Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Document No. 2220-PS

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THE REICH Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery RK.318D g III
Berlin W8, April 17th, 1943.
Vosstrasse 6, at present: FIELD-quarters.
Mail must exclusively be directed to Berlin address.

To the reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police. Herr Himmler

Ref: The situation in the Government General.

Dear Mr. Reichleader,

We had agreed at our conference on March 27th of this year that written texts should be worked out about the situation in the Government General, on which our intended, mutual report to the Fuehrer, could be based.

The material gathered for this purpose by Lieutenant General Krueger was submitted to you immediately. Based on this material, I have a sketch prepared, which sums up the most important points of this material, sub-divides them in a way quickly to grasp, and finally points out the kind of measurements to be taken.

The memorandum was checked, together with SS lieutenant General Krueger who agrees with it in full. Part of it I herewith submit to you.

(signed) Dr. Lammers.

Copy to RK. 318 D g III. F.Q. April 12th, 1943


Ref: The situation in the Government General.

A. The task of the German Administration in the Government General. The German Administration in the Government General has to fulfill the following tasks:

1. For the purpose of securing food for the German people, to increase agricultural production and utilize it to the fullest extent, to allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work essential for the war effort and to deliver the rest to the armed forces and the homeland.

2. To employ the manpower of the native population in the Government General itself only for war important purposes, and to put at the homeland's disposal such manpower which is not needed for the purpose mentioned above.

3. To consolidate German folk-dom in the Government General and by means of inland settlement in particular to create a stronghold of German folk-dom in the eastern border districts, also by means of colonization with racial Germans, transferred from other places, thus safeguarding these very border districts.

4. To safeguard the government general as a transit zone for replacements and supplies to the East front.

5. To obtain troops as far as possible from the native population for the fight against Bolshevism.

B. Wrong ways chosen for the fulfillment of these tasks. The German Administration in the Government General has failed by a wide margin in achieving the tasks listed under A. Although, in the year of 1942, one succeeded in meeting the delivery quota of agrarian products for the armed forces and the homeland at a relatively high percentage, namely over 90% and also met the demands of the homeland concerning the conscription of labor in general, one has to consider two things on the other hand: First, these accomplishments in the year of 1942 were achieved for the first time, prior, f. i. only 40,000 German tons [Translator's remark: 2206 lbs. Avoir P. makes a ton] bread grain had been delivered to the Armed Forces. Secondly, and above all, one had failed to create for the bringing about of such achievements the necessary organizational, economic, and political basis, which is absolutely required, if such achievements shall not strongly affect the entire situation, may eventually cause chaotic conditions in the future. This failure of the German administration can for one thing be explained by the system of the German administrative and governmental activity in the Governments General, personally represented by the governor general, and secondly, by the wrong basic principles of policy in all those questions, which were decisive for conditions in the government General.

II. The failure in basic principles of policy.

1. The realization of the task, listed in A 1, necessitates in the first place a strict and clear-cut structure of economics, as well as a disciplined and clear-cut official economic policy, accompanied by an elimination as totally as possible of clandestine trading and black markets. This stipulates above all the fullest utilization of the harvest and its public management, the stopping of all trade enterprises, which are not essential to the war and the care to be taken for a clear-cut management in war essential enterprises.

The German administration was in no respect capable of living up to these requirements. In the matter of raising food it took a request of a delivery contingent for the Reich and the Armed Forces amounting to 750,000 metric tons of bread grain in the summer of 1942, in order to have the attempt made, of drawing up an inventory of food products. For this purpose a census was taken. The result however turned out to be unreliable. The utilization of the harvest [Ernte-erfassung] did not even permit the full delivery of the contingent for the Reich and the Armed Forces (instead of 750,000 metric tons only 690,000 tons) let alone the ample feeding of the native population working for German interests. While 1.4 million metric tons were demanded, only 1.2 million metric tons of bread grain could be taken hold of, of which 690,000 m.t. were delivered to the Reich and the Armed Forces, so that for roughly 16 million natives only 510,000 m.t. were left. Accordingly, the weekly bread rations for the normal consumer had to be cut down to only 1050 g, compared with 1675 g in the Protectorate and 2600 g in the annexed Eastern territories. To make supplies available for the native population, black markets and clandestine trading were tolerated to the greatest extent, resulting in prices entirely unattainable for the population, working for German interests. A married Polish official, without children, with High School education f.i. has a net income of 234.27 Zloty per month. Compared with this, the prices in the clandestine trade are;

1 kg. rye bread ................ 11.00 Zloty
1 kg. potatoes ................. 2.40 Zloty
1 kg. pork ..................... 80.00 Zloty
1 kg. bacon .................... 160.00 Zloty
1 kg. butter ................... 170.00 Zloty

Under such conditions the foreign worker remains at his place of work for about 4 to 5 days per week only in order to purchase the missing provisions for himself and his family on the remaining other days. Daily ransackings, robberies, murders and other crimes are further consequences of these conditions.

