 21, a translation of which will be found in our Document 2307-PS.
This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich. By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles,
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which provided (by the way, on the Constitutional Law to which I just referred there appear as signatories the following names:
Adolf Hitler, Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor; Goering, General Field Marshal, Reich Minister of Aviation; Frick, Reich Minister of the Interior; Von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs; R. Hess, Deputy Fuehrer.)
By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides, and I quote:
"Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of Austria within the frontier, which may be fixed in a treaty between that state and the principal Allied and Associated Powers. She agrees that this independence shall be inalienable." (JN-2)
Similarly, the Austrian action violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:
"The independence of Austria is inalienable, otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes, in the absence of the consent of the said Council, to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power." (JN-3)
This basic Constitutional Law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 April 1938 on the question of reunion, but this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union declared in the law. It could not undo Germany's union with, and control over, Austria.
To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured under conditions of occupation of Austria by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of the acts passed within the month.
Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his own command and required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander. A translation of the pertinent document will be found in our 2936-PS, and I refer to the instruction of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, concerning the Austrian Federal Army, March 13, 1938, Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6, I, Page 150.
Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing allegiance to Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich and people.. Jewish officials as defined were not permitted to take the oath.
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I refer to a decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration of oath to the officials of the Province of Austria, March 15, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 245, Number 24, the translation being in our Document 2311-PS.
Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich Laws, including the law of 1933 against the formation of new political parties, and the 1933 Law for the Preservation of Unity of Party and State.
I refer to the first decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the introduction of German Reich Law into Austria, 15 March 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 247, Number 25, the translation being in our Document 2310-PS.
Hitler, Frick, and Goering ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. I cite the order pursuant to the law concerning the reunion of Austria with the German Reich, March 16, 1938, Reichegesetzbtatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 249, Number 25, translated in our 1060-PS.
In connection with Germany's extensive propaganda campaign to insure acceptability of the German regime, it may be noted that Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna.
I cite the order concerning the establishment of a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna, March 31, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 350, Number 46, translated in our Document 2935-PS.
The ballot addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as "German soldiers" asked the voters whether they agreed with the accomplishment and ratification on March 13, 1938 of the reuniting of Austria with Germany.
I cite the second order concerning plebiscite and election for the Greater German Reichstag of March 24, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 303, translated in our Document 1659-PS.
The ground work was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite "for German men and women of Austria" promised in the basic law of March 13.
Then, the importance of Austria in further aggression. Could we run that screen up, or is the chart still behind it? Well, the Court will remember the chart.
The seizure of Austria had now formed that lower jaw to the head of the wolf around the head of Czechoslovakia. Germany's desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria and her determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that she did-that is, with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risk-was due to the importance of Austria in her further plans of aggression.
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The conference held November 5, 1937, planning for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food through expulsion of a million people and the effective increase in fighting strength, in part through the improvement in the frontier.
I cite again Document 386-PS, Exhibit USA-25. Austria was to yield to Germany material resources, and moreover, she provided ready cash taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.
One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin van Krosigk and Schacht for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. I refer to the order for the transfer of the Austrian National Bank to the Reichsbank, March 17, 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 254, Number 27, translated in our 2313-PS.
Austria also yielded human resources. Three months after the Anschluss there was enacted a decree requiring the 21-year-old men, Austrian men, to report for active military service. I refer to the decree regarding registration for active military service in Austria during 1938, Reichsgesetzblatt 1938, Volume 1, Page 634, translated in our 1660-PS.
And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position of the German Army. I invite the Court's attention to a document which I introduced in the case on preparation for aggression, L-172, Exhibit USA-34, which was a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the German Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiter. Only one page of that lecture appears in this particular document book, and I quote from one paragraph on Page 5 of the English text, which is Page 7 of Jodl's lecture, which reviewed the situation in 1938:
"The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfillment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas, until then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany-a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia- Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Her own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigor before effective aid from the west could be expected to arrive."
The Nazi conspirators were now ready to carry out the second part of this second phase of their aggression and to take over Czechoslovakia.
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Logically, if the Tribunal please, we should proceed at this point with the story about Czechoslovakia. For reasons that I explained earlier in the week we have had to change our plans somewhat from a strictly logical order, and the plan at present is that on Monday I shall go forward with the Czechoslovakian part of the aggressive war case.
At this point it is planned by our staff to show a motion picture, and it will take some few minutes to make the physical arrangements in the courtroom, so that if the Court should feel like recessing, those arrangements could be made.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell me how long the showing of the picture will take?
MR. ALDERMAN: My understanding is about an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes then, shall we now, or until the picture is ready?
[A recess was taken.]
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, Sir, supplementing what Mr. Alderman has said, we have had to readjust our presentation to some extent. Tomorrow morning, a witness will be offered for interrogation. Then Mr. Alderman on Monday; and Sir Hartley Shawcross will make the opening statement for the British Empire on Tuesday morning.