The farmer received, as an incitement for delivery of his agrar products, premium certificates for the obtaining of commodities (articles needed for farming, household necessities, salt, cigarettes, brandy, etc.). These commodities very often could not be had, however, despite the fact that they were obtainable in any desired quantity in the clandestine trade, but at exorbitant prices.

(1 bricklayer's brush = 1 cow
1 dz. (Drusch) coal = 30.00 Zloty
1 pair of boots = 1500.00 Zloty
1 horse shoe nail = 3.00 Zloty
1 pair of wooden slippers = 2 calves
1 dress = 1 cow)

The consequences of this situation naturally leads to a severe curbing of the farmer's willingness to produce. Instead of reducing prices in the trade section by means of taking the necessary measures in regard to the management, a decree of the Governor General recommended, to adjust the prices of agrar-products to the prices of commodities, which were as much as 300 to 4000% higher.

The trade economics are entirely built up according to capitalistic viewpoints, with the aim of earning quickly and much and any planned leadership, which might take war requirements into consideration, is lacking. There is a lack of state supervision and of guidance in the line of production and in the line of trade. The German individual business man as a "trustee" on his own, of enterprises personally directed by him, is given a free hand to do what he wants, in the unrestricted play of forces. These trustees very often make use of former Polish and Jewish owners of enterprises as agents empowered to sign in their names. These trustees make tremendous profits in clandestine trading, tolerated by the Government, and make them within the shortest time, Prohibition of production and control of individual management, as requested by the Armament Inspection (Lt. Gen. Schindler), were not carried out. Part of the trade production is directed only at putting at the disposal of the native population objects for the trade-in of food; metals, materials for spinning, leather, etc., are thus being drained off from the war economy.

2. The Utilization of Manpower. The most important presupposition for a proper and relatively frictionless regulation to utilize manpower taken from the native population within the Government General itself, as well as within the Reich, are normal conditions in the sphere of economics. Lack of this coordination influences the steering of labor employments unfavorably in many respects. If it would be possible to provide the population, working in the interest of Germany, with the minimum of food needed, and everyday objects, and to render impossible the access to other items by way of black market channels and clandestine trade, then the reserves of manpower at hand would volunteer for employment as planned, of their own volition. This would mean a basis for a sensible shaping of agrarian property-units. It is necessary in this respect that parts of the population thus available may then be employed in such work which will guarantee them a satisfactory standard of living. After failing to have created the necessary supposition for a well-planned and well-steered employment of manpower, the utilization of manpower is confronted with the greatest difficulties. It is clear that these difficulties have been increased by the elimination of Jewish manpower. But it is incorrect to consider this elimination as the cause of difficulties. If the necessary basis for proper management of manpower had been given, the elimination of Jewish manpower would not have caused any difficulties worth mentioning. As things were, the utilization of manpower had to be enforced by means of more or less forceful methods, such as the instances when certain groups appointed by the Labor Offices, caught Church and Movie-goers here and there and transported them into the Reich. That such methods not only undermine the people's willingness to work and the people's confidence to such a degree that it cannot be checked even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought about by a strengthening of the political resistance movement.

3. The Treatment of the Native Populations. Can only be led into the right channels based on a foundation of a clear-cut and well-organized administration and management. Only such a foundation permits that the native population may be handled strictly if necessary, even severely. On the other hand, it can be dealt with in a big-hearted manner and may be granted certain liberties, especially in cultural respect, causing a certain amount of contentment. Without such a foundation, severity would only strengthen the resistance movement and meeting the native population half way would only undermine the German reputation. That this foundation is missing can be concluded from the facts mentioned above. Instead of trying to create this basis, the Governor General inaugurates a promotion of cultural life on the part of the Polish population, which knows no bounds in itself. Under prevailing circumstances however and last, but not least, in connection with our military situation last winter, this could only be explained as a weakness and thus had to bring about exactly the opposite results of the aspired aim.

Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV
Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality
Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946

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