The film this afternoon, at the request of defendants' counsel, made in writing to the Court, has been exhibited to defendants' counsel on day before yesterday evening in this courtroom. I personally requested Dr. Dix to convey the invitation to Defense Counsel to witness the film. Eight of them came. Dr. Dix advised me kindly that he would not come unless he was forced to come.
I now present Mr. Dodd, who will have charge of the presentation.
MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, the Prosecution for the United States will at this time present to the Tribunal, with its permission, a documentary film on concentration camps. This is by no means the entire proof which the prosecution will offer with respect to the subject of concentration camps, but this film which we offer represents in a brief and unforgettable form an explanation of what the words "concentration camp" imply.
This subject arises appropriately in the narrative of events leading up to the actual outbreak of aggressive war, which, as Mr. Alderman's presentation shows, was planned and prepared by the Nazi conspirators. We propose to show that concentration
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camps were not an end in themselves but rather they were an integral part of the Nazi system of government. As we shall show, the black-shirted guards of the SS and the Gestapo stood ranged behind the official pages of the Reichsgesetzblatt.
We intend to prove that each and every one of these defendants knew of the existence of these concentration camps; that fear and terror and nameless horror of the concentration camps were instruments by which the defendants retained power and suppressed opposition of their policies, including, of course, their plans for aggressive war. By this means they enforced the controls imposed upon the German people, as required to execute these plans, and obliterated freedom in Germany and in the countries invaded and occupied by the armies of the Third Reich.
Finally, we ask the Tribunal in viewing this film to bear in mind the fact that the proof to be offered at a later stage of this Trial will show that on some of the organizations charged in this Indictment lies the responsibility for the origination, the control, and the maintenance of the whole concentration camp system: Upon the SS, the SD-a part of the SS which tracked down the victims-upon the Gestapo, which committed the victims to the camps, and upon other branches of the SS which were in charge of the atrocities committed therein.
Commander James Donovan will introduce the film with a statement explaining its source and its authenticity.
COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN, USNR. (Prosecution Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, I refer to Document Number 2430-PS, concerning the motion picture entitled "Nazi Concentration Camps" and to the affidavits of Commander James B. Donovan, Lieutenant Colonel George C. Stevens, Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg and Colonel Erik Tiebold contained therein. The affidavits of Colonel Stevens and of Lieutenant Kellogg are also contained in the motion picture, and thus will be in the record of the Tribunal. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall now, however, read into the record those affidavits not appearing in the film.
THE PRESIDENT: In the absence of any objection by the Defense Counsel, we don't think it is necessary to read these formal affidavits.
COMMANDER DONOVAN: Yes, Sir. The United States now offers in evidence an official documentary motion picture report on Nazi concentration camps. This report has been compiled from motion pictures taken by Allied military photographers as the Allied armies in the West liberated the areas in which these camps were
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located. The accompanying narration is taken directly from the reports of the military photographers who filmed the camps.
While these motion pictures speak for themselves in evidencing life and death in Nazi concentration camps, proper authentication of films is contained in the affidavits of the United States Army and Navy officers to which I have referred.
As has been stated, this motion picture has been made available to all defense counsel and they possess copies in their Information Room of the supporting affidavits duly translated.
If the Tribunal please, we shall proceed with the projection of the film, Document 2430-PS, Exhibit USA-79.
[Photographs were then projected on the screen showing the following affidavits while at the same time the voices of the respective affidavits were reproduced reading them.] "I, George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United States, hereby certify:
"1. From 1 March 1945 to 8 May 1945 I was on active duty with the United States Army Signal Corps attached to the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and among my official duties was direction of the photographing of the Nazi concentration camps and prison camps as liberated by Allied Forces.
"2. The motion pictures which will be shown following this affidavit were taken by official Allied photographic teams in the course of their military duties, each team being composed of military personnel under the direction of a commissioned officer.
"3. To the best of my knowledge and belief, these motion pictures constitute a true representation of the individuals and scenes photographed. They have not been altered in any respect since the exposures were made. The accompanying narration is a true statement of the facts and circumstances under which these pictures were made.
"(Signed) George C. Stevens, Lieutenant Colonel, AUS. "Sworn to before me this 2nd day of October 1945.
"(Signed) James B. Donovan, Commander, United States Naval Reserve."
"I, E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy, hereby certify that:
"1. From 1929 to 1941 I was employed at the Twentieth Century Fox Studios in Hollywood, California, as a director of film effects, and am familiar with all photographic techniques. Since 6 September 1941 to the present date of 27 August 1945, I have been on active duty with the United States Navy.
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"2. I have carefully examined the motion picture film to be shown following this affidavit and I certify that the images of these excerpts from the original negative have not been retouched, distorted or otherwise altered in any respect and are true copies of the originals held in the vaults of the United States Army Signal Corps. These excerpts comprise 6,000 feet of film selected from 80,000 feet, all of which I have reviewed and all of which is similar in character to these excerpts.
"(Signed) E. R. Kellogg, Lieutenant, United States Navy. "Sworn to before me this 27 day of August 1945.
"(Signed) John Ford, Captain, United States Navy."
[The film was then shown.]
COL. STOREY: That concludes the presentation.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 30 November 1945 at 7000 hours.]
